[G.R. NO. 159411.

March 18, 2005]

TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACINTO S.

TRILLANA, Respondents.

Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law8 provides that an amicable settlement
reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal
court within ten (10) days from its date. 9 It further provides that the settlement may be enforced
by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the
appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. 10 This special provision
follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:

A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties
themselves.11 It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially
approved,12 and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.13

However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos,14 we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in
Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:

If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

We explained, viz:

[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise agreements.
Where a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other
party was to enforce the terms thereof.

When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created for the first time the
right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand." Article 2041 should
obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a]
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. (Underscoring ours)

In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring
the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. 15 This is because he may
regard the compromise as already rescinded16 by the breach thereof of the other party.
Thus, in Morales v. National Labor Relations Commission17 we upheld the National Labor
Relations Commission when it heeded the original demand of four (4) workers for reinstatement
upon their employer's failure to comply with its obligation to pay their monetary benefits within
the period prescribed under the amicable settlement. We reiterated the rule that the aggrieved
party may either (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded
and so insist upon his original demand upon the other party's failure or refusal to abide by the
compromise. We also recognized the options in Mabale v. Apalisok,18 Canonizado v.
Benitez,19 and Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,20 to name a few cases.

In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered
mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled
thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. 21 However, the mode of
enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The
availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 22 itself which
provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6)
months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that
period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory23 or merely optional in nature.

Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of
the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-
compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either
enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent
chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized
profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount
in the "Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability
but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation 24 which the parties
hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the
hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing.25 Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only
required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner
fully complies with his obligations thereunder.26 It is undisputed that herein petitioner did not.

In Philippine law, the principle of joint liability of spouses is generally upheld, meaning
that both spouses should be included in legal actions involving their conjugal
partnership. However, there are specific circumstances where only one spouse may be
sued, particularly when the obligation is personal to one spouse or when the other
spouse is not an indispensable party.

1. Personal Obligations: If a debt or obligation is solely incurred by one spouse

without the consent or knowledge of the other, the creditor may sue only the
spouse who incurred the obligation. For instance, in the case of Trinidad
Manaois-Salonga and Isaias Reyes Salonga vs. Imelda V. Natividad and Marciano
Natividad (G.R. No. L-13927, 1960) [J5], the court ruled that the husband could
not be held liable for a promissory note signed only by the wife, as there was no
evidence that the loan was a conjugal partnership liability.
 2. Indispensable Parties: The rules of civil procedure state that all indispensable
parties must be included in a lawsuit. However, if one spouse is absent or has
deserted the other, the remaining spouse may sue alone to protect their
interests. This was highlighted in Robert C. Peyer vs. Felix Martinez (G.R. No. L-
3500, 1951) [J1], where the court allowed the wife to sue alone to manage
property during her husband's absence.

3. Solidary Liability: In cases where both spouses are solidarily liable for a debt,
the creditor may choose to sue either spouse. The case of The Imperial
Insurance, Inc. vs. Emilia T. David (G.R. No. L-32425, 1984) [J7] illustrates that
creditors can pursue either spouse for the full amount owed if they are jointly
and severally liable.

In summary, while the general rule is that both spouses should be included in legal
actions, exceptions exist where only one spouse can be sued based on the nature of the
obligation or the circumstances surrounding the case.

To determine whether barangay conciliation is required when the respondents (husband

and wife) reside in different municipalities, we need to refer to the relevant
jurisprudence and legal provisions.

Key Jurisprudence
1. G.R. No. 160032 (2005) [J1]:

o The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint was premature because the
petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings as required by the Local Government Code. However, this
case involved parties residing in the same city or municipality.
2. A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265 (2000) [J2]:

o The Supreme Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for dismissing a case without prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The case clarified that disputes involving real property
should be brought in the barangay where the property is situated, but it
also emphasized that barangay conciliation is not necessary if the parties
do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.
3. G.R. No. 211966 (2017) [J3]:

o The Supreme Court ruled that the lupon has no jurisdiction over disputes
where not all real parties in interest reside in the same city or municipality.
The lack of barangay conciliation proceedings was not considered during
the trial because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order.
4. G.R. No. 94436 (1991) [J4]:

o The Supreme Court stated that the conciliation requirement cannot be

enforced if the parties reside in different cities.
5. G.R. No. 65629 (1986) [J5]:
 o The Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of prior submission to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation does not apply to disputes involving
parties residing in different cities or municipalities.
6. G.R. NO. 158867 (2006) [J6]:

o The Supreme Court upheld that the requirement under Section 412 of the
Local Government Code applies only to cases where the real parties-in-
interest actually reside in the same city or municipality.

To determine whether barangay conciliation is required in the scenario where the

respondent husband and the complainant reside in different cities or municipalities, but
the wife of the respondent resides in the same municipality as the complainant, we
need to analyze the relevant provisions of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) and
applicable jurisprudence.

Relevant Provisions and Jurisprudence

1. Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) - Section 408(f) and Section 409(c):

o Section 408(f) states that disputes involving real property or any interest
therein are not required to undergo barangay conciliation if the parties do
not reside in the same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays.
o Section 409(c) provides that disputes involving real property shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or larger portion thereof
is situated.
2. Jurisprudence:

o A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265 (2000) [J1]: The Supreme Court emphasized that
barangay conciliation is not necessary where the parties do not reside in
the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays.
o G.R. No. 160032 (2005) [J2]: The Court ruled that parties residing in the
same city or municipality must undergo barangay conciliation.
o G.R. No. 101328 (1993) [J6]: The Court clarified that the Lupon
Barangay does not have jurisdiction over disputes involving parties who
reside in different municipalities, cities, or provinces, except where such
barangays adjoin each other.

Analysis
Given the scenario:

 The respondent husband and the complainant reside in different cities or

municipalities.
 The wife of the respondent resides in the same municipality as the complainant.

