NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2024, AMITY UNIVERSITY JAIPUR

TEAM CODE:

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2024,

AMITY UNIVERSITY JAIPUR

Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICANA,
AT NEW ANSARA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No: _______ of 2024

IN THE MATTER OF

PRIYA MEHRA & ANR ……(APPELLANTS)

Versus

STATE OF TIAMAAR ……(RESPONDENT)

In response to the APPEAL filed u/s 374 of INSS Challenging the

conviction u/s 103(1) of INS

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SR. NO. CONTENTS PAGE NO.

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2

2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

3. LIST OF LAWS 4

4. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

5. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

6. ISSUES RAISED

7. STATEMENT OF FACTS

8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

9. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

10. PRAYER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

Hon’ble Honorable

Art. Article

AIR All India Reporter

& And

R.T.I Right to Information

B. A. Bail Application

Sec Section

SSC Supreme Court Cases

F.I.R First Information Report

Consti. Constitution

C.C Certified Copy

C. A. Charge Application

LIST OF LAWS

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STATUTES

The Constitution of Indicana, 1950

The Indicana Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)

The Indicana Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

The Indicanan Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

General Clauses Act, 1897

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

RESEARCH DATABASE
a) AIR ONLINE
b) SSC ONLINE
c) MANUPATRA
d) INDIAN KANOON
e) JUSTIA
f) PARLIAMENT UK

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BOOKS

“Principles of Criminal Law” by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

“Criminal Law: Cases and Materials” by K.D. Gaur

“Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law” by J.W.C. Turner

“The Law of Evidence” by M. Monir

“Law of Evidence” by Vepa P. Sarathi

“Phipson on Evidence” by Hodge Malek

Durga Das Basu’s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 3481

“Constitutional Law of India” by H.M. Seervai

“Code of Criminal Procedure” by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

“Circumstantial Evidence” by S.L. Phipson

“Principles of Circumstantial Evidence” by Avtar Singh

“Supreme Court on Criminal Law” by Surendra Malik

“Commentary on the Indian Evidence Act” by Sarkar

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

SR.NO. CASES CITED PAGE NO.

1. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda V. State of 12

Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116

2. Sukhbir Singh V. State of Haryana (2002) 12

3SCC 327

3. Ramanand V. State of Himachal Pradesh 13

(1981) 1 SCC 511

4. Jaharlal Das V. State of Orissa (1991) 3 SCC 13

27

5. Kishanpal V. State of U.P. (2008) 16 SCC 73 13

6. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan V. State of 13

Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681

7. Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy V. State of 13

Andhra Pradesh (2006) 153 SC

8. State of U.P. V. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 13

302

9. State of M.P. V. Sanjay Rai (2004) 10 SCC 130 13

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10. Joseph Kurian V. State of Kerala 1994 CriJ 2031 14

11. Nathuni Yadav V. State of Bihar 1996 AIR 1808, 14

SCC (3)

12. Govindarajau @ Govinda V. State (2012) 4 SCC 14

722

13. State of Rajasthan V. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 15

14. Bhim Singh V. State of Haryana (2002) 10 SCC 15

461

15. Palvinder Kaur V. State of Punjab (1953) SCR 94 15

16. Virendra Kumar V. State of Punjab (2016) 8 SCC 15

588

17. Keshoram Bora V. State of Assam (1992) Supp 15

(1) SCC 206

18. Mohd. Aman V. State of Rajasthan (1997) 10 15

SCC 44

19. K. M. Nanavati V. State of Maharashtra AIR 15 - 16

1962 SC 605

20. Bachan Singh V. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 16

684

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21. Virsa Singh V. State of Punjab (1958) AIR 465, 16

SCR 1495

22. State of Maharashtra V. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 16

23. Bhagat Ram V. State of Punjab (1954) SCR 708 16 - 17

24. Aloke Nath Dutta V. State of West Bengal 17

(2007)12 SCC 230

25. State of Tamil Nadu V. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253 18

26. Yash Pal Mittal V. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 18

540

27. State of Maharashtra V. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4

SCC 659

28. Ajay Aggarwal V. Union of India (1993) 3 SCC

609

29. Brajendrasingh V. State of Madhya Pradesh

(2012)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

For the sake of brevity of this hon’ble court, the Respondent humbly submits the following
Statement of Jurisdiction:

1. The State of Tiamaar, the respondent, respectfully contends that the apellants’
appeal under Article 134 lacks substance and does not justify the Hon’ble Supreme
Court’s intervention.

2. The respondent firmly rejects the appellants’ assertion that a significant legal or
procedural issue requires this Court’s review under Article 134 of the Constitution of
Indicana.

3. The appellants’ conviction are upheld as supported by substantial evidence. The

lower courts thoroughly evaluated the evidence, including factual findings, forensic
analysis, and witness testimony, and reached a verdict based on their comprehensive
examination.

4. The appellants' claim lacks any noteworthy legal question as outlined in Article 134
of the Indicana Constitution. The lower courts' decisions were based on a precise and
accurate interpretation of the relevant sections of the Indicanan Nyaya Sanhita (INS),
and the matters they addressed had both substantive and procedural aspects.

5. There is no evidence that supports the appellants' contention of miscarriage of

justice. There is no evidence that the appellants were deprived of any procedural
equity or legal protections throughout their trial or subsequent appeal, and both the
Trial and the Hon'ble High Court have strictly adhered to the law.

6. The respondent humbly argues that this Hon’ble Court's authority to intervene
under Article 134 of the Indicana Constitution is restricted to situations wherein there
is a significant question of law or other circumstances. The appellants fails to bring
forth any such arguments, and their appeal only aims to review matters already been
decided by the lower courts.

Therefore, in the light of above, it is humbly requested that this hon’ble court be pleased to:
i. Deny the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction;
ii. Uphold the Hon'ble High Court's verdict and conviction;
iii. Confirm the sentence imposed by the subordinate courts.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Shailja Singhania, a 23-year-old drama student, was found dead in her Apartment at
Ansara, a principal city in the State of Tiamaar, Indicana. Shailja was the stepdaughter
of Rajiv Singhania who was the proprietor of Arsha Hotel Chain, and Simran
Singhania, the head of Sunshine NGO. Despite of her family’s prominence, Shailja
had distanced herself from her family for the past five years.

2. Six months prior to her death, Shailja started receiving roses along with threatening
notes from an unknown stalker, greatly concerning her. One such disturbing message
read, “You would look good in red, whether you wear it or ooze it from your blood”.
Shailja revealed her fears to her roommates, Priya Mehra and Naina Mehra, who
disregarded her concerns as trivial jokes.

3. On June 30, 2024, Shailja rejected an invitation to a party organized by Naina’s friend
Raj. During, the party Raj overheard telephonic conversation between Priya and
Tanmay, in which he had just broke up with Priya in accordance to pursue future with
Shailja. He heard Priya’s threatening words, “I will not let her get away with it”.

4. After that evening, although Shailja distanced herself from her family, she contacted
her stepfather, Rajiv Singhania to inform him about her fears. This call led to a bitter
argument with her family years ago. Alerted, Rajiv instantly traveled all the way to
Ansara, only to find Shailja’s lifeless body on his arrival.

