Emergency Descent (memory item)

If an emergency descent is required, the Captain should consider

taking control if not already PF. PF initiates the memory items by
announcing “Emergency Descent.”

Don oxygen masks and establish communication.

PF then flies the emergency descent. Descent with autopilot and

autothrust engaged is preferred. The configuration is thrust idle, full
speed brake and maximum appropriate speed, taking into account
possible structural damage.[5] Target altitude is FL100 or MORA if
this is higher. If speed is low, allow speed to increase before
deploying full speedbrake to prevent activation of the angle of
attack protection. Landing gear may be used below 25,000ft, but
speed must be below VLO when it is extended and remain below
VLE. If on an airway, consider turning 90° to the left.

PM’s only memory action is to turn the seatbelt signs on.[6] Initially,
PM’s main task is to ensure that PF has promptly and correctly
initiated the descent.

Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraft is

descending, PF should call for the Emergency Descent Checklist
(“My radios, Emergency Descent Checklist”). This will lead PF to
finesse the speed and altitude targets and inform ATC of the
descent; PM to set continuous ignition on the engines and set 7700
on the transponder. Both pilots then set their oxygen flows to the N
position[7] and, if cabin altitude will exceed 14,000ft, PM deploys the
cabin oxygen masks. On most aircraft, the CIDS/PRAM will not
automatically play a suitable PA, so it is necessary for the flight
crew to carry out the EMER DESCENT (PA) action.

Once level, restore the aircraft to a normal configuration. When safe

to do so, advise cabin crew and passengers that it is safe to remove
their masks. To deactivate the mask microphone and switch off the
oxygen flow, close the oxygen mask stowage compartment and
press the “PRESS TO RESET” oxygen control slide.

Windshear (memory item)

Reactive
The windshear detection system is a function of the Flight
Augmentation Computer (FAC). It only operates during the takeoff
and landing phases with at least CONF 1 selected. In the takeoff
phase, warnings are provided from 3 seconds after lift off until
1300ft RA is achieved. In the landing phase warnings are provided
between 1300ft RA and 50ft RA. A warning is indicated by a red
“WINDSHEAR” flag on the PFD and a “WINDSHEAR,
WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR” aural warning.

When on the ground, windshear is only indicated by significant

airspeed variations. It is possible that these fluctuations may cause
V1 to occur significantly later in the takeoff run then it should. It
therefore falls to the Captain to make an assessment of whether
sufficient runway remains to reject the takeoff, or whether getting
airborne below Vr would be the better option. If the takeoff is to be
continued in windshear conditions, call “Windshear, TOGA” and
apply TOGA power. Rotate at Vr or with sufficient runway remaining
and follow SRS orders.[8] SRS will maintain a minimum rate of
climb, even if airspeed must be sacrificed.

If a warning occurs when airborne, call “Windshear, TOGA”, apply

TOGA power and maintain current configuration. The autopilot can
fly the escape manoeuvre as long as αreq < αprot. If the autopilot is
not engaged, follow the SRS orders on the FD. If the FD is not
available, initially pitch up to 17.5°, then increase as required.

Do not change configuration until out of the windshear.

In severe windshear, it is possible that ALPHA FLOOR protection

will activate. As TOGA will already be selected, this will have no
immediate effect. Once clear of the windshear, however, TOGA LK
will be active, requiring the autothrust to be disconnected to avoid
an overspeed. This is most naturally achieved by pressing the
“instinctive disconnect pb” on the thrust levers then flying manual
thrust until the situation has sufficiently stabilised to re-engage the
autothrust.
Predictive

When below 2300ft AGL, the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60°
arc ahead of the aircraft for returns indicating potential windshear.
Alerts are categorised as advisory, caution or warning, in increasing
order of severity. Severity is determined by range, position and
phase of flight. Alerts are only provided when between 50ft and
1500ft, or on the ground when below 100kt.

All types of alert produce an indication of windshear position on the

ND, providing the ND range is set to 10nm. A message on the ND
instructs the crew to change range to 10nm if not already set.
Cautions also give an amber “W/S AHEAD” message on both PFDs
and an aural “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” warning. Warnings
give a red “W/S AHEAD” message on the PFDs and either a
“WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” or “GO AROUND,
WINDSHEAR AHEAD” aural message.

