MTP-6 (C) VolII
MTP-6 (C) VolII
MTP-6(C)
VOLUME II
NAVAL MINE
COUNTERMEASURES
OPERATIONS PLANNING
AND EVALUATION
MAY 2002
0410LP1016240
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September 2002
2. Summary:
This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.
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May 2002
2. The aim of MTP-6(C) VOLUME II is to provide NATO and co-operating nations with a user
friendly coherent publication forming common doctrine to conduct multinational exercises and
operations.
5. This MM shall not be posted on any freely accessible information or media facility unless
previously and expressly approved by the Naval Board on a case-by-case basis.
6. MTP-6(C) VOLUME II contains tactical doctrine and procedures derived directly from ATP-
6(C) VOLUME II. Change proposals may be submitted by any nation either through a
sponsoring NATO nation or directly to UK as the NATO Custodian.
Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director, NSA
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NATION RESERVATIONS
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September 2002
2. Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command will promulgate the effective date of
MTP 6(C) VOLUME II for Department of the Navy holders.
4. This Multinational Manual shall not be posted on any freely accessible information or media
facility.
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RECORD OF CHANGES
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this
Contents List refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’
respectively.
SECTION I - INTRODUCTION
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SECTION II - MISSION
SECTION I - INTRODUCTION
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SECTION I - INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 6: MINESWEEPING
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CHAPTER 7: MINEHUNTING
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SECTION I - GENERAL
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SECTION I - GENERAL
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INDEX-1
LEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LEP-1
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
CHAPTER 1 - DEFENSIVE MCM OPERATIONS
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CHAPTER 6 - MINESWEEPING
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LIST OF TABLES
CHAPTER 1 - DEFENSIVE MCM OPERATIONS
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CHAPTER 6 - MINESWEEPING
CHAPTER 7 - MINEHUNTING
CHAPTER 8 - DIVING
Table 8-1 The General Relationship between the Different Diver Breathing
Gases and their Suitability for Clearance Diving . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4
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PREFACE
0001. Purpose.
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this
publication refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
The purpose of MTP-6(C), Volume II, is to provide guidance and common doctrine for Allied and
National Commands and for mine countermeasures forces in support of MTP-1. It is the governing
NATO mine warfare publication and covers minefield and mine countermeasures planning, mine threat,
minelaying and mine countermeasures operations. MTP-6(C), Volume II, is intended for application at
the operational level.
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0003. Symbols. In some cases throughout MTP-6 the same symbol has more than one meaning for
minefield planning and another meaning for mine countermeasures. This has been found necessary
because of the limitations of available symbols. Care has been taken however to limit each symbol to no
more than one meaning for minefield planning and one meaning for mine countermeasures.
1. The International Units System (Systme International d'Unites - short title `SI Units') is the
standard NATO system of measurement. A conversion table is included for convenience in converting
from SI Units to CGS and other units, and vice versa, since many equipments will be based on the old
systems until the turnover to SI Units has been completed. Where other units are by necessity used, eg
yards or fathoms, equivalent values in SI Units will be shown in brackets ( ) alongside each other in the
text, in figures and by showing both scales together. Where sound levels are expressed in decibels, unless
otherwise stated, the reference is FPa. The relation of this level to a reference of 1 microbar is as follows:
a. Value in dB (re 1 FPa) = value of dB (re 1 Fbar) + 100dB. Spectrum level shall be quoted
in dB (re 1 FPa) for 1 Hz bandwidth.
b. Unless otherwise stated the following units of measurement are used in the Mine Warfare
Publications MTP-6 and MTP-24:
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c. For intranational use, the units of measurement of the nation concerned may be used.
Some data has been devised and collected in Imperial and/or Metric Units of measurement.
Where this is so the NATO Agreed Conversion Factors in the following conversion table are
to be used.
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CHAPTER 1
1. Responses to a mining attack must be immediate, with highest priority being given to the most
urgent objective. The responsible authority must assess the threat and available MCM assets and with
the aid of contingency orders, plan the MCM operation. The immediate reaction must be to gather data
on the threat as soon as possible. This may be done by minehunting systems, exploratory operations,
minewatching reports, intelligence estimates, mine investigation and exploitation (MIE) and any other
means available. Exploratory operations may begin in accordance with contingency plans while the threat
estimate is still in progress. The choice of mine countermeasures becomes a continuing process based
on information as it is received. In all cases, where risk to the MCMV permits, channels are segmented
and the various segments are cleared simultaneously. Risk to the MCMV must be considered in the light
of the objective together with the tactical considerations and the number of MCMVs available. The loss
of MCM platforms may increase the subsequent threat to traffic and thus the accepted MCMV risk must
be as low as possible.
2. The above discussion points out the most urgent actions which must be taken in breakthrough
operations. However, most of these actions must be taken with any objective, but perhaps with less
urgency. In any event in any MCM scenario the planning follows these basic steps:
3. These concepts are discussed in different contexts and in more detail in the following paragraphs
and chapters.
1. When a report of mining, from whatever source, has been received the responsible Operational
Commander must decide:
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g. Whether MIE should be executed, keeping in mind that MIE is of utmost importance in
subsequent operations.
i. Whether he has sufficient forces under his command to deal with the minefield without
adversely affecting other equally or more important operations and, in consequence, whether
reinforcements should be requested.
j. Whether it would be advisable to pass ships or a particular ship through the area using
self-protective mine countermeasures, such as low speed, high tide, etc.
1. In assessing the size and shape of the minefield, the following factors should be taken into
account:
2. Mine Danger Area. If the limits of the field cannot be accurately determined, and depending
on intelligence and the geographical position of the mine, a circle should be drawn round the position of
each discovered mine to give the limits of the minefield, this is called the Mine Danger Area (MDA).
This should be done with experienced judgement and care should be taken not to draw the limits of the
mine danger area larger than necessary, otherwise the threat to shipping will be exaggerated and the
subsequent MCM operations unnecessarily prolonged. Any planned diversion should be kept clear of all
the circles.
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3. In assessing the likely contents of the minefield and how to counter them the factors discussed in
the previous paragraph must again be considered. Of considerable importance is the enemy's objective,
including the target he has chosen, and his knowledge of allied MCM forces and specifically the number
of sweepers and hunters and their capabilities. In addition a variety of parameters such as the local
environment and characteristics of the minefield will have a significant impact on the total MCM effort,
particularly the amount of work required and concomitantly the time required for the task. Advance
intelligence of the enemy's established policy in attaining his objective will probably not be adequate, and
thus this policy may only be known after trial and error (experience) or exploitation of recovered mines.
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1. Ships other than MCMVs. Any decision to sail ships through a known mined area should be
taken only after due consideration and inquiry of higher authority as to whether delays to particular ships
can be accepted. Only after rejection of all the possible alternatives, such as anchoring, diversion,
alternative destination etc, should ships be sent through a minefield believed to contain poised mines.
Factors affecting the decision to move traffic are risk, urgency of movement, and effectiveness of passive
and self-protective MCM.
b. Precautions to be Taken. When it is necessary that they pass through waters which may
have been mined, all ships should be instructed to carry out self-protective measures as given ATP-
6 Volume I, Chapter 4, and in ATP-1.
2. MCM Forces. The use of MCMVs in waters which are highly dangerous to them should be
undertaken only in extreme circumstances and when other more suitable forces are not available. From
a safety point of view the ideal in any MCM operation is to conduct the operation in the proper stages so
as to remove mines in order of their greatest hazard to the MCMV. This is not always possible, notably
when the replenishment rate of the minefield due to freshly-laid or poised mines is such that mines cannot
be dealt with in the required order. In such a case an attrition operation is normally called for. However,
when possible, the MCM planner should prepare a prioritized listing of known or suspected mines in
order of their degree of danger to the MCMV, indicating the stages which offer the most safety to the
MCMV, and a means of clearing the mines. This listing should be consulted when the detailed planning
commences.
d. Up-to-date information on the characteristics, equipment and state of training of the units
assigned.
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f. Time available, both for the operation and for the MCM units assigned.
4. Use of Forces. The basic concept is to integrate the conduct of operations, so as to make full
use of the information available, and to maximize co-operation between various MCM forces. Initial
planning must be based upon the best information available, and the resultant general plan must be
sufficiently flexible to change as new information becomes available. There will seldom be sufficient
knowledge of the environment, or of the mines. Also MCM assets will rarely be so flexible as to allow
their immediate assignment to a task most suited to their particular capability.
1. When determining the proper MCM tactics and techniques, the authority planning, ordering or
conducting the operation is usually constrained by the time allowed to complete the operation and the risk
to which he may subject the MCM asset(s). Generally the shorter the time allowed for an operation, the
greater becomes the risk to the MCM asset(s), and vice versa. However, risk to the MCM asset(s) and
speed of the operation are not always mutually compatible. For example, by subjecting certain MCM
asset(s) to high risk in a given operation it may actually take longer than if it were conducted using a
technique presenting less risk to the MCM asset(s) or using (an) other MCM asset(s) In a multinational
MCM force this can be achieved taking into account prior knowledge of the strengths of national MCM
forces, allowing task assignment based upon national/individual MCM capabilities.
2. In ordering MCM operations, except in those situations in which risk can be quantified or
estimated based on valid criteria, directives may be used. Directives are normally ordered by the
Operational Commander. There are three MCM Risk Directives:
a. Risk Directive Alfa. The primary concern is to minimize the risk to the MCM asset(s). The
timely completion of the task is of secondary importance.
b. Risk Directive Bravo. Balance the risk to MCM asset(s) and the time available, in order
to complete the task.
c. Risk Directive Charlie. The primary concern is the timely conclusion of the task. Risk to
MCM asset(s) is of secondary importance.
3. These MCM Risk Directives may be applied whenever it is deemed necessary by the appropriate
command authority. However they are of most benefit to a Commander employing a multinational MCM
force.
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d. Limited Clearance Operations. The same as clearance operations, except that the
required degree of clearance is limited to particular types of mines.
e. Short-term Operations. Carried out when the time available before ships are passed
through a mined area (or suspected mined area) is insufficient to carry out a clearance operation.
They may also be breakout/breakthrough operations. The aim of a short-term operation is to make
the best use of the available time in achieving the lowest number of casualties.
f. Attrition Operations. These may be necessary when enemy minefields are being frequently
replenished, or when the enemy is using mines with high ship counts, long arming delays, or
delayed rising, and when minehunters are not available or are operationally limited by the type of
bottom encountered. The aim is to keep the mine threat as low as possible.
h. Check Operations. Intended to confirm as far as possible, that no mines are left after a
previous clearance operation.
2. A number of specific tasks are not considered MCM operations, but can also be executed by MCM
forces. These include:
a. Surveys which concern the collection of data on the MCM environment. Surveys are normally
conducted in peacetime and their basic aim is to ascertain the suitability of conditions for MCM
operations.
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b. Lead-through operations to assist traffic in the transit of parts of a mined area which previous
have been subject to MCM effort. Details are given in ATP-24(C), Volume I, and ATP-1(C),
Volume I. (See also paras 0410 and 1013.)
The relationship between types of operations and information obtained about enemy mining effort is
shown in Figure 1-1 below:
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1. Localising the Threat. The threat can be localised, mine clearance forces concentrated, and
shipping more effectively controlled, by establishing a system of routing ships passing through mineable
waters. Movement of shipping by convoy and an adequate mine danger warning system are also
desirable.
a. Shipping Routes. These should be selected to make MCM as easy as possible. Some chief
requirements are shown below, if they conflict, suitability for minehunting and the depth of water
should be the first consideration.
(2) The route must be as short as possible, bends over 20E should be avoided if possible.
(3) Where possible, the route should be in range of radar surveillance apparatus and/or
minewatching and/or coastal defences. This is particularly important for those parts of the
route in shallow water.
(4) The route should be in range of good visual and/or radar fixing marks for navigation.
(5) Where possible, the route should be clear of strong tides and currents. The seabed should
be magnetically clean and acoustically suitable for effective MCM operations.
(1) Transit. A route which crosses the open water joining two coastal routes.
(2) Coastal. A route, normally following the coastline, which joins adjacent approach routes.
(3) Approach. A route which joins a port to the coastal or a transit route.
(4) Link. A route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes.
(5) Diversion. A temporary route which bypasses a section or the whole of a transit, coastal,
or approach route or link.
(6) Channel. The whole, or part of a route which has been subject to active MCM. The
width of the channel must be specified; the narrower the channel the fewer number of enemy
mines likely to be found in it, and thus it is likely to be safer. The minimum width of a channel
is governed by the requirements of safe navigation.
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e. Convoys. Convoys enable defences to be concentrated and effective control exercised. Less
disruption to MCM operations is caused by convoys than by independent ships, and the risk of
casualty may be reduced by MCM operations being carried out immediately prior to convoy
passage.
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f. Mine Danger Warning System. An adequate mine danger warning system is essential so
that shipping is supplied with up-to-date information and can take the necessary action to avoid
new mining or navigational dangers.
a. The laying of a minefield may be reported by minewatchers, other intelligence sources, other
forces, or the general public.
b. Minewatching is the mine countermeasures procedure to detect, record and, if possible track
potential minelayers and to detect, find the position of and/or identify mines during the actual
minelaying. Efficient minewatching can greatly reduce the task of the mine countermeasures
forces, by informing them of the likely limits of minefields and of the areas where no mines have
been laid. Minewatching is a most important countermeasure in port approaches, convoy assembly
anchorages, harbour, rivers, canals, docks and basins. In these waters diversion will probable not
be possible. It is possible to observe the fall of a mine through the air with the aid of suitable radar
and such equipment can give the range of the point of entry of the mine into the water as well as
the bearing. Minewatching radar stations should therefore be sited where they can best cover the
observed length of channel and only a small overlap between adjacent stations is needed. The
equipment required to interpret the information given by the radar in terms of final mine position
will vary with the type of radar used but communications must be such that alarm reports of mining
can be passed to the command without delay. It will probably be found convenient to pass the
accurate mine positions to the minewatching plotting centre for necessary action; indeed, the
essential calculations to determine these positions may well be done by the personnel at the
plotting centre. Minewatching may be carried out by a shore-based organisation, but this will
normally not materialise due to non-availability of appropriate sites and personnel. That is why
minewatching must be considered part of surveillance. Any ship or aircraft operating in an area
suitable for mining must be tasked by the Operational Control Authority to conduct minewatching
to the extent possible. Minewatching by ships will generally be conducted by tracking and plotting
suspicious units. Cognizant NATO and National commanders must consider the implementation
of appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE) which allow the necessary steps to identify possible
minelaying agents.
3. Reducing the Risk. Risks may be reduced by altering NAVAIDs, by self-protective methods,
and by seabed surveys.
a. Altering NAVAIDS. An enemy minelayer may use existing channel marking buoys or other
navigational aids to assist in its positioning of mines, it may also use opposing radio beacons and
transmissions to fix its own position. To prevent this, lighthouses may be extinguished or dimmed,
buoys reduced to the minimum required for safe navigation and their lights screened from above,
and radio beacons and transmitters operated with caution. All of these measures are a matter of
national policy.
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(1) Before deployment, ships should be in-date for acoustic and magnetic ranging. A
half-yearly ranging schedule ensures that only limited adjustments are needed at the time of
deployment.
(2) Check ranging is essential and should be done as close to the area of operations and as
frequently as possible. This is best achieved by use of mobile ranges.
(3) During operations, frequent ranging of MCMVs on mobile ranges might reveal variations
in acoustic or magnetic signature that require adjustment of the ship's installation.
(4) Diving equipment that was considered magnetically safe before the deployment, may be
later found to be below the required standards.
(5) Portable magnetometers in ships contribute to the safety awareness essential for
operations.
c. Seabed Survey. Seabed Surveys are conducted to determine the suitability of the
seabed and the maritime environment to mine countermeasures. Surveys can be scientific
or experimental, general or detailed, one-off or continuous. They can use MCM forces or
other vehicles, and can be carried out in peace or war.
1. Active mine countermeasures are taken to attack the mine after is has been laid, and are carried
out only when offensive and passive measures fail. A pattern of tracks is laid out (the MCM track is not
necessarily the track of the MCMV) and either equipment designed to detonate or remove mines is towed
or carried across the track, or minehunting gear is used to detect and locate mines so that they may be
disposed of at once or at a later time.
a. Minesweeping
(a) Mechanical gear to physically contact the mine or its appendages to either cut the
mine mooring, detonate or otherwise remove the mine from the area. This is called
Mechanical Sweeping.
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(2) Mechanical sweeping is accomplished by towing a wire astern of the MCMV on which
can be fitted various types of wire cutters to cut the mine mooring. Alternatively a net or chain
can be towed at any depth from surface to sea bottom to physically remove the mine from the
area.
(a) Projecting a sufficiently strong influence field(s), from gear fitted in or towed beneath
the minesweeper, to detonate mines at a safe distance ahead or abeam.
(b) Towing an influence sweep(s) astern to produce either an influence field(s) of strength
sufficient to detonate mines a safe distance astern, whilst not directly endangering the
sweeper, or an influence field(s) extending over such a wide area that although mines may
be detonated inside the damage area of the sweeper, the chances of this occurring are so
small as to be acceptable in the interests of the rate of sweeping an area.
(6) When sweeping mechanically for moored mines and when sweeping for moored influence
and ground influence mines, the cutting or actuating of a mine of a given type on a given run
may not be certain. Several factors could contribute to this uncertainty, for example, the
effectiveness of the mechanical sweep cutters, the uncertainty of actuation because of mine
orientation, local physical environment characteristics of the sea affecting the sweep
performance, or the navigational inaccuracies of the MCMV. To the extent that these factors
can be evaluated, statistical methods make it possible to estimate the probability of success
of sweeping operations.
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b. Minehunting. Minehunting gear can be designed to detect mines by their acoustic properties
through a sonar beam, by magnetic properties of the components, or visually. Minehunting can
be described as the operation of equipment to search the seabed and/or water volume for mines,
or to assess the nature of the seabed and the objects on it. This search includes the process of
detection, classification or identification of contacts and their position relative to the minehunting
unit, to construct a plot of the contacts or to mark them, to convert the relative position of the
contact to a true position, and to dispose of mines or supposed mines. The tactical objective of the
OTC should be reflected in the task order and to facilitate this a number of minehunting definitions
are used and their combination permits the scope of a minehunting task to be defined. These
definitions are at para 0704 of this volume. In hunting for mines the detection of a mine of a given
type or a given run may not be certain. Several factors could contribute to this uncertainty of
detection because of mine position or orientation, local physical environment characteristics of the
sea or seabed affecting the sonar performance, or the navigational inaccuracies of the MCMV. To
the extent that these factors can be evaluated statistical methods make it possible to evaluate the
probability of success of minehunting operations. The figure below shows the dynamics of
minehunting tasking.
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(1) The primary usefulness of minehunting is that it allows tactics other than those available
to sweepers, particularly defining non-mined waters, establishing diversions and assessing the
limits of mined waters.
(2) Minehunting operations are not influenced by mines with sophisticated firing circuits, ship
counts, or arming delays. This gives an overall advantage in MCM, especially if
environmental and bottom conditions are favourable when close inshore (ie in to 8 metres), and
when wrecks are about.
(3) Minesweeping is likely to be more effective than Minehunting if the bottom is rock, stone,
shingle, coral, fouled by debris; or if mines are buried (in mud, sand or weed) are acoustically
or magnetically transparent; or if the environmental conditions are poor.
(4) The OTC of a combined minehunting/minesweeping force should be embarked in the ship
best fitted to control the operation. He should be capable of assessing the nature of the
environmental conditions and the mining intelligence and of deciding which areas are most
suitable for the different types of operation. He should keep in mind that a minesweeping force
is relatively un-manoeuvrable whereas a minehunters is usually able to give way unless
operating divers; that danbuoys laid by sweepers are unlikely to be satisfactory for
minehunting owing to their excessive scope; and that if much diving is required, the greater
the depth the more the operation may be slowed down due to the requirement for
decompression.
(5) To ensure that the operations of one MCM force do not interfere with those of another,
it is essential to co-ordinate search areas and schedule operations. Some overlapping of areas
may be required to ensure no unswept gaps, this is when mutual interference between forces
is most likely.
d. Clearance Diving. Although clearance diving and minehunting are separate types of MCM
operation, it is convenient to treat them together as many of their functions overlap. For example,
minehunters frequently employ diving teams. However, it is important to acknowledge the
separate identity of the Clearance Diver Team (CDT) and their requirement, as a self contained
MCM task unit, as CDTs’ have other tasks other than MCM operations. Clearance divers are
trained for air scuba and mixed gas scuba diving, qualified to carry out tasks in mine/ordnance
search (investigation, recovery and removal), underwater and ashore.
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(2) Radio communication is required between the minehunters and the minehunting diving
craft, eg diving dinghies. Minehunters should normally operate independently at least two
miles apart, to work at the optimum rate, to eliminate sonar mutual interference, and to reduce
the danger to ships and divers due to underwater shock from an unexpected detonation.
(3) Careful timing of the use of explosive charges or of the detonation of mines is essential
if other forces operating in adjacent areas are not to be endangered. It will normally be easy
for diving forces to time the explosion of their charges so that the work of MCM forces in
adjacent areas is not interrupted, but minesweeping forces are liable to detonate mines at
unpredictable times. To avoid danger to divers employed on mine disposal a minimum
separation should be maintained between divers in the water and minesweepers. The
separation should be the sum of the minimum acceptable separation of divers from a mine
explosion (see Table 1-3) and the maximum expected range of actuation of the most sensitive
mine by the sweep in question. Note that these maximum actuation ranges may be in excess
of 5 miles.
(1) The organisation for EOD is a national commitment within the terms of STANAG 2143.
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(2) The duties are normally carried out by specially trained personnel formed into EOD units
or clearance diving teams. EOD may be carried out in two stages:
(b) Disposal Stage 2. Making the ordnance no longer a danger to anyone. This less
urgent stage involves disposal of all explosives and fittings which may cause harm eg
cocked strikers, acid containers, high voltage batteries etc. When ordnance is found in the
sea the first stage will normally be adequate.
(1) A small remotely controlled investigation vehicle with mid-water capability can provide
minehunters with enhanced prosecution and identification capability and would reduce
expenditure of such items as bobbins and dragropes (guide ropes). National authorities should
develop special tactics for such vehicles and include them in their national supplement to
ATP-24. Video equipment should be available on minehunters to record the images provided
by both intervention vehicle and sonar.
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CHAPTER 2
1. The mine warfare operations room is the nucleus for planning, conduct and evaluation of MCM
as well as for mining operations which must not be separated. The extent of manning depends upon the
intention to use mines and upon the degree of mining attack expected. The duties of the Staff Mine
Warfare Officer are described in Chapter 1 of MTP-6, Volume I.
a. Task. The object of the Mine Warfare Operations Room is to enable the command to further
the aims of mining and mine countermeasures. With this object in mind, two specific aims can be
allotted to the MW Operations Room:
(1) The presentation to the Command of a comprehensive, easily assimilated and up-to-date
picture of the requirement, the threat and the operations in progress or available.
(2) The operational control, on behalf of the Command, of allocated mine warfare forces.
2. The achievement of these aims requires the input of information in considerable detail from
superior and collateral authorities, forces at sea, past records, and the output or reports of past
achievement, present state and future intentions. In addition the preparation of detailed orders for
subordinate Commanders. This requirement is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2-1 on Page 2-2.
Because the Mine Warfare Operations Room is dealing with mine countermeasures mainly, details are
contained in this volume of MTP-6.
3. Not releasable
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3. Facilities. In order to display and record the picture of mine warfare, the Operations Room
contains the following equipment. (A standard code of symbols for use on all plots is given in
MTP-24(B) Volume I).
a. The Display Plot. This consists of a wall map of the command area with an overlap of
adjacent command areas. It should be on such a scale that the following information can be clearly
displayed, although not necessarily in detail:
(1) Subordinate command boundaries and HQs. Established routes and anchorages, with an
indication of environmental conditions.
(3) Channels in which MCM operations have been or are being conducted and their present
state.
(4) Diversions.
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(5) State of shipping (ie positions of shipping at sea, numbers of ships in ports, numbers of
ships ready to move within next 24 hours, whether ports are closed).
(8) Tasks.
b. Detail Plots. These are plots of approaches and focal areas with own minefields or those
considered likely to be mined on such a scale that details can be plotted. They are in effect
permanent versions of the Analysis Plot. They should include pertinent environmental conditions.
c. Analysis Plots. These are required for determining the precise position of mines. They are
compiled from all raw information on suitable plotting sheets. Filtered mine positions are then
converted to precise navigation co-ordinates (eg HSA, UTMG co-ordinates, Decca co-ordinates
etc), and are transferred to other plots for display and information as required. The positions
should also be entered up in a log book for record purposes.
d. Chart Table. To assist in the compilation of the Analysis Plots, and complementary to the
Detail Plots, a complete and up-to-date set of chart folios of the area is required. A proper chart
table, with storage for these folios, is essential and can also be used for compiling and storing the
Analysis Plots.
e. Stateboards. The four stateboards in use are listed below and they are designed to
supplement the information on the Display Plot. Information displayed on these boards is kept
up-to-date from signals and from plot comparison with the Naval Control of Shipping or Trade
Plot. The minimum requirement for display of information is to enable direct cross-reference from
any one to any other of the following headings:
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f. Task Book. This is an essential record, and in constant use for reference to details of tasks.
The following information should be recorded:
(2) TG/TU and Area. Here are shown the forces involved providing a cross-reference to the
State of Forces boards and the Display Plot.
(3) Physical Data. This includes everything required for planning which needs looking up
elsewhere. Examples are; depth range, tidal range, channel width and length.
(4) The Schedule. This should show not only the estimated times of occurrences, but also
the rough work by which they were arrived at.
(5) Task Orders (Operation Order). A copy of the actual signal should be pasted in.
