Name: Robert Aldrin I.

Flores
Subject: Legal Profession
Activity: Typewritten Case Digest
Date: December 3, 2023
Professor: Atty. Ma. Christina G. Castillo

1.) Case Title: Hosoya v. Atty. Contado, A.C. No. 10731, October 05, 2021
Complainant: Crisanta G. Hosoya
Respondent: Atty. Allan C. Contado

FACTS:
Crisanta met Atty. Contado in 2003. Atty. Contado immediately courted her and represented
that he was already separated-in-fact from his wife.

In 2010, Crisanta agreed with Atty. Contado's proposal to live together as husband and wife.
During that time, however, Crisanta discovered that Atty. Contado was also cohabiting with and
impregnated other women (apart from her). Despite these, Crisanta continued living with him.
Their cohabitation resulted in two children that were born in 2011 and 2013.

Crisanta further claimed that they were having financial problems, and Atty. Contado left her
alone in settling the obligations. She and her children no longer received support from Atty.
Contado. Thus, she sent him a demand letter asking him to provide support and to return her
vehicle. However, Atty. Contado did not respond to the demand as of the time of the filing of
the instant complaint.

In response, Atty. Contado denied the allegations in the Complaint. He posited that Crisanta's
allegations were not supported by evidence and were meant to exact revenge for a relationship
that had gone sour.

Atty. Contado confirmed Crisanta helped him in running for governor of Eastern Samar in 2009,
although the run was unsuccessful. In 2013, He ran for mayor of the Municipality of
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, and won this time. He claimed that Crisanta was supportive on
both election campaign and the subject vehicle used during those campaigns. He also claimed
that their relationship became complicated, so they parted ways. Crisanta, however,
threatened to destroy his reputation by going public online.

On the allegation of non-support of his daughters, Atty. Contado insisted that he was not remiss
in his obligations to them. He attached receipts and deposit slips to show that he is sending
money and supplies to Crisanta. He deflected the blame and pointed out that Crisanta is the
one guilty of child abuse in depriving their daughters of the right to see and be with him.

On the allegations of having sexual relations with many other women, Atty. Contado pointed
out that Crisanta offered no evidence to support these claims.

On the subject vehicle, Atty. Contado admitted that it is still with him. He insisted, however,
that there is no carnapping as he did not take it through violence or intimidation since Crisanta
voluntarily broght the vehicle to him for his use in the election campaigns.
The CBD ruled that there is no sufficient evidence to fault Atty. Contado. Crisanta was not able
to rebut Atty. Contado's presentation of receipts and deposit slips. The same was true with
respect to the allegation of multiple sexual relations: this was also not supported by evidence.
However, CBD ruled that Atty. Contado is guilty with immorality for having a relationship and
children with Crisanta despite having a legal wife, which he admitted although he stated that
they were already separated-in-fact at that time. Further, the Committee stated that Atty.
Contado's failure to return Crisanta's vehicle constituted conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Bar; it was imperative for him to find a way to return the subject vehicle to her. Hence, it
recommended that Atty. Contado be suspended from the practice of law for one year. It also
recommended that he be directed to return the subject vehicle to Crisanta.

The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of the
CBD. However, it resolved to increase the penalty to disbarment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors was correct in the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment against Atty. Contado.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR state:
Rule 1.01 (Canon II, Sec. 1, CPRA) - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 (Canon II, Sec. 2, CPRA) - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit or the legal profession.

For the imposition of the penalty of disbarment on the ground of immortality, the conduct
complained of must not only be immoral, but must be grossly immoral. Grossly immoral
conduct as "one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency."

In the instant case, Atty. Contado admitted the fact of his relationship with Crisanta, while being
married to his wife. In so admitting, he effectively admitted to living a life of deceit and
immorality. He also admitted that their relationship resulted in two daughters.

