Date and Time: Wednesday, 27 November 2024 7:42:00PM MYT

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1. ABC & Anor v JKL [2024] MLJU 2737

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 ABC & ANOR v JKL
CaseAnalysis
| [2024] MLJU 2737

ABC & Anor v JKL [2024] MLJU 2737

Malayan Law Journal Unreported

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM)

JULIE LACK J
CIVIL SUIT NO BA-22F-3-11 OF 2019
20 March 2024

Tay Kit Hoo (with Seen Rui Yong and Cassandra Lee) (Low & Partners) for the plaintiff.
Xenia Lok Zou Chieh (Ang & Xen) for the defendant.

Julie Lack J:

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1] This is the Defendant’s ‘urgent’ application dated 11 November 2023 (End 343) for interalia :
(i) visitation rights to the Child GHL;
(ii) for the Child to be brought before the Family Court on earliest date;
(iii) for the Interim Injunction granted on 9.1.2020 be revisited (dikaji semula);
(iv) and other orders.

[2] I had on 12.1.2024 dismissed the Defendant’s application with costs and given broad reasons for
my decision. This judgment contains the full reasons for my decision.
Background

[3] The background facts are taken from the affidavits and submissions of the parties.

[4] The Plaintiffs, a husband and wife adopted a baby (the Child) pursuant to the Adoption Act 1952
on 12.7.2016. The baby was a male born on 2.2.2016. Its biological mother had filed a Statutory
Declaration stating that she fully and voluntarily relinquished all her rights as the Child’s mother. The
baby is an illegitimate child and the whereabouts of its putative father was unknown. It has now been
established through DNA results that the Defendant is the biological father of this Child.

[5] The Defendant initially challenged the Adoption Order but subsequently withdrew his objections.
He commenced a social media offensive against the Plaintiffs accusing the Plaintiffs of ‘buying the
Child’ and ‘human traffickers’ among other things for their role in adopting the Child.

[6] As a result of this the Plaintiffs had on 11.11.2019 filed a civil suit for stalking and harassment
against the Defendant. The Plaintiffs simultaneously sought interlocutory injunctive reliefs to prevent
the Defendant from inter alia contacting or attempting to contact the Plaintiffs and/or the Child and
from assaulting, harassing and/or stalking the Plaintiffs and the Child. The inter partes application
was allowed by the learned Judge on 9.1.2019.
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[7] The Defendant had on 1.9.2021 filed a civil suit against the Child’s biological mother in the Kuala
Lumpur Family Court alleging fraud and cheating in regard to her role in the adoption process and
seeking a declaration that the adoption order granted by the Shah Alam Sessions Court is not valid if
the claims are proven not valid.

[8] The Defendant had also on the same day filed an Originating Summons in the same court seeking
orders for DNA testing be carried out on him and the Child. A DNA test was carried out as ordered and
the results proved that the Defendant is the biological father of the Child. Upon confirmation of the
results, this Court had on 4.8.2023 given a Declaratory Order to that effect, i.e. that the Defendant is
the biological father of the Child.

[9] Meanwhile the Plaintiffs through their solicitors proposed mediation and letters were exchanged
with proposals offered by the contending parties. The mediation failed as parties failed to reach an
agreement. Continued trial dates have since been fixed.

[10] The Defendant then filed this application as he states that he has not seen the Child since the
Child was a few days old.
The Defendant’s grounds for supporting the Application

[11] The Defendant has contended that he is the natural father of the Child and hence reasonable
access and visitation ought to be given to the Defendant.

[12] The Defendant has contended that he had never relinquished his rights as a father to the Child.
He stated that the adoption proceedings were undertaken and concluded in the Shah Alam Sessions
Court without his knowledge nor consent as the natural father. He had never agreed to give up his
son for adoption.

[13] He argued that it is the basic right of the Child to have the connection, knowledge, love and care
of his natural father and the Child has been deprived and denied of this right since he was a few days
old before the natural mother whisked him away from the presence of the Defendant. It would be a
gross violation of the child’s basic and fundamental human rights if the Defendant’s application to
see and have access to his son is rejected and dismissed by the Court.