Any other signals worth keeping may be transferred from the clip below the Employment
Schedule when the latter is brought up-to-date.
h. Enemy Mining Record. This could be kept in a data bank or in the form of a looseleaf
book with separate sheets for each route, channel, or area mined by the enemy. It takes the form
of an account with a running `balance' of mines remaining shown in the central columns. To the
left of this are shown details of minelays as ‘debits’ to the account, and mines accounted for are
‘credited’ on the right. To avoid confusion the sheets should be written up each day from MCM
Reports only and preferably by the same person. Mine Reference Numbers must be shown to
avoid counting a mine more than once.
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i. Not releasable
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j. Narrative. This combines the functions of Deck Log and Turnover Book. It should be a
large lined book, and in it should be the following columns available: DATE/TIME, EVENT,
ACTION. There should be entered a note of everything that happens, at the time. Accuracy and
completeness are of more importance than neatness. The column headed `ACTION' should contain
only the name or title of the officer required to take action, or a brief reference to the action
required. This should be ticked off, if necessary with a further brief note when action has been
taken, so that outstanding items can be quickly seen by a relieving officer. It is particularly
important that the sense of telephone conversations should be noted in the narrative while they are
in progress or immediately afterwards, as details are quickly forgotten.
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
f. Not releasable
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5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
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b. Not releasable
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c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
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CHAPTER 3
0301 Introduction
This chapter gives guidance on the choice of MCM techniques, procedures for segmentation, the
execution and sequence of MCM stages and the choice of a task cycle. In addition, basic information to
be considered for the conduct of MCM is included.
1. When selecting the technique, consideration should be given to the type of operation (short-term,
clearance attrition, exploratory, reconnaissance etc), the enemy mine types, the Risk Directive (if
applicable, see para 0106.2) in conjunction with the mine types, and the environment. From this it may
be ascertained whether hunting, sweeping or any other technique should be employed in a particular area.
2. Segmentation is one of the elements fundamental to the application of the MCM technique chosen.
It can apply to both channels and area, and is initiated by consideration of water-depth or environment.
When considering the various MCM techniques, segmentation is always introduced as a basis for
discussion. This does not imply that segmentation must be utilised in all cases.
b. Magnetic Sweeping. The channel or area is divided into segments based on either
water-depth or water-depth and conductivity (horizontal component mines in the case of electrode
sweeps).
c. Acoustic Sweeping. The channel or area is divided into segments based on water-depth
or acoustic transmission loss parameters.
d. Hunting. The channel or area is divided into segments based on bottom and environmental
characteristics.
e. In all cases, for the segments considered, the best technique is selected. It is advisable not to
preconceive segment lengths. The bottom conditions are predominant and may easily lead to
irregular forms and shapes of the segments.
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3. Choice of Platform.
1. The relative merits of minesweeping and minehunting determine the choice between sweepers and
hunters. One should consider the environment (bottom conditions, acoustic propagation), mine
expectation (ship counts, arming delays, anti-sweeping components such as pressure sensors), the
sweeping and hunting rate, and the risk to MCMVs.
2. The helicopter is the best vehicle for certain minesweeping tasks. For example it is most suitable
for conducting approach channel clearance of moored mines (see note), from the limit of mineable waters
into those areas where surface craft will commence sweeping. Under some conditions these approach
channels will be very long and the helicopter can transit in the least possible time. It can also be used
efficiently for sweeping moored minefields which contain sweep obstructors, and should be used for
sweeping heavily obstructed fields especially in shallow water. The combination of lightweight gear and
high sweep speed permits heavy arming of airborne gear, and consequently an increased probability of
defeating an obstructor. In addition, for the helicopter, the consequence of losing sweep gear to
obstructors is much less severe in terms of sweeping time lost, since gear may be replenished in much less
time than needed by the surface minesweeper.
3. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of sweeping and hunting the same area. The
decision to use the various techniques must also be based on consideration of the available MCM forces.
When a MCMV is hunting, minesweeping is not normally carried out by the MCMV. When a MCMV
is minesweeping and hull mounted minehunting equipment is fitted it should be used provided that its
operation will not detract from the effectiveness of the MCMVs primary sweeping task.
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1. The optimum selection is the mechanical sweeping technique which yields the greatest overall
sweeping rate and sweeper safety against any moored mine expected to be in a minefield.
2. When determining the best sweep technique, it is convenient to classify moored mines into the
categories listed at Table 3-2:
Category Description
A Moored mine case depth between maximum moored sweep depth and
the surface, and moored influence mines dangerous to the sweeper.
B Moored mine case depth between maximum moored sweep depth and
slightly below keel depth of sweeper, and moored influence mines not
dangerous to the sweeper
3. Five types of mechanical sweep can be considered for sweeping the foregoing categories of mines,
these are:
a. Team sweeps
b. Oropesa sweeps
c. Bottom sweeps
e. Helicopter sweeps
Notes:
1. Not releasable
2. During mechanical sweeping operations arrangements must be made to destroy all mines
swept as soon as possible after sweeping, to avoid the threat posed by drifting mines. Mines
should be disposed of by EOD means whenever possible. Destruction by machine gun or small
arms fire should be considered a last resort. (See para 0411.6 in Volume I for further details).
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4. Precursor Techniques. In some situations, more than one mechanical sweep technique may
be required. For example, in deep water where moored influence and contact mines with shallow case
depths are laid in the same area, it may be necessary to begin sweeping using a technique with a relatively
shallow sweep depth and then follow this with a technique using deep sweep gear.
5. When sweeping in shallow water, the scope of sweep wire should be shortened to reduce hog and
sag and the possibility of dragging on the bottom. Also the sweep should be armed as heavily as possible
so that the spacing between cutters is kept to a minimum. Minimum cutter spacing increases the
probability of the cutters cutting the mine mooring before the mine case is pulled into contact with the
sweep wire. This is a critical factor in shallow water mechanical sweeping. When sweeping in deep
water, the scope of sweep wire should generally be near or equal to the maximum.
1. As with mechanical sweeping, the optimum selection for influence sweeping is the technique
which yields the greatest overall sweeping rate and sweeper safety against the mines expected in a
particular minefield. However, large sweep rates and low sweeper risk do not necessarily coincide for
a given sweep and minefield combination, and adjustments will have to be made based on the
minesweeping objective. Some risk may have to be accepted in order to gain a large enough sweeping
rate to complete an operation in the time allowed. Alternatively, a lesser sweeping rate may have to be
accepted for sweeper safety when time is not a primary consideration. The following sub paragraphs
provide guidelines for selecting the best sweeping techniques for particular minesweeping objectives.
The relative importance of these factors must be weighted in deciding which sweep would be most
effective in each segment. Ideally, the sweep combination will be selected which has the highest W.V
value against the mine most difficult to sweep. This selection may however, require modification,
because of sweeper risk from all mines to be cleared.
a. Sweep Types. In a field of mixed single-influence mines, combination sweeps will require
fewer sweeper runs than single-influence sweeps. Since fewer runs are required, the combination
sweep also effectively reduces the number of times the sweeper is exposed to hazards from mines
that can be actuated by the sweeper's own influence fields. This reduces the probable sweeper
losses from sensitive acoustic/magnetic mines. Combination sweeps must be used in order to
satisfy mine firing requirements in minefields containing combination-influence mines.
b. Estimating Sweeping Rate and Sweeper Safety. For each water depth segment, and
for each available combination sweep, determine the following values for each of the mines
selected:
(1) Sweeping Rate (W.V) For each sweep technique used against each of the mines
considered.
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c. Clearance Operation. When clearance is the objective and time is not a limiting factor,
sweeper safety is of primary importance. When time is limited, sweeper safety is still of primary
importance. In either case both the sweeping techniques and the order in which they are used
should provide for the necessary clearance with the smallest possible sweeper risk. The method
selected should be the one that permits clearance to be completed as safely as possible in the least
time.
f. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
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c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
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b. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
1. If several minehunting techniques are available then the selection of the best minehunting
technique will depend on factors such as the MCM objective, the minehunting environment, and
information available. Minehunting techniques in use are described in Chapter 7 of this publication, and
in MTP-24, Volume I. Selection of the best minehunting technique involves several independent
selections such as search gear (sonar or other), method of navigation, and disposal techniques. The
minehunting technique therefore comprises the search equipment, the operating parameters of the search
gear such as A, B, V, and the characteristic disposal probability associated with the disposal techniques.
Selecting the minehunting technique which has the most effective sub-system is based upon the following
selection procedures:
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Note. Where limited supply of more than one disposal technique is available it may be necessary
to allocate different systems to different operational segments. In this case MCM force allocation
to various operational segments should be considered due to associations of some search systems
with particular MCMV types.
1. An MCM stage is the use of a specific MCM technique to counter a particular or several types of
mine. Each MCM operation should be carried out in a sequence of stages, their number, type and
sequence depending upon the complexity of the minefield, the Risk Directive ordered and the forces
available. This paragraph discusses some of the operational factors relating to individual stages, a
complete list of which are contained in MTP-24, Volume I.
a. Stage 11. Shallow Moored Mine Sweep. This stage can be carried out by helicopters,
surface effect vessels (SEVs) or by shallow-draught sweepers with low magnetic and acoustic
signatures to protect larger sweepers following. MCM Formation G will normally be used.
Sweeping techniques must be specifically modified if used against antenna or snagline mines to
ensure that these mines are not detonated close to the sweeper. Stage 32 or other of the 30 series
may be carried out simultaneously.
b. Stage 12. Antenna Sweep. If antenna mines are likely to be found, special sweeps should
be used when these are available in the sweepers. When these are not available and Risk Directive
A has been ordered, the leading sweeper in the formation should not stream her kite and the second
sweeper should use a double sweep. Sweeps must be armed.
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c. Stage 13. Snagline Sweep. This is a precursor sweep to protect following displacement
sweepers. This stage is carried out by helicopters or well degaussed shallow draught sweepers.
It is ordered only when snagline mines are known to be present. The use of a special sweep, fitted
with fish hooks or grips to catch the snagline and thus detonate the mine is recommended, above
all where the depth of water is small. A snagline mine which has been cut adrift and is
subsequently sunk by rifle fire may still be very dangerous because the snagline and float may
nearly reach the surface although the mine case will be on the bottom. MCM Formation G will
generally be adopted, sweeps being set shallow (kites down). Under Risk Directive A, the leading
sweeper should not stream her kite if she operates in mined water, and the second sweeper should
use a double sweep.
d. Stage 14. Precursor Hunting. This stage is applicable in good detection conditions
against shallow moored mines, and short-tethered moored mines. It may be used to provide a
channel for the first pass of the guide of a mechanical sweeping formation.
3. Precursor Stages Against Magnetic Mines. Depending on the type of magnetic sweep to
be used Stage 21, 22, 23, 24 or 25 may be ordered. Used as a precursor sweep when Risk Directive A is
in force. Sweepers use a current in the sweep which will just keep them safe against mines of the lowest
actuation level expected in the area. This current may give a useful swept path against mines of a higher
actuation level depending on the local circumstances. This particular swept path is used for calculating
track spacing and when the required number of runs has been completed, it may be considered that all ripe
mines up to this higher actuation level are cleared to the calculated percentage clearance. One or more
of the 30 series may be carried out simultaneously with these stages.
a. Stage 31. Preliminary Explosive Acoustic Technique. This stage can be used in
conjunction with some other stages to increase slightly their effectiveness and safety in minefields
containing acoustic mines. It will normally be omitted if time is limited. The technique consists
of exploding depth charges or bombs which have approximately 90 to 135kg of explosive at
intervals along a line leading from the deepest water to be found within 10 to 20 miles of the
minefield up to the field. If aircraft are used the bombing should be extended through the mined
area. The time interval between explosions should be at least three minutes, and there should be
at least three explosions per mile along the line. If possible, depth charges should be set to
detonate at a depth of about two thirds of the depth of water. The minefield should be kept
under observation during this process. If a mine is observed to fire, additional charges should be
exploded (at intervals of at least three minutes) at the location of the charge which caused the mine
to fire. This process should be continued until five successive charges have failed to fire another
mine and should be done before other charges are exploded nearer the field. This preliminary
explosive acoustic sweep is rarely effective. Results are dependent on the depth of water, bottom
composition and configuration and other variables which cannot be predicted, as well as the mine
characteristics. However the process is relatively simple and safe and there is a possibility that
some mines may be swept. At large distances the sound of an explosion may be converted by
reverberations into a rumble that can fire acoustic mechanisms. At closer distances, it will fire
mines whose protective circuits are inadequate or it may cause the mine firing circuit to fail to
operate correctly.
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Radius R:
Simple acoustic mines
cleared.
Radius r:
Mines fitted with anti-
countermining devices
rendered passive.
b. Stage 32. Explosive Sweep. An explosive sweep, in theory, makes it possible to clear
simple acoustic mines in a circular area of radius R (see Figure 3-1). In addition, acoustic mines
fitted with anti-countermining devices may be rendered passive inside a circle of radius r. Many
actuations may be achieved with only one run.
c. Stage 33. This stage is intended to clear AF acoustic mines and may be carried out by
helicopters, SEVs or MCMVs with small magnetic and acoustic signature. Noise makers should
be used. It may be used in conjunction with other stages.
d. Stage 34. The AF sweep is towed at long stay astern, preferably by a MCMV with a small
acoustic signature. This stage may be carried out simultaneously with any of the 20 series of
stages.
e. Stage 35. The LF sweep is towed at long stay astern, preferably by a MCMV with a small
acoustic signature. This stage may be carried out simultaneously with any of the 20 series of
stages.
f. Stage 36. The tuned oscillator is towed at long stay astern, preferably by a MCMV with a
small acoustic signature. This stage may be carried out simultaneously with any of the 20 series
of stages.
g. Stage 37. This makes use of a unified acoustic sweep ie LF and AF combined in the same
towed body. It is towed at long stay and the output is usually variable. It may be used in
conjunction with other sweeps, especially magnetic.
h. Stage 38. This stage is used by the TROIKA system. It is an AF (hammer) sweep installed
in the mine sweeping drone (MSD).
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i. Stage 39. This stage is used by the TROIKA system. It is an LF sweep towed by the MSD.
5. Diving Stages. All the following diving stages can be conducted by using diver's aids ie
hand-held sonar or hand-held magnetometers in addition to searching by visual means or by touch.
a. Stage 41. Progressive Grid Search. This is a visual, snagging and feeling search. Two
heavy weighted parallel jackstays, 30 to 60 metres apart, are laid out on the bottom. A grid-line
connects the two jackstays.
(2) Though this is the most accurate and efficient of all procedures, it is a very slow one
because the search rate is dependent on the rate of progress of the diver along the bottom.
b. Stage 42. Snagline Search. This is a snagging and partly visual search. This procedure
can be used on a smooth, rather hard bottom, by day or night, whatever the visibility, and in
moderate currents. The procedure is tiring for divers.
c Stage 43. Circular Search. This is a snagging and, to some extent a visual search.
(2) Note that the same procedure can be performed by a boat - instead of a diver - pulling the
end of the snagline.
d. Stage 44. Enclosed Water Grid Search. This is a visual and feeling search.
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e. Stage 45. Towed Diver. This search is carried out by a diver who is towed by a motor or
rowing boat proceeding very slowly, using a line with a weighted toggle at the diver's end.
f. Stage 46. Diver Towed on Underwater Sled. The search is carried out by a diver
riding on an underwater sled which is towed from a motor boat by a rope.
g. Stage 47. Running Jackstay Search. This is a visual search. It is carried out by laying
parallel jackstays in a given area of the bottom and searching the area between the jackstays by a
line of divers or swimmers who are positioned along a distance line reaching from one jackstay
to the other.
h. Stage 48. Bottom Team Sweep. (Two boat snag-line). A wire or hemp rope or chain
sweep is towed along the bottom by two craft at a specified distance apart with the aim of snagging
any mines or objects laying on the bottom. Divers investigate the objects snagged. This procedure
can be used only on a very smooth, hard, clean seabed and the mines must be protruding from the
bottom. Searches at night are possible. This method requires only a few divers to determine the
presence of mines in very large areas and it is useful when temperature, depth and current
conditions make it difficult for diving.
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6. Minehunting Stages
Stage 50A AMCM Plot and determine Sonar Contact Confidence Level (Post Mission
Analysis)
a. Stage 61. Moored Mine Sweep. When Risk Directive A is in force, MCM Formation
G must be used, and the leading sweeper must keep in water believed clear of moored mines.
Under Risk Directives B and C, the formation chosen will depend on the time available and
percentage coverage required.
b. Stage 62. Team Sweep. In this sweep, wire is towed between two (or more) ships in line
abreast. Each ship uses a kite to keep its end of the sweep down to the selected depth. The
advantages are:
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(3) The swept path produced by a team sweep will always be wider than the same number of
ships in single Oropesa and three or more ships team sweeping have a greater swept path than
the same number of ships using double Oropesa.
c. Stage 63. Deep Sweeping with Team Sweep. This is conducted by specially fitted
sweepers to counter deep moored mines.
8. Magnetic Sweeping Stages. Depending on the type of magnetic sweep to be used Stages 71,
72, 73, 74 or 75 may be ordered.
a. Not releasable
a. Stage 81. The AF sweep (Hammer) is towed abeam. This stage may be carried out in
conjunction with the 70 series and with the 60 series.
b. Stage 82. The LF sweep is towed abeam. This stage may be carried out in conjunction with
the 70 series and with the 60 series.
c. Stage 83. Pipe Noisemaker etc. This stage is intended to clear mines which react to
noisemakers. It may be used in conjunction with the 60 series, 70 series and possibly Stage 82.
d. Stage 84. The AF sweep is towed astern at long stay. In this way the acoustic field more
closely coincides with that of the magnetic sweep. This stage may be used in conjunction with the
70 series.
e. Stage 85. The LF sweep is towed astern at long stay. In this way the acoustic field more
closely coincides with that of the magnetic sweep. This stage may be used in conjunction with the
70 series.
f. Stage 86. The Tuned Oscillator sweep is towed astern at long stay. In this way the acoustic
field more closely coincides with that of the magnetic sweep. This stage may be used in
conjunction with the 70 series.
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g. Stage 87. This stage makes use of a unified acoustic sweep ie LF and AF combined in the
same towed body. It is towed at long stay and the output is usually variable. It may be used in
conjunction with other sweeps.
h. Stage 88. This stage is used by the TROIKA System. It is an AF (Hammer) sweep installed
in the MSD. It may be used in conjunction with Stages 75 and 89.
i. Stage 89. This stage is used by the TROIKA System. It is an LF sweep towed by the MSD.
It may be used in conjunction with Stages 75 and 88.
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. When deciding on the order in which stages should be carried out, the need to complete the
allotted task in the minimum possible time whilst ensuring the maximum degree of safety for the MCMVs
should be borne in mind. For example, when Stages 11 and 61 have been ordered, Stage 11 should
normally be carried out by MSIs, MSBs or helicopters with the object of providing safety for the MSOs
or MSCs who will be carrying out Stage 61 against moored mines. If the latter are sufficiently well
degaussed, only Stage 11 need be carried out ahead of MCMVs carrying out Stage 61. If not, then one
of the 20 series Stages will be necessary before magnetic sweeping can start.
2.. In addition, when a 20 series Stage followed by a 70 series Stage has been ordered, it is possible
with some sweeps to carry out the 20 series Stage using safe track sweeping. This can be accomplished
by conducting a safe current technique over an initial track to provide a swept path from which maximum
current techniques could then be used.
3. An example of the order of some MCM techniques expressed as MCM Stages in a clearance
operation is given in Table 3-3:
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4 Mechanical sweep. 61 - 62
4. In influence sweeping, safe current sweeping techniques, if required, should be used in such a way
that when the ship's safety is predominant the MCMVs will first have to achieve the required percentage
clearance against mines which may endanger the minesweeper before sweeping the coarser mines. In
circumstances where the time factor outweighs the sweeper's safety, such as in short-term operations,
increased current should be used. This may increase the risk to sweepers.
5. When ordering a minehunting stage, some general considerations have to be made about the
environmental conditions such as bottom type, current, underwater visibility, and also about the
percentages of undetectable and unsweepable mines and the minefield density. Before ordering a Stage
of the 50 series, one of the 10 and 30 series Stages may be necessary for the MCMVs safety.
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a. General Principles. The ideal in any sweeping operation would be to remove mines in the
order of their hazard to the sweeper. This is not always possible notably when the replenishment
rate of the minefield, (due to fresh lays or mine ripening) is such that mines cannot be dealt with
in any special order. In this case attrition sweeping is needed.
c. Those MCM stages which are carried out to remove mines which are particularly dangerous
to MCM vessels will, in fact, actuate mines of all sensitivities, although the swept path against the
less sensitive mines may be narrow. Whether time will permit all these stages being carried out
will depend on a combination of width of channel required, time which can be made available
before the arrival of the next traffic ships and availability and efficiency of MCMVs.
d Specific intelligence about the minefield may provide circumstances which make deviation
from this guidance necessary. Stage 32 may be carried out whatever directive is in force.
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Snagline mines 13
1. Operational orders fix the limits of channels, but the areas used for track turns can be as dangerous
to the sweepers as the channel itself. The OTC has to take the following measures:
a. Precursor stages or stages with MCM gear especially designed for very shallow moored mines
or Snagline mines are ordered only if intelligence indicates the possibility of their presence.
b. If very sensitive magnetic mines are to be expected the OTC should order MCM operations
to be undertaken in the streaming and turning areas, especially when these areas are situated in
shallow waters.
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1. The task cycle chosen for a particular operation will depend upon the number and types of MCM
units, their endurance (fuel, water etc), manning, the scope of the operation and the distance between the
area of operations and the support facilities, and finally the environmental conditions. The cycle should
be chosen to obtain the maximum 'ONTASK' time from available MCM units. 'ONTASK' starts when
a unit enters the track at the beginning of the task, and stops when it leaves the track at the end of its task.
2. The aim should be to have sufficient MCM units available to maintain a steady level of operations
whilst retaining the flexibility to deploy the maximum number of units at the right place and time (ie
immediately prior to the passage of convoys). A reserve of MCM units should be maintained, which can
be deployed rapidly to focal areas when required. This reserve might actually be, meanwhile, employed
'ONTASK' in non-essential areas.
3. Generally, the initial task will be selected to be conducted along as many routes and in as many
areas as quickly as possible. This should be modified as necessary, to enable exploration to be conducted
in specific areas eg as a result of a mine watchers report. If, during exploration, no mines are found,
consideration should be given to amending the task cycle in force to continue the exploratory operations
to a lesser intensity and with fewer forces. If mines are found during the exploratory tasks, the OPCON
authority will state the priority of task and forces to be deployed and tasked accordingly. The Task Cycle
most suitable for a particular operation is normally decided by the OTC. It is emphasised that the task
cycle pattern must be flexible. The following task cycles are among those that can be successfully
employed in different circumstances:
a. 24 Hour Cycle. (12 hours on, 12 hours off). This cycle can be used by minehunters. Then
a 24 hour off-period is required, depending on the type of the ship.
b. 48 Hour Cycle. (24 hours on, 24 hours off). This cycle is considered to be the optimum for
MSIs under normal conditions.
c. 54 Hour Cycle. (36 hours on, 24 hours off) can be used by MSC in difficult circumstances.
d. 72 Hour Cycle. (48 hours on, 24 hours off). This cycle is considered in general to be the
optimum cycle for MSC. The advantages of this cycle are that ships can perform a long period of
useful sweeping during each ‘ONTASK’ period, there is less fatigue to the sweepdeck crew than
with a shorter cycle, and the period ‘OFFTASK’ is long enough to enable maintenance and repairs
to be carried out and for the ship’s companies to rest. A disadvantage, as compared with the
rotational task cycle, is that with all ships of a Task Unit returning to harbour at the same time,
individual ship’s rest period may be seriously interrupted by berth-shifting for fuel, repairs etc.
e. 96 Hour Cycle. (60 hours on, 36 hours off). This is an extension of the 72 hour cycle and
could allow more ‘ONTASK’ time for sweepers.
f. 7 Day Cycle. (5 days on, 2 days off). This task cycle is feasible when the utmost effort
‘ONTASK’ is required over a period of not longer than about three weeks, provided the conditions
are not arduous.
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g. Rotational Task Cycle. The rotational task cycle is a cycle which enables part of a Task
Unit to be ‘ONTASK’ continuously throughout the period. A disadvantage is that any
Commanding Officer in the task unit must be prepared to take charge of the operation at any
moment, unless the MCM Commander is established ashore or in a ship not actively involved in
MCM operations. When planning a rotational task cycle during integrated minehunting operations,
consideration must be given to the inherent off task periods of available assets (i.e. AMCM
Helicopters do not conduct tactical missions at night).
1. Introduction.
a. In mechanical sweeping for moored mines, in sweeping and hunting for moored influence and
ground influence mines, the cutting, actuating, or detection of a mine of a given type on a given
run may not be certain. Several factors could contribute to this uncertainty, for example the arming
of mechanical sweeps or the effectiveness of the cutters, the uncertainty of actuation or detection
because of mine position or orientation, local physical environmental characteristics of the sea
affecting the sweep or hunting gear’s performance and navigational inaccuracies of the MCMV.
All these factors can be accounted for in evaluating the results of sweeping and hunting through
the application of statistics to mine countermeasures.
b. Certain parameters are used in the planning and evaluation of MCM operations. These
parameters provide the means for measuring both the effectiveness of a particular technique
against a particular mine in a certain environment, and the danger to the MCMV while using the
technique. The relationship of these parameters is shown in Figures 3-2 to 3-5 and is described
in the following paragraphs.
d. Evaluation and planning in this volume is based upon the principle that parameters are
calculated by means of known or assumed relationship between sweep/hunting technique and the
mine and its environment, or that parameters are deduced from the signature produced by the target
to be protected.