Further, the fact that Atty. Contado has not yet returned the subject vehicle to Crisanta despite
demand bolsters this disciplinary case against him. Refusal to return property despite lawful
demand is akin to deliberate failure to pay debt. Jurisprudence is clear that a lawyer's failure to
pay debts despite repeated demands constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct also a
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of
a lawyer; this is in accord with a lawyer's mandate to "faithfully perform at all times his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients."
2.) Case Title: Atty. Kayaban Jr. v. Atty. Palicte III, A.C No. 10815, October 5, 2021
Complainant: Atty. Vicente Roy L. Kabayan, Jr.
Respondent: Atty. Leonardo B. Palicte, III

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Roy L. Kabayan, Jr. received an order issued by the MeTC, Makati City directing the
complainant to explain within five (5) days for failure to appear in the hearing of the Civil Case
No. 82422. Confused, complainant complied with the said order alleging that his former
classmate, Atty. Leonardo B. Palicte, III would be the proper person should give an explanation
as this case appears to be one of a number of cases Atty. Palicte has accepted using
undersigned's name and office address without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Upon examination of the records of the case, complainant and Judge Azarcon of MeTC, Makati
City discovered that complainant, through an Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Extension of Time to File an Answer and/or Responsive Pleading, entered his appearance as
part of the law firm "Kayaban Palicte & Associates."

Consequently, complainant sent a letter to respondent demanding that complainant be

disassociated from the case as well as from any other case where respondent may have
unauthorizedly used complainant's name and address. Respondent responds asking for
apologies and affirmation to the demand of the complainant. However, respondent filed a
Notice of Change of Address of Counsel but the complainant sent another letter because it finds
this insufficient to rectify respondent's continuous misrepresentation.

According to complainant, his supposed signature appearing on said Entry of Appearance was a
forgery because he never signed the same and his official signature is actually long and
complicated which he affixes after the main body of whatever pleading he files. Respondent
used and forged complainant's initials in the Entry of Appearance in Civil Case No. 82422
because it is easier to forge than complainant's official signature. To substantiate his allegation
of forgery, complainant incorporated a specimen of his primary signature and attached two (2)
sample pleadings with his official signature and initials.

Respondent countered that he and complainant were informal partners in the practice of law. It
was during this informal partnership that Civil Case No. 82422 was referred to respondent
sometime in 2003. Respondent denied the accusation of forgery. He stressed that forgery must
be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. Complainant's submission of two (2)
sample pleadings hardly supports his claim of forgery more so considering his admission that he
has been using two (2) signatures. Respondent believes that the present disbarment complaint
was complainant's way to get even with respondent relative to a drug case that they previously
collaborated with.

Unrelenting, complainant filed a Reply saying that he and respondent became collaborating
counsels in a drug case sometime in June 2003. However, complainant felt cheated by that time
because he failed to receive attorney’s fees that are initially agreed by them. Thus, he
completely distanced and detached himself from respondent. This unfortunate incident further
shows the impossibility of complainant and respondent collaborating again for Civil Case No.
82422.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Leonardo B. Palicte, III shall be administratively liable for violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Canons 1, 7, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled the Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer, not just to obey the laws
of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts, as well as to his clients. As instruments in the
administration of justice, as vanguards of our legal system, and as members of this noble
profession whose task is to always seek the truth, members of the bar are expected to maintain
a high standard of honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.

As officers of the court, lawyers are expected to act with complete candor. They may not resort
to the use of deception, not just in some, but in all their dealings. Complete and absolute
honesty is expected of lawyers when they appear and plead before the courts. Any act that
obstructs or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct which merits
disciplinary action on lawyers.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 thereof, as well as Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 provide that:
CANON 1 (Canon III, Sec. 1, CPRA) - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 (Canon II, Sec 1, CPRA) - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Here, respondent committed misrepresentation and dishonesty when he utilized complainant's

name and office address without authority and made it appear that complainant entered
appearance as a counsel on record in Civil Case No. 82422 before the MeTC of Makati City.

In addition, respondent, as a lawyer in government service, is a keeper of public faith and is

burdened with high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tends
to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.

Further, when lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not
only the rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of
justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand,
suspension or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.
3.) Case title: OCA v. Atty. De Vera, AM No. P-19-4017, October 5, 2021
Complainant: Office of the Court Administrator
Respondent: Atty. Eric De Vera, Et. Al.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from the Investigation Report of Judge Dyna Doll Chiongson-Trocio (Judge
Trocio) that was treated as an administrative complaint, pursuant to the Resolution in cases
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2488 and A.M. No. P-14-3216.

In A.M. No. RTJ-17-2488 May N. Laspiñas (Laspiñas), and 13 others, employees of RTC of Silay
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69, filed a complaint against Judge Felipe G. Banzon (Judge
Banzon) alleging that Judge Felipe G. Banzon (Judge Banzon) in every meeting threaten them
with dismissal or transfer them if they disobey him. Judge Banzon also allegedly threw a paper
weight in front of them, and told them that he would make their lives a living hell.