The key factor here is the residence of the primary parties involved in the dispute.
According to the Local Government Code and the cited jurisprudence, the requirement
for barangay conciliation primarily depends on the residence of the disputing parties.
Since the respondent husband and the complainant reside in different cities or
municipalities, barangay conciliation is not required. The residence of the respondent's
wife in the same municipality as the complainant does not alter this requirement, as the
primary parties to the dispute are the complainant and the respondent husband.

Conclusion
Barangay conciliation is not required in this case because the respondent husband and
the complainant reside in different cities or municipalities. The residence of the
respondent's wife in the same municipality as the complainant does not necessitate
barangay conciliation.

This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the Local Government Code and the
relevant jurisprudence, particularly A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265 (2000) [J1] and G.R. No.
101328 (1993) [J6].

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Law

Jurisprudence

SORT BYRelevanceDate

[J1] A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1265

VALENCIDES VERCIDE, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE

PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, FIFTH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT, CLARIN AND TUDELA, MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.
2000-04-06

AI SUMMARY

Complainant Valencides Vercide filed a complaint against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of

the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, for
dismissing a case without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. The case
involved a dispute over possession of a piece of land. The respondent judge
dismissed the case based on P.D. No. 1508, but the complainant argued that
R.A. 7160 did not require prior resort to barangay conciliation in cases
involving real property when the parties were not residents of the same city
or municipality or of adjoining barangays. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended dismissal of the case, but the Supreme Court found the respondent judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and fined her for her failure to follow established
rulings.

Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However,
all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis
added)Complainant and his wife moved for a reconsideration, citing the following
provisions of R.A. 7160, "The Local Government Code of 1991":

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[J2] G.R. NO. 160032

ESTELA L. BERBA, PETITIONER, VS. JOSEPHINE PABLO

AND THE HEIRS OF CARLOS PALANCA, RESPONDENTS.

2005-11-11

AI SUMMARY

The case involves a dispute between Estela L. Berba, the owner of a property, and
Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca, who were leasing the property. Berba
filed a complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals against Pablo, which was
approved by the pangkat. The case was then elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) and then to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, it was ruled that
Berba's complaint was premature because she failed to go through
conciliation proceedings in the Lupon, as required by the Local Government
Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and the Supreme Court
subsequently denied Berba's petition for review on certiorari. The Court ruled that the
complaint against Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca was premature and that the
petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings. Therefore, the petition was denied.

The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties
who reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays
are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The
court cited the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.
[21]

[J3] G.R. NO. 169129

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,

SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS,
ERNESTO F. SANTOS, AND TADEO F. SANTOS,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO AND PROSERFINA
LUMBAO, RESPONDENTS.

2007-03-28

AI SUMMARY

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a 107-square meter lot that was
purportedly sold by the late Rita Catoc Santos to the Spouses Jose Lumbao and
Proserfina Lumbao. The heirs of Rita, the Santos family, contested the sale and argued
that the documents were falsified and unenforceable. However, the Court upheld the
validity of the sale documents and ordered the Santos heirs to reconvey the property to
the Lumbao spouses and pay them attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The Court
also ruled that the failure to comply with barangay conciliation proceedings
did not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the case, as the Santos
family had waived this defense by actively participating in the trial. Overall, the
Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-93[15] provide that
all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are
subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing
a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case
before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction.[16]

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[J4] G.R. NO. 207707

ANTONIO G. NGO, PETITIONER, VS. VISITACION GABELO,
ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ, EDUARDO TRAQUENA,
ERLINDA TRAQUENA, ULISYS* MATEO, ALFONSO PLACIDO,
LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSANA** RENDON, AND MATEO
TRINIDAD, RESPONDENTS.

2020-08-24

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We thus quote with approval the findings of the CA, to wit: Based on the aforecited
provisions, all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-
condition before filing a complaint in court or any government office. Non-compliance
with the said condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court
of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the
case before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction.

[J5] G.R. NO. L-60083

CRISPINA PEÑAFLOR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DOMINGO

PANIS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES (OLONGAPO CITY BRANCH), AND
PRESCILLA DELOS SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.

1982-10-27

SECTION 3. Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respond-
ent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes: (1) involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays
adjoin each other; and (2) involving real property located in different municipalities. "
(Italics ours). While the provision on mandatory conciliation, as a pre-condition to the
filing of the Complaint, is found in Section 6:

[J6] G.R. NO. 101328

EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO,

PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS, RESPONDENTS.

1993-04-07

The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of
disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or
province. Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted
cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it
does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion.[8] In the instant
case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same municipality
of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where
the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and
provinces.

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[J7] G.R. NO. 70245

ELEUTERIO DOMINGO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO A.

ROSERO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH XXVI, NAGA CITY; LEONILO BERCASIO AND
CANDIDA DELA TORRE, RESPONDENTS.

1989-05-05

SECTION 3. Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.
Show more (1)

[J8] G.R. NO. 158867

JIMMY BANTING, ALFRED REYES AND MAXIMA ARCENO

REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. JOSE MAGLAPUZ AND
RAYMUNDA BANDIN MAGLAPUZ, RESPONDENTS.

2006-08-22

Such arguments lack merit. It is settled that the requirement under Section 412
of the Local Government Code that a case be referred for conciliation before
the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases
where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality.[56] Here, the complaint filed with the MeTC specifically alleged that the
parties reside in different barangays and cities.[57]

[J9] G.R. NO. 157830

DANTE M. PASCUAL, REPRESENTED BY REYMEL R.

SAGARIO, PETITIONER, VS MARILOU M. PASCUAL,
RESPONDENT.

2005-11-17

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or
any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. (c)
All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated. (d) Those
arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution
where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.