2. Actuation/Cutting/Detection Parameters.
a. Definitions. Parameters are established for the actuation, cutting and detection of mines for
influence sweeping, mechanical sweeping and minehunting respectively. The parameters are
designed to describe the effectiveness of a countermeasures gear or system against the mine. They
are based on the probability P(y) of actuating, cutting or detecting the mine as a function of lateral
distance y from the centre of the MCM gear.
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c. Development of Parameters.
(1) The development and relationship of the parameters defined above are shown in Figures
3-3 to 3-5 for influence sweeping. Since these figures indicate the results for one run, the
situation is analogous to mechanical sweeping and minehunting. Figure 3-3 is a display of a
minefield in a geographic setting. The figure also indicates the results of one sweep run.
Figure 3-5 shows the same results as a cumulative plot of all mine actuations relative to the
sweeper. As the sweeper moves along the track, the range and bearing to each mine actuation
is recorded. At the end of the run, the ranges and bearings are plotted from a single point as
shown in Figure 3-4. In this type of plot some mine actuations may coincide. Figures 3-3 and
3-4 show the effect of a given sweeping technique employed against poised mines of a given
type in a given environment.
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(2) The result from Figure 3-4 can now be plotted graphically as shown in Figure 3-5A. The
probability (P(y)) of actuation is plotted as a function of the athwartship distance (y). The
curve that is formed is then superimposed on a trapezoid or rectangle as shown in Figure 3-4B.
The height of the trapezoid or rectangle is the Characteristic Actuation Probability (B). A line
is now drawn parallel to the horizontal axis at one-half B. The distance between this point on
B and the intersection of the parallel line with the side of the trapezoid or rectangle is the
Characteristic Actuation Width (A). As shown in Figure 3-4B, the Characteristic Actuation
Width is only one-half, since only one-half of the trapezoid or rectangle has been drawn. The
area of the full trapezoid or rectangle can be determined from the product of A and B. This
product is the Aggregate Actuation Width (W): W equals A times B.
(3) For some techniques and mines the probability curve may reach as high as unity, while
for other techniques the probability curve may not reach unity, or it may be irregular in shape.
These variations are illustrated in Figure 3-2. Mathematically, the area under the probability
curve has the dimensions of a width (since it is essentially the product of a probability and a
width) and it is called the aggregate Actuation Width (W). W does not correspond to any
actual physical width or distance from the sweep. A is a definite width and has a definite
location with respect to the position of the MCM gear.
(4) In the same way, the probability (P(y)) that use of a given hunting technique in given
circumstances will result in detection and classification of mines will vary with athwartship
distance (y). Just as for sweeping, this probability can be plotted as a function of y, as in
Figures 3-2 to 3-5. The area under the detection curve is the Aggregate Detection Width (W).
The Aggregate Detection Width is used for analysing the effects of detection and classification
in using the hunting technique, but does not include the effects of classification and disposal.
4. Sweep/Hunting Gear Offset (h). The perpendicular distance between the centre of the
characteristic width, 'A' (the sweep/hunting gear track), and the track of the MCMV is the sweep/hunting
gear offset. The intended track of the MCMV must be displaced from the intended track of the sweep or
hunting gear by the amount of the offset. Since the MCMV must maintain the sweep/hunting gear on the
sweep/hunting gear track, it is also necessary for the MCMV to allow additional corrections for the effects
of crosswinds and currents, which are not included in the values of h. For each MCM technique, tables
providing offset as a function of wind and current are provided in National Annexes to MTP-24.
5. Parameters for Calculating MCMV Risk and MCMV Safety. These parameters have to
consider MCMV data in addition and are discussed in Chapter 5 of MTP-6(C) Volume II.
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Figure 5
1. When ordering MCM Operations, the concept and instructions for the conduct of MCM as
contained in relevant Mine Warfare/MCM Operational Plans have to be considered.
2. In all MCM operations, the time in which it is desirable that the operation should be completed
must be balanced against the risk to MCMVs and shipping. Each operation must therefore conform to
as policy ordered by the OPCON authority who is in the best position to assess the permissible degree of
risk to the MCMVs and shipping
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Orders governing the operations controlled by the OTC concerning the general conduct of operations
(intelligence, priorities, directives etc) are called MCM Operations Directives. details are contained in
Section 3, of annex B to this Chapter. MCMOPDIRs are normally issued by the Operational Control
Authority.
1. Forms for ordering MCM operations and tasks are provided and discussed in Annex B to this
Chapter.
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
3. The issuing authority will chose that format which is most suitable for all addressees of the
appropriate orders.
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this Annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. The Commander's estimate of the situation (or the Estimate) is the basis of military operational
planning. It is broadly defined as a systematic analysis of a situation for the purpose of determining the
best course of action to pursue. It is the phase of the planning process in which a Commander investigates
all essential elements of the situation confronting him. When he has completed his estimate, the
Commander will have made his major decisions and will have determined his general concept of
operations.
2. The usefulness of an Estimate depends on the open-mindedness and professional judgement of the
Commander in weighing the facts upon which he bases his decision. The process of making an Estimate
is intended to ensure that certain aspects of the problem are not partially or wholly neglected by undue
reliance on intuition, habit, preconceived ideas or analogy with apparently similar situations. An Estimate
should be as thorough as time will permit. It may vary from a quick mental estimate to a carefully written
document requiring days of preparation.
3. In Chapter 3, the level of the MCM Commander is considered to be the ‘OTC’. Nevertheless, the
procedure and principles followed in making an Estimate are appropriate to all levels of command and
to all types of plans.
1. A sequence for recording data and ideas is established by the following major steps of the estimate:
b. Situation.
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f. Decision.
2. Although these steps follow one another in logical sequence they usually cannot be made in final
and satisfactory form in the same sequence. When working on later steps of the Estimate, it will
frequently be necessary to return to earlier steps, expanding material which proves inadequate, adding
material which is found wanting, and perhaps discarding some which is irrelevant. Intelligent following
of the indicated steps and making such adaptations as the circumstances require will lead the planner
successfully through a maze of complex variables and sequences to an Estimate which does have form
and one in which he may have a reasonable degree of confidence.
3A03 Assumptions
1. An assumption takes the place of necessary information which is unavailable at the time it is
needed to enable the Commander to complete his Estimate. The assumption may replace missing
information about the enemy, the environment, the timing, progress or outcome of friendly or own force
activities against the enemy.
2. The need for an assumption usually becomes evident early in the Estimate, but may arise at any
step of the analysis of the factors affecting the problem. The following points should be noted:
a. When a need is identified, the assumption made should be stated and kept in mind during the
remainder of the planning.
c. If an assumption fails to happen, then the plan becomes impracticable or unacceptable and
must be revised or abandoned.
d. Assumptions made about enemy mines in the minefield should be confirmed by whatever
means available during the initial phase of the operation.
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SECTION II - MISSION
3A04 Introduction
The MCM Commander must analyse his mission with consideration to the general background of the
operation, his superior's mission, and the capabilities and limitations of his own force. For a good
analysis of the mission, it is useful to consider paragraphs in this section as a basis (outline).
2. The MCM Commander will receive certain basic information. This will normally include:
a. Indication of mission.
c. Time available.
e. Intelligence.
f. Traffic expectation.
3A06 Assumptions
3A07 Objectives
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3A08 Introduction
1. This section deals with the factors affecting possible courses of action and is an evaluation of the
numerous environmental and relative strength/weakness factors which may affect the actions taken by
both own and enemy forces. This evaluation is conducted by first tabulating the pertinent facts and then,
from these facts, drawing meaningful and relevant conclusions as to the effects these factors will have
on the outcome of the operation, both from own and enemy standpoint. The importance of drawing
proper conclusions cannot be over-emphasised because they form the basis for assessing:
a. All action within the physical capability of the enemy, which may materially affect the
accomplishment of the MCM Commander's mission.
b. All courses of action available to the Commander which, if successfully executed, will
accomplish his mission.
2. The following paragraphs set out a recommended procedure for the examination of the situation.
Following this fixed sequence is not necessary in all cases. Conclusions should be listed after each item.
A simple guide is:
c. Draw conclusions.
3. The tendency to state facts as conclusions must be avoided. Conclusions drawn in this section will
temper, limit or otherwise affect the Commander's solutions to the various problems. Therefore, the
conclusions must not only be sound, but should also be relevant to the particular problems facing the
Commander. If conclusions do not assist the Commander in determining how best to accomplish his
mission then they are of little or no value and should be discarded.
The factors which do not directly concern the operation but which may have a bearing upon it must be
considered as part of the analysis of the general situation.
1. The nature and scope of the problem will dictate the factors which require study and the degree
to which they should be covered.
2. The MCM Commander should consider the following environmental factors if applicable. These
factors and their impact or possible conclusions are non-exhaustive and the lists should be completed to
reflect the peculiarity of each situation.
a. Not releasable
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3. Geographical Factors
Transit time
Segmentation of channels/areas
Helicopter operations
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4. Minehunting Environment
- clutter
MH techniques/tactics to be used
Water depth (clustering, track spacing, track orientation,
segmentation)
Sea water
conditions
Disposal systems to be used
- temperature
- thermal
structure
- salinity
Underwater visibility
5. Acoustic Environment
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6. Magnetic Environment.
7. Pressure Environment
1. Introduction. An examination of own and enemy forces includes a study of the numbers and
characteristics of the opposing MW forces, together with an examination of the supporting factors and
elements which will have a direct relationship on their operational effectiveness. This examination is
more than a mere listing of numbers and types of forces, ships, aircraft, mines etc. It requires an
investigation of all the means by which the Commander's forces can attain the aim(s). Thus the analysis
should be at the same time a `static' one (situation and characteristics of the `means') and a `dynamic' one
(tactical and logistical possibilities, doctrine, training and readiness).
2. Like the preceding step, this one is a study of facts about the opposing sides as a means of
establishing conclusions. It is recommended to consider the factors in the following sequence:
3. The factors and their impact or conclusions listed in the following tables are non-exhaustive and
the lists should be completed or reflect the peculiarity of each situation.
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- Acoustic and
magnetic
signatures
- High value
targets
- VDDS
- speed
limitations
(steerage way)
- routes
- shipping
density
- convoys
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5. Enemy Forces and Support. The transition from the study of the factors to relevant
conclusions takes place by relating the factors to target ships, traffic and environment.
- obstructors and
decoys
available/suitable
- sensors and
sensitivities
available/suitable
- ship counts
available/suitable
- arming delays
available/suitable
- mine logic
available/suitable
- controlled mines
available/suitable
- self burial
available/suitable
- unsweepable/
undetectable
mines available/
suitable
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5. Cont'd
- surface - AAW
- air - communications
- EW
- platforms
- sonars
- disposal
systems
- effectiveness of
hunting and
disposal systems
in relation to mine
types, uh,
environment,
(A, B, W)
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6. (NU) Cont'd
- task cycles,
endurance
- number and
characteristics of:
- platforms
- sweeps
- effectiveness of
sweep in relation
to mine types, us,
environment,
(A, B, W)
- Sweeping rate
- risk to MCMV in
relation to mine
types, sweep
outputs and self
protective
measures
- task cycles,
endurance
- streaming/
recovery time
needed
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6. (NU) Cont’d
- helicopters
- hovercraft
- MSL
- Clearance
diving teams
- guinea pigs
- effectiveness of
sweeps in
relation to mine
types,
environment
- sweeping rate
- risk to MCMV
Support
- computer
assistance for
evaluation and
planning
- data availability
(survey, EVEC,
automatic
processing)
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6. (NU) Cont’d
- defensive
support from
other forces
- mine
investigation
teams/
laboratories
- danlaying,
buoying
- recompression
chambers
1. A comparison of the different enemy mine types with the available MCM techniques, target ships
and traffic may lead to important conclusions on the relative strength and weakness. Samples are given
in the following tables:
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II
!- + + - mine type B can be partially countered
Sweeper
Table 3A-2. Comparison Target Ships and Traffic - Enemy Mine Types
Symbols: ! dangerous
Enemy mine types O not dangerous
A B C
Conclusions
I ! ! O - mine type B imposes a great priority for MCM
target ships
III
O ! O
Convoy
traffic
IV
O O !
IV I n d e p e n d e n t
merchants with speed
restrictions
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2. The MCM planner should now review all data developed and the conclusions reached up to this
point and organise them in a form that will show the strengths and weaknesses of each of the opposing
forces. It must be emphasised that a strength factor for one side is not a weakness factor for the other.
Review of strength and weakness factors in relation to the mission of the force can be helpful in analysing
enemy capabilities and in determining own courses of action. An example of strength and weakness
factors for a particular operation is given in Table 3A-3 below:
Strength Factors
MCM Commander Enemy
Diversions possible between Covert minelay possible
points AA and FF
Weakness Factors
MCM Commander Enemy
Unfavourable weather forecast Area difficult to mine due
to steep gradient
Lack of good navigation
reference points Swell capable of actuating
pressure sensors
Long supply lines
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1. A course of action is described by a tactical concept of operations whose components are discussed
below. One should guard against the premature exclusion of an idea, simply because it may be either
fragmentary or uncommon. In MCM operations it is advisable to first consider enemy courses of action.
a Having studied the factors governing the situation, the MCM Commander should now conceive
different possibilities by which the enemy can affect the mission.
Different Concepts
Elements
A B C
Purpose of minefields
Composition of minefields
- size
- mine density
- µh, µs
- sensors and sensitivities
- ship counts
- arming delays
- sterilizers
- obstructors and decoys
- anti-MCMV mines
Note. Each mining concept may be completed by possible courses of action regarding
threats other than MW: AAW, EW Int. If possible, enemy courses of action are listed in
the order of their probable adoption by the enemy. Unlikely enemy courses of action
are not rejected but are retained and listed in low order of probability.
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a. Having received and understood his mission, and analysed the factors governing the situation,
the MCM Commander should conceive one or more `tactical concepts'. A `tactical concept', as
used here, is a general concept of how the MCM operation will be conducted.
Different Concepts
Element
A B
Objective
Area priorities
- harbours
- approach, coastal and transit routes or portions of them
- focal points
- anchorages
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(1) Own course of action A. Execute exploratory MCM operations and, if mines are
found, followed by attrition MCM operations in approaches to Rotterdam with minehunters
and minesweepers alternatively, giving priority to minehunters in the exploratory phase.
Minesweepers to use shiplike signatures.
(2) Own course of action B. Execute exploratory minehunting on the coastal routes to
Rotterdam. When mines found, execute minehunting reconnaissance operations to establish
diversions.
(3) Own course of action C. Execute exploratory minehunting on the coastal routes to
Rotterdam. When mines found, execute a short-term operation using a computer-assisted
model, based on the use of a mixed task unit of minehunters and minesweepers.
4. Each enemy or own course of action has to be weighed in relation to the following criteria:
a. Suitability
(1) Enemy course of action (Enemy mining concepts). An enemy course of action
is suitable in so far as it opposes itself to the accomplishment of our mission by:
(2) Own course of action (Concepts of MCM operations). An own course of action
is suitable in so far as it permits the accomplishment of our mission.
b. Feasibility
(1) Enemy course of action (Enemy mining concepts). The feasibility of an enemy
course of action is a function of his resources and of the characteristics of the operations area.
(2) Own course of action (Concept of MCM operations). The feasibility of our course
of action is a function of our resources and the characteristics of the operations area.
5. The discussion on suitability and feasibility highlights the value of the course of action considered
and permits those courses of action which do not meet the requirements of suitability and feasibility to
be discarded.
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1. Comparison of each retained own course of action against each retained enemy capability may be
thought of as mental `war gaming'. From the interaction of opposing courses of action, conclusions must
be drawn related to the probable or possible outcome of the interactions. The conclusions should be
stated in terms of feasibility (versus enemy mining and other actions) and acceptability (in terms of
losses). It may be useful to write the conclusions of the comparison in matrixes as illustrated below. The
courses of action not found acceptable are now discarded.
a. Example 1.
Enemy course of action
A B C
b. Example 2.
Enemy course of action
A B C
R=1% R=1% R=1%
A neutral advantageous disadvantageous
Own course P=95 P=98 P=80
of action
R=1% R=1% R=1%
B advantageous advantageous disadvantageous
P=98 P=98 P=80
2. On the basis of analysing opposing actions, the MCM Commander lists the advantages and
disadvantages of his own courses of action. He then compares the relative merits of each course of action
and selects the best one as his decision.
3A15 Decision
1. The MCM Commander must now state the selected course of action. The decision expresses:
a. A concept of operations indicating in broad terms how the mission is to be accomplished. This
should in fact become Para 3.a. (Execution Para) of the Operation Order.
b. An outline of the plan of execution, containing sufficient detail to establish in the Operation
Order:
(1) The tasks of the principle subordinates and the definition of the priorities.
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2. In certain situations, the MCM Commander will not have sufficient time to plan the MCM
operation in detail prior to commencing the initial phases of the operation. Also, weather conditions,
breakdowns, and losses due to mine explosions and other factors, combined with intelligence gained
during the operation, will normally cause the MCM Commander to modify the conduct of a planned
operation on a daily or even hourly basis. Under these circumstances the original plan is updated and
modified. The MCM Commander, in making modifications to the operation order should consider the
most important factors first, following up with detail as time permits. Common sense, experience and
sound judgement should be exercised by the MCM Commander in determining the best course of action
in the light of new information.
1. TG 424.3 will conduct MCM operations on the approach route to Rotterdam (AA to FF) starting
at 270800Z AUG 81, consisting of visual helicopter search and precursor acoustic sweeping in the initial
phase. When mines are found, traffic will be diverted. If not, exploratory mechanical and exploratory
influence sweeping or exploratory minehunting will determine follow-up operations. When ship(s) are
sunk by mines, new exploratory efforts will be put into the area, followed by clearance/attrition
operations. Operations will continue, until ordered to stop by CTF 424.
2. The concept of operations can be given in a flow diagram highlighting its dynamic character,
different phases and decision-making points. (Figure 3A-1) .
1. Task organisation: pm
2. Tasks
f. TU 424.3.4)
TU 424.3.6) Exploratory hunting and clearance hunting
TU 424.3.7)
TU 424.3.8)
3. Priorities
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4. Co-ordination instructions
a. It is not intended to use minesweepers and hunters in the same area. Change of plans however,
using mixed task units, will imply that hunters have to give way to sweepers unless they are using
divers or PAP 104.
c. Sweepers are not to use the VHF channel used by hunters for communications with zodiac.
d Air attacks are not expected. However, if air attacks develop TG 423.8 (in Area A) will act
as FTC-A.
5. Alternatives
a. In the case of transits to or from Rotterdam by high value targets VDDS, computer-assisted
short-term operations may be considered (diversions being impossible). They will be initiated,
planned and controlled by CTF 424.
b. Initially sweep techniques are to conform with standard parameters given in SOP,
Annex XXX. If necessary parameters will be adapted by CTG 424.3.
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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 3
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this Annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
3B01 General
1. The preparation of mine countermeasures orders can take a considerable amount of time and
depends upon gathering a large quantity of information and detail on both the enemy's and own mine
warfare organisations. Some of this information will be exact but a lot will be based upon intelligence,
estimates and assumptions. A successful operation depends upon the success the planner has in correctly
weighing the facts and assumptions and making the correct deductions and decisions. This is in fact the
Commander's Estimate as given in Annex A.
2. The operation order is the means by which the planner distributes and assigns the forces available
to him in the most effective way to accomplish his mission.
a. MCM OPERATION ORDERS (MCM OPORDER), see Section 2. The format is based on
STANAG 2014.
2. In addition to the mine countermeasures operation order other orders may be required. Orders
other than the operation order should aim to amplify the operation order without duplication. However,
it must be borne in mind that there may well be occasions when forces go on an operation without having
received the operation order. Supplementary or amplifying orders or a Task Order may be sufficient for
a joining unit to commence its task before receiving the operation order.
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The prime role of an exercise is to see how forces cope with their designated task in conditions simulating
those which will exist in time of war. To this end the operation order for an exercise should be
constructed along a similar format as that for real operations. While preparing EXOPORDS exercise
objectives have to be defined. It is advisable to consult existing collections of recommendations and
lessons learned from previous exercises as they are promulgated by national authorities.
Individual MCMV or clearance diver tasks are allocated by means of Task Orders. These tasks can be
pre-planned and allocated Task Order Numbers. This allows for rapid transmission of orders and rapid
allocation of units to tasks. Guidance on drafting Task Orders and standard Suffixes to Task Order
Numbers is given in MTP-24(B), Volume I, Chapter 2.
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3B05 Introduction
1. This section gives detailed instructions for preparing the MCM OPORDER and its annexes but
although the examples of the principles explained here are for MCM operations they can also be applied
to all mine warfare operations.
2. Information required for the MCM operation order, except for the task force organisations, is
obtained from the operational planning data developed in Annex A. Task force organisation is dependent
upon the determination of tasks, as discussed below in paragraph 7.
3B06 Format
(1) References
b. Situation
c. Mission
d. Execution
e. Service Support
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1. The statement on task force organisation in the operation order represents the OPCON authority
decision on how his available force will be organised to accomplish the assigned mission. Depending on
the circumstances, he may decide to either keep the entire force together under his own direct operational
control or he may decide to sub-divide the force into task units, each with specific assigned tasks.
2. Initial tasks assigned to task units by the OPCON are stated in the operation order. Subordinate
commanders need not prepare separate operation orders. Subsequent tasks may be relayed in accordance
with MTP-24(B), Volume I, Chapter 2.
3. It is possible that the OPCON can accomplish his mission by keeping all forces under his
immediate tactical command. With a small force of three to five ships of the same type, sub-division is
not always feasible. However if the force contains several types of ships or more than five ships of the
same type operating in a large area, task sub-division may be necessary to obtain maximum efficiency.
1. The situation paragraph of the operation order provides background information for the entire
operation. It also contains four sub-paragraphs.
a. Enemy forces. This should also contain the enemy mining effort. (Mine types and density).
b. Friendly forces.
This paragraph is identical with the ‘MISSION’ as formulated in the Commander’s Estimate of the
situation. (Annex A).
This paragraph contains three sub-paragraphs. The first is identical with the ‘Concept of Operations’ as
formulated in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (Annex A), the second covers in general terms
the conduct of operations, and the third sub-paragraph gives co-ordinating instructions.
This paragraph contains orders concerning the administrative and logistic arrangements to support the
operation.
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This paragraph contains orders concerning the command structure and the use of communications and
electronic equipment.
1. The paragraphs of the NATO Standard Format for an Operation Order contain essential
instructions and information only. This paragraph describes the type of material that may be contained
in the annexes to the MCM OPORDER. A sample operation order is given in paragraph 14.
a. Annex A: Task Organisation. This annex should cover all participating MCM forces,
their task organisation, commanders, headquarters and, if feasible, the name and rank of each
Commanding Officer.
b. Annex B: Intelligence.
(b) MCM operations (MCM techniques, MCM Task Order Book, schedule of events,
movement plan, manoeuvring instructions).
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f. Annex N: Logistics.
g. Annex O: Safety Rules. This annex will contain special rules not contained in relevant
publications to avoid interference and inform on local arrangements for divers' safety.
h. Annex R: Records and Reports. This annex will state, which reports are to be submitted
and when. Variance from MTP-6/MTP-24 will be included. Details on position reporting may
be included, as well as instructions for coding and encrypting of positions.
i. Annex S: Communications.
j. Annex T: Planning Timetable. In case a detailed time schedule becomes necessary, this
annex will be used instead of Appendix 2 to Annex D.
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(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
References: CINCHANOPLAN X
BA Chart 2807
Task Organisation:
CTG 428.9 CSNFC in HMS ATHERSTONE
CTU 428.9.1 CO ATHERSTONE
TU 428.9.1 HMS ATHERSTONE (MHC)
CTU 428.9.2 CO BREYDEL
TU 428.9.2 BNS BREYDEL (MHSO)
CTU 428.9.3 CO LINDAU
TU 428.9.3 FGS LINDAU (MHC)
CTU 428.9.4 CO NAALDWIJK
TU 428.9.4 HNLMS NAALDWIJK (MSC)
HNLMS NAARDEN (MSC)
TU 428.9.5 To be designated (one MHC)
TU 428.9.6 To be designated (MCS)
(2). Friendly Forces. Two ATAF will provide air cover during daylight.
(3) Attachments and detachments. TU 428.9.5 (MHC) and 428.9.6 (MCS) after
assignment of additional forces in accordance with CINCHANOPLAN X to be
allocated to CTG 428.9.
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b. Mission. TG 428.9 will carry out mine countermeasures operations in the Deep
Draft Route from point A to point G, starting at 22 SEP 91 first light in order to ensure safe
passage of shipping from 24 SEP 91 onwards.
c. Execution.
(3) Further operations depend on established Mine Danger Areas and will be
ordered by CTG 428.9.
(a) Mines to be recovered will be designated by CTG 428.9. CTU 428.9.2 will
recover and transport.
(c) Hunters and sweepers will only work together in areas longer than 6 nm.
Hunters will give way to sweepers unless operating divers or PAP 104.
d. Service Support. All units shall be prepared to sail at 220400Z and be fully
provisioned. Fuel and limited maintenance will not be available afloat before 23 SEP
when a logistic support vessel will arrive in the operations area (TU 428.9.6). Food and
fresh water will be available in OSTEND or FLUSHING during stand-off periods. Further
details are contained in Annex LIMA.
Signature
Commander MCM Force North
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3B15 Purpose
1. The MCM Operations Direction (MCMOPDIR) is used by the Operational Control Authority
to order general execution of MCM operations by subordinate tasking authorities.
2. Not releasable
In order to facilitate identification, each MCMOPDIR will be allotted an individual number consisting
of three digits. MCMOPDIR numbers are promulgated consecutively, appropriations of a block of
numbers are allocated by the Operational Control Authority.
1. All MCMOPDIR must have a number, but the individual paragraphs are only to be filled in
when applicable. This means, for example, that MCMOPDIR 307 consisting of all paragraphs from ‘A’
to ‘Z’ might be amended by MCMOPDIR 312 consisting of paragraphs ‘E’ and ‘Z’ only.
