(1121) Trade2 BaldwinFreeman (2002)
(1121) Trade2 BaldwinFreeman (2002)
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, an explosive growth in demand for Covid-19-related medical supplies teamed up with
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supply disruptions to produce sudden shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), test-
ing kits, and medical devices such as respirators. At the same time, shutdowns in the US and
European economies generated startling disruptions in the availability of everyday goods ranging
from vegetables and eggs to cleaning products and toilet paper. These shocks struck at a time when
trade flows had already been stagnating for years, and a political backlash against globalization was
well under way (Antràs 2020b, Colantone et al. 2021). These shortages generated headlines that,
in turn, thrust supply disruptions to the top of policy makers’ agendas. As global supply chain
(GSC) pioneer Gary Gereffi put it, “Global supply chains have suddenly become a new buzzword
in public consciousness” (Gereffi 2020, p. 1).
The buzzword brought with it a narrative that emphasizes risks and vulnerabilities, as illus-
trated by the title of a widely read March 2020 article in The Atlantic, “The modern supply chain
is snapping: the coronavirus exposes the fragility of an economy built on outsourcing and just-in-
time inventory” (O’Leary 2020). Corresponding policy proposals took one of two routes: They
stressed making GSCs either shorter and more domestic (through reshoring activity) or more
diversified ( Javorcik 2020, Lin & Lanng 2020).
This risk narrative is new, but internationalized production is far from new. Archaeologists
found stone tools in the Levant made of volcanic rock quarried in Turkey, and long-distance trade
in tin was common during the Bronze Age (Berger et al. 2019). GSCs waxed and waned in the
intervening years, but by the 1960s, intermediate goods dominated trade, accounting for over
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two-thirds of world exports (Sturgeon & Memedović 2010, Johnson & Noguera 2012a). The im-
portance of GSCs was highlighted in early empirics (Grubel & Lloyd 1975) and theory (Batra &
Casas 1973, Woodland 1977). Their importance was underscored every decade since, with impor-
tant theory contributions starting in the 1980s (Dixit & Grossman 1982, Ethier 1982, Sanyal &
Jones 1982, Helpman 1984) and the 1990s (Francois 1990, Jones & Kierzkowski 1990, Deardorff
1998, Hummels et al. 1998, Venables 1999).
GSCs have also long been on the policy agenda. The United States and Canada, for instance,
signed the 1965 Auto Pact to underpin supply chain trade in vehicles. Europe’s Common Market,
implemented by 1968, went far beyond duty-free trade by embracing the so-called four freedoms
(goods, services, workers, and capital) with the explicit intent of internationalizing manufacturing
at the European level. At this stage, GSC narratives in the profession and policy circles were
largely positive. Manufactured exports were growing faster than manufacturing GDP, which in
turn was growing faster than total GDP; GSCs were associated with industrialization and growth
in G7 nations.
The literature and narrative changed course as the nature and impact of GSCs changed starting
around 1990 (Baldwin 2006, Taglioni & Winkler 2016). From the 1980s, information and com-
munication technology (ICT) made it feasible to unbundle manufacturing processes and offshore
some stages to low-wage nations. This intensified trade in intermediates and spurred foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), but the big change came from elsewhere. The ICT revolution enabled
firms in G7 countries to send their firm-specific know-how to low-wage nations along with the
offshored production stages to ensure quality and compatibility. This created a new high tech–
low wage combination in manufacturing that transformed the competitive landscape (Baldwin
2016). The result was the industrialization of a handful of emerging market economies at a histor-
ically unprecedented pace—far faster, for example, than that of the so-called newly industrializing
economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (Birdsall et al. 1993). The G7’s
share of world manufacturing fell from two-thirds in 1990 to less than half in 2010, with all of the
G7 share-loss offset by share-gains for a handful of rapid industrializers—China above all.
et al. 2006, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2008) as well as more recently (Koopman et al. 2010,
2014; Johnson & Noguera 2012b; Antràs & Chor 2013; Baldwin 2013; Baldwin & Venables
2013; Halpern et al. 2015; Antràs et al. 2017; Bernard & Moxnes 2018; Grossman & Helpman
2021). Further, the heightened policy importance of GSCs resulted in massive efforts on the
part of governments, international organizations, and academia to produce new databases and
measurement approaches (such as value-added trade) for many countries and sectors (Lenzen
et al. 2012; Timmer et al. 2015, 2016; OECD 2019; for an overview of data sources, see Johnson
2018, Antràs & Chor 2022).
Yet, while the academic debate gravitated toward the productivity and welfare-enhancing ben-
efits of GSCs to international firms (Amiti & Konings 2007, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2008,
Topalova & Khandelwal 2011, Halpern et al. 2015) as well as firms along the domestic supply
chain (Blalock & Veloso 2007, Merlevede & Theodorakopoulos 2021), the GSC narrative in pol-
icy circles tended toward highlighting risks rather than rewards (Bown 2021). Hints of a shift ap-
peared when Autor et al. (2013) found large and persistent adjustment costs in the United States
caused by trade with low-wage nations—with much of this being within GSCs.1 These widely
publicized findings, together with social dislocation in the United States driven by technologi-
cal changes (Autor 2015), were factors behind the sharp change in US trade policy from 2016,
especially with respect to China (Rodrik 2018).
Such phenomena have also been linked to a wave of populism in the United States and
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Europe, with several influential studies documenting that perceivable rises in trade exposure, and
the associated distributional consequences, can be tied to a political backlash against globalization
(Colantone et al. 2021, Rodrik 2021).2 More generally, Eichengreen (2018) argues that global-
ization and declining US manufacturing were important in driving the results of the 2016 US
presidential election, which broadly highlighted an anti-trade and anti-GSC rhetoric. On top of
this, a series of widely covered natural disasters in the 2010s contributed to the view that nations
were too reliant on foreign suppliers (Abe & Ye 2013).
