University Institute of Legal Studies,

Chandigarh

BUSINESS LAW PROJECT

MARDIA CHEMICALS V. UNION OF INDIA

Submitted to: Submitted by

Ms. Neha Aditi Verma

University Institute of Legal Roll No.- 187/20

Studies,
8th semester

Section- D

Course – B.COM LL.B

(Hons.)

1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Prof. Shefali Singh who
gave me the golden opportunity to do this project on the topic MARDIA CHEMICALS V.
UNION OF INDIA which helped me in doing a lot of research and it added immensely to my
knowledge. I would also like to thank my family and friends who helped me in finalizing this
project within the given time frame.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 4

BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..................................................................... 4

ISSUE 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 5

ISSUE 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 6

ISSUE 3 ...................................................................................................................................... 7

ISSUE 4 ...................................................................................................................................... 9

DECISION OF THE COURT ................................................................................................... 10

The reasoning of the Court was the following .......................................................................... 10

Rest of the Act was upheld Appraisal of the judgment ............................................................. 11

Relationship with winding up ................................................................................................... 11

THE ADDITION OF EXTRA-STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS .......................................... 13

WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRARINESS .......................................................... 13

THE POWERS UNDERS.13 CAN BE EXERCISED UNDER THE FOLLOWING ............ 14

CONDITIONS .......................................................................................................................... 14

IMPACT OF THE JUDGEMENT ............................................................................................ 15

CONCLUSION -THE WAY FORWARD ................................................................................. 15

WEBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 17
 MARDIA CHEMICALS LTD

UNION OF INDIA

2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 1090

Case Number- Transfer Case (Civil) 92-95 of 2002

Decided On- April 8, 2004

CJ VISHWESHWAR NATH KHARE

J BRIJESH KUMAR

J ARUN KUMAR

INTRODUCTION

Here, the constitutionality of SARFAESI was challenged, particularly §s 13, 15, 17, and 34, on
the grounds that they are arbitrary and unjustified.

IDBI Bank served a notice upon Mardia when the Act came into force. Mardia defaulted-
approached Court where a number of similar petitions were clubbed together and answered
together.

BRIEF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In a notice dated July 24, 2002 to Mardia Chemicals Ltd., the Industrial Development Bank of
India (for short `the IDBI') under § 13 of the Ordinance, then in force, required it to pay the
amount of arrears indicated in the notice within 60 days, failing which the IDBI as a secured
creditor would be entitled to enforce the security interest without intervention of the court or
Tribunal, taking recourse to all or any of the measures contained in sub-§ (4) of § 13 namely,
by taking over possession and/or management of the secured assets. The petitioner was also
required not to transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise any of the secured assets. Similar
notices were issued by other financial institutions and banks under the provisions of § 13 of the
Ordinance/Act to different parties who filed petitions in different High Courts.

This was joined with various writ petitions in various High Courts challenging the validity of
the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
Act, 2002
RELEVANT ACT/§

• Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security

Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002

• Essential Services (Maintenance) Ordinance Repeal Act, 2001

• Transfer of Property Act, 1882

ISSUE 1

Whether it is open to challenge the statute on the ground that it was not necessary to enact it in
the prevailing background particularly when another statute was already in operation

It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act 1993 was enough to meet the challenge posed by NPAs and the present
enactment was not necessary.

It is open to question in determining the Constitutional validity of a statute if it is at all necessary

for the Court to enter into the necessity of a statute. The Supreme Court has held in the past that
that “The Parliament and Legislatures composed of as they are of the Representatives of the
people are supposed to be aware of the needs of the people and what are good or bad for them.
The Court cannot sit over the judgment of their wisdom…A law made by the Parliament or State
legislature can be struck down on two grounds alone (1) lack of legislative competence,
(2) violation of any Constitutional rights”.1

The Court has recently held in BALCO Employees Union v Union of India2 that the proper
forum for discussing a policy aspect is the parliament and not the Court.

So in view of the earlier pronouncements of the Court it is clear that the required enquiry is
whether the statute is constitutional. Any discussion as to the whether a statute is necessary
specially vis-avis another Act whose vires is not a issue in the present case was unnecessary.

