a.

Doctrine:

1.The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest.

2.The actions of the MB under Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 "may not be

restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction."

3.It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an

exercise of police power.

b. BSP Monetary Board vs. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R.No. 184778,

(J.Velasco Jr.) (October 2,2009)

c. Facts:

On September of 2007, the Supervision and Examination Department

(SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of
the books of the following respondent banks which revealed deficiencies of
respondents.

Respondents allege that the banks failed to submit a copy of the ROE
which violated its right to due process (Report of Examination (ROE) which
finalizes the audit findings).
d. Issue:

Whether or not the respondent are entitled to the preliminary injunction.

d. Held:

No. The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an

unwarranted interference with the powers of the MB. Secs. 29 and 30 of
RA 7653 refer to the appointment of a conservator or a receiver for a bank,
which is a power of the MB for which they need the ROEs done by the
supervising or examining department.

It is well-settled that the closure of a bank may be considered as an

exercise of police power. The action of the MB on this matter is final and
executory. Such exercise may nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry
and can be set aside if found to be in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on
the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is
certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to
mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed CA
Decision dated September 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103935 is hereby
REVERSED. The assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction of
respondent Judge Valenzuela in Civil Case Nos. 08-119243, 08-119244,
08-119245, 08-119246, 08-119247, 08-119248, 08-119249, 08-119250,
08-119251, and 08-119273 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

a. doctrine: The insolvent bank's legal personality is not dissolved by virtue

of being placed under receivership by the Monetary Board. It must be
stressed here that a bank retains its juridical personality even if placed
under conservatorship; it is neither replaced nor substituted by the
conservator who shall only take charge of the assets, liabilities and the
management of the institution.

b. BALAYAN BAY RURAL BANK v. NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (NLDC). GR No. 194589, (J. Perez)
(September 21, 2015).

c. Facts:

Respondent NLDC filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against

petitioner bank for the latter's unpaid obligation

During the pendency of the case before the RTC, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, thru the Monetary Board, placed the petitioner bank under
receivership and appointed the PDIC as receiver of the bank pursuant to
Section 30... of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653.
petitioner bank contending that the PDIC is not the real party in interest in
the instant case because it does not stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.

d. Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE 11 JUNE 2010 RTC ORDER WHICH

DIRECTED THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE PDIC AS DEFENDANT OR ITS
INCLUSION THEREIN AS CO-DEFENDANT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

e. hence:

We deny the petition.

While we agree with the conclusion reached by the RTC that the PDIC
should be included in Civil Case No. 09-917, its reliance on Section 19,
Rule 3 of the Revise Rules of Court on transfer of interest pendente lite as
justification for its directive to include the PDIC in the case is erroneous.

For one, the properties of an insolvent bank are not transferred by

operation of law to the statutory receiver/liquidator but rather these assets
are just held in trust to be distributed to its creditors after the liquidation
proceedings in accordance with the rules on concurrence and preference of
credits. In addition, the insolvent bank's legal personality is not dissolved by
virtue of being placed under receivership by the Monetary Board. It must be
stressed here that a bank retains its juridical personality even if placed
under conservatorship; it is neither replaced nor substituted by the
conservator who shall only take charge of the assets, liabilities and the
management of the institution. It being the fact that the PDIC should not be
considered as a substitute or as a co-defendant of the petitioner bank but
rather as a representative party or someone acting in fiduciary capacity, the
insolvent institution shall remain in the case and shall be deemed as the
real party in interest.

The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary shall be
deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included in the title
of the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: In fine, the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court

pertains only to the adjudication of claims against the bank. It does
not cover the reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim
against another person or legal entity.

b. Manalo vs. CA, GR. No. 141297,(J. Puno) (October 8, 2001)

c. Facts:
Villanueva Enterprises, represented by its president, Therese Villanueva
Vargas, obtained a from the respondent PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank
and the Philippine American Investments Corporation (PAIC), respectively.
Villanueva Enterprises failed to settle its loan obligation.

Accordingly, respondent instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings

over the mortgaged lots and acquired the same as the highest bidder. After
the lapse of one year, title was consolidated in respondent’s name for
failure of Vargas to redeem.

The Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the
liquidation of the respondent PAIC with the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent petitioned the RTC, Branch 112 for the issuance of a writ of
possession during the pendency of the civil case No. 9011; thereafter,

Vargas sold the disputed lot to Armando Angsico. Later Armando Angsico
assigned his rights to petitioner.

d. Issue: Whether or not the jurisdiction for the issuance of the writ of
possession filed by the respondent bank is vested solely on the
liquidation court.

e. Held: No. The exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court pertains

only to the adjudication of claims against the bank. It does not cover
the reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim against
another person or legal entity.

