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EN BANC
AN WARAY PARTY-LIST, G.R. No. 268546

represented by FLORENCIO
GABRIEL "BEM" NOEL AND Present:
VICTORIA ISABEL NOEL, in'her own
personal capacity, GESMUNDO, C.J,
Petitioners, LEONEN,
CAGUIOA
'
HERNANDO,
LAZARO-JAVIER,*
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,
- versus - LOPEZ, M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.,
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,
KHO, JR., and
SINGH, JJ
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DANILO T. PORNIAS, JR.; AND Promulgated:
JUDE A. ACIDRE,
Respondents.
x- - _,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before ,the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo
Ante Order with Motion for Conduct ofSpecial Raffle 1 (Petition) filed under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which assails the
following Resolutions issued by public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPP No . 19-008: •
• Also refe1Ted to as Danilo T. Pomias in some parts of the rollo .

• On o fficia I business.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-88.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 268546
1. Resolution2 dated June 2, 2023 of the COl\lIELEC Second Division,

granting the petition of private respondents Danilo T. Pomias, Jr.
(Pomias) and Jude A. Acidre (Acidre) for cancellation of the
registration of petitioner An Waray Party-List (An Waray) as a
party-list organization; and
2. Resolution 3 dated August 14, 2023 of the COl\lIELEC En Banc,

denying petitioners An Waray and Victoria Isabel Noel's (Victoria)
(collectively, petitioners) motion for reconsideration.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
An Waray is a duly registered multi-sectoral party-list organization

which participated in the 2013 National and Local Elections (NLE). 4 For the
2013 NLE, An Waray's nominees were: (1) Neil Benedict A. Montejo
(Montejo); (2) Acidre; and (3) Victoria. An Waray obtained a total of541,205
votes or 1.96% of the total votes cast for party-lists, thereby emerging as one
of the winners of seats in the House of Representatives (HoR). 5
Thus, in Resolution No. 0006-13 6 dated May 24, 2013 of COMELEC

sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), An Waray was one of the
14 party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners, guaranteed with one seat
each.
On May 28, 2013, the NBOC issued Resolution No. 0008-13 7 which
cancelled the registration of some party-list groups, resulting in the adjustment
of the seat allocations. Due to this realignment, An Waray's number of seats
was increased to two "without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to
one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat." 8
On May 29, 2013, An Waray's second nominee, Acidre, submitted his

resignation from the party, citing "pressing personal reasons." 9 Consequently,
Victoria succeeded as An Waray's second nominee.
2
Id. at 89-l 03. The June 2, 2023 Resolution in SPP No. 19-008 was signed by Presiding Commissioner
Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bu lay and Nelson J. Celis of the COMELEC Second
Division.
3
Id. at 104-113. The August 14, 2023 Resolution in SPP No. 19-008 was signed by Chairman George
Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E.
Bulay, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. (with Separate Opinion, id. at 114-128), and Nelson J. Celis of
the COMELEC En Banc.
4
Id at 89, 105.
Id. at 90.
6
Id. ati546-547.
7
ld.at175-177.
8
Id. at 176.
9
Id. at 9 and 90. A copy of the Minute Resolution No. 13-0885 was reproduced in the Separate Opinion
of Commissioner Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. which indicates that the resignation of Acidre was
only rneeived by the COMELEC Law Department on May 29, 2013. ~
On June 5, 2013, the NBOC issued a Certificate of Proclamation (CoP)

to An Waray as one of the winning party-lists in the 2013 NLE, entitling its
first nominee, Montejo, to sit in the HoR. 10
On June 26, 2013, Montejo took his oath of office before then House
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte). 11 Premised on the tally
indicated in NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, An Waray's second nominee,
Victoria, took her oath of office separately on July 13, 2013 before Senator
Francis Joseph "Chiz" Escudero. 12
The counsel for An Waray sent a letter to the NBOC requesting for a
CoP in favor of its second nominee, Victoria. In its Resolution No. 0018-13 13
dated July 17, 2013, the NBOC merely noted the letter-request. 14
On July 16, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc accepted Acidre's

resignation from An Waray through Minute Resolution No. 13-0085.
In a Decision dated October 22, 2013, the Court inAbang Lingkod Party-
List v. COMELEC 15 (Abang Lingkod) reversed COMELEC's cancellation of
Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. The Court thus ordered COMELEC to
proclaim Abang Lingkod as one of the winning party-list groups during the
2013 NLE. 16
On August 20, 2014, COMELEC issued NBOC Resolution No. 13-030

(PL )/0004-14 where it declared the final distribution of seats for party-list
groups in accordance with the Court's computation in the landmark case of
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
v. COMELEC 17 (BANAT). In the said Resolution, An Waray was listed as
entitled to only one guaranteed seat. 18
10
Id at 91. The Certification relevantly reads:
We, the Chainnan and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections, sitting en bane as
the National Board of Canvassers for Party-List Representatives, do hereby proclaim
ANWARAY
as winner in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 to entitle its nominee, namely:
NEIL BENEDICT A. MONTEJO
to sit as representative to the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines,
and to serve for a term of three (3) years, ending June 30, 2016, in accordance with Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution.
11
Id. at IO, 96, and 202.
12 Id
13
Id. at 549-550.
14 Id. at 91.
15
720 Phil. 120 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
16
Id. at 145-146.
17
604 Phil. 131 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
18
Rollo, pp. 91-92. The Resolution relevantly provides:
Applying the Banat formula using Party-List Canvass Report No. 11, after
deducting the votes for the disqualified party-list groups, but maintaining the votes for
SENIOR CITIZENS in view of the pendency of its case before the Supreme Court, and the
votes for ABANG LINGKOD considering the reversal of the cancellation ofits registration
by the Supreme Court, the computation shows that PBA is not entitled to a party-list seat.
To illustrate:
' '
In the years following the 2013 NLE, An Waray continued to

participate in the party-list elections and was able to secure one seat in the
HoR in 2016, another seat in 2019, and another seat in 2022.
On May 10, 2019, Pomias, invoking his alleged standing as a registered

voter and taxpayer, and Acidre, then a sitting second nominee of Tingog
Sinirangan Party-List in the HoR, filed with COMELEC a petition 19 for the
cancellation of An Waray's registration pursuant to Section 6 ofRepublic Act
No. 7941 20 or the "Party-List System Act". They asserted that Victoria, with
the knowledge and consent of An Waray, deliberately took her oath of office
as a Member of the 16th Congress n9t only without having been validly
proclaimed by the NBOC, but also wh~n An Waray was finally adjudged to
have been legally entitled to one seat only. 21 On this score, Pornias and Acidre
submitted a Memorandum dated November 29, 2018 issued by CO:MELEC
Regional Election Director for Region VIII, certifying that, "[b]ased on the
records at hand, this office did not issue any Certificate of Proclamation to
Atty. Victoria Isabel G. Noel, 2nd nominee of An Waray Party-List." 22 They
posited that the aforementioned acts constitute a violation of election laws by
An Waray and Victoria, thus justifying the cancellation of An Waray's
registration under Section 6(5)23 of Republic Act No. 7941. 24
In their Joint Verified Answer, 25 An Waray, represented by their then