[J10] A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1786 [FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 10-2262-MTJ]

FELICISIMA R. DIAZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE GERARDO

E. GESTOPA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, NAGA, CEBU,
RESPONDENT.
2011-06-22

Judge Gestopa concluded that since the subject property is in Naga, and that
complainant has always been a resident of Naga, it is therefore proper to
refer the case for barangay conciliation. Complainant, on the other hand, claimed
that she is no longer a resident of Naga.

[J11] G.R. NO. 56011

ELMER PEREGRINA, ADELAIDA PEREGRINA AND CECILIA

PEREGWNA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS,
PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ZAMBALES & OLONGAPO CITY, BRANCH III, PROCOPIO
SANCHEZ AND CARMELITA SANCHEZ, RESPONDENTS.

1984-10-31

We uphold PETITIONERS. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides:

"Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. x
x"It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law:

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[J12] G.R. NO. 65629

TERESITA E. AGBAYANI AND LUCAS F. AGBAYANI,

PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. BELEN,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL TRIAL JUDGE, BRANCH
XXXVIII, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL REGION,
AND SPOUSES SEVERO A. VILLAFUERTE AND ANA P.
VILLAFUERTE, RESPONDENTS.

1986-11-24

6) "involving real property located in different municipalities."[11] The

question presented in this case is whether the "precondition", i.e., the prior
submission of the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation, should
apply to actions affecting real property situated in one city or municipality
although the parties actually reside in barangays which are located in
different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin each other.
[J13] G.R. NO. 60367

ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

ROSARIO R. VELOSO, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE CITY COURT OF
MANILA, AND JULIETA CAPATI, RESPONDENTS.

1982-09-30

"SECTION 3. Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

[J14] G.R. NO. 140528

MARIA TORBELA, REPRESENTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY:

EULOGIO TOSINO, HUSBAND AND CHILDREN: CLARO,
MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA AND CALIXTA, ALL
SURNAMED TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
RAMIREZ AND JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA,
REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: JOSE AND
DIONISIO, BOTH SURNAMED TORBELA; EUFROSINA
TORBELA ROSARIO, REPRESENTED BY HER HEIRS,
NAMELY: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO,
ROMULO T. ROSARIO AND ANDREA ROSARIO-HADUCA;
LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA,
REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: SERGIO T.
TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T. ZULUETA,
CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA AND
PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA;
LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED BY HER
HEIRS, NAMELY: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO AND
FELIX, ALL SURNAMED AGUSTIN; AND SEVERINA TORBELA
ILDEFONSO, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ANDRES T.
ROSARIO AND LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO AND BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
RESPONDENTS.G.R. NO. 140553LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO,
PETITIONER, VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENT.

2011-12-07

Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the
same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involved real property or any interest
therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated. The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes: involving parties who actually
reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays
adjoin each other; and involving real property located in different municipalities. x x

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[J15] A.M. NO. MTJ-99-1236

GERMAN AGUNDAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE NIETO T.

TRESVALLES, MTC, VIRAC, CATANDUANES, RESPONDENT.

1999-11-25

Respondent judge's dismissal of the case on the ground that there was no prior referral
of the case to the Lupon Tagapayapa for conciliation proceedings was likewise
erroneous. A cursory examination of the records would have shown to him that
the parties were not residents of the same barangay and, therefore, the prior
referral of the case to the barangay authorities was not required. Complainant
lives in Cavite, while the three accused in the criminal case reside in Virac,
Catanduanes.

[J16] G.R. NO. 181097

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MALIK "BOBBY" T.
ALINGAN, RESPONDENTS.

2008-06-25

As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner. As borne out from the
record, respondent's domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is her
place of birth. When she got married, she became a resident of Marawi City,
specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by operation of law pursuant to
the Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal v. Comelec (G.R. No. 100739,
September 3, 1991). What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has
changed her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x

[J17] A.M. NO. MTJ-03-1505 (FORMERLY OCA IPI NO. 03-1363-MTJ)

MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON.

BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HON.
PUNDAYA A. BERUA, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, HADJI
IBRA DARIMBANG, CLERK OF COURT AND MANDAG U.
BATUA-AN, COURT STENOGRAPHER, ALL OF THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPALITY OF
BALINDONG, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR,
RESPONDENTS.IN THE MATTER OF: PETITION FOR
ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF FORMER JUDGE
BAGUINDA-ALI A. PACALNA, MTCC, MARAWI CITY

2013-11-27

In the present case, the Court held that respondent exhibited gross ignorance
of procedure in the conduct of election cases in connection with petitions for
inclusion of voters in the barangay elections, resulting in delays such that
complainant’s name was not timely included in the master list and
consequently he was not considered a candidate for barangay chairman. Such
failure to observe fundamental rules relative to the petitions for inclusion cannot be
excused. Further, respondent was found to have intentionally fabricated an order which
supposedly granted a motion for intervention by the counsel for the incumbent mayor
whose re-election complainant and his co-petitioners were allegedly not willing to
support. Respondent’s act of fabricating an order to cover up his official shortcomings
constitutes dishonesty, a reprehensible act that will not be sanctioned by this Court.
Show more (1)

[J18] G.R. NO. 210984,

JAMES CUA KO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

2023-04-12

ARTICLE 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in
the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the
husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in
the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they
should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration or said birth, whichever is earlier.

[J19] G.R. NO. 170626

THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON

MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG
PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by BARANGAY
KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER
FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN,
CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY SIMANGAN, Petitioners, vs.
PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ, Respondent.

2008-03-03

The FOREGOING considered come AUGUST 8, 2005, respondent SEVERINO D.

MARTINEZ is hereby directed NOT to ASSUME and DISCHARGE the functions of
the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and for complainant JOSE CENEN SANTOS to
CONTINUE assuming and discharging the functions of the said office in ACTING
CAPACITY pursuant to the provisions of Sections 67 and 68 of Republic Act No.
7160. On 26 August 2005, Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court
against petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity
of the Decision dated 28 July 2005 of the Sangguniang Bayan. This case was docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 6727, which was initially heard by Branch 28, but later raffled
to Branch 27 of the trial court.[11]

Show more (5)

[J20] G.R. NO. 142619

MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, HON. MAYOR RICARDO PAPA,

JR. AND ROBERT O. SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO
AND BARANGAY HAGONOY, TAGUIG, M.M.,
RESPONDENTS.