Although the law provides that all claims against the insolvent bank should
be filed in the liquidation proceeding, such legal provision only finds
operation in cases where there are claims against an insolvent bank. In
fine, the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court pertains only to the
adjudication of claims against the bank. It does not cover the reverse
situation where it is the bank which files a claim against another person or
legal entity. Moreover, a bank which had been ordered closed by the
monetary board retains its juridical personality which can sue and be sued
through its liquidator. The only limitation being that the prosecution or
defense of the action must be done through the liquidator. Otherwise, no
suit for or against an insolvent entity would prosper. In such situation,
banks in liquidation would lose what justly belongs to them through a mere
technicality.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to disturb the assailed

Decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine:

Foreclosure by the receiver should not be considered included in the

acts prohibited (under section 29 of the Central Bank Act), in the phrase
“prohibited from doing business” during receivership and liquidation
proceedings.

b. Larrobis vs Phil Veteran Bank, Gr. No. 135706 ( J .Austria-Martinez)

(October 1, 2004) .
 c. Facts:

Petitioners, spouses Larrobis contracted a monetary loan with respondent

Phil Veteran bank secured by a Real estate mortgage.

Respondent bank was placed under receivership or liquidation by the

Central Bank.

Due to unpaid obligations by petitioner, the respondent moved for the

extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property and was sold to it as
being the lone bidder.

Petitioners claim that respondents are barred by prescription and thus

question the foreclosure by respondents.

d. Issue:

Whether or not the receivership status of respondent bank is one of the

prohibitions under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act which interrupts the
running of the prescriptive period.

e. Held: No.

While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of “doing
business,” that is:

…a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates

to that extent, the performance of acts or words or the exercise of some of
the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the
purpose and object of its organization.
it should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited
whenever banks are “prohibited from doing business” during receivership
and liquidation proceedings.

In this case, unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition
imposed upon herein respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from
performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in
the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar.

Having reached the conclusion that the period within which respondent
bank was placed under receivership and liquidation proceedings does not
constitute a fortuitous event which interrupted the prescriptive period in
bringing actions,

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch
24, dated April 17, 1998, and the order denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration dated August 25, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on
October 18, 1995, is hereby declared null and void and respondent is
ordered to return to petitioners their owner’s duplicate certificate of title.

a. Doctrine: power of the COA to examine and audit government

agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA.
Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that:

"Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the

Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any
 investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit."

b. DBP vs. COA, GR. No. 88435, ( J. Carpio) (January 16, 2002).

c. Facts:

Phil government loaned money from world bank during the economic crisis
caused by the Marcos regime.

The World bank gave a condition that the PH gov’t rehabilitate DBP. One of
the steps required is for the DBP to be fully audited by external
independent auditors.

Central Bank issued a circular to comply with the condition of WB.

However unlike the former COA chairman, the new chairman of the
Commission on Audit protested the issuance of Circular No. 1124 saying
that it encroaches upon the COA's constitutional and statutory power to
audit government agencies.

d. Issue: Whether or not the COA has the sole and exclusive power
to examine and audit government banks.

e. Held: No.

The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while
non-exclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D
of the Constitution mandates that:
 "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit."

The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does
not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a
private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and
its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their
officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public
funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.

Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of
its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA does not
have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The
framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the
COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a government-
controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or
publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows
money from abroad.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The letter-decision of the

Chairman of the Commission on Audit dated August 29, 1988, and the
letter-decision promulgated by the Commission on Audit en banc dated
May 20, 1989, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the temporary restraining order
issued by the court enjoining respondent Commission on Audit from
enforcing the said decisions is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine:

In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote
that:

x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or

an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just
imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the
order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes
may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire
banking community.

b. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP, GR. No. 191424, (J. Mendoza)
(August 7, 2013).

c. Facts:

Petitioner Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in Rural
Bank Faire, a bank whose corporate life has already expired. BSP
authorized extending the banks’ corporate life and was later renamed to
EuroCredit Community Bank (ECBI). Consequently ECBI was placed under
receivership.
d.Issue:

Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being
placed under receivership.

e.Held: Yes.

In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon.

