S H

LA
Y
F Incorrect use of the
T
FE TCAS traffic display
S A
Event 1: Loss of separation due to an inappropriate turn
Editorial
A B767 heading 100 and a MD80
heading 217 are maintaining FL290 MD80 – FL290
TCAS II is a last resort safety
on crossing tracks. The B767 will
net designed to prevent mid-air B767 – FL290
pass approximately 15 NM
collisions. It alerts the flight
behind the MD80 (dotted line on 15 NM
crew and provides Resolution
the figure).
Advisory (RA) manoeuvre
indications when it computes a For radar separation, when they are
risk of collision. The correct use still 80 NM apart, the controller
of TCAS II increases the safety instructs both aircraft to maintain
of air transport. their present heading. 2 NM
One minute before the tracks cross,
The TCAS II traffic display is
the controller provides traffic
provided for the purpose of
information to the B767 “eleven
assisting the flight crew in the
o’clock, from left to right, same level, aircraft type MD 80, present time 25 NM,
visual acquisition of aircraft in
converging”. The B767 pilot starts monitoring a target, which is on the left hand side of
the vicinity. Of course, it also
the TCAS traffic display.
helps to improve flight crew
situational awareness. As he assesses that the other traffic is converging head-on, the B767 pilot asks:
“Where is this twelve o’clock traffic going?” The controller responds with updated
However, experience has traffic information.
shown that in some cases, flight
However, the B767 pilot says: “We’re going to take a heading here 120” whilst
crew are tempted to make their
starting to turn to the right. Due to this turn, which is in the wrong direction, the
own traffic assessment based
horizontal separation reduces quickly and a TA is triggered on both aircraft. Whilst
on the traffic display information,
starting to descend, the B767 pilot says: “we’d like to go to [FL] 270”.
and to manoeuvre in
anticipation of ATC instructions. Afterwards, to justify his decision to turn, the B767 pilot said to the controller that “the
traffic was coming right up, so we turn to avoid the traffic”. This inappropriate turn
The TCAS II traffic display can reduced the separation to only 2 NM.
be misinterpreted, since it
So, why did the B767 pilot decide on his own to turn, contrary to the ATC
provides only partial information,
instruction? And why to the right?
it has limited accuracy, and it is
based upon a moving reference. The figures below show how the situation was represented on the controller’s radar
It has not been designed for the display and the B767 TCAS traffic display, at the time of the initial traffic information.
purposes of self-separation or
sequencing, and using it for TRK 100 M
these purposes is inappropriate, 47
and could also be hazardous. ABC123 9 12
B767
290 - 52
This ACAS Bulletin includes XYZ456
some actual events where MD80 40
290 -
problems arose due to
misinterpretation of the TCAS II
00
traffic display, and provides
00
some insight into why these
events occurred.
00:00

John Law Controller’s radar display B767 TCAS traffic display

Mode S and ACAS
Programme Manager, On the controller’s display, the 3 minute speed vector (magnetic track and speed)
EUROCONTROL clearly shows that the B767 was going to pass behind the MD80 (which was faster:
March 2005 520kts vs. 470 kts ground speed). This is not obvious on the TCAS traffic display.
The reason why the B767 pilot was misled is explained on the next page.

March 2005 Page 1 EUROCONTROL Mode S and ACAS Programme

 The TCAS traffic display is not a radar display Regulations for the use of
the TCAS traffic display
Due to the relative motion of the symbol and the lack of speed vector, it is
extremely difficult to anticipate the evolution of the situation based ICAO PANS-OPS, Doc 8168 states that:
solely on the TCAS traffic display (see explanation on page 3). In the
“Pilots shall not manoeuvre their aircraft in
event described on the first page, the B767 pilot related a target on the
response to traffic advisories (TAs) only”
TCAS traffic display to the initial traffic information. What the pilot could
see was a target moving apparently on opposite track, slightly on the left. This point is emphasized in the ICAO ACAS II
So, he started to question the controller : Training Guidelines for pilots:

47 TRK 100 M “No manoeuvres are made

ABC123 based solely on the information
B767 9 12 shown on the ACAS display”
290 -
52 ICAO standards only include phraseology to
XYZ456
MD80 40 report RAs. Therefore, pilots should not
290 - report “TCAS contact” or “we have it on
TCAS” after traffic information from ATC.
Indeed, such a report provides no added value
00
to ATC.

+00:25
Examples of incorrect use of
“Where is this 12 o’clock traffic going?”
the TCAS traffic display
When the target was at 12 o’clock position and less than 20 NM, the B767
pilot decided to turn right to avoid the target on the TCAS traffic display : Decisions to turn

TRK 100 M • A Fokker 100 is cleared to descend to FL110.