2005-09-13

We have consistently ruled that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two different forums. Although most of the cases we have ruled upon
regarding forum shopping involved petitions in the courts and administrative
agencies, the rule prohibiting it applies equally to multiple petitions in the
same tribunal or agency.

Show more (8)

[J21] G.R. NO. 72477

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 10TH
JUDICIAL REGION BRANCH XXV, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, MUNICIPALITY OF
JASAAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL AND BARANGAY APLAYA,
JASAAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENTS.

1990-10-16

Section 82. Collection of real property tax through the courts. - The delinquent real
property tax shall constitute a lawful indebtedness of the taxpayer to the province or
city and collection of the tax may be enforced by civil action in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The civil action shall be filed by the Provincial or City Fiscal within
fifteen days after receipt of the statement of delinquency certified to by the
provincial or city treasurer. This remedy shall be in addition to all other remedies
provided by law. It is indeed desirable and beneficial to the Judiciary’s on-going program
of decongesting court dockets that intra-governmental disputes such as this be settled
administratively. Unfortunately, our consideration of the legal provisions involved leads
us to a different conclusion. In reconciling these two conflicting provisions of P.D. 242
and P.D. 464 on the matter of jurisdictions, we are guided by the basic rules on
statutory construction.

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[J22] G.R. NO. 204183

BARANGAY TONGONAN, ORMOC CITY, REPRESENTED BY

ITS PUNONG BARANGAY, ISAGANI R. BAÑEZ, PETITIONER,
V. HON. APOLINARIO M. BUAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 35,
ORMOC CITY, CITY GOVERNMENT OF ORMOC,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HONORABLE ERIC C.
CODILLA, THE MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, LEYTE,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HONORABLE GIOVANNI M.
NAPARI, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.
[*](PNOC-EDC), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MR.
PAUL AQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

2018-06-20

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Resolution[2] dated November 24, 2011 and Resolution[3] dated September 27,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City in CA-G. R. CEB SP No. 02691 which
dismissed petitioner's Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of
Court Order and Amicable Settlement due to a defective Verification and Certification
Against Non-forum Shopping. The Antecedents The instant petition has as its factual
background a boundary dispute between respondents Ormoc City and the Municipality
of Kananga. To settle the controversy, Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga
entered into an Amicable Settlement dated February 27, 2003, which compromise
agreement was subsequently approved by respondent court a quo. [4] Claiming that
the Amicable Settlement constitutes an illegal relinquishment of the
patrimony of Ormoc City in general and of petitioner in particular which
greatly altered its boundaries and reduced its territory by 325 hectares,
petitioner lodged a petition before the CA Cebu City seeking to annul the
Amicable Settlement as well as the court a quo's Order approving the
same. [5] Because of certain procedural defects,[6] the petition for annulment was
initially dismissed by the CA Cebu City in its Resolution dated June 18, 2010. [7]
However, on petitioner's motion for reconsideration with motion to admit amended
petition, the CA Cebu City reinstated the petition, noting that petitioner promptly
corrected the procedural infirmities besetting its petition. Accordingly, the CA Cebu City
directed the issuance of summons to the respondents.

[J23] G.R. NO. 166910

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. AND JOSE MA. O. HIZON,

PETITIONERS, VS. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, MANILA
NORTH TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES HOLDINGS
CORPORATION, FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, CITRA
METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION AND
HOPEWELL CROWN INFRASTRUCTURE, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO. 169917]HON. IMEE R. MARCOS,
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, CONSUMERS UNION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., QUIRINO A. MARQUINEZ, HON. LUIS A.
ASISTIO, HON. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, HON. RENATO
"KA RENE" B. MAGTUBO, HON. RODOLFO G. PLAZA, HON.
ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, HON. EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA, HON. ANIBAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
AGRIKULTURA (AMA), INC., ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGINGISDA AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA-
KATIPUNAN, INC., KAISAHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA SA
AGRIKULTURA, INC., KILUSAN NG MANGAGAWANG
MAKABAYAN, PETITIONERS, VS. THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, MANILA NORTH TOLLWAYS
CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, AND FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT CORP., RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO.
173630]GISING KABATAAN MOVEMENT, INC., BARANGAY
COUNCIL OF SAN ANTONIO, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
PEDRO, LAGUNA [AS REPRESENTED BY COUNCILOR
CARLON G. AMBAYEC], AND YOUNG PROFESSIONALS AND
ENTREPRENEURS OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA PETITIONERS,
VS. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE TOLL REGULATORY BOARD (TRB),
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
(PNCC), RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO. 183599]THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, PETITIONER, VS. YOUNG
PROFESSIONALS AND ENTREPRENEURS OF SAN PEDRO,
LAGUNA, RESPONDENT.

2010-10-19

Similarly in Padua v. Ranada, the fixing of provisional toll rates by the TRB without a
public hearing was held to be valid, such procedure being expressly provided by law.
[113] To be very clear, it is only the fixing of the initial and the provisional toll
rates where a public hearing is not a vitiating requirement. Accordingly,
subsequent toll rate adjustments are mandated by law to undergo both the
requirements of public hearing and publication.