Antonio-Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of “close now, hear
later,” stating that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the
public interest. Thus:

The “close now, hear later” doctrine has already been justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on
the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is
certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to
mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.

The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate

unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of
police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the
general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken
against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government
agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the
prejudice of the national economy.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: On the BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of

banks, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000)
elaborates as follows:

CHAPTER II
AUTHORITY OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL

SECTION 4. Supervisory Powers. — The operations and activities of banks

shall be subject to supervision of the Bangko Sentral. "Supervision" shall
include the following:

4.1. The issuance of rules of conduct or the establishment of

standards of operation for uniform application to all institutions or
functions covered, taking into consideration the distinctive character
of the operations of institutions and the substantive similarities of
specific functions to which such rules, modes or standards are to be
applied;
 4.2. The conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws
and regulations if the circumstances so warrant as determined by the
Monetary Board;

4.3. Overseeing to ascertain that laws and regulations are complied

with;

4.4. Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year
from the last date of examination to determine whether an institution
is conducting its business on a safe or sound basis: Provided, That
the deficiencies/irregularities found by or discovered by an audit shall
be immediately addressed;

4.5. Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution (2-D); or

4.6. Enforcing prompt corrective action. (n)

b. Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Development Bank (PDB), GR. No.

154470, (J. Brion), (September 24, 2012).

c. Facts:

This case involves the several transfers of Central Bank (CB) bills with a
total face value of ₱ 70 million, as evidenced by a "Detached Assignment".
The BSP already made known to the PDB its unfavorable position on the
latter’s claim of fraudulent assignment due to the latter’s own failure to
comply with existing regulations:

d. Issue: Whether or not the BSP has the power of supervision over the
disputed CB bills.

e. Held: Yes but this answer is qualified to follow the requirements

under RA 8791.

The BSP’s power of supervision over the operation of banks is stated in

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000).

For the purposes of this Act, "quasi-banks" shall refer to entities engaged in
the borrowing of funds through the issuance, endorsement or assignment
with recourse or acceptance of deposit substitutes as defined in Section 95
of Republic Act No. 7653 (hereafter the "New Central Bank Act") for
purposes of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations.
[emphasis ours]

In this connection, Section 10 (b) 2 also requires that a "Detached

assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon previous notice to the
Central Bank x x x." In fact, in a memo dated September 23, 1991 xxx then
CB Governor Jose L. Cuisia advised all banks (including PDB) xxx as
follows:

In view recurring incidents ostensibly disregarding certain provisions of CB

circular No. 28 (as amended) covering assignments of registered bonds, all
banks and all concerned are enjoined to observe strictly the pertinent
provisions of said CB Circular as hereunder quoted:

xxxx

Under Section 10.b. (2)

x x x Detached assignment will be recognized or accepted only upon

previous notice to the Central Bank and its use is authorized only under the
following circumstances:

(a) x x x

(b) x x x

(c) assignments of treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness in

registered form which are not provided at the back thereof with
assignment form.

(d) Assignment of securities which have changed ownership several

times.

(e) x x x

Non-compliance herewith will constitute a basis for non-action or

withholding of action on redemption/payment of interest coupons/transfer
transactions or denominational exchange that may be directly affected
thereby. [Boldfacing supplied]

Again, the books of the BSP do not show that the supposed assignment of
subject CB Bills was ever recorded in the BSP’s books.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are
GRANTED. The Planters Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file
with the Regional Trial Court its comment or answer-in-interpleader to Bank
of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to
assess the docket fees due from Planters Development Bank and Bank of
Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with DELIBERATE
DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of
the Central Bank bills.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143,
or his duly authorized representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and
collect the appropriate amount of docket fees separately due the Bank of
Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting claimants in
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this
decision.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine

We never fail to stress the remarkable significance of a banking

institution to commercial transactions, in particular, and to the
country's economy in general. The banking system is an
indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in
 the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive
entities for the safekeeping and saving of money or as active
instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an
ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard
them with respect and even gratitude and, most of all, confidence.
Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high
standards of integrity and performance are even required, of it.

b. Prudential Bank vs. Rapanot, GR. No. 191636, (J. Caguioa) (January
16, 2017)

c. Facts:

In 1995 the Prudential Bank (bank) extended a loan to Golden

Dragon (developer). To secure the loan, a mortgage in favor of the bank.
Among the units in the mortgage is Unit 2308-B2.

In 1996 Rapanot and Golden Dragon entered into a Contract to Sell

covering Unit 2308-B2. In 1997, Rapanot completed payment. However
delivery of the property was not made by Golden Dragon .