If a warning alert occurs during the takeoff roll, reject the takeoff. If it
occurs during initial climb, call “Windshear, TOGA”, apply TOGA
thrust and follow SRS orders. Configuration may be changed as
long as the windshear is not entered.

If a warning alert occurs during approach, carry out a normal go-

around. If positive verification is made that no hazard exists,
providing that the reactive windshear is serviceable the crew may
downgrade the warning to a caution. If a caution alert occurs during
approach, consider use of CONF 3 and increasing VAPP to a
maximum of VLS+15.

Unreliable Speed

Unreliable airspeed indications may result from radome damage

and/or unserviceable probes or ports. Altitude indications may also
be erroneous if static probes are affected.

The FMGCs normally reject erroneous ADR data by isolating a

single source that has significant differences to the other two
sources. It is possible that a single remaining good source may be
rejected if the other two sources are erroneous in a sufficiently
similar way. In this case, it falls to the pilots to identify and turn off
the erroneous sources to recover good data.

The first problem is recognition of a failure, since the aircraft

systems may be unable to warn of a problem. The primary method
of doing this is correlation of aircraft attitude and thrust to displayed
performance. Correlation of radio altimeter and GPIRS derived data
(available on GPS MONITOR page) may also aid identification. The
stall warning (available in alternate or direct law) is based on alpha
probes, so will likely be valid. Other clues may include fluctuations
in readings, abnormal behaviour of the automatics, high speed
buffet or low aerodynamic noise.

If the aircraft flight path is in doubt, disconnect the automatics and

fly the following short term attitude and thrust settings to initiate a
climb:

If configured CONF Full, select CONF 3, otherwise flap/slat

configuration should be maintained. The gear and speedbrake
should be retracted. If there is any doubt over the validity of altitude
information, the FPV must be disregarded. If altitude information is
definitely good, the FPV may be used.

It is important to understand that at this stage, while the pilot has

identified that airspeed is unreliable, the aircraft systems have not.
Thus flight envelope protections based on airspeed data from
unreliable ADRs may activate. This may lead to pitch inputs from
the flight computers that cannot be overridden with the sidesticks. In
this case, immediately switch off any two ADRs; this causes the
flight computers to revert to Alternate Law with no protections, and
thus allows control of the aircraft to be regained.

Once the flight path is under control and a safe altitude is attained,
the aircraft should be transitioned into level flight. Refer to
QRH AEP.NAV.USI to extract a ballpark thrust setting, a reference
attitude and a reference speed for the current configuration, bearing
in mind that an auto-retraction of the flap may have occurred. Set
the ballpark thrust setting and adjust pitch attitude to fly level; if
barometric altitude data is considered accurate use the VSI,
otherwise fly a constant GPS altitude. The thrust should then be
adjusted until level flight is achieved with the reference attitude.
Note that in the radome damage case, the required N1 may be as
much as 5% greater than the ballpark figure. Once stable, the
speed will be equal to the reference speed.
If there is insufficient data available to fly level (e.g. GPS data
unavailable and barometric data unreliable), fly the reference
attitude with the ballpark thrust setting. This will give approximately
level flight at approximately reference speed.

With the speed now known, the ADRs can be checked to see if any
are giving accurate data. If at least one ADR is reliable, turn off the
faulty ADRs. GPS and IRS ground speeds may also be used for an
approximate cross check.

If all ADRs are considered unreliable, turn off any two of them; one
is kept on to provide stall warning from the alpha probes. More
recent aircraft have backup speed/altitude scales based on AOA
probes and GPS altitudes which are activated when below FL250
by turning off the third ADR. The ALL ADR OFF procedure in
QRH AEP.NAV describes the use of these scales, but it boils down
to fly the green on the speed scale and anticipate slightly reduced
accuracy from the altitude scale. For aircraft without this
functionality, tables are provided in section AEP.NAV.USI of the
QRH to enable all phases of flight to be flown using just pitch and
thrust settings. Acceleration and clean up are carried out in level
flight. Flap 1 can be selected as soon as climb thrust is selected,
flap 0 once the appropriate S speed pitch attitude from the table on
the first page of the QRH AEP.NAV.USI procedure is reached.
Configuration for approach is also carried out in level flight,
stabilising in each configuration using the technique described
above. The approach is flown in CONF 3 at an attitude that should
result in VLS+10 when flying a 3° glide. Landing distance will be
increased.