[J24] G.R. NO. 209797

FROILAN L. HONG, PETITIONER, VS. ILUMINADO ARAGON,

MA. ELENA ARAGON, SUSAN RAMOS, HENRY TAN,
MARILOU VILLAMOR, TERESITA TAN, HAROLD MANLAPAZ,
FELIPA ROSOS, ROSITA IGNACIO, EDUARDO MATIAS,
ROMEO GREGORIO, RONILO DINO, MINDA GONZALES,
RICO VILLA, ELENITA ALVIAR, GUIA CABLE, EDGAR
VALENTIN, GENEROSA ZALETA, FEDERICO ZALETA,
ROSEMARY VALENTIN, DR. EDGARDO CUADRO, GRACE
CUADRO, CARMELA MANALO, FE GRIJALDO, RUBEN
RESIDE, ANTONIO ALDEA, CAROLINA SHEY, BERNARDITA
SALAZAR, SHERWIN CASTELLTORT AND ABRAHAM
SANTOS. RESPONDENTS.

2020-09-08
Both constitutionally enshrined rights ensure that delay is averted in the administration
of justice. The difference, however, depends as to which body can such right be invoked
against. As held in the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan[36] the right to
speedy trial under Section 14(2)[37] of the 1987 Constitution is invoked
against the courts in criminal prosecution while the right to speedy
disposition of a case under Section 16[38] of the 1987 Constitution is invoked
against the courts, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal or
administrative case.

To address whether both the husband and wife need to be impleaded as respondents in
a case involving property bought by the husband when they are separated in fact, we
need to consider the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
applicable jurisprudence.

Relevant Provisions
1. Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386)
o Article 113: This article outlines the instances when the husband must be
joined in suits by or against the wife. It includes exceptions such as judicial
separation, separation of property, and when the litigation concerns the
wife's paraphernal property, among others.
o Article 178: This article states that separation in fact without judicial
approval does not affect the conjugal partnership, except in specific
circumstances such as the spouse who leaves the conjugal home without
just cause not having the right to be supported, and the necessity of
judicial authorization for transactions requiring the consent of both
spouses.

Jurisprudence
1. Presentacion Bautista vs. Anita F. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-24062 (1971)
[J1]:

o The court emphasized the necessity of impleading the husband as a party-

defendant in cases involving recovery of real property admitted as
conjugal. The damages sought were chargeable against the conjugal
assets under the administration of the husband.
2. Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Alejo M.
Vinluan, G.R. No. 102692 (1996) [J4]:

o The Supreme Court held that the conjugal partnership is liable for
obligations incurred by either spouse if it is presumed that the proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. The court also noted that the
husband must be joined as a party-defendant to bind the conjugal
partnership.

Analysis
Given the provisions of the Civil Code and the cited jurisprudence, the following points
are crucial:

1. Conjugal Partnership: If the property in question is considered part of the

conjugal partnership, both spouses generally need to be impleaded to address
any claims against the conjugal assets. This is because the administration of
conjugal property typically involves both spouses, and any judgment affecting
conjugal property should bind both.

2. Separation in Fact: Article 178 of the Civil Code specifies that separation in fact
without judicial approval does not dissolve the conjugal partnership. Therefore,
the conjugal nature of the property remains unless there is a judicial decree of
separation of property.

3. Impleading Both Spouses: Based on the jurisprudence, particularly the case of

Presentacion Bautista vs. Anita F. Fernandez [J1], the husband should be
impleaded in cases involving conjugal property to ensure that any judgment can
be enforced against the conjugal assets.

Conclusion
If the husband and wife are separated in fact but there is no judicial decree of
separation of property, both spouses should be impleaded as respondents in a case
involving property bought by the husband. This ensures that any judgment can be
properly enforced against the conjugal partnership.

References:

 Republic Act No. 386, Articles 113 and 178 [L1]

 Presentacion Bautista vs. Anita F. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-24062 (1971) [J1]
 Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Alejo M. Vinluan, G.R. No.
102692 (1996) [J4]

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Law

Jurisprudence

SORT BYRelevanceDate

[J1] G.R. NO. L-24062

PRESENTACION BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. ANITA F.

FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.

1971-04-30

AI SUMMARY

The case involves a dispute over the ownership and possession of a piece of land in
Manila. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila sold the land to different individuals,
leading to conflicting claims of ownership. The respondent filed a suit to have the
petitioner vacate the land, which resulted in a series of court decisions, including the
Court of Appeals affirming the respondent's ownership of the entire lot. The petitioner
raised various legal arguments, including the jurisdiction of the court and the non-
joinder of her husband as an indispensable party. The court ultimately ordered the
respondent to file an amended complaint including the petitioner's husband
as a party, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, we opine that the petitioner's husband should have been

impleaded as party-defendant, for the action involves recovery of real
property admitted by the petitioner herself in her petition filed with this Court
as conjugal and includes a demand for damages for the use and occupancy of
the premises in question. Undeniably, the damages sought to be recovered are
chargeable against the conjugal assets under the administration of the petitioner's
husband.

[J2] G.R. NO. L-8190

GONZALO GARCIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS.

CONSOLACION MANZANO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

1958-05-28

AI SUMMARY

Gonzalo Garcia filed an action for the judicial declaration of the separation of his
conjugal partnership with his wife Consolacion Manzano. However, the court dismissed
the complaint, ruling that the allegations did not establish a case for separation of
property. The court also stated that the provisions of the Civil Code regarding
separation of property are limited and do not apply to the husband in the
same way as they do to the wife. The judgment of the court was affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.

ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval,
shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the
conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have a right to be
supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is
required by law, judicial authorization shall be necessary; (3) If the husband has
abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court
for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or
separation of property. " In support of his thesis, appellant argues that in case of
mismanagement and maladministration by the wife, the husband should be
entitled to the same relief as the wife, otherwise there would be a void in the
law. This contention ignores the philosophy underlying the provisions in question. The
wife is granted a remedy against the mismanagement or maladministration of the
husband because by express provision of law, it is the husband who has the
administration of the conjugal partnership.

Show more (1)

[J3] G.R. NO. 13952

WILLIAM AHERN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS.

TORIBIO JULIAN, OBJECTOR AND APPELLEE. PERCY A.
HILL, ASSIGNEE.