In a Resolution, the Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Banzon. Nonetheless, the
Court held Judge Banzon administratively liable for conduct unbecoming a judge, and
reprimanded and advised him to be more circumspect in his dealings with the court employees.

In A.M. No. P-14-3216 Judge Banzon filed a letter-complaint alleging he received complaints of
misconduct and corruption in the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), mostly referring to
Laspiñas. The RTC rendered its decision finding May N. Laspiñas, guilty of grave misconduct
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She was
dismissed from the service.

Meanwhile, during the investigation of A.M. No. P-14-3216, Judge Banzon submitted a list of
the anomalous transactions of certain RTC employees to Judge Trocio. Judge Banzon accused
Atty. Eric De Vera (Clerk of Court) of committing immorality and perjury when he stated in his
Joint Affidavit of Cohabitation with Mae A. Espinosa (Espinosa) that they have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage and that they do not suffer
from any legal impediment to enter into a contract of marriage.

Further, the Investigation Report submitted by Judge Dyna Doll Chiongson-Trocio was hereby
treated as an administrative complaint against: Atty. Eric De Vera, and other who are also
involved in the anomalous transactions alleged by Judge Banzon.

In the Report and Recommendation of the OCA, OCA recommends Atty. De Vera be found guilty
of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and Less Serious Dishonesty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct as well
as less serious dishonesty.

RULING:
No, Atty. De Vera shall only be liable for simple dishonesty.
The Supreme Court do not subscribe to the OCA's recommendation that Atty. De Vera's false
statements in the Joint Affidavit should be considered as less serious dishonesty. The Court
finds that the same only constitutes simple dishonesty. There is no showing that the
government suffered damage or prejudice as a result of his act. Likewise, it was not established
that Atty. De Vera took advantage of his position as Clerk of Court to execute the Joint Affidavit.
In fact, his execution of the Joint Affidavit had no relation whatsoever to his duties as a Clerk of
Court.

In addition, the Supreme Court is not convinced that Atty. De Vera's relationship with Espinosa
qualifies as disgraceful and immoral conduct. The RTC declared Atty. De Vera's marriage with
Tancinco null and void in 1995. It is stated in the Decision that Tancinco never performed her
duties and obligations as Atty. De Vera's wife during their marriage. Tancinco abandoned the
conjugal home sometime in June 1994 without just cause. She did not return despite Atty. De
Vera's efforts to save their marriage. Atty. De Vera met Espinosa afterwards. He explained that
he and Espinosa kept their relationship confidential and discreet while the case for the
nullification of his previous marriage was pending. Atty. De Vera and Espinosa only married
each other after the former's marriage was declared null and void. There is no evidence that
Tancinco questioned Atty. De Vera's relationship with Espinosa. Considering the circumstances,
Atty. De Vera did not behave in a willful, flagrant, or shameless manner.
4.) Case Title: Dela Rosa Verano vs. Atty. Diores, A.C. No. 8887, November 07, 2017
Complainant: Roman Dela Rosa Verano
Respondent: Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr.

FACTS:
Verano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to
use Verano's parcel of land as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that
had been filed against Atty. Diores.

Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a
Memorandum of Agreement with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation in order to use the
subject property as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been filed against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City
(RTC). Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores to enter into such MOA, to use the
subject property as collateral for bail bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against the
latter. RTC, finding Atty. Diores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa.

Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. The Court directed Atty. Diores to file his
comment on the letter-complaint. However, Atty. Diores failed to file any comment despite
notice.

At the scheduled mandatory conference before the IBP, only Verano appeared together with
his counsel. Atty. Diores, failed to appear despite notice. Only Verano was able to filed his
position paper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent committed deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the law and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

RULING:
Yes. The respondent committed deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the law and violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.

The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Diores’ act for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee
for the bail bonds, it only authorized Atty. Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases,
and not for the other criminal cases filed against him. Such act not only violates the trust
granted to him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character.

In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to Verano's letter-complaint filed against him
despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed to attend the mandatory
conference and file his position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped bail in the
criminal cases filed against him. His actions show his propensity to willfully disobey the orders
of the Court, no less and other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which is a grave affront to
the legal profession, and which should be penalized to the greatest extent.