Therefore, the Court refused to entertain the argument.

2
1
State of Andhra Pradesh v Mcdowell AIR 1996 SC 1627 Para 45, 47A
AIR 2002 SC 350
ISSUE 2

Whether the terms or existing rights under the contract entered into by two private parties could
be amended by the provisions of law providing certain powers in one sided manner in favour of
one of the parties to the contract

The argument raised on behalf of many petitioners was that existing rights of private parties
under a contract cannot be interfered with, more particularly putting one party to an
advantageous position over the other. For example, in the present case, in a matter of private
contract between the borrower and the financing bank or institution through impugned
legislation rights of the borrowers have been curtailed and enforcement of secured assets has
been provided for without intervention of the court and above all depriving them the remedy
available under the law by approaching to the civil court.

The Appellants are silent on where exactly are they locating the legal validity of their argument.

It has been pointed out by the Honorable Supreme Court that unlike Art 1 s.10 of the US
Constitution there is no bar to prospective invalidation of a contract in India and hence such a
law is perfectly valid.2

Indeed, the very right to property stand deleted from the Constitution as a fundamental right by
the 44th amendment and exists merely as a Constitutional right. Indeed, even when the right
was existent in part III the Courts have held that absolute freedom of contract as expounded in
the doctrine of leissez fare is obsolete.3

The Appellants also cannot locate the right under right to Art 19(1)(g) and Art 298. The Supreme
Court has held that these articles are subject to reasonable restrictions and that what is
reasonable is to be interpreted from the point of view of public interest no matter how harsh it
is on the interest of the person.4

In view of these case laws it is difficult to say where does the appellants locate their argument.
The counsels for the respondents however has not entered into the position of freedom of
contract or right to trade in the Constitution but has pointed out that similar argument has been

2
Raghubir Dayal v Union of India AIR 1962 SC 263
3
YA Marmade v Authority under Minimum Wages Act (1972) 2 SCC 108
4
Krishan Kakkanth v Government of Kerela (1997) 9 SCC 495
raised in a different context, namely statutes giving relief to agricultural borrowers and it has
been repeatedly rejected.

Some case laws may be mentioned here. Thevar and Dahya Lala v. Rasul Mohd. Abdul Rahim5,
validity of the Madras Agriculturalist's Relief Act and Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 were upheld
respectively. Under these two statutes relief was given to the debtors who were agriculturists as
a class, by sealing down their debts. The validity of the Act was upheld though it affected the
individual interest of creditors.

Similar provisions were upheld in Swami Motor Transports Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Sankraswamigal
Mutt and Raval & Co. v. K.G. Ramachandran6, Kanshi Ram v. Lachhman, Pathumma v. State
of Kerala7, Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra8 etc.

ISSUE 3

Whether § 13 of the Act ultra vires of the Constitution

The first line of attack has been the Constitutionality of § 13 itself.

It has been argued that before applying the power u/s.13 certain determination of facts are
necessary, namely, whether a person to whom notice is given is under a liability to pay as also
the question of extent of the liability etc. Further the questions pertaining to law of limitation
and bar under consortium agreements, claim of set off/counter claim, creditors defaults as bailee
or its failure to disburse the credit in time, the chargeability of penal interest or compound
interest or non-appropriation of amount already paid and so on and so forth, all these questions
need to be decided. So it was argued with case laws that shall be discussed in the main project)
that in such a case a lis exists and that power to decide a lis is a judicial or quasi-judicial power
and not purely an administrative power. Therefore, a suitable forum has to be provided to decide
all such disputes at an appropriate stage.9

If such a forum is not provided then the statutory provision becomes arbitrary, procedurally and
substantively unfair

5
1963 (3) SCR 1
6
1963 (Supp. 1) SCR p. 282
7
1974 (1) SCC p. 424
8
2001(5) SCC 546
9
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors. 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC p. 651, Associated Cement Companies Ltd v. PN
Sharma 1965 (2) SCR p. 366 at pages 386-387
This is a factually faulty argument. S.13 do not exclude any judicial forum, but merely provides
that a judicial remedy can be availed only after the secured creditor has exercised his powers
under s.13 (4). This is perfectly valid. Many statutes have provisions under which a forum can
be availed after the aggrieved party has engaged self-help.

