Review

Reviewed Work(s): Soul and the Structure of Being in Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus,
Proclus and Simplicius by H. J. Blumenthal and A. C. Lloyd
Review by: Anthony Meredith
Source: The Classical Review , 1984, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1984), pp. 135-136
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/3064494

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 THE CLASSICAL REVIEW 135

runs
runs 'A
'AisistotoB,B,
B is
B to
is C;
to so
C;Asois A
toisC'.to
OfC'.
course
Of course
the 'is to'
theis'is
slippery:
to' is slippery:
'A is to B' 'A
may
is mean
to B' may mean
that
that AAisisa anecessary
necessarycondition
condition
of B;of
'B B;
is to
'B C'
is ascribes
to C' ascribes
to C's a to
goalC's
that
a goal
somethat
C's may,
some C's may,
unnaturally,
unnaturally,lack.
lack.
TheThe
syllogism
syllogism
is practical
is practical
when the
when second
the premiss
second is,
premiss
as one is,
might
as one
put might
it, put it,
epitactic
epitacticrather
ratherthan
than
ethnologic,
ethnologic,
so that
so to
that
grasp
to grasp
it is anitexercise
is an exercise
at once ofatthe
once
intellect
of the and
intellect
of and of
the
the will.
will.
Aristotle's
Aristotle'sdisparate
disparateschemata
schemata and and
examples
examples
are then
arepresented
then presented
as derivations
as derivations
from this from
root. this root.
Most
Mostobviously,
obviously, if if
thethe
upshot
upshotis toisbeto
action
be action
by theby
reasoner
the reasoner
himself 'I'
himself
must be'I'brought
must be in,brought in,
whether
whethersimply
simply in in
place
place
of'C'of'C'
or subsumed
or subsumed
under under
'C'. More'C'.inconveniently,
More inconveniently,
Aristotle often
Aristotle often
reasons
reasonsfrom
from goals
goalsto to
sufficient,
sufficient,not necessary,
not necessary,
means. means.
If we then
If we
replace
then'Areplace
is to B' 'A
by is
'B to
is B' by 'B is
to
to A'
A'(e.g.,
(e.g.,when
whenperforming
performing
A is A
a case
is a of
case
achieving
of achieving
B), the B),
result
theis result
no longer
is no
valid
longer
as a syllogism
valid as a syllogism
Both
Bothof ofthese
these
features
features
underlie
underlie
Aristotle's
Aristotle's
premiss-schema
premiss-schema
at De An.at434a
De An.
16 ff.,
434a
which
16 ff.,
is effec-
which is effec-
tively
tivelythis:
this:'Every
'EveryC must
C mustachieve
achieve
B; A B;
is B,
A and
is B,I am
andC.'I M.
amconstrues
C.' M. construes
this as a quasi-
this as a quasi-
syllogistic
syllogisticmodification
modification to the
to the
practical
practical
equivalent
equivalent
of the of
teleological
the teleological
syllogism syllogism
of Post. An.of Post. An.
Whether
WhetherAristotle
Aristotlereally
really
had,had,
or kept,
or kept,
any such
anyaetiology
such aetiology
in mind inmaymind
be doubted;
may bebut doubted;
M.'s but M.'s
reconstruction,
reconstruction, which
whichfollows
follows
a single
a single
initialinitial
model model
with a series
with aofseries
well-motivated
of well-motivated
variations, variations,
attractively
attractivelyreconciles
reconcilesunity
unity
withwith
variety.
variety.
One
One variable
variableis is
the
the
manner
mannerin which
in which
'B' presents
'B' presents
the goal.
theThis
goal.
mayThis
be largely
may be indeterminate,
largely indeterminate,
as
as when
when'B''B'is is
'living
'living
well',
well',
and and
'C' is'C'
'man'.
is 'man'.
Here it Here
can just
it can
be argued
just bethat
argued
B yields
thatanBaccount
yields an account
of
of C,
C,asasPost.
Post. An.An.envisages
envisages(94b19
(94b19
f.): what
f.): what
it is toitbeisato
man
beisa perhaps
man is an
perhaps
abstraction
an abstraction
from from
what
whatititisistotofunction
functionwellwell
as a as
man.
a man.
If 'B' If
is more
'B' is determinate,
more determinate,
B may still
B may
yield still
an account
yield an account
of C if'C' is correspondingly determinate, say if'B' is 'healing' and 'C' is 'doctor'. However,
two points arise, of which M. possibly overlooks the first, but rightly makes much of the second:
(i) If 'C' is 'man', 'B' 'living well', and 'A' a specification of something that counts towards
living well, then 'A is B' is an evaluation of A whose truth (if any) is as inherently practical as
that of 'Every C must achieve B.' M.'s contrast between inherently and accidentally practical
truth (pp. 266 f.) fails to distinguish these two propositions.
(ii) If 'C' is 'man'. and 'B' a specification of living well, then if I accept 'Every C must achieve
B' I resolve to imprint upon myself (M.'s Selbstgestaltung) a character that others may disregard
or reject. Can I hope to prove them ignorant or mistaken? M.'s Aristotle doubts it. Otherwise
a man could discover practical truth by theoretical inquiry and without active commitment; but.
as it is, virtue and experience are necessary for effective knowledge of the good. M. seems later
to leave open a contrary line of speculation (pp. 293 f.): but I find it refreshing that he generally
repudiates any 'function argument' on behalf of Aristotle, and not in criticism of him.
Are there any disappointments? The little that M. has already published on practical thinking
is original and provocative; so it is a pity that here, of the issues most relevant to current debate,
some are only mentioned (e.g., whether p;actical premisses are to be taken only in relation to
the immediate context), others discussed too briefly (notably whether any inference is essentially
practical, ? 25). The result is as Aristotelian as one could have hoped, but perhaps less
philosophical than one might have expected. One waits for more.