Another thing that the Supreme Court pointed out is that, Atty. Diores was convicted of not
only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and fraudulent means under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows his criminal tendency
to defraud and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-earned money, which the
legal profession condemns in the strongest terms.

Thus, Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. found guilty of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Canon II, Sec. 1, CPRA), and Willful Disobedience to a Lawful Order
of the Court and Conviction for Estafa, both in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. He is hereby disbarred, and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
5.) Case Title: Sison Jr. vs. Atty. Camacho, A.C. No. 10910, January 12, 2016
Complainant: Antero M. Sison, Jr.
Respondent: Atty. Manuel N. Camacho

FACTS:
Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim against Paramount Life and
General Insurance. He proposed to increase their claim against the said insurance company and
require additional docket fees. The money for the payment of additional docket fees amounting
to P1,288,260.00 was given to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt, but he never did.
Atty. Sison discovered that RTC had rendered a decision in favor of MDAHI granting its
insurance claim plus interests on May 26, 2011. However, on August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho
sent a letter to MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance. MDAHI refused
to offer a compromise. Even without the written conformity, Atty. Camacho, entered into a
compromise agreement.

Atty. Camacho denied all allegations against him and stressed that he had the authority to enter
into the compromise agreement, and that the docket fees given to him by MDAHI formed part
of his attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Camacho has authority to enter a compromise agreement in behalf of his
client.

RULING:
No. Atty. Camacho has no authority to enter a compromise agreement in behalf of his client.

The Supreme Court ruled that in the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise
agreements for the benefit of their clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that special
powers of attorney are necessary to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to
renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or
to abandon a prescription already acquired. However, in line with the fiduciary duty of the
Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a stringent
requirement with respect to compromise agreements, to wit: Attorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim
but the full amount in cash.

It is clear that Atty. Camacho never consented MDAHI when Paramount Insurance offered a
compromise settlement. Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment from Paramount
Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise
agreement without the prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty.
Camacho violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR (Canon II, Sec. 3, CPRA), which states that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar
must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.

Another thing, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount as payment of
additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended purpose. Delving
into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule
16.01 of the CPR (Canon III, Sec. 52, CPRA), which provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for
all money or property collected or received for or from the client." when Atty. Camacho
personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the
amount of Pl, 288,260.00 to the former. Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to
MDAHI from the moment he received the said amount.

The Supreme Court teaches us that those in the legal profession must always conduct
themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath
to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These
mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship.

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is disbarred from the practice of law and his name stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.
6.) Case Title: Cortez vs. Atty. Cortes, A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018
Complainant: Eugenio E. Cortez
Respondent: Atty. Hernando P. Cortes

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC) in which they won. They had a
handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees.

PEC was ordered to pay complainant the total amount of One million One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱1,100,000) in three staggered payments. PEC then issued checks all payable in the
name of complainant, as payment.

Complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount of the initial check
deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off the
transaction claiming that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees.

Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay ₱200,000, and
when Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty.
Cortes still insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the
second and third checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of
the first check. Complainant was able to cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes
before he was able to encash the same.

In his answer, Atty. Cortes, admitted that his services were engaged by complainant to pursue
the labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of
attorney's fees. He insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction
of complainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing
arrangement is not unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option to hire
other lawyers, but still he engaged his services.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of Atty. Cortes, which
would subject him to disciplinary action.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in the case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez “A contingent fee
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but
must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed upon by the
parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit
or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this
nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to
pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent
fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement
is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and
have their rights vindicated.”

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon III, Sec. 40, CPRA) states that "A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 (Canon III, Sec. 41, CPRA) of the
same canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his
fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

The Supreme Court believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes
was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The SC has
held that lawyering is not a money-making venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.
7.) Case Title: Ong Bun vs. BPI, G.R. No. 212362, March 14, 2018
Petitioner: Jose T. Ong Bun
Respondent: Bank of the Philippine Islands

FACTS:
In 1989, Ma. Lourdes Ong, the wife of petitioner, purchased the following three (3) silver
custodian certificates (CC) in the Spouses' name from the Far East Bank & Trust Company
(FEBTC). The total value of CCs was Php750,000.00. Thereafter, FEBTC merged with BPI after
about eleven years since the said CCs were purchased. After the death of Ma. Lourdes Ong in
December 2002, petitioner discovered that the three CCs bought from FEBTC were still in the
safety vault of his deceased wife and were not surrendered to FEBTC. As such, petitioner sent a
letter to BPI, to advise him on the procedure for the claim of the said certificates. BPI replied to
petitioner and informed the latter that upon its merger with FEBTC in 2000, there were no
Silver Certificates of Deposit outstanding, which meant that the certificates were fully paid on
their respective participation's maturity dates which did not go beyond 1991. There were
further exchanges of written communications between the parties but the latter still refused to
pay petitioner's claim. Thus, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, made a final demand in
writing for the payment of the certificates, to no avail.