The culmination of shocks made many realize how far interdependence had gone in many
industrial goods. Evenett & Fritz (2021) survey various policies that governments have used to re-
duce import dependence on a single nation—usually China. These include changing tariffs/border
barriers to redirect investment, providing local production subsidies, and adopting policies on FDI
such as limits on foreign ownership or outright bans. The Japanese Minister of Economy, for in-
stance, said in June 2020, “We have become dependent on China. We need to make supply chains
more robust and diverse, broadening our supply sources and increasing domestic production”
(Yasutoshi Nishimura, cited in Evenett & Fritz 2021, p. 30). The European Union embraced a
new policy of “strategic autonomy” with the French Minister of Economy explaining, “We should
develop strategic stockpiling, geographic diversification of supply and, where appropriate, increase
European production capacity, to build up our autonomy in these strategic areas” (Le Maire 2020).
Against this backdrop, the rest of the article follows a simple progression. Section 2 covers
the connections between risk and GSCs across several dimensions—risks to GSCs, risks from
1 These results were later echoed by Pierce & Schott (2016) and Amiti et al. (2019), among others.
2 Readers are referred to Autor et al. (2020), Che et al. (2020), and Blanchard et al. (2019) for the United States;
Dippel et al. (2021) and Dauth et al. (2014) for Germany; Caselli et al. (2021) for Italy; Colantone & Stanig
(2018) for the United Kingdom; and Colantone & Stanig (2019) for Western Europe.
from portfolio theory provides a convenient approach to thinking about whether policy is justified.
The section next discusses how exposure to foreign shocks is measured before showing evidence
that exposure may be higher than direct indicators imply. The final segment of Section 3 reviews
policies that can affect GSC resilience. Section 4 swings the spotlight to the issue of what the future
of GSCs might look like given the policies under discussion and the impact of digital technology
(digitech). We close with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2. GSC RISKS
Risk in a stock portfolio is easily defined, measured, and controlled since the shocks (price changes)
and impact (wealth changes) are clear. This is not the case with supply chains. GSCs vary consid-
erably by industry, country, product characteristics, position in the chain, company strategy, and
distribution channels (Cattaneo et al. 2010). This section considers the nature of risk in GSCs and
the literature that has dealt with it.
labor strikes, bankruptcy of suppliers, and industrial accidents, as well as disruptions from broader
sources such as trade and industrial policy changes and political instability. On the demand side,
firms face risks including damage to product and to company reputation, customer bankruptcy,
entry of new competitors, policies restricting market access, macroeconomic crises, and exchange
rate volatility. Transportation disruptions can be put in a separate category since they are both
very frequent and not associated exclusively with supply or demand. Moreover, transportation is
part of the service sector and thus potentially subject to different shocks than goods are. This was
the case during the pandemic, since services tend to be more labor-intensive and often involve un-
avoidable face-to-face contact. Restrictions on crew changes on container ships in Singapore, for
instance, proved massively disruptive to global shipping in 2020 (Heiland & Ulltveit-Moe 2020).
In normal times, GSC shocks tend to be geographically and/or sectorally concentrated in terms
of direct impact. The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan (Carvalho et al. 2021) and flooding in
Thailand (Haraguchi & Lall 2015) are classic examples. Barrot & Sauvagnat (2016) reinforce this
message for a wide range of natural disasters by demonstrating sizable drops in sales growth of
affected firms’ direct customers.3 More recently, the pandemic and Brexit have spawned much
broader shocks. As Gereffi (2020, p. 288) put it, “The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become
one of the most significant disruptive events in modern times.” The Business Continuity Institute
(BCI) Supply Chain Resilience Report 2021, which surveyed 173 firms in 62 countries, found
that over 25% of firms experienced 10 or more disruptions in 2020, whereas that proportion was
under 5% in 2019. Firms blamed Covid-19 for most of the rise, although Europe-based firms also
pointed to the implementation of Brexit as an important source of shocks (BCI 2021).
3 Although not as widely, the literature has also documented the international transmission of natural disaster
shocks. For example, Boehm et al. (2019) document how the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan disrupted
production of US-based affiliates of Japanese multinationals.
foreign shocks. What risks emanate from this? The literature has focused on three aspects of this
question: the costs and effects of delinking, the propagation of micro shocks into macro shocks,
and whether GSCs amplify the trade impact of macro shocks.
Eppinger et al. (2021) use a multi-sector quantitative trade model with domestic and interna-
tional supply chain linkages, in the spirit of Caliendo & Parro (2015), to simulate the impact of full
decoupling. As Antràs & Chor (2018), they allow different trade costs for intermediate inputs and
final goods, so they can shut down GSCs. They establish a counterfactual without GSCs (no trade
in intermediates) and find that national GDPs are lower by 3% to 70% compared to the baseline,
depending upon the nation in question. They look at shock transmissions with and without GSCs
by considering a China-only supply disruption that lowers Chinese GDP by 30%. With GSCs, the
shock produces heterogeneous welfare effects ranging from small positive effects in some nations
(which benefit from trade diversion) to −1% in Russia. The same shock without GSCs produces
smaller effects in most cases but magnified losses in some large nations (France, Germany, and
Japan). However, even economies that gain in the no-GSC case are worse off than they would
be in the shock-with-GSCs case. The welfare loss from shutting down GSCs outweighs the gain
from the shock-shielding effect by an order of magnitude.
Relatedly, Bonadio et al. (2020) empirically examine the international transmission of GSC
shocks due to the Covid-19 pandemic using a multi-sector model with input-output linkages.
Simulating a global lockdown as a contraction in labor supply, the authors estimate that roughly
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4 In the theoretical model, trade partner diversification tends to decrease volatility, although this depends on the
variance-covariance of shocks across partners. Whether specialization increases or decreases volatility depends
on the sector in which the country specializes and how it correlates with sector and country shocks. The overall
effect depends on the strengths of these two channels.
integration and productivity while having an ambiguous effect on income volatility. The conclu-
sion is that a blanket reduction in supply chain integration can be economically costly while not
significantly reducing economic volatility. The study goes on to look at the impact of reshoring
and finds that reshoring increases aggregate volatility by reducing source diversification. By
contrast, policies that encourage diversification of foreign suppliers lower volatility by reducing
the exposure to individual economies.