sitting Representative in the HoR, Florencio Gabriel "Bern" Noel (Bern), and
Victoria, countered that from the time An Waray assumed its second seat
through Victoria in 2013, no one ever questioned the same. As such, Victoria
was able to discharge her official duties as representative of An Waray,
without any interruption in accordance with NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13,
which has not been revoked, amended, or vacated by COMELEC. 26 They also
averred that the petition failed to present any legal basis in its conclusion that
An Waray or Victoria committed any violation of election laws. 27
Rank Party-List Votes % of Votes Guaranteed Additional Total

i Garnered as Garnered Seat (1st Seat (2 nd Seats
of28 May (A) Round)(B) Round)=
2013 (58-14) (A)
....
15 AN 541,205 1.96 N.A. 0.86 1
WARAY
19
Id at 178-198.
20 An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor ( 1995).
21
Rollo, pp. 185-188.
22
Id at 197.
23 SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections[]
(Emphasis supplied)
24
Rollo, pp. 188-189.
25 Id. at 200-209.
26
Id. at 203.
27
See id. at 204-205.
Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division
In its assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2023, the CO1\1ELEC Second

Division granted the petition to cancel An Waray's registration, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.

The registration of AN WARA Y Party-list is cancelled.
Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Law Department of

this Commission for the conduct of preliminary investigation relative for
(sic) possible elections offense/s committed.
I
SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)
The COMELEC Second Division emphasized that NBOC Resolution

No. 0008-13 expressly stated that the declaration of seats allocated to the
party-list groups mentioned was "without prejudice to the proclamation of
other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat."29 Further, NBOC
Resolution No. 0008-13 was effectively superseded by NBOC Resolution No.
13-030 (PL)/0004-14 on August 20, 2014, following the promulgation of the
Abang Lingkod Decision. As for the total number of seats of An Waray,
NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 clearly provided that, with the
votes garnered by An W aray, they secured a total of ONLY one seat in the
HoR. Having known this, An W aray allegedly arrogated unto itself the
authority to have its second nominee, Victoria, take her oath and assume office
in the HoR, constituting a ground to cancel its party-list registration under
Republ~c Act No. 7941. 30
Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
In the second assailed Resolution dated August 14, 2023, the

CO1\1ELEC En Banc, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc)

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The Resolution of the Second
Division is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 31 (Emphasis in the original)
It ruled that Pomias and Acidre were able to establish by substantial

evidence that An Waray committed a serious infraction of the law by allowing
28
Id. at 103.
29
Id at 100.
30
Id at 101-103.
31
Id. at 112.
Victoria to assume office in the HoR when Section 13 32 of Republic Act No.
7941 requires prior proclamation by COMELEC therefor. 33
The Present Petition

i
Petitioners An Waray and Victoria now seek relief through the present
Petition against the assailed Resolutions of COMELEC, alleging that: 1) since
the resolution of the Petition against them is dependent on the validity of
Victoria's proclamation as a Member of the HoR, thus falling under "returns"
. in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's (HRET) exclusive
jurisdiction over contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of
such HoR members; 34 2) assuming that COMELEC does have jurisdiction and
that Victoria's assumption as Member of the HoR in 2013 violated election
laws, the cancellation of An Waray's registration is too harsh a penalty,
considering the lack of evidence that An Waray itself participated in the so-
called scheme; 35 3) COMELEC should have dismissed the petition for
cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) after it failed to decide the case
within 60 days as mandated in Article IX-A, Section 736 of the Constitution,
because the same constituted a violation of petitioners' right to speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed under Article III, Section 16 37 of the
Constitution; 38 4) in failing to dismiss the petition despite the violation of
petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases although it dismissed motu
proprio several election offense cases from the 2010, 2013, and 2016 NLEs
on the same ground, COMELEC violated petitioners' right to the equal
protection of laws; 39 5) An Waray is being stripped of its membership in the
HoR for an alleged offense that was committed over 10 years ago in 2013; 40
and 6) the alleged violation of the election law has already prescribed because
under Section 267 41 of the Omnibus Election Code42 (OEC), election offenses
shall prescribe after five years reckoned from the date of commission. 43
32
SEC. 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. - Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed
by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or
coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
33
See ro!lo, pp. 111-112.
34
Id. at 43.
35
Id at 55.
36
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provii:led by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.
37
SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
38
Rollo, pp. 61-65.
39
Id. at 64-65.
40
See id. at 60.
41
SECTION 267. Prescription. - Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their
commission. If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of
prescription shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and
executory.
42
Batas Pambansa Big. 881 (1985).
43
Rollo, pp. 65-66.
Petitioners additionally pray for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order
(WPI/TRO/SQAO) against the execution of the assailed Resolutions which
will cause irreparable injury on An Waray as a duly elected and registered
party-list for many years. 44
In the Resolution 45 dated August 29, 2023, the Court En Banc required
both COMELEC and private respondents to file their respective comments on
the Petition and application for injunctive relief.
In its Comment, 46 filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,

COMELEC contends that: 1) the issue in this case is not Victoria's continued
membership in Congress since she has already ceased to discharge her official
duties, but An Waray's entitlement to participate in the party-list elections and
COMELEC was vested with the jurisdiction to determine the same; 47 2) while
NBOC ResolutionNo. 0008-13 named An Waray as an initial winner garnering
1
two seats in the HoR, this did not equate to COMELEC's proclamation of
Victoria as required under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7941 for party-list
representatives; 48 3) petitioners should be deemed to have waived their right to
a speedy disposition of the case due to their failure to timely invoke the same,
until an unfavorable resolution was already issued against them by
COMELEC; 49 and 4) their claim of prescription is not tenable because the
present case is not an election offense case. 50
COMELEC also opposes the prayer for the issuance of a

WPI/TRO/SQAO, arguing that petitioners have no clear legal right to
participate in the party-list elections as this is a mere privilege granted to those
compliant with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941, and that there is no
urgency warranting the grant of these provisional remedies since the
subsequent party-list elections is slated to happen much later in 2025. 51
Private respondents, on the other hand, allege: 1) that their petition

sought'to cancel the registration of An Waray as a party-list organization, a
matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of COMELEC; it was neither
a case to disqualify Victoria nor a petition for quo warranto against her; 52 2)
moreover, as Victoria was not a validly proclaimed Member of the HoR,
COMELEC retained jurisdiction over contests relating to her election, returns,
and qualifications; 53 3) there was no prescription because An Waray's acts
were unconstitutional, thus, cannot prescribe; 54 and 4) because An Waray
44
id. at 67-70.
45
id. at471-A-471-B.
46
Id. at 517-545.
47
Id. at 530.
48
Id. at 531-533.
49 Id. at 537-538.
50
Id. at 538.
51
Id. at 538-540.
52
id. at 592-596.
53
Id. at 618--619.
54
Id. at 627--630.
failed to raise violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases before