It was also pointed out that the provisions under s.13 create certain practical difficulties that
might give rise to grave miscarriges of justice. For example, § 2(f) of the Act to indicate that
the definition of the word `borrower' covers even the guarantor. Under § 135 of the Contract
Act a guarantor is discharged of his obligation under certain circumstances. Now suppose a
discharged guaranteer received a notice under § 13(2) of the Act in view of the bar of § 34 to
file a suit in the Civil Court, it is not possible for him to approach the Court to show and establish
that he is a discharged guarantor. Hence notice under § 13(2) is bad.10

These concerns have been taken care of by s.35 of the Securitization Act that lays down that the
provision of the Act overrides all other laws.

Finally, it was pointed out that under s.13 read with s.34 the borrower has no access to Court
before the lender exercises the powers u/s.13 (4) this exposes him to arbitrary even, fraudulent
practices by the lender. In defense of this § it was pointed out that u/s 9 of the Rules the asset
cannot be sold for 60 days, it is open to the borrower to approach the Tribunal within that period.

The Court partially accepted the argument of the plaintiffs and added two riders to s.13

Firstly, it held that the lender is under a duty to disclose the reasons for the reason for not
accepting the objections or points raised in reply to the notice served upon them before
proceeding to take measures under sub-§ (4) of § 13.

Secondly the Court drew an analogy with English mortgage and pointed out that enforcement
proceedings under an English mortgage can be challenged on the ground of fraud. Such
provisions are applicable to this § as well.

Another aspect the Court has ignored is that it is a general rule of statutory construction that a
statute must be read in context and pari materia.

S.13 of the present Act is Pari materia with s.29 of the State Financial Corporation Act 1951

10
Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India 1997 (5) SCC p. 536 at page 735
The Constitutional vires of this § has been repeatedly challenges Art 300A, 21, and 14 on
substantially the same grounds namely that it gives no right to appeal. Though the case has
never reached the Supreme Court a number of High Courts have deliberated on the issue. The
Courts have persistently held that the statute itself discloses a definite policy and objective and
the power conferred under s.29 is to achieve the policy namely speedy recovery of the dues.

ISSUE 4

Whether the requirement of 75% of the amount due before appeal to the DRT is onerous and
therefore § 17 of the Act is ultra vires to the Constitution

§ 17 of the Acts titled right to appeal. It requires that the borrower deposit 75% of the sum before
approaching the DRT. This sum however may be waived by the DRT.

An appeal is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary as “A proceeding undertaken to have a

decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher authority, especially the submission of a lower
court court for review and possible reversal.” The BBC English Dictionary on the other hand
defines an appeal to be “a serious and urgent request”.

The wording of § 17 is misleading because what it provides is a right to approach the Court at
first instance and not merely as an appeal so it can be said to be an appeal in only very general
sense.

Any aggrieved person including the borrower can prefer the Appeal. If it is the borrower who is
making the Appeal then he has to deposit 75% of the borrowed to amount claimed in the notice
under 13(2) before the DRT, otherwise the claim would not be entertained.

It was argued on behalf of the Appellants that the deposit of 75% of the amount makes the
provision onerous and arbitrary.

The Respondents countered by citing two sets of case laws

The first set lays down that right to Appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of
natural justice which principles are to be followed in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. A
right of appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions. The other cases
lay down that pre-deposit of amount is perfectly constitutional and not arbitrary.

The respondents also pointed out that as per RK Garg as well as in other cases after that
“there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute .... This rule is based
on the assumption, judicially recognized and accepted, that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, its law are directed to problems made manifest
by experience ... Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it
is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method ... There may be
crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account
alone it cannot be struck down as invalid.”

The Court however did not accept these arguments and struck down § 17(2) as ultra-views to
the Constitution being arbitrary.