2. Not releasable
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3B18 Introduction
MCM operations are divided into different tasks. These tasks are allocated by the OPCON or the OTC
to the different task groups, units or elements. They are based on the outline of the plan of execution as
given in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (See Annex A).
General instructions are contained in MTP-24, Volume I. Task Orders can be prepared in advance (Task
Order Book) to deal with all anticipated circumstances and to reduce communications before and during
operations. Generally they are issued by the OTC based on the MCM OPORDER or MCMOPDIR, but
they may also be issued by the OPCON Authority in special situations.
The OTC decides how to execute his task. He is responsible for the proper execution of all tasks within
his MCM Force. He will give necessary additional instructions as the development of the situation
dictates, and will keep his superiors informed.
1. When the types of operation are definitely established as reconnaissance, exploratory, clearance
or short-term and the parameters of the minefield and environment are known or can be sufficiently
estimated, a tasking schedule can be prepared at the beginning, for the entire operation.
2. However, when attrition operations are planned the MCM operations may extend for an
indefinite period. In this case it is recommended that the tasking schedule be prepared for a period which
coincides with the task cycle. Prior to the completion of this task cycle, a new on-time should be
promulgated to the MCM force carrying out the attrition operation. This procedure should continue until
MCM forces are no longer required.
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ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 3
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this Annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
3C01 Introduction
1 The very specialised nature of certain types of mine countermeasures operations do not fit into
the general mould of MCM. Too little may be known or agreed about them, or they may have such a
special application as to make them not generally useable, or they may have only some minor differences
which requires their mention in a special section but not necessarily in a special chapter. This Annex
deals with special types of mine countermeasures operations, which means a possible use of own MCM
forces. As more information is gained about special operations, as more is agreed to, and as other
conditions arise which demonstrate the need, new paragraphs may be added to this Annex. Alternatively,
those which no longer demonstrate a need for identification as a special operation may be eliminated
entirely. As new theories and new special types of mine warfare operations evolve they may be included
initially in this Annex, then transferred or deleted as appropriate.
2. Not releasable
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1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
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1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
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3C04 General
In Mine Warfare the mine countermeasure of moving merchant and naval ships from mined anchorages
to safer waters is known by the term EVACUATION. The goal of mine countermeasures, which is the
protection of shipping against the danger from mines, will never by easy to achieve in a mined anchorage
with ships present. The means of achieving this goal will vary from one anchorage to another depending
on location, configuration and other characteristics. Both passive and active mine countermeasures can,
and must be used. Preplanned anchorages may make it easier to conduct any necessary MCM operations.
1. The defence of an anchorage against the danger from mines starts with the selection of the
anchorage and anchor berths. The main criteria for the selection of anchorages are:
f. Depth of water.
2. From the MCM point of view, however, the minehunting and mine-burial characteristics of the
bottom must be taken into consideration and may lead to selecting one anchorage in preference to another.
3. Selected anchorages must be surveyed from the Minehunter and mine-burial points of view.
Bottom condition charts must be established wherever minehunters are likely to be available to the MCM
forces. If feasible, minehunters and/or divers should make the surveys, since they are likely to obtain the
most complete and definite data on the local conditions and given guidance on the choice of anchorages.
If minehunters or naval divers are not available local skin (SCUBA) divers may be able to give an idea
about which bottoms are best.
4. Not releasable
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a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
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5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
1. A minewatching organisation using both shore facilities and ships at anchor will enable the
Operational Command Authority to obtain a good picture of the extent of the minelaying offensive, and
should enable him to draw a fairly accurate picture of the position of the mines.
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
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2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
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1. Evacuation can be supported by the following methods. These additional procedures have to be
balanced very carefully against active MCM before ordering their execution.
a. Towing. MCMVs and some craft of opportunity (COOP) can, in emergency, be used to tow
ships at slow speed away from the mined anchorage, thus avoiding increased acoustic output by
the vessel in tow. However, it has to be considered that MCMV/COOP employed as tugs will be
at risk.
b. Drifting. If ships have to leave a mined area urgently and no tugs are available drifting with
the current into safer waters may be considered.
3C09 Lead-through
1. If necessary, MCMV/COOP may carry out lead-through operations in accordance with the
following references:
a. MTP-1, Volume I
b. Not releasable
c. MTP-24, Volume I,
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3C10 General
1. Precursor operations are defined as the sweeping or hunting of an area by relatively safe means in
order to reduce the risk for MCMVs in subsequent operations. They are ordered by MCMOPDIR. These
operations should be ordered:
a. When mine explosions endanger an MCMV engaged in a MCM operation other than precursor.
b. When the OTC estimates that the risk to MCMVs is higher than the ordered acceptable risk.
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
3C12 Execution
1. The safest possible platforms should be used in precursor operations. Some vehicles offer
advantages over others, for example:
a. Helicopters and Surface Effect Vehicles. These vehicles possess great advantages for
precursor operations since they present greatly reduced signatures for all known mine influences
and are inherently immune to shock damage from mine explosions. They are, however,
endangered by water plume and by shrapnel from explosions in shallow water.
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b. Small craft. These may be specially designed to have shallow draught and reduced influence
signatures. Their only real advantage is their shallow draught.
c. Remotely-controlled sweeps. These offer the advantage that human life is not at risk.
2. In mechanical sweeping, the sweep should be at the maximum depth possible, and no change of
depth should be necessary. If ‘safe’ MCMV platforms are available then mechanical sweeping may be
in Formation ‘I’, if a safe platform is not available then Formation ‘G’ is recommended. Stages for
sweeping moored mines are given in para 0307g of this publication.
3. In influence sweeping, operations should be carried out assuming the most unfavourable
magnetic/acoustic signature of any MCMV deployed in the area. If ‘safe’ platforms are available then
MCM equipment settings will be determined by the procedures for clearance operations detailed in
Chapter 13. If no ‘safe’ platforms are available, the dangerous front should be reduced by carrying out
influence sweeping in the following two steps:
a. STEP 1: Calculate the MCMV risk and the sweep output assuming the most sensitive mine
settings to be expected in the minefield. Use MCM Formation ‘P’ for the Step 1 sweep. MCMVs
operate at maximum sweep output or at an output which gives an acceptable risk of damage.
4. Stages for acoustic and magnetic precursor sweeping are given in para 0307. In general, acoustic
loud speakers are best suited for acoustic precursor sweeping.
5. If available, a decoy emitting minehunting sonar frequencies and pulses could be used as a
precursor against homing mines aimed at minehunters.
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CHAPTER 4
1. Modern technology, thought and experience has allowed a whole new approach to be made to the
provision of MCM vehicles, and the MCM systems fitted to these vehicles. MCMVs are divided into
surface vehicles, airborne vehicles and sub-surface vehicles. These vehicles may be manned or
unmanned, remotely controlled or programmed, single or multi-role, specially designed and built or
adapted or converted, precious or expendable, large or small.
2. Whatever the type of MCM vehicle the MCM equipment fitted to it must be designed and built to
withstand repeated shocks from underwater explosions of a high order. The vehicle may be just a carrier
or an MCM system; it may be considered a part of the system or the whole system itself.
1. The standard MCMV at the present time is the Surface Vehicle and the most numerous type is the
Displacement Vessel. Other types of vessel may be used, including Surface Effect Vehicles (SEV),
Semi-Submerged Vehicles (SSV) and Hydrofoils; they are attractive because of their low underwater
signatures.
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3. Surface Effect Vehicles (SEV). Surface effect vehicles may be of two basic forms; one of
which is an amphibian such as the hovercraft, the other a non-amphibian characterised by rigid side walls
which enter the water. An air cushion is maintained under the vehicle body by a skirt which retains the
air generated by high volume fans. Reduced friction between the craft and water surface permits
maximum speeds of 50 to 60 knots. Hovercraft are essentially oriented toward high speed and short range
application in sheltered waters or moderate seas. Hovercraft have achieved a high degree of inherent
stability and have operated in sea states 5-6. As a result of the air cushion construction, SEVs are less
affected by underwater explosions than normal displacement hull forms; however plume and
fragmentation damage can occur. Noise from the propulsion system and lift fans may be significant. The
combination of a low-ferrous hull and machinery results in an essentially low magnetic signature. SEVs
generate a low in-water acoustic signature and a weak pressure signature as long as the craft is in the
hover mode. When the hovercraft sinks to the boating mode there is an increase in signature. An example
for an SEV used for mine countermeasures is shown in Figure 4-1.
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5. Hydrofoils. Recent advances in high strength wear-resistant materials have facilitated further
development of the hydrofoil concept. It has proven to be an attractive means of achieving high speed
in open ocean areas while retaining a capability to operate as a conventional displacement vessel in
restricted waters. The speed range for a foil-borne hydrofoil craft is approximately 25 to 80 knots. High
speeds can be reached because of the reduction in water resistance with respect to displacement hulls.
In the hull-borne mode, hydrofoil vehicles are susceptible to the same damage as mono-displacement
hulls. When the hydrofoil is hydroplaning it is unlikely to be hit by a torpedo. It will only be at risk from
mine plume damage, and shock damage is likely to be negligible. Speed and manoeuvrability tend to
decrease the probability of other threats. As a result of propulsion and flow noises the acoustic signature
is significant. The magnetic signature is quite small. However, it is anticipated that varying pressure
signatures will be produced.
1. Helicopters are capable of sweeping moored and influence mines, and of minehunting. Special
MCM helicopters are able to carry and stream their own gear. High sea states will not directly impede
the helicopter performance, however, the effects on towed equipment and the accompanying high winds
may tend to limit operations. Helicopter operations will not be possible in sea state 4 or higher.
Helicopters are relatively invulnerable to damage from underwater weapons with the possible exceptions
of damage caused by the plume of a detonating mine or by mine fragmentation in extremely shallow
water. When operating in a hostile area vulnerability to missiles and gunfire must be given serious
consideration.
2. Helicopters allow fast overseas deployment of MCM effort and, apart from minesweeping,
helicopters can be usefully employed in the following main and subsidiary tasks:
a. Mine spotting.
c. Communications; rapid transit of classified instructions, reports and records between units at
sea and command headquarters.
3. The use of light aircraft in mine countermeasures is confined to mine spotting, marking mines on
the surface and communications between shore headquarters; however, certain airships may have a greater
capability.
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Sub-surface MCM Vehicles can be utilised as submersibles or small submarines, torpedo or drone type
vehicles or bottom crawlers. As this type of vehicle is very vulnerable to underwater shock, its primary
task is likely to be limited to reconnaissance or minehunting. The envisaged manoeuvrability and control
are likely to be within the requirements for this role.
Remotely controlled vehicles are defined as unmanned airborne, surface and/or sub-surface vehicles
which derive their commands from a mother vehicle or a self-contained programme system. Technically
it is feasible to consider any of the above forms for performing all types of MCM missions, but principally
influence sweeping and minehunting. The advantage exploited by these vehicles is that MCM tasks can
be performed without directly endangering personnel. For example, to enable a detection to be made by
remote means it would not be necessary for a manned surface displacement to pass over or be in the
vicinity of a mine. An example is shown in Figure 4-2.
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2. Remotely operated vehicles (ROV) from civilian sources, for example side scan sonars from
hydrographic institutes or submersibles used for oilrig platform inspections, may be used for route survey
or minehunting. Support by clearance divers for disposal of mines is to be considered.
1. Guinea Pig. A special MCM vehicle known as a ‘Guinea Pig’ is a ship designed to sweep mines
by its own characteristics or to transit an already swept channel before or ahead of the passage of
important other ships. It is usually made very resistant to underwater shock and damage and may be
manned or unmanned and remotely controlled.
2. Clearance Diver Vessel (MCD). The MCD is especially designed to accommodate and support
clearance divers. It should have the same characteristics as an MCMV to include endurance, precise
navigational accuracy and seaworthiness. In addition, the MCD should be equipped with a recompression
chamber, mixed gas/compressed air refilling capability, medical personnel trained to treat diving
casualties and facilities to repair MCD diving equipment.
a. Any MCMV, but preferably a craft of opportunity (COOP) is suited to act as mine disposal
vessel. See MTP-6(C) Volume 1, para 0411.6 and Note 2 at para 0303.3 of this volume.
b. Not releasable
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Table 4-1 lists the NATO designators for mine countermeasures vehicles (MCMV) and their support
vehicles. A full list of ship designators is contained in STANAG 1166 MT, Standard Ship Designator
System. A designator for MCM Helicopter is not assigned.
Description Designator
MINESWEEPER, GENERAL MS
MINESWEEPER, FLEET MSF
MINESWEEPER, OCEAN MSO
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL MSC
MINESWEEPER, INSHORE MSI
MINESWEEPER, RIVER MSR
MINESWEEPER, BOAT MSB
MINESWEEPER, AUXILIARY MSA
MINESWEEPER, DRONE, MSD
MINESWEEPER, COASTAL, WITH DRONE MSCD
MINESWEEPER, SPECIAL DEVICE MSS
MINEHUNTER, GENERAL MH
MINEHUNTER, OCEAN MHO
MINEHUNTER, COASTAL MHC
MINEHUNTER, INSHORE MHI
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, OCEAN MHSO
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, COASTAL MHSC
MINEHUNTER, AUXILIARY MHA
MCM SHIP, GENERAL MCM
MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER, GENERAL MHS
MCM SUPPORT SHIP MCS
MCM VESSEL, HOVERCRAFT MCJ
MCM VESSEL, DIVING MCD
1. The OTC of a MCM Task Group at sea is best supported by a tender type vessel. The requirements
for such a unit are:
c. Logistic support and replenishment facilities for all types of MCMV constituting task units of
the respective MCM Task Group. This includes storage of POL, spare parts and provisions.
Availability of small workshops is desirable.
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Any unit capable of precise navigation and properly trained to conduct leadthrough may be used to act
as pilot for naval and merchant shipping through established channels and mine free areas or gaps.
However, the units chosen must be familiar with the established leadthrough area. MCMVs should only
be ordered to conduct leadthrough operations if no other suitable unit is available. It is the Operational
Commander's responsibility to choose and prepare suitable units from national sources in his area.
1. Nations and/or Operational Control Authorities must ensure that adequate navigation buoy and
danbuoy laying capacity is available in all areas of concern.
2. Mine countermeasures buoys can be carried and laid by most naval and civilian vehicles. If such
vessels have sufficiently accurate navigational systems and knowledge of the area their use in buoylaying
will free MCMVs to conduct mine countermeasures operations. But, where large numbers are required
to be laid the use of specifically built or converted vessels such as MSAs is recommended.
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CHAPTER 5
NOT RELEASABLE
SECTION I - NOT RELEASABLE
Not Releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5-1 ORIGINAL
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c. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
5-2 ORIGINAL
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1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
5-3 ORIGINAL
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3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
5-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
5-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
5-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
5-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
8. Not releasable
9. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
5-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
5-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
(To be issued)
5-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. MCMV risk is defined as the probability that a poised mine of given characteristics, exploded by
the sweeping or hunting technique in use, will explode within the damage area of the MCMV. For
example, if a given sweeping or hunting technique is expected to result in nine mines being fired outside
the damage area for every mine exploded inside the damage area, R equals 0.10.
2. When the threat to the sweeper comes from mines fired by the sweep in the vicinity of the sweeper
and for mechanically sweeping contact mines, MCMV risk may be estimated from the following formula:
F x Bd
R '
A x B
3. When the influence field of the sweeper or hunter is large enough to actuate mines, it may be
assumed that these actuations will be within the damage area of the MCMV. When the MCMV can
actuate mines and when (F) x (Bd) is near the value of or larger than (A) x (B), R can be more accurately
represented by adding (F) x (Bd) to (A) x (B) in the denominator of R. This adjustment to R will only
be significant when mines are likely to be fired by the MCMV and only applies to situations which should
be avoided.
4. The value of R is valid when skip track sequence is used and in the first run of progressive
sequence (See MTP-24(B) Volume I).
1. Safety of the MCMV is one of the most important factors to be considered when choosing
appropriate techniques and patterns. Protection of the MCMV from mine explosion damage is always
important, even when the urgency of the operation demands that the rate of sweeping or searching be
considered foremost.
2. Safe Procedures. Safe procedures are intended to prevent any mine from firing within the
damage area or to minimize the risk incurred by the MCMV carrying out MCM operations. One method
is to apply the correct sequence of stages, which is discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume. Other methods
are stated below.
3. Figure 5-18 gives an example of the application of a minesweeping technique and the associated
MCMV risk.
5-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. MCMV Safety Parameters. When a MCMV passes close to a poised mine, there is a
probability that the mine will be exploded forward of the damage area, within the damage area or aft of
the damage area. The cumulative effects of these three possibilities are caused either by the MCMV, the
sweep or a combination of both. The probability that a mine will be exploded within the damage area at
an athwartships distance y, is designated Pd(y). Two forms of the curve of Pd(y) plotted as a function
of y are shown in Figure 5-17. Three parameters for MCMV safety can be determined from the
probability curve. These are:
a. Dangerous front (F), which is the maximum width of the curve of Pd(y) plotted as a function
of y.
b. Aggregate Damage Width (Wd) which is the area under the curve of Pd(y).
y2
ie: Wd ' Pd y dy
my1
c. Damage Probability, (Bd), which is the weighted average value of Pd(y) within F, thus
Wd
Bd '
F
These parameters are shown with some additional features in Figure 5-19 and are discussed
further.
5. Figure 5-20 illustrates the development of these safety parameters. Part A of the figure is a plot
of the results obtained from the first 100 yards athwartships distance of one sweeping run. The
probability of explosion (Pd) within 100 yards of the MCMV is plotted as a function of the athwartships
distance y.
6. From the curve, half of which is plotted in Part A of Figure 5-20, the MCMV safety parameters
are determined as shown in Figure 5-20, Part B. F is determined from the intersection of the curve with
the horizontal axis y. Wd is the arc under the curve Pd(y) and is determined by adding the individual
values of Pd(y) at various distances of y (see formula (1) below) and then dividing by the total number
of y's taken (see formula (ii) below).
5-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. The damage area of a MCM Vessel approximates to a cylinder (the vertical axis of which passes
through the centre of gravity of the ship) of 100 yards radius for a charge of 1000 kg of TNT. This
theoretical damage area is thus independent of the depth of water. Its radius varies as the square root of
the weight of explosive charge in units of TNT.
2. There are two influence firing areas; the firing area of the sweep, and that of the vessel. These two
areas are not always separate, since the influences due to sweep and vessel may combine. Thus:
a. A 200 nT magnetic mine may detonate dangerously within the shock zone because to the 150
nT due to the sweep are added the 50 nT due to the vessel.
b. A 5 Pascal acoustic mine may be influenced because to the 4 Pascal due to the sweep are
quadratically added the 3 Pascal due to the vessel.
3. However, the two above areas are assumed to be separate, so we calculate the dangerous front in
relation to these two danger areas.
5-31 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Figure 5-19. Damage Radius, Damage Area, Dangerous Front, Damage Probability and
Aggregate Damage Width
5-32 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Without prior intelligence, the potential efficiency of an influence sweep operation cannot be
satisfactorily estimated, and if it must proceed it will be planned on the basis of ‘best guess’. But as
intelligence is gathered (as a result of precursor operations, mine recoveries, casualties etc) planning can
proceed on a more certain basis. However, there are some factors common to influence sweeping
operations, and so far as these affect the potential risk to the MCMV, they can be taken into account from
the beginning.
2. For example, the more efficient an influence sweeping operation, the more mines are actuated, and
the greater the risk to the sweeper. Thus, in terms of operational efficiency, any estimate of Actuation
Probability (B) is also, in effect, an estimate of Damage Probability (Bd) to the sweeper. Similarly, any
estimate of Swept Path (A) may also, in the circumstances described shortly, reflect upon the estimate of
Dangerous Front.
3. When influence sweeping a regular pattern minefield, the probability is that the highest number
of mine actuations will occur along or near the track of the sweep (and sweeper if they are in line). This
probability is shown in simple graphic form in Figure 5-21 where actuations are plotted against distance.
The centreline of the curve represents the track of the sweep. The area under the curve shows the
probable efficiency of sweep operation. If a rectangle is drawn having the same area as that under the
curve, then:
This graph which here represents efficiency of the sweep operation, can also be considered for its
implications to MCMV risk.
5-33 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5-34 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Considering the influence of the sweep alone, it is omni-directional and has the potential to actuate mines
out to its periphery. If the sweep periphery overlaps the danger area of the sweeper then there is a
potential that not only medium sensitive mines may be actuated, but that coarse mines may be fired under
the combined influence of sweep and sweeper. A line cutting the intersects of the sweep influence and
the sweeper dangerous area circle is called the Dangerous Front (F), and this has relationship with both
the amount of overlap and the Swept Path width.
Once again, the Damage Potential (Bd) is related to the Actuation Probability (B), since the same factors
apply, that is, the most mine actuations will probably occur along the line of the sweep (and sweeper),
and the more actuations there are the more likelihood of damage to the MCMV.
The Aggregate Damage Width (Wd) is a statistical estimate of the potential vulnerability of an MCMV
to mine damage in a given circumstance. It is the product of Dangerous Front and Damage Potential.
Wd ' F x Bd
When minesweeping, the ‘self-protection depth’ is the depth where there is no overlap between the firing
area and the sweeper damage area. In some cases, there is no overlap from the surface down to
self-protection depth. In other cases there may be no overlap from self-protection depth down to the
bottom. Again, there may be no overlap between two depths, of which one is the self-protection depth
of the field of the MCMV (safe depth) and the other the self-protection depth of the field of the sweep
in use.
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5-35 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
5-36 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
e. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
5-37 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5-38 ORIGINAL
5-39
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
CHAPTER 6
MINESWEEPING
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this chapter
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Mechanical sweeping includes all the techniques of sweeping whose aim is to cut the mine
mooring to remove the mines from the area, or to detonate the mines by direct action on the mine mooring
cables (cutting), the mine cases (trawling), or the mine firing mechanisms (antenna or snagline mines).
2. When sweeping shallow contact mines (other than antenna or snagline mines) the factors involved
in the determination of the degree of risk to the sweeper are the depth, height and dip of the mines, and
the draught of the sweeper.
3. When sweeping antenna or snagline mines, the degree of risk depends on the same factors and also
on the type of sweep used (only appropriate special sweeps are safe). If a standard sweep is used against
any contact mine (other than antenna or snagline), there is always a danger area because a mine may
explode either on contact with the kite or on any other part of the sweep. When sweeping influence mines
the safety of the sweeper may depend on the degaussing, silencing, or other self protective measures
adopted. Consideration must be given to attempting to sweep the moorings of moored antenna or snagline
mines rather than to use a sweep designed to actuate their mechanism.
1. Moored mines are swept by towing a wire through the water horizontally at a suitable depth. The
standard sweep is the Oropesa, shown in Figure 6-1. The Oropesa sweep consists of sweep wires
streamed from one or both quarters, with a kite or depressor to keep them down to a set depth astern of
the ship and otters controlled by floats to spread the wires horizontally apart. Mine moorings are cut by
the sawing action of the sweepwire. Serrated or square wire is used (see Figure 6-2) and cutting
efficiency increases with speed. At normal sweeping speeds the sawing action of the wire may fail to cut
the mine mooring, the mines are then dragged along the bottom and their moorings often part. However,
mines can explode and destroy the sweep, become free from the sweep (especially on turns), or be tangled
in the sweep to jeopardize the sweeper when the sweep gear is raised. Thus sweeps are armed with
cutters, generally explosive with static cutters at the extremities. The greater the scope of the sweep the
more economic the use of the sweepers, however, scope may be limited by for example, lack of sea-room
or lack of water depth at the shore end of channels.
6-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Team Sweep. The sweep wire is towed between two or more ships using only kites to keep
the sweep down. This sweep is not so efficient at cutting as the Oropesa sweep but possesses the
advantages of being capable of adjustment for depth while sweeping.
b. The Antenna Sweep. The Antenna Sweep may be used with either a single or multiple ship
rig and is designed to ensure that the sweep wire is not brought into contact with the antenna until
the mine is a safe distance astern.
6-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c The Snagline Sweep. This type of sweep is used for catching the snagline of moored
mines. Sweeps are fitted with fish hooks or grips along their length and are run without kites in
order to avoid detonating mines close in the wake. Helicopter wire sweeps are very useful against
antenna or snagline mines.
a. Bottom Sweeps (Figure 6-5). Bottom sweeps are two-ship sweeps used either to sweep
mines close to the bottom, to sweep heavy obstructors or remove such mines and obstructors from
a channel by dragging them to a safe dumping ground and releasing them. A wire bottom sweep
uses a heavy sweep wire kept down by otter boards. A chain bottom sweep uses a chain for
sweeping and kites for depressing.
b. Net Sweeps (Figure 6-6). Net sweeps are sweeps designed to collect mines and either
detonate them by contact or dispose of them by dumping. They are of two types:
(1) Trawl Net - which uses a bottom trawl to scoop up mines from the seabed.
(2) Skim Net - which uses a surface net to collect drifting and floating mines.
6-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Gear Configuration
a. Surface Ship Gear Configurations. Standard mechanical sweeps may be either one or
two sided. Two sided sweeps should be used except when in a protected echelon formation using
ship-to-float overlap, when sweeping in shallow water where it is necessary to turn away from the
sweep to prevent the sweep wire from bottoming, or when the sweepers tow capability is limited
to a single side.
b. Helicopter Gear Configurations. Two sided are preferred for formation and independent
helicopter operations to prevent loss of a complete side to an obstructor encounter on the inboard
leg, and because sweep gear handling and performance is improved. However, one sided may be
preferred when the need for manoeuvring room or other operational considerations dictate. Factors
that affect the choice of configuration include the towing capability of the aircraft resulting from
atmospheric conditions and the desired tow speed. Speeds for MCM helicopter sweeps are given
in national publications.