COMELEC, they effectively waived the same. 55
Private respondents also oppose the issuance of a WPI/TRO/SQAO,

raising the same arguments as COMELEC above. 56
Finally, private respondents emphasize that in accordance with the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the assailed Resolutions
have become final and executory as, in fact, an entry of judgment has been
made on September 19, 2023. 57
i
Later, petitioners filed a Manifestation, 58 informing the Court that Bern

has received an official communication from the Secretary General of the
HoR that he has been dropped from the HoR' s Roll of Members in view of
the finality of the assailed CO:l\1ELEC En Banc Resolution. Petitioners
reiterated the urgent need for the issuance of a SQAO in view of the actual
and irreparable damage being suffered by Bern and . the electorate he
represents.
In their Supplemental Comment/Opposition, 59 private respondents

additionally aver that since Acidre was originally the second nominee and he
resigned only on May 29, 2013, which COMELEC only accepted on July 16,
2013, Victoria was not yet the second nominee entitled to the additional seat
when she took her oath of office on July 13, 2013. 60 They also filed a separate
Comment/Opposition to Petitioner's Manifestation, 61 reiterating petitioners'
alleged failure to establish their entitlement to injunctive relief.
Issues
I) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled An
Waray's registration as a party-list organization.
2) Whether the HRET, not COMELEC, has jurisdiction to cancel An

Waray's registration as a party-list whose nominees became a
Member of the HoR.
3) Whether An Waray's constitutional right to speedy disposition of

cases was violated by COMELEC.
55
Id at 631-632.
56
Id at 632-634.
57
Id at 585 and 701-703.
58
Id. at 706-715.
59
Id. at 724-759.
60
Id. at 743-744.
61
Id. at 807-821.
' '
4) Whether the petition to cancel the registration of An W aray as a

party-list has already prescribed.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, the Court resolves the issue of jurisdiction. Specifically,

An Waray alleges that the BRET has exclusive jurisdiction over the case
because Bern and Victoria had already become members of the HoR.
Respondents counter that it is COMELEC which has jurisdiction, as clearly
and categorically provided in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941.
The significance of this issue in the present case is that if it is the HRET that
has sole jurisdiction, then the same likewise excludes the Court and only after
the HRET has decided and such decision has been brought to the Court on
petition for review can the Court properly take cognizance of the case.
It is well to mention that the COMELEC-HRET jurisdiction issue is a

staple issue raised in virtually every case involving the qualifications or
eligibilities of candidates for Congress and the Senate which are filed with
these two bodies or with the Court, if the same are resolved after such
I
candidates have already won in the elections. In most of these cases, the
underlying issue of whether the candidate has already legally become a
Member of the HoR oftentimes becomes the determinant question, the answer
to which identifies the body having jurisdiction. Thus, in most of these cases,
the controversy and the arguments revolved around the requisites of becoming
a Member of the HoR, that is: I) a valid proclamation, 2) a valid oath of office,
and 3) assumption to the office sought.
This is not, however, the determinant issue in this case. That Bern and
Victoria became HoR Members and the relevant dates therefor are facts which
are not contested. The issue here is whether the cancellation of An Waray's
registration falls under the HRET' s jurisdiction on account of its effect upon
the status ofBem's membership in the HoR and the validity ofVictoria's past
membership therein. Stated otherwise, the jurisdiction issue here relates more
to the nature of the action filed, assuming as a given that petitioner party-list
won in the last elections and has a nominee sitting as a Member of the HoR.
COMELEC has the exclusive

jurisdiction to rule on the cancellation of
An Waray's party-list registration, as it
is categorically provided such power to
cancel party-list registrations under the
law.
Foremost, as jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, reference to the

Constitution or statute is necessary. The main case from which the present
certiorari petition stemmed, is a petition for the cancellation of An Waray's

party-list registration. Hence, to determine which body possesses jurisdiction
over the case, one need only to refer to the law conferring the same.
Jurisdiction over cancellation of party-list registrations is categorically

conferred by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 on COMELEC, thus:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
( 1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or

fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered. (Emphasis supplied)
This power of COMELEC is recognized in the Constitution, as it

likewise grants to COMELEC the concomitant power to register party-list
organizations. Article IX-C, Section 2 provides:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,

organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens'
arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall

likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their

agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related
to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation oftheir registration with
the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
'f:he power of COMELEC to register party-lists is echoed in Republic

Act No. 7941, which confers upon COMELEC the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction to act on petitions for registration of party-lists, after the same is
published and after the parties are given due notice and hearing. Needless to
say, the discretion of COMELEC when it acts on petitions for registration
includes denying such petitions. Republic Act No. 7941 provides:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - (a) The party-list system is a

mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.
SEC. 5. Registration. - Any organized group of persons may

register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before
the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire
to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the
petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision
but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Clearly, both the Constitution and the statute-Republic Act No.

7941-' categorically vest in COMELEC the power and authority to decide on
matters relating to an organization's participation in the party-list
system-from the grant or denial of its petition for registration as a party,
organization or coalition to participate in the party-list elections, to the
cancellation of a previously granted registration.
The HRET does not have jurisdiction

over petitions to cancel the registration of
party-lists, including those whose
nominees are incumbent Members of the
HoR. 1
Despite the unequivocal mandate of the law and the Constitution on

COMELEC's jurisdiction over party-list registrations, the question of which
between COMELEC and the HRET has jurisdiction over the petition to cancel
An Waray's party-list registration is still a fair one to ask under the
circumstances. In fact, as mentioned, this is a recurring issue raised in virtually
every similar election case filed in either COMELEC or the HRET, and one
that, as in the instant Petition, is oftentimes even brought up on review with
this Court.
This is because, unlike the general concept of jurisdiction in that once

it is acquired by a court over a subject matter, its authority over the case
attaches until final judgment is rendered, 62 the jurisdiction of COMELEC over
cases involving the qualifications and eligibilities of candidates for
representatives in the HoR transfers to the HRET when such candidates win
and thereby assume office before the case filed before COMELEC is finally
decided by it.
This peculiar phenomenon is a function of the fact that the respective

jurisdictions of COMELEC and the HRET are exclusive and that they arise
successively with a very short window of time in between. This exclusivity
remains even in a case involving the same candidate and the same subject
matter.
To illustrate, a petition to disqualify can only be filed after the deadline

for the filing of a CoC and until the date of proclamation of the winners. 63 A
petition to cancel or deny due course to a CoC must be filed within five days
from the deadline to file CoCs64 until 25 days from when such assailed CoC
was actually filed. 65 This deadline to file CoCs normally falls about three
months before the election date. 66
62
Peoplf! v. Montilla, G.R. Nos. 24 I91 I & 242375, February 8, 2023 [Per J. Singh, Third Division] at 8.
This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
63
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 25, sec. 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. - The petition shall be filed any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
64
Before the start of the Campaign Period which is 90 to 15 days, depending on the position sought.
65
Section 78 of the OEC provides:
SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
66
Under the Omnibus Election Code, it cannot be beyond the start of the Campaign Period, which, in tum,
is set on a per candidate basis but the longest is 90 days. (OEC, Sec. 3)
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the HRET, following