1919-02-06

AI SUMMARY

William Ahern filed for voluntary insolvency proceedings, claiming he had no property
except for personal clothing and a claim against his wife for services rendered. An
objector, a judgment creditor, opposed his discharge, arguing that property owned by
Ahern's wife should be subject to the payment of his debts. Despite claims by Ahern
and his wife that the property was separate, the court found the evidence
insufficient to rebut the presumption that it was communal property and
ordered it to be included in Ahern's schedule of assets. The court also ordered
Ahern's wife to be given the opportunity to defend her interests in the property.

To overcome the statutory presumption that all of this property, acquired during the
marriage of petitioner and his wife is communal property (bienes gananciales) the
burden of proof clearly rested on the petitioner. If the facts are contrary to that legal
presumption, the petitioner and his wife, better than any one else, should be able to
establish these facts by the production of satisfactory evidence. Doubt and uncertainty
may well be anticipated on a question of this kind where the interests of the husband
and wife are opposed to each other, or in cases wherein the lapse of time, or the death
of one or both of the spouses may have rendered the production of affirmative evidence
difficult or impossible. But in a case such as that now under consideration,
wherein both husband and wife appear to be interested in establishing
separate ownership in the wife; wherein both spouses are living; and wherein
the facts to be established are of comparatively recent origin, we are justified
in requiring clear, satisfactory and convincing proof in rebuttal of the
statutory presumption, when the interests of third persons would be
materially prejudiced by our failure to give the presumption its full force and
effect.

[J4] G.R. NO. 102692

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., PETITIONER, VS.

COURT OF APPEALS AND ALEJO M. VINLUAN,
RESPONDENTS.

1996-09-23

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Petitioner contends[15] that the purpose of impleading private respondent as co-

defendant in petitioner's complaint was to bind not only the defendant-spouses'
conjugal partnership but also private respondent's capital. The trial court resolved that
it was not necessary that private respondent (as husband) be joined as party-defendant
in the suit below. Inasmuch as it appeared from the allegations in the complaint
that private respondent may be a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises, the trial
court nonetheless did not exclude private respondent but passed upon the
issue of such co-ownership to determine whether he may be held liable in the
same manner as his wife. Petitioner insists that the trial court in its decision merely
made a finding that the private respondent husband was not a co-owner of the business
venture of his wife, which conclusion ("exoneration") only exempted his capital from the
adjudged liability, but not the conjugal properties of the spouses. Petitioner further
argues that nowhere in the trial court's decision can there be found any pronouncement
absolving the conjugal property from liability, contrary to the findings of the respondent
Court.

[J5] G.R. NO. 198660

TING TING PUA, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES BENITO LO

BUN TIONG AND CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG,
RESPONDENTS.
2013-10-23

Respondent Benito cannot escape the joint and solidary liability to pay the loan on the
ground that the obligation arose from checks solely issued by his wife. Without any
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the
benefit of their family. Hence, the conjugal partnership is liable therefor.[72] The
unsupported allegation that respondents were separated in fact, standing
alone, does not persuade this Court to solely bind respondent Caroline and
exempt Benito. As the head of the family, there is more reason that respondent Benito
should answer for the liability incurred by his wife presumably in support of their family.

[J6] G.R. NO. L-5949

TANG HO, WILLIAM LEE, HENRI LEE, SOFIA LEE

TEEHANKEE, THOMAS LEE, ANTHONY LEE, JULIA LEE KAW,
CHARLES LEE, VALERIANA LEE YU, VICTOR LEE, SILVINO
LEE, MARY LEE, JOHN LEE, AND PETER LEE, FOR
THEMSELVES AND AS HEIRS OF LI SENG GIAP, DECEASED,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS AND THE
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENTS.

1955-11-19

Appellants herein are therefore in error when they contend that it is enough
that the property donated should belong to the conjugal partnership in order
that the donation be considered and taxed as a donation of both husband and
wife, even if the husband should appear as the sole donor. There is no blinking
the fact that, under the old Civil Code, to be a donation by both spouses, taxable to
both, the wife must expressly join the husband in making the gift; her participation
therein cannot be implied.

[J7] G.R. NO. L-19565

ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

1968-01-30

It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The evidence
presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of the defendant, while
pertinent and material in the determination of the merits of a petition for
legal separation, must in this case be regarded merely as an attempt to
bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which abandonment,
if it constitutes abandonment in law, would justify separation of the conjugal
assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil Code
which read: "The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that . if the husband
has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property, or separation of property." In addition to abandonment
as a ground, the plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil Code in
support of her prayer for division of the matrimonial assets. This article provides
that "In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property
by the husband, the courts, on the petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership,
or administration by the wife, or separation of property." It behooves us, therefore, to
inquire, in the case at bar, whether there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by
the defendant of the plaintiff, and/or whether the defendant has abused his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property, so as to justify the plaintiffs plea for
separation of property.

[J8] G.R. NO. L-25788

PACIFICO C. DEL MUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO, EUGENIA,
DELFIN AND MARCIANA, ALL SURNAMED ALVAREZ, AND
SIMPLICIO BALCOS, RESPONDENTS.

1980-04-30

Moreover, when the question is exclusively between husband and wife, or between one
of them and the heirs of the other, the admission or acknowledgment of one spouse
that the money used to purchase the property came from the other spouse, is evidence
against the party making the admission or his heirs.[15] Likewise, where the
husband has been a party to an act of purchase of immovable property in the
name of his wife, which recited that the purchase was made with paraphernal
funds, and that the property was to be and remain paraphernal property,
neither he nor his heirs can be permitted to go behind the deed and contest
the wife's title to the property by claiming that it is conjugal.[16] Since the
property is the paraphernal property of Isidra, the same having been acquired by her
prior to her marriage with Agripino[17] and having been purchased with her exclusive or
private funds[18] any declaration to the contrary made by her, as well as that of her
child, cannot prevail nor change the character of the property in question. The extra-
judicial partition was evidently an expedient only to facilitate the sale without giving rise
to any question as to the legality of the transmission of the property to Isidra and his
daughter, as the death of Agripino Alvarez may occasion, for the better protection of the
vendee, the petitioner herein. If the property were conjugal, the private respondents
would have been made parties to the extra-judicial partition and made signatories
thereto. As the Court of First Instance aptly observed:

[J9] G. R. NO. L-9727

MARGARITA TABUNAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS.