1. For any condition there is an optimum sweep towing speed (over the ground) for which sweeping
rate is greatest. This speed is given in national publications for the various sweeps. The optimum towing
speed is the maximum which does not produce sag or lift.
2. Sweep depth for standard and horizontal mechanical sweeps is the horizontal depth of the diverter
and kite; this is always below the mine clearance depth. The minimum depth considered is that depth in
the shallowest part of the segment at low tide, and the maximum depth is that in the deepest part of the
segment at high tide.
3. The Sweep Constant (G) is the maximum distance that the mine mooring can safely be deflected
in the direction of the tow before encountering a cutter. Figure 6-7 shows a sweep wire touching a mine
mooring at Q. As the sweep moves forward the point of contact moves to R. If the mooring has not been
cut before G is exceeded, the mine may either contact the sweep wire and explode, it may slip off the wire
and return to its original position, or it may tangle in the wire and foul the sweep.
It is used for determining sweeping effectiveness which is a planning and evaluation criterion for
MCM operations.
6-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Sweep Arming refers to the type, number and position of cutters attached to the sweep wire. The
type of cutter depends on the type and size of the mine mooring to be severed. The maximum number
of cutters depends on the type of cutter and the type of sweep gear. The number of the cutters required
for a particular operation depends on the density of the minefield and the depth of the sweep below the
clearance depth. That is, the closer the sweep depth is to the clearance depth, or the denser the minefield,
the larger the number of cutters required. Detailed instructions for determining the type and number of
cutters required for arming a mechanical sweep against known or assumed mine types are contained in
national publications. For surface ship sweepers, cutter positions on the sweep wire depend on the scope
of the wire and the number of cutters used. These positions are given in national publications. For
helicopter sweeps, cutter loading is determined by the water and mine case depth, obstructors and mine
density. Two basic types of cutters are used, mechanical and explosive. Characteristics of mechanical
and explosive cutters, the maximum number of cutters per side of sweep for the various sweeps and cutter
types are given in national data.
a. Mechanical cutters sever the mine mooring between the jaws formed by two steel cutting
blades. When the sweep wire contacts the mooring it slides along until the mooring enters the
cutter. Mechanical cutters can snag the mooring and drag the mine case some distance before
cutting the mooring. This type of cutter cannot cut chain moorings.
6-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Explosive cutters employ an explosive charge for cutting the mine mooring. They are effective
at all speeds. These cutters are of the chisel or shaped charge type and they may be either single
or multiple shot variety. The shaped charge type severs the mine mooring by means of a blast
produced by the firing of an inverted wedge shaped charge. The chisel type severs the mine
mooring by means of a chisel propelled by an explosive.
c. To avoid the possibility of an undersized cutter snagging a mooring instead of cutting it all
cutters on the sweep must be capable of cutting the largest size and type of mooring expected in
the field.
d. When mechanical cutters are used, the cutters remain fixed throughout the operation and are
not replaced except for those that become defective. However, when explosive cutters are used,
each mooring severed reduces the available explosive cutter shots. Consequently, after a number
of shots have been expended the sweep must be rearmed. Since rearming takes time, this must be
considered as a factor in reducing both the time available for actual sweeping and the overall
sweeping rate.
6. The most effective measures for countering anti-sweep devices are to set the sweep depth as deep
as possible, and to arm the sweep heavily enough to cut obstructor moorings before the sweep wire comes
into contact with the obstructor case. If sweep gear is destroyed despite these measures, it may indicate
that obstructors and anti-sweep devices are located considerably below the mine case.
7. Not releasable
Influence sweeps may be divided into three principal types ie magnetic, acoustic or pressure. They can
be used concurrently for sweeping combination mines. Influence minesweeping is carried out by
generating with the sweep the principal influence fields generated by ships in such a way that the firing
mechanism is actuated by these sweep-produced fields. For present-day mines, the influence fields are
effective in countering some single influence or combination influence mines even though the sweep
influence patterns generated by the sweep do not always resemble those influence patterns generated by
target ships. This method of countering present-day influence mines has been and is being employed
principally because it generally results in very high sweeping rates in terms of square kilometres swept
per hour. Against the present mine threat it would be much less efficient to generate sweep influence
fields which resemble those influences generated by ships, however, modern mines require ship-like
signatures of influence sweeps.
1. The basic types of operational magnetic sweeps are towed closed loop sweeps, electrode sweeps
(two and three electrode types), solenoid sweeps and magnetised ferrous sweeps (Figure 6-8).
a. Solenoid Sweeps. These consist of a large number of horizontal coils through which a
comparatively small current is passed. The solenoid is generally incorporated in a float towed by
a surface sweeper or a helicopter, or being remotely controlled.
6-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Electrode Sweeps. These generally consist of two buoyant conducting cables, an electrode
being fitted at the end of each leg. The electrical circuit is completed through the sea water. A
high current is passed through this circuit. These sweeps can obviously be used only where the
water is sufficiently saline. Moreover, the variable conductivity of the seabed can cause
considerable distortion of the magnetic field. It is therefore difficult to determine the swept path
accurately and sweeper safety may be endangered. However, conductivity surveys and/or the use
of a towed monitor may permit estimations of acceptable accuracy (and hence safety) to be made.
Under favourable conditions of the bottom and of water salinity, the electrode fields will give a
large increase in swept path compared with a loop. Electrode sweeps may be straight or diverted
in inverted V, Y or J shapes. Straight electrode sweeps may have a third electrode intended to
reduce the horizontal component of the field produced by the sweep near the sweeper. A variant
of the electrode sweep is used by a team of two sweepers, each towing a buoyant cable with an
electrode at its end. The circuit is completed by a conductor running between the two ships.
c. Loop Sweeps. These consist of a conducting cable, usually buoyant, loop-shaped (the loop
being kept spread by use of one or two diverters) through which is passed a high current. Loop
sweeps may either be symmetrical (diverter towed on each side) or asymmetrical (diverter towed
on one side only). A variant of the symmetrical loop is towed by two sweepers working as a team.
6-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
d. Permanent Magnetic Sweeps. These consist of an array of permanent magnets which may
be used to sweep magnetic influence mines. They generally have the same limitations as solenoid
sweeps.
2. Not releasable
3. Magnetic sweeps suffer from the disadvantage that, if sufficient current is passed through the
cables to give a good swept path, very sensitive mines may be fired inside the damage area of the sweeper.
If the current is reduced to give safety to the sweeper, the swept path is also reduced and the time taken
to sweep an area is somewhat increased. The safety of the sweeper is given consideration in the choice
of sweeping technique. Table 6-1 below compares the different types of magnetic sweeps.
EFFECTIVENESS
TYPE OF SWEEP ENVIRONMENT REMARKS
Vertical Horizontal
Component Component
Mines Mines
Electrode - Yes Less than Depth and Large Fields under
Straight tail Vertical Conductivity sweeper without security
Component electrode. Easy to
manoeuvre.
Electrode - Yes Yes Depth and Large fields under
Diverted Conductivity sweeper without security
electrode.
Closed Loop Yes Yes Depth Effectiveness more
predictable than electrode
sweeps.
Solenoid and Yes Yes Depth Effectiveness more
Permanent predictable than electrode
Magnet sweeps.
1. Sweeping Speed. Two principal considerations determine sweeper speed when sweeping
magnetic mines, these are that the safety of the sweeper increases as its speed increases and the sweeping
rate is not necessarily maximum at the highest towing speed. For a given set of conditions, there is an
optimum sweep towing speed (over the ground) for which the sweeping rate is greatest. This speed is
given in national publications for the various sweeps. When the indicated optimum towing speed over
the ground exceeds the maximum towing speed through the water, the latter speed becomes the sweeping
speed. To maintain the optimum towing speed over the ground corrections should be made for the effects
of the water current.
6-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. When the safety of the MCMV is of paramount importance, consideration should be given to the
mine types to be countered and to the appropriate selection of the MCM pattern. If only magnetic mines
are present in the minefield, the maximum possible towing speed through the water will be the safest
sweeping speed. However, if other mines are present for example acoustic or pressure mines, the overall
danger to the MCMV may be increased by the use of maximum speed. When full current is used, the
safety is provided by keeping the MCMV in swept waters, the optimum towing speed over the ground
should be used as the sweeping speed.
3. Pulse Cycle. The pulse cycle period is the time interval between the beginning of one pulse and
the next in the same direction. The pulse cycle used depends on the characteristics of the mines being
swept. The sensitivity of a particular mine to one pulse cycle is not the same as its sensitivity to another,
so that a variation of the pulse cycle may also vary either sweeping efficiency and/or safety of the
sweeper. The necessary changes in the magnetic field required to actuate magnetic induction mines can
best be produced by pulsing sweeps at intervals as the MCMV moves forward. With existing pulse
distributors or controllers it is generally possible to select the wave form (square, sinusoidal, triangular,
arbitrary shape), the pulse length, the pulse interval (on-time plus off-time) and the polarity of four
successive pulses. Values of the pulse cycle elements are given in national annexes to MTP-24 and
AMP-3, Volume I. Pulsing also enables generators to produce peak fields larger than would be possible
using their continuous power rating. To actuate a mine, consecutive pulses have to be of opposite
polarity, whilst field strength may have to be varied throughout the pulse which must last sufficiently long
to overcome the damping and to operate the mine relay. Control equipment is therefore fitted to enable
pulses to be generated. Examples are shown in Figure 6-9. For each pulse cycle and mine type, two
different actuation intervals are given. The Threshold Actuation Interval (Tm) corresponds to the situation
wherein the proximity of the sweep to the mine is such that the swept field at the mine reaches the level
required for actuation at the beginning of the pulse cycle ON time. Tm is used in determining sweeper
safety parameters since it is the shortest possible actuation interval. The Average Actuation Interval (To)
is the average of Tm and the actuation interval for the situation wherein the proximity of the sweep to the
mine is such that the sweep field at the mine reaches the level required for actuation just after the
beginning of the pulse cycle ON time. To is used in determining actuation parameters.
a. Not releasable
6-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. The Sweep Current. The actuation parameters of a magnetic sweep increase as the sweep
current is increased. Therefore the maximum sweep current gives the maximum actuation width. In many
cases, however, the maximum sweep current will impose an unacceptable risk to the MCMV. Therefore
the use of a reduced sweep current (safe current) must be considered in sweeping magnetic mines for the
purpose of MCMV safety. The magnetic field produced in the damage area is a function of the field
produced by the sweep and by the combination sweeper/sweep. It consists of the sweep field directly
beneath the MCMV, the MCMV constant field and the sweep generator stray field. If maximum current
is used this may result in a dangerous front (F). Using safe current the actuation width will be reduced
and the dangerous front may be zero.
6-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Sweeping Actuation Level. The Sweeping Actuation Level (SAL) is the amplitude pulse
height or half peak to trough in a sweeping waveform of a given character which will just cause mine
actuation in the orientation of maximum mine response with respect to the mine axis.
a. Example:
5. The angle between the orientation of the mine axis and the orientation of the magnetic field results,
for horizontal component mines, in two values of actuation width which are, the average aggregate
actuation width (W) for all possible angles and the lower aggregate actuation width (w) for the most
unfavourable angles. Average aggregate actuation width is used in all types of operations except
clearance. Lower aggregate actuation width is used for clearance. For a given mine and for different
characteristics of the wave form, different values of SAL (amplitude) can be found. Values of SAL are
given in national annexes. Because of tolerances in the manufacture of mines two values are used in
calculations for SAL:
a. SAL + ı . SAL = Ho
b. SAL - ı . SAL =- Hm
6. Sweeping Rate. For a given mine and sweep it is possible to determine an optimum sweeping
rate. The sweeping rate equals actuation width multiplied by sweeping speed over the ground (WV).
Sweeping rate is used to determine sweeping effectiveness (a planning and an evaluation criterion for
MCM operations).
7. Not releasable
1. Mines can be made to actuate on the sound output of a ship which lies between approximately 2
Hz and 100,000 Hz. The variable nature of propagation of sound in water makes it necessary to limit the
sound output of the sweep so that mines will not be actuated within the damage area of the ship. The
combination of position of tow of the sweep and its sound output with regard to both frequency and
intensity, affect sweeper safety, thus reduced output is sometimes desirable. A means of controlling
sweep output is therefore very desirable.
2. Operational acoustic sweeps consist of the acoustic explosive type, the vibrating hammer - bar
type, the opposed - oscillating-piston displacement type, the cavitating type, the hammer - bar type, and
the acoustic loud-speaker. Some ASW-lures could be used as acoustic sweeps.
a. Not releasable
6-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Acoustic sweeps can also be characterised by steady output, pulsed output, modulated output, or
controlled variable output. They can also be categorised by their frequency ranges.
a. Low Frequency (LF). Sweep of which the prominent output range is up to 30 Hz.
b. Medium Frequency (MF)/Audio Frequency (AF). Sweep of which the prominent output
is between 30 and 15,000 Hz.
c. Wide Band Range. Sweep of which the output can cover LF and MF/AF bands.
d. Narrow Band Range. Sweep of which the output can be restricted to a narrow band and a
single frequency.
4. Normally, national annexes to MTP-24, provide the limits of a relationship between frequency
bands and acoustic pressure for each acoustic sweep mentioned above. Standard NATO agreed
procedures provide for reporting frequency bands of 1/3 octave (1 Hz), the corresponding centre
frequencies and for band levels to be reported in decibel (re 1 FPa) at 1 metre from the source.
1. An acoustic sweep can be fitted in, towed abeam or under or towed astern of the ship. When the
sweep is fitted in or towed abeam or under the MCMV the sweep suffers from the disadvantage that when
magnetic and acoustic sweeps are towed concurrently the source of noise is at some distance from the
centre of the field of the magnetic sweep, and therefore certain combination magnetic/acoustic mines may
not be swept. It also greatly increases the danger to the MCMV from certain mines. Towing the acoustic
sweep at long stay astern gives maximum safety against coarse mines. There may be a risk from medium
sensitivity mines but this is limited because the actuation width will necessarily be larger than the danger
width, so that many mines will be exploded outside the damage area and because of the actual variability
of mine sensitivities even among mines nominally the same. Also it is very unlikely that the propagation
conditions will be known by the enemy, so it would be almost impossible for him to ensure that a large
proportion of the mines laid were capable of exploding within the damage area.
2. Whether the risk to the sweepers is greater when the sweeps are towed at long stay than it is when
they are towed under the ship depends on the characteristics of the mines laid by the enemy.
a. Not releasable
b. Nevertheless, a sweeper towing sweeps under the ship is certainly in danger of damage from
coarse and directional mines, whereas, if the sweeps are at long stay there is less probability of
damage from the conventional medium sensitive mine.
3. The frequency band of a sweep is that within which it is likely to actuate mines. The sound output,
apart from falling off towards the limits of the band, is not uniform and varies considerably over a range
of a few Hertz.
6-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. The optimum sweeping speed is a compromise between the rate requirement limits of the mines
and the towing speed over the ground. For a MCMV with significant sweep limitations (15 knots for
example) the optimum sweeping speed is the maximum towing speed, unless the MCMV towing a
controlled variable output sweep is carrying out target sweeping, in which case the sweeping speed
should be equal to the target ship speed.
5. The pulse cycle period is the time interval between the beginning of one pulse and the next similar
pulse. The pulse cycle used depends on the characteristics of the mines being swept. The response of
one particular mine to one pulse cycle is not the same as its response to another. Therefore, variation of
the pulse cycle may lead to more, or less, efficient sweeping. The necessary changes in acoustic output
required to actuate acoustic rate requirement mines can best be produced by pulsing or modulating the
sweep at intervals as the MCMV moves forward. With existing pulse controllers, it is generally possible
to select the build-up output time, the high output time, the decrease output time and the low or zero
output time. Maximum output is only produced during high time. For each sweep mine combination an
optimum pulse cycle is given.
6. For each sweep mine combination there is a frequency band (NFB) in which most energy is
transmitted from the sweep to the mine. In the NFB, the maximum Allowable Transmission Loss (ATL)
is the maximum loss in sound pressure level from the sweep to the mine that permits actuation of the
mine. Values of ATL and NFB can be found in national annexes to MTP 24. Since the transmission loss
is not exactly known and that most sweeps cannot be used as controllable variable output sweeps, the
acoustic sweeping parameters and safety parameters have only approximate values. The same applies for
actuation and safety parameters of target ships.
7. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
6-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
1. Combined influence sweeping is the process of carrying out different sweeping techniques
concurrently in order to run off ship counts or detonate combined influence mines by the production of
influences likely to actuate the firing mechanism of these mines. Combined sweeping requires as full a
knowledge as possible of the characteristics of mines to be swept and, in particular, of the sequence and
timing of the various influences required. Various techniques may be carried out simultaneously by one
sweeper or by a team of sweepers using one technique. Mines may require that appropriate looks for both
or all influences be received with definite time relationships and sweeps must be regulated accordingly.
Examples of combined influence sweeping are:
6-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. Not releasable
6-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 6
SECTION I - NOT RELEASABLE
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
6A-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
9. Not releasable
6A-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable:
6A-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable:
6A-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
6A-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
Not releasable
6A-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
Not releasable
4. Not releasable
6A-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
6A-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6A-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
6A-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6A-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6A-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6A-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 6
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
6B-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
8. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
6B-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
6B-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
6B-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
6B-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
6B-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
6B-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6B-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6B-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6B-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
6B-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
Not releasable
6B-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6B-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6B-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6B-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
Not releasable
6B-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
6B-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6B-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Not releasable
6B-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
6B-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. Not releasable
6B-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6B-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 6
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
6C-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
6C-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
6C-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
6C-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
6C-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
9. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
Not releasable
6C-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
6C-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
6C-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6C-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
6C-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6C-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6C-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6C-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 6
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
6D-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6D-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
Not releasable
6D-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
Not releasable
6D-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6D-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6D-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6D-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6D-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6D-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6D-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 6
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
6E-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
8. Not releasable
6E-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6E-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6E-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6E-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
6E-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6E-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6E-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
6E-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
6E-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
CHAPTER 7
MINEHUNTING
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this Chapter
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. A variety of equipments and technical processes permit detection, classification and localisation
of ground and/or moored mines. These different processes are at present based on optical, acoustic and
magnetic means of detection.
a. Flying over and visually searching suspected mined areas by slow moving fixed wing aircraft
or, preferably, by helicopter. The operation is further described in para 0711.
3. Ahead-looking Sonars. These sonars may be either hull-mounted or towed at variable depths
from surface ships or helicopters. Their general characteristics are:
a. They usually have two operating frequencies, one for detection purposes and the other for
classification. The lower frequency is used to detect contacts at ranges of approximately 500 yds
and the higher frequency, usually in a narrower beam, provides the resolution in range and azimuth
necessary for classification. Classification of a contact is usually inside 200 yds and is achieved
by an assessment of its size, shape and shadow and the structure of the displayed echo.
b. Detection widths A are determined by the sonar beam width and the selected search pattern and
vary with sonar range. Search patterns are designed to insonify the seabed and/or the water
volume and are achieved by automatically training the transducer array around a centre bearing
(normally the track course).
c. Detection probability B of the sonar against bottom mines is directly related to the composition
of the bottom. There is a necessity for an exact definition of the B-factor and the interaction of its
components for minehunting and for a more realistic assessment of their values.
7-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
d. A Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) capability allows the transducer to be placed in a more
advantageous position for detection and to provide a better grazing angle between the sonar and
the mine. This also permits easier classification while in the VDS mode, however the MCMV may
be somewhat limited in speed.
e. National authorities specify the limits of the execution of tasks and determine the planning
parameters (in particular, track spacing and number of coverages) as a function of the environment.
4. Towed Side-looking Sonars. These high frequency and high resolution sonars are contained
in vehicles which are towed astern or abeam by the MCMV. One or more vehicles are towed and they
travel (fly) at a constant height above the seabed. On the towing vessel each vehicle is monitored by
means of its own individual control display. Real-time exploitation is difficult to achieve even with
trained operators so these systems normally have recording equipment to enable later analysis. The
analysis is used to compile a picture of the bottom and to determine the position of possible mines. In
the case of areas which are frequently surveyed the existence of new contacts and possible mines can be
discovered by comparison with previous recordings. An advantage of towed side-looking sonars is that
the determination of effectiveness is easier than is the case with ahead-looking sonars. The use of towed
side-looking sonars is limited by the following environmental and/or operational factors:
a. In some circumstances towed side-looking sonars may provide better results than a hull
mounted sonar however, they travel close to the seabed and because they are relatively blind ahead
they are endangered by major irregularities of the bottom.
b. Their use in the presence of moored mines is dangerous and their use in the presence of ground
mines imposes a certain degree of risk to both the towing vehicle and the towed vehicle.
c. Towed side-looking sonars permit general and detailed surveys as well as providing a means
of surveillance and check operations. However, a detailed analysis is only possible if the precise
geographical position of the towing vessel and the relative position of the towed vehicle is known.
5. Magnetic Detectors. Although non-linear and synthetic aperture acoustic techniques are under
investigation existing sonars have a limited ability to detect buried mines and to overcome this systems
making use of magnetic detection may be used. These systems often use towed vehicles or arrays which
carry very sensitive magnetometers and are characterised by a small intercept which requires very precise
localisation and by difficulties in classification. They are inhibited in areas which are littered with ferrous
objects and their effectiveness is difficult to determine because of a lack of knowledge of the magnetic
moment of buried mines. Magnetic detectors for mine warfare divers have been developed but they are
limited to shallow water use and their effectiveness is also difficult to predict.
1. The primary usefulness of minehunting is that it allows tactics other than those available to
sweepers, particularly:
b. Establishing diversions.
7-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Also, in operations related to active countermeasures, the fact that minehunting is not concerned
with sophisticated firing circuits, shipcounts or arming delays, gives it an overall advantage in MCM.
This is especially so if one or more of the following conditions apply:
a. Mines with high ship counts or long arming delays have been laid.
3. Minesweeping is likely to prove more effective if any of the following conditions apply:
e. Not releasable
4. The OTC of a combined minehunting/minesweeping force should be embarked in the ship best
fitted to control the operation. He should be capable of assessing the nature of the environmental
conditions and the mining intelligence and deciding which areas are most suitable for the different types
of operation. The following factors should be borne in mind:
b. Dan buoys laid by sweepers are unlikely to be satisfactory for minehunting owing to their
excessive scope.
c. If much diving is required, the greater the depth the more the operation may be slowed down
owing to the requirement for decompression.
5. Co-ordination of search areas and scheduling of operations is essential to ensure that the operations
of one MCM force do not interfere with those of another. Some overlapping of areas may also be
required to ensure that holidays are not left between the areas searched by adjacent forces, but it should
be noted that it is in these circumstances that the dangers of mutual interference are at their greatest.
However, the combined employment of hunting and sweeping assets in a common area successively,
especially in type B and C bottom conditions, is considered the most effective use of those MCM assets.
7-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
0704 Minehunting Terminology
1. DETECT. The action of operating minehunting sensors (acoustic, optical or magnetic) to find
objects on or in the seabed which distinguish themselves from the general structure of the bottom, or to
find objects floating in the water volume. Detection, by itself, does not make a distinction between
objects which resemble or do not resemble a mine.
2. CLASSIFY. The action of operating minehunting equipment to investigate detected contacts with
the intention of discerning those which have properties (size, shape, shadow and structure) leading to the
assumption that they may be mines. Thus all investigated contacts are classified as follows:
b. NONMINE. This is a contact which does not satisfy the criteria for a MINELIKE object.
3. IDENTIFY. The result of the operation of divers, underwater vehicles or other systems which
permit a positive (ie by sight or touch) identification of objects as mines. The identification thus results
in a decision about the contact being a CERTMINE or a NONMINE.
4. LOCATE. The term locate is a commonly used term which concerns the determination of the
position of a contact detected during the searching phase. This position may be either plotted or marked.
5. PLOT. The construction of a record by which the result of detection, classification and/or
identification can be operationally exploited. (As such, minehunting survey and reconnaissance
operations express their result in the construction of a plot or chart of the area covered). Plots can be:
7-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. A geographical chart or overlay.
b. Data-processed.
c. Bottom pictures.
7. DISPOSE. In general, when the intention is to annihilate the mine danger, mines are disposed
of by the Minehunter or by other means ie a diving vessel assisting the hunter. Mine disposal is done by
countermining or mine neutralisation. For reasons of the particular tactical objective, rendering safe,
recovery and removal of mines are not included in the general term ‘DISPOSE’.
8. RENDER SAFE. The action to make a mine inoperative by direct interference with its firing
system or explosive train. This may be done underwater, in situ, or after recovery.
10. REMOVE. To take a mine out of an area where its detonation would be unacceptable.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
7-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
0706 Minehunting Phases
1. The preceding paragraphs have discussed the detection of minelike contacts and their classification
as non, possible and probable mines. Localisation, identification and disposal phases may follow this
initial phase.
a. Localisation. This phase consists of the plotting and possible marking of probable mines in
order that traffic and MCM vessels may avoid mine danger areas.
(1) Divers. Clearance divers embarked in MCMVs with hull mounted or variable depth
sonars may identify contacts and they can also be used in the disposal phase.
(2) Underwater vehicles. In order to reduce the risk to divers underwater vehicles fitted
with a CCTV camera or sonar imaging device may be used both for identification and disposal.
(1) Neutralisation. This is done either by disrupting the mine firing mechanism or by
separating the firing mechanism from the main explosive charge. It may be achieved by using
divers to place a relatively small shaped explosive charge on the mine or by using a vehicle to
lay a charge sufficiently close to disrupt the mechanism. Alternatively divers may be used to
render the mine safe using EOD procedures.