jurisprudence, arises after a candidate has been elected, proclaimed, has taken
the proper oath of office and then assumed the position of Member of the HoR.
Under normal circumstances, such assumption coincides with the start of the
term of the office which is on June 30 following the elections. 67
As such, petitions for disqualification and petitions to cancel/deny due

course to a CoC of a winning candidate for Member of the HoR only has a
lifetime of about four months, before the jurisdiction of the HRET arises, at
which point such petitions must be dismissed-by COMELEC or by this
Court if on review-because the HRET' s own jurisdiction has arisen ousting
all other bodies of authority to take cognizance of the case. This situation
occurs regardless of whether an actual case is filed before the HRET. In other
words, COMELEC-or the Court on review-is without discretion but to
dismiss the case pending before it if the HRET' s jurisdiction has already
attached because the respondent candidate has already become a Member of
theHoR.
Thus, in cases pending with COMELEC-or the Court on

review-involving incumbent members of the HoR and the resolution of
which case can lead to the removal of such members, the relevant question to
ask is this: does the case fall under the HRET's exclusivejurisdiction so that
COMELEC-or the Court-will have to dismiss the same for having lost its
own jurisdiction over the case?
In the case of the petition to cancel An Waray's registration, the answer

to this question is "no."
To recall, petitioners' insistence on the HRET's jurisdiction over the

case is grounded on the fact that Victoria had already assumed her position as
a Member of the HoR when Abang Lingkod was promulgated (which
allocated, with finality, only one seat to An Waray, leaving none for Victoria
to sit in as the second nominee). Further, they argue that the resolution of the
instant Petition is dependent on a finding of Victoria's valid proclamation.
Thus, this issue is covered by the word "returns" in Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution on the HRET' s jurisdiction.
During the deliberations, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier

(Justice Javier) manifested support for this proposition, saying that
COMELEC cannot be given a carte blanche jurisdiction when it comes to the
registration and cancellation of party-list organizations. According to Justice
Javier, although the original cause is the cancellation of the party-list's
registration, the result is the removal of a sitting Member of the HoR. Hence,
Justice Javier opines that it is the HRET which should have exclusive
jurisdiction over the instant Petition.
67
See CONST., art. VI, sec. 4.
l
Again, jurisdiction being conferred by law, reference here should be

made to the law providing for the HRET' s jurisdiction. That law is no less
than the Constitution, which states in Article VI:
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall

each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge ofall contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis supplied)
This is echoed in the HRET's Rules of Procedure68 (HRET Rules):
RULE 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all

contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ofthe Members
of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there

must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation;
(2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
What is clear from these provisions is the intent of its framers to limit
the jurisdiction of the HRET to only contests relating to the election, returns
and qu~lifications ofMembers of the HoR.
Article VI, Section 17 may, thus, be broken down into two tiers: 1) as
to the nature of the action-that is, that it must be a contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the respondent; and 2) as to the status
of the respondent-that is, he or she must be a Member of the HoR, which, in
tum, requires the concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the second
paragraph of Rule 15, i.e., (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath of office;
and (c) an assumption to the office of a Representative.
In Javier v. COMELEC69 (Javier), the Court had the occasion to

dissect the nature of a case that falls under the BRET' s jurisdiction.
.Specifically, Javier defined the phrase "elections, returns, and
qualifications," to wit:
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be

interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct ofthe polls, including the listing ofvoters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
68
THE 2015 REVISED RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRlBUNAL (2015).
69
228 Phil. 193 ( I 986) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications"
to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy
ofhis certificate of candidacy. 70 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the present case, the component issues of the main jurisdiction
question are: a) whether the respondent An Waray in the petition for
cancellation of registration as party-list is an incumbent Member of the HoR;
and b) whether the nature of the case is one of a contest relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of An Waray.
In ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. COMELEC' 1

(ABC), the Court held that although it is the party-list that voters vote for
during the elections, it is its nominee who sits as a Member of the HoR and
who must observe all the qualifications therefor under Article VI of the
.Constitution. 72 This distinction is important in determining which between the
HRET and COMELEC has jurisdiction over a case affecting a party-list who
-has a nominee sitting as an incumbent representative in the HoR. As it is the
nominee--and not the party-list- who is the Member of the HoR, then the
HRETi s jurisdiction is limited only to cases involving the election, returns,
and qualifications of the sitting nominee, and not those of the party-list.
This is the Court's ruling in ABC, when it affirmed COMELEC's

jurisdiction over petitions to cancel party-list registrations, while likewise
taking care to distinguish this from the power of the HRET over
determinations of qualifications of individual members of the HoR, including
nominees of such party-list organizations. The Court held:
[T]he Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political

parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the
registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the
COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 ofR.A. No. 7941, which provides:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of

Registration. - The Comelec may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of
the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,

organization or association organized for religious purposes;
70
Id. at 205-206.
71
66 l Phil. 452 (20 l l) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
72
Id. at 462.
It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
In the case ofthe party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET

that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although
it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a
member of the House of Representatives. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the present case involving a petition to cancel the party-list

registration of An Waray, as An Waray is not a Member of the HoR, the case
cannot fall under the HRET' s jurisdiction. CO1\.1ELEC, thus, retains its
jurisdiction over such cases pursuant to Republic Act No. 7941 and the
Constitution, as discussed above ..
Neither can Victoria's membership in the HoR trigger the jurisdiction

of the HoR. Apart from her not being the respondent in the main petition for
cancellation, she is likewise not an incumbent HoR Member, as her term has
long ended. Inasmuch as the respondent in an election case must have already
been proclaimed as winner in the elections, had taken the proper oath of office,
and had assumed as Member of the HoR, he or she must still possess such
status, i.e., his or her term has not ended, in order for the HRET to retain
jurisdiction over questions on the respondent's election, returns, and
qualifications. Here, Victoria had long ceased to be a Member of the HoR;
thus, any ruling on this specific issue will no longer affect her as such Member,
such issue being ripe only insofar as it determines whether An Waray
committed a ground to cancel its registration.
Moreover, while it is true that the removal of An Waray from the

registered list of party-lists will necessarily cause the removal of its
representative in the HoR for the 2022 to 2025 term-Bern Noel--the same
1
cannot, of and by that fact alone, trigger the jurisdiction of the HRET. Apart
from Bern, like Victoria, not being the respondent in the main petition to
cancel registration, the nature of the case itself is not one of a contest relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of a Member of the HoR.
The Court cannot subscribe to the submission of An W aray that as the