5. The police investigation discovered Shailja’s diary which revealed her fears which
included her frequent arguments with Priya related to Tanmay, her anxiety regarding
allegations of her family involving in human trafficking via Aarsha’s Hotel and
Sunshine NGO.

6. Priya’s car was seen in the CCTV footage outside Shailja’s apartment on the night of
her murder. Naina’s hair was found near Shailja’s bed where her dead body was
found. The forensic team discovered five sets of fingerprints on Shailja’s laptop,
amongst which two belonged to her roommates and one to Shailja herself. Also, a
knife was discovered from a flowerpot in Shailja’s apartment, carrying traces of her
blood and fingerprints of her roommates, Priya and Naina.

7. The Hon’ble Trial Court convicted Priya u/s 103(1) INS (Murder) and Naina
u/s 3(5) INS (Common Intention), u/s 61(2)(a) INS (Criminal Conspiracy), u/s 238
INS (Disappearance of Evidence) and u/s 351 (Criminal Intimidation). The
convictions were rightly upheld by the Hon’ble High Court.

8. The Appellants’ being dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision, filed an appeal
before this hon’ble Supreme Court of Indicana, seeking their convictions to overturn
and assert their innocence.

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ISSUES RAISED

I. Whether Priya can be held liable under section 103(1) of INS?

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Naina’s guilt for conspiracy, aiding
in the crime, and tampering with evidence as per the relevant sections of the
Indicana Nyaya Sanhita (INS)?

III. Whether trial court have conducted fair trial by ignoring the
absence of Raichand?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. Whether Priya can be held liable under section 103(1) of INS?

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. Whether Priya can be held liable under section 103(1) of INS?

Yes, Priya Mehra can be held liable u/s 103(1) of INS which provides punishment for
murder which is considered as intentionally and purposefully causing of death.
The respondent humbly submits that Priya Mehra’s conduct, as supported by the
evidence, meets the standard for intentional murder within this section.

 It is humbly submitted that motive is a crucial element in proving intent to

commit murder. In the present case, evidence uncovers Priya’s deep-rooted
envy and malice towards Shailja due to Tanmay’s decision to break all his ties
with Priya and pursue future with Shailja. Moreover, witness testimony
demonstrates that Priya expressed her rage and intent to harm Shailja during
her telephonic conversation with Tanmay at Raj’s party (Naina’s friend).
She was overheard making the statement that “I will not her get away with it”.
This statement clearly depicts the deteriorating relationship between Priya and
Shailja which leads to establishment of motive of her murder.

 It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Trial Court and the Hon’ble High Court
rightly relied upon the circumstantial evidence to establish Priya’s guilt.
In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda V. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 1,
this Hon’ble Court lays down the principles for relying on circumstantial
evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that chain of circumstantial evidence must
be complete leaving no room for any hypothesis other than the unequivocal
guilt of the accused. In the present case, the circumstantial evidence against
Priya viz. CCTV footage wherein Priya’s car outside Shailja’s apartment on
the night of the murder, fingerprints obtained by the forensic analysis on
Shailja’s laptop and murder weapon (the knife), and Priya’s car returned at
Aarsha Hotel at 3 AM, creates a complete chain establishing her guilt.

 It is also submitted that Priya’s act of concealing the crime further supports her
intent to murder Shailja. Priya’s involvement in cleaning up the crime scene,
as evidenced by presence of her fingerprints on Shailja’s laptop while wiping
it and the murder weapon (knife). This conduct of Priya clearly demonstrates
her mens rea (intent) which his requisite for murder. In Sukhbir Singh V.
State of Haryana [(2002) 3 SCC 327]2, the Hon’ble Court noted that attempts
to destroy the evidence post-offenses can strengthen the interference of guilt
and intent.

1
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
2
Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 327

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 It is further submitted that both the Hon’ble trial Court and the Hon’ble High
Court have thoroughly examined the evidence and delivered the verdict that
Priya is guilty of murder u/s 103(1) INS. The findings of the lower courts are
based on a detailed evaluation of facts, forensic evidence, and witness
testimony, all of which together confirms that Priya had mens rea to kill
Shailja.

 In Ramanand V. State of Himachal Pradesh [(1981) 1 SCC 511] 3, this

Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that when two courts below have
concurrently convicted an evidence, interference by appellant courts should be
rare. In the present matter, the conviction is backed up by overwhelming
evidence, and Priya’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

 It is humbly submitted that the time of death as revealed by the autopsy report,
co-occurs with the period during which Priya’s car was spotted outside the
apartment. This fact indicates Priya’s presence during Shailja’s murder and her
involvement in the crime. In Jaharlal Das V. State of Orissa [(1991) 3 SCC
27]4, it was held that forensic evidence can provide conclusive proof when it
clearly places the accused at the crime scene.

 In Kishanpal V. State of U.P. [(2008) 16 SCC 73] 5, the court highlighted that
when motive is clear, it strengthens the case of premediated murder. In the
present case, Priya’s jealousy- driven threats towards Shailja, evidenced by the
overheard telephonic call establishes her intent and makes her liable for
conviction u/s 103(1) INS.

 It is also submitted that the principle Res Ipsa Loquitur is applicable in the
present case wherein the facts are so obvious that they speak for themselves
and affirms the defendant’s guilt without the need for further explanation.
In the present case, the circumstantial evidence, such as the CCTV footage,
presence of her fingerprints on the murder weapon and her presence at the
crime scene, speaks for itself.

 It is further submitted that Priya failed to provide a credible alibi during the
time of Shailja’s death supports the prosecution’s case. As she failed to explain
her whereabouts which is combined with the circumstantial evidence, creates a
ground for her involvement in the crime. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan V. State
of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 6, the court established that when the
accused is the last person seen with the victim, the burden shifts to the accused
to explain their absence and prove their innocence.

3
Ramanand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCC 511
4
Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 27
5
Kishanpal v. State of U.P., (2008) 16 SCC 73
6
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681

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 Moreover, the legal principle, Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus, which

holds that if a witness is found to be false in one part of their testimony can be
discarded. In the present case, Priya failed to provide a credible alibi, he lack
of explanation about her whereabouts shows her dishonesty which weakens
her case.

 It is submitted that Priya’s inability to provide any alternative explanation for

astounding evidence against her. The principle of last seen theory as observed
in Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 7,
states that when an accused is last seen with the victim and fails to provide a
reasonable explanation, the presumption of guilt is strengthened.

 Moreover, the legal principle Audi Alteram Partem, emphasizes the right to a
fair hearing and the need to hear both the sides before delivering a judgment.
Priya has been given all the opportunities to prove her innocence, including
providing an alibi, but she failed to offer a plausible defense. The principle of
fairness has been given preference throughout her trial.

 In State of U.P. V. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 302 8, it was held that the
circumstantial evidence must be so concrete that raises no benefit of doubt. In
the present case, the CCTV footage, forensic analysis and witness testimonies
including overhearing of threatening telephonic conversation between Tanmay
and Priya establishes a strong and consistent guilt of Priya.

 It is also submitted that Priya’s conduct post-crime, including leaving the

crime scene in the early morning and removal of certain items, demonstrates
that she was fully aware of her act and was attempting to cover her misdeeds.
The premediated nature of Priya’s conduct arising from sheer jealousy and
anger, affirms her intent, a crucial element u/s 103(1) INS as held in
State of M.P. V. Sanjay Rai [(2004) 10 SCC 130]9.