(2) Countermining. This consists of placing a mine disposal charge close enough to the
mine such that sympathetic detonation occurs. In some cases when a mine is destroyed
(countermined) by a ROV it may not be known with a degree of certainty whether the mine
was actually detonated by the disposal charge. In such cases the Minehunter should determine
the condition of the mine, using Minehunting Sonar, and if required the ROV, taking further
action to ensure that the mine is effectively countermined. (See note overleaf.)
Note. Moored Mine Sinkers, normally, remain in place after the mine has been destroyed,
however, in some instances the Operational Control Authority may request that the sinkers are
removed or taken away.
(3) Removal. There may be circumstances which make it necessary to move a mine,
however it will normally be rendered safe or neutralised first. Removal is usually achieved by
means of flotation bags.
(4) Recovery. This consists of the recovery of the mine in order that a detailed technical
evaluation may take place. It is necessary that the mine suffers as little disruption as is safe
and practical.
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0707 Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
7-7 ORIGINAL
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(3) Not releasable
b. Not releasable
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0709 Bottom Conditions and Undetectable Mines
1. Bottom conditions may be summarised as bottom composition, bottom profile and operational
clutter. More precise details about the minehunting environment and the effects of permanent and
temporary environmental features are contained in Chapter 11.
2. The bottom types are defined in MTP-24(C), Volume I, Chapter 6. MTP-24(C) also describes the
minehunting techniques.
3. A certain fraction of the mines present in an area may be undetectable, if the sonar being used
cannot detect buried mines or mines which blend in with the bottom because of bottom profile or if the
bottom composition is one which exhibits high reverberation characteristics.
4. Not releasable
1. A mine introduced into the marine environment upsets the established equilibrium in its vicinity.
In re-establishing this equilibrium both the mine and the environment undergo certain adjustments. Of
these adjustments, settling (the gradual downward vertical displacement of a ground mine) and burial (the
submergence of a minecase below the plane of the sea floor) are the most important to the Minehunter.
The extent of settling and burial is primarily determined by the type of bottom upon which the mine is
laid.
2. Not releasable
1. A factor for consideration in MCM operational planning is that mines can sometimes be sighted
visually by observers in low flying aircraft, particularly helicopters. However, an area searched visually
with negative results should not be considered free of mines. The principal advantage of this technique,
which is described in this paragraph, is that large areas may be searched in a relatively short time. A
principal disadvantage is that the confidence level must remain very low.
a. Aerial Visual Search Techniques. The general search and disposal procedures for this
technique are as follows:
(1) Several longitudinal and lateral runs are made over an area by the search aircraft, which
can be helicopters or slow-moving fixed-wing aircraft.
(2) A plot of all contacts sighted in the area being searched is maintained.
(3) Mine-like contacts are marked with mini-buoys or other semi-permanent markers.
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b. Observers in the search aircraft will normally be able to detect floating mines and mines at
shallow depth. Under optimum conditions ground mines and moored mines at deeper case depths
may be observed. These optimum conditions are:
c. The lack of any one of the foregoing conditions usually precludes effective aerial visual search.
However, since these conditions are highly variable, an aerial exploratory search should be
included in any MCM operational plan or operation in which aerial assets are available.
d. Speed. The optimum search speed is sensitive to the environmental conditions and is
therefore, that which is best for the observer.
e. Altitude. When searching for individual mines, altitude is maintained between 500 and 600
feet. When searching for minefield patterns, altitude of about 1200 feet is maintained.
f. Solar Attitude. Optimum search conditions exist when the sun is behind the observer and
between 40 and 70 degrees from the horizon.
g. Scan Angle. The observer should scan the water from directly below to within 40 degrees
of the vertical.
h. Marking Technique. The searcher should mark mines and minefields by dropping buoys,
acoustic markers, or other markers directly after detection.
i. Disposal Technique. Swimmer disposal may be used selectively to investigate and dispose
of marked contacts.
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ANNEX A CHAPTER 7
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1 Not releasable
2 Not releasable
3 Not releasable
4. Not releasable
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Table 7A-1. Not releasable
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7A-4 ORIGINAL
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7A-6 ORIGINAL
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7A-7 ORIGINAL
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Not releasable:
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
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CHAPTER 8
CLEARANCE DIVING
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this chapter
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. It is important to acknowledge the separate identity of the clearance diver team and the requirement
for it, on occasions, as a self-contained MCM task unit.
2. A clearance diving organisation is necessary, because there are certain tasks which cannot be
performed by minehunters or sweepers due to prevailing environmental restrictions (ie water depth,
underwater visibility, ships at anchor) or because the MCM equipment is not capable of completing
special functions. If the equipment fails, divers are sometimes still able to operate. They provide mine
countermeasures effort where the use of vessels alone is either not possible or not justified
3. Clearance divers are of special value for removal, reconnaissance and investigation of mines and
for EOD procedures. They will also improve the operational performance of minehunters.
4. Marine Mammal Systems, independently or in conjunction with other MCM forces can detect,
mark and neutralise mines. In conjunction with EOD MCM divers they can also exploit mines.
1. This Chapter discusses the operations carried out by clearance divers who operate as specialist
groups and as such are not normally attached or borne by minehunters.
a. Mainly in shallow or confined waters which are not accessible to minehunters or which prevent
the effective use of the minehunting sonar. This is particularly the case in harbour areas in the
vicinity of lock gates etc, and in narrow channels. In these circumstances the diving team is
responsible for both finding and disposing of mines.
b. In small parts of channels or areas where the minehunters' sensors are ineffective due to
environmental factors such as cliffs, coral reefs, crevices, wrecks etc.
c. In all areas when a mine detected by a minehunter or other unit has to be recovered.
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2. The factors affecting a clearance diving operation are various. They include the mine, the
reliability of its reported position, the importance of its disposal and its presumed type. They include
the shape of the area being searched, the time available and the navigational capability. They include the
state of the weather and the sea, strength of the tide, depth of water and underwater visibility, nature of
the seabed. Finally, they include the availability of equipment, craft, personnel and experience, and the
condition of the divers, time interval since last dive, fitness etc.
3. In some employment areas close to the enemy, clearance divers and their equipment and
installations may be subject to sabotage or direct/indirect attacks. For this purpose they should be
equipped with small arms for self-defence and personal NBC-defence material.
1. Clearance Divers use self-contained breathing apparatus which delivers gas to the diver at a
pressure which corresponds to the pressure at the diver's depth. The compressed gas is made up of one
of several possible mixtures (different percentages of oxygen and nitrogen) and the maximum operating
depth depends on the mixture used. The deeper the diver goes the more gas he uses with each intake of
breath and although the oxygen content of the gas mixture is readily dissolved in the blood the other gases
are not. Thus on his way back to the surface the diver has to stop for a period of time at different depths
to prevent decompression sickness/problems. In general, the deeper the diver has to go the less time can
be spent on the bottom before lengthy periods of recompression are required and safety regulations may
prevent a diver from conducting more than one deep dive a day.
2. The allowed diving time at a certain depth also depends on whether the mixed-gas-breathing
apparatus is of the ‘constant flow’ or ‘demand’ type. With a demand system one can dive longer (at a
certain depth, with a particular breathing gas mixture) without applying decompression stops.
Note. The diving supervisor is in charge of the dive and he always acts according to his national safety
regulations.
3. Clearance divers are also subject to reduced efficiency due to the environmental factors.
a. Seawater temperature.
c. Bottom type.
d. Underwater visibility.
e. Sea State.
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4. Underwater explosions in the vicinity of divers must be avoided by co-ordination between MCM
units and an observance of the safety rules contained in ADivP-1(A)/MDivP-1(A).
1. There are four principle ways in which divers can search for mines lying on the seabed or
suspended or floating in mid-water. These are:
- visual search
- snagline search
- search by touch
- use of hand-held active or passive acoustic or magnetic search aids.
2. Not releasable
1. Self contained underwater breathing apparatus, or surface supplied diving equipment can be
divided into five main groups, namely:
2. The planner of clearance diving operations has to make the best possible choice of the available
diving equipment. Sometimes the available equipment may not be suitable for a particular operation.
Table 8-1 gives a general statement of the relationship between diving equipment and breathing gases.
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Table 8-1. The General Relationship between the Different Diver Breathing Gases and
their Suitability for Clearance Diving
Equipment
Characteristics Maximum Acoustically Magnetically Main Application
Diving Safe Safe
Gas Depth
Mixture
1. Not releasable
2. Visual detection requires adequate underwater visibility and includes the following methods:
a. Towed diver.
d. Search by grids.
3. The first two visual methods are only used for large areas whilst the last two can be used in
confined water. When visual detection techniques are used in areas with low underwater visibility there
is a risk from sensitive acoustic and/or magnetic mines.
4. Detection by Hand-held Sonars and Magnetic Detectors. The hand-held sonars used by
clearance divers may be for active detection of objects on the bottom and/or for passive detection of
acoustic markers dropped or placed near the mine. Divers may also be equipped with hand-held magnetic
detectors to find buried mines, however, classification of ferrous objects is as difficult for the diver as it
is for a minehunter fitted with a magnetic detection system. Different stages for clearance divers permit
the use of these sensors and when these stages are ordered it will be sufficient to add the suffix S (for
Sonars) or M (for Magnetic) to the stage number.
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5. Detection by Snagline. This consists of dragging a weighted line along the bottom so that it
is caught or ‘snagged’ by objects which are protruding from or laying on the seabed. The end of the line
can be towed by the divers boat or by the divers. Caught (snagged) objects are investigated by a diver
and mines are marked to permit subsequent disposal. These methods can be used at night as well as
during the daytime but their use is limited to areas which are not rough or heavily littered.
6. All the foregoing methods are characterised by small intercepts between the diver and the mine
and it is therefore important that the geographical position of all necessary buoys and jackstays are set-up
as accurately as possible both to enable the task to be completed as efficiently as possible and to ensure
the positions of mines are accurately recorded. This is relatively easy to achieve in harbour areas or very
close to shore but becomes more difficult when the operating area is not in the vicinity of prominent
landmarks or seamarks. In these circumstances the position fixing system available to the divers should
have a similar accuracy to that used by the minehunter.
7. Divers need to use the largest scale chart available and the planner must issue the charts or make
arrangements so that the divers can draw them themselves.
1. A large area search will seldom result in all mines in the area being located. In any case, the actual
number of mines laid will rarely be known and the actual degree of success of any particular search will
therefore, be difficult to compute.
2. Figures of the percentages likely to be achieved by a search can only be approximate and based
on the work of an average clearance diving team working under average conditions and within the limits
of weather, underwater visibility, tides etc, required for the particular search. Local conditions, including
weather, tides and temperature will affect results, and the efficiency of the divers does not remain
constant.
3. In assessing the likely result of a search the opinion of the leader of the team, should be given due
weight, since he should have the best knowledge of the conditions underwater.
a. General considerations of the use of divers, diving safety, national diving activities/capabilities
and diving communication are given in ADivP-1(A)/MDivP-1(A), Section 1.
b. Diving breathing gases, the interoperability of gas supplies and standard adaptor set for
compression chamber are dealt with in ADivP-1(A)/MDivP-1(A), Section 2.
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2. Mine neutralisation by divers, and removal and recovery operations may only be conducted by
specially trained personnel who use EOD equipment and techniques.
3. Cutting mine mooring cables should not be undertaken by divers unless remotely controlled or time
delay charges or devices are used.
4. Further details on co-ordination concerning diving safety are contained in MTP-24, Volume I,
Chapter 1.
Due to the inherent dangers of diving, whether during exercises or actual combat operations, a diving
casualty/search and rescue exercise should be scheduled at the beginning of all diving operations and at
least monthly during the conduct of the operations. This procedure should ensure the availability of
adequate equipment and that correct procedures are followed to preclude, or deal with potential diving
casualties.
The US operated Marine Mammal System consists of Dolphins which are trained to use their natural echo
location capability to search for MILCOs. The Mk 7 MMS uses six trained dolphins to detect, mark
and/or neutralise proud and buried ground mines. The Mk 4 uses four trained dolphins to detect, mark
and/or neutralise moored mines. Dolphins have a capacity to detect, recognise, and discriminate between
targets. The dolphins have a high probability of first pass detection.
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CHAPTER 9
1. MCM support needs to provide a quick reaction organisation optimised to MCM vehicles
operational schedules, and to employ standard support procedures where possible. These objectives can
only be achieved by mobile support being taken to the MCM vehicles in their operational area rather than
the MCM vehicles having to transit long distances for it. This is most important for NATO members who
have only a small number of MCM vehicles available.
2. Nations should aim to keep support facilities highly mobile and not allow them to become fixed
in one place. The assumptions for supporting own MCM forces differ from navy to navy. They depend
mainly on the geographic conditions of the deployment area, and the ability to obtain the support most
suitable to meet the requirements of the particular MCM force. Although the assumptions differ the
navies should be able to adapt their support to MCM vehicles to the above rule ie to keep support highly
mobile in order to make operating MCM vehicles flexible in accordance with the actual situation.
3. MCM vehicles have to keep their MCM gear in a state of high readiness and should be able to
avoid long transits when requiring support. This support will embrace supply and maintenance
capabilities, as well as the possibility of changing damaged equipment.
1. Docking Support. Normal activities of a naval base include refitting, rebuilding or conversion,
docking and major repairs. It is the function of a base or supply authority to stock and maintain mine
warfare stores and repairs capacities including dormant facilities.
2. Base Support. Provision of expertise and facilities which should meet all periodical
maintenance of MCM vehicles including large repairs and supervision of dockyard support activities.
This equates to the normal function of a Fleet Maintenance Group. It is normally shore based.
3. Forward Support. Provides a quick response and includes repair of operational defects and
provision of ready-use spares. It is capable of full logistic support and technical administration for its
attached MCM vehicles. Located as near as possible to the operation area of the attached MCM vehicles,
it may be either at a fixed shore base, onboard a support ship, or fully mobile. Forward support may be
limited in its capabilities by its functional period before re-supply is necessary, the number and type of
MCM vehicles it can support, the type and degree of assistance available, or other factors.
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1. The organisation for logistic support of MCM forces covers normal peacetime conditions in the
same way as for war. Dormant MCM stores and support facilities are to be held in readiness to enable
the navies to give a flexible response during the gradual transition from peacetime to war. Logistic
requirements will equate to those in peacetime except that the usage rate of MCM and other specialist
stores will increase. A quick re-establishment of readiness for MCM forces will become of the utmost
importance.
2. Every nation has to consider in its war plan the necessary logistic support to keep MCM vehicles
operational and on task ie to be efficient. To cover all special aspects it is necessary to produce detailed
orders for MCM logistic support which have to consider the peculiarities of every deployment area and
the support levels which are available in the area of its vicinity.
1. The quantity of spare gear that can be carried on board MCM vehicles is limited by space and top
weight. It is impracticable to carry equipment which requires external aid for fitting. Spare gear should
therefore include only that which can be fitted by ship's staff in a reasonably short time, together with
certain spares necessary to keep the MCM vehicle operating.
2. Particular care should be taken to retain a magnetically clean state in accordance with the ferrous
manifest.
3. The growing complexity of MCM equipment and the installation of even more complex weapon
systems for minehunters will reduce the MCMVs own capability to rectify defects or damage. The
dependence on the logistic support organisation will increase. It is therefore essential for MCM vehicles
to be fully supported by a proper logistic support organisation.
1. Each nation is completely responsible for the support of its own MCM vehicles. Under conditions
of war however, own support resources may be destroyed by enemy attacks, or MCM forces may be
operating away from their support facilities. Additionally the employment of MCM vehicles in their
primary operational area may be completed and the MCM forces be deployed elsewhere ie in an adjacent
operational area. This may necessitate support by another national authority. Nations should therefore
be prepared to provide support for each other's MCMVs.
2. To keep the efficiency for MCM vehicles as high as possible it is of vital interest for the NATO
Allies to agree joint or allied arrangements for mutual support for MCMVs. These agreements should
include the standardisation of MCM equipment as well as support facilities. This aim can be realised by
promoting the interchangeability of MCM-type equipment and thus enable nations to be flexible and
remain effective throughout NATO at all times.
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3. The NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA) is entrusted with the direction of this standardisation
task, which is hampered by the many different types of MCM vehicles and MCM equipments used within
NATO. The results of the standardisation endeavours are published in STANAGs and NATO
Publications. All efforts concerning the interchangeability of MCM equipment as far as replacement and
interchangeability should be supported by all NATO nations in order to achieve the necessary state of
preparedness. This can be done by obtaining more knowledge during exercises when two or more nations
operate their MCM forces together.
Logistic support for clearance divers must comprise material support as well as lodging and messing.
This may be made available in buildings or appropriate mobile facilities (trucks, tents) ashore or onboard
clearance diver vessels or minehunters. It also includes maintenance facilities and diving equipment as
listed in Chapters 11 and 12 of ADivP-1(A)/MDivP-1(A). Main subjects are availability of gas and
interoperability of gas supplies and divers' safety facilities.
1. A senior diving officer shall ensure that all plant, equipment and facilities necessary for the safe
conduct of diving operations have been provided for and are used by the persons carrying out these
operations.
2. Operation Orders must contain statements on the organisation of diver's safety in the respective
area. It is the operational control authorities' responsibility to make the necessary arrangements. It is
advised to do this in close co-operation with local divers.
When operating in remote areas a doctor and a special medical kit should be available to each group of
MCMVs. Therapeutic compression chambers should be available at short notice. There must be a
co-ordinated exchange of information on availability of compression chambers, NATO standard adapter
flanges, and transfer-under-pressure facilities between forces participating in MCM Operations.
National authorities should make prior logistic support arrangement for the support of their MCM forces.
These arrangements have to be examined and their efficiency assessed in peacetime. The readiness of
available capacities in wartime can only be estimated. In the same way however, national authorities
should be able to calculate dormant war capacities and their efficiency on being activated in a state of
tension or under war conditions. The functioning of logistic support under war conditions requires
continuous training and exercising whenever possible.
Logistic support for MCM operations is contained in those NATO logistic publications listed in para
0201.
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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CHAPTER 10
1. General. A primary factor influencing the selection and conduct of the proper MCM objective
and having a direct bearing on the type and number of MCM assets required for an adequate defence
against mines is the accuracy and means of navigation. The following paragraphs provide specific
examples of tasks in which accuracy of navigation is particularly important.
2. MCM in Channels
a. Channel Width. MCM operations during times of hostility will be conducted mainly in
channels, making it necessary to keep widths as narrow as possible.
(2) It is estimated that a reduction of transitor SDNE from 60m to 30m will reduce the required
channel hunting effort by at least 50 per cent. Further reductions of minehunting effort, though
less than 50 per cent are realised if transitor SDNE is reduced to 15m. Since the
actuation/damage range of mines comes into play, a reduction of transitor SDNE below 15m
is of less value; however, higher accuracy for minehunters is a continuing requirement for
greater efficiency and safety in establishing and maintaining mine-free channels.
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3. Route Surveys. By nature and definition route surveys are usually conducted and documented
in peacetime, when there is time available. This facilitates classification of objects which appear during
hostilities. In route surveys positioning of the MCMV is only one of the requirements; the object's
position (two- or three-dimensional) must also be accurately established particularly if the object is not
prosecuted at once. In hunting operations in which disposal is not conducted immediately, accuracy and
precision in the location and plotting of a contact become more important. Relocation of a contact,
perhaps by an MCMV other than the one which initially located it, demands the highest degree of
positional accuracy.
a. Not releasable
4. Area MCM Operations. Although most MCM operations during wartime are expected to be
in channels, preparations for area operations must not be ignored. Some important operations involve
tasks which are not directly associated with channels eg short-term operations, essentially minehunting
clearance, in amphibious assault, manoeuvring and staging areas. Transitor and MCMV SDNE is less
important than in channel operations if appropriate MCM procedures are used and sweeper SDNE is less
important than that of the hunters. However, when sweeping is necessary, the safest procedure is
preferred over that of other methods. In almost all cases of safe path operations the required number of
sweeper runs decreases from 30 to 90 per cent for each 50 per cent reduction (down to about 10m) in
SDNE.
Some examples of navigational systems which are available for the use of MCMV and transiting vessels
and values indicating estimated system position-fixing accuracy are shown in Table 10-1. These values
should not be taken as absolute but as being relative to the system used. The values are useful however,
because they indicate the relative accuracy to which one can navigate within the system.
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1003 Common Causes of Navigational Error
1. Amplifying information of some types of systems listed in Figure 10-1 are given below:
c. Magnetic Navigational Systems. Common systems include magnetic and three-axial flux
gate compasses.
d. Optical Navigational Systems. The sextant, the bifocal and infra-red rangefinders, and
conventional and laser theodolites are the most common. Horizontal sextant angles (HSA) is the
most accurate method of terrestrial fixing. HSA requires careful selection of conspicuous and
accurately-charted objects. Good visibility is essential, and the chosen objects should not be more
than eleven nor less than five kilometres for best results.
e. Radio Navigational Systems. Many radio fixing aids are available to NATO nations, the
principal differences being in ancilliary equipment, power supply, frequency, range, accuracy and
the principle used. They enable ships to navigate at night or in poor visibility, and to plot positions
quickly and easily. Major disadvantages are that they may be affected by atmospheric conditions
or silenced by EMCON and other restrictions. According to their LOPs, radio navigation systems
may be described as hyperbolic, ranging, azimuthal, or composite.
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(1) Hyperbolic Systems. The lattices formed in their signal fields and the associated LOPs
supplied by these systems give them their name. They consist of fixed synchronised reference
stations, transmitters at known locations and a shipboard receiver. The phase or time
comparison of signals from two stations gives a hyperbola, the intersection of two hyperbolae
locates the ship relative to the two stations. Hyperbolic systems have a great capability to
cover large areas with a small number of transmitting sites, and of all radio systems may
provide the best compromise between accuracy and coverage. Typical examples of hyperbolic
systems are, Loran-C and Omega. To use these systems, an automatic track plotter, an
automatic plotting table, and/or special charts with the hyperbolic net are required.
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1006 Marking of Routes and Channels
a. Types of Buoys
(1) Permanent Buoyage. Channels are usually marked with permanent buoys prior to
minelaying or by special vessels after MCM operations. Permanent buoys are able to
withstand heavy weather for prolonged periods, whereas MCM buoys are inadequate for long
periods of time. Distance between buoys is governed by local conditions and, sometimes, the
numbers of available buoys. Five miles spacing is usually satisfactory for coastal and transit
channels, but closer spacing may be needed for approach routes, ends of channels, and
junctions/turning points. Permanent buoys laid prior to mining fix the channel; after MCM
operations, MCM buoys fix the channel.
(2) MCM Buoys (Danbuoys). Even with precise navigation, MCM buoys must not be
overlooked. Their principal use is to mark out the areas of past, present, or future MCM
operations. The tactics and stationing of MCM buoy and Dan Layers are laid down in
MTP-24, Volume I. The OTC is responsible for deciding the distance apart of danbuoys
according to visibility, radar range, and sea state; however, buoys normally should be 1 to 1.5
miles apart. A rule of thumb is that the guide should be able to see two buoys ahead. For
observation at a distance the buoys may be fitted with signal flags, radar flags, radar
targets/reflectors and/or fixed or flashing lights. If MCM buoys have radar reflectors, the
guide or any transiting ship may keep station on the line of MCM buoys with radar; if they do
not have radar reflectors, the guide/transiting ship may use the buoy layer as a reference. Mine
countermeasures buoys can be carried and laid by most naval and civilian vehicles. If such
vessels have sufficiently accurate navigational systems and knowledge of the area their use in
buoy laying will free MCMVs to conduct mine countermeasures operations. But where large
numbers are required to be laid the use of specifically built or converted vessels such as MSAs
is recommended.
(3) Short Scope Buoys. Minehunters normally require more accurate navigation than can
be provided by the danbuoy, so special mine countermeasures buoys with very short scope are
used during minehunting operations. These short scope buoys are usually not as robust as
danbuoys and so are limited in endurance. Short Scope Buoys achieve the highest navigational
accuracy relative to a fixed mark on the seabed when weather conditions or distance from land
makes other aids insufficiently accurate. A Short Scope Buoy provides a minimum watch
circle (horizontal distance between buoy and sinker) without unacceptable risk of dragging.
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b. Methods of Marking
(1) Centreline Buoys. Buoys laid on the centreline of a route or channel are most useful
for long distances. The centreline buoy method offers the advantages that it is easier for
shipping to follow and lessens the likelihood of collisions between ships proceeding in
opposite directions. It suffers from the disadvantage that it is difficult to sweep (but not to
hunt) close to a buoy, which can cause holidays in the centre of the channel.
(2) Offset Buoys. Buoys laid on one side of a route or channel may be the most useful to
minesweepers because they can then operate without fouling gear in buoy moorings.
c. MCM Buoy Layers. A ship tasked to lay or recover MCM buoys is called a ‘MCM buoy
layer’. Such vessels use the same self protective measures as the MCMVs with which they are
working. In addition to laying and recovering buoys, they also may be assigned the following
tasks:
(1) Point buoys, ie keep station near buoy in order to make it easier for the guide to steer the
correct course.
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(4) Act as mine disposal vessel to sink/detonate swept moored mine cases floating on the
surface.
(6) Maintain a buoy laying diagram on which every line of buoys is drawn, together with any
distinguishing marks of individual buoys. Track coverage and runs per track should also be
recorded.
(7) Use the buoy reports as shown in the MCM reporting system.
An automatic track plotter produces continuous automatic plotting, thus reducing fatigue and manpower
requirements. Ship position and tracking is presented continuously, so an experienced quartermaster can
steer directly from the plotter. If all ships in a squadron have automatic plotters, it is possible for each
ship in the formation to follow an independent track. Another possibility is that the guide follows the
centre or a selected line of the channel while passing receiver corrections to all ships to displace them
laterally from his own track.
Most MCMV have automatic plotting tables driven by radar or radio fixing aids, while most other
warships have plotting tables driven by gyrocompass and log. Some MCMV can retrieve locations and
classifications of contacts previously recorded by themselves or other MCMVs.