Incapacitation

Take control, using the stick priority button if necessary. Contact

cabin crew ASAP. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to his
seat, move the seat back, then recline it. If there are two cabin crew
available, the body can be moved. Medical help should be sought
from passengers, and the presence of any type rated company
pilots on board ascertained.

Ditching
If time is short due to loss of thrust at low altitude, a “quick” ditching
procedure is available on the back of the normal checklist. This
procedure gives you a suitable configuration for ditching (CONF 2,
Gear up) and a table for determining a suitable approach speed
given your gross weight. It also instructs that the APU be started,
the ditching button be pushed, provides guidance for the flare
(minimise VS, attitude 11°) and provides instructions for shutting
down the engines and APU on touchdown (all masters off).

If time is available, apply the procedures in the QRH. The

QRH AEP.MISC Ditching procedure applies if the engines are
running. If the engines are not running, depending on airframe, refer
to either the appropriate QRH AEP.ENG ENG DUAL FAILURE
(DEF) procedure or to the QRH AEP.ENG ALL ENG FAIL (AEF)
procedure[9]; all of these incorporate ditching procedures.

Preparation for ditching involves notifying ATC in order to expedite

rescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the aircraft for
impact. The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent nuisance
warnings. The crew oxygen should be turned off below FL100 to
prevent potentially dangerous leaks.[10]

The engines operative ditching configuration is gear up, config full,

11° pitch and minimal V/S. If both engines are inoperative: for DEF
airframes use config 3 and for AEF airframes use config 2[11];
maintain at least 150kt to give a margin against RAT stall. In strong
winds, land into wind. In lighter winds, land parallel to swell. At
2000ft AGL, the bleeds are all turned off, the ditching button is
pushed[12] and the “Cabin crew, landing positions” PA is made. At
500ft, make a PA “Brace, brace”

At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. After coming to
a stop, notify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents
(engine agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft.[13]

Forced Landing

If time is short due to loss of thrust at low altitude, a “quick” forced

landing procedure is available on the back of the normal checklist.
This procedure gives you a suitable configuration for forced landing
(CONF 2, Gear down by gravity, spoilers armed) and a table for
determining a suitable approach speed given your gross weight. It
also instructs that the APU be started, provides guidance for the
flare (minimise VS) and provides instructions for shutting down the
engines and APU on touchdown (all masters off).

If time is available, apply the procedures in the QRH. The

QRH AEP.MISC Forced Landing procedure applies if the engines
are running. If the engines are not running, depending on airframe,
refer to either the appropriate QRH AEP.ENG ENG DUAL FAILURE
(DEF) procedure or to the QRH AEP.ENG ALL ENG FAIL (AEF)
procedure[9]; all of these incorporate Forced Landing procedures.

Preparation for forced landing involves notifying ATC in order to

expedite rescue, preparing survival equipment and securing the
aircraft for impact. The GPWS should be inhibited to prevent
nuisance warnings. The crew oxygen should be turned off below
FL100 to prevent potentially dangerous leaks.[10]

The engines operative forced landing configuration is gear down,

config full, spoilers armed. If both engines are inoperative: for DEF
airframes use config 3 and for AEF airframes use config 2[11];
maintain at least 150kt to give a margin against RAT stall. The ram
air button is used to ensure that the aircraft will be completely
depressurised at touchdown. At 2000ft, make a PA “Cabin crew,
landing positions”. At 500ft, make a PA “Brace, brace”

At touchdown, turn the engine and APU masters off. This will leave
accumulator braking only. After coming to a stop, set the parking
brake, notify ATC, push all fire buttons, discharge all agents (engine
agent 2 may not be available) and evacuate the aircraft.[13]

Evacuation

Evacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency

evacuation checklist. The procedure is for CM1 to call for the
checklist and then send a Mayday message to ATC before
commencing the checklist.

The first two items confirm the RTO actions of stopping the aircraft,
setting the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew. The next item
confirms ATC has been alerted.
The next four items prepare the aircraft for evacuation. If manual
cabin pressure has been used, CM2 checks cabin diff is zero, and if
necessary manually opens the outflow valve. CM2 then shuts the
engines down with their master switches, and pushes all the fire
buttons (including the APU). Confirmation is not required before
carrying out these actions.[14] In response to the next checklist item,
“Agents”, CM1 decides if any extinguishing agents should be
discharged and instructs CM2 to discharge them as required.
Engine agent 2 will not be available. Agents should only be
discharged if there are positive signs of fire.

