Presumptions of Statutory

Interpretation
Statutory interpretation refers to the process of interpreting and
understanding the meaning of statutes (laws) enacted by legislative
bodies. When engaging in statutory interpretation, courts and legal
scholars often rely on a set of presumptions or principles that guide
their analysis.
These presumptions help in resolving any ambiguities or
uncertainties present in the language of a statute.
Contents hide
1. What are The Presumptions of Statutory Interpretation?
2. Presumption of Validity
3. The Territorial Operation of the Act is within the Country
4. Interpretation That Takes Away Jurisdictions of Court Must Not Be Enforced
5. Prospective in the Operation of Statutes
6. Exceptions to Prospective Operation of Statutes
7. Conclusion

What are The Presumptions of Statutory

Interpretation?
The interpretation of statutes is guided by several presumptions that
help maintain the rule of law and ensure justice. These
presumptions of statutory interpretation play a crucial role in
understanding the legislative intent behind the enactment of
statutes.
All the presumptions of statutory interpretation can be briefed as:
 Firstly, there is a presumption of validity, which assumes that
statutes are enacted within constitutional limits and are presumed
to be valid unless proven otherwise.
 Secondly, the territorial operation presumption limits the application
of an act to the territories of the country where it is enacted unless
specifically provided otherwise.
 Thirdly, the presumption against taking away the jurisdiction of the
courts emphasizes that interpretations should not readily strip
courts of their authority unless the statute clearly and explicitly
intends to do so.
 Lastly, the prospective operation presumption indicates that
statutes are generally meant to have an effect on future acts or
events rather than retroactively impacting past circumstances
unless the legislature expressly indicates otherwise.
Presumption of Validity
In legal interpretation, there is a presumption that statutes are valid
and do not violate the Constitution. Laws enacted by the Parliament,

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State legislatures or their subordinate bodies should adhere to
constitutional boundaries and not contradict the provisions and spirit
of the Constitution. When faced with two possible interpretations,
one that upholds the constitutionality of the statute and another
that renders it void, the interpretation that preserves the
constitutionality of the law should be followed.
There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an
enacted law. If someone claims that a law is unconstitutional, they
must demonstrate a violation of constitutional boundaries. When the
validity of a statute passed by a competent legislature is challenged,
the court assumes its validity.
However, if the law appears arbitrary and discriminatory, the
presumption of constitutionality cannot be upheld. In cases of doubt
regarding the constitutional validity of a law, the benefit of the
doubt should lean towards its constitutionality. The court should
assume that the legislature acted intentionally and expressed its
intention appropriately in the law. Every word used by the
legislature carries significance and unless it is proven that the
legislation has crossed constitutional limits, it is presumed to be
constitutionally valid.
When statutory language can be interpreted in multiple ways, the
statute should be construed in a manner that upholds its
constitutional validity and avoids any doubts about its
constitutionality. This is the rule of harmonious construction and
applies even to bylaws and constitutional amendments.
In the case of Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, the constitutional
validity of the “Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act” was brought into
question. The interpretation of Section 16 of the Act was a key issue.
The words “affairs of temple” in that section were construed
narrowly to refer only to secular matters, ensuring its
constitutionality. If a broader interpretation had been given to
Section 16, it would have violated Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution, which guarantee the freedom of religion and the right
to manage religious affairs.
The Territorial Operation of the Act is
within the Country
The general principle regarding acts of parliament is that they are
applicable within the territories of the country in which they are
enacted unless stated otherwise. Statutes passed by parliament are
binding within the boundaries of the country and do not have extra-
territorial operation.
However, Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India provides that no
act made by parliament shall be deemed invalid on the ground of
having extra-territorial operation. Courts are obligated to enforce
such legislation.