[14] Apart from that the Defendant has contended that the interim injunctive reliefs sought in
November 2019 and granted by the learned judge in January 2020 is now rendered obsolete with the
results of the DNA test coupled with the Court’s declaration that he is the biological father of the
Child. He contended that there has been a change in circumstances with the declaration granted and
therefore the interim injunction order should be re-visited, reviewed and varied by this same Court
which is in possession of all the crucial evidence now.

[15] He further contended that the interim injunction orders are in effect and essence restraining the
Child and his basic rights under the guise of an Order imposed on adults i.e. the Defendant.

[16] The Defendant relied on a remark allegedly made by the learned Federal Court Judge at the
hearing of his appeal arising out of the DNA testing that the matter concerned the Child’s rights and
the Defendant had been precluded from the adoption proceeding but the Plaintiffs wanted to prevent
the Child from seeing him and knowing him.

[17] He urged the Court to order the Child to be brought to the Family Court in the presence of all
parties so that his current situation and wellbeing can be assessed and his identity ascertained. The
Defendant stated that he had never been given the chance to see the child, not even through
photographs noting that the actions of the Plaintiffs were inhumane, unjust and unfair and not in line
with natural justice and equity.

[18] He asserted that the sworn evidence given by the Plaintiffs’ in the course of this application has
revealed that the Child has not been living a normal, healthy ordinary life like other children of his
age. It was contended that the Child was obviously living a suffocating and suppressed daily life
unnecessarily caused by the Plaintiffs when he could have had and enjoyed the love and affection
from his natural father.

[19] Based on the aforesaid reasons the Defendant argued that it was not in the welfare of the Child
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or his best interest to be raised in2737
deception, lies, irrational fears and over-protectiveness of adults
surrounding him. Hence for all the aforesaid reasons the Defendant prayed for his application to be
allowed with costs.
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[20] The Defendant referred to a number of laws and statutes to justify his reasons for the
application to be allowed. The Defendant started with Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.

[21] For ease of reference I shall produce Articles 7, 8 and 9 thereof below here:

Article 7(1)

The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

Article 8(1)

Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family
relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.

Article 9(1)

Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will except when
competent authorities subject to judicial review determine...,that such separation is necessary for the best interests of
the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse and neglect of the
child.

[22] The Defendant made reference to the decision of the then learned High Court Judge, Justice
Komathy Suppiah (now JCA) on her Ladyship’s decision in allowing the DNA application. The learned
Judge in allowing the application had stated :

“It is possible that as the Child develops emotionally and cognitively he may have a different reaction to the
adoption and may have some difficulty coming to terms why his adoptive parents have kept him away from
his birth father. Conversely, the Child may also struggle with the fact a the was rejected by his biological
parents”.

[23] In the same judgment the learned Judge had referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal
which cited with approval the following passage in the judgment of Ravindra Bhat J in Rohit Shekhar:

“23. The right of the child to know of her (or his) biological antecedents is now recognized internationally as being of critical
importance, Major international instruments such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights have recognize the rights of a
child irrespective of her (or his) legitimacy and the Convention on the Rights, 1990 has expressly specified a right to
knowledge of parenthood”.

24. The Convention therefore, specifically requires that as far as possible, the State must enable the child to know of his
true paternity…”

25 These developments all over the world indicate that there is a very tenable argument in the child’s interests that support
its right to know the truth of its origin…”

[24] On the issue of the validity of interim injunctions, the Defendant referred to section 5(1) of the
Specific Relief Act 1950 which states as follows :

‘Temporary injunctions are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the court”

[25] In Order 29 rule 7 it is stated:

‘Where an application is made under any of the provisions of this Order, the Court may give directions as to the further
proceedings in the cause or matter”

[26] Counsel for the Defendant led my attention to the case of WRPAsia Pacific Sdn Bhd & Anor v
Tael Tijari Partners Ltd & Ors [2019] MUU 1244 where the learned Judge held as follows :
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“[1] This Judgement deals with an application to vary or set aside an injunction order...

[2] The application is made principally on the ground that there was a suppression of material facts leading to the granting
of the injunction order and a substantial change in the circumstances.”

[27] The court made reference to the Malaysian case of Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd v Mirza
Marine Sdn Bhd and the Singapore case of AAR & Another v AAS [2009] SGHC 139 and concluded as
follows ;

“[89] Based on the above meaning of the word “interim”...Such relief should only have interim effect and may be subject to
the following circumstances: (i) the court has the subsequent power to vary and/or discharge the interim relief in question.