The last planetary disruption of GSCs—the so-called great trade collapse (Baldwin 2009)—
was sparked by a macroeconomic shock (the global financial crisis). The trade collapse was the
steepest in recorded history and the deepest since the Great Depression. The drop was sudden,
severe, and synchronized. Imports and exports of all WTO members plummeted simultaneously,
and trade growth turned negative in all product categories. Most remarkably, the ratio of trade-
to-GDP dropped far more than it had in previous recessions. Contemporary studies hypothesized
that GSCs played an important role in this (Bems et al. 2010, 2011); however, subsequent empirical
work concluded that the main cause was a synchronized collapse in demand for trade-intensive
durable goods (Bems et al. 2013).
Further, various studies have highlighted that GSCs helped attenuate the collapse. Antràs
(2020b) notes that due to the “sticky” nature of supply chain trade, most of the adjustment was
short-term and on the intensive margin. This story was echoed by Bricongne et al. (2012) and
Behrens et al. (2013), who showed—using detailed French and Belgian microdata, respectively—
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that intensive margin effects dominated and that firms’ involvement in GSCs played a minor role
in the collapse.5
5 Relatedly, Freund et al. (2021) provide evidence that intermediate imports in auto and electronics sectors were
significantly less affected by the Tōhoku earthquake in Japan compared to final goods imports, suggesting that
GSC links are difficult to untangle after a crisis.
narrative has focused on concrete strategies to determine a company’s “time to recovery” or “time
to survive” (Simchi-Levi et al. 2014, Simchi-Levi 2015). Further, resilience involves working
closely with the supplier and creating mutual trust (Bode et al. 2011, Dubey et al. 2017, Martins
de Sá et al. 2019). There is evidence, for instance, that supplier diversification slows recovery
from supply disruptions, whereas long-term relationships speed recovery (Alfaro & Chen 2012,
Jain et al. 2017).
the world are reevaluating the merits of GSCs in, inter alia, medical supplies and semiconductors.
The implicit assumption is that the current state of foreign input reliance is too risky, but is
this just press-release politics reacting to current events? For instance, a thoughtful report from
Bank of England economists D’Aguanno et al. (2021) cautions against interventions that are not
clearly targeted to address well-understood market failures and externalities. This begs the ques-
tion, When it comes to risk, how high is too high from a policy perspective?
Before answering this question from an economist’s perspective, we consider how business
scholars approach the age-old issue of GSC risk. Having followed the matter for decades,
Miroudot (2020b) points out that some of today’s policies are disconnected from the conclusions
of the supply chain literature.
principle, is the ability of a GSC to adapt rapidly to shocks. The most often mentioned pro-agility
factors are visibility and velocity. Making rapid decisions about a disrupted supply chain demands
extensive knowledge of the whole system and the status of its elements (visibility). Velocity
refers to the pace at which the GSC can be reconfigured; this involves intrafirm and interfirm
aspects. The last principle, SCRM, refers to a corporate culture in which it is normal to expect
people throughout the organization to develop responses to abnormal situations. The goal is
to have all components of the system prepared to contribute to the development of rapid and
effective solutions. The literature stresses leadership and innovation as important aspects of this.
In response to Covid-19 disruptions, the World Economic Forum and the consulting firm
A.T. Kearney interviewed over 400 operations and supply chain executives to develop an updated
framework for resilience building. The result is a “resiliency compass” (World Econ. Forum 2021)
that organizes eight pro-resilience strategies into demand-facing and supply-facing pillars. The
demand-side action works first with the design of individual products and a product portfolio to
foster interchangeability of inputs and production arrangements. The second and third pillars
stress increases in engagement with customers in light of possible disruptions as well as boosting
inventories and keeping cash buffers. The latter is to diversify distribution channels including
wholesalers, retailers, distributors, and direct online sales.
The supply-side actions start with making logistic systems more visible and flexible by boost-
ing control of and information on warehousing, inventory, and transportation. Here, cooperation
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with suppliers and customers is essential. Boosting the flexibility of manufacturing processes
and/or creating redundancies is the second supply-side pillar. The third is creating trusting re-
lationships with suppliers, which involves balancing diversifying sources while creating strategic
partnerships with a few. Advanced planning is the last pillar. The study points in particular to
the use of digitech and planning that span the company’s whole product portfolio, production
facilities, logistics, and suppliers.
6 We discuss below how the importance placed on risks to banking has now been integrated into regulatory
frameworks.
Private trade-off
Risk P
The wedge
Public trade-off
applicability to any particular GSC is an empirical matter, but it is easy to imagine that medical
supplies share features of the public-private wedge in food production, as might other strategic
inputs such as semiconductors. The situation depicted has the public desiring a lower level of risk
(point S in Figure 1) compared to the private sector (point P). This wedge between the public
and private evaluation of risk is a clear market failure that could justify policy interventions.
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Where does the wedge come from? The question deserves extensive theory and empirical
investigation in the GSC context. Because, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have explored
this (apart from Grossman et al. 2021), analogies with other sectors provide some intuition. In
the financial setting, the wedge stems from a divergence between investors’ and governments’
preferences. Banks do not internalize the macro costs of a banking crisis, whereas governments
do. In food production, the wedge arises because individual farmers do not take account of the
full social costs of famine, whereas governments do. In the GSC world, divergences in public-
private risk preferences can arise from a wide range of mechanisms whereby individual firms do
not internalize the full risk of their actions.
Figure 1 shows a second possible justification for policy interventions. Real-world GSCs are
massively complex. Even large, sophisticated companies do not know all their suppliers and the
suppliers of their suppliers. To drive this point home, we refer to a study by the McKinsey Global
Institute (MGI) (Lund et al. 2020). The authors of the MGI report analyzed data on the number
of publicly disclosed suppliers to 668 companies spanning a range of sectors, and they found that
companies’ first-tier suppliers make up only a small fraction of the full value chain network. For
instance, General Motors was reported to have 856 direct (tier-1) suppliers but over 18,000 tier-2
and below suppliers. With such a large network, it is easy to see how supply chain visibility can
turn to supply chain opaqueness. Whereas the MGI report focused primarily on large firms, the
lack of firms’ understanding of where they sit in their own supply chains can become exasperated
for small and medium enterprises. Specifically, smaller companies might not have the financial
or operational resources to examine their own supply chains. Even worse, purely domestic firms
might not appreciate being part of a global network at all.