 It is further submitted that Priya evaded law enforcement and flee from the
crime scene after Shailja’s murder which establishes guilt upon her.
In Joseph Kurian V. State of Kerala (1994)10, it was held that attempts to flee
or evade the law enforcement authorities depicts establishment of guilt, which
further weakens Priya’s case.

 It is humbly submitted that Priya’s emotional outburst, due to Tanmay ending

his relationship with her to pursue his future with Shailja, serves as the
emotional trigger for the murder. Courts have consistently acknowledged that
motive plays a crucial role in providing insight into the accused’s state of mind
and helps to establish mens rea. In Nathuni Yadav V. State of Bihar (1996)11,
7
Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 172
8
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302
9
State of M.P. v. Sanjay Rai, (2004) 10 SCC 130
10
Joseph Kurian v. State of Kerala, (1994) 6 SCC 535
11
Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 4 SCC 124

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this Hon’ble Court held that a strong motive, when supported by other
evidence, can be decisive in proving guilt.

 In the case Govindaraju @ Govinda V. State (2014) 12, this hon’ble Supreme
Court held that appellate courts should generally defer to the actual findings of
lower courts unless there is a manifest error. Since both the Trial Court and
High Court found Priya guilty based on a detailed examination of evidences
presented before them, this principle supports upholding the conviction of
Priya.

 In State of Rajasthan V. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 13, this hon’ble court held
that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, every link must be proven, and
the cumulative effect of these links must lead to the guilt of the accused. The
circumstantial evidence against Priya, including her threats, presence at the
crime scene, and forensic links, meets this standard.

 In Bhim Singh V. State of Haryana (2002) 10 SCC 461 14, this hon’ble
Supreme Court underscored that strong suspicion or motive alone is not
enough—there must be corroborative evidence. In Priya’s case, the
prosecution has provided not only a clear motive but also strong corroborative
evidence (CCTV footage, fingerprints, and witness testimonies).

 In Palvinder Kaur V. State of Punjab (1953) SCR 9415, This case underscores
that the prosecution must conclusively prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and cannot rely on inferences. The prosecution in Priya’s case has provided a
complete set of circumstantial evidence, leaving no room for inference or
doubt about her guilt.

 It is also submitted that Priya’s conduct both before and after the crime, shows
a pattern of upsurge violence and obsession. This trajectory matches with the
psychological framework of escalation theory, where the accused’s actions,
beginning with the verbal threats, later intensifies into actual physical harm.
In Virendra Kumar V. State of Punjab (2016) 16, the court held that the
accused’s prolonged anger and resentment towards the victim contributed in
establishing the mens rea which is a necessary element for a murder
conviction.

 It is humbly submitted that Courts in similar cases have frequently relied upon
the pre-offense statements to establish mens rea, such as in Keshoram Bora V.
State of Assam (1992)17, where verbal threats immediately before the murder
were seen as evidence of a deliberate plan to commit the crime.
12
Govindaraju @ Govinda v. State, (2014) 1 SCC 140
13
State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, (1999) 3 SCC 507
14
Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461
15
Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1953) SCR 94
16
Virendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2016) 1 SCC 243
17
Keshoram Bora v. State of Assam, (1992) 1 GLR 109

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 It is also submitted that under criminal law, the discovery of an accused’s

fingerprints on a weapon used in a killing is often considered as prima facie
evidence of their involvement. In Mohd. Aman v. State of Rajasthan (1997)18,
forensic evidence connecting the accused to the murder weapon was held to be
a key factor in affirming the conviction.

 It is submitted that, in cases of murder, the defense often attempts to argue that
the killing was the result of a sudden provocation, thereby reducing the
accused’s liability from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder
(i.e., under a lesser charge). In Priya’s case, however, there is no evidence of
provocation that could justify or explain her actions. On the contrary, the
prolonged animosity and premeditation leading up to the killing negate the
possibility of sudden provocation. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra
(1962)19, the court held that for the defense of sudden provocation to apply, the
act of killing must be an immediate and spontaneous response to provocation.
In Priya’s case, her prior threats and the cumulative manner in which the crime
was executed (i.e., planning, bringing the weapon, and ensuring that there
were no witnesses) show a well-thought-out plan to murder Shailja, rather than
an act of passion or impulse.

 It is further submitted that Priya cannot claim the defense of self-defense, as

no evidence suggests that Shailja posed any threat to her. The crime scene and
the forensic evidence do not indicate any struggle that might suggest that Priya
was acting to protect herself from imminent harm. The burden of proving self-
defense lies on the accused, and in this case, Priya has failed to provide any
credible narrative that would support such a claim.
In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)20, the court laid down that self-
defense as a justification for homicide requires evidence that the accused had a
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous harm. Given the overwhelming
evidence against Priya, including her previous threats, motive, and the nature
of the crime, the possibility of self-defense is highly implausible.

 It is submitted that the nature of the weapon used in the crime—a knife—also
points to intentional murder. The selection of a lethal weapon such as a knife,
particularly when used in a premeditated manner, strengthens the argument for
Priya’s intention to kill. The forensic report indicated that Shailja suffered
multiple stab wounds, which shows that Priya’s attack was not just a spur-of-
the-moment action but a sustained and deliberate attempt to inflict fatal
injuries. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958) 21, the court held that when
the accused inflicts injuries that are severe and intended to cause death, the act
qualifies as murder, provided that the accused had knowledge that the injuries
would likely cause death. Priya’s repeated use of the knife and the location and
18
Mohd. Aman v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 3 SCC 159
19
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, (1962) AIR 1962 SC 605
20
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684
21
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) AIR 1958 SC 465

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nature of the injuries inflicted indicate that her actions were clearly designed
to result in Shailja’s death. This use of a lethal weapon in a targeted manner
satisfies the requirement of mens rea u/s 103(1) INS.

 It is further submitted that Priya’s post-crime behavior also demonstrates a

lack of remorse, further supporting the prosecution’s argument that she acted
with full intent to kill. Instead of turning herself in or showing any sign of
regret, Priya attempted to conceal her involvement by cleaning the crime scene
and leaving Shailja’s apartment in the early hours of the morning. Courts often
consider the conduct of the accused after the crime as an indicator of guilt. In
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000)22, the court held that actions such as
fleeing the scene, tampering with evidence, or attempting to mislead
investigators can be interpreted as consciousness of guilt, which further
solidifies the prosecution’s case.

 In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (1954) SCR 708 23, this case reinforced the
principle that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but if circumstantial evidence forms a complete chain and
rules out any other hypothesis, it is sufficient for conviction. Priya’s case fits
within this principle as the prosecution’s evidence leaves no room for doubt.

 In Aloke Nath Dutta V. State of West Bengal (2007) 12 SCC 230 24, the court
reaffirmed that circumstantial evidence must be carefully evaluated and every
reasonable possibility of innocence must be ruled out. The totality of the
evidence in Priya’s case points out only to her involvement in the murder.

 It is submitted that both the Hon’ble Trial Court and the Hon’ble High Courts
found that Priya’s actions meets the standards for committing the crime of
murder u/s 103(1) INS and no such error exists to justify the overturn of her
conviction.

