REVIEWER POLSCI LUANCING

ART 3 SEC 12-18

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Section 12. Rights of person under investigation for the commission of an offense.

Rights of person under investigation for the Commission of an offense CODE: SCISI
1) Right to remain silent
2) Right to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
3) Right to provided with the services of counsel if he cannot afford the services of one.
4) Right to be informed of these rights.
When rights are available:

1) AFTER a person has been taken into custody or

2) When a person is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

3) When the investigation is being conducted by the government (police, DOJ, NBI) with
respect to a criminal offense.
4) Signing of arrest reports and booking sheets.

When rights are not available:

1) During a police line-up. Exception: Once there is a move among the investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions from the suspect.

2) During administrative investigations.

3) Confessions made by an accused at the time he voluntarily surrendered to the police or

outside the context of a formal investigation.

4) Statements made to a private person.

Exclusionary rule

1) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in

evidence against him (the accused).

2) Therefore, any evidence obtained by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is also

inadmissible, being the fruit of a poisoned tree.

Requisites of valid waiver:

1) Waiver should be made in WRITING

2) Waiver should be made in the PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.

Section 13. Right to bail

Who are entitled to bail:

1) All persons ACTUALLY DETAINED

2) shall, BEFORE CONVICTION

3) Be entitled to bail.

Who are not entitled to bail:

1) Persons charged with offenses PUNISHABLE by RECLUSION PERPETUA or DEATH, when

evidence of guilt is strong

2) Persons CONVICTED by the trial court. Bail is only discretionary pending appeal.
3) Persons who are members of the AFP facing a court martial.

Other rights in relation to bail.

1) The right to bail shall NOT be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended.

2) Excessive bail shall not be required.

Factors considered in setting the amount of bail:

1) Ability to post bail

2) Nature of the offense

3) Penalty imposed by law

4) Character and reputation of the accused

5) Health of the accused

6) Strength of the evidence

7) Probability of appearing at the trial

8) Forfeiture of previous bail bonds

9) Whether accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested

10) If accused is under bond in other cases

Implicit limitations on the right to bail:

1. The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the law.
2. The constitutional right is available only in criminal cases, not, e.g. in deportation
proceedings.

Note:
1. Right to bail is not available in the military.
2. Apart from bail, a person may attain provisional liberty through recognizance.
Section 14. Rights of an accused
Rights of a person charged with a criminal offense
1. Right to due process of law
2. Right to be presumed innocent
3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel
 4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
5. Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial
6. Right to meet the witnesses face to face
7. Right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf

“DUE PROCESS”

This means that the accused can only be convicted by a tribunal which is required to comply
with the stringent requirements of the rules of criminal procedure.

“PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE”

The Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from providing that proof of certain facts
leads to a prima facie presumption of guilt, provided that the facts proved have a reasonable
connection to the ultimate fact presumed.

Presumption of guilt should not be conclusive.

“RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL”

The right to be heard includes the following rights:
1. Right to be present at the trial
1. The right to be present covers the period from ARRAIGNMENT to
PROMULGATION of sentence.
1. After arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding absence of accused,
provided 2 requisites are met. Note, that trial in absentia is allowed only if the
accused has been validly arraigned.

(i) Accused has been duly notified; and

(ii) His failure to appear is unjustifiable.

1. The accused may waive the right to be present at the trial by not showing up.
However, the court can still compel the attendance of the accused if necessary for
identification purposes. Exception: If the accused, after arraignment, has
stipulated that he is indeed the person charged with the offense and named in the
information, and that any time a witness refers to a name by which he is known,
the witness is to be understood as referring to him.
1. While the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of judgement, the
absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not affect its validity.
2. Right to counsel
(a) Right to counsel means the right to EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.

(b) If the accused appears at arraignment without counsel, the judge must:

(i) Inform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before arraignment

(ii) Ask the accused if he desires the aid of counsel

(iii) If the accused desires counsel, but cannot afford one, a counsel de oficio must be appointed

(iv) If the accused desires to obtain his own counsel, the court must give him a reasonable time
to get one.

3. Right to an impartial judge

4. Right of confrontation and cross-examination

5. Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses

“RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM”

Purposes of the right:

1) To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defenses

2) To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal against a further prosecution for the same
cause

3) To inform the court of the facts alleged.

If the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense, the accused cannot be
convicted thereof even if the prosecution is able to present evidence during the trial with
respect to such elements.

The real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in the information.
It is not determined based on the caption or preamble thereof nor from the specification of the
provision of law allegedly violated

“RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL”

Factors used in determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated.

1) Time expired from the filing of the information

2) Length of delay involved

3) Reasons for the delay

4) Assertion or non-assertion of the right by the accused

5) Prejudice caused to the defendant.

Effect of dismissal based on the ground of violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial

If the dismissal is valid, it amounts to an acquittal and can be used as basis to claim double
jeopardy. This would be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the consent of the
accused

Remedy of the accused if his right to speedy trial has been violated

He can move for the dismissal of the case.

If he is detained, he can file a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus.

Definition of impartial trial

The accused is entitled to the “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”.

It is an element of due process.

Definition of public trial

The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespective of their relationship to the accused.
However, if the evidence to be adduced is “offensive to decency or public morals”, the public
may be excluded.

The right of the accused to a public trial is not violated if the hearings are conducted on
Saturdays, either with the consent of the accused or if failed to object thereto.