This lack of information about where companies’ inputs are actually made can result in pri-
vate misjudgments as to how risky a GSC is for firms of all sizes. The situation is shown as the
actual risk-reward trade-off taking place above the perceived trade-off, which would also result
in a wedge. Given the lack of information about where things are made, one classic source of the
classic source of intervention-justifying externalities. Because GSCs are interwoven and gener-
ally not fully contained within the boundaries of a single firm, information about them has public
good features: It is costly to collect and cheap to share, and it provides value to many. With this in
mind, D’Aguanno et al. (2021) draw parallels to reforms of the global financial system, which were
underpinned by large efforts to enhance policy makers’ understanding of stress points, and they
advocate for similar reforms to enhance transparency in complex GSCs so that risks can be more
easily monitored. Among other elements, this would include efforts to enhance the timeliness and
availability of granular data on GSCs. As we shall see, even with the available data at hand, misper-
ception of actual vulnerability is pervasive. Therefore, pinning down just how exposed countries
are to disruptions abroad can help with empirical evaluations of whether GSCs are too risky.
(or I2P; Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez 2015). This is typically scaled as a share of all purchased
inputs or as a share of gross production.
The next indicator draws upon the core logic of GSCs, which tells us that the location of
production and the location of work can be very different. Using observed trade flows [called gross
trade (GT) in the GSC literature] may misrepresent the true location and overstate the magnitude
of foreign exposure. A telling example is the famous iPhone case (De Backer & Miroudot 2013),
whereby assembly mostly happens in China—so import measures point to a massive dependence
on China—but most of the value in an iPhone is added elsewhere. To capture this important
Figure 2
Types of sourcing-side global supply chain (GSC) exposure. Authors’ illustration based on data for the
United States in 2015 from the OECD TiVA Database 2018 (see https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=TIVA_2018_C1).
or domestic production.
To fix these ideas, observe that the difference between VT and GT is called double counting.
For instance, a component in a US-made auto may cross the US–Canada and US–Mexico borders
several times as it moves its way down the internationalized production line. The value of the
component is thus added several times to the GT flows while it is added only once to the VT
flows. The ratio of VT to GT is the famous value added to gross exports, or VAX, ratio ( Johnson
& Noguera 2012a) that is one of the principal indicators of a nation’s involvement in GSCs.7
Finally, some of the most widely used indicators, such as the backward participation mea-
sure [introduced by Hummels et al. (2001), computed with international input-output tables by
Koopman et al. (2010), and widely popularized by the OECD], provide yet a narrower defini-
tion. Focusing on VT that crosses a border at least twice, this indicator looks at the fraction
of a country’s imported foreign value added that is re-exported. In other words, this measure looks
at importing to export. This can be seen as the exposure of a nation’s exports to foreign ruptures
affecting value added, and it is shown as the smallest area in Figure 2. On the right-hand side of
Figure 2 we list associated values for the US economy in 2015. As is evident, the numbers decrease
drastically—by $2.3 trillion—as we move from the outermost to the innermost layer.
Two additional points are worth noting before turning to an overview of how the indicators are
calculated from the data and a summary of what they tell us about GSC risks. First, we note that
using VT data as opposed to GT data redresses two misrepresentations: the true magnitude of
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the exposure (VT instead of GT) and the true geographic location of the exposure. Because the
relevant measure of foreign exposure is not independent of the type of foreign shock to which a
nation is exposed, the indicators we focus on below deal with these separately.
Second, GSC shocks can originate from the demand as well as the supply side, so there are
sales-side versions of all the aforementioned indicators. These are based on exports rather than
imports, and they seek to capture the exposure of domestic production, or domestic work, to
foreign market sales.
When measuring exposure to foreign supply shocks, the core question is, Where are things
made? The answer comes at three levels. When a Ford rolls off the assembly line in Dearborn,
Michigan, we can say it was made in Dearborn. This is the first-level truth, but it is not the whole
truth. The second level recognizes that the Dearborn plant buys inputs from other sectors located
at home and abroad. Tracing the first-level production location of inputs gives us the second-level
answer; this provides a directly observable dependence on foreign inputs, or I2P in Figure 2. The
I2P measure is directly observable from standard trade databases, and this has many merits, but
I2P is not the whole truth either, because purchased foreign inputs also use inputs. The third-level
answer, the whole truth of foreign input reliance, takes account of the infinite sequence of all the
inputs into all the inputs. This can be found with the help of a global input-output matrix and a
single line of matrix algebra. The calculation details have been discussed at length many times, so
we provide only a sketch of the issues involved.8
The logical departure point is the well-known usage identity for production. This states that
production is used as intermediate inputs into production or as final goods that are consumed,
7 Below, we discuss different types of shocks that might affect gross production versus value added and provide
a discussion of why various indicators are more or less appropriate depending on the type of disruption.
8 Readers are referred to Miller & Blair (2009) for an overview of input-output foundations, Johnson (2018)
for a review of GSC measures, and Baldwin & Freeman (2022) for details on GT-based indicators.
of input-output coefficients that shows the inputs from each sector needed to produce a unit of
output in each sector (thus it is an n × n square matrix). In other words, AX is the intermediate
usage and F is the final usage. In this literature, X is usually called gross production to distinguish
it from net production, that is, production minus the output used up as intermediate inputs.
Because the world is a closed economy, the concepts apply equally to a world with one nation
and to a world with many nations. If there are n sectors in each of m countries, the vectors are
nm × 1, and A is nm × nm. Traditionally, subscripts are used to track the origin sector and nation
and the destination sector and nation, but these are unnecessary for our level of discussion here.