Therefore, in the light of the above arguments advanced, legal principles, and overwhelming
evidence, including Priya's motive, the circumstantial and forensic evidence linking her
directly to the crime scene, her prior threats and malice toward the victim, and the absence of
any credible defense or justification, it is clear that Priya's actions meet the legal requirements
for liability under Section 103(1) of the Indicana Nyaya Sanhita (INS). The prosecution has
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Priya acted with intent and premeditation,
fulfilling the criteria for murder as defined under this provision. As both the Trial Court and
the Hon’ble High Court have correctly found, Priya is fully liable for the offense of murder,

22
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471
23
Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, (1954) SCR 708
24
Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230

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and her conviction should be upheld. The chain of evidence, along with legal precedents and
principles, conclusively points to her guilt, leaving no room for reasonable doubt.
There is no legal or factual grounds for interference and appeal should be set aside and
conviction of Priya u/s 103(1) INS should be upheld by this Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Naina’s guilt for conspiracy, aiding
in the crime, and tampering with evidence as per the relevant sections of the
Indicana Nyaya Sanhita (INS)?

Yes, the evidences presented were sufficient to prove Naina’s guilt for conspiracy,
aiding in the crime, and tampering with evidence u/s 61(2)(a) INS for Criminal
Conspiracy, u/s 3(5) INS for Common Intention, u/s 238 INS for Tampering with
evidence, and u/s 351 INS for Criminal Intimidation.

The respondent most respectfully asserts that Naina should be held liable u/s 61(2)(a)
INS for Criminal Conspiracy. The definition of Criminal Conspiracy u/s 61(2)(a) is
reproduced herein below;

2. Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy,

(a) to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous
imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is
made in this Sanhita for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same
manner as if he had abetted such offence;

 It is humbly submitted that Naina’s involvement in a conspiracy with Priya is

clearly established. Witness testimony uncovers that Naina was present when
Priya made threatening statements against Shailja, including: “I will not let her
get away with it.” Naina was overheard consoling Priya and supporting her
decision, stating, “Whatever you decide, I will be by your side.” This
statement indicates that Naina was aware of Priya’s intentions and conspired
with her to harm Shailja. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC
25325, it was held that conspiracy can be established through circumstantial
evidence and need not be demonstrated through direct evidence. The
conspiracy in this case is clearly implied by Naina’s close relationship with
Priya, her knowledge of Priya’s threats, and her willingness to support her.

 It is humbly submitted that the CCTV footage and call records further
corroborate that Naina was present at the crime scene, supporting Priya’s
actions. The circumstantial evidence shows that she actively participated in
concealing Priya’s plan, thereby contributing to the conspiracy. In Yash Pal
Mittal v. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 540 26, this hon’ble Supreme Court
held that once the act of conspiracy is established, all conspirators are liable
for the acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

 It is further submitted that Naina actively participated in a conspiracy to

commit the crime. Evidence points out that Naina maintained regular
communication with the principal accused i.e. Priya, before the crime was
committed. The pattern of these communications, particularly those occurring
close to the time of the crime, reveals that Naina was aware of and possibly

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coordinated the events leading to the commission of the offense. Naina's

actions went beyond mere association. By providing noticeable support or
aiding the principal accused in the planning or execution of the crime, Naina
clearly acted with criminal intent. Her participation in the conspiracy meets
the requirement of mens rea, as set out in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath
Thapa (1996)27, which held that knowledge of and agreement to commit a
crime makes a person culpable for conspiracy, even if they did not commit the
crime directly.

 It is further submitted that both mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty
act) are essential elements in criminal law. The respondent argues that Naina
had:
a) Guilty Mind (Mens Rea): By knowingly participating in the
conspiracy, aiding in the crime, and tampering with evidence, Naina
demonstrated clear intent to facilitate and shield the perpetrators from
justice.
b) Guilty Act (Actus Reus): Her actions, particularly her involvement in
planning, aiding, and tampering with evidence, fulfill the actus reus
component required for conviction under Section 61(2)(a).

The principle of “ignorantia juris non excusat” (ignorance of the law is no

excuse) further applies, as Naina cannot claim lack of knowledge regarding
the illegality of her actions, particularly when they were aimed at obstructing
justice.

 It is humbly submitted that conspiracy involves an agreement between two or

more persons to commit an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to achieve
a lawful end. Naina’s involvement in planning or facilitating the crime would
satisfy this condition. The doctrine of common purpose applies when co-
conspirators are all responsible for actions taken to further the conspiracy,
even if they did not directly participate in every aspect of the crime. "In jure
non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur" – In law, it is not the remote
cause but the proximate cause that is looked at.

 In Ajay Aggarwal V. Union of India (1993)28, this case underscored that

mere agreement to a conspiracy is sufficient proof to impose liability, even
when the accused was not directly involved in the final commission of the
crime. In the present case, Naina’s involvement and intent in the conspiracy
rather than her physical or direct involvement in execution of the crime,
makes her liable u/s 61(2)(a) INS.

 In Brajendrasingh V. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 29, the reliance on

circumstantial evidence in conspiracy cases was, with the court affirming that
a continuous chain of events leading to accused’s involvement establishes
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case, Naina’s involvement in

aiding the crime or tampering the evidence can be inferred from the
circumstantial evidence, forming continuous chain of events which connects
Naina to the conspiracy beyond the reasonable doubt.

 It is also submitted that courts have held that active participation in any stage
of a crime, including the preparatory or concealment stages, is sufficient to
establish guilt. In State (NCT of Delhi) V. Navjot Sandhu (2005) (the
Parliament attack case)30, this hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that those
who provide logistical support or assist in covering up the crime can be
convicted for conspiracy, even if they didn’t directly commit the crime. In the
present case, Naina’s actions facilitated the crime or helped the co-
conspirators evade detection, this is sufficient to establish her guilt under u/s
61(2)(a).

 It is further submitted that the doctrine of vicarious liability applies in

criminal conspiracy cases, making all the participants liable for the conduct
of the group. Under section 189 of INS (earlier 120B of IPC), which parallels
61(2)(a) INS, once a conspiracy is established, each conspirator is liable for
acts committed in furtherance of conspiracy, even if they are not directly
linked with the final commission of the crime.

 It is humbly submitted that the legal maxim In pari delicto, holds that when
two parties are equally at fault in a wrongdoing or an unlawful act, neither
can claim innocence. In Naina’s case, her involvement in planning the
murder of Shailja makes her equally culpable with the others under the
conspiracy charge, even though she wasn’t directly linked to the crime. This
maxim makes Naina equally liable for her role in conspiracy for murder u/s
61(2)(a).

 It is also submitted that the legal term Res gestae, which refers to acts or
declarations that are part of the events in question, often considered as
evidence that is a same transaction as the crime. In the present case, Naina’s
statement i.e. “Whatever you decide, I will be by your side”, clearly shows
her involvement in the conspiracy of Shailja’s murder which is a part of the
res gestae and establish her guilt.

 It is humbly submitted that the legal principle Qui facit per alium facit per
se which asserts that if a person directs or participates in a crime by another’s
hand is considered equally liable for that crime. In the Naina’s case although
she may not have directly committed the murder, but her participation in the
conspiracy makes her as culpable as the person who physically carried out
the act.

