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Crim Pro - Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 414 SCRA 181

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Nilfpe Salcedo
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
97 views2 pages

Crim Pro - Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 414 SCRA 181

Uploaded by

Nilfpe Salcedo
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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You are on page 1/ 2

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, Petitioner

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017

SECOND DIVISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

NATURE OF ACTION

This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioner assailing the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan which denied the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 23848
on the grounds that it does not alleged the facts constituting the offense for violation of Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 3019.

FACTS

The petitioner is a mayor of Laoang, Northern Samar. The complaint was filed against her for
violation of Section 3(c) of R.A 3019 which alleged that on or before Feb. 15, 1993 while she is
in the performance of her official functions, she took advantage by requesting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five (5)
drums of diesel fuel for herself from Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao in order for the latter to obtain
municipal government permit or license for the operation of their bus company.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the information does
not alleged the facts constituting the offense. She argues that a provision of Section 3(c) of R.A
3019 must be interpreted in light of all other provisions particularly the definition of “receiving
any gift” under Section 2(c). She contends that pursuant to the mentioned section, the value of
the alleged gift must be specified in the information.

ISSUE

Whether or not the information does not alleged the facts constituting the offense which may
cause the grant of motion to quash.

RULING

No. The Court ruled that the information alleged the facts that constitute the offense.

The Court explained that Section 2(c), to wit:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms.- As used in this Act, the term –

(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person
other than a member of the public officer’s immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any
member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or
affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the
value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.

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Case Digest by: Nilfpe Criss Salcedo
The above cited mentions a situation where (1) the value of the gift is manifestly excessive; (2)
from a person who is not a member of the public officer’s immediate family; and (3) even on
the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity.

In contrast, Section 3 (c) quoted in the present case applies regardless of whether the gift’s
value is manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in
our view, is whether the gift is received in consideration for help given or to be given by the
public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense
charged under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify
such value in order to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.

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Case Digest by: Nilfpe Criss Salcedo

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