University of York A. W. PRICE

H. J. BLUMENTHAL, A. C. LLOYD (edd.): Soul and the Structure

of Being in Late Neoplatonism. Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius.
Pp. vii + 95. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1982. Paper, ?6.50.
This short and not inexpensive book contains the papers and discussions of a colloquium held
at Liverpool, 15-16 April 1982. There are four papers dealing in turn with 'Monad and Dyad
as Cosmic Principles in Syrianus' by A. D. R. Sheppard; 'Procession and Division in Proclus'
by A. C. Lloyd; ' La doctrine de Simplicius sur l'ame raisonnable humaine dans le Commentaire
sur le manuel d'Epictete' by I. Hadot and fourthly 'The Psychology of (?) Simplicius'
Commentary on the De anima' by H. J. Blumenthal. The other participants in the colloquium
must have made it a memorable and worthwhile, though rather shortlived occasion. 'he
foremost living experts on the field of later Platonism were present including A. H. Armstrong,
P. Hadot, J. Rist and A. Smith.
Arguably the most interesting feature of the collection is the difference of opinion among two
at least of the participants about the validity of the thesis of C. G. Steel's The changing self: a
study of the soul in later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus (cf. the review by
A. Smith in JHS 100 [1980]). There it is argued that the three authors there mentioned were

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136 TIHE CLASSICAL REVIEW

the
the only
only later
laterPlatonists
Platoniststototeach
teachthe
the
mutability
mutability
as distinct
as distinct
from
from
the the
fall fall
of the
of soul.
the soul.
So itSo
is it
well
is well
enough
enough known
knownthat thatProclus
Proclusdissented
dissented from
from Plotinus
Plotinusin in
hishis
assertion
assertion
at e.g.
at e.g.
Elements
Elements211 that
211 that
the
the soul
soul completely
completelyfalls.
falls.But
Butititis is
also
also
argued
arguedthat
that
Proclus
Proclus
dissented
dissented
fromfrom
lanblichus
lanblichusin denying
in denying
the
the changeableness
changeablenessof ofthe
thefallen
fallensoul.soul.
With
With Steel's
Steel's
hypothesis
hypothesis Blumenthal
Blumenthal is inisa in
large
a large
measure
measure
of agreement,
agreement,whereas
whereasIlsetraut
IlsetrautHadot
Hadot feels
feels
that
that
such
sucha view
a view
is oversimplified.
is oversimplified. She suggests
She suggests
that that
even
even Plotinus
Plotinus isisprepared
preparedtotoadmit
admit a greater
a greaterdegree
degreeof of
alteration
alterationin the
in the
soulsoul
thanthan
somesome
exegetes
exegetes
allow
allow for.
for. It
It must
mustbebesaid
saidinindefence
defence ofofher
her
position
positionthatthat
despite
despite
the the
evidence
evidence
of Ennead
of Ennead
4. 8. 4.
8 8. 8
and
and 4.
4. 1,
1, there
thereare
aredisturbing
disturbingpassages
passages
at at
4. 4.
4. 4.
3 and
3 and
5. 1.
5. 11.which
1 which
challenge
challenge
a tooa simple
too simple
evaluation
evaluation
of Plotinus.
Plotinus. In
Inthis
thisparticular
particularcollection
collectionthetheissue
issue
is rather
is ratherover
over
the the
interpretation
interpretation
of Simplicius.
of Simplicius.
De Anima
Anima 220.
220.2-4
2-4(cf.(cf.p.p.91).
91).Blumenthal
Blumenthal argues
arguesthat
that
Simplicius'
Simplicius'
language
language
needneed
onlyonly
meanmean
that that
the
the soul
soul has
has aatemporary
temporarychange. change.Against
Againstsuch
such
an an
interpretation
interpretationHadot
Hadot
argues
argues
thatthat
suchsuch
a view
a view
overlooks
overlooks the
thefact
factthatthatS.S.waswasa apupil
pupil
ofofDamascius.
Damascius. AndAnd
he he
certainly
certainly
believed
believed
in the
in change
the change
of the
the human
humansoul.
soul.Perhaps,
Perhaps,though,
though, the
the
views
viewsareare
notnot
as far
as far
apart
apart
as the
as the
foregoing
foregoing
remarks
remarks
may may
suggest.
suggest. After
Afterallallititisishardly
hardlytotobebe supposed
supposedthat
that
thethe
change
change
in the
in the
soulsoul
argued
argued
for by
forlamblichus
by lamblichus
and his followers was in itself irreversible. The whole Platonist school had to offer some sort of
rationale for the obvious fact of the weakness and sinfulness of the human being. Whether one
talks of 'fall', 'change' or 'weakness' seems hardly to matter. Nor is the problem restricted to
pagans. A few apt quotations from St Augustine illustrate the universal nature of the problem
which faces any thinker who is prepared to take seriously both the goodness of the human soul
and the existence of evil.