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Therefore, in light of the above arguments and evidence, Naina’s involvement in the
conspiracy and her actions in furtherance of the criminal plot make her liable under Section
61(2)(a) of the INS. Her participation, even if indirect, clearly aligns with the principles of
vicarious liability. The respondent respectfully submits that Naina's conviction under this
section should be upheld, and the appeal dismissed.
The respondent further respectfully submits that evidences presented were sufficient to
establish Naina’s guilt u/s 3(5) INS for Common Intention. For the sake of brevity of this
hon’ble court, the definition of 3(5) of INS is reproduced herein below;

(5) When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone.

 It is humbly submitted that u/s 3(5) of the INS liability of individuals

establishes who aid, abet, or conspire in the commission of an offense. Under
this section, liability is extended to those who knowingly participate in or
support the commission of the crime, even if their role is indirect or ancillary.
The prosecution's case against Naina hinges on the assertion that she
conspired to commit the offense, and that her actions contributed materially to
the execution of the criminal act. This section ensures that all parties to a
criminal enterprise, not just the principal offender, are held equally
accountable.

 It is also submitted that in accordance to prove Naina’s guilt u/s 3(5) INS, the
crucial element to commit a crime, i.e. mens rea (criminal intent) is present in
her participation in Shailja’s murder. Naina’s consolation to Priya and giving
her assurance to be in her support of whatever she decides to do with Shailja
clearly indicates that she had clear knowledge of Priya’s intentions and the
later crime that took place.

 Furthermore, it is submitted that even though Naina did not physically

participated in the commission of the crime, her constructive knowledge of the
conspiracy makes her liable u/s 3(5) for acting with common intention with
Priya to carry out Shailja’s murder. The concept of willful blindness, applies
when someone willfully or deliberately avoids to confirm the details of the
criminal plan they are aware of. In Naina’s case, she had full knowledge of the
crime and willfully consented for the conspiracy of Shailja’s murder, her
deliberate ignorance to stop Priya and choosing not to withdraw from the
conspiracy clearly shows her willful blindness. In United States V. Jewell
(1976)31 and R. V. Vincet, courts have affirmed that deliberate ignorance of
facts can establish the necessary mens rea for the commission of the crime.

 It is further submitted that the legal maxim Ignorantia juris non excusat,
applies in the present case as Naina asserts that she did not fully had the
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knowledge of legal consequences of her actions, this maxim affirms that

ignorance of the law does not absolve her of responsibility u/s 3(5) INS. In
Harbhajan Singh V. State of Punjab (1996)32, the court held that deliberate
ignorance of criminal plan does not absolve one of liability.

 Furthermore, it is submitted that Naina’s involvement in conspiracy is not only

limited to remote planning. Evidences, such as, her hair near the bed where
Shailja’s body was found, fingerprints on Shailja’s laptop and the murder
weapon, i.e. knife, and her consoling words to Priya, “Whatever you decide, I
will be by your side”, indicates her proximity in assisting the principal
offender. Courts have consistently held that even indirect actions contributing
to the success of the crime can impose liability under conspiracy laws,
including Section 3(5) INS.

 In State of Gujarat V. Mohanlal Jitamaji Porwal (1987)33, the courts upheld

that individuals who play supportive roles in the background are considered
equally culpable in the crime, depending on the weight of the assistance.

 In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon V. State of Maharashtra (2013)34, related to

the 1993 Mumbai blasts, this hon’ble Supreme Court held that conspiracy
liability extends to all the participants, regardless of the scale of their
involvement. The case underscored that even indirect participation or minor
roles in furthering the conspiracy can result in liability. In the present case,
Naina’s role whether significant or not, still makes her liable u/s 3(5) INS as it
contributed to the crime’s objective.

 In R.K. Dalmia V. Delhi Administration (1962) 35, the court emphasized that
the existence of a conspiracy can be inferred from the actions of the
conspirators and does not necessarily require a direct, formal agreement.
Participation in a series of acts leading to a common unlawful goal is
sufficient. In Naina’s case, her actions were part of a sequence of events that
supported the conspiracy’s criminal objective, she could be held liable even if
no formal agreement is proven.

 It is also submitted that the legal principle Dolus directus, which refers to an
individuals intent to bring about a specific outcome. Naina’s involvement in
planning and aiding the conspiracy indicates her direct intent to carry out
Shailja’s murder.

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Therefore, in the light of the above arguments, the respondent humbly asserts that it is evident
that Naina’s actions and involvement align with the essential elements of Section 3(5) of the
Indicana Nyaya Sanhita (INS). Through her participation in the conspiracy, regardless of the
degree of direct involvement, she actively contributed to the criminal enterprise. The
evidence demonstrates that Naina had knowledge of the conspiracy, aided its furtherance,
and, through willful blindness and tacit approval, supported the commission of the offense.
The legal precedents and facts presented conclusively establish her liability under Section
3(5), warranting that the conviction should be upheld, and the appeal set aside.
The respondent also asserts that Naina’s conviction should be upheld u/s 238 INS for
disappearance of the evidence related to the murder of Shailja Singhania. For the sake of
brevity of this hon’ble court, the definition of Disappearance of evidence u/s 238 INS is
reproduced herein below;

the act of causing evidence to disappear or providing false information to shield an

offender from punishment as an offense. The penalties for this offense vary depending on the
severity of the underlying offense.

 It is humbly submitted that Section 238 of the INS penalizes individuals for
tampering, disappearing, concealing, or destroying evidence with intent to
shield or protect themselves or others from the criminal liability. The motive of
this section is to ensure that justice is served by preventing individuals from
obstructing an investigation or a trial by interfering with material evidence. In
the present case, Naina's involvement in attempting to dispose of the murder
weapon squarely falls under this provision.

 It is further submitted that, forensic analysis has conclusively revealed that

Naina's fingerprints were found on the murder weapon, i.e., a knife, buried in a
flowerpot in the apartment. The presence of her fingerprints suggests that she
handled the weapon after the murder, likely attempting to hide it, as evidenced
by its concealed location.

 Furthermore, it is submitted that on the night of Shailja's murder, CCTV footage

captured Priya's car near the crime scene, and evidence suggests Naina was
present during the period in which the murder took place. This raises strong
suspicion that Naina assisted in hiding the weapon after Shailja’s death. Her
proximity to both the crime scene and the weapon strengthens the suspicion that
she had a role in attempting to conceal the evidence.

 It is further submitted that, Naina had expressed support for Priya during her
confrontation with Shailja, as demonstrated by her comment, "Whatever you
decide, I will be by your side." This not only shows solidarity but also hints at a
possible common intention to act in Priya’s favor, which extended to concealing
evidence of the crime.

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 It is also submitted that the legal term In flagrante delicto (Caught in the act)
can be used to highlight the fact that Naina’s fingerprints on the murder weapon
essentially place her in the act of hiding or tampering with it. This supports the
assertion that she was caught in the process of concealing evidence. In Jagdish
Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 954 36, this case, the Supreme Court
of India dealt with the issue of concealment of evidence. The accused was found
guilty of tampering with crucial evidence in a murder case by hiding the weapon
used in the crime. The Court held that the act of concealing a weapon amounted
to an obstruction of justice, as it prevented the proper course of investigation.
The Court emphasized that any attempt to hide or destroy evidence relevant to a
crime is an offense, punishable under relevant criminal statutes. This case
directly supports the argument that Naina’s act of concealing the murder weapon
(the knife) should hold her liable under Section 238 INS.