Modern MCMVs are equipped with up-to-date ship control and data processing systems which enable
them to hold position and track automatically, and to store data for more efficient and effective MCM.
For information see Annex A to Chapter 10.
1. General
a. All clearance diving operations are characterised by a very narrow search path, sometimes not
wider than the diver's span. Therefore, very great accuracy is required by clearance diving craft
in both marking and navigation.
b. If divers are operating for disposal of mines previously located, they have to know the location
of mines with an accuracy which is smaller than the length of their snagline (normally 30m).
c. Any area in which clearance divers are to operate should be marked with buoys.
d. Not releasable
10-8 ORIGINAL
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2. Shore Marking
a. In areas near coasts with no conspicuous natural landmarks, simple shore transit marks should
be set up. These can be posts with flags on top placed at regular intervals.
b. In ports, narrows, and the like, the wharfs, docks and piers may be graduated. These
graduations are used to mark transits (parallel or converging on a distance point). These marks
enable operations to be carried out with accuracy and speed.
a. The normal navigational charts available will seldom be on a scale convenient for use in
clearance diving operations. Detailed plots are required, constructed to a desired scale and gridded
for easy reference.
b. Clearance divers may use lattice charts (1/1000 to 1/10000) on which are drawn the
conspicuous shoremarks and if possible the transit lattice, or the horizontal sextant angle (HSA)
or radio navigation curves. If there is no plot for a given operation, the divers should prepare a
large scale diagram on which they can place the natural or artificial shoremarks to be use for
triangulation.
c. Hydrographic Information. For every area in which mines can be laid, in depths up to 55
metres (30 fathoms), clearance divers need the information below.
(a) Photocopies of draft sounding sheets used by Hydrographic Survey Officers (HSO)
to draw charts.
(c) Position of rocks, wreckage, and the like, that might hinder searches.
(g) Currents; strength and direction on the surface and on the bottom according to tide and
weather conditions.
(h) Underwater visibility, according to prevailing wind and sea and the season.
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4. Methods of Navigation. In their searches, divers can follow jackstays laid from boats; they can
also be towed by boats. The methods of navigation of the boats are those used in hydrographic surveys,
which are the best available, unless the boats are equipped with precise navigational systems.
a. Not releasable
1. MCMVs are to comply with the International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea
(IRPCS) and use the prescribed lights, daymarks and fog signals.
2. Station Keeping Lights. In addition to the lights required by the IRPCS, the following lights
should be fitted in minesweepers for station keeping purposes; two white lights vertically disposed one
above the other, each light to be visible from 20E before the beam on one side through the stern to 20E
before the beam on the other side. The two lights are to be 9m apart in MSOs and 6m apart in MSC and
MSI. The lights are to be controlled by dimming to provide a visibility range from 200 yards (183m) to
2 nautical miles (3.22 km). Both lights are to be screened from above. In the smaller sweepers, where
it may not be possible for the lower of the two lights to be visible over the entire arc in one light fitting,
two light fittings may be provided to cover the entire arc.
3. Pulse Indicating Lights. Minesweepers of all types capable of sweeping with pulsed magnetic
sweeps are to be fitted with Pulse Indicating Lights to their own national requirements.
1. This paragraph contains information for the NATO common Standard Squares System for use in
co-ordinating Mine Countermeasures Planning, Tasking, Reporting and Data Processing.
a. The standard-square system is based on the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid and
may be superimposed on charts for military purposes.
b. The UTM grid divides the earth between 84 degrees North and 80 degrees South into alpha-
numeric grid zones. Each grid zone has a central meridian and extends to 3 degrees either side of
the central meridian; the UTM-grid zone system starts at the 180 degree meridian and proceeding
Easterly is numbered consecutively from 1 to 60.
c. Beginning at 80 degrees South, and proceeding North, grid-zones are further divided into 8
degree belts of Latitude, (except for the belt from 72 degrees to 84 degrees South), and are
identified by the letters from C to X (with the letters I and O omitted).
d. Using the UTM Projection, NATO has divided the entire world between 80 degrees North and
80 degrees South into squares. Each square is further sub-divided into squares with sides of 108
kilometre in length, with an exactly defined origin. These squares are called ‘Basic Squares’.
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e. In a third step each Basic Square is further sub-divided into 900 small squares with sides of
3600 metres in length. These smaller squares are called ‘Standard Squares’.
f. Each Standard Square is identified by its name (eg CC153) which also indicates its position
within the grid. Co-ordinates for all Standard Squares are available and can be calculated for any
Geodetic System.
g. The ‘squares’ are always North-up orientated and the gridded maps overlap to ensure complete
coverage.
Note: The use of a special squaring method is not excluded by this system when the use of
Standard Squaring does not fit with a route or with a particular Mine Danger Area. In this case
a specifically designed software computer program is available which can generate a set of
Elementary Squares thus providing an optimal coverage of the required area.
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(1) The squares are a defined world-wide system which is unique and therefore unambiguous.
All information is referenced to one unique and single Standard Square; thus the Gathering,
Storage and Updating of data on mines found, environmental conditions and bottom objects
is made easier and more accurate.
(2) The tasking of MCMVs is made easier and the precision of operations improved by
working the standard square system; so that the relief of MCMVs on task is safer.
(3) Planning of subsequent taskings during extensive MCM operations is easier for CTGs,
who are also able to validate the progress of MCMVs.
(4) Co-operation with other nations is simplified whereby the progress in each Standard
Square can be readily identified.
1. Introduction. The object of a Leadthrough Operation (LTO) is to pilot vessels, which are
without the appropriate navigation capability, through mined areas. The aim of the Vessel Transiting the
Minefield (VTM) is to pass over the same ground as the Leadthrough Vessel (LTV). This para outlines
the broad guidelines for LTO, detailed instructions for the guidance of vessels transiting mined areas is
contained in Volume 1 of MTP-1(C); a simple communication code which can be used in all EMCON
states, by day or by night, both by Leadthrough Vessels and other Warships, ( and Merchants Ships alike)
is contained in MTP-1(C) Vol II. MCMVs may be used to lead, but this should not preclude the use of
other units that have suitably qualified personnel, such as pilots, and accurate navigation equipment.
Merchant vessels will use MTP-2 Vol II and the International Code of Signals (INTERCO). One LTV
can lead a maximum of three VTMs through a mined area; a ratio of one LTV to one VTM is ideal.
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2. Navigation. The navigation of the LTV must be accurate and repeatable. Precise Navigation
Systems (PNS), in particular, Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS), if available, are the
preferred methods of navigation. Radar Danning is the best alternative method if Radio Fixing Aids
(RFAs) are not available.
3. Distance
a. Not Releasable
b. The LTV is to maintain distance, the VTM being led is to sail at minimum steerage way
and is to maintain bearing from the LTV.
4. Communications.
b. Standardization. The table of signals at MTP-1(C) Vol II is to be used between all vessels
involved in LTO, irrespective of the means of transmission, thereby avoiding any
misunderstanding between the different nationalities involved.
c. Amplification. Use may also be made of other supplementary tactical signal groups from
MTP-1(C) Vol II when operating with Warships, or MTP-2 Vol II and the International Code of
Signals (INTERCO) when operating with Merchant Vessels.
d Not releasable
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(a) Not releasable
e. Merchant Vessels. Modern Merchant Vessels do not carry UHF, nor are they configured
for flag hoists or manned for communications by light. IMM VHF is the primary means of
communication.
f. INTERCO. There is no special “NEGAT” flag in the International Code of Flags. If visual
INTERCO signals have to be used, then Flag ‘N’, followed by ‘TACK’ is to be used for the
purpose of expressing the converse meaning of a signal. However, if using voice INTERCO
procedure , the word “TACK” must NOT be used; Flag “N” is to be substituted by using the
proword “NEGAT”.
(1) Examples:
Note. The International Flag outfit as held by merchant vessels contain numerical pennants
and NOT number flags. The first merchant vessel will repeat the signal for the benefit of those
ships astern; in the absence of such signals subsequent ships should pass over the same ground
as the LTV and/or their next astern.
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 10
1. This navigation system is an automatic parallel track guidance system based on radar MCM buoy
navigation. It is an integrated part of the minehunting system together with a modified plotting table, an
autopilot, a stabiliser, the radar and a ‘track while scan’ system.
2. The system presents continuously the position of the ship on the plotting table with an accuracy
of a ‘worst case’ value within a circle of 21 yards, and a ‘mean’ value within a circle of 10 yards, all
relative to the position of the MCM buoys.
3. The advantage of this system is the absolute independence of the hunter from shore based
equipment in comparison to other highly accurate navigation systems.
a. Computation and holding of the ship's absolute location. For this purpose, it may be connected
to:
(1) Navigational radar which transmits the co-ordinates of a sea-mark or of a buoy (eg
short-scope buoy).
(3) If necessary, the doppler sonar or ship’s log and gyro compass which transmit the speed
and heading.
b. Computation of the sonar contact's absolute location and target designation. For this purpose,
it is connected to:
c. Automatic display of the ship location and of sonar contacts with their classification on a
plotting table.
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d. Data processing by recording on magnetic tape contact designated by the operator. The
recordings use absolute co-ordinates and consequently enable the play-back by any MCMV fitted
with the EVEC system.
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CHAPTER 11
1. The environmental factors affecting the planning and conduct of MCM operations fall into two
main groups:
a. Stable Features. Such as depth of water, bottom topography etc. This information may be
available as the result of surveys carried out in the past.
b. Temporary Features. Such as the thermal structure, climate and water transparency.
Information here is best based on observations taken on-the-spot, although previous surveys may
have indicated average readings.
1. The following environmental factors affect mechanical and influence minesweeping operations:
a. Water depth.
b. Bottom topography.
c. Bottom composition.
e. Prominent landmarks.
f. Geographic location.
2. Water Depth. The sweeping technique employed is influenced by water depth, so that when
segmenting areas for sweeping, or choosing reference buoys, known variations in water level must be
taken into account. Depths less than 5 metres are generally too shallow for the operation of conventional
hulled vessels, and require both a special kind of vehicle (hovercraft) and a special type of sweep
technique.
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3. Bottom Topography. The presence of abnormal variations of bottom gradient, deep holes,
peaks etc, impose restrictions on sweep gear handling, track orientation and depth segmentation and
increase the probability of damage or loss of equipment. Variations in bottom gradient may increase the
minesweeping effort by necessitating changes in the sweep depth of mechanical sweeps. When using
mechanical sweeps, it may prove practically impossible to sweep moored mines laid close to pinnacles of
rock or in submerged valleys. A relatively smooth bottom is required for bottom mechanical sweeps to
maintain contact with the bottom and to prevent damaging the sweep. The sweep must also be slowed
down when passing over sand waves.
4. Bottom Composition. Bottom strength, composition and stability will determine the burial
potential for ground mines. Burial in soft sediment may affect the sensitivities of acoustic and pressure
mechanisms and thus the actuation widths of the sweeps. Burial may also have an effect on the damage
radius of these mines and may limit enemy options to the use of moored or magnetic influence mines.
Burial potential influences the decision on whether sweeping or hunting techniques are to be used.
a. Wrecks and man-made underwater obstructions restrict the use of sweep gear. Numerous
underwater obstructions may require area avoidance.
b. Large masses of drifting debris suspended in the water may obstruct sweep gear and reduce its
effectiveness. This may be a particular problem when operating in, or in the vicinity of, a river.
Mooring wires of reference buoys may be fouled causing them to pull under.
c Surface debris may pose navigational problems for the displacement sweeper and obstruct or
damage sweep gear. This again is particularly true in a river or its estuary. Additionally the extent
of sea ice could influence operations, especially diverted and helo-towed sweeps, when ice clearing
ability of displacement craft must be considered. Ice may also interfere with the surface
destruction of any swept moored mines.
6. Prominent Landmarks. Knowledge of prominent landmarks and coastal features will be useful
in the planning phase when determining navigational methods, and for simplifying manoeuvres within
the operational area.
7. Geographic Location. This may restrict the use of certain types of gear or the employment of
certain sweeping formations and manoeuvres. For example, rivers and estuaries pose problems in the use
of sweeping gear, whilst cliffs and hills may cause turbulence which adversely affects helicopter
operations, and so on.
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8. Not releasable
a Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
11-3 ORIGINAL
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9. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d Not releasable
11-4 ORIGINAL
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1. Various environmental factors influence minesweeping operations. These include the climate and
the weather, the state of seas, tides and currents, and the nature of local marine life.
2. Tides. Tidal variations must be allowed for when planning an MCM operation. The possibility
of irregular fluctuations due to floods, storms etc, should also be considered.
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3. Tidal Streams and Currents. A careful distinction must be made between tidal streams
(called in some countries ‘tidal currents’) and currents (called in some countries ‘non-tidal currents’).
Tidal streams are horizontal movements of water in response to the tide-raising forces and they do not
cause any nett transfer of water. Mixed up with the tidal stream however, are currents, some of which
are regular and some entirely capricious. Currents can be caused by oceanographic factors such as water
of differing salinity or temperature, by meteorological factors such as differing barometric pressure and
wind, and by topographical factors such as irregularities in the seabed. Unfavourable tidal stream
velocities and direction can cause navigational, manoeuvring and sweep streaming problems and thus the
tidal stream must be considered when planning the sweep procedures and selecting the displacement
platforms. Strong tidal streams and currents may displace or submerge reference buoys and will affect
the depth of moored mines. Displacement sweepers must take tidal stream velocities into account when
proceeding against pressure mines because the ship's movement over the ground will include the tidal
stream velocity.
4. Climate and Weather. Both can influence minesweeping operations; for example, local
conditions of torrential rain, storms or fog may seriously hamper operations, whilst rough sea states can
lower the minesweeper's performance. Airborne operations are particularly affected by bad weather.
5. Wind. This is a significant factor in helicopter sweep operations, since wind speeds of greater
than 30 knots limit helo-tow operations, whilst a complete lack of wind may cause the helicopter to fail
to achieve the required lift/power. Also, wind direction can impose tow path limitations, whilst
turbulence causes a loss of aircraft manoeuvrability and subsequent difficulties in controlling sweep
equipment. The effect of wind on surface craft varies with displacement and sail area and the course and
speed of the sweeper relative to the wind. Wind affects the track-keeping ability of the sweeper, and must
be taken into account in determining track displacement and navigational error.
6. Air Temperature and Air Pressure. Ambient air temperature and air pressure determine
helicopter sortie time and load limits.
7. Visibility. Reduced visibility restricts sweeping operations, particularly helicopter operations and
operations of small craft with no radar.
8. Action and Sea Swell. Under certain conditions surface wave and swell action causes pressure
variations which can trigger pressure mine mechanisms. Thus, when surface wave action meets those
requirements, acoustic and magnetic sweeps can be effective against combination
magnetic/acoustic/pressure mines. For planning purposes, it is essential to have background wave data
for the area of interest. If prevailing conditions are insufficient to meet pressure sweeping requirements
it may be necessary to plan ‘guinea pig’ sweeps. On-the-spot wave data can be obtained by wave
recorders planted in the area during sweep operations. From data recorded by these instruments, the
effect of wave action against pressure mechanisms can be evaluated.
9. Marine Life. Biological fouling of the mine casing and the cable of a moored mine will decrease
the buoyancy of the mine. Together with the greater cross sectional area of the mine and cable presented
to the prevailing current, this results in increased dip. The effect of marine fouling on mine actuation
depends on the mine firing system involved. Magnetic and pressure mines are little affected. However,
acoustic actuating systems may be considerably degraded by heavy fouling. The presence of heavy
marine growth on the bottom must be considered when sweeping moored mines. Giant kelps, for
example, may fire explosive cutters or foul mechanical cutters. In general heavily armed sweeps are
necessary where dense marine growth is present on the bottom.
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a. Water depth.
b. Bottom topography.
c. Bottom composition.
d. Bottom reverberation.
f. Underwater visibility.
g. Water density.
2. Water Depth. The depth of water will determine the type(s) of mine that may be countered by
the available minehunting sensors and disposal systems and may limit the number and duration of possible
diver actions. Thus in some circumstances water depth can dictate the choice of the most suitable vehicle
and the decision to hunt or to sweep. Segmentation of an area by depth may improve minehunting
efficiency and may influence sonar search capability.
4. Bottom Composition. The bottom sediment will affect both the initial penetration of the mine
into the bottom and also subsequent burial. In general, no penetration takes place in a rock, gravel,
sand-gravel or sand bottom but occurs primarily on a mud bottom. Subsequent burial may occur on a sand
bottom over a period of time as a result of scour due to current or wave action. Burial may be partial or
complete depending on prevailing environmental conditions eg bottom hardness, currents and/or wave
action and depends not only on the surface sediments but also on the underlying layers. Burial severely
reduces the detection capability of sonar systems.
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5. Bottom Reverberation. A minehunting sonar ‘detects’ a target when the signal strength of the
target is large enough to be seen by the operators against the background noise on their displays. The
background noise is heavily influenced by bottom reverberations since the sonar is normally deliberately
aimed at the seabed. A mud or sand bottom gives a low reverberation background whereas gravel, shingle
or rock bottoms give high reverberation levels. Reverberations are caused by the numerous
discontinuities or scattering sources within the sea which reflect the projected energy of the transmitted
sonar beam back to the receiver. Reverberations can be direct or indirect and are distinguished from the
general background noise in that they are directly related to the projected energy. If there is no
transmission, there is no reverberation.
b. Minelike Echoes (MILEC). These are echoes, which are selected within the clutter by sonar
operators or automatic processing during the detection phase as being Minelike by criteria
depending on the type of sonar being used and also on the experience such operators have in the
use of their sonar. The number of MILEC per square mile of seabed is called MILEC Density.
The source of a minelike echo can be:
(3) Minelike Contacts (MILCO). A minelike echo selected during the classification stage
is referred to as a minelike contact. Contacts are selected by sonar operators by assessment of
their Shape, Size, Shadow, Structure, Persistency and other criteria depending on the type of
sonar being used and also on the experience such operators have in the use of their sonar. The
source of a Minelike contact can be
(a) A mine
(4) Non-mine Minelike Bottom Objects (NOMBO). Non-mine minelike bottom objects
are objects which are Identified as non-mine. They emanate from rock, reef, and man-made
debris and may give minelike responses on minehunting sonars. The number of NOMBO’s
per unit area is known as NOMBO Density. In general as NOMBO Density increases
minehunting performance decreases.
(5) Further details are available in MTP-24(B), Vol I, and national supplements.
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8. Water Density. Changes in water temperature or salinity may change the density and thus the
buoyancy of the water. This in turn may influence the operation of divers and of remotely controlled
underwater vehicles.
9. Underwater and Surface Obstacles. Minehunters are subject to the same problems as
minesweepers when considering underwater and surface obstacles, however, an additional hazard of
conducting minehunting operations in the presence of floating debris or ice is the danger of damaging the
sonar dome and/or transducer.
a. Bottom Topography. Projections from the bottom may snag bottom following gear and a
rocky bottom with abrupt changes of depth may well make the use of bottom following gear
impracticable. Good conditions are found where there is a sand and/or gravel bottom with little
change in water depth.
b. Magnetic Field. The local magnetic field affects target strength levels. Local magnetic
anomalies and magnetic debris on the bottom may produce false contacts, slowing up the speed
of the search. Some areas contain so much magnetic debris that magnetic minehunting is
impractical.
1. Minehunting operations may be affected by such environmental factors as climate and weather,
tides and currents, acoustic and magnetic conditions.
2. Tidal Streams and Currents. These affect the operational capabilities of divers and remotely
controlled underwater vehicles, and may well cause navigational and mine burial problems. Additionally
the minehunter must also consider the effect of current on mine rolling and the transparency of sea water:
a. Mine Rolling. While comparatively uncommon in most mineable waters, it must nevertheless
be considered where there is a smooth firm bottom. Normally rapid currents are required, although
3/4 to 1 knot is sufficient to roll a mine over a smooth sand bottom.
b. Transparency. Sediment carried in water will affect transparency. The amount of sediment
that can be carried depends partly on the rate of flow ie current, and partly on the type of bottom
sediment. Helicopters may often be able to sight mines in clear water.
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3. Climate and Weather. Minehunters are subject to the same problems from climatic conditions
as previously discussed for minesweepers. However, the weather prevailing during a minehunting
operation may have a more pronounced affect on the efficiency and performance of the minehunter. For
example in high winds and a heavy swell the minehunter may well have difficulty in manoeuvring at slow
speed. A heavy swell will produce pitching and quenching around the sonar dome with a consequent loss
of sonar performance and may also reduce operator efficiency. An increase of sea state will also
increase ambient noise. Ambient noise is caused by the disturbance of the sea surface due to wind and
rain breaking on the surface. In addition an increase of wind strength will increase surface reverberations
due to both a disturbed surface and the formation of bubbles on the water. The effect of sea state and
swell on mine disposal weapon delivery depends on the system involved.
a. Sound Velocity Gradient. The acoustic velocity may vary due to changes in temperature,
pressure or salinity and the resulting velocity gradients will cause bending of the acoustic rays.
This bending will cause the intensity and direction of approach of the acoustic beam to vary from
that expected for an iso-velocity medium. Velocity gradients have to be considered with respect
to:
(2) Reduced intensity at the mine causing reduced return signal compared with noise.
Notes:
1. It should be standard that minehunters have sound velocity measuring and associated data
handling equipment in order that accurate sound propagation predictions can be made.
2. To minimise the adverse affects of sound velocity gradients, use of variable depth sonars
may be preferred to hull-mounted sonars. Salinity effects on sound velocity may be significant
off river mouths, after heavy rainfall, or in the vicinity of ice, but can otherwise be
disregarded.
b. Multi-Path Effects. In addition to the direct path, the sonar pulse may reach the target or
receiving array by one or more paths due to forward scattering. The signal received will be the
sum of the echoes travelling over these various paths. The effect of the multi-path depends on the
position and aspect of the mine in relation to the minehunter.
c. Abnormal Absorption. Absorption greater than that expected from normal sea-water can
result from the presence of suspended matter or bubbles and causes a reduction in sonar
performance. Also the temperature of the sea water will affect attenuation losses at the higher
frequencies used in minehunting sonars. The effect is small below 4EC, but becomes significant
at the higher temperatures (eg 27EC) found in tropical waters.
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5. Magnetic Minehunting Environment. The local magnetic field intensity affects target
strength levels. This should be taken into account before deciding to use a magnetic minehunting
technique.
1. Minehunting Sonar Forecast Reports should become a standard headquarters service for
minehunters which are not able to make their own calculations.
2. For this purpose the minehunter has to signal results of own sound velocity or Bathythermograph
readings to the responsible headquarters.
3. Nevertheless, each minehunter should be equipped with real time performance measuring
equipment to determine minehunting sonar performance at a specific time and place.
1. Water Depth. The depth of water and equipment available determine where diving operations
can be carried out. Water depth and its physical affects on the diver effect the operational capabilities
of the diver. For example, in very shallow depths of water the diver is not generally limited in the number
of investigations (or bottom time) but at greater depths a diver may be able to safely conduct only one or
two dives a day.
2. Bottom Topography. A rough seabed will increase the time and effort required to carry out a
seabed search.
3. Bottom Sediment. The effectiveness of a visual underwater search is largely dependent on the
composition of the bottom. Soft mud is easily stirred up by water movement or by the diver himself with
a resulting loss in visibility. In addition mines will sink into soft mud and may not be detected by visual
search.
1. Weather. Once underwater the diver is relatively unaffected by the sea state. However, the
attending boat may well have difficulty in tending the diver, and underwater visibility will be reduced if
the bottom sediment is stirred up.
2. Current. It is important that the diver be aware of currents, both surface and sub-surface. In deep
water a relatively small current may prevent the diver from reaching the bottom.
3. Density. Variations in density caused by both salinity and temperature changes affect the diver's
buoyancy. Large variations eg those that occur off river mouths, may hinder diving operations.
4. Sea Water Temperature. Extremely cold water may affect the functioning of diving equipment
(eg icing up) and will considerably reduce the diver's efficiency and underwater endurance.
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5. Marine Life. The presence of predators such as shark and barracuda, poisonous fish, jelly fish
etc, and heavy weed may restrict the diver's ability to carry out a task underwater.
1. Where areas appropriate to MCM operations are too large for timely completion of a
comprehensive Mine Warfare Pilot, Mine Warfare Surveys should be carried out.
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
11-12 ORIGINAL
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 11
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this chapter
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
11A-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
11A-2 ORIGINAL
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6. Not releasable
11A-3 ORIGINAL
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
11A-4 ORIGINAL
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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 11
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
11B-1 ORIGINAL
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11B-2 ORIGINAL
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1. Not releasable
11B-3 ORIGINAL
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2. Not releasable
11B-4 ORIGINAL
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1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
11B-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
11B-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
11B-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
11B-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
11B-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
11B-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
11B-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
11B-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
11B-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
11B-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
CHAPTER 12
1201 Introduction
1. Mine countermeasures reports and records are the only means that various levels of command have
of obtaining up to date information on the state of own mine countermeasures. A full list of MCM reports
and records is given in para 1208 below.
2. Reports are required by the Operation Control Authority and higher commands to evaluate current
operations and tasks and to be enabled to make decisions about sailing of own naval units and merchant
shipping.
3. It is very important that complete and up-to-date records of enemy minefields and the progress
made in dealing with them is maintained. The effectiveness of the countermeasures taken can thus be
determined and the pattern of enemy mining tactics gauged. Proper use of this information will enable
available countermeasures forces to be used in the most effective way and the shipping casualties to be
reduced to a minimum.
4. Authorities charged with the responsibility for making a report should remember that because a
particular report is available, its use is not necessarily mandatory. Operational Commanders at the various
levels should indicate as a matter of policy which reports are definitely required and which may be left
to the discretion of those responsible for rendering them. The aim at all command levels should be to
provide the maximum relevant information, using the means of communication appropriate to its priority
and classification, whilst paying due regard to the need to minimise signal traffic.