After about three years from his discovery of the certificates, petitioner filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money and damages against BPI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
33, Iloilo City praying that BPI be ordered to pay him the amount for P750,000.00 for the three
CCs, legal interest, 175,000.00 for attorney's fees, P100,000.00 for moral
damages, and an unspecified amount for exemplary damages as well as cost of suit.

BPI, in its Answer, insists that as early as 1991, all the Silver Certificates of Deposits, including
those issued to petitioner and his wife, were already paid. It claimed that the CCs had terms of
only 25 months and that by the year 2000, when it merged with FEBTC and when the Trust and
Investments Group of FEBTC was no longer in existence, there were no longer any outstanding
CCs in its books. It also argued that petitioner filed his claim for the first time only on August 12,
2003, or 12 years after the maturity of the CCs and under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions
based on a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right accrues.

RTC of Iloilo City ruled in favour of the petitioner. BPI, elevate the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) which granted its appeal.

CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove that the deposits, which he claims to be unpaid, are still
outstanding. The CA further ruled that the surrender of the custodian certificates is not
required for the withdrawal of the certificates of deposits themselves or for the payment of the
Silver Certificates of Deposit, hence, even if the holder has in his possession the said custodian
certificates, this does not ipso facto mean that he is an unpaid depositor of the bank.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the BPI is obliged to pay Mr. Jose T. Ong Bun the value of the three (3) CCs.
2. Whether or not the award for Attorney’s fee should be granted.
RULING:
Yes. As to the first issue, BPI is obliged to pay Mr. Jose T. Ong Bun the value of the three (3) CCs.
The Supreme Court ruled that the said CCs are proof that Silver Certificates of Deposits are in
the custody of a custodian, which is, in this case, FEBTC. The CA therefore, erred in suggesting
that the possession of petitioner of the same CCs does not prove an outstanding deposit
because the latter are not the certificates of deposit themselves. What proves the deposits of
the petitioner are the Silver Certificates of Deposits that have been admitted by the Trust
Investments Group of the FEBTC to be in its custody as clearly shown by the wordings used in
the subject CCs.

As to the respondent’s argument that there were no longer any outstanding Silver Certificates
of Deposits, such argument does not prove that petitioner has already been paid or that his
deposits have already been returned. Likewise, there was no proof or evidence that petitioner
or his late wife withdrew the said Silver Certificates of Deposit. When the existence of a debt is
fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such defense to the claim of the
creditor. Even where it is the plaintiff who alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment. Verily, an obligation may be extinguished by payment. However, two requisites must
concur: (1) identity of the prestation, and (2) its integrity. The first means that the very thing
due must be delivered or released; and the second, that the prestation be fulfilled completely.
In this case, no acknowledgment nor proof of full payment was presented by respondent but
merely a pronouncement that there are no longer outstanding Silver Certificates of Deposits in
its books of accounts.

No. As to the second issue, the award of attorney's fees must be omitted. Supreme Court held
that an award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification to avoid speculation and conjecture surrounding the grant thereof. Due
to the special nature of the award of attorney's fees, a rigid standard is imposed on the courts
before these fees could be granted. Hence, it is imperative that they clearly and distinctly set
forth in their decisions the basis for the award thereof. It is not enough that they merely state
the amount of the grant in the dispositive portion of their decisions. It bears reiteration that the
award of attorney's fees is an exception rather than the general rule; thus, there must be
compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions provided under Article 2208 of
the Civil Code to justify the award. In this case, the RTC merely justified the grant of attorney's
fees on the reasoning that petitioner was forced to litigate. Thus, the present case does not fall
within the exception provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
8.) Case Title: Lopez vs. Atty. Ramos, A.C. 12081, November 24, 2020
Complainant: Alberto Lopez
Respondent: Atty. Rosendo C. Ramos

FACTS:
In the complaint-affidavit, Lopez alleged that on January 5, 2005, he was the vendee of a parcel
of land in Tondo, Manila. The property was originally covered under a Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (TCT) 143583 before the Register of Deeds of Manila, in Aurea Munar Masangkay's
name. He discovered that TCT 143583 had been cancelled, upon the issuance of TCT 184238 to
Placida Ronquillo (Ronquillo). According to Lopez, it was thru a forged deed of sale notarized by
the respondent, which enabled the regular issuance of a new title in Ronquillo's name.