“RIGHT TO MEET WITNESS FACE TO FACE”

Purposes of the right:
1. To afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
2. To allow the judge the opportunity to observe the deportment of the witness
Failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness

If the failure of the accused to cross-examine a witness is due to his own fault or was not due to
the fault of the prosecution, the testimony of the witness should be excluded.

When the right to cross-examine is demandable

It is demandable only during trials. Thus, it cannot be availed of during preliminary
investigations.

Principal exceptions to the right of confrontation

1. The admissibility of “dying declarations”
2. Trial in absentia under Section 14(2)
3. With respect to child testimony

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Distinction between Section 14 and Section 16

While the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of criminal cases, the right to a
speedy disposition of cases covers ALL phases of JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL or ADMINISTRATIVE
proceedings.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

When is a question incriminating:

A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would establish
a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a
crime by the accused or the witness.

Distinction between an accused and an ordinary witness

1. An accused can refuse to take the witness stand by invoking the right against self-
incrimination.
2. An ordinary witness cannot refuse to take the stand. He can only refuse to
answer specific questions which would incriminate him in the commission of an
offense.
Scope of right
1. What is PROHIBITED is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which would not
exist were it not for the actions compelled from the witness.
2. The right does NOT PROHIBIT the examination of the body of the accused or
the use of findings with respect to his body as physical evidence. Hence, the
fingerprinting of an accused would not violate the right against self-incrimination.
However, obtaining a sample of the handwriting of the accused would violate this
right if he is charged for falsification.
3. The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his
possession which might tend to incriminate him. However, a third person in
custody of the document may be compelled to produce it.
When the right can be invoked:
 1. In criminal cases
2. In administrative proceedings if the accused is liable to a penalty (Ex. Forfeiture of
property)
Who can invoke the right:

Only natural persons. Judicial persons are subject to the visitorial powers of the state in order
to determine compliance with the conditions of the charter granted to them.

Citizenship

17. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to? Explain, and give
illustrative case.

Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year
before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution
of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands. x x x

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her
birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a
citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship x x x. So also, the principle of jus
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the
principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9,
2000, En Banc [Purisima])

18. What are the ways of acquiring citizenship? Discuss.

Held: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen,
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the x x x Constitution, natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.”

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530. (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc
[Kapunan])

19. To be naturalized, what must an applicant prove? When and what are the conditions
before the decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory?

Held: To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when
the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any
act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies
(Section 1, R.A. 530). (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc
[Kapunan])

20. What qualifications must be possessed by an applicant for naturalization?

Held: Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten
years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
languages; and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools
or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines where
Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to
the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
(Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

21. What are the disqualifications under Section 4, Act 473, in an application for
naturalization?

Held: Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:

(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (or not less than
six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war,
during the period of such war;
(h) He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
(Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

22. Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority?
Held: Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 which
was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then
commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by
basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a “reasonable time” after
attaining the age of majority. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that
the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.

The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of
majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority.”

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. (Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D.
Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999, En Banc [Kapunan])

23. How may Philippine citizenship be renounced? Is the application for an alien certificate
of registration, and the possession of foreign passport, tantamount to acts of renunciation of
Philippine citizenship?

Held: Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this
contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s application for an alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and
the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Xxx

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be

express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to
rest in the case of Aznar v. COMELEC (185 SCRA 703 [1990]) and in the more recent case of
Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC (G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999).
 In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of
registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate
of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship.
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As
held by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship.
The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the
most, private respondent had dual citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])

24. How may Filipino citizens who lost their citizenship reacquire the same?

Answer: Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, June 28,
1996, En Banc [Panganiban]; Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En
Banc [Kapunan])

25. Distinguish naturalization from repatriation.

Held: Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63 (An Act Providing
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]). Under this law,
a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4, C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II (Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
2630 [1960]); (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171
[1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic (314 SCRA 438 [1999]), we held:

[P]arenthetically, under these statutes (referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630), the person desiring
to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all
that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided
in the Philippines.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

26. Who may validly avail of repatriation under R.A. No. 8171?

Held: R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the
repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. (Gerardo Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999
[Vitug])

27. Before what agency should application for repatriation under R.A 8171 be filed?

Held: Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 725, dated June 5, 1975, amending C.A. No. 63, an
application for repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization chaired
by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members. Although the agency was
deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Memorandum of March 27, 1987, it was
not, however, abrogated. The Committee was reactivated on June 8, 1995. Hence, the
application should be filed with said Agency, not with the Regional Trial Court. (Gerardo Angat
v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug])

28. May a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and, therefore, qualified to
run for Congressman?

Held: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. [T]he term “natural-born citizen” was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Section 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before
January 17, 1973 (the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution), of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those “naturalized citizens”
were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: “Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.” Consequently, only naturalized
Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in the
said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefore is clear: as to such persons, they would either
be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. (Antonio Bengson III
v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

29. Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance.

Held: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. (Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May
26, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])

30. What is the main concern of Section 5, Article IV, 1987 Constitution, on citizenship?
Consequently, are persons with mere dual citizenship disqualified to run for elective local
positions under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code?
Held: In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, x x x, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. (Mercado v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999 [Mendoza])

31. Cite instances when a citizen of the Philippines may possess dual citizenship considering
the citizenship clause (Article IV) of the Constitution.

Held:

1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
father’s country such children are citizens of that country;
3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999 [Mendoza])

32. Does res judicata apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship?

Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res
judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao
v. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]). He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the
case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be
placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier
or simpler. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])