Golden Dragon sent a letter to the Bank dated March 17, 1998,
requesting for a substitution of collateral for the purpose of replacing Unit
2308-B2 with another unit with the same area. However, the Bank denied
Golden Dragon's request due to the latter's unpaid accounts.

d. Issue:
Whether or not the Bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good
faith.

e. Held:

Yes. It cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith.

If only the Bank exercised the highest degree of diligence required by

the nature of its business as a financial institution, it would have
discovered that (i) Golden Dragon did not comply with the approval
requirement imposed by Section 18 of PD 957, and (ii) that Rapanot
already paid a reservation fee and had made several installment
payments in favor of Golden Dragon, with a view of acquiring Unit
2308-B2

The Bank's failure to exercise the diligence required of it constitutes

negligence, and negates its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good
faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated November 18, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 93862 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine

The Anti-Money Laundering Council is not merely a repository of

reports and information on covered and suspicious transactions. It
was created precisely to investigate and institute charges against
those suspected to commit money laundering activities.

The criminal prosecution of such offenses would be unduly hampered

if it were to be prohibited from disclosing such information. For the
Anti-Money Laundering Council to refuse disclosing the information
required of it would be to go against its own functions under the law.

b. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 232724-27, ( Leonen)

(February 15, 2021)

c. Facts:
Respondent issued a subpoena ad testificandum to investigate the bank
account of Lionair (seller of anomalous helicopters) in relation to a plunder
case filed against first gentleman Arroyo.

Petitioner is anti-money laundering council (AMLC), representing the

Republic of the Philippines. AMLC refused to disclose bank records of
Lionair. It avers that the disclosure of reports on covered and suspicious
transactions is prohibited under Section 9(c) of the Anti-Money Laundering
Act.

Issue:

Whether or not AMLC is a covered institution and it cannot be forced to

disclose such prohibited information.

Held: No.

Petitioner is not merely a repository of reports and information on covered

and suspicious transactions. It is created precisely to investigate and
institute charges against the offenders. Section 7 clearly states that it is
tasked to institute civil forfeiture proceedings and other remedial
proceedings, and to file complaints with the Department of Justice or the
Office of the Ombudsman for anti-money laundering offenses.

In addition, the criminal prosecution of anti-money laundering offenses

would be unduly hampered if petitioner were prohibited from disclosing
information regarding covered and suspicious transactions. It would be
antithetical to its own functions if petitioner were to refuse to participate in
prosecuting anti-money laundering offenses by taking shelter in the
confidentiality provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The March 28,

2017 Resolution and May 12, 2017 Order of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0164 to 0167 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine:

An ex post facto law is a law that either: (1) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law that was innocent when done,
and punishes such act; or (2) aggravates a crime, or makes the crime
greater than it was when committed; or (3) changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; or (5) assumes
to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right for an act that was lawful when done;
or (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
 b. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) G.R. No. 217682,
(Bersamin) (July 17, 2018).

c. Facts:

Petitioner Estrada's bank accounts were determined by the Anti-

money laundering council (AMLC) to be related to the charge of
plunder and the violation of R.A. No. 3019.

AMLC authorized its secretariat to file in the Court of Appeals (CA) an

ex parte application for bank inquiry pursuant to R.A. No. 9160, as
amended (The Anti-Money Laundering Act).

The petitioners insist that R.A. No. 10167, which amended Section 11
of R.A. No. 9160, is an ex post facto legislation because it applies
retroactively to bank transactions made prior to the effectivity of the
amendment

d. Issue:

Should the ex parte application for a bank inquiry order provided for
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, be applied
retroactively?

e. Held: Yes.
The amendment to Section 11 of R.A. 9160 allowing an ex parte
application for the bank inquiry does not violate the proscription
against ex post facto laws.