[90] A variation of an injunction may be granted if there has been a material change of circumstances since the injunction
as first granted.

[128] The above is yet another reason why the Injunction Orders ought to be discharged.

[129] Accordingly, I allowed the Defendant’s application under Enclosure 147 with costs fixed at RM10,000 to be paid by
the 2nd Plaintiff.”

[28] In the circumstances the Defendant concluded with calling onto the Court to revisit, review, vary
or even discharge the interim injunction that was granted since 2019 against the Defendant.
The Plaintiffs’ Response

[29] On the point of the reasons for filing the Notice of Application itself, learned counsel for the
Plaintiffs submitted that the reliefs sought therein i.e. asking for the interim injunction to “dikaji
semula” as set out in Paragraph (e) of the application was vague and ambiguous. It was made more
acute as the Defendant did not specify any source of power for this Court to grant htm the reliefs
sought therein.

[30] In relation to the above contentions, the Plaintiffs argued that the Court was res judicate to deal
with the matter bearing in mind that the Defendant wanted the interim injunction to be reviewed (it
being the closest meaning to “di’kaji semula”).

[31] The Plaintiffs contended that a court of concurrent jurisdiction cannot set aside a final order
regularly obtained unless it can be proven to be null and void on the ground of illegality or lack of
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs relied on the Federal Court case of Badiaddin Mohd Man id in & Anor v Arab
Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75 for that proposition.

[32] It was noted that the Defendant has not averred that he fell within any of the special exceptions
of the above case to support his application.

[33] In an unrelated stand the Plaintiffs contended that the interim injunction stood unassailed as it
was grounded by sound judgment. Reliance was placed on the reasons for the decision of the learned
judge who heard the interim injunction application itself. In that judgement the learned judge made
the following findings :

“[25] In the present case, I find as follows:

(i) The defendant has failed to mount any kind of legal challenge till to date on the court adoption order from the
Shah Alam Sessions Court.
(ii) There are probative materials at this juncture (unless successfully proven otherwise) of the defendant’s
defamatory campaign of fear and harassment against the plaintiffs.
(iii) There are materials to consider whether the defendant had put the plaintiffs in fear of the child (“GHI”) being
abducted, public humiliation and contempt which in the normal circumstance can cause tremendous emotional
distress on the parents of the said child.
(iv) It is not denied that the defendant had unlawfully since 2016 used various social media platforms to publicly
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accuse the plaintiffs amongst2737
other things, of “buying” the child, as being “human traffickers”, “child abusers”and
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committing “genocide” by adopting the child. There can be no doubt In my mind that there is a complaint in the
form of the plaintiffs’ police report (exh. TKK-INJ-14 - (end 5), the offensive and threatening social media upload
available in the defendant’s account (exh TTK-INJ-11) - (end 5) and the defendant’s emails to the plaintiffs,
defendant’s adverse chat with various people In his social media account, police report lodged by the NGO,
OrphanCare of which all of the above constitute an integral part of the instant proceedings.
(v) The materials presented to the court by the plaintiffs in totality at this juncture clearly support the granting of the
interim injunction to protect the said child from direct and/or indirect third party interference (putative father) who
has no right to do so as dictated by law. The court must intervene if the harm to the child can be classified as a
real and immediate danger to their physical well-being from anyone including their parents (see Tan Chong Pay v
Tan Swee Boon [1997] 4 CLH 625).

(vi) The tortious claims against the defendant are not to be determined at this juncture but only at the final
determination of the trial (see Chong Sui Jin & Orss v Jeramas Sdn Bhd & Anor & Another Case [2012] 1 LNS
896. In an application for interlocutory injunction, the court needs to find bona fide serious issues to be tried and
must refrain from making a determination of the issues (see Tien ik Sdn Bhd & Ors (supra) and American
Cynamid (supra)).
(vii) it is in my considered view after appraising all evidence and arguments placed before this court, that the
defendant will not be prejudiced by the granting of this interim injunction pending the final determination of this suit
by the plaintiffs, I am in agreement with the plaintiffs’ arguments that anchored on the prevailing materials
presented, if this interim injunction is not granted there is a real and significant risk to the safety of the life of the
said child and his adoptive parents form third party interference by the putative father in total disregard to the
Court Adoption Order granted by a court of competent jurisdiction to the plaintiffs. The welfare and the best
interest of the child is the paramount consideration in exercising this discretion. Damages would be an adequate
remedy to compensate the defendant if it is determined later that the interim injunction had been wrongly granted,
but the psychological trauma that will be visited on the said infant child if such restrain is not granted cannot be
compensated by cost/damages.”