A Falsification of Public Document was filed by Aurea Munar Masangkay before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 53, respondent was initially included as defendant (counsel
of Ronquillo), together with Ronquillo, and Benjamin M. Masangkay (Benjamin). The RTC
convicted Ronquillo. In the course of the proceedings, it was determined that there were two
(2) deeds of sale executed by, and for the benefit of, the same parties, and that these deeds
have identical registration, page and book numbers, in the notarial portion. In addition, the
respondent secretary, Consolacion de los Santos, testified that respondent prepared, notarized
and witnessed the execution of the two (2) deeds of sale covering the same property. Court of
Appeals (CA) acquitted Ronquillo due to insufficiency of evidence.

In Lopez's complaint-affidavit, he avers that respondent prepared two (2) deeds of sale; one for
₱130,000.00 and another for ₱30,000.00, with the purpose of helping the alleged seller
minimize the payment of taxes. At the time, a price of ₱30,000.00 would have exempted the
transaction from capital gains tax. Complainant argues that respondent was grossly negligent in
the performance of his duties as a notary public when the latter failed to exercise prudence in
ascertaining that the identity of the persons who signed the deeds before him were the same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that he prepared and notarized only one (1) Deed of
Sale dated January 26, 1989, with the amount of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱130,000.00) as consideration. Respondent argues that upon rigorous inspection of the deeds
of sale, it appears that only certified photocopies and not certified true copies of the said
documents were attached to the complaint-affidavit. Respondent argues in the allegation of
gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a notary public that this is a mere
speculation that has yet to be proven before a judicial tribunal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ramos should be held administratively liable for gross negligence in
violating Notarial Law, Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Otherwise, the notary public
would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. In this case, respondent was grossly
negligent in the performance of his duties as a notary public. First, respondent failed to
ascertain beforehand, the identity of the vendor, when he notarized the deeds of sale. Second,
the deed of sale which respondent prepared and notarized, was proved to have been falsified.

In Delos Santos testimony, respondent told her that he drafted and notarized another
instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale, in order to reduce the capital
gains tax due on the transaction. Respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful
statement in a public document for an unlawful purpose. Respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon
1 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 1 (Canon III, Sec. 1, CPRA) - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 (Canon II, Sec. 5, CPRA) - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

The act of notarization is imbued with substantive public interest wherein a private document is
converted into a public document, which results in the document's admissibility in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity.

Rule IV, Section 4(a) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits notaries public from
performing any notarial act for transactions that the notary knows or has good reason to
believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.
9.) Case Title: In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), A.M. 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommending to the Supreme Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues"
assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section
24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

The respondent argued that the provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. He further
questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to
the IBP.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.

The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar…
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and
his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to
the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

Thus, the Supreme Court found that respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be disbarred, and his
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
10.) Case Title: Zarcilla vs. Atty. Quezada Jr., A.C. 7186, March 18, 2018
Complainant: Romeo A. Zarcilla and Marita Bumanglag
Respondent: Atty. Jose C. Quesada Jr.

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and
Gloria Quezada and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale dated April 12, 2002 by making it
appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under
TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents were
already deceased since March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988 respectively. Said deed of sale was
notarized by the respondent.

Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on March 20, 2002, the
Spouses Quezada filed a petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy of
TCT No. 18490 where they presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already deceased parents,
the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners. Said Joint-Affidavit of the
Spouses Quezada was again notarized by the respondent lawyer.

Subsequently, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit claiming that she is the real owner of
the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag stated therein that
she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada and spouses Quesada; that she did
not have any criminal intent when she did the sale made it appear that Perfecto Zarcilla sold
the property to the said spouses.

In this admission, all other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his
counter-affidavit, were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence. Complainant indicted
Bumanglag for four counts of falsification but later withdraw said cases when he found out that
Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-affidavit when she signed the same;
and that Bumanglag was deceived by her co-accused including the respondent.