case concerns the validity of the proclamation of Victoria, the same falls under
the definition of a contest involving the returns of an HoR Member. Again,
Victoria is no longer an incumbent Member. Moreover, the case is not a
cont~st involving the returns of Victoria inasmuch as it is merely a petition for
the deregistration as a party-list of An Waray.
That the nominee, not the party-list, is the Member of the HoR is all the
more evident when one examines the requisites to becoming such a Member,
73
.Id. at i46 1-462.
as already settled in jurisprudence--that the candidate has been previously

proclaimed winner, that he or she had taken the proper oath of office, and that
he or she had assumed office as a Member of the HoR. 74 Evidently, a party-
list, having merely a juridical personality, is incapable of satisfying all three
requirements. In fact, as repeatedly emphasized in the present case by
respondents-as to the first requisite of proclamation, the law requires that a
CoP be issued specifically in favor ofthe nominee who shall be taking a seat
in the HoR for the party-list, which must be different from any such certificate
that may have been issued to the party-list. It is the CoP in favor of the
nomine'e which works to satisfy the requisite of proclamation under the law.
Further, it is, in fact, the happening of these three requisites which

triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET, and consequently divests COMELEC
of its own jurisdiction. The case of Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC7 5 (Vinzons-
Chato), which was also quoted in the instant Petition, 76 is instructive.
According to Vinzons-Chato, "once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken [their] oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to [their] election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's
own jurisdiction begins." 77
However, emphasis should likewise be made on the fact that the

jurisdiction that is transferred to the HRET is not absolute, as shown in
Vinzons-Chato. What is transferred is not all actions cognizable by
COMELEC, and not even all pertaining to the candidate-cum-HoR Member.
Only those contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
such Member is transferred. Any other case is retained under COMELEC's
jurisdiction, including those pertaining to the Member himself or herself.
Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination would the action of cancelling a
party-list's registration possibly fall under this classification in Vinzons-
Chato.
Further, the grounds for cancellation under Republic Act No. 7941
pertain to the party-list and not the sitting Member or its
nominee/representative. Not only is this distinction clear under the law, 78 but
it has also been interpreted by the Court this way. An example is the Court's
pronouncement in Abang Lingkod when it was ruled that "a declaration of an
untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6) of R.A.
No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of
registration under the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification ofthe
party, organization or coalition under the party-list system."79 Nowhere in the
Constitption, Republic Act No. 7941, or the HRET Rules is the HRET given
74
See Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 712 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
1s Id.
76
Ruffo, pp. 32-35.
77
Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, supra note 74, at 725-726. (Citation omitted)
78
Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), sec. 6.
79
Abang lingkod Party List v. COMELEC, supra note 15, at 143. (Emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction over party-list organizations. This interpretation is also found in

COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, 80
when it ruled in this wise:
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply

with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the
cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group's registration.
Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for
cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and
regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one
that is primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly
confined to an individual member or its nominee. 81 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction between COMELEC's and the HRET's jurisdictions

over party-lists and their nominees is, again, emphasized in Abayon v.
HRET, 82 wherein the Court held that, in the case of party-list
nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests
relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. 83
I
During the deliberations, Justice Javier suggested that as the petition to

cancel the registration of An Waray as party-list will necessarily lead to the
removal of its then sitting nominee in the HoR-Bem Noel---then the HRET
must have jurisdiction; that regardless of the nature of the case, the fact is that
its effects will lead to the disqualification of a Member of the HoR.
This is erroneous.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law on the basis of a case's subject matter.

A simple reading of the HRET' s jurisdiction under the Constitution shows
that it is not concerned with the effects of a case, but rather with its subject
matter or nature-that is, again, the case must be a contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of a Member of the HoR.
The Court cannot give paramount consideration to the effects of a case,

1
over its nature or subject matter, in determining jurisdiction. To see the effects
of the cancellation as determinative of which body has the power to make the
cancellation is to make the tail wag the dog. That a party-list nominee will
cease to be a Member of the HoR because of the cancellation of the party-
list's registration does not mean that it is the HRET that has the jurisdiction.
Such a view will be contrary to the above-quoted constitutional and statutory
80
716 Phil. 19 (2013) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
81
Id. at 30.
82
626 Phil. 346 (2010) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
83
Id. at 352 as cited in ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. COMELEC, supra note 71, at
462.
Decisio~ 19 G.R. No. 268546
prov1s1ons empowering CO:l\1ELEC to be the body to make such a

determination.
Such a view will likewise unnecessarily convolute the jurisdiction of

the HRET far beyond the limits which the Constitution provides-that is, only
over contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
HoR. Such a view will then place under the HRET's jurisdiction other cases
which may remove a sitting Member, even when the resolutions of such cases
do not involve the election, returns, and qualifications of the Member. Prime
examples of this are criminal or administrative cases which carry the
accessory penalties of disqualification from holding public office. To be sure,
such accessory penalties are imposed, not by electoral tribunals, but by the
courts of justice or other bodies which have jurisdiction over the main
administrative or criminal case.
In the landmark Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 84 the Court held that COMELEC

had the positive duty, with or without a petition filed therefor, to cancel the CoC
of Romeo G. Jalosjos who was previously convicted by final judgment of
statutory rape and carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification under Article 41 ofthe Revised Penal Code.
Similarly, in Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal 85 (Ty-Delgado), the Court held that libel is a crime involving moral
turpitude which results in the disqualification of a convict to hold public
office for five years after his or her service of sentence following Section 12
of the OEC. In Ty-Delgado, there was already a final conviction for four
counts of libel by the Court which the HRET failed to consider in
disqualifying Philip A. Pichay (Pichay ). This was eventually reversed by the
Court which declared that Pichay was ineligible to sit as Member of the
HoR. 86 It should be emphasized that it was the regular courts that convicted
Pichay pf libel.
If the Court were to allow the jurisdiction of the HRET to be determined,

not by the nature of a case, but by its effects (i.e., whether it can cause the
disqualification or removal of a sitting Member of the HoR), then-extreme
as it may be-cases such as criminal complaints for statutory rape or libel
against sitting Members must be dismissed by a regular court of law in
deference to the purported "exclusive" jurisdiction of the HRET over its
members. Such notion clearly goes against the tenets of subject matter
jurisdiction and even of common sense. Obviously, the ultimate effect of a
case in removing a sitting Member cannot be the sole basis for determining
jurisdiction. Not only is this conclusion in line with the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws, but it also ensures that the proper checks and balances are in
place.
84
71 I Phil. 414 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
85
779 Phil. 268 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
86
Id at 286-287.
An Waray 's right to speedy disposition

ofcases was not violated by COMELEC.
An W aray argues for the dismissal of the petition to cancel its

registration on the basis that COMELEC violated its right to speedy
disposition of cases after having incurred an inordinate delay of four years in
resolving the case.
UJnder the COMELEC Rules, a division of COMELEC has 10 days to

resolve a case from the time it is deemed submitted for such resolution,
whereas the COMELEC En Banc has 30 days to resolve a motion for
reconsideration of such a division's decision, reckoned also from the time that
the case is deemed submitted for decision. Here, the petition to cancel An
Waray's party-list registration was filed in May of 2019. The COMELEC
Division granted the same in June of 2023, and the COMELEC En Banc, later
in August 2023, affirmed its Division on motion for reconsideration.
Thus, there is no denying that COMELEC did, in fact, incur in delay of