(see ABC & Anor v JKL [2020] 7 CLJ 190).

[34] That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal hence the interim injunction ought not to be
disturbed or reviewed.

[35] The Plaintiffs drew the Court’s attention to Exhibit ABC-INJ-13 and Paragraph 51 of Enclosure 14
which was part of the reason the interim injunction was granted by the learned Judge. Paragraph 51
is reproduced below:

“51. In a Facebook conversation between the Defendant and one Ms AB, the Defendant actually admitted that if he ever
found my son, he would abduct my son and leave the country. Screenshots of this conversation was forwarded to me by
Ms S from OrphanCare and are annexed and marked as Exhibit ‘ABC-INJ-13’ at pages 1 and 3.”

[36] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs urged this court to take into account the concerns of the
Learned Judge hearing the application for the injunctive reliefs in taking into serious consideration
the actions of the Defendant against the Plaintiffs and the Child and not so much as to whether the
Defendant was the biological father of the Child or not.
Decision of the Court

[37] It is observed that the present application by the Defendant seeks to review (‘kaji semula’) the
interim injunction order granted on 9.1.2020. The central issue revolves on the Defendant’s assertion
that he has been declared via an Order of Court dated 4.8.2023 as the biological father of the Child.
He claims that this is a material change in the circumstances which justifies his application to
review/vary the injunctive reliefs granted by the Court.

[38] It is trite that Courts have the power to vary or discharge an interim injunction granted when the
main basis for seeking the discharge is due to a material change of circumstances since the
injunction was granted (see WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd supra). Hence when appropriate interlocutory
injunctions may be dissolved or varied at any time. The learned Judge quoted from a book written by
N.R Burns: ‘INJUNCTIONS: A Practical Handbook’ (The Law Book Company Limited (1988) for the legal
principles on variation or discharge of an injunction at page 49 where it was stated as follows ;

“In Mullen v Howell (1879) 11 Ch. D at 766 Sir George Jessel M.R said: the court has jurisdiction over its own orders,
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there is a larger discretion as to orders made on interlocutory applications than as to those which are final judgments.”
When appropriate, interlocutory injunctions may be dissolved or varied at any time. This will be done, for example, when
changed circumstances made the relief as granted inappropriate, or when the original order is found to have been based
upon a fundamental mistake. An application for discharge may be granted if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the claim to final
hearing with due diligence, in the case of an undertaking given to the court the appropriate course has been held to be a
withdrawal of the initial undertaking and the substitution of another rather than an application to vary.”

[39] The question now to be determined is whether the Defendant has shown that there has been a
material change of circumstances to warrant a review of the injunction order granted. At the same
time, it must be realized that the change in question must be material and not any change. The
change must be material enough such that to allow the status quo to remain would not be justified.

[40] It is an established principle that the Defendant carried the evidential burden of satisfying this
Court on a balance of probabilities that there has been a material change in circumstances.

[41] In the present case the Defendant has asserted that it is his basic and fundamental right to have
reasonable access and visitation rights.

[42] From the affidavits filed it is a fact established that the Child was born illegitimate and remained
so when he was put up for adoption by his biological mother.

[43] The pertinent question for this Court’s consideration is what are the rights of a biological father
to his illegitimate child. It has been understood under English common law the putative father has no
legal rights over an illegitimate child and only the natural mother has such legal rights over an
illegitimate child (see Lai Meng v Toh Chew Lian [2012] 10 CLJ479).

[44] That is no longer the law in this country. In Sean O’Casey Patterson v Chan Hoong Poh & Ors [2011] 3
CLJ 722 the Federal Court put to rest that issue and affirmatively held that the Guardianship of
Infants Act 1962 applies to illegitimate children :

“[37]... that we have in Malaysia our own GIA which contains s. 1(3)(a). And this provision specifically expresses ‘in the
case of an illegitimate child’. We are of the view that there is no requirement for us to look further than this provision
especially to s. 5 of GIA, like what was done in Law Pak Houng v Tan Kok Keong (supra) to decide whether the GIA
includes or exclude an illegitimate child, We conclude that the wordings of s. 1(3)(a) of the GIA is sufficient to imply that
this Act applies to an illegitimate child. The matter is now settled.”