Note that X gives the first-level answer, that is, where things are made, and AX gives the
second-level answer, that is, the source of directly purchased inputs. To get the third-level an-
swer, the total foreign input reliance, we must take account of the inputs’ inputs with a line of
linear algebra. Solving the identity for X yields X = LF, where L is the Leontief inverse, namely,
L = (I − A)−1 . Importantly, this expression allows us to solve for the infinite sequence of inputs’
inputs.
To fix ideas as to what L tells us, suppose we want to identify all the production necessary to
produce one dollar of final output in the first of the n × m sectors (i.e., sector 1 in nation 1). To
this end, we set the first element of F to 1 and zero out all the others. Using X = LF, we see that
this means that the first column of L gives us a list of how much production is needed from each
sector in each nation to produce the single unit for the sector under study. A moment’s reflection
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reveals that this provides the third-level answer to all where-is-the-production-done questions; it
tells us how exposed sector 1 in nation 1 is to the production of all the sectors in the world. More
generally, each column of L lists the production necessary to produce a unit of final output of the
corresponding sectors.
3.3.1. GSC sourcing-side exposure: levels and trends in the foreign input reliance index.
Most of the discussion on risky GSCs revolves around manufactured goods, so we focus here on
exposure in the manufacturing sector. It is important to start with a bird’s eye view—namely, the
first-level answer to the where-are-things-manufactured question.
Figure 3a shows the world shares of the four biggest manufacturing producers (China, United
States, Japan, and Germany) from 2004 to 2018. China’s rise jumps out as the dominant feature;
its share tripled in 15 years and is now more than 10 percentage points above the second biggest
world manufacturer (the United States). Share gains must be matched with share losses, and the
steady decline of the other manufacturing giants’ dominance in world manufacturing is the second
most salient feature.
Figure 3b illustrates differences between the second- and third-level answers in the context of
the US auto sector’s reliance on Chinese inputs. Specifically, the observed foreign input reliance
(FIR-Observed) line shows the US auto sector’s intermediate imports from China as measured
by standard trade data (which come from the relevant elements of AX); the flows are shown as a
share of its gross production. This indicator shows that the US auto sector gradually increased
the share of its intermediate inputs purchased from China by a couple percentage points over
10 years.9 The total foreign input reliance (FIR) line takes account of all Chinese inputs that are
9 2005 and 2015 are the earliest and latest years currently available in the 2018 version of the OECD
Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables, upon which we base this analysis (see https://www.oecd.
org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
25
20
10
15 Japan
5
10
FIR-Observed
Germany
5 0
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Year Year
Figure 3
Global manufacturing shares and the difference between observed (FIR-Observed) and total (FIR) foreign
input reliance. (a) World manufacturing shares of the top four nations, 2004–2018. (b) Observed and total FIR
of the US motor vehicle sector on Chinese inputs. Panel a based on data from the World Bank World
Development Indicators (see https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators).
Panel b based on data from the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables 2018 (see https://www.
oecd.org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
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bought directly by the US auto makers as well as indirectly—i.e., that are embedded in the inputs
they buy from other US and foreign suppliers (which come from the relevant elements of L).10 For
example, General Motors buys ultrashort-range radar technology from the Canadian company
Alps Electric, so although General Motors has no direct reliance on China for this input, it does
have an indirect one, since Alps sources some of its inputs from China. Looking at Figure 3b, in
2015 the difference between the US auto sector’s FIR-Observed and FIR with China amounted to
roughly 14 percentage points.11 Looking across all US manufacturing sectors’ reliance on China,
the average difference between FIR-Observed and FIR in 2015 was 7.6 percentage points.12
Note that, in line with the schema in Figure 2, one could also map the full reliance measure on
a VT instead of a GT basis. This can be useful when considering exposures to shocks that affect
value added rather than production. For instance, if the shock is due to a labor strike that affects
only the value that is added in China, then a VT-based FIR indicator may be more appropriate. By
contrast, if the shipping of key components from China were disrupted by, say, a natural disaster,
the vulnerability would affect the whole value of the shipment, that is, the FIR that is based on
GT. The general point is that there is no perfect indicator of GSC risk; the indicator used should
be matched with the risk being evaluated (Baldwin & Freeman 2022).
10 Similarly,
Timmer et al. (2021) apply GT concepts in their computation of a supply chain fragmentation
ratio.
11 Note that, as many components cross borders multiple times, the measures involve some double counting
that could be problematic for some applications, but not for measuring total exposure to foreign production
shocks.
12 Of course, this discussion relates to the evolution of FIR but does not address the evolution of risk. When
using the FIR measure to consider overall risk, the probability of disruption in any given location should also
be considered.
CAN 29 2.2 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.8 9.9 1.7 1.3 0.6 18
DEU 3.9 0.4 0.3 2.8 4.1 3.3 6.3 1.4 0.8 0.7 35
GBR 5.6 1.2 0.2 6.3 3.5 2.2 6.7 1.2 0.8 1 25
FRA 4.9 0.6 0.3 9.1 3.2 4.1 5.7 1.1 0.6 0.7 31
ITA 3 0.4 0.3 7.7 2.2 4.9 6.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 36
CHN 3.3 0.7 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 2.9 3.8 0.5 21
JPN 3.6 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 8.9 1.7 0.4 22
USA CAN MEX DEU GBR FRA ITA CHN JPN KOR IND ROW
Figure 4
Foreign input reliance (FIR). Values shown are percentages. They indicate row nations’ reliance on inputs
from column nations for manufacturing production in 2015. Colors are indexed to share sizes, with darker
reds indicating higher FIR. Countries are denoted by ISO-3 codes; ROW stands for rest of the world.
Authors’ computations based on OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables 2018 (see https://www.
oecd.org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
Returning to the GT-based FIR measures, it turns out that the increasing reliance on China’s
industrial inputs shown in Figure 3b is true more generally. Figure 4 shows an aggregate bilateral
FIR measure for all G7 countries and other major manufacturing economies in 2015, as well as a
rest of the world (ROW) aggregate. The importing nations are listed down the rows and supplying
nations across the columns. The numbers show the share of the row nation’s total manufacturing
production that is made up of inputs from the column nation. For example, the 29 in the Canada
(CAN) row and the USA column indicates that 29% of Canadian manufacturing production was
made using inputs sourced directly and indirectly from the United States.