almost four years in resolving the petition.
Despite this delay, during the deliberations for this case, Associate
Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (Justice Gaerlan), citing the landmark case of
Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City87 ( Cagang), opined
that there was no violation of An Waray's right to a speedy disposition of
cases. Justice Gaerlan cited the following factors in arriving at such
conclu~ion: 1) An Waray had waived its right to speedy disposition of cases
as it failed to raise the same in the four years that the case was pending with
COMELEC; and 2) the delay caused no actual prejudice to petitioners as even
after the petition was filed and remained pending in 2019 and 2022, An Waray
was still able to participate, and, in fact, was still able to win seats in the HoR
in both election years.
The Court agrees that there was no violation of An W aray' s right to

speedy disposition of cases despite the four-year delay of COMELEC in
resolving the petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration. This
conclusion is stronger in the context of the.nature of the case filed against An
Waray being one of an administrative nature vis-a-vis the criminal case
involved in Cagang.
The Court in Cagang clarified the distinction between the two rights
involved under Sections 14(2) and 16 of the Constitution, namely: (1) Right
to SpeJdy Trial; and (2) Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases. According to
the Court:
[T]he right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to

• speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to
87
837 Phil. 815 (2018) [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of

law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked
before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right
to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked. 88
Cagang likewise recognized that, apart from criminal cases, the right
to speedy disposition of cases also applies to administrative cases before any
tribunal, but qualifies such administrative cases as those which are
adversarial and may result in criminal prosecution, to wit:
While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law, the
right to speedy disposition ofcases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or
administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may result
in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition of cases is most
commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these
proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. 89 (Emphasis
supplied)
As recognized in the preceding paragraph, these cases or matters

includJ preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman90 or by
the various prosecutor's offices. In fact, a perusal of the guidelines set forth
in Cagang suggests that its application might even be limited to criminal
proceedings, either at the preliminary investigation stage or criminal cases
already filed in court, to wit:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the

right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right
to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts
of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked
before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is
that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right
to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal

complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods
for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and
Auances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the
filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of
proof If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in
current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that
will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs
88
Id. at 880.
89
Id. at 849.
90 Id.
beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has
the burden ofjustifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether
the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is
attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not
contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution

must prove first, that ii follo'wed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation ar,zd in the prosecution of the case; second, that
the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.

Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is [f there is an allegation that the

prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the
case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite
utter lack ofevidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of
the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is
properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed without need o.ffurther analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver ofthe accused to the right to

speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven
that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no
longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the

qelays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
l
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy

trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition
of cases. 91 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Thus, even as Cagang categorically acknowledged the application of

the right to speedy disposition of cases in administrative cases, it nonetheless
focused only on such administrative cases that can result in criminal
indictments.
A purely administrative case that tackled this right is Abella v.

Commission on Audit Proper 92 (Abella), a case which involved the
disallowances of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, where the Court
91
Id. at i880-882.
92
G.R. No. 238940, April 19, 2022 [Per J.M. Lopez, En Banc].
emphasized therein the need to allege and prove that the party invoking the
right must have suffered an actual, specific, and real injury for the claim of
violation of such right to prosper, thus:
Moreover, petitioners failed to seasonably question the violation of

their right to speedy disposition, if at all. Throughout the proceedings
before the COA Regional Office and the COA Proper, petitioners never
asserted their right. They could have filed a manifestation or a motion for
e,arly resolution of their case before the COA Regional Office, or invoked
I
their right before the COA Proper on appeal, but did not do so. Instead, in
a last-ditch attempt to seek a favorable resolution, petitioners raise this
alleged constitutional violation for the first time in this petition. Certainly,
this lapse deprived the COA of the opportunity to address the issue and
beclouded petitioners' invocation of inordinate delay. We emphasize that
the right to speedy disposition of cases is not a last line of remedy when
parties find themselves on the losing end of the proceedings.
. . . [T]he sheer length of time, without allegation and proof of

prejudice to the party invoking the right, does not equate to an inordinate
delay to justify the nullification of the COA Proper issuances. The right to
speedy disposition of cases is not a magical invocation that can
automatically compel courts or any justice-administering agency to rule in
one's favor. To sustain a violation of this right, there must be an actual,
specific, and real injury to the claimant's rights as a result ofthe delay, not
mere conjectural supplications ofprejudice or generalized invocation ofthe
constitutional right. A claim ofprejudice, if at all, must have a conclusive
and/actual basis. 93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A comparison of Cagang and Abella shows a contrast on the degree of

strictness that the Court observed in deciding whether a claim for violation of
one's right to speedy disposition of cases can prosper. Specifically, Abella
went as far as requiring an actual, specific, and real injury to the claimant's
right which, further, must have conclusive and factual basis. Such requirement
does not obtain in Cagang. Thus, Abella appears to have set a higher standard
in proving such violation than Cagang.
This differential treatment between criminal cases and others, including

administrative cases, vis-a-vis proving a violation of one's right to speedy
disposition of cases becomes logical when one investigates the rationale
behind this right as applied to criminal cases-that is, it seeks to prevent the
.oppressive nature of criminal cases from looming indefinitely over the
respondent. In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 94 the Court pronounced:
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition

of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression ofthe citizen
by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time,
and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
93
Id at 6-7. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court
website.
94
484 Phil. 899 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated

only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been
denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of
a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. 95 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, criminal proceedings are a class ofits own in light of the highly
burdensome effects it imposes upon the person being investigated or indicted.
One faces the terrifying possibility of arrest and detention, even pending
resolution of the case. In addition, pending criminal cases normally appear in
an individual's records that can greatly hamper his or her employability or
besmirch his career or profession.
The Court has likewise recognized that criminal prosecution can validly
impair one's right to travel; 96 in fact, a precautionary hold departure order can
•· already be issued even before a formal indictment. 97 On a social level, a
criminal complaint lodged against one, of and by itself, and even in the
absence of a conviction, already creates a stigma which subjects the person to
humili~tion and ridicule. All told, criminal prosecution, prior to a case filed in
court, damages a person's reputation to a level that can substantially prejudice
him or her psychologically, socially, and economically.
Considering these factors, it is but reasonable that the Constitution

more vigorously guard the people against the State's delay in criminal
proceedings as compared to other types of cases. The grave effects of a long-
standing preliminary investigation, for example, does not apply to purely
administrative cases, such as the one at hand. To stress, the petition to cancel
An Waray's registration as a party-list organization is not tantamount to a
criminal prosecution. There are no rights of an accused on the line, and the
toll upon the respondent of a pending administrative case is nowhere near as
inimical as a long-standing criminal prosecution.
It appears, thus, that the need to distinguish as to the nature of a case