DECISION OF THE COURT

In this case, the Supreme Court held that:

• The Parliament’s superiority in deciding the need for legislation was emphasised.
• The connection between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was rejected since the latter deals
with the highly particular issue of nonperforming assets (NPAs) (among other
differences such as the latter dealing only with secured creditors).
• As a result, it is up to Parliament to decide whether or not legislation is required.
• §13 was found to be constitutionally legitimate by the Court.
• The secured creditor is only exercising his entitlement because the default that led to the
§13 measure might be considered a “second default”—NPA + 60 days extra time to
repay following notice.
• Prior to the 2016 Amendment, §13 acknowledged the Right of Redemption in a sense.
Rule 8 and 9 of the SI Rules stated that the bank must serve a notice confirming the sale
of secured property and that the borrower may pay off the obligation and reclaim
possession at any point prior to the actual sale
• While the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the §, it pushed hard for
borrowers to have the right to representation.
• The Supreme Court determined §17(2) to be arbitrary, and ordered that the heading be
altered from “appeal” to “application.”

The reasoning of the Court was the following

1. Under s.13 (2) the borrower does not get any pre decisional hearing

2. There should be no pre-supposition that the borrower is a willful defaulter.

In order to make the legislation fair the provision was held to be arbitrary and struck down.

Rest of the Act was upheld Appraisal of the judgment

The Court upheld § 13. So it can be argued that the main structure of the statute has survived.

The judgment however suffers from a large number of deficiencies. These can be enumerated
in terms of what the judgment does lay down and what the judgment does not discuss but should
have done.

Relationship with winding up

There is a fundamental tension between the Act and Companies Act.

Under the Companies Act all the creditors and not merely the secured creditor can file a petition
for winding up (s.439 of the Co Act).This the creditors can do if a)the Company is indebted to
a sum of more than 1lakh rupees and it has pay the sum or secure or compound for it to the
reasonable satisfaction of the creditor within three weeks of the submission of demand ,b) if an
execution of a decree remains unsatisfied ,c) it is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that
the Company is unable to pay its debts (s.433).

However, the right of the creditors to wind up a Company is limited by the case laws like Tata

Iron Steel v Micro Forge11 (India) that lays down that winding up is at the discretion of the
Tribunal and a host of factors like whether the inability is temporary, the Company has grown
consistently, there is a temporary cash crunch etc.

But on the other hand u/s.13 of Securitization Act the Bank can straightaway enforce the security
interest without regards to any of these criterion. Such enforcement in all probability shall force
the Company to become insolvent.

So it seems there is a basic difference in philosophy behind the two statutes. While the Co Act
strives to put the interest of the Company, and that of the economy in perpetuation of
Corporations the other Act gives preference to the rights of the secured creditors above that of
the Company.

The conflict is more than that of principle. Enforcement of security interests can actually reduce
the value of other assets of the Company that is not with secured creditors. So the unsecured
creditors and other persons who are to receive their dues had the Company being wound up

11
CLC 1669 Guj
stands to lose even more when a § 13 is brought into use. This is against the global trend has
been to pay special attention to the interest of the unsecured creditors. CThe Enterprises Act of
the UK engages in what is known as ring fencing that is keeping aside a certain amount of
money for the benefit of the unsecured creditors.

On the basis of this can the Act be said to be arbitrary? The answer can be only guessed because
the Court did not discuss this issue at all. This perhaps leaves a scope for the Act to be challenged
in future on this ground.

The only duty that the secured creditor has is towards the workmen. § 13(9) of the Act lays
down that a secured creditor has the option of enforcing his security interests either under this
Act or under s.529 of the Companies Act.

In case, he chooses to go by this Act he shall have to pay the workman’s dues as under s.529A
of the Companies Act.

Then again unders.13 the secured creditor is not under a duty to pay not all the employees but
only the workmen.

Under § 17 any person who is aggrieved by the measures taken by the lender can approach the
DRT. Exactly who these aggrieved persons can be have not been defined under the Act. The

Uniform Non-Judicial Foreclosure Act of the USA defines an “aggrieved party” as a party
entitled to a remedy and includes the debtor, the secured creditor, a person having an interest in
the real property that will be affected by 16 foreclosures, and a purchaser or prospective
purchaser at a foreclosure.