Atty. Quesada was required by the Court to file a comment on the complaint against him. Atty.
Quesada files a two (2) Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment due to voluminous
workload. The Court granted the motions. However, despite numerous resolutions was made
by the Court, Atty. Quesada still failed to comply with the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty.
Quesada must be competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed.
Such allegations should be first established and determine in appropriate proceedings, like in
civil or criminal cases. However, it is noted that Atty. Quesada violated the notarial law for his
act of notarizing the alleged falsified Deed of Sale and the Joint Affidavit of Complainant’s
deceased parents. Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the
necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public: (b) A person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document - (1) is
not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale
appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud when he certified in the acknowledgment
thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons who executed the
document. When he declared that such appeared before him and acknowledged to him that
the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the vendors were
already deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not merely
negligent. Thus, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer
when he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to
perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the
notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading
the function of notarization.

The Supreme Court also held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

In addition, the Supreme Court find more deplorable was his defiant stance against the Court as
demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his comment on the
complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines for Atty.
Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years.
Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time. Atty. Quesada's acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility.

Thus, Atty. Jose C. Quesada Jr. is hereby disbarred for being found guilty of gross misconduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in
the legal profession. Supreme Court likewise revoked his notarial commission.
11.) Case Title: Complaint of Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco against Justices Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy, Ramon Paul L. Hernando, and Carmelita Salandaan-Manahan, of the Court of
Appeals Cebu, IPI No. 14-222-CA-J, February 23, 2016

FACTS:
The complainant, who is the counsel for the petitioners in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 06984, claimed
that the respondent-Justices, through their resolution in the same case, appeared to be "trying
hard to find faults on the petition for review to justify its dismissal favorable to respondents
without reading the prayer of the said petition." The complainant's prayer was for the Court of
Appeals (CA) to "gives (sic) due course to the petition and that an order issue directing the
respondent secretary (of the DENR) to certify the record of DENR CASE No. 8859 to CA in order
to have the annexes of this petition authenticated and thereafter for review."

Justices Sempio Diy and Salandanan-Manahan filed a Joint Comment while Justice Hernando
filed separately.

Justices Sempio Diy and Salandanan-Manahan maintain that the outright dismissal of the
complainant's clients' petition for review. They contended that the dismissal is warranted and
supported by the Rules of Court and by jurisprudence. They further alleged that the charges
against them for violations of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 are utterly baseless and unwarranted; that, in dismissing the petition for review of the
complainant's clients, "gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct" or
"manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" cannot be imputed
against them; a judge or justice can only be held administratively liable if it can be shown that
he or she committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.

In a separate comment, Justice Hernando contends that the present administrative complaint is
baseless and vexatious and must be dismissed outright because the remedy for the
complainant's case is judicial, not administrative, in nature; that the filing of an administrative
complaint against a judge or justice is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is
available. Also, he argues that the complainant has no authority to file the present
administrative complaint, as he appears to be without any special power of attorney from his
clients for such purpose; and that the complainant's lack of authority reflects upon his utter
ignorance of the rules on representative parties and of the substantive law on Agency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint of Atty. Pefianco against the respondent has a legal and factual
merit.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that bare allegations of the complainant will not suffice to sustain
a claim of impartiality. The complainant carries the burden of proof to show that the conduct of
the judge, or the respondent-Justices in this case, was clearly indicative of arbitrariness and
prejudice before the questioned conduct could be stigmatized as biased and partial. The
evidence of bias or prejudice must be clear and convincing.
It is also important that the resulting order, resolution, or decision must have been rendered
based on an "extrajudicial source" in order for a claim of partiality to be upheld against the
judge or justices who issued the order, resolution, or decision. This rule is known in the United
States as the Extra-Judicial Source Rule, which means that "in order to be disqualifying, the
alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case."

In Gochan v. Gochan, the Supreme Court held that as long as decisions made and opinions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented, the conduct
observed by the magistrate, and the application of the law, such opinions - even if later found
to be erroneous - will not sustain a claim of personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.

In the present case, other than the complainant's accusation, SC find nothing in the
administrative complaint and in the records to sufficiently convince us that the respondent-
Justices were impartial in issuing their dismissal resolution.