vis-a-vis granting a claim of violation of the right to speedy disposition of
cases boils down to the evils which the right seeks to prevent. In criminal
cases, an accused or respondent need not show actual injury because the
restrictions and limitations on fundamental rights come with the indictment
and investigation as shown above. The same, however, cannot be said for
administrative cases-thus, for a claimant to successfully hurdle a claim of
violation of this right, it is imperative to prove actual injury caused by the
purported delay as elucidated in Abella.
On this point, the Court agrees with Justice Gaerlan-·-An W aray utterly
failed to show any prejudice or injury that resulted from the pendency of the
95
Id. at 9 I 7.
96
Pichay, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 903 Phil. 271 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third
Division].
97
A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order (2018), secs. I and 2.
i
petition with CO1\1ELEC. In fact, during this period, An Waray participated

in and won the elections, thus securing a seat in the present Congress.
Further, considering that in administrative cases such as the one at hand,

the burden is placed on the party invoking the right to prove its violation, and
considering the evils of an administrative case compared to criminal cases, the
Court likewise holds, as pointed out by Justice Gaerlan, that An Waray's own
delay in invoking its right is tantamount to waiver or acquiescence to
COMELEC's delay on the part of An Waray.
The petition to cancel An Waray 's party-

list registration has not prescribed under
Section 267 of the OEC because this law
applies1only to election offenses.
Petitioners allege that the action to cancel An Waray's party-list

registration had already prescribed in accordance with Section 267 of the OEC,
which reads:
SECTION 267. Prescription. - Election offenses shall prescribe

after five years from the date of their commission. If the discovery of the
offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of prescription
shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such proceedings
becomes final and executory. (Sec. 185, Id) (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, Sections 261 and 262 of the OEC specify the acts which
constitute an election offense. A perusal of the said provisions in the OEC
shows that a petition to cancel a party-list's registration is not among the acts
considered as an election offense. In statutory construction, the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all
others. The rule is expressed in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Indubitably, the petition to cancel An Waray's registration has not prescribed
under Section 267 of the OEC as it is not an election offense.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7941-the main law governing the party-
list system in the Philippines-is silent as to the period of filing of a petition
to cancel party-list registration. So is the COMELEC Rules.
Neither can petitioners find refuge in the New Civil Code, specifically
Article 1149 thereof, which provides:
ART. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this
Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the
right of action accrues. (n)
Article 1149 of the New Civil Code is inapplicable in this case. As held
in Spouses Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 98 this provision refers to
98
660 Phil. 368 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
prescription of actions. An action is "defined as an ordinary suit in a court of

justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 99 The petition
to cancel An Waray's party-list registration is clearly not an ordinary action
•filed in court for Article 1149 to apply.
In Dayao v. COMELEC 100 (Dayao), the Court likened an accreditation

or registration of an organization under the party-list law to a franchise granted
by the Congress, in that it is not a right but merely a privilege that is conferred
by the granting authority-COMELEC in the case of registration of party-
lists. Such organizations become juridical entities only when they are granted
registration or accreditation. Relevant to the question of prescription, the
Court in Dayao likewise declared that, like a congressional franchise, an
accreditation or registration can never become fmal or irrevocable, and the
granting authority can always review the accreditation it extended and revoke
the same at will, thus:
Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list

organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or
associations created under the Corporation Code.
Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from

a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a legislative power. It may,
however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which
the power has been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of a franchise may be made.
The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for

registration of any corporation or partnership is vested with the SEC by
virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No. 7941, on the other
hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to
grant franchises in the form of accreditation to people's organization
desirous of participating in the party-list system of representation.
Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical

entities only when they are granted registration by the SEC in the same way
that people's organizations obtain legal existence as a party-list group only
upon their accreditation with the COMELEC. A party-list organization, like
a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise
fi'om the State, thru the COMELEC.
Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority

upon the existence of certain conditions. The power to revoke and grounds
for revocation are aptly provided in Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A, for
corporations and Section 6 ofR.A. No. 7941 for party-list organizations.
99
Id. at 386. (Citation omitted)
100
702 Phil. 348 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that

it can never be final and conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading
tb the grant ofthe franchise/accreditation can never attain.finality as well.
Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain
perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants
it. The circumstances of the grantee are subject to constant review and the
franchise/accreditation from which it derives its existence may be
suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority. 101 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, Republic Act No. 7941 expressly recognizes COMELEC's

power to review and cancel registrations it already extended to party-list
groups. That it does not limit the exercise of this power to a specific period
means that, consistent with the rationale in Dayao, it can exercise the same at
any time. In short, it does not prescribe.
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse

of discretion when it cancelled An
Waray 's registration as a party-list.
Having settled that COMELEC properly exercised jurisdiction over the

petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration, and that such action did
not, as it does not, prescribe, the only issue left to settle at this point is whether
COMELEC, in exercising its jurisdiction over the case, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of such jurisdiction.
It did not.
To recall, An Waray's party-list registration was cancelled by

COMELEC on the basis of Section 6(5) of Republic Act No. 7941, which
provides as a ground for such cancellation any violation of, or failure to
comply with, laws, rules or regulations relating to elections committed by a
.registered party-list. COMELEC found that An Waray's act of aiding or, at
the very least, allowing Victoria to assume a second seat in the 16th Congress
back in 2013, despite knowledge that it was only entitled to one seat and that
Victoria was, in fact, not proclaimed by COMELEC, constituted a violation
of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7941, which reads:
SEC. 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. - Party-list

representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of
names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to
the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
As to this point, the Court finds COMELEC to have erred. A simple

reading of the provision shows that it is a directive to COMELEC itself to
proclaim the winning party-list representatives according to their rankings in
the list of names submitted by such party-lists. Being that the provision speaks
101
Id at 370-371.
of COMELEC's duty and responsibility to make such proclamation, it defies

logic to find An Waray to have violated or failed to comply with the same.
Again, it was not its responsibility to obtain such proclamation under Section
13. Its failure to do so cannot be regarded as a violation of this section.
Nevertheless, An Waray did commit a violation of, or a failure to

comply with, a law, thus warranting the cancellation of its party-list
registration. The law is NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 which,
applying BANAT, clearly and unequivocally declared the number of seats that
An W aray was entitled to-ONE:
Applying the Banat formula using Party-List Canvass Report No.