Finally, order the evacuation. This is primarily done with the PA

“Passengers Evacuate, Evacuate Evacuate”, with the evacuation
alarm being triggered as a backup.

If no evacuation is required, then don’t forget to make the PA ”

Passengers and cabin crew to remain seated”

Overweight Landing

A landing can be made at any weight, providing sufficient landing

distance is available. In general, automatic landings are only
certified up to MLW, but the FCOM specifies that, for the A319 only,
autoland is available up to 69000kg in case of emergency. The
preferred landing configuration is CONF FULL, but lower settings
may be used if required by QRH/ECAM procedures. QRH MISC.OL
also specifies CONF 3 if the aircraft weight exceeds the CONF 3 go
around limit; this will only ever be a factor for airfields with
elevations above 1000ft. Packs should be turned off to provide
additional go around thrust. If planned landing configuration is less
than FULL, use 1+F for go-around.

It is possible that S speed will be higher than VFE next for CONF 2. In
this case, a speed below VFE next should be selected until CONF 2 is
achieved, then managed speed can be re-engaged.

In the final stages of the approach, reduce speed to achieve VLS at

runway threshold. Land as smoothly as possible, and apply max
reverse as soon as the main gear touches down. Maximum braking
can be used after nose wheel touchdown. After landing, switch on
the brake fans and monitor brake temperatures carefully. If
temperatures exceed 800°C, tyre deflation may occur.

Engine Failure in Cruise

Engine out ceiling is highly dependent on weight; ISA deviation also

has a modest effect. It will generally lie between FL180 and FL350.

The first action will be to select both thrust levers to MCT so as to

allow the autothrust its full engine out range. If the N1 gauges
indicate a thrust margin exists, then the aircraft is below engine out
ceiling; descent may be appropriate to increase the available thrust
margin, but there is no immediate threat. If, however, the N1
gauges indicate that the autothrust is commanding MCT, and the
speed is still decaying, then the aircraft is above engine out ceiling
and prompt execution of a drift down procedure is required.

Drift down with autopilot engaged in OP DES is preferred.

Engagement of this vertical mode normally results in the autothrust
commanding idle thrust, which is not what is desired. Thus, having
set the thrust lever to MCT, the autothrust is disconnected. The
PROG page provides a REC MAX EO flight level to use as an
altitude target. If the speed decay is modest, it may be possible to
alert ATC before initiating the descent, but in-service events have
shown that speed decay is often very rapid, requiring descent
initiation to be prioritised.

Once drift down has been initiated, a decision needs to be made

about speed. If obstacles are a concern, the lowest drift down rate
and highest ceiling are achieved at green dot. Airbus refers to
drifting down at green dot as “Obstacle strategy”. Flying at green
dot reduces the chance of the FADECs automatically relighting the
failed engine as the engine will be windmilling more slowly.
Therefore, if obstacles are not a concern, M.78/300kt is flown, a
speed that will always fall within the stabilized windmill engine
relight envelope; Airbus refers to this as “Standard Strategy”.

If obstacles remain a problem, MCT and green dot speed can be

maintained to give a shallow climbing profile. Once obstacles are no
longer a problem, descend to LRC ceiling (use V/S if <500 fpm
descent rate), engage the autothrust and continue at LRC speed.
Bomb On Board

The primary aim is to get the aircraft on the ground and evacuated
ASAP.

The secondary aim is to prevent detonation of the device. This is

achieved by preventing further increases in cabin altitude through
the use of manual pressure control and by avoiding sharp
manoeuvres and turbulence.

The tertiary aim is to minimise the effect of any explosion. This is

achieved by reducing the diff to 1 psi. The method is to set cabin
vertical speed to zero using manual pressurisation control, then
descend to an altitude 2500ft above cabin altitude. As further
descent is required, cabin vertical speed should be adjusted to
maintain the 1 psi diff for as long as possible. Automatic pressure
control is then reinstated on approach. Low speeds reduce the
damage from an explosion but increase the risk of a timed
explosion occurring whilst airborne; a compromise needs to be
found. The aircraft should be configured for landing as early as
possible to avoid an explosion damaging landing systems.