Importantly, these are not value-added numbers but rather gross production numbers. As men-
tioned, this shows a given sourcing country’s exposure to ruptures in origin nation production—
say, a medical lockdown of all Canadian manufacturing plants or surges in demand (e.g., increased
orders of PPE). The colors are indexed to the share sizes, with darker reds indicating more expo-
sure or reliance. Because the indicator is based on production and GT, there is double counting,
so the row sums need not equal 100.13
13 The matrix diagonal has been excluded, as we are interested here in foreign inputs. The diagonal term
would show a nation’s input reliance on itself—in terms of both direct domestic sourcing and indirect sourcing
through the re-import of previously exported inputs.
CAN –1 0.1 –0.2 –0.7 –0.2 –0.1 5.2 –1.4 0 0.2 1.7
MEX 0.7 0.2 0.4 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2 13 –1 0.7 0.7 0.5
DEU 0.6 –0.2 0.1 –0.4 –0.3 –0.1 4.2 –0.3 0.1 0.2 4.3
GBR 0.8 0.1 0 0.4 –0.6 –0.4 4.3 –0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1
FRA 1.2 0 0.1 0.9 –0.2 –0.9 3.4 –0.4 0 0.3 0.2
ITA 0.3 –0.1 0.2 0 –0.4 –0.7 4.2 –0.3 0.1 0.4 3.5
CHN –1.1 –0.1 0 –0.6 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3 –5.2 –2.7 –0.6 –7.4
KOR –1.4 –0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0 –0.1 11 –6.2 0.3 –0.2
IND 1 0.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.7 –0.2 –0.2 6.4 0 0.5 2.1
Nov 2024 06:10:05
USA CAN MEX DEU GBR FRA ITA CHN JPN KOR IND ROW
Figure 5
Change in foreign input reliance (FIR). Values shown are percentage points. They indicate row nations’
reliance on inputs from column nations for manufacturing production in 2015 compared to 2005. Red-
shaded cells indicate FIR increases; blue-shaded cells indicate FIR decreases. Countries are denoted by
ISO-3 codes; ROW stands for rest of the world. Authors’ computations based on OECD Inter-Country
Input-Output (ICIO) Tables 2018 (see https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
The regionalization of GSCs is plain. For example, what Baldwin (2008) called Factory Asia
is highlighted in the box at the bottom right, where the colors tend to be darker than in the
other cells of the matrix. Factory Europe is represented by the central box, and Factory North
America is shown in the upper-left box. The global importance of the United States and China,
but especially China, is shown by the fact that their columns are highlighted primarily in red. In
other words, the fact that the USA and China (CHN) columns are relatively dark indicates that
they are important suppliers of inputs to the manufacturing sectors of all nations. Although the
United States dominates in Factory North America far more than China does in Factory Asia, it
is remarkable that more than 5% of all countries’ gross production relies on inputs from China.
Further, note the asymmetry between the United States’ manufacturing production’s reliance on
Chinese inputs (8.9%) and China’s manufacturing production’s reliance on US inputs (3.3%).
After seeing Figure 3b, it should not come as a surprise that most of the numbers in the 2015
bilateral FIR matrix with respect to China were much larger in 2015 than they were in 2005. This
point is shown in Figure 5, which displays the percentage point difference between FIR in 2015
and 2005 for each pair of nations. Red-shaded cells indicate FIR increases, whereas blue-shaded
cells highlight FIR decreases.
The figures in the China column are all positive, with some of them in the double digits. The
figures in the United States column are small, mostly under 1 percentage point, and some are
creased substantially between 2015 and today. More generally, the charts bring out the unique role
of China in the evolution of GSCs: Every major manufacturing nation’s output is more reliant on
Chinese inputs. Note also that every element in the China row is negative. This indicates that
China reduced its reliance on imported inputs from every nation (as its rise as a manufacturing
powerhouse allowed it to source more inputs from itself ). We also see evidence of a deregionaliza-
tion of GSCs in North America and Europe due to the shift toward China as a source of industrial
inputs.
3.3.2. GSC selling-side exposure: levels and trends in the foreign market reliance index.
Firms involved in GSCs face sales-side shocks as well as sourcing-side shocks. Just as the FIR
index measures countries’ total reliance on foreign production on the sourcing side, the foreign
market reliance (FMR) index measures countries’ reliance on foreign markets on the sales side.
That is, FMR is the bilateral dependence of a row nation on sales to a particular column nation.
Because the indicator is based on sales measured by GT (instead of VT) concepts, there is also
double counting involved. The double counting overstates reliance when considering a whole-
world shock, but it is useful in capturing the full exposure when thinking about single-country
and bilateral shocks.
The FMR measure differs from FIR in that it relies upon the cost-accounting identity for pro-
duction instead of the use-accounting identity. This states that the value of gross production (i.e.,
Nov 2024 06:10:05
sales) is equal to the cost of productive factors employed plus the cost of intermediate goods used.
With matrix notation, the cost-accounting identity for every sector is X = B X + V, where V is an
n × 1 vector of value added. The B matrix (commonly known as the allocation coefficients matrix)
is analogous to the A matrix, except that it represents the inputs from each sector scaled by the
gross output of the selling (rather than the buying) sector. As such, B X represents the destina-
tion of directly sold inputs. Solving for the gross output row vector, X , we get X = V (I − B)−1 ,
where G = (I − B)−1 is the less well-known but equally important Ghosh inverse matrix, which
allows us to solve for the infinite sequence of input sales.
Figure 6 shows the numbers for the main manufacturing nations. Since trade among the main
manufacturers is dominated by intra-industry trade, it is not surprising that Figure 6, which ex-
amines countries’ bilateral FMR, resembles Figure 4. We see the regionalization of GSCs and the
dominance of China and the United States. However, the US-China asymmetry is less marked and
is reversed, given that China’s sales-side reliance on the United States is 6.7%, while that of the
United States on China’s market is only 5%. The evolution of FMR is again similar to that of FIR,
but the deregionalization is less marked (Figure 7).