When passing through FL120, two targets
9 12 appear on the TCAS traffic display, both “in
52
XYZ456
front, on the left, at -15” (i.e. 1500 ft below). A
MD80 “Climb” RA is triggered. The pilot follows the
47 290 - 40 RA but also decides to turn to the right.
ABC123
B767 Fortunately the pilot’s correct reaction to the
290 - RA provides safe vertical separation, because
the inappropriate turn reduces the horizontal
00 margin to 0.2 NM.

+00:50
• A B737 is cleared to climb to 3000 ft. A VFR
on an opposite track is level at 3500 ft, but
offset horizontally. The controller provides
“We’re going to take a heading 120”
traffic information to the B737. The pilot
The pilot could not relate the direction of the traffic, contained in the
reports two targets on the TCAS traffic display
controller’s traffic information, to the information provided by the TCAS
and shortly after reports a left turn to avoid this
traffic display, so he did not take it into account. But to the controller, it
traffic. Fortunately, the controller instructs the
was obvious that this turn to the right would create a loss of separation.
B737 to stop climb at 2500 ft, because the
Due to the turn to the right, the target remained on the left hand side on inappropriate turn reduces the separation.
the TCAS traffic display, apparently still on opposite track, and a TA was
then triggered. The pilot now decided to descend : ATC instructions disregarded
TRK 120 M The two following events were reported by
12 controllers at a major European airport.
52
XYZ456 9 15 • "The A340 reduced its speed on its own, miles
47 MD80 too early on approach, to increase the distance
ABC123 290 - from the preceding aircraft [based on the
B767 40
290 - TCAS traffic display]. It messed up the
sequence and an A320 was then only 4 NM
behind it! I was obliged to make the A320
perform an "S" for delay".
00
• "The pilot did not turn on time onto base leg
+01:35 [because he was monitoring the preceding
aircraft on the TCAS traffic display]. After no
“We’d like to go to 270” reply to two instructions to intercept the
A loss of separation then occurred, the reason for this incident was not localizer, I had to instruct [the next aircraft] to
understood by either the pilot or the controller. climb back to 4000 ft to avoid an Airprox and I
had to give headings for delaying action to all
The TCAS traffic display is not designed to support separation
the other aircraft [...]. When he finally replies,
manoeuvres, but to aid visual acquisition of an intruder. It gives only a
he tells me "I can't listen to you, I must monitor
snapshot of the relative horizontal and vertical position of other
my TCAS".
aircraft in the vicinity.
March 2005 Page 2 EUROCONTROL Mode S and ACAS Programme
 Moving reference display

The reference for the TCAS traffic display is the aircraft own position, which The same issue is also evident when the own
is constantly moving (unlike the controller radar display, which has a fixed aircraft is catching up a slower aircraft flying in
reference). This gives a display where the targets are shown in relative the same direction. In this situation, the target is
motion, which is a major cause of TCAS traffic display misinterpretation. displayed apparently as an intruder on an
opposite direction track.
The most significant illustration of this is when two aircraft are converging
at 90°. The following figures show that the symbol of an aircraft on a 90° The interpretation of an intruder trajectory on the
crossing track actually appears to be converging at a 45° angle on the TCAS traffic display is even more difficult when
TCAS traffic display. the own aircraft is manoeuvring since the bearing
of the intruder will vary significantly even if its
(1) (2) (3) heading is steady.
TRK 000 M
0 In addition, the lack of either a speed vector or
(3) 33 3 knowledge of the intent of other aircraft increases
the difficulty in the interpretation of the TCAS
(1) 20 traffic display.
00
(2) (2) Furthermore, it is difficult to determine in advance
00 if the aircraft are indeed on a collision course or
(3) whether separation will be maintained. For
00
instance, when an extended range is selected,
(1) the size of the target symbol can be large,
corresponding to a few nautical miles. Therefore,
Aircraft trajectories converge at 90° Closure appears to be at 45° it is much less precise than the controller’s radar
display.

Partial traffic picture Limited accuracy of TCAS bearing information

Although the TCAS traffic display assists to detect TCAS II bearing measurement is not very accurate. Usually, the
the presence of intruders in the close vicinity, flight error is no more than 5° but it could be greater than 30°. Due to
crews should not be over-reliant on this display. It these errors the target symbol on the display can jump.
supports visual acquisition; it is not a replacement
The following illustrations show the TCAS traffic displays of an event
for the out-of-window scan. One of the main
recorded during a TCAS II trial. There were 3 intruder aircraft, in the
reasons is that the traffic picture provided by the
12 o’clock position, but separated by 500 ft vertically. However, the
TCAS traffic display is only partial.
intruder at +05 (i.e. 500 ft above) appears at 6 seconds intervals, on
TCAS only detects intruders with an active the right of the group of targets (1) and then on the left (2), before
transponder, and does not provide traffic identity being shown in the correct 12 o’clock position (3).
information. There may be aircraft in the vicinity even
In the worst case, bearing error could cause a target on one side of
if there is no target on the TCAS traffic display.
the aircraft to be displayed to the other. This emphasises the
Therefore, flight crews may get an incorrect
danger of undertaking a horizontal manoeuvre based solely on
perception of the air traffic situation, as illustrated by
the TCAS traffic display.
the following two events.
• A controller advised a pilot approaching his
cleared flight level that further descent would be
in 4 NM due to traffic. The pilot answered: “We
have him on TCAS”. However, he misidentified
the target because the actual conflicting aircraft
had a transponder failure; it was shown to the
controller on primary radar, only.
• A pilot filed a report due to a TCAS technical
fault; it displayed an intruder in descent whereas (1) (2)
he had had visual acquisition on a climbing
fighter. Actually, TCAS operated perfectly: there
were two fighters, the one descending was
transponding but the one climbing was not.