 It is further submitted that criminal liability establishes under Section 238, as

Naina had the requisite intent to conceal evidence. The fact that the murder
weapon was buried in a deliberate attempt to prevent its discovery is strong
circumstantial evidence of such intent. Naina, being aware of the gravity of the
situation and her connection to Priya, had every reason to assist in covering up
the crime to shield both herself and Priya from culpability.

 In Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2007) 4 SCC 266 37, the accused was
involved in the destruction of evidence related to a murder. The court held that
under Indian Penal Code (IPC) provisions, concealing evidence with an
intention to prevent its discovery or to shield the actual perpetrator of a crime
constituted a punishable offense. The court stressed that even if the accused did
not directly participate in the murder, their involvement in disposing of or hiding
evidence still rendered them liable for criminal conspiracy and destruction of
evidence. This precedent aligns with Naina’s case, where even if she was not the
direct perpetrator of the murder, her role in attempting to hide the murder
weapon makes her liable under Section 238 INS.

 Furthermore, the legal maxim, Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi (Suppression of

the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of falsehood) supports the idea that by
concealing the murder weapon, Naina was effectively suppressing the truth and
obstructing the investigation. Her act of hiding the knife misled investigators,
which can be considered equivalent to lying.

 In V. K. Mishra & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., (2015) 9 SCC 588 38,
this hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the concept of tampering with evidence
and obstruction of justice. The court reiterated that anyone involved in
tampering or altering evidence with the intent to obstruct the investigation or
trial can be held criminally liable. The court held that such actions impair the
pursuit of justice and cannot be condoned. This case supports the notion that
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Naina’s actions in hiding the knife amounted to deliberate tampering with

evidence, intending to obstruct the investigation of Shailja’s murder.

 It is also submitted that the legal maxim Volenti non fit injuria (To one who is
willing, no harm is done), applies in Naina’s case as she willfully concealed the
evidence which makes her unfit to claim innocence or ignorance of the
consequences of her actions. Her voluntary actions should hold her accountable
under the law.

 It is humbly submitted that the fact that the knife was found hidden and bore her
fingerprints strongly implicates her in the concealment of evidence. Any
tampering or disruption of this chain is a strong indicator of intent to obstruct
justice. The forensic evidence clearly places Naina at the crime scene and links
her directly to the act of hiding the knife. Forensic reports that indicate her
fingerprints were on the weapon, despite the weapon being hidden in a
deliberate manner, show that Naina’s involvement was not incidental but
intentional.

 Furthermore, Naina’s relationship with Priya, as described in the facts of the

case, suggests loyalty and a motive to assist her. This provides a plausible
reason for Naina’s actions. Naina’s loyalty led her to help Priya cover up the
crime, thereby concealing the weapon to prevent Priya’s conviction. This close
relationship and Naina’s role in comforting Priya after the breakup with Tanmay
show that her assistance in hiding the weapon was a continuation of her support
for Priya, further demonstrating intent and premeditated involvement in the
cover-up.

 It is submitted that the legal term Causa causans (The immediate cause) can be
used to emphasize that Naina’s attempt to hide the weapon was a key and
immediate cause of the delay in uncovering the true facts of the crime. Her act
of concealment significantly impacted the investigation process. In Sukhwinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 140 39, the accused was found guilty of
not only abetting the crime but also concealing the material evidence that could
have led to a conviction. The court held that the act of concealing evidence,
particularly material evidence like weapons, was a serious offense as it
obstructed the investigation process. The Supreme Court observed that any
concealment of evidence that leads to a delay in justice is a criminal offense and
should be punished accordingly. This case strengthens the argument that Naina’s
role in concealing the knife obstructed the investigation into Shailja’s murder
and thus warrants liability under Section 238 INS.

 It is also submitted that Consciousness of guilt is a concept where the behavior

of the accused after the crime indicates their awareness of guilt. Naina’s attempt
to hide the murder weapon demonstrates this consciousness. She did not report
the crime or cooperate with authorities but instead actively participated in the

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concealment, which shows her intent to obstruct justice. Naina’s actions

following the murder (helping to hide the knife) are strong circumstantial
evidence that she knew of Priya’s involvement in the crime and wanted to
protect her by destroying or concealing crucial evidence.

 In Lal Singh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 746 40, this hon’ble Supreme
Court held that concealment of evidence by an individual, even when they are
not the principal offender, still attracts criminal liability. The accused was
convicted under Indian Penal Code provisions for concealing evidence related to
a murder. The Court stated that the law must penalize not only the principal
offender but also anyone who aids the criminal process by destroying or hiding
evidence. This case emphasizes that even though Naina might not have been the
primary offender, her act of concealing the murder weapon makes her an
accessory to the crime and holds her liable under Section 238 INS.

 It is further submitted that the facts of the case suggest the possibility of a larger
conspiracy, including potential links to human trafficking operations and other
criminal activities surrounding Shailja’s family and associates. Naina’s role in
hiding the weapon fits into a broader pattern of criminal conduct aimed at
protecting those involved in more serious offenses. Even if Naina’s direct role in
the conspiracy isn’t fully established, her involvement in concealing evidence
could be seen as part of an ongoing effort to shield Priya and other figures from
prosecution. Her actions could be viewed as aiding and abetting a criminal
enterprise.

 In R. V. Yianni, (1997)41 EWCA Crim 1620 (United Kingdom)42, the accused

was found guilty of perverting the course of justice by concealing evidence
related to a crime. The court emphasized that any attempt to destroy or hide
evidence constitutes an obstruction of justice and should be treated as a serious
offense. The court upheld the conviction, noting that tampering with evidence
undermines the justice system and the ability of law enforcement to properly
investigate crimes. Although this is an international case, it supports the
argument that Naina’s concealment of the knife amounted to an obstruction of
justice and is punishable under law.

 It is humbly submitted that, it is important to emphasize that Naina never came

forward to report the crime or her involvement in handling the murder weapon.
The fact that Naina did not voluntarily disclose the location of the knife or her
knowledge of its concealment further demonstrates a willful intent to obstruct
justice. Naina’s lack of cooperation with the investigation and her failure to
explain why her fingerprints were found on the murder weapon suggest that she
was actively hiding crucial information. This silence demonstrates that Naina’s
intention was to obstruct the investigation from the beginning.

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 In R V. White (David), [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 72 (United Kingdom), the

defendant was convicted of perverting the course of justice by concealing a
murder weapon and providing false information to investigators. The court ruled
that any act intended to interfere with an ongoing investigation, including
concealing evidence, amounts to an offense of perverting justice. This case is
relevant because it involved the concealment of the murder weapon, similar to
Naina’s case. This precedent can be used to support the contention that Naina’s
act of hiding the knife not only interfered with the investigation but also fulfills
the criteria for her liability under Section 238 INS.

 It is also submitted that even if Naina did not own the knife or use it during the
murder, her handling of it and her actions in concealing it point to constructive
possession of the murder weapon. Constructive possession can be established if
the person has control over the weapon, even if it was not directly used by them
during the crime. By physically handling and hiding the weapon, Naina
exercised sufficient control over the object, linking her to the crime scene and
the weapon’s concealment.