11, after deducting the votes for the disqualified party-list groups, but
rhaintaining the votes for SENIOR CITIZENS in view of the pendency of
its case before the Supreme Court, and the votes for ABANG LINGKOD
considering the reversal of the cancellation of its registration by the
Supreme Court, the computation shows that PBA is not entitled to a party-
list seat. To illustrate:
Rank Party-List Votes % of Votes Guaranteed Additional Total

Garnered as Garnered Seats (1 st Seat (2 nd Seats
of28 May (A) Round)(B) •Round)=
2013 (58-14)(A)
....
15 AN 541,205 1.96 N.A. 0.86 I 102
WARAY
Despite notice of such resolution indicating that it secured only one seat
in the HoR after the 2013 NLE, An Waray continued to occupy a second seat
•through Victoria until the end of her term. This was a clear defiance ofNBOC
Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 in relation to Section 6(5) of Republic
Act No. 7941.
Other factors also show An Waray's lack of penitence leading to its

violation ofNBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14.
First, NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 expressly stated that the

declaration of seats allocated to the party-list groups mentioned (which
included An Waray which was then allocated two seats) was "without
prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions
which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or
additional seat[.]" 103 True enough, NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-
14 was thereafter issued and the same recomputed and finally allocated to An
Waray only ONE seat.
Second, An W aray knew that it lacked Victoria's CoP and that the same
was necessary for her to become a Member of the HoR. An Waray, in fact,
102
Rollo, pp. 91-92.
103
Id. at 60 I. (Emphasis supplied)
wrote COMELEC a letter-request for a CoP, proclaiming Victoria as being

entitled to a seat in the HoR:
"I am writing in behalf of the AN WARAY Party-List and this is in

connection with the Certification of Proclamation being issued by your good
office to the nominees of the Proclaimed Party-List Groups. We have been
informed that insofar as concerns the AN WARAY Party-List you will issue said
Certification in favor ofMr. Neil Benedict A. Montejo only, our first nominee.
:
In this regard, may we point out that on May 28, 2013, the
Commission (sitting as National Board ofCanvassers) promulgated NBOC
Resolution No. 0008-13 and proclaimed the AN WARAY Party-List as one
of the winners in the Party-list elections entitled to Two (2) seats.
Thus, we are respectfully requesting that the Second nominee ofAN

WARAY, Atty. Victoria G. Noel, be likewise issued a Certification of
Proclamation. This request is being made also in order that she can get a
room assignment, organize her staffand more importantly, be able to obtain
Committee memberships in furtherance of the legislative agenda of the AN
WARAY Party-List.["]1°4 (Emphasis in the original)
An Waray's letter belies its argument that NBOC Resolution No. 0008-
.13 was sufficient for Victoria to take her oath and assume office. In fact, the
letter reveals that An Waray was aware that a CoP was necessary for Victoria
to assume office and perform the duties of a congresswoman, such as
organizing her staff and obtaining committee memberships. Yet, despite the
absenc6 of the CoP, Victoria took her oath and assumed office. An Waray's
audacity in deliberately ignoring NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14
was solidified when it chose to let Victoria finish her term despite the
unequivocal wording of the said NBOC Resolution.
Conclusion
In sum, the petition for cancellation of An Waray's registration is

within COMELEC's sole and exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941. It is not a case that falls under the HRET's
jurisdiction; thus, even as An Waray had an incumbent nominee in the HoR
when the petition against it was filed, and which nominee was at risk of being
removed as a consequence of said petition, COMELEC nonetheless retained
jurisdiction.
Moreover, when COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction and cancelled

the registration of An Waray for violating or failing to comply with election
laws, it did so without grave abuse of its discretion. An Waray knowingly and
deliberately allowed, and consciously aided, the assumption of Victoria as its
second nominee in the HoR, despite its knowledge that Victoria lacked a CoP
from COMELEC. Thus, COMELEC was correct in cancelling An Waray's
registration.
104
Id at 549.
Anent the issue of the violation of An Waray's right to speedy

disposition of cases, this does not arise since the present case is merely
administrative in nature, and not criminal. Based on jurisprudence and the
language of the Constitution, the rules for determining a violation of this right
by the State in criminal proceedings, which are meant to protect the rights of
the accused, cannot apply in a purely administrative case such as the one at
hand. Applying stricter parameters in the determination of the right's violation
in the present case, the Court finds that there is no such violation committed
byCOMELEC.
Finally, there can be no prescnpt10n of the action to cancel the

registration of An W aray, as the same is akin to a legislative franchise which
never gains finality or conclusiveness because the granting authority can
always review and revoke the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The

Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order
and/or
.
.Status
I
Quo Ante Order with Motion for Conduct of Special Raffle
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is likewise
DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2023 of the Commission on
Elections Second Division and Resolution dated August 14, 2023 of the
Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 19-008 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
S.CAGUIOA
WE CONCUR:
GESMUNDO
q . . ~ _ Qp ustice
~ -µ-J.__.
RAMPrL.lIERNANDO
Senior Associate Justice Associate Justice
~ .
Su- f)~ (I'. ~--LI--
~~ a voZ.e:·
AM
1 sociate Justice
R HE B.INTING
EDA
: =>~
SAMUEifi:~ RIC
Associate Justice
JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Jo
-M J
T .
As P. MARQUEZ ~ ~ f f i o T.
~~~
KHO: .Jft. ~
ciate Justice Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

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AN WARAY PARTY-LIST, G.R. No. 268546

• Also refe1Ted to as Danilo T. Pomias in some parts of the rollo .

1. Resolution2 dated June 2, 2023 of the COl\lIELEC Second Division,

2. Resolution 3 dated August 14, 2023 of the COl\lIELEC En Banc,

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

An Waray is a duly registered multi-sectoral party-list organization

Thus, in Resolution No. 0006-13 6 dated May 24, 2013 of COMELEC

On May 29, 2013, An Waray's second nominee, Acidre, submitted his

On June 5, 2013, the NBOC issued a Certificate of Proclamation (CoP)

On July 16, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc accepted Acidre's

On August 20, 2014, COMELEC issued NBOC Resolution No. 13-030

In the years following the 2013 NLE, An Waray continued to

On May 10, 2019, Pomias, invoking his alleged standing as a registered

In their Joint Verified Answer, 25 An Waray, represented by their then

Rank Party-List Votes % of Votes Guaranteed Additional Total

Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division

In its assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2023, the CO1\1ELEC Second

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.

Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Law Department of

SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)

The COMELEC Second Division emphasized that NBOC Resolution

Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

In the second assailed Resolution dated August 14, 2023, the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc)

SO ORDERED. 31 (Emphasis in the original)

It ruled that Pomias and Acidre were able to establish by substantial

The Present Petition

Petitioners additionally pray for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

In its Comment, 46 filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,

COMELEC also opposes the prayer for the issuance of a

Private respondents, on the other hand, allege: 1) that their petition

failed to raise violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases before

Private respondents also oppose the issuance of a WPI/TRO/SQAO,

Finally, private respondents emphasize that in accordance with the

Later, petitioners filed a Manifestation, 58 informing the Court that Bern

In their Supplemental Comment/Opposition, 59 private respondents

I) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

2) Whether the HRET, not COMELEC, has jurisdiction to cancel An

3) Whether An Waray's constitutional right to speedy disposition of

4) Whether the petition to cancel the registration of An W aray as a

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, the Court resolves the issue of jurisdiction. Specifically,

It is well to mention that the COMELEC-HRET jurisdiction issue is a

COMELEC has the exclusive

Foremost, as jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, reference to the

certiorari petition stemmed, is a petition for the cancellation of An Waray's

Jurisdiction over cancellation of party-list registrations is categorically

SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. - The

( 1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or