TIMOTEO MARIGMEN AND CONSORCIA MARIGMEN,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

1957-04-29

On this appeal, it is claimed on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the sale as to 1/2 of
the entire homestead is invalid and is not binding on the plaintiff-appellant; that the
power or right of the husband to sell the conjugal property is recognized only in cases
where the husband and wife are not separated. We do not find merit in these claims of
the plaintiff-appellant. The right of the husband to administer and dispose of
conjugal property of the spouses is not limited to the cases^ in which the
husband and wife are living together as spouses, and that said right to
administer or dispose of does not cease upon the separation of husband and
wife. The husband's right in this respect is full, absolute and complete. Article 1413 of
the old Civil Code provides:

[J10] G.R. NO. 106169

SAMSON T. SABALONES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES,
RESPONDENTS.

1994-02-14

These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction
is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and
prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. The twin requirements of a valid
injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
[5] Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the
petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the
action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if
not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence
to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its
improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that
inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to
participate in its management.
[J11] G.R. NO. 159889

WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA,

PETITIONERS, VS. FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA
CHIONG, RESPONDENTS.

2008-06-05

Likewise, under Article 160[17] of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's supposed
exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against all
the evidence for respondents.

[J12] G.R. NO. 136803

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. MA. ELVIRA

CASTILLO, RESPONDENT.

2000-06-16

The main issue is -- Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of
co-ownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and
defendant are admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still
valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that
they lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other
words, can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying
each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife (?)

Show more (1)

[J13] G.R. NO. L-28546

VENANCIO CASTANEDA, AND NICETAS HENSON,

PETITIONERS, VS. PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

1975-07-30
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,[1] where the wife was a party in one
case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal
properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly
bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal
properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the present
case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the
common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.

[J14] G.R. NO. 198908

VIRGINIA OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. DEOGRACIO

OCAMPO, RESPONDENT.

2015-08-03

While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein may have
been actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was
able to do so without the invaluable help of respondent. Even a plain housewife who
stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the household while the husband
indulges in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion
the husband is, to the property or properties acquired by the marriage. In the same
breadth, respondent must be considered to be entitled to the same extent. Petitioner's
claim that the seed money in that business was provided by her mother and that, had it
not been for that reason, the properties now subject of controversy could not have been
acquired. That may be true but the Court is not prone to believe so because of
insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-serving
allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible
and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made but the testimonies
adduced towards that end, failed to fully convince the Court that respondent
should be punished by depriving him of his share of the conjugal property
because of his indiscretion.[16]

[J15] G. R. NO. L-3500

ROBERT C. PEYER, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX MARTINEZ,

JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, TERESA
FANLO PEYER, AND HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

1951-01-12
Counsel are probably right in contending that under the article in question, declaration
of the husband's absence must precede the transfer of the management; i.e., it must be
sought in a separate action in which the absent husband or his representative was
given an opportunity to be heard. But if this be so, the requirement, eminently remedial
or procedural in character, must be deemed superseded by the new Rules of Court. By
section 4 of Rule 3, supra, applications to pronounce the husband an absentee
and to place the management of the conjugal assets in the hands of the wife
may, in our opinion, be combined and adjudicated in one and the same
proceeding.

[J16] G.R. NO. 171904

BOBBY TAN, PETITIONER, VS. GRACE ANDRADE, PROCESO

ANDRADE, JR., CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE,
ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, GLORY ANDRADE,
MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE,
RESPONDENTS.[G.R. No. 172017]GRACE ANDRADE,
CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE, ANDREW
ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE, AND
JOSEPH ANDRADE, PETITIONERS, VS. BOBBY TAN,
RESPONDENT.

2013-08-07

Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil
Code[38] which states that “[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to apply, the
party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property
was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:[39]

[J17] G.R. NO. 82753

ESTELA COSTUNA, PETITIONER, VS. LAUREANA

DOMONDON, THE HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVIII, QUEZON CITY, THE HON.
PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, 13TH
DIVISION, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
1989-12-19

On the confronting issue of whether or not the defendant can be compelled to

signify her conformity in the deed of sale, it is the considered opinion of the
court that weighing their respective evidence and the end line of arguments
of the parties in view of the peculiar circumstances attendant to the case that
the refusal of the defendant to give consent to the sale of what rightly
belongs to her husband was unreasonable. Consequently, the court believes and
so holds that defendant can be compelled to grant the same consistent with the last
provision of Article 166 of the New Civil Code whichever one-half (1/2) portion of the
whole estate she may choose from the survey plan of the project of partition (Exh. 28,
Q-25601) shall be segregated. As can be gathered from the records, the present case
presupposes a situation where the husband disposed of his legitimate share one-half
(1/2) of the conjugal property so that his pressing financial needs for medical and
hospitalization expenses could be met. The defendant appears to have been accorded
all the formalities required of the marital companionship in securing her consent but
none of the representations were heeded. The fact that letters (Exh. E, Q-34527; Exh.
28, Q-25601) for a proposed partition and seeking of conformity for her to stamp
approval of the deed of sale were never denied since this was confirmed by the records
of the proceedings (t. s. n. July 28, 1978, pp. 19-20, Q-25601). While it is argued that
this has been done upon the prodding of other interested parties, nowhere has it been
shown that the defendant ever reacted when she acknowledged the subject letters. The
contents of said letters were significant since the proposed partition and/or conveyance
of the husband's one-half share means life and death to the latter.

[J18] G.R. NO. 63025

RAMON C. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

FRANCISCO BOIX AND ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY
SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, RESPONDENTS.