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For instance, the Indian Penal Code, 1860, has extra-territorial
application. Section 3 states that any person bound by Indian law
who commits an offence outside India shall be tried in India as if the
offence was committed within the country. Section 4 further extends
the application of the IPC to offences committed by Indian citizens in
any place outside India or by any person on a ship or aircraft
registered in India, regardless of its location in the world.
State legislatures in India have the power to enact laws for the
entire state or any specific part of the state. These laws are
applicable only within the territory of that particular state and do not
have extra-territorial operations.
To establish a territorial connection, two factors must be considered:
i) The territorial connection should be real and factual, rather than
illusory.
ii) The liability under the Act being enforced must be related to that
territorial connection only.
In the case of Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, the Supreme
Court ruled that the offence of criminal conspiracy is considered a
continuing offence. As a result, it does not matter where the acts
constituting the conspiracy are committed, whether in Dubai or
Chandigarh. The offence can be tried in India under Section 4 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), which provides for the extraterritorial
application of the IPC.
In the case of K.K. Kochari v. The State of Madras, the Supreme
Court held that laws enacted by state legislatures apply within the
boundaries of the respective states. These laws can be challenged if
they have an extra-territorial operation. This is because Article
245(2) of the Indian Constitution empowers only the Union
Parliament to make laws with extraterritorial application.
Interpretation That Takes Away
Jurisdictions of Court Must Not Be Enforced
There is a presumption in statutory interpretation that an
interpretation of a statute that restricts or takes away the
jurisdiction of the courts should not be given effect unless the words
of the statute clearly and explicitly provide for it.
In both civil and criminal cases, there is a strong presumption that
civil courts have jurisdiction over matters of a civil nature. The
exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts should not be readily
inferred. This presumption is based on the principle that courts
should be accessible to all seeking justice and that the existing state
of the law should be maintained.
Unless the legislature clearly and expressly ousts the jurisdiction of
the courts or it can be inferred by necessary implication, the courts
should be presumed to have jurisdiction. Statutes should be

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construed in a manner that avoids taking away the jurisdiction of
superior courts or extending jurisdiction through the right to appeal.
Statutes that confer jurisdiction on subordinate courts, tribunals or
government agencies should be strictly construed. Unless the
construction of an act clearly indicates the intention of the
legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, the jurisdiction of
ordinary courts of judicature is not taken away. When jurisdiction is
conferred by a statute, it is implied that the act also grants the
power to perform all acts necessary for its execution.
Special powers granted by an act must be limited to the purpose for
which they are granted. The power of control by superior courts
cannot be taken away unless expressly provided by the statute. In
the absence of clear statutory provisions, it is presumed that new
jurisdiction is not created or existing jurisdiction is not enlarged.
Since legislation grants jurisdiction to the courts, only legislation can
take away that jurisdiction. If an interpretation of an act allows for
two constructions, one giving jurisdiction to the court and the other
taking it away, the construction that grants jurisdiction to the court
should prevail. Parties to a dispute cannot, by mutual consent,
create or take away jurisdiction from the court where their dispute
can be adjudicated.
There is a general presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to
hear all civil matters. The exclusion of civil jurisdiction must be
expressed in clear terms or by necessary implication. The general
rule is that courts have jurisdiction over civil matters and the burden
of proof lies on the party alleging the exclusion of civil jurisdiction. In
cases where the jurisdiction of courts is excluded, civil courts have
the power to examine whether the provisions of the statute have
been complied with and whether the prescribed legal procedures
have been followed by tribunals established by the statute.
Non-compliance with the statute or procedural requirements can be
challenged in a court of law. This principle is based on the
presumption that an aggrieved person should always have recourse
to ordinary civil courts, in addition to any remedies provided by the
statute, unless expressly excluded by the language of the statute or
necessary implication.
In the case of Provincial Government of Madras (now Andhra
Pradesh) v. J.S. Bassappa, the Supreme Court ruled that the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts should not be readily
construed. Even if the provisions of an act confer finality to the
orders of a particular authority, civil courts still retain jurisdiction if
the provisions of the act are not complied with or if the statutory
tribunal has failed to adhere to the principles of judicial procedure.
In the case of Bhimsi v. Dundappa, the Supreme Court held that if
a revenue court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to try certain
matters and the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely excluded,
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then the civil court should transfer those matters to be tried and
decide by the revenue court alone.
Prospective in the Operation of Statutes
The term “prospective” with reference to statutes refers to the
application of laws in the future or from the date of commencement
of the statute, as indicated by its dictionary meaning. In the Indian
context, the Doctrine of Prospective Overruling was first introduced
by the Supreme Court in the case of I.C. Golak Nath v. State of
Punjab (A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643). In this case, the Supreme Court held
that the Parliament did not have the power to amend fundamental
rights.
Chief Justice Subba Rao raised the question of how Parliament, even
with a two-thirds majority, could abrogate a fundamental right if it
could not affect fundamental rights through ordinary legislation,
even unanimously. He argued that the term “law” in Article 13(2) of
the Constitution includes both ordinary law and constitutional law,
encompassing amendments as well.
Therefore, according to the court’s interpretation, the state was not
authorized to make any constitutional amendment that would curtail
or diminish fundamental rights. The court declared that this principle
would only apply prospectively, meaning it would have no
retrospective effect. This concept came to be known as “prospective
overruling.”
As a result of this decision, all amendments made to the
fundamental rights prior to the court’s ruling remained valid and
effective. However, after the date of the decision, the Parliament
would no longer have the power to amend any of the fundamental
rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
Penal statutes generally have prospective operation and Article 20
of the Constitution of India restricts the retrospective operation of
such statutes. According to Article 20, an act that was legal when it
was committed cannot be made illegal by the enactment of a new
statute.
In the case of Gramma v. Veerupana, it was observed that Section
8 of “The Hindu Succession Act, 1956” applies to the devolution of
property of a Hindu male who dies intestate. The Supreme Court
ruled that the Act is not applicable to successions that occurred
before the Act came into operation, which means it has only
prospective operation. In other words, the Act does not have
retroactive effect on successions that took place prior to 1956.
In the case of Govind Das v. Income Tax Officer, the Supreme
Court considered Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This
provision imposes joint and several liability on the members of a
Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) to pay tax assessed on the HUF
property in case a partition has taken place. The court held that

