1. PEOPLE VS.
MAPA
GR NO. 220301, AUGUST 30,1967
Facts:
Mario Mapa was accused of violating Section 878 of the Revised
Administrative Code for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. He was caught in Manila with a homemade revolver,
caliber 22 gun, and six rounds of ammunition without a legal permit.
Mapa argued that his ownership is legal and related to his duties as
a secret agent to the Provincial Governor.
Issue:
Whether or not the employment as a special agent to the provincial
Governor constitutes as an exception to defend the possession of
the said firearms and ammunition without necessary permit and
license.
Ruling:
No. The judgment appealed to the higher court was affirmed. The
provisions of the law expressly provide the grounds of violation and
being a “Secret Agent” is not an exemption.
2. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS VS. YAP TICO
24 PHILS 504 (1913)
Facts:
Lizarraga Hermanos claimed ownership of a real estate property in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and contested the right of repurchase.
They sought a permanent injunction to prevent a public sale. The
lower court found Hermanos' complaint insufficient and supported the
demurrer of local respondents, who argued they lacked sufficient
facts.
Issue:
Whether or not insufficient information in the complaint be remedied
by introducing evidence in the trial.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs stating that a
complaint, even if poorly drafted, is already valid and sufficient if it
already informs the respondents the actual nature of the issues and
claims. The case should be based on merits on the actual trial
through introduction of evidence.
3. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT VS. MUNICIPALITY OG NAGA
GR No. 24116, 1968
Facts:
Cebu Portland Cement Co and the Municipality of Naga, Cebu were
involved in a legal dispute over the distraint and auction of 100,000
bags of cement by the Municipality to compensate for a plaintiff's
alleged tax deficiency. The court affirmed the municipality's actions.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement on
July 6, 1961, valid despite the plaintiff being granted a ten-day grace
period to settle the tax account.
(2) Whether or not the auction sale on January 30, 1962, valid
considering the alleged
failure to observe the required notice period and discrepancies in the
sale date.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, validating
both the distraint and
the auction sale.
(1) The court held that, the clear and explicit language of the law
allowed the municipal
treasurer to seize and distraint any personal property of the individual
or entity subject to tax upon failure to pay the tax at the required
time, making the distraint valid.
(2) The court found that the municipality had substantially complied
with the requirements of the law. The court noted that more than 20
days had elapsed from the date of the distraint to the date of the
sale, and any delay in the sale was due to the plaintiff's request for
deferment.
4. RESINS, INC. VS AUDITOR GENERAL
GR No. 17888, 1968
Facts:
Resins Inc, a manufacturer of synthetic glue, seeks a refund from
Central Bank for the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of
urea and formaldehyde as separate units. The petitioner claims that
the law, which specifically mentions "urea formaldehyde," can be
interpreted as exempting the company from the fee if it imports these
separately.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Resins Incorporated is entitled to an exemption
from the margin fee for importing urea and formaldehyde as separate
units under Republic Act No. 2609.
(2) Whether or not the enrolled bill accurately reflects the legislative
intent, and could the courts interpret it differently based on individual
statements by members of Congress
Ruling:
(1) The Supreme Court ruled that Resins, Inc. cannot be exempt
from margin fee payment and refund due to the distinction between
"urea and formaldehyde" and "urea formaldehyde." The exemption
only covers urea formaldehyde, not both, and therefore, as a
manufacturer of both, Resins, Inc. cannot claim the exemption.
(2) The court ruled that the enrolled bill was conclusive, and
individual statements by Congress members did not necessarily
reflect legislative intent. It stressed that courts' fundamental duty is to
apply the law as it is, excluding construction or interpretation unless
necessary or inadequate.
5. University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Auditor General
GR No. 19617, 1969
Facts:
The University of the Philippines Board of Regents and Professor Cristino
Jamias filed a petition against the Auditor General and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) to stop withholding his salary and
deduction from his retirement annuity after he was compulsorily retired at
65. The extension was approved by the Board of Regents, but the Auditor
General and GSIS challenged it and withheld the salary and deduction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) may extend the tenure of a professor beyond the retirement age by
law fixed at 65 years.