It is submitted that the Indian law lacking that sort of precision leaves a space for intense and
competitive litigation. The moment the banks make use of the provisions under s.13(4) there
will be a flurry of litigation by the unsecured creditors, the workers and a host of other people
with the active blessing of the management.

Indeed, the process of litigation can go even further. Can “measures taken under s.13 (4) “imply
measures not taken under the said § when it should have been taken? This is not improbable in
view of the fact that the Supreme Court has entertained a petition by Common Cause (a NGO)
that has challenged a loan to S Kumar’s Shree Maheswar Hydro Power Corporation (SMHPCL)
in Madhya Pradesh by LIC in spite of repeated default by the said Company.
It should be noted that the project has remained a point of contention between civil society
groups and the Company. This controversial project has seen a pitched battle between the
Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and its promoters, ending with the NBA almost being gagged
by the courts. It is not to accuse the Common Cause of any oblique motive but to point out that
if somehow the Court system permits issues those are political to be settled by the Act.

The Court can however be excused for not dealing with these issues as the Mardia Chemicals
arguably did not raise them. But less easy is to accept certain innovations to the Act that the
Court has done.

THE ADDITION OF EXTRA-STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

It has held that the lender is supposed to furnish the borrower the reason as to why his objections
are not being acceded to and these reasons have to show an application of mind on part of the
lender. It is difficult to understand the rationale form such action. After the entire lender is
claiming the money after the fulfillment of certain conditions as a matter of right. Why an
exercise of right must be accompanied by a rider?

The Court has added that this reason given shall not endow the borrower with the right to
approach the DRT, at that stage. But can this be a ground for approaching the DRT at a later
stage? With approaching the DRT being made easier this extra statutory requirement imported
by the Court shall only give another cause of action and more room for delay.

WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRARINESS

The requirement of deposit of 75% u/s.17 of the Act was struck down because it was deemed to
be onerous and arbitrary. The author considers this a failure on part of the respondents who did
not point out why the Act should not be deemed to be arbitrary but instead harped on right to
appeal and how economic legislations can afford to be a little inequitable.

This raises the question what is arbitrary? It has not been defined anywhere but it is probably
safe to go by the definition provided by the Supreme Court in Srilekha Vidyarthi- arbitrary is

“something from which no discernible principle can be found.”12

To see if one can find any discernible principle behind it one has to look into the provisions of
the Act.

12
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v State of Uttar Pradesh (1991) 1 SCC 912
THE POWERS UNDERS.13 CAN BE EXERCISED UNDER THE FOLLOWING

CONDITIONS

1. Before taking action under the Act the assets shall have to be classified as NPAs This is done
under RBI guidelines.

2. Under §13 (12) the aforesaid actions can be exercised only as per prescribed by the Union
Government by Rule.

3. Under §19 the banker is liable to pay compensation for wrongful possession

4. The debtor can file a writ under ART 226 if the bank is in Public sector (most of the major
Banks are)

5. Detailed rules are laid down for giving notice, taking possession, (the Court has also added
to it)

6. As per RBI guidelines legal actions can be taken only in case of willful default.

7. The Court itself has empowered the borrower to approach the civil Court in case of any fraud
in sale. Any way sale of assets under §29 of the SFC Act is guided by the rules laid down in
by the Supreme Court –§13 of the Securitization Act is pari materia.

It is submitted that in view of all these safeguards it is highly unlikely that the powers unders.13
can be misused.

So why shall the borrower go to the DRT at all? Experience suggests that majority of the cases
in the DRT challenge the loan document itself and often simply to delay the process rather than
actually win the case. Under the Indian law the prohibition against unconscionable contracts
have been imported by the Supreme Court. This gives the borrower the chance to challenge the
loan document as having signed under unequal bargaining power, having irrational clauses etc
and prolong the judicial process.

There can be exceptions to this rule but then the DRT is empowered to waive the fees and if a
probable case can be suggested then the DRT is most likely to do so. The presence of dilatory
litigation is a well-known feature of the Indian legal system and it was precisely this defect that
the legislature sought to remedy. The Court by overturning the requirement of predeposit has
more or less returned everything to square one.
Certain assumptions that the Court makes are also questionable. For example, there has been a
continuous stress on making the legislation balanced.