In the cabin, procedures are laid down for assessing the risks of
moving the device and for moving the device to the LRBL at door
2R.

Stall Recovery (memory item)

Aerofoil stall is always and only an angle of attack issue. It is not

possible to directly prove an unstalled condition from attitude and
airspeed data. The flight recorders from the December 2014 Air
Asia accident recorded an angle of attack of 40 degrees (i.e. around
25 degrees greater than critical angle) with both pitch and roll zero
and speeds up to 160kt. Importantly, it is perfectly possible to be
fully stalled in the emergency configurations described
in “Unreliable airspeed (memory item)”. Identification of a fully
stalled condition is thus largely dependent on identifying a high and
uncontrollable descent rate that does not correlate with normal flight
path expectations for the attitude and thrust applied.
To recover from a fully stalled condition, the angle of attack of the
aerofoils must be reduced to below critical. The generic stall
recovery is therefore simply to pitch the nose down sufficiently to
break the stall and level the wings. In normal operations, the
velocity vector of the aircraft is around 3° below the centerline of the
aircraft (i.e. an attitude of around 3° is required to fly level). In a
stalled condition, the velocity vector may be 40° or more below the
centerline of the aircraft. Thus the amount of pitch down required to
recover a fully stalled aircraft can be 30° or more.

The aircraft’s thrust vector helps to accelerate the aircraft during the
recovery, and increasing speed along the aircraft’s centerline acts
to reduce the stalled angle of attack. Thus, while thrust is not a
primary means of recovery, it does help. Unfortunately, Airbus have
determined that due to the pitch couple associated with underslung
engines, there may be insufficient longitudinal control authority to
pitch the aircraft sufficiently to recover from a stall if TOGA is
selected. It may therefore be necessary to initially reduce thrust to
allow the primary recovery technique to be applied; this is extremely
counterintuitive.

In the two recent Airbus accidents involving stalls, the lack of

physical cross coupling of sidesticks was a major factor. If one pilot
elects to hold full back sidestick, the aircraft cannot be recovered by
the other pilot unless the takeover pushbutton is used. With all the
alarms, it is easy to miss “Dual Input”.

Once there are no longer any indications of the stall, smoothly

recover from the dive, adjust thrust, check speedbrakes retracted
and if appropriate (clean and below 20,000ft) deploy the slats by
selecting flaps 1. The load factor associated with an overly
aggressive pull out can induce a secondary stall; on the flip side,
once reattachment of the airflow occurs, drag rapidly diminishes
and exceedance of high speed airframe limitations becomes a
threat.

If a stall warner sounds on takeoff it is likely to be spurious since

you are almost certainly in normal law. The procedure in this case is
essentially to initially assume unreliable airspeed and fly TOGA,
15°, wings level until it can be confirmed that the warning is
spurious.
A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that the aircraft
is reaching αbuffet. In this case simply reduce the back pressure on
the sidestick and/or reduce bank angle.

Computer reset

Abnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interrupting

the power supply of the affected computer. This can be done either
with cockpit controls or with circuit breakers. The general procedure
is to interrupt the power supply, wait 3 seconds (5 seconds if a C/B
was used), restore the power, then wait another three seconds for
the reset to complete. QRH SYSTEM RESET details the specific
procedures for a variety of systems.

On the ground, almost all computers can be reset. MCC can usually
supply a reset procedure if nothing applicable is available in the
QRH. The exceptions are the ECU and EIU while the associated
engine is running and the BSCU when the aircraft is not stopped.

In flight, only the computers listed in the QRH should be considered

for reset.

Landing Distance Calculations

Many failures result in a longer than normal landing distance. The

QRH inflight performance section has tables for calculating VAPP and
Reference Landing Distances for single failures. These reflect the
performance achievable in a typical operational landing without
margin. easyJet requires a factor of 1.15 to be applied to these
distances.

The EFB module provides both factored and unfactored landing

distances, and also can calculate for multiple failures.

The safety factor may be disregarded in exceptional circumstances.