Ruling:
No. Prof. Cristino Jamias retired at 65 on July 20, 1961, under Republic Act
3096, which prohibited him from extending his government service beyond
that age. As a result, the retirement became automatic and compulsory,
and the Board of Regents was powerless to extend his service beyond that
date.
6. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia
G.R. No. 25659, 1969
Facts:
In 1960, the respondents-spouses filed a suit for injunction against the
Provincial Sheriff to prevent selling their sugar, which they claimed was
owned by their conjugal partnership. The court declared the garnishment
contrary to the Civil Code and made the injunction permanent. The Garcias
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not a conjugal partnership be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor
of a surety company without evidence of benefit to the partnership.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision, stating
that conjugal partnerships are only liable for debts and obligations
contracted by the husband. The Court of Appeals' clear and
unambiguous language ensures the judiciary obeys its mandate,
which cannot be questioned for being contrary to law.
7. RAMOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
108 SCRA 728, 1981
Facts:
The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan hired Cruz Durian & Academia
to represent them in a fishpond recovery suit. The provincial fiscal
and municipal attorney also appeared as supervising counsel.
Defendant Maria C. Ramos tried to disqualify the firm, but the trial
court denied her motion. Ramos appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to
represent LGU is correct
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding
that the municipality's hiring of private counsel was illegal. The Court
held that Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code clearly
mandates that the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney should
represent municipalities in court cases.
8. REPUBLIC V. GO BON LEE
111 Phil 805
Facts:
Go Bon Lee was granted Philippine citizenship in 1941 and took his
oath of allegiance in 1942. In 1951, the Solicitor General filed a
petition to cancel his certificate of naturalization, claiming he did not
meet the necessary qualifications, such as filing his petition before
the required one-year period and not enrolling his minor children in a
recognized school.
Issues:
1. WON Go Bon Lee meets the necessary qualifications for
naturalization, specifically regarding the one-year waiting period and
the enrollment of his minor children.
2. WON the government estopped from questioning Go's citizenship
after his naturalization certificate was issued?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
overturning the lower court's decision and cancelled Go Bon Lee's
certificate of naturalization. The Court found that Go had violated the
necessary qualifications for citizenship by filing his petition before the
one-year waiting period and failing to enroll his minor children in a
recognized school. The Court also held that the doctrine of estoppel
does not apply against the government when it is asserting
governmental rights.
9. NEPOMUCENO V. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP
110 PHIL 42, 1960
Facts:
Jose Nepomuceno and Isabel Acuña, spouses, obtained a loan from
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation for fishing vessel
construction. They failed to pay their mortgages, leading to the
corporation foreclosing their properties and acquiring them through a
public auction. Jesus Nepomuceno and his assigns attempted to
redeem the property but were rejected.
Issue:
What amount may Jesus Nepomuceno redeem the foreclosed
property for, given that he acted as an accommodation mortgagor
and the loan was obtained by other spouses? Should it be the
auction sale price, or the total indebtedness owed to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that a mortgagor can only redeem a
foreclosed property by paying the full amount owed to the lending
institution, as stated in Commonwealth Act No. 459. Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act No. 459, which applies to properties mortgaged
to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, requires the mortgagor to
pay the full amount owed on the date of the sale, with interest, to
redeem the property.
10. CRISOLOGO V. PEOPLE
94 PHIL 862, 1954
Facts:
Juan D. Crisologo, a WWII USAFFE captain, was accused of treason
and sentenced to life imprisonment for violating Commonwealth Act
No. 408, or the Articles of War. Crisologo challenged the court's
jurisdiction and pleaded not guilty, but the court denied his motion.
After pleading not guilty, he filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to dismiss the case.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the military court constitutes a bar to further
prosecution for the same offense in the civil courts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the offense charged in the military
court and civil court is the same, and both courts derive their powers
from one sovereignty. The sentence meted out by the military court
should be a bar to the petitioner's further prosecution for the same
offense in the Court of First Instance of Zambales. The petition for
certiorari and prohibition is granted, and the criminal case for treason
against the petitioner is dismissed without costs.