Having considered sourcing-side and selling-side exposure, it is natural to combine the FIR and
FMR measures, since both are scaled by manufacturing gross output. We call this sum the total
foreign reliance (TFR) indicator. We exclude the exact figures for brevity, but a visual examination
when summing across the rows of Figures 5 and 7 reveals a net aggregate decrease in China’s TFR
of roughly 29 percentage points, in contrast with a net aggregate increase for virtually all other
countries.14
14 In line with previous explanations, note that the TFR indicator includes double counting as well as imported
inputs (from FIR) and sold inputs (from FMR) that are not re-exported.
CAN 29 1.5 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.3 9.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 8.2
MEX 27 2.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 3.2 0.6 0.6 0.3 7.2
DEU 5.9 0.7 0.8 3.4 4.3 3.8 8.6 1.4 1.8 1 35
GBR 6 0.8 0.4 4.3 2.6 1.8 4.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 23
FRA 4.6 0.6 0.5 7.4 3.4 4.4 6.7 1.2 1.2 0.8 29
CHN 6.7 0.7 1 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.6 2.3 2.5 1.3 14
KOR 8.3 0.8 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 36 3.6 2.3 26
USA CAN MEX DEU GBR FRA ITA CHN JPN KOR IND ROW
Figure 6
Foreign market reliance (FMR). Values shown are percentages. They indicate row nations’ total input sales
to column nations’ manufacturing sector in 2015. Colors are indexed to share sizes, with darker reds
indicating higher FMR. Countries are denoted by ISO-3 codes; ROW stands for rest of the world. Authors’
computations based on OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables 2018 (see https://www.oecd.
org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
CAN –15 0.3 –0.1 0 –0.1 –0.2 7.5 –0.9 –0.1 0.5 –0.2
MEX 2.3 –0.4 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 2.2 0 0.3 0.2 2.1
DEU –1.3 0 0.2 0.3 0.1 –0.7 5.8 0 0.8 0.4 5.3
FRA –0.1 0 0.1 1 –0.2 –0.8 4.8 –0.1 0.5 0.3 3.4
ITA 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.1 –0.1 3.3 0 0.5 0.4 5.7
CHN –3.3 –0.7 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –2.7 –1 0.3 –0.7
JPN –2 –0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 6.5 –0.2 0.5 3
IND –0.6 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 –0.3 0 –0.2 1.4 –0.2 –0.1 0.5
Nov 2024 06:10:05
USA CAN MEX DEU GBR FRA ITA CHN JPN KOR IND ROW
Figure 7
Change in foreign market reliance (FMR). Values shown are percentage points. They indicate row nations’
total input sales to column nations’ manufacturing sector in 2015 compared to 2005. Red-shaded cells
indicate FMR increases; blue-shaded cells indicate FMR decreases. Countries are denoted by ISO-3 codes;
ROW stands for rest of the world. Authors’ computations based on OECD Inter-Country Input-Output
(ICIO) Tables 2018 (see https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/input-outputtables.htm).
cited by the SCRM literature are varied, but some of the most frequent are: diversifying suppliers,
customers, and delivery channels; establishing redundant production capabilities; boosting flexi-
bility; stockpiling/inventory/buffer stocks; and taking better steps to gather precise, extensive, and
timely information (Kamalahmadi & Parast 2016, Martins de Sá et al. 2019).
The shortages of PPE that made headlines in 2020 stemmed primarily from unexpected and
explosive demand. As such, the problem is not the shape of the GSC, and therefore diversifying
the sources would not be a solution. The obvious answer is stockpiling. Redundant production
could also logically work, but it seems unlikely to be the most cost-effective means. Meanwhile,
the shortage of vaccines was a supply problem: It took time to ramp up production. Here, stock-
piling would be impossible, and reshoring production could well be counterproductive, given the
important scale economies involved. The policy applied in the United States and Europe was
for the government to promise to underwrite the costs of vaccine development regardless of the
outcome. Trying to reshape the vaccine supply chain would probably have slowed things down.
Second, improved information and greater supply chain transparency is probably a no-regrets
policy. It seems clear that extreme weather events and geopolitical tensions will frequently create
demand, supply, and transportation shocks (BCI 2021). Having an overview of the whole sup-
ply chain can allow faster and more efficient adjustments. Additionally, climate and social poli-
cies are likely to require such information. For example, calculating carbon border tax measures
via taxes and subsidies, or regulation, seems implausible given the vast cost involved. Direct public
ownership of the production facilities (i.e., the military) is the standard solution.
Fourth, as we saw in 2020, macro-level policies can act as circuit breakers that prevent sup-
ply, demand, and transport shocks from snowballing. Resilience at the macro level can also be
important for resilience at the micro level. For instance, the massive fiscal interventions in 2020
prevented a cascade of bankruptcies that would have made the disruption of GSCs far worse. Like-
wise, income support measures allowed demand to carry on even as incomes fell. The result was
that the demand shocks did not trigger the Keynesian aggregate demand multiplier.
15 The citation is taken from an interview on The Talk of The Nation, aired on NPR on November 30, 1999;
the likelihood that Covid-19-linked policy announcements will actually reshape GSCs. Locational
equilibriums are unlikely to shift unless firms perceive a permanent shock16 and governments
commit to substantial, long-term production subsidies (as with agriculture), massive regulation
(as with banking), or massive state-lead interventions (as with defense).
Policies on essential medical supplies and semiconductors may well prove to be more durable
and effective, given their critical nature. Arguments that these sectors are part of today’s national
defense, broadly defined, are more credible and thus more likely to endure long enough to reshape
production structures.
aic are the wage and unit-labor input coefficient in country c, respectively, and r is all non-labor
costs. To simplify, suppose that labor is perfectly non-traded but non-labor inputs are perfectly
traded (and thus cost the same in all countries). The proportional production cost difference be-
tween country c and c is
cic − cic wc aic
= θL 1 − ,
cic wc aic
where θ L is the labor-cost share in c . To be concrete, assume that the cost is lower in country c.