 In Sanbeer Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 36943, this hon’ble Supreme
Court dealt with constructive possession in the context of an accused being
involved in a crime even though the crime was carried out by others. The court
ruled that the mere fact that the accused did not physically handle the weapon
used in the murder did not absolve them of liability if they had control over or
participated in the concealment of that weapon. Constructive possession was
inferred from the fact that the accused had knowledge of the weapon and aided
in its concealment after the crime. In Naina’s case, even if she did not directly
use the murder weapon, her handling and attempt to hide it can be seen as
constructive possession. Her fingerprints on the weapon, coupled with her
presence at the crime scene, establish that she exercised control over the knife
and intended to conceal it, supporting her conviction under Section 238 INS.

 In Ganga Saran v. State of U.P., AIR 1975 SC 1533 44, this hon’ble Supreme
Court discussed the concept of constructive possession in the context of a co-
conspirator's involvement in hiding evidence. The accused did not directly
possess the weapon used in the commission of the crime but assisted in
concealing it. The Court held that the accused was in constructive possession of
the weapon, as they had knowledge of its location and participated in the
concealment to shield the actual perpetrator from legal consequences. Naina’s
act of concealing the knife, even though she did not commit the murder, fits
within the concept of constructive possession. She knew about the murder,
handled the weapon after the fact, and attempted to hide it. This is sufficient to
hold her liable for constructive possession, making her culpable under Section
238 INS for tampering with evidence.

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 In Durga Prasad Gupta V. B.V. Raja and Others, AIR 1997 SC 3459 45 although
dealing with the constructive possession of property, lays down the principle
that constructive possession is established when an individual, although not in
physical possession, has knowledge and the ability to exercise control over an
object. The Court stated that constructive possession can be inferred from
circumstances where a person demonstrates control or access to the item, even if
they did not physically possess it at all times.

Therefore, in light of the evidence and legal principles, Naina’s conviction u/s 238 INS is
justified. Therefore, supported by legal precedents, her deliberate actions to conceal evidence,
aiding and abetting make her liable u/s 61(2)(a), 3(5), 238 and 351(Criminal Intimidation) of
INS ensuring the integrity of the justice process is upheld and therefore, the appeal must be
set aside by this hon’ble court.

III. Whether trial court have conducted fair trial by ignoring the
absence of Raichand?

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Yes, the respondent submits that the trial court has conducted a fair trial despite the
absence of Lalit Raichand. The trial was based on sufficient and admissible evidence
presented before the court, and Raichand's absence does not detract from the fairness
or legality of the proceedings. The respondent intends to demonstrate that Raichand's
absence did not compromise the trial’s integrity or the legal process.

 It is humbly submitted that a fair trial is guaranteed under the Constitution of

Indicana which mandates that trials be conducted impartially and without
prejudice, ensuring that both parties have the opportunity to present their
cases. However, this right is not absolute in the sense that every witness or
suspect’s presence is necessary, particularly when sufficient evidence can
establish the accused’s guilt.

 It is submitted that the Hon’ble Trial court reached its decision based on
overwhelming forensic, documentary, and testimonial evidence pointing to
Naina’s guilt. The absence of Raichand did not affect the core evidence against
Naina, including:
- Naina’s fingerprints on the murder weapon.
- Her proximity to the crime scene.
- The testimony of witnesses, such as Raj and Tanmay, which corroborated
Naina’s involvement in concealing evidence and her common intention with
Priya. The evidence directly implicating Naina in tampering with evidence
was unchallenged and sufficient to sustain her conviction u/s 238 INS,
irrespective of Raichand’s involvement.

 It is further submitted that the legal terms Actus reus and mens rea refer to
the physical act (actus reus) and the guilty mind (mens rea) necessary to
establish a crime. Naina’s act of concealing the weapon constitutes actus reus,
and her intent to obstruct justice shows mens rea. Raichand’s absence did not
negate these elements, as Naina’s actions and intentions were proven by the
existing evidence.

 It is also submitted before this hon’ble court that the trial court’s conviction of
Naina did not hinge on Raichand’s presence or testimony. Raichand was
implicated in other aspects of Shailja’s life, including the threats related to her
knowledge of the trafficking operations, but his involvement did not directly
relate to the charges of concealment of evidence against Naina. Naina’s
criminal actions, specifically her role in hiding the murder weapon, were
independent of Raichand’s actions and were clearly established by the
evidence presented in court.

 In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 47146, this hon’ble Supreme

Court held that a trial can proceed and be considered fair even in the absence
of certain witnesses or accused, provided there is sufficient evidence available

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to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court emphasized that
trials should not be unduly delayed due to the absence of a party, especially if
the evidence presented is credible and sufficient to convict the accused. Even
though Raichand was absent, the trial court had ample evidence (forensic,
documentary, and witness testimonies) to convict Naina. The absence of
Raichand did not affect the trial’s fairness as the evidence directly implicating
Naina was strong enough to support her conviction.

 It is further submitted that Raichand’s absconding does not reflect on the

fairness of the trial against Naina. Courts often proceed with trials even when
certain accused individuals are unavailable or are fugitives, as long as the
rights of the present parties are upheld. Naina’s liability was independent of
Raichand’s conduct. The charges against her, including those under Section
238 INS, were distinct from any charges that could have been brought against
Raichand.

 In Ashok Kumar V. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 35047, this hon’ble

Supreme Court held that trials should focus on the available evidence and the
accused’s right to a fair hearing. The absence of an individual accused or
witness, when other evidence is present, does not render the trial unfair. The
court also mentioned that absconding or missing accused does not impact the
conviction of others if their guilt is established independently. Naina’s guilt
was established based on independent evidence such as her fingerprints on the
weapon and her presence at the crime scene. Raichand’s absence did not affect
the proceedings or the evidence presented against her.

 It is humbly submitted that the trial court provided Naina every opportunity to
defend herself. The principles of natural justice, including audi alteram
partem (the right to be heard), were followed, ensuring that Naina was
represented and allowed to present her defense. The court also ensured that all
relevant evidence against Naina was examined, and there was no procedural
irregularity or bias resulting from Raichand’s absence.

 In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade V. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 48,

this hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that a trial is fair as long as the accused is
given a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves and present their case.
The Court noted that absconding or missing parties do not necessarily make
the trial unfair, provided that the accused on trial has been treated in
accordance with due process and all relevant evidence has been scrutinized.
Naina was given every opportunity to defend herself, and the evidence against
her was considered properly. The absence of Raichand does not diminish the
fairness of the trial because the proceedings focused on Naina’s independent
actions, such as her role in concealing evidence, which were well established.

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 In Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 668 49, the Court ruled that
a trial remains fair if it adheres to due process, even if certain witnesses or co-
accused are unavailable, as long as the remaining evidence is sufficient to
establish the accused’s involvement in the crime. The focus should be on
whether the available evidence is reliable and sufficient to determine guilt.
Raichand’s absence did not affect the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence
against Naina. The trial court had enough evidence, including forensic
findings and witness statements, to convict Naina without relying on
Raichand’s presence or testimony.

 It is also submitted that the legal maxim Causa sine qua non (A cause
without which the effect could not happen), which refers to an indispensable
and essential cause applies in the present case. The conviction of Naina was
based on sufficient evidence, making Raichand’s presence or absence a non-
essential factor in the trial’s fairness. The court’s decision was based on the
available evidence, not on Raichand’s potential testimony.