In commercial arena there are many laws that are tilted to one party, mention may be made of
the Consumer Protection Act, Rent Legislation, Industrial Disputes Act. These Acts are not
arbitrary even when they are not equal benefit to both the parties, because there is no duty that
legislation shall have to be balanced. The scrutiny is on a) public purpose, b) objective of the
Act, c) legislative intent. The Court however was not directed to the end partly because of the
faulty strategy of the respondents who insisted on cases that said pre-deposit is not arbitrary
rather that this line of argument. This shall be elaborated in the project.

As pointed out in the cases involving §29 of SFC Act that special privilege given to the
Corporation is not arbitrary but for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Act”. Here
the object of the Act was very clear to avoid vexatious litigation. Striking down §17 that
object seems to have been defeated.

IMPACT OF THE JUDGEMENT

• §13 now states that the bank must evaluate all of a borrower’s representations and
respond within seven days (which was later changed to 15 days).

• Within §17, the word “appeal” was replaced by “application,” despite the fact that the
marginal header remained the same (wow). In 2016, the appeal was superseded by an
application in the marginal heading.

• DRTs now have jurisdiction over the rights of tenants in a security property. In such
instances, the property is given to the person who files the application (if he meets
the requirements).

• §18 was also considerably amended. When filing an appeal with the DRAT, you must
deposit 50% of the total cost, which can be lowered to 25%. DRT was likewise
granted a similar waiver right under §17.

This was later changed in 2016 and DRT cannot waive off the deposit amount, although it can
be reduced to 25%.

CONCLUSION -THE WAY FORWARD

It now seems certain that the Securitization Act is to be amended. This is in view of the fact that
the Basel II provisions shall come into force by 2006, which would require the banks to make
hefty provisions for credit risks apart from the market and operational risks Bankers feel that
the credit risk in India is still high as per the global standards due to inadequate laws for recovery
of the NPAs and lack of information sharing data base among bankers on the risk profile of the
borrowers.

However, it is not clear how the Government can go around the Supreme Court stricture on
predeposit.

The Government can take two-pronged approach.

Firstly, it can amend §17. there are several options

It can reduce the amount, to say 25% of the amount due as recommended by the Bankers. It can
make the debtor pay 75% of the pending amount rather than 75% of the interest rather than the
whole loan as had been suggested by the Small Industries lobby some time ago.

The other way is to amend the DRT Act that makes putting a stay order against the enforcement
of the security interest difficult, indeed impossible without the presence of a prima facie case.
It seems this is the approach the Government is rather inclined to take.

It is submitted the second approach is the most feasible one. The reason why the Court rejected
the amount of predeposit was that the debtor may not be in a position to pay after the secured
creditor has enforced his interest’s – a 25% predeposit may be held to be just as onerous by the
Court.

The amendment should not only clear the air for the Banks but should also clear certain other
ambiguities in the Act that has been mentioned like the broad definition of “. “aggrieved
persons”, the locus standi of then Unions and the unsecured creditor before the DRT after the
security interest under §13 is enforced.

The judgment in this case has taken off the pressure that the loan defaulters, but the sake of the
economy and development certain pressure has to exist. It remains to be seen how the
Government brings some teeth into the Act without compromising on the fairness to the debtor.
WEBLIOGRAPHY

• https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ijcl2&div=11&id=&pa
ge= last accessed on 13 February 2023 at 5:15 pm
• https://www.khaitanco.com/sites/default/files/2019-09/SARFAESI.pdf last accessed on
13 February 2023 at 5:02 pm
• https://www.latestlaws.com/latest-caselaw/2004/april/2004-latest-caselaw-234-sc last
accessed on 11 February 2023 at 9:09 pm
• https://www.livelaw.in/columns/securitization-and-reconstruction-of-financial-
assetsand-enforcement-of-security-interest-act-2002-sarfaesi-act-drt-mardia-
chemicals194534 last accessed on 11 February 2023 at 8:09 pm