What happens to offshoring as digitech and artificial intelligence continue to automate man-
ufacturing? While there can be countervailing effects, it is likely that θ L will fall (Manyika et al.
2019). If this happens, and separation costs do not fall as much, firms will tend to shut down GSC
trade and produce all stages locally. The outcome might look like decoupling, or deglobalization,
but it would have nothing to do with mitigating the risk of GSCs. It would be the result of long-
term trends in industrial automation and of the fact that most non-labor costs are trade costs.
Taking the logic one step further suggests that the same trend could make all manufactured goods
non-traded. This stark result is not a prediction but rather an illustration of digitech’s possible
impact on the future of GSCs (see Baldwin & Forslid 2020 for a more extensive discussion of this
possibility).
16 Martin et al. (2020) find that the probability that a trade relationship will cease is significantly reduced in
sticky product markets during uncertain times, which is an illustration of firms’ wait-and-see behaviors during
uncertainty episodes.
this projection, as trade in services has grown faster than trade in goods for many years (WTO
2019a).
Digitech has interacted with the Covid-19 pandemic to facilitate services trade in another way.
One of the most obvious outcomes of the pandemic is a heightened ability of services firms to
spatially unbundle their value chains. Services, like goods, are typically produced by value chains—
especially complex service products in professional sectors like human resources, law, finance, ac-
counting, architecture, and media. Think of the process of providing investment advice to clients;
the process of developing, pricing, and marketing life insurance; or the process of selecting, hiring,
and on-boarding new workers.
In the old days, these service value chains (SVCs)—just like manufacturing value chains—
tended to be bundled in a single building. More recently, however, digital technologies such as
collaborative software, online databases, and excellent Internet connectivity have resulted in the
fractionalization and separation of some of the stages of SVC production.
Once separation of stages became technically feasible, vast international wage differences made
offshoring of some stages profitable. This has already happened extensively for some services
tasks—think of call centers and web development. The advance of digitech, accelerated by Covid-
19, is expanding the range of service tasks that can be offshored (De Backer & Miroudot 2013).
Another feature suggesting that GSCs will shift toward services is the lack of protection in
intermediate services tasks that make up many of the intermediate stages of SVCs. This results
Nov 2024 06:10:05
from several policies. First, since the Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, WTO mem-
bers have refrained from imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions; this moratorium
was renewed in December 2019 (WTO 2019b). Second, most domestic regulation-based protec-
tion of services implicitly assumes that SVCs are spatially bundled, and that regulating the final
service product is sufficient to protect all the jobs along the chain. For example, countries limit
who can provide legal, medical, and engineering services via qualifications, but the workers un-
dertaking the intermediate tasks in the SVCs are often much less regulated. Third, as part of the
Uruguay Round, most developed nations have committed themselves to imposing no barriers to
trade in many sectors when it comes to cross-border services trade (i.e., Mode 1 services trade).
This made good political sense in the mid-1990s, as most services were non-traded and those that
were traded were dominated by exports from high-wage nations.
The upshot of this is that the main barrier to globalization of SVCs is now technological.
Given the short doubling times for digitech related to the processing, transmission, storage, and
gathering of information, these technology barriers are falling far faster than the costs of ship-
ping did following the unbundling of production and consumption of goods since 1820 and the
unbundling of manufacturing stages since the 1990s. These trends suggest that the future of
international supply chain trade lies increasingly in services and decreasingly in goods. A twist
on this is servicification, the rising value-added share of services in manufactured goods, for which
there is evidence both in the aggregate (Miroudot & Cadestin 2017) and at the firm level (Ariu
et al. 2019).
The changing challenges faced by GSCs call for changes in GSCs, but should governments
be instrumental in directing the changes? As suggested in Section 3, the answer should involve
a careful consideration of whether the incentives private actors face are sufficiently misaligned
with the public weal so as to justify expensive or extensive interventions. Expensive and persistent
de-risking policies are applied today only to very few sectors, like farming and defense. Medical
supplies and a small number of other critical goods sectors may well join the list. Beyond these, we
conjecture that sustained policy interventions will be unlikely unless vested interests take the reins.
BCI (2021) documents that businesses are already adjusting rapidly to the new nature of shocks.
The report shows how firms have revamped supply chains to ensure continuity of supply, reviewed
their manufacturing models, and returned to stockpiling—including, in some cases, shifting away
from just-in-time manufacturing.
A logically separate, but temporally correlated, concern is the reliance on industrial inputs from
China. In strategic sectors such as semiconductors, the political forces that underpin expensive
policies in defense procurement may well reshape the relevant GSCs. This seems more likely to
the extent that geostrategic tensions persist and intensify.
In terms of policy, one no-regrets option would seem to be stress testing. This is standard op-
erating procedure in the financial sector. Why not extend it to critical goods sectors? D’Aguanno
et al. (2021), Miroudot (2020a,b), and Simchi-Levi & Simchi-Levi (2020) provide an interesting
set of ideas on this. International cooperation would naturally be part of this, as the information
externalities are global. An analogy with the global network of weather stations suggests that in-
formation sharing could be win-win (Hoekman 2014).
Only time and research will tell what was really behind the 2020 disruptions and how best to
deal with the changed situation. So what might future research focus on?
On the theory side, the discussion in Section 3 suggests that the risk–GSC nexus serves up a
rich menu of unmodeled, yet important, phenomena. Risk considerations are not entirely new to
GSC studies (Costinot et al. 2013), but the theory has largely assumed away risk for convenience,
helps econometricians more than truly exogenous shocks, and 2020 and 2021 were bursting with
them. This, coupled with the availability of massive, high-frequency online data and headline-
grabbing importance, suggests that there is a great deal of impactful empirical research to be done
on GSCs and risk. Overall, we see exciting times ahead for GSC researchers. Things have, as they
say, changed so much that not even the future is what it used to be. It is riskier than we thought.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to Sébastien Miroudot for helpful comments and conversations related to GSC
measurement and indicator computation, and to Angelos Theodorakopoulos for useful sugges-
tions and comments overall. Gene Grossman provided invaluable guidance and editor advice.
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