Supreme Court also refer this case the Office of the Bar Confidant for proper investigation of
the complainant's alleged violation of his suspension from the practice of law as Justice
Hernando cited that many judges and justices in the Visayas Region have been at the receiving
end of baseless administrative suits from the complainant.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2012, in Administrative Case No. 6116, the Supreme Court
suspended the complainant for one (1) year from the practice of law for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, and Rule 1.01 (Canon II, Sec 1, CPRA) Canon 1 (Canon III, Sec. 1, CPRA) and Rule
9.02 Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless his suspension has been lifted
by this Court, the complainant remains to be suspended and is prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law. We have held that the lifting of suspension from the practice of law is not
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the decision; an order from the Court lifting the
suspension is necessary to enable the suspended lawyer to resume his or her legal practice.

Wherefore, the administrative complaint filed is hereby dismissed. Atty. Pefianco is required by
the Court to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar
Confidant to determine whether Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco has violated the terms and
conditions of his suspension from the practice of law which SC imposed upon him in a
resolution dated August 1, 2012, in Administrative Case No. 6116.
12.) Case Title: Ferguson vs. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 9209, April 18, 2017
Complainant: Nenita De Guzman Ferguson
Respondent: Atty. Salvador P. Ramos

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that in 2007 she purchased a house and lot located in San Rafael, Bulacan,
for the sum of ₱800,000.00. Without her knowledge, the seller obtained a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) mainly to transfer the title of the said property to her name.
However, the seller was unaware that the said CLOA was void ab initio as the subject land was
not an agricultural land and there existed a 10-year prohibition to transfer the subject land. In
2009, complainant instituted a petition for the cancellation of the CLOA before the DAR Office
where the defendants were represented by Atty. Ramos, who was the Chief Legal Officer of
DAR-Provincial Office in Bulacan. Complainant decided to withdrew the petition before the DAR
and filed the case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malolos City (RTC). Upon receipt
of the Answer, complainant found out that it was strikingly similar to the one filed by the
defendants in the DAR, which was prepared by Atty. Ramos. Complainant discovered that the
Deed of Sale, dated April 24, 2009, which became the basis of the transfer of title was
fraudulently altered as it only covered the sale of the land, not the house and lot, and the price
indicated was only ₱188,340.00, not the amount of ₱800,000.00 that she actually paid. Her
signature and her husband, Douglas Ferguson -(Douglas), were forged and the document was
notarized by Atty. Ramos.

In his Comment, Atty. Ramos denied that he represented the defendants in• the case before
the DAR but he admitted that he notarized their Answer. He likewise denied any participation
and countered that his signature as a notary public was forged in the aforementioned Deed of
Sale. Nonetheless, he admitted that he notarized the "genuine" Deed of Sale, dated May 12,
2009, executed between vendor Alfredo Inosanto, and vendees complainant and her spouse,
involving the same property for the amount of ₱300,000.00. He even alluded that the person
who benefited from such act could be the forger as the capital gains tax liability was reduced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Salvador P. Ramos is guilty of violating the Rule on Notarial Practice.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the
Notarial Law states that the acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is• his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal,
and if not, his certificate shall so state.

The importance of the affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b),
Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which specifically provides that: A person shall
not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The Supreme Court found that Douglas, one of the parties in the; deed of sale, was not in the
Philippines on May 12, 2009, the day the "genuine" deed of sale was notarized. Complainant
presented a copy of Douglas' passport indicating that he entered the Philippines only on May
26, 2001 and left on June 12, 2001. This substantially established that indeed Douglas could not
have personally appeared before Atty. Ramos when he notarized the deed. Moreover, an
examination of the April 24, 2009 and May 12, 2009 deeds of sale disclosed that both
documents bore the same document number, page number and book number of the notarial
registry of Atty. Ramos.

The Supreme Court further ruled that as a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Ramos
was mandated to exercise the function of his office and must observe with utmost care the
basic formalities of his office and requisites in the performance of his duties. When Atty. Ramos
affixed his signature and notarial seal on the deed of sale, he led us to believe that the parties
personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents thereof.
His conduct was fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents.
Certainly, Atty. Ramos failed to exercise the functions of the office and to comply with the
mandates of the law.

Thus, respondent lawyer Atty. Salvador P. Ramos was found guilty of violating the Rule on
Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01 (Canon II, Sec 1, CPRA) and Canon 1 (Canon III, Sec. 1, CPRA) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.