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Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 does not apply to
assessments made before 1st April 1962, which was the date the
Act came into force. Therefore, the provision has only prospective
operation and does not apply retrospectively to assessments made
prior to that date.
Exceptions to Prospective Operation of
Statutes
Procedural statutes, also known as adjunctive statutes, do not
establish or confer new rights. They pertain to procedural matters
and are generally presumed to have retrospective operation,
meaning they can apply to matters that occurred before the
enactment of the statute.
Retrospective operation means that a statute can have an effect on
events or circumstances that took place prior to its enactment. A
statute can be explicitly declared as retrospective or implied as such
by the court. However, the retrospective application should not
impair existing rights or obligations.
If a statute allows for two interpretations, one retrospective and the
other perspective, the prospective interpretation is usually preferred
based on the presumption that the legislature did not intend to
create injustice. Generally, statutes are expected to apply to acts or
circumstances that occurred after their enactment, unless there is
clear legislative intent to apply them retrospectively.
Amendments to procedural laws typically have a retrospective
effect. Declaratory acts, which clarify the meaning and effect of a
statute, are also given retrospective operation. Such acts aim to
rectify judicial errors and remove doubts.
The presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes is
rebuttable, meaning it can be challenged with strong contrary
evidence. Courts should not give a statute a greater retrospective
effect than intended by the legislature.
In cases where a court declares an act void, the parliament has the
power to pass a validating act with retrospective effect to revive the
void act. However, penal laws generally cannot have a retrospective
operation unless expressly allowed by Article 20(1) of the Indian
Constitution. If a retroactive application of a penal law benefits the
accused, it may be allowed.
In Balumar Jamnadas Batra v. State of Maharashtra,
the Supreme Court held that Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962,
which dealt with the burden of proof, pertained to procedural
matters and thus had a retrospective operation.
In Reliance Jute and Industries Limited v. Commissioner of
Income Tax, the Supreme Court stated that while interpreting
taxing statutes, the law in force during the relevant assessment year

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should be applied unless there is an express provision or clear
intention suggesting otherwise.
Conclusion
The presumptions of statutory interpretation include validity,
territorial operation, non-interference with court jurisdiction and
prospective operation. These presumptions of interpretation of
statutes ensure fairness and uphold the rule of law in legal systems.