5. In case a detailed analysis of MCM operations is intended, the responsible authority will order the
application of manuscript reports from the Maritime Analysis Handbook (MAH). The FORMEXs will
satisfy all needs for an analysis, although having been prepared for exercises.
1. The arrangement of the MCM reporting system is aimed at allowing authorities controlling mine
countermeasures to display and evaluate the effectiveness of MCM forces and operations. It also provides
superior authorities with information from which they can assess future operations.
(1) Tactical Level. Units being controlled by an OTC will keep him informed by MCM
reports stating the progress of work detailed to them by the appropriate task orders. Reports
to be sent are stated in the task order. They also report those observations and events which
will affect their task. Details are contained in MTP-24(B), Volume I, Chapter 10.
12-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
(2) Operational Level. OTCs have to keep their OPCON Authority informed about the
progress of work and the status of the enemy mine threat. The frequency of these reports will
be ordered in the appropriate MCM Operations Direction (MCMOPDIR).
1. Definition of OP/NONOP
a. OP. An MCMV is termed OP (for operational) when it is capable of effectively carrying out
its ordered task.
c. The time on passage, in port or harbour, at a buoy or anchor, in transit, streaming and
recovering sweeps, gear or equipment, time out of channel or any other missions may be OP or
NONOP.
d. The period effectively carrying out the MCM task in the channel cannot be anything other than
OP.
e. The change from an OP to a NONOP situation occurs when the equipment, gear or material
concerned ceases to function effectively. In certain particular cases (for example a defect in a
mechanical noise maker) it is possible to give an estimate of when the equipment, gear or material
went defective and how long it will take to repair or replace.
f. The change from a NONOP to an OP situation occurs when the equipment, gear or material
concerned has been repaired or replaced and is operating correctly again. If trials (either at sea or
in harbour) are required to prove the equipment, gear or material the MCMV does not become OP
again until the satisfactory completion of all trials. If trials are not required the ship becomes OP
on completion of the repair or replacement. If however the repaired or replaced equipment, gear
or material does not function effectively when next used, the time taken to again repair or replace
is included in NONOP.
One category of MCM reports are signalled reports which are to be found in the Mine Warfare Chapter
of MTP-1(C), Volume II. They will normally be applied within MCM Task Groups and by clearance
divers. The main advantage of these MW Signals is that they are short compared with other categories
of MCM reports, because relevant letters and/or figures only have to be transmitted and describing text
will be omitted. Also one book only has to be used for tactical reporting.
12-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. In order to allow proper analysis of MCM operations in detail with a certain time delay, manuscript
reports/records were developed to enable evaluation of the effectiveness of single MCM vessels as well
as of MCM task groups.
2. Instructions for the completion of manuscript reports/records are contained in Supplement to the
Maritime Analysis Handbook (MAH)
This paragraph and the following tables lists those MCM reports and records which are available in
different publications.
12-3 ORIGINAL
1. Reports by MCM Units/OTCs
START/STOP X When start or stop time differs from task order OTC OTC P
TIME
(MW 127) NONE UNCLAS
MINEREP X When a mine has been detected (2) or has been disposed of OTC OTC O/P
(MW 128) (only when ordered) or any unit on transit
None CONF
12-4
MCM OPDEF X Whenever a unit is unable to carry out the task ordered Unit or OTC OTC As required
(MW 129)
None UNCLAS
MCM SITREP X On completion of each stage and task and when ordered OTC OTC P
(MW 130)
None CONF
Not Releasable
Not Releasable
Notes:
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Only if necessary to inform other authorities/units.
ORIGINAL
2. This report has to be applied by Non-MCMVs when detecting a drifting mine or observing a mine explosion.
2. Reports Generated by Control Authorities:
Signal
SENT / INFO CLASSIFICATION
Not Releasable
MCM SITREP X At midnight local time daily or as ordered by the OPCON Operational Commander P
(MW 130) Operational Command Authority
other OCA’s (if required) CONF
Not Releasable
Not Releasable
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
4. Special MCM Reports
REPORT TITLE Not Not Maritime OCCASION SENT SENT PRECEDENCE
Releasable Releasable Analysis BY TO
H/B
Not Releasable
Not Releasable
12-6
Not Releasable
MTP-6(C) VOL II
OF MINEHUNTING SONAR sonar has occurred
(FORMEX 186) None CONF
ORIGINAL
4. (Cont'd)
Manuscript SENT /
INFO CLASSIFICATION
EMPLOYMENT
RECORD CONF
(FORMEX 187)
Note. Above Summary of MCM reports and records is also to be found in MTP-24, Volume I, Chapter 10.
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
12-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
CHAPTER 13
MINE COUNTERMEASURES
REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES
Note: (NU) All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this
chapter refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
SECTION I - GENERAL
1301 Introduction
a. Determining the number of runs per track (J) and the percentage clearance (P) for operations
in which the objective is clearance. The instructions correlate the actuation/cutting/search
parameters and sweeper safety parameters with the standard deviation of navigational error (ı) to
assist the MCM Commander in obtaining maximum effectiveness from his forces.
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Annex E to this chapter provides the necessary instructions for determining the number of
tracks and, the number of runs per track when operating with, and for use by, non-NATO Nations.
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
13-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
13-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
13-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
13-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
13-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
13-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
f. Not releasable
g. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
13-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
13-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Not releasable
Not releasable
13-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
5. Not releasable
13-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
Not releasable
b. Not releasable
Not releasable
13-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
Not releasable
b. Not releasable
Not releasable
13-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
13-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
8. Not releasable
9. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
13-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
Not releasable
13-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
Not releasable
13-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-31 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-32 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-33 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-34 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-35 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-36 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-37 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-38 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-39 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-40 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-41 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-42 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-43 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-44 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-45 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-46 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-47 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-48 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-49 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-50 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-51 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-52 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
5. Not releasable
13-53 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13-54 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
13-55 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-56 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13-57 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
13-58 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13-59 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13-60 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
13-61 ORIGINAL
Table 13-5 - Not releasable
13-62
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
Table13-7(a). Not releasable
13-63
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
Table 13-7(b). Not releasable
13-64
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 13
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
Not releasable
13A-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
Not releasable
13A-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13A-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
13A-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 13
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13B-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Not releasable
Not releasable
13B-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13B-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13B-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13B-5 ORIGINAL
13B-6
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ORIGINAL
6. Not releasable
7. Not releasable
(NC)(NMM)
13B-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13B-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
7. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
13B-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
8. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
Not releasable
13B-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13B-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Figure 13B-4. Not releasable
13B-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Figure 13B-5. Not releasable
13B-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
Not releasable
13B-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
13B-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 13
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
13C-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
c. Not releasable
d. Not releasable
e. Not releasable
f. Not releasable
g. Not releasable
13C-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
5. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
b. Not releasable
13C-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
13C-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX D TO CHAPTER 13
NOT RELEASABLE
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex refer
to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
4. Not releasable
13D-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
3. Not releasable
1. Not releasable
2. Not releasable
a. Not releasable
13D-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
b. Not releasable
13D-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13D-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13D-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13D-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13D-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13D-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
ANNEX E TO CHAPTER 13
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this annex
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
13E01 Introduction
1. This Annex provides instructions for the following when operating with, and for use by , non
NATO Nations:
a. Determining the number of runs per track (J) and the percentage clearance (P) for operations
in which the objective is clearance. The instructions correlate the actuation/cutting/search
parameters and sweeper safety parameters with the standard deviation of navigational error (s) to
assist the MCM Commander in obtaining maximum effectiveness from his forces.
2. The standard deviation of navigational error (ı) and the Characteristic Actuation/Cutting/Detection
Width (A) and the channel width (C) used in this chapter for determining the track spacing (D) can be in either
units of yards or metres. However ı , A and C must be in the same units and the determined value of D will
be in the same corresponding units.
3. For all operations the planning parameters should be re-evaluated in the light of observations during the
operations. Observed changes must be reported.
1. General. The following factors are to be taken into account, where applicable, in the execution of
MCM operations:
a. Track spacing (D) is the perpendicular distance or lateral separation between two adjacent tracks.
Track spacing for MCM operations is initially based on the countermeasures pattern used, and on an
assumed navigational and localization error and values of actuation/cutting/ detection parameters (see
Chapter 3, Para 0311.2). Track spacing may be dragged in accordance with the actual navigational
errors and values of A and B experienced during the conduct of the operation.
b. Normally D # 2 ı which is a condition necessary to be able to lump tracks (J > 1). Usually D = 2
ı is taken, unless calculations show the advantage of D < 2 ı permitting an economy in total number
of runs.
13E-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. In the case of a large A and small ı the calculated J may be smaller than one (J < 1). In this case
J is set equal to 1 and D recalculated. Then D is greater than 2 ı. This is particularly the case with mine
hunting systems.
3. Track Runs. The number of times the countermeasures gear must follow each track is defined as the
number of runs per track (J).
4. MCM Pattern. A mine countermeasures pattern is a way of distributing sweeping, hunting or diving
runs within an area or a channel. The term distribution, as used here, includes the general procedure for laying
out tracks and the sequence and distribution of runs on the various tracks. The pattern in use is the uniform
pattern. In this pattern, runs are made along a series of tracks equally spaced across a channel or throughout
an area. The same number of runs is made on each track. The order in which tracks are swept or hunted will
not affect the ultimate degree of clearance. However, it will affect the risk to the MCMV in some operations
and it may affect the degree and uniformity of clearance at times during the operation.
This is the term applied to the navigational error computed for use in statistical MCM operations. Numerically,
it is the root mean square of the navigational error.
13E-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13E20 General
a. The aim of a clearance operation is to achieve a high probability of clearing any mine in a
channel/area. This probability of clearing any mine is also defined as the mathematical expectation (P)
of the fraction of the total number of mines of that type (including unsweepable and/or undetectable
mines) that will be cleared. In the present context this mathematical expectation is also defined as
percentage clearance. The actual percentage of mines cleared in such an operation may differ
substantially from the theoretical percentage clearance aimed at.
a. In order to obtain a high probability to clear any mine, the percentage clearance aimed at should be
at least 96 (P $ 96). To increase the percentage clearance respectively from 94 to 96 or from 96 to 98
an average increase of MCM effort of respectively 13 to 20 % is needed.
b. If a percentage clearance of 96 cannot be achieved with one technique, other technique(s) should
be used in the same channel/area.
(2) In multiple coverage the maximum percentage clearance will be given by the technique yielding
the maximum value from the above formula's.
3. Definition of Calculated Percentage Clearance Due to the fact that unsweepable and/or
undetectable mines can be present, a calculated percentage clearance (Pcal) is introduced. The calculated
percentage clearance is the mathematical expectation of the fraction of sweepable or detectable mines that can
be cleared. The relation between the percentage clearance (P) and the calculated percentage clearance (Pcal) in
sweeping is P = Pcal (1-Fs). The relation between the percentage detection (Pd) and the Pcal in hunting for
detection is Pd = Pcal (1-F).
13E-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
4. Extension of Pcal
a. Clearing a mine during minehunting operations is achieved after the sequential processes of
detection, classification and/or identification and disposal.
b. The detection process normally dominates the other processes. Classification is not necessary if
detailed survey information is available. To quantify these processes the following definitions are
needed:
(3) Classification Probability (Bc): the probability of classifying an object correctly after
detection, if the object is in fact a mine.
(4) Disposal Probability (Bn): the probability of disposing of an object that has been classified
correctly if the object is in fact a mine. If repeated identification/disposal runs are made in order to
ensure a positive/correct identification/disposal, Bn can be taken equal to unity.
c. The percentage detection is defined as the mathematical expectation of the total number of
detectable mines that will be detected. Thus the percentage clearance P being expressed in relation to
clearing mines, after the detection phase correct classification and disposal must be performed thus:
P = Pd Bc Bn (or Pd = P / Bc Bn).
d. The formulas used above are only correct if the performance of the system is such that if an object
has been classified once, the classification process will not be repeated after a "new" detection of the
same object.
P
Pcal =
( 1 - ms )
in hunting :
P
Pcal =
(1 - m ) Bc Bn
13E-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. If the percentage clearance is the probability to effectively counter each mine, the chance or
probability to sweep/hunt ALL mines present if there were t mines is : pt.
b. The probability of hunting all detectable mines or of sweeping all mines of a particular type,
sensitivity and ship count setting which have been cleared to a given percentage clearance can be readily
determined from Figure 13E-1. Similarly, the percentage clearance which is required for a particular
probability that all detectable mines are hunted or that all mines of a particular type, sensitivity and ship
count settings are swept can also be determined from Fig 13E-1. Fig 13E-1 shows the way in which the
probability of countermeasuring a particular mine type varies with the percentage clearance for various
estimates of the total number of the particular mine type expected. For example if there are 10 mines
of a particular type in the channel, then to attain a probability of 0.8 of countering all 10 mines, the
percentage clearance against them must be 97.8 per cent. In the case of hunting to obtain a probability
of 0.8 of finding and disposing of all ten detectable mines in a channel, the percentage of clearance must
also be 97.8 per cent.
13E-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
c. The distribution of K.
d. F and Fs.
1. Single coverage. Single coverage is the execution of a number of runs (J) on a number of tracks (N)
with a specific MCM technique (i.e. same parameters).
2. Multiple coverage. Multiple coverage is the execution of a number of runs (J) on a number of tracks
(N) with different MCM techniques (i.e. different MCM parameters).
The method used is based on the ‘clearance’ of a channel/area and uses the standard deviation of the
navigational error(s) as a statistical efficiency factor along with the basic MCM parameters A and B. This
method is applicable to all values of Kcal and for all values of A/ı.
13E-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Introduction
a. To achieve a certain percentage clearance it will be necessary to divide the Channel into tracks and
to determine how many runs per track have to be made.
b. If a run on a track has not been completed the track is not considered valid and therefore not
accounted for.
c. The following tables give the required number of tracks and number of runs per track. These tables
are based on the calculated percentage clearance (Pcal) (see para 0820). Each table refers to a specific
MCM technique and does not reflect the overall Percentage clearance (P). If only one MCM technique
is used it may not cover all mine types: this is reflected in the parameter F/Fs and in the Pcal.
d. To plan/evaluate the percentage clearance of a Channel (P) for a given minetype by a multiple
coverage [e.g. mechanical/hunting and influence sweeping for a given classification probability (Bc) and
disposal probability (Bn)] and for a given percentage of non sweepable or not huntable mines (F/Fs), use
the following approximative formulas:
e To achieve a certain percentage clearance, the following factors have to be taken into consideration.
These affect the Characteristic Actuation/cutting/detection Width and Probability (A and B) and the
number of mines which cannot be dealt with by the technique used (F/Fs) (see also paras 0814 and
0831):
f. The tables are based on statistics and are grouped around the mostly used values in current MCM
techniques. Covering all values is not possible. Although the results are not linear, it can be accepted,
with some approximation, for intermediate values to interpolate between the tables.
13E-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
a. Parameters:
b. Examples:
Given:
Channel width 400m
Technique: Mechanical sweeping
Characteristic Cutting Width: 200 m.
Characteristic Cutting Probability: 0.95
SDNE: 50 m.
Required Pcal: 95%
Runs per track:1
Solution:
Take table for Mechanical sweeping: Channel Width 400 m. and SDNE 50 m.
- The intersection of Pcal equal 95% for 200m Characteristic Cutting Width and 0.95 Characteristic
Cutting Probability gives 5 tracks.
Given:
Channel width 800 m.
Technique: Hunting
Characteristic Detection Width: 400 m
Characteristic Detection Probability: 0.85
SDNE: 25 m.
Required Pcal: 99%
Runs per track: 1
Solution:
Take table for Hunting for a Channel Width of 800 m with SDNE 25 m.
- The intersection of Pcal equal 99% for 400 m Characteristic Detection Width and 0.85
Characteristic Detection Probability gives 6 tracks.
13E-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
(3) Question: Find required number of tracks and runs per track.
Given :
Channel width 800 m.
Technique: Influence sweeping
Characteristic Actuation Width: 200 m.
Characteristic Actuation Probability: 0.8
SDNE: 75 m.
Required Pcal:90%
Solution:
Take table for Influence sweeping for a Channel Width of 800 m with SDNE 75 m.
- The intersection of Pcal equal 90% for 200m Characteristic Actuation Width and 0.8 Characteristic
Actuation Probability gives 5 tracks and 8 runs per track.
Given:
Technique: hunting
Channel width 800 m.
SDNE 25 m.
Characteristic Detection Width 500 m.
Characteristic Detection Probability 0.8
Number of tracks: 6
Solution:
Take table for hunting for a Channel Width of 800 m with SDNE 25 m.
- Enter the column of 0.8 Characteristic Detection Probability and the rows of 500 m Characteristic
Detection Width until finding 6 tracks. At the left margin of this row find the corresponding
percentage Pcal of 99%.
13E-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Given:
The examples of hunting and sweeping of the 800 m channel width above with of sub para (4)
and (3) a Pcal result for the hunting technique of 99% and for sweeping Pcal 90%.
Mine Type: bottom influence magnetic /acoustic mine
It is the commanders' assessment that F is 0,05 (5% non huntable mines)
Fs: 0 (it is supposed that a correct appropriate sweep pulse for that mine type is used)
Bc: 0,95 (based on the commanders' assessment of the sonar conditions during that operation)
Bn: 1 (it is assessed that each disposal is successful)
Solution:
13E-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
Characteristic
Pcal Detection/Cutting Characteristic Detection/Cutting Probability
Width
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
150 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
200 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
50 250 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
300 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
400 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
500 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
150 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
200 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
60 250 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
300 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
400 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
500 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
150 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 2
200 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
70 250 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
300 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
400 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
500 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
150 8 6 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 3
200 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 2
80 250 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2
300 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
400 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1
500 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
150 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 3
200 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 4 3 2
90 250 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 2
300 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2
400 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 1
500 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
150 13 12 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 4
200 10 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 4 3
95 250 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 2
300 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2
400 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2
500 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 1
150 19 17 14 13 11 10 9 8 6 6
200 15 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 5
99 250 12 11 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 4
300 11 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3
400 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3
500 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2
13E-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-13 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-14 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-15 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-16 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-17 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-18 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-19 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-20 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-21 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-22 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-23 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-24 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-25 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-26 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-27 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-28 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-29 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-30 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-31 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-32 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-33 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-34 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-35 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-36 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-37 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-38 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-39 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-40 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-41 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-42 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-43 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-44 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-45 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-46 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-47 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-48 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-49 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-50 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-51 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-52 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-53 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-54 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-55 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-56 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
13E-57 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 10
NATO UNCLASSIFED
13E-58 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-59 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-60 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-61 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 25
13E-62 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-63 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-64 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-65 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 50
13E-66 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-67 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-68 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-69 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
SDNE (m) 75
13E-70 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
13E30 General
b. The sweeping or hunting of a mine does not complete the operation, an effort over the
complete channel/area in consideration will allow the localization of the focal or critical mined
areas.
1. Introduction. Care should be taken into the distribution of effort when different techniques are
available for the execution of the operation. Runs can be allocated between identical techniques while
between different ones the allocation is done by ‘coverages’. The effort already put into the channel/area
during the exploratory (for the mine type being considered) should be taken into account when planning
further MCM operations.
2. Rule for determination of the effort. To determine the effort required (expressed in
percentage clearance) use tables in Section 2 of this Chapter.
4. Reducing the Risk (R) to MCMVs. In order to reduce the risk the methods described in
Section 4 of Chapter 5 apply.
13E-71 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
1. Introduction.
a. After carrying out an exploratory operation there are two possible results: one or more mines
are countered or no mines are countered during the operation.
b. More over, by ‘exploring’ a channel/area, it is possible to localise those areas in which mines
are most likely to be present thereby reducing the size of the channel(s)/ area(s) for further MCM
operations.
c. When evaluating an exploratory operation care should be taken in not mixing conclusions
drawn from channel(s)/ area(s) where different parameter values were used to plan the operation.
2. Considerations. If no mine was swept or hunted it should be borne in mind that the following
possibilities do exist :
13E-72 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this Glossary
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
Not releasable
AAW Anti-Air Warfare
Not releasable
ADivP Allied Diving Publication
Not releasable
AF Audio Frequency
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
AOA Amphibious Objective Area
Not releasable
ARNAS Automatic Radar Navigation System
ASEVM Anti-Surface Effect Vehicle Mine
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
GLOSS-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
DG Degaussing
DWM Deep Water Mine
Not releasable
Not releasable
ELF Extreme Low Frequency
EMCON Emission Control
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Not releasable
EVEC Equipment de Visualisation et d'Enregistrement de la Chasse aux Mines
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
HF High Frequency
HSA Horizontal Sextant Angle
GLOSS-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
MAH Maritime Analysis Handbook
MAIM Maritime Anti-Invasion Mine
Not releasable
Not releasable
MCM Mine Countermeasures
MCMOPDIR MCM Operations Directions
MCMOPORD Mine Countermeasures Operation Orders
MCMR Mine Countermeasures Reports
MCMV Mine Countermeasures Vessel
Not releasable
Not releasable
MHC Minehunter Coastal
MILCO Minelike Contact
MILEC Minelike Echo
MF Medium Frequency
MMS Marine Mammal System
MNC Major NATO Commander
Not releasable
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
Not releasable
MRN Mine Reference Number
MSA Minesweeper Auxiliary
MSB Minesweeper Boat
MSC Minesweeper Coastal/Major Subordinate Commander
MSCD Minesweeper Coastal, Drone Guide Unit
MSD Minesweeper Drone
MSI Minesweeper Inshore
MSO Minesweeper Ocean
Not releasable
MW Mine Warfare
Not releasable
NAVAIDS Navigational Aids
NAVSAT Navigation Satellite System
NBC Nuclear Bacteriological Chemical
NCS Naval Control of Shipping
Not releasable
Not releasable
NOMBO Non Mine Minelike Bottom Object
NOME Non Mine Minelike Echo
NONOP Non Operational
GLOSS-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
Not releasable
SCUBA Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus
SDNE Standard Deviation of Navigational Error
SEV Surface Effect Vehicle
Not releasable
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
SSV Semi-Submerged Vehicle
STANAG Standardisation Agreement
GLOSS-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
GLOSS-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
GLOSS-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX
Note: All references to ‘Mine Warfare’, ‘Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘mines’ throughout this index
refer to ‘Naval Mine Warfare’, ‘Naval Mine Countermeasures’ and ‘sea mines’ respectively.
INDEX-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Not releasable
Categories of moored mines: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0303
Channel: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0109, 1001, Not releasable
Not releasable
Characteristic actuation probability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristic actuation width: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristic detection probability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristic detection width: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristic disposal probability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristics of the area of operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex 3A
Characteristic sweep path probability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Characteristic sweep path width: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311
Charts: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201, 0807, 1010
Check operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0107
Check ranging: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0109
Choice of platform: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0302
Circular search: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0307
Classify: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704
Clearance diver vessel: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0407
Clearance diving: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110, Annex 3C, 0706, 0801-0810
Clearance diving navigation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
Clearance operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0107, 0304, 0308,Not releasable
Not releasable
Clutter: see "Bottom clutter"
Not releasable
Coastal route: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0109
Combination sweep: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0304, 0611, Not releasable
Combined MCM: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0302, 0703
Commander's estimate of the situation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex 3A
INDEX-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
H
Hand-held sonar: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0807
Hazard to sweepers: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0308
Helicopter: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0302, 0403, 0711
Hovercraft: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0402
Hunting precursor: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0307
Hydrofoils: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0402
Hydrographic information: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
INDEX-5 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-6 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Narrative: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201
Narrow band range sweeps: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0607
Navigation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0306, 1001-1011
Navigational accuracy: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Navigational error: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Navigational systems: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Navigational warnings: see `Warnings'
Net sweeps: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0602
Neutralisation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704, 0706
NOMBO: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Not releasable
Not releasable
Nonmine: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704
NONOP (non-operational): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Not releasable
INDEX-7 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Objective: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0105
Objectives of enemy minefields: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0103
Offset of gear: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311,Not releasable
OP (operational): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Operational command(er): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0102
Operational control: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201
Operational Minehunting Clutter (MILEC)(NOMBO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Operation order: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201, 0312, Annex 3B
Operations room: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201, Not releasable
Optical detection: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0702
Orders: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0106, 0312, Annex 3A
Oropesa sweeps: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0602
OTC: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110, 0312, 0703
Not releasable
Own mining record: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201
INDEX-8 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
Q
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Readiness: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0909
Reconnaissance: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0107, 0801
Recording: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704
Records (MCM): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201-1208
Recovery of mines: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704, 0706
Reducing the risk: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0104, 0109,Not releasable
Relationship between types of operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0108
Relationship minehunting/minesweeping: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110, 0311, 0703
Remotely controlled MCMV: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0405
Removal of mines: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704, 0706, 0801
Render safe: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0704
Reports (MCM): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201-1208
Risk: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0304,Not releasable
Risk to MCMV: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0311,Not releasable
Routes: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0109
Route Survey: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Rules of engagement (ROE): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0109
Running Jackstay search: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0307
Not releasable
Not releasable
Safe current: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0308, Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Not releasable
Safety distances (divers): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110
Safety of MCMV: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110, 0304, Not releasable, 0311, 0532, Not releasable
Schedule: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0201
Scheduled tasking: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annex 3B
Not releasable
Not releasable
Search by divers: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0805
Segmentation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0302
Selection of MCM technique: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0302, 0303, 0304
Self-protection depth for MCMV: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0538
Self-protective measures: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0102, 0104, 0109, 0534
Semi-submerged vehicle: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0402
Separation: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0110
INDEX-9 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-10 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-11 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INDEX-12 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
LEP-1 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
LEP-2 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
LEP-3 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C) VOL II
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
LEP-4 ORIGINAL
MTP-6(C)
VOLUME II