[45] However, the difficulty in the present case is the fact that the Child has been legally adopted by
the Plaintiffs. At this juncture it is crucial for this Court to emphasize the point that the Child in this
present application had been adopted by the Plaintiffs before they knew of the existence of the
Defendant as the biological father.

[46] My attention was again drawn to the Sean O’Casey case which curiously enough also involved an
illegitimate child. The Federal Court was asked to consider a number of questions of law put by the
parties for deliberation. One important question the Federal Court deliberated on was the position of
the biological father of an illegitimate child, in particular whether the consent of the biological father
of that illegitimate child must be obtained before an adoption order can be allowed.

[47] James Foong FCJ put the matter to rest once as follows :

“[38] Possessing such right and authority equivalent to that of the 1 st Defendant over J is one thing but whether the consent
of the plaintiff was required for the purpose of the registration of this adoption is another. At the time when the 2 nd and 3rd
Defendants made their application to register the adoption of J, the plaintiff was not known to be the biological father of J.
J’s father was listed in J’s birth certificate as Bart. It was only after the adoption was made and subsequent DNA test
conducted that the plaintiff was confirmed as the biological father of J. If the plaintiff was not known or confirmed to be the
father of J when the application for the registration of the adoption was made, then his consent was irrelevant. (Emphasis
added)

[48] The facts of the Sean O’Casey Patterson case are almost akin to the instant case that is to say
the Child is illegitimate and the father was not informed of the child being adopted by another family.
His consent had not been
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sought and more importantly the fact that the application for adoption was made when the father of
the child was not known. In this situation I am bound by the decision of the Federal Court on this
issue.

[49] It is necessary to bear in mind that the Child has been legally adopted by the Plaintiffs. With that
and in accordance with the decision of the Federal Court aforesaid, the Defendant’s right as the
biological father no longer exists. I respectfully hold that when an adoption order is granted it
effectively extinguishes all rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the parent, guardian of the
adopted child, in relation to the future custody, maintenance and education of the child, including all
rights to appoint a guardian or to consent or give notice of dissent to marriage. All such rights shall
vest in and be exercisable by and enforceable against the party who adopted the child.

[50] This is made clear in Section 9 of the Adoption Act, 1952. The section reads as follows :

“Effect of adoption order

9.(1) Upon an adoption order being made, all rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the parent guardian of the adopted
child, in relation to the future custody, maintenance and education of the adopted child, including all rights to appoint a
guardian or to consent or give notice of dissent to marriage shall be extinguished, and all such rights, duties, obligations
and liabilities shall vest in and be exercisable by and enforceable against the adopter as thought he adopted child was a
child bom to the adopter in lawful wedlock,”

[51] Under the circumstances and pursuant to section 9 of the Adoption Act 1952, the Defendant though
he may be the biological father has had all his rights, duties, obligations and liabilities in relation to
the Child extinguished. All those rights are now vested in and exercisable by and enforceable against
the Plaintiffs. It shall take effect on the Plaintiffs as though the Child was a child born to the Plaintiffs
in lawful wedlock.

[52] This position of the law was reaffirmed in the Sean Q’Casey case where his Lordship James Foong
FJ observed :

We agree with this statement Though both Act 253 and Act 257 deal with adoption of a child, the effect of an adoption
under Act 253 is limited. Unlike Act 257, “all rights, duties, obligations and liabilities of the parent guardian of the adopted
child, in relation to future custody, maintenance and education of the adopted child, including all rights to appoint a guardian
or consent or give notice of dissent to marriage shall be extinguished, and all such rights, duties, obligations and liabilities
shall vest in and be exercisable by and enforceable against the adopter as though the adopted child was born to the
adopter in lawful wedlock” is not provided under Act 253. Act 253 only caters for the registration of a de facto adoption and
as such it only confers upon the adopter parent or parents a custodian right with responsibilities to care, maintain and
educate the adopted child. Other than these, it confers none of those rights exercisable and enforceable against the
adopter as though the adopted child was a child born to the adopter in lawful wedlock as spelled out in Act 257.”