Furthermore, the AMLC's inquiry and examination into bank accounts

are not undertaken whimsically based on its investigative discretion.
The AMLC and the CA are respectively required to ascertain the
existence of probable cause before any bank inquiry order is issued.
Section 11 of R.A. 9160, even with the allowance of an ex parte
application therefor, cannot be categorized as authorizing the
issuance of a general warrant. This is because a search warrant or
warrant of arrest contemplates a direct object but the bank inquiry
order does not involve the seizure of persons or property.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus for being moot and academic, without
pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

A1.doctrine:
Section 11 of RA 9160 itself requires that it be established that "there
is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities," and it obviously is the court which stands as
arbiter whether there is indeed such probable cause. The process of
inquiring into the existence of probable cause would involve the
function of determination reposed on the trial court. Determination
clearly implies a function of adjudication on the part of the trial court,
and not a mechanical application of a standard predetermination by
some other body. The word "determination" implies deliberation and
is, in normal legal contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a
court of justice."

a2 doctrine: The court receiving the application for inquiry order

cannot simply take the AMLC's word that probable cause exists that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will
have to exercise its own determinative function in order to be
convinced of such fact.

b. Republic vs. Bolante, G.R. No. 186717, G.R. No. 190357 (Sereno)
(April 17,2017)

c.Facts: The AMLC reported a series of suspicious transactions in

relation to the fertilizer scam involving the respondent Undersecretary
of Agriculture Jocelyn I. Bolante in the amount of 728 million.
AMLC found probable cause for violation of RA 3019 and plunder.
Then the AMLC through the Republic sought court approval for the
conduct of bank inquiries and freeze order against 70 bank accounts
related to the fertilizer fund scam.

d.Issue: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in

ruling that there exists no probable cause to allow an inquiry into the
total of 76 deposits and investments of respondents.

e.Held: No.

We find no reason to conclude that the R C determined the existence

of probable cause, or lack thereof, in an arbitrary and whimsical
manner.

the R TC found during trial that respondent Bolante had ceased to be

a member of the board of trustees of LIVECOR for 14 months before
the latter even made the initial transaction, which was the subject of
the suspicious transaction reports.

With the resources available to the AMLC, coupled with a bank

inquiry order granted 15 months before Eugenio was even
promulgated, the AMLC should have been able to obtain more
evidence establishing a more substantive link tying Bolante and the
fertilizer fund scam to LIVECOR.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 186717 is DENIED. The Court
of Appeals Resolution dated 27 February 2009 in CA-G.R. AMLC No.
00024 is AFFIRMED.

The petition in G.R. No. 190357 is DISMISSED. The Resolution

dated 3 July 2009 and Order dated 13 November 2009 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59, in AMLC Case No. 07-001
are AFFIRMED.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on 25 March 2009 is
hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine:

Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and

inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments
does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical
seizure of property involved at that stage.
 b. Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 216914 (J. Perez) (December 6, 2016)

c.Facts:

In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on

the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay
and the rest of his family.

In granting the petition of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the

Court of Appeals also ordered the inspection of the bank deposits of
Binay's wife, children, and a law office connected to him.

D:Issues:

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to

privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

e.Held. No.

1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of

the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into
certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage.

In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a

freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the direct
objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not
necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder.
What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular
deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial
institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such
banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are
examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of
deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the
records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically
seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession
of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the
account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation
and devotion of the bank.

At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain
bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any
form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.
2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances
mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a
Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b.
Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the conflict
arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled
that the Ombudsman's denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate
Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the
existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an
information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a
copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or
even during trial.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its

determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry
into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into
an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11
of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to
violate SPCMB's constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative

of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be
furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order
and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in
relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the purported
blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant
intended to aid a mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client
privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a
money laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of
SPCMB' s] clientele.

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and

found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to
undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we
found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued,
ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely
confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:

The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte
application for bank inquiry order;

The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself

makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;

A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a

bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account which court order
ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that
such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired
into; and
The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and
the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the
inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken
whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC.
In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and
determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such
governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11
as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for
information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order
involving its accounts.

All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing

the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into, and
examine, certain bank deposits and investments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No.

9160, as amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

a. 1.Doctrine: Based on Section 1050 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended,

there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1)
the application ex-parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of
probable cause by the CA.
a.2. A freeze order cannot be issued for an indefinite period. In fact, in said
case, We held that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the
six-month period violated the Ligots' right to due process

b.Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 171054, ( J.Gaerlan) (January 26, 2021).

b. facts:

The AMLCfound reasonable grounds to believe that the monetary

instruments and properties in the name of Gen. Ligot and his family,
including petitioner, are related to unlawful activities as defined under
Section 3(i) ofR.A. No. 9160, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) ofR.A.
No. 3019, as amended.

the AMLC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the
CA an Urgent Ex-parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order
against the monetary instruments and properties .

c. Issues:

THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS AND AS

GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND AS PROVIDED BY THE
NEW RULES

THE CA ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT PROBABLE CAUSE

EXISTED AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND HIS MONETARY
INSTRUMENTS AND FREEZE ORDERS
e.held:

To begin with, a freeze order is not dependent on a separate criminal

charge, much less does it depend on a conviction.

In resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA's

statutorily-guided determination's focus is not on the probable commission
of an unlawful activity ( or money laundering) that the 0MB has already
determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other
monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of
the illegal activities enumerated under R.A. No. 9160, as amended.

Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation

between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which
is the focal point of Section 10 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended.

Nonetheless, the Court, also in the Ligots' case, clarified that a freeze
order cannot be issued for an indefinite period. In fact, in said case, We
held that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month
period violated the Ligots' right to due process

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the: (a) Motion to Lift Freeze order

Against the Monetary Instruments and Properties of Edgardo Yambao with
Prayer Requests for Setting of an Oral Argument is DENIED for lack of
merit; and the (b) Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order
filed by applicant Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Freeze Order issued by
this Court on July 5, 2005 against the subject bank accounts, investments,
vehicles and the related web accounts of the respondents, except those
that were already closed as herein-above identified, is EXTENDED until
after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations being conducted
are terminated, conformably with Section IO of Republic Act No. 9160, as
amended. SO ORDERED.

a. doctrine:

SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions. -

(a) Civil Forfeiture. - When there is a covered transaction report

made, and the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose ordered
seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised Rules... of
Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.

RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay

down two conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:

(1)... when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered

transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by the AMLC
and
 (2)... the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the
seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part,
directly or indirectly, related to said report.

b.Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, G.R. No. 170281
(J.Corona) (January 18, 2008).

c. facts:

Defendant Glasgow's bank account and deposit are related to the unlawful
activities of Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation Code, as well as
to a money laundering offense [which] [has] been summarized... by the
AMLC in its Resolution No. 094; and

this led to the eventual... freeze orders and civil forfeiture in favor of the
government in accordance with Section 12, R.A. 9160, as amended.

d.Issues:

Whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed

e.held:

The Court agrees with the Republic.

The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction Reports;

Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied. - When there is a

SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR A COVERED
TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER
INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and the court has, in a petition filed for
the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary... instrument or property,
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised
Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.

Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1)

covered by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the
control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, the conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as...
amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC,
properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.

A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the

institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt
for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.

Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture

provides:

Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary. - No prior

criminal charge, pendency of or conviction for an unlawful activity or money
laundering offense is necessary for the commencement or the resolution of
a petition for civil... forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal

prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money laundering, an action for
civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and
resolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October 27, 2005

order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 03-
107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11, 2005 motion to dismiss of Glasgow
Credit and Collection Services, Inc. is DENIED. And the complaint for
forfeiture of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the case pursuant to the
provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. Pending final determination of the
case, the November 23, 2005 temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is hereby MAINTAINED.

SO ORDERED.

a. doctrine:

The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the

jurisdiction of the CA over the extension of freeze orders. As the law now
stands, it is solely the CA which has the authority to issue a freeze order as
well as to extend its effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to
extend existing freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis-à- vis
accounts and deposits related to money-laundering activities.

b.Republic vs. Cabrini, Green & Ross, Inc.,G.R. No. 154522, G.R. No.

154694, G.R. No. 155554, G.R. No. 155711 (J.Corona) ( May 5, 2006).

b. facts:

In the exercise of its power under Section 10 of RA 9160, the Anti-Money

Laundering Council (AMLC) issued freeze orders against various bank
accounts of respondents. The frozen bank accounts were previously found
prima facie to be related to the unlawful activities of respondents, the
AMLC2 filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) various petitions for extension
of effectivity of its freeze orders.

c. Issue: Which court has jurisdiction to extend the effectivity of a freeze

order?

d. Held:

The Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of these petitions, or on March 3, 2003, Congress
enacted RA 9194 (An Act Amending Republic Act No. 9160, Otherwise
Known as the “Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001”).It amended Section 10
of RA 9160 ,as follows:

SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.—The Court of

Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination
that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in
any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may
issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order
shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the
court.”(emphasis supplied)

Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:

SEC. 12. Transitory Provision.—Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC

shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) days after theeffectivity of this
Act, unless extended by the Court of Appeals.(emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 154694 is hereby DISMISSED for being moot

while G.R. Nos. 154522, 155554 and 155711 are REMANDED to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action. Pending resolution by the Court of
Appeals of these cases, the April 21, 2003 temporary restraining order is
hereby MAINTAINED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.