Update on the ICAO work
programme on Conflict Zones
and way forward
ICAO AVSEC2018
Global Aviation Security Symposium
Kas E. Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert ANB/ICAO
Montréal, 26 November 2018
ICAO Conflict Zone Work Programme
Involved ICAO provisions
5 Annexes
6 Manuals (Docs)
1 Circular *)
*) Circ 330 Doc 10088
13 maart 2018 2
Involved ICAO publications
ANNEXES
Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport – Aeroplanes
Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services
Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 17 – Security
GUIDANCE MATERIAL
Doc 9554, Manual concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil
Aircraft Operations
Doc 9756, Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part I
Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual
Doc 9962, Manual on Accident and Incident Investigation Policies and Procedures
Doc 9971, Manual on Collaborative Air Traffic Flow Management
Doc 10084, Risk Assessment Manual on Civil Aircraft Operations over or near Conflict Zones
Doc 10088, Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management *)
*) replaces Circular 330
TIMELINE 2018 - 2020
Improvement of related ICAO provisions
ANNEXES
2018 2019 2020
AN 6: State Letter
AN 13: review ANC
6, 13, 11, 15, 17 AN 11 and 15: ANC approved State Letters Adoption Council
ICAO ANNEXEN AN 17: published
DOCs
2018 2019 2020
9554, 9756 Part I: started
9962, 10088: ongoing ICAO Secretariat Published
DOCs 9859, 9971, 10084: published
Results
IMPROVEMENTS Annex 17 - Security
Published (2017) to adjust NCASP elements:
Expanding existing State requirement to constantly
review, besides the level, also the nature of the threat
to civil aviation in its territory and the airspace above
New requirement (Nov 2018): the appropriate
authority to establish and implement procedures to
share, as appropriate, relevant information with
operators, ANSPs or other entities concerned in a
practical, timely manner to assist them to conduct
security risk assessments relating to their operations
5
Results
ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS
Risk assessment and sharing information – Air Traffic Services
New requirements (2020)
• ATS ensures to conduct a risk
assessment of airspace concerned for
hazardous activities to civil aircraft and
take mitigating actions when necessary
• conflict zone is a reportable hazard for
civil aviation in NOTAM, include nature,
Annex 11 Annex 15 extent of threat, and consequences
6
Results
PUBLISHED & ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS
ATS Contingency and Civil - Military Coordination
2018 2020 2018
Improved guidance: 2018 - 2020
• Coordination and contingency
improvements during conflicts
• Responsibilities of parties
• Establish joint high-level policy
body for oversight
Doc 9971 Doc 9554 Circ 330 New Manual (Doc 10088)
7
Results
ONGOING IMPROVEMENTS
Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I
New requirement (2020)
• Operator ensures to conduct before the
flight a risk assessment for the entire flight
plan route, including alternates, and when
necessary to take mitigating actions
• Note with reference to new Risk Assessment
Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or
Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084)
8
New Risk Assessment Manual for States
and airspace users – Conflict Zones
PUBLISHED IMPROVEMENTS
Doc 10084 – Risk Assessment Manual for Civil
Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
1st Edition (2016): Conflict zones defined and advice to
States and operators about risks of overflying conflict zones
2nd (non-restricted) Edition (2018):
• Improved ICAO framework and procedures
• Responsibilities of all stakeholders
• Consolidated source material for risk assessments
• Risk information sharing mechanisms
• Guidance what to do with threat and risk information
• Best practices
9
2nd Edition Doc 10084
So, what’s new?
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned
State that manages the airspace
Primarily relevant Annex 17 provisions
Establish and implement procedures for risk assessment
mechanisms to share information own territory and airspace
above it
Also some Annex 11 and 15 provisions
Geographical area of CZ and contingency plans
Promulgation of information
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned
Aircraft Operator
Primarily Annex 6 provisions
Not to commence the flight before appropriate risk
assessment of the entire route, incl. en-route alternates,
and if necessary, take mitigating actions for a safe and
secure flight
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned
Air Navigation Service Provider
Primarily Annex 11 provisions
Development and promulgate contingency planning
Perform risk assessment for activities potentially
hazardous for civil aircraft and if necessary take
mitigating actions
Civil – Military ATS coordination
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned
State of the Operator
Primarily Annex 17 provisions
Assure protection and safety of passengers, crew,
ground personnel and general public safeguarding
acts of unlawful interference
Establish an organization and structure to ensure the
safety, regularity and efficiency of flights
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Roles parties concerned
ICAO
Based on Annex 11 provisions
When necessary, initiate and coordinate appropriate
contingency actions with stakeholders involved
Practice example with industry
ICAO – IATA Contingency Coordination Team (CCT)
(airspace avoidance in ICAO Middle East and North Africa region)
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Risk Assessment Cycle
Risk
Assessment
Cycle
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Risk Assessment Cycle
1. Collection of Relevant Information
2. Threat Analyses
3. Security Risk Assessment
4. Mitigating Actions
5. Hazard Identification
6. Unintended Consequences of Security RA Mitigating Actions
7. Safety Risk Assessment
8. Mitigating Actions – Functional Systems
9. Unintended Consequences of Safety RA Mitigating Actions
10. Acceptable Risk Level
Integrated Risk Management
Mitigating actions – Functional Systems
• Operations
• Safety
• Security ICAO
• Environment
• Maintenance
• Quality
NOT LIMITED
• Finance
2nd Edition Doc 10084
Security and Safety Risks
Flight
Operations
Security Risk Safety Risk
Intentional acts to Exposure to
disrupt the system unintentional events
and consequences
interrupting the system
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1
Flight
Operations
Security Risk Assessment
Potential SAM threat
Mitigating Action
Rerouting
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1
Flight
Operations
Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment
Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic
Mitigating Action
Rerouting
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1
Flight
Operations
Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment
Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic
Unintended Consequential
Mitigating Action Safety Risk
Rerouting Fuel/drift down/alternate
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 1
Flight
Operations
Security Risk Assessment Safety Risk Assessment
Potential SAM threat Separation CIV/MIL traffic
Unintended Consequential
Mitigating Action Safety Risk
Rerouting Fuel/drift down/alternate
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2
Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx 300 POB)
Example assumptions
• In the case of a potential SAM attack, the only mitigation
action available is likely to be avoidance of the affected
airspace
• For explanatory purposes of the risk assessment process a
potential attack with MANPADS is given below FL320
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2
Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx 300 POB)
1. Collection of relevant information
CZ: conflict between non-state armed groups and government
No indications that the non-state groups possess medium or long range
SAMs with a greater range than MANPADS
2. Threat analysis
Q: Does it involve Intention and Capability?