Abnormal V Alpha Prot

If two or more angle of attack vanes become blocked at the same

angle during climb, alpha floor protection will be activated once a
Mach number is reached where the angle of attack at which the
vanes were blocked becomes indicative of an incipient stall
condition. Since the flight computer’s attempts to reduce angle of
attack will not be registered by the blocked vanes, a continuous
nose down pitch rate which cannot be stopped with sidestick inputs
will result.

Indications of the incipient condition are available from the Alpha

Prot and Alpha max strips. If the Alpha Max strip (solid red)
completely hides the Alpha Prot strip (black and amber) or the
Alpha Prot strip moves rapidly by more than 30kt during flight
manoeuvres with AP on and speed brakes retracted, blocked angle
of attack vanes should be suspected.

The solution is to force the flight computers into Alternate Law

where the protection does not apply. This is most conveniently done
by turning off any two ADRs. Once in Alternate Law, the stall
warning strip (red and black) becomes available. Since this may be
receiving data from a blocked angle of attack vane, erroneous
presentation is possible.

Overspeed Recovery

In general the response to an overspeed should be to deploy the

speedbrake and monitor the thrust reduction actioned by the
autothrust. Disconnection of the autopilot will not normally be
required. If autothrust is not in use, the thrust levers will need to be
manually retarded.

It is possible that the autopilot will automatically disengage and high

speed protection will activate, resulting in an automatic pitch up. In
this case, smoothly adjust pitch attitude as required.

Volcanic Ash Encounter

Volcanic ash clouds are usually extensive, so the quickest exit will
be achieved by a 180° turn.

Air quality may be affected, so crew oxygen masks should be

donned with 100% oxygen to exclude fumes. Passenger oxygen
may also need to be deployed.

Be prepared to carry out the unreliable speed procedure as

airspeed indications may be compromised.
Disconnect the autothrust to prevent thrust variations. To minimise
the impact on the engines, if conditions permit thrust should be
reduced. Turn on all anti-ice and set pack flow to high in order to
increase bleed demand and thus increase stall margin. Wing anti-
ice should be turned off before restart in case of double engine
flameout.

If engine EGT limits are exceeded, consider precautionary engine

shutdown with restart once clear of volcanic ash. Engine
acceleration may be very slow during restart. Since compressor and
turbine blades may have been eroded, avoid sudden thrust
changes.

Damage to the windshield may necessitate an autoland or landing

with a sliding window open.
[5]
According to Airbus, structural damage may be suspected if there has been a “loud
bang” or there is a high cabin vertical speed. When limiting descent speed due to
suspected structural damage, it is IAS rather than Mach that is relevant.
[6]
Prior to a 2017 update from Airbus, PM would complete a fairly lengthy list of
memory items at the start of the Emergency Descent procedure. It was found that
PM was more usefully employed monitoring PF’s actions, and hence most of these
memory items were removed to a read and do checklist to be completed once
descent had been initiated.
[7]
There may be insufficient oxygen to cover the entire emergency descent profile if
the oxygen masks are left set to 100%.
[8]
“Sufficient runway remaining” is actually Boeing advice – Airbus offers no guidance
for the case where there is insufficient runway available to stop nor to rotate at
normal speeds.
[9]
The ALL ENG FAIL checklist replaces the DUAL FAILURE checklist for certain
airframes; this appears to be related to the modification level of the FWCs.
[10]
The reasoning behind turning off the crew oxygen is an assumption on my part.
[11]
The AEF vs DEF configuration difference is odd since it would seem that the
airframes involved are fundamentally the same, differing only in modification level of
the FWCs. A reasonable explanation is that there is not, in reality, much difference
between config 2 and config 3 in the ditching or forced landing case. If hydraulics are
only available from the RAT, flaps are frozen and hence config 2 and config 3 are
identical. If the APU generator is available and thus the yellow electric pump is
available, the flaps are available; however the ΔVREF mandated for a config 2 landing
and a config 3 landing (from the QRH Inflight Performance Slats and Flaps System
tables) is 10kt in both cases. Clarification has been sought from Airbus – this manual
will be updated as soon as I have the information.
[12]
This closes all openings below the waterline and reduce water ingress; the
pressurisation must be in AUTO for this to work.
[13]
The “no fuel remaining” procedure does not directly call for the fire buttons to be
pushed or the agents to be discharged, but the evacuation action includes these
items.
[14]
The Airbus Training Study Guide was recently (mid 2017) changed to align with
the FCTM.