TCAS surveillance range may be reduced to 5 NM

in high density airspace. Therefore, pilots could
observe aircraft in the vicinity, which might not be
shown on the TCAS traffic display.
Even if aircraft are detected by TCAS, they may
(3)
not be displayed. Some installations limit the
number of displayed targets to a maximum of 8. In Bearing variations from +17° to -26° and then to 02°
addition, the TCAS traffic display options provide
altitude filtering (e.g. NORMAL mode only shows Note: TCAS II does not need the bearing information for collision
targets within +/- 2700 ft from own aircraft). avoidance RAs. Bearing is used for the TCAS traffic display.

March 2005 Page 3 EUROCONTROL Mode S and ACAS Programme

 Event 2: Challenge to an ATC turn instruction for separation

A DC10 heading 100 and a B747 heading 040 are level at

TRK 040 M TRK 040 M
FL350 on a collision course.
3 6 3 6
Two and a half minutes before the crossing, the controller
instructs the B747 to turn 30 degrees left to achieve 5 NM
separation behind the DC10. However, the B747 pilot sees
40 40
on his TCAS traffic display a target on the left at the same
level and so asks “Confirm 30 degrees left?” He thinks,
wrongly, that a left turn (which will actually resolve the
situation) will create a risk of collision.
00 00
Thirty seconds later, the B747 pilot says “if we turn 30
degrees left, we will be aiming towards another aircraft at
our level”.
“Confirm 30 degrees left?” “if we turn 30 degrees left,
Meanwhile, a Short Term Conflict Alert has been triggered we will be aiming towards
and the controller has instructed the DC10 to descend. another aircraft at our level”

The controller then provides traffic information to the B747 pilot who asks
“which heading would you like us to take?” The controller repeats his
instruction to “turn left 30 degrees”. This time, the B747 pilot accepts the
DC10 – FL350 instruction and initiates the left turn, but it is too late to maintain separation. The
5 NM B747 pilot reports a “TCAS advisory”. The minimum distance was 1.6 NM.
1.6 NM
Subsequently, the B747 pilot asks the controller to explain the reason for the
Trajectory if the first turn. The controller replies that there was conflicting traffic at the same level.
ATC instruction was The B747 pilot answers that “we are filing [a report]; on the TCAS you sent
followed us straight into the aircraft”.
Analysis of this incident confirmed that if the B747 pilot had complied with the
B747 – FL350
initial ATC instruction to turn, 5 NM horizontal separation would have been
achieved. (dotted line on the figure).

Conclusion

The TCAS traffic display is designed to assist the visual the provision of separation and sequencing.
acquisition of surrounding aircraft.
Manoeuvres initiated solely on the information shown on the
There is a risk that some aircraft in the vicinity might not be TCAS traffic display have often degraded flight safety.
displayed and in addition, due to bearing inaccuracy, a Therefore, pilots should not attempt to self-separate, nor
moving reference, and a lack of a speed vector, together with to challenge an ATC instruction, based on the
no identity information, flight crews could wrongly attribute a information derived solely from the TCAS traffic display.
target symbol on the TCAS traffic display. It is the controllers’ responsibility to separate aircraft.
Air traffic controllers base their actions on the comprehensive TCAS II will trigger an RA if there is a risk of collision between
information shown on the radar display, which enables them aircraft. A principle of TCAS II operation is that correct
to provide a safe and expeditious air traffic flow. The TCAS reaction to posted RAs will safely resolve such
traffic display does not provide the information necessary for situations.

The TCAS traffic display

must not be used for self-separation

This is one of a series of ACAS II Bulletins addressing

specific TCAS operational issues.
“Follow the RA !”
Contact: John Law “RAs and 1000 ft level-off manoeuvres”
EUROCONTROL “Wrong reaction to “Adjust Vertical Speed” RAs”
Mode S and ACAS “TCAS II and VFR traffic” Tel: +32 2 729 37 66
“Controller and Pilot ACAS regulation and training”
Programme Manager Fax: +32 2 729 37 19
96, rue de la Fusée They are available on the ACAS Programme website, as http://www.eurocontrol.int/acas/
B-1130 Brussels well as an ACAS II brochure and some training material. acas@eurocontrol.int

March 2005 Page 4 EUROCONTROL Mode S and ACAS Programme