A: Both YES for MANPADS
Q: Can the information be verified?
A: Security info, public info; e.g. NOTAMs potential risk airspace below
FL320 (Note: variation in NOTAMs depending source)
Q: Does the treat exist? A: YES
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2
Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)
3. Security Risk Assessment (SeRA)
Q: Threat (Intent + Capability) Consequence Vulnerability Risk
A: (T) Yes + Yes (C) High (V) High (R) High (below FL320)
4. Security risk mitigating actions
A: NOT necessary for flights above FL320
5. Hazard Identification
Q: What is the operational exposure to unintended consequences of the conflict zone?
A: (1) Drift down (N-1) ceiling FL250 or (2) emergency decent (decompression) to FL100 or
higher e.g. MSA (FL140) with mountainous terrain
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2
Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)
6. Unintended Consequences of SeRA Mitigating Actions
A: NO actions necessary above FL320
7. Safety Risk Assessment (SaRA)
A: Likelyhood N-1 or emergency decent is LOW
Consequences and Vulnerability are HIGH SaRA is HIGH
8. Mitigating Actions – Functional Systems (Security/Safety/Operations)
A: (1) Drift down ceiling FL250 or below: e.g. contact Mil ATC for traffic
separation or divert outside FIR
(2) Emergency decent: rerouting for ETOPS ERA and/or divert outside FIR
Example Risk Assessment
Conflict Zones 2
Overflying CZ: aircraft A330 (approx. 300 POB)
9. Unintended consequences of SaRA mitigating actions
A: More trip fuel necessary for possible risk of diversion/rerouting
recalculate trip fuel/alternate/MTOM/payload
10. Acceptable Risk Level – defined with oversight authority
A: Acceptable when outcomes all steps within operational limits
and as low as possible
Introduction 2nd Edition Doc 10084
IATA Safety and
Flight OPS Conference
18 April 2018, Montréal
IATA AVSEC World Conference
1 October 2018, Athens
ICAO AVSEC2018 Symposium
26 November 2018, Montréal
2nd Edition Doc 10084 - IMPLEMENTATION
Inventory – State type of guidance
Differences between the guidance provided by States
to airspace users in the risk assessment process
Inventory type of mechanisms
in the ICAO Regions
Example 1: No or limited guidance
• Focus on national/domestic security
• No advise about foreign CZ
• Operator depends on own Security
Department or outsource risk assessment
Example 2: Information provided by authorities
• Provide with threat-related info
• No advise where to fly
• Operator able to make risk assessment based
on more consolidated data
Experience of information sharing
in the Netherlands
• No State regulation or advise for operators regarding
airspace beyond State territory and/or FIR
• Operators make their own risk assessment and decide
where (not) to fly
• Agreement: State authorities to exchange non-public
information, as far as available
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(Voluntary) Agreement State – operators
Relevant Ministries (like):
operators • Transport
• Justice/Security
AGREEMENT
• Foreign Affairs
voluntary basis
Security
agencies • Home Affairs
• Defense
Scheduled / ad hoc meetings or bilateral
contacts when needed
Information from States AND operators
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Example 3: Recommendations by authorities
• Provide with threat-related info and risk
assessment
• Advise where (not) to fly
• Operator includes this in its own risk
assessment
Example 4: Regulation by authorities
• Provide with threat-related info or risk
assessment and advise where (not) to fly
• Advise: low – high risk / fly – not fly
(restrictions)
• Operator own risk assessment (pending)
Implementation Challenges
Some key challenges for cooperation and sharing info
COOPERATION SHARING INFORMATION
1. Confidential (voluntary) 1. Exchange based on trust and
cooperation (legal) arrangements
2. Involvement (military) 2. Security clearances for
persons and channels
security services
3. Need for adequate
3. Create a structure - national, information service (SWIM)
regional/international with
the stakeholders
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Takeaway – Doc 10084
Differences between the guidance provided by States
to airspace users in the risk assessment process
THANK YOU