 In the landmark case of Nalini v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1999) 5 SCC 253
(Rajiv Gandhi assassination case)50, the court held that the trial of an
individual could proceed even in the absence of certain co-accused or
witnesses, as long as the remaining evidence against the present accused was
sufficient to establish their guilt. The court emphasized that judicial processes
cannot be halted or delayed indefinitely due to the absence of one or more
individuals. The trial court rightfully proceeded with Naina’s case despite
Raichand’s absence, as there was ample evidence to convict her independently
of his testimony or involvement. The fairness of the trial was maintained as
Naina was fully represented and given the opportunity to defend herself.

 It is further submitted that it becomes crucial to note that if courts were to halt
proceedings every time a key individual goes missing or absconds, it would
undermine the administration of justice. Naina’s trial was conducted without
unnecessary delays and concluded based on available evidence, ensuring that
justice was served in a timely manner. The absence of Raichand should not be
a reason to delay the process or question the trial’s fairness. The trial court
acted appropriately by proceeding with the trial, despite Raichand’s absence,
to prevent the obstruction of justice. This approach aligns with legal principles
that ensure trials are conducted in a reasonable time frame without relying on
the availability of every individual, particularly when they have deliberately
absconded.

 In State of Karnataka v. Yarappa Reddy (1999) 8 SCC 715 51, this hon’ble
Supreme Court emphasized that the primary duty of the court is to administer
justice and arrive at the truth, irrespective of the absence of certain witnesses
or accused persons. The Court held that if sufficient evidence is available, the
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trial should proceed, and the absence of an individual should not result in a
miscarriage of justice. The trial court’s decision to proceed without Raichand
was in line with the principles established in this case. Naina’s conviction was
based on solid evidence, and Raichand’s absence did not prevent the court
from administering justice effectively.

 It is also submitted in complex criminal cases involving multiple defendants,

each party’s role is examined separately. The court is not required to establish
the presence of every co-accused to convict one party. Naina’s involvement in
the concealment of evidence and her role in aiding Priya’s actions were
sufficiently proven. Raichand’s involvement in other aspects of the conspiracy
is a separate issue, and his absence does not affect the fairness of Naina’s
conviction. support the idea that a fair trial can be conducted even if a co-
accused is absent, as long as there is sufficient evidence to determine the guilt
of the present accused. The trial court followed this principle, ensuring
fairness by relying on the independent evidence against Naina.

 In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab (2009) 1 SCC 441 52, the court in
this case dealt with a complex conspiracy involving multiple accused and
emphasized that the fairness of the trial for each accused must be judged
independently. The absence of one co-accused or witness does not invalidate
the entire trial, provided that the available evidence is sufficient to reach a fair
and just conclusion for the accused on trial. Raichand’s absence should not
undermine the fairness of the trial against Naina, as her involvement in the
crime was independently proven. The trial court’s focus on the available
evidence ensured that Naina’s trial was conducted fairly, regardless of
Raichand’s involvement.

 The trial court exercised its judicial discretion appropriately by deciding to

continue the trial despite Raichand’s absence. Courts have broad discretion to
determine how to proceed when key witnesses or co-accused are unavailable,
particularly when they have absconded or are deliberately avoiding
prosecution. This discretion was exercised in accordance with the law,
ensuring that the trial process remained fair and just. As discussed earlier, such
as State of Maharashtra v. Suresh53 establish that a trial can be considered
fair even when certain witnesses or co-accused are absent. The trial court
followed these legal precedents by focusing on the available evidence against
Naina and ensuring that she received a fair opportunity to defend herself.

 It is also submitted that Raichand’s Absence Is Peripheral to the Core Charges.

The key legal issue before the trial court was whether Naina should be held
liable for her actions in concealing evidence, criminal conspiracy and aiding,
abetting the crime. This issue was unrelated to Raichand’s broader
involvement in the alleged human trafficking and other criminal activities. The

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absence of Raichand did not affect the court’s ability to adjudicate the core
issue of Naina’s criminal liability for tampering with evidence. The trial court
focused on Naina’s specific role in aiding the concealment of the murder
weapon and supporting Priya’s actions. Raichand’s absence did not prevent the
court from reaching a conclusion based on the facts of the case and the charges
against Naina.

 It is humbly submitted that Raichand’s deliberate absconding from the trial

process should not be rewarded by questioning the fairness of the trial against
Naina. Allowing an accused person’s absence to disrupt or discredit the trial
process would set a dangerous precedent. The court rightfully proceeded with
the trial to prevent any delay in justice. The trial focused on the available and
credible evidence, not on the presence or absence of every individual involved
in the broader case. Raichand’s absence should not impact the fairness of
Naina’s trial, as his involvement was not directly related to the charges she
faced.

 It is further submitted that the legal maxim Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
(The inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other) applies in the present case
which means that if certain elements are included, others are excluded.
Applied to Naina’s case, the evidence against her (forensic and testimonial) is
sufficient for conviction, and the absence of Raichand does not diminish the
weight of this included evidence.

 In Suleman Usman Mithaiwala v. State of Gujarat (1989) 1 SCC 588 54, the
Court in this case reiterated that absconding accused cannot be allowed to stall
the trial. It held that if certain individuals abscond or refuse to appear, the
court has the discretion to continue the trial with the available evidence. The
fairness of the trial should be judged by how the present accused are treated,
not by the absence of co-accused. Raichand’s absence should not affect the
fairness of the trial against Naina. The trial court acted within its discretion by
proceeding with the evidence available and ensuring that Naina had full
opportunity to defend herself.

Therefore, in light of the overwhelming independent evidence and legal principles discussed,
the trial court conducted a fair trial despite Raichand’s absence. The court rightly focused on
the available forensic evidence, witness testimonies, and Naina’s involvement in the crime,
which were sufficient to support her conviction. Raichand’s absence neither created any gap
in the prosecution’s case nor prejudiced Naina’s defense. The court exercised appropriate
judicial discretion, ensuring that Naina’s rights were upheld and justice was administered
efficiently. As such, the trial court's decision to proceed without Raichand does not detract

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from the fairness of the trial. Accordingly, the appeal should be set aside, and the conviction
of Naina should be upheld.

PRAYER

Therefore, in the light of the facts, circumstances and arguments advanced, it is most
respectfully prayed before this Hon’ble Court that this Court may be pleased to:

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a) Dismiss the present appeal filed by the Appellants, Priya Mehra and Naina Mehra as
it lacks the jurisdiction to stand before this Hon’ble Court;

b) Uphold the conviction of Priya Mehra u/s 103(1) of the Indicana Nyaya Sanhita (INS)
for the murder of Shailja Singhania;

c) Assert the conviction of Naina Mehra u/s 61(2)(a) INS (Criminal Conspiracy), u/s
3(5) INS (Common Intention) and u/s 238 INS (Tampering with Evidence), as
imposed by the Hon’ble Trial Court and further upheld by the Hon’ble High Court;

d) Affirm the sentences imposed on the Appellants as just, appropriate and proportionate
to the crimes committed by them;

e) And pass any other order or relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the interests of justice, equity and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness, the Respondent shall, as in duty bound, ever pray.

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

On the behalf of the respondent.

s/d-

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