Campion Hall, Oxford A N T H O N Y M EREDITH

AN NICK CHARLES-SAGET: L'Architectur

et philosophie chez Plotin et Proclus. Pp. 345
1982. Paper.
Mme. Charles-Saget sets out to examine the variety of roles played by mathematics in the
metaphysics of Plotinus and Proclus. Rather than attempting to cover the subject comprehensively
she concentrates on Plotinus' treatment of intelligible number in Ennead 6. 6, Proclus' use of
the deductive method in the Elements of Theology and Proclus' view of geometry as it is presented
in his Commentary on the first book of Euclid's Elements. One of C-S.'s aims is to examine the
differences between Plotinus and Proclus as philosophers. She is very aware too of how much the
Neoplatonic manner of philosophising differs from Plato's own and her discussions of Plotinus
and Proclus are preceded by three chapters which pick out certain relevant features of Plato's
metaphysics.
C-S. is at her best when expounding and discussing particular Neoplatonic texts and she may
well be right to treat a potentially large and diffuse subject in a selective way. Nevertheless the
different parts of the book are not sufficiently drawn together and where she does attempt general
discussion, C-S.'s own style becomes somewhat diffuse and it can take het a long time to make
a point. This fault is most evident in the initial discussion of Plato where too much ground is
covered too fast. Chapter I gathers together what Plato has to say about the world of Forms and
relationships within it. Chapter 2, which is mostly about the Timaeus, is concerned with the
different kinds of mathematical ordering found in Plato, while Chapter 3 puts together Plato's
view of the whole-part relationship in Theaetetus 201d-206c and Parmendes 157c-e with what
first Plotinus and then Proclus have to say about that relationship. C-S. has some suggestive
things to say about Plato, such as her remarks on his notion of doxa on pp. 31--3, but they are
wrapped up in rather grandiloquent language in which, for example, the difficulty of giving a
clear account of knowledge becomes 'l'impossible transparence du savoir a soi-meme' (p. 32)
The discussion becomes more detailed, more precise and easier to follow when we reach the
second part of the book which is mostly concerned with Plotinus 6. 6. The best chapter here,
a long analysis of the treatise which includes elucidation and discussion of its arguments, has
already appeared in the joint edition of 6. 6 published in 1980 by J. Bertier, L. Brisson, A. Charles.
J. P6pin, H. D. Saffrey and A. P. Segonds. 6. 6 is concerned with number as an intelligible
principle of order rather than with numbers in mathematics but C-S. does her best to widen
the discussion by examining what view of arithmetic is implied both in this treatise and in others
such as 5. 5 and 6. 2. However, she cannot really avoid the conclusion that Plotinus shows little
interest in the application of numbers in mathematics and she returns to further consideration
of the place and function of number in Plotinus' intelligible world. Towards the end of this part,

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