g. CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION @) Definition «Conditional a may be described as “a statute that provides controls but specifies that they to go into effect only when a given administrative authority fulfils the e istra Xistence or conditions defined in the statute”. (b) Nature and scope In conditional legislation, legislature makes the law. It is full and com- plete. No legislative function is delegated to the executive, But the said Act is not brought into force and it is left to the executive to bring the Act into operation on ful: filment of certain conditions or contingencies and for that reason the legislation is call scot led “conditional legislation” or “contingent legislation”, Cooley’ also says: Icis not always essential that a legislative act should be a completed statute which must in any event take effect as law at the time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some subsequent event. 162. Ibid; see also, Fatma Haji Ali Mohammad Hajee v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 180: 1951 SCR 266; State of Assam v. Keshab Prasad Singh, AIR 1953 SC 309: 1953 SCR 8653 State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751: (1961) 2 SCR 679; CIT v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd.; (1992) 3 SCC 326: AIR 1992 SC 1782; State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement, (1998) 7 SCC 162: AIR 1998 SC 3067; R.K. Trivedi v. Union of India, (1998) 9 SCC 58: 1998 SCC (L&S) 1112; State of T.N. vy. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, (1995) 4 SCC 1043 Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj, (2015) 6 SCC 363. 163. (1985) 1 SCC 641, 689: AIR 1985 SC 5153 State of Rajasthan v, Basant Nabata, 16a (2005) 12 SCC 77: AIR 2005 SC 3401. . See, for iled discussion, Lecture 5. 165. Hart, ante to “Administrative Law with Selected Cases (2nd Edn.) 810. 166. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, Vol. I (8th Edn.) 227. © scanned with OKEN Scanner106 Lecture 4 Delegated Legislation (General Principles) (c) Categories Conditional legislation may be classified into three categories: 1, Where the legislation is “full and complete” but leaves its futur icability ¢ executive authority. Se Sea ian iad foetal drawn from operation of the Act ina given area or in given situs, tions to the executive authority. ; 3. Where the legislation leaves it to the executive authority to grany benefit of the Act to one class depriving the rival class of such benefit.” (d) Illustrative cases In the leading case of Field v. Clark, the President was empowered to suspend the operation of an Act permitting free import of certain produen, in the US on being satisfied that the duties imposed upon such produers were reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. The Supreme Court held the Act valid on the ground that the Act was complete and the President wae a mere agent of Congress to ascertain and declare the contingency upon which the will of Congress was to take effect. The court quoted with approval the following famous passage from a Pennsylvania case™, The legislature cannot delegate its powers to make a law; but it can make a Jaw to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law intends to make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things on which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power and must, therefore, be the subject of enquiry and determination outside the hall of the legislature. In King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma", by promulgating an Ordinance, the Governor General was empowered to set up special courts, But the operation of the Ordinance was left to the Provincial Government on being satisfied that emergency had come into existence. The Calcutta High Court!” held that there was excessive delegation and the Ordinance was, therefore, invalid. The Federal Court” confirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court, but the Privy Council reversed the decision and upheld the validity of the Act. According to the Privy Council, it was a piece of conditional legislation as the legislation was complete and what 167. State of T.N. v. K. Sabanayagam, (1998) x SCC 318: AIR 1998 SC 344. 168. 36 L Ed 294: 143 US 649 (1892). 169. (1873) 71 Locke’s Appeal 4g1. 170. (1944-1945) 72 A 57: AIR 1945 PC 48. 171. Benoari Lal Sharma v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Cal 285: 44 Cri L] 673. 172. Emperor v, Benoari Lall Sharma, AIR 1943 FC 36: 208 IC 564, \ © scanned with OKEN Scannerional legislation 107 had been delegated was the poser to apply tain conditions, | In State of Bombay y, Narottamdas Jo Civil Court Act, 1948, an additional civil eo pombay having jurisdiction us try all state Government was authorised oe The Supreme Cour ld tat the islation and upheld it. The te ermine ew Sealine wae elcid a ee imate exceutve to dase when the said power could be exercised. gain, in Sardar Inder Singh v, State of Ry i ro Pectin Gree Rasa. he Raphan Section 3 thereof, the Rajpramukh was empowered ts enterdl dha heat the said Ordinance by issuing a notification, if required. The duration of the Ordinance w, i as extended by issuing a notification which was chal- lenged before the Supreme Court. The g ed before th ourt upheld the provision as bein conditional legislation, E 7 Act on fulfilment of cer- thabai*, by the Bombay City purt was established for Greater 8 Hot exceeding z 10,000 but the aise the jurisdiction up to 215,000. as merely a conditional leg- the provision w. gislature itself If we compare this case with Jatindra Nath to be clear, that before Independence, the Fede row view with regard to delegated legislation has taken a liberal view, In Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Tulsipui issuing a notification under Section 3 of the U.P. Town A! the limits of Tulsipur Town were extended to village Shitalpur where the sugar factory of the plaintiff was situated. The notification was chal- lenged on the ground that procedure under the Act was not followed and the subordinate legislation was, therefore, bad. Negativing the contention and holding the case to be one of conditional legislation, the Supreme Court held that “the effect of making the Act applicable to a geographical area is in the nature of conditional legislation” and that “it cannot be characterised as a piece of subordinate legislation”..”” In M.P. High Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India”, M.P. Reorganisa- tion Act, 2000 empowered the State Government to abolish State Administrative Tribunal. The validity of the provision was challenged on the ground that the delegation of power conferred on the State to abolish the tribunal was in the nature of “excessive delegation” as it was “essen- tial legislative function” or “legislative policy”. Negativing the contention and holding the provision as conditional leg- islation and referring to earlier decisions, the Supreme Court stated: 173. AIR 1951 SC 69: 1951 Sok st. 17 fi 05. 125 Jando Nerd Gaps Province of Bar, AIR. 1949 FC 17: 1949 FCR 595. 176. (1y80) 2 SCC 295: AIR 1980 SC 882, 177, Ibid, SCC 306. 178. (2004) 11 SCC 766: 2005 SCC (L&S) 27. Gupta"®, one thing seems ral Court had taken a nar- while the Supreme Court 5, by reas Act, 1914, © scanned with OKEN Scanner