[53] In this case the Plaintiffs adopted the Child under Act 257.

[54] Up until todate the Adoption Order remains valid. It was registered after due process in
accordance with the
law. The Adoption Order has not been set aside. It therefore remains good in law and valid.

[55] It is noted that the Defendant has admitted to professing the religion of Islam. Section 1(3) of the
GIA 1962 clearly states that Act 257 does not apply to persons professing the religion of Islam. The
pertinent portion of the section is reproduced below for ease of reference :

“Nothing in this Act shall apply in any State to persons professing the religion of Islam until this Act has been adopted by a
law made by the Legislature of that State; and any such law may provide that...”

[56] Reverting to the issue at hand, I hold that the Defendant’s rights as the biological father has
been extinguished by the Adoption Order and therefore he has failed to show any material change of
circumstances that would warrant this Court to intervene and vary and/or review the injunctive
orders granted on 9.1.2020.

[57] I am therefore of the opinion that the Defendant’s status as the biological father of the Child is
not a factor to be treated as a special circumstances to justify this Court to review or to discharge the
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interim injunction. 2737

[58] If I am found to be wrong in my construction of the law and the abovementioned passages of
Sean O’Casey’s
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case I nevertheless am of the view that the interim injunction ought not to be disturbed now at this
stage of the court’s proceedings. At the time of writing this judgement, the case is part heard. Trial
commenced in 2021 and the first witness for the Plaintiffs has not concluded cross-examination. The
trial was halted due to a myriad of reasons. Until todate the trial has not yet continued.

[59] When the previous learned Judge granted the interim reliefs she had at the forefront of her mind
been satisfied with the following :
(i) the totality of the facts presented before her disclosed bona fide serious issues to be tried;
(ii) she had considered the justice of the case and after taking into account all relevant matters
including the practical realities of the case before her had concluded that the justice of the
case lay upon granting the interim injunction;
(iii) she had known in the forefront of her mind that the remedy that she was asked to administer
is discretionary, intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of the
application and the trial proper and she intended for it to maintain the status quo.

[60] The Defendant has not overcome the concerns raised by the Learned Judge in paragraphs 59
above in particular the findings made as per (i), (ii) and (iii) thereof. In her grounds of judgement, the
Learned Judge had serious concerns with the actions and conduct of the Defendant after she was
referred to Exh ABC-INJ-13 and Paragraph 51 of End 14. In a Facebook conversation with a friend the
Defendant had admitted that if he found his son, he would ‘abduct my son and leave the country.’ I am of
the view if access were to be allowed there is no guarantee that the Defendant would not carry out
his intentions.

[61] Having read the grounds of the Learned Judge, I find it reasonable to draw the conclusion that
the Learned Judge was not so much concerned as to whether the Defendant was the biological father
of the Child but rather with the safety of the Child and the threat to the Plaintiffs. There was an
element of a “real and significant risk to the safety of the Child and his adoptive parents from third party
interference by the putative father in total disregard to the Court Adoption Order granted by a court of competent
jurisdiction to the Plaintiffs” (para 33 above).

[62] The interim injunction is therefore necessary to ensure that the Child would not be in any danger
of being taken away from his adoptive parents.

[63] Having considered the cause papers and the submissions, I drew the following conclusions. At
the risk of repetition, I acknowledge the Defendant is the biological father of the Child. I am bound by
the Adoption Order which is stiil valid and in effect. The Defendant has until todate not succeeded in
overturning the court adoption order issued by the Shah Alam Sessions Court. Hence the Defendant’s
rights over the Child including visitation rights have been extinguished. Those rights are now vested
on the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs are the ones who have lawful custody care and control over the Child.
As hard as it is for him to accept,

the right of access is not the right of the Defendant though he may be the natural and biological
father.

[64] The Defendant has failed to provide justification that his access is in the best interest and
welfare of the Child and there are no strong enough reasons to cast aside the status quo pending the
disposal of the whole suit.
Conclusion

[65] It is entirely up to the Plaintiffs as the adoptive parents of the child whether they wish the child
to know the truth surrounding his birth and the existence of his biological parents since they have
full legal rights over the adopted child.

[66] For now, I am of the view that it is in the best interest and welfare of the Child that the
application be refused and hence the application is dismissed with no order as to costs.

End of Document