1991-11-29

We disagree. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax
declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property
was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that
the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife’s name, but the house built thereon
was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a
careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, We hold that the lot in question is
paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.

[J19] G.R. NO. 166496

JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, PETITIONER, VS. SPS. MANUEL
M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER AND SPS. ISMAEL M.
FERRER AND FLORA FERRER, RESPONDENTS.

2006-11-29

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations

contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises,
are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse
upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the
spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated,
respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner's right to be reimbursed.

[J20] G.R. NO. L-16991

ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND

APPELLANTS, VS. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

1964-03-31

Again, in the Coingco case, We ruled: "The second question raised in the
motion for reconsideration is, whether the presumption that the properties in
litigation are conjugal properties because they were acquired during the
coverture may be sufficiently rebutted by any one of the following facts: (1)
the titles to them are in the name of the wife alone; (2) that the husband gave
his marital consent to their being mortgaged by the wife; (3) that the wife
was financially able to buy those properties. While it is true that each one of
them, taken separately, may not be sufficient to overcome the above-quoted
presumption established by Art. 1407 of the Civil Code, it is nonetheless true
that all of them taken together with all the other facts and circumstances
established by the evidence, might be and were considered by the lower court
as sufficient to rebut the same presumption."

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[J21] G.R. NO. 111904

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA AND ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA,

PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCEDES
DANLAG Y PILAPIL, RESPONDENTS.
2000-10-05

As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when it is

supported by evidence on record, is binding on us.[18] On the alleged purchase
by her husband of two parcels, it is reasonable to infer that the purchase was without
private respondent's consent. Purchase by her husband would make the properties
conjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is against her self-interest, weighs
strongly in her favor and gives credence to her claim that her husband was manipulated
and unduly influenced to make the purchase, in the first place.

[J22] G.R. NOS. L-2147-48

IGNACIO M. COINGCO, PETITIONER, VS. ROBERTA

FLORES, RESPOSDENT.

1948-12-09

The second question raised in the motion for reconsideration is, whether the
presumption that the properties in litigation are conjugal properties because
they were acquired during coverture, may be sufficiently rebutted by any one
of the following facts: (1) that the titled to them are in the name of the wife
alone; (2) that the husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged
by the wife; and (3) that the wife was financially able to buy those
properties. While it is true that each one of them, taken separately, may not be
sufficient to overcome tha above quoted presumption, established by Art. 1407 of the
Civil Code, it is nonetheless true that all of them taken together, with all the other facts
and circumstances established by the evidence, might be, and were, considered by the
lower as sufficient to rebut the said presumption. The other facts and circumstances
taken into consideration by the Court of Appeals together with tho three above
enumerated are, among others, that "two other lots (those mentioned in items 3 and 5)
which were also acquired during coverture were put in the name of the spouses as
conjugal property." We can not revise and correct the finding of the lower court that all
those foota ware established by the evidence.

[J23] G. R. NO. 7397

AMPARO NABLE JOSE ET AL., STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF

NEW YORK AND CARMEN CASTRO, PLAINTIFFS AND
APPELLANTS, VS. MARIANO NABLE JOSE ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
1916-12-11

It would be inconsistent with the breadth and power of the discretion

conferred upon the husband to hold that purchasers from him of personal or
real estate should be required, at their peril, to ascertain whether sales made
by him are made in good faith for the purpose of the payment of the debts of
the partnership, or to require such purchasers to see that the purchase price
is in fact applied to the payment of such debts. The purchaser has the right to
assume that in disposing of the property, the husband, as administrator, is proceeding
according to law. And this is true even though the purchaser knows that the husband
intends to apply the money for the payment of his own personal debts contracted after
the dissolution of the partnership because, as we have said already, the husband may
pay the partnership debts out of his private funds and reimburse himself from the
partnership property. So far as the purchaser is concerned, he has the right to assume
that when the husband liquidates or sells partnership property and applies the proceeds
to the payment of his personal debts, the transaction is merely the means adopted by
the husband to reimburse himself for payments of partnership indebtedness theretofore
made out of the husband's private funds.

[J24] A.M. NO. O.C.A.-00-01 (FORMERLY O.C.A. I.P.I. NO. 99-02-OCA)

JULIETA B. NAVARRO, COMPLAINANT, VS. RONALDO O.

NAVARRO AND ROBERLYN JOY C. MARIÑAS,
RESPONDENTS.

2000-09-06

The facts of the case are not in issue as both respondents admit begetting a child out of
wedlock; they, however, deny that are still living together. As complainant failed to
adduce any proof to support her bare allegation that respondents are still
living together purporting to be husband and wife, we see no reason to
disbelieve respondents' claim to the contrary. Hence, what remains to be resolved
is the penalty to be imposed on the respondents for having had an illicit relationship in
the past.

[J25] G.R. NO. 241168

BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

(BCDA), PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO S. CALLANGAN, JR.,
ELIZABETH BARBA-AZARES, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND
ORLANDO AZARES, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, HENRY T. VILLEGAS, RESPONDENTS.
2022-08-22

Petitioner also disputes the title of respondents, alleging that the Deed of Sale between
respondents and the Vizcarra Spouses is fictitious.[29] Moreover, the cancellation of
petitioner's tax declaration in favor of respondents cannot be judicially
resolved separately from the main case because it is intertwined with the
issue of ownership and possession.[30] It further argues that it is the Vizcarra
Spouses, not respondents, who are the real parties in interest. Without a showing that
respondents were duly authorized to represent the owners, they cannot ask a relief for
their behalf.[31]

[J26] G. R. NO. 143256

RODOLFO FERNANDEZ AND MERCEDES CARANTO

FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND AND WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ
AND LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, PETITIONERS, VS.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ,
FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM
FERNANDEZ, MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO
FERNANDEZ AND GREGORIO FERNANDEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

2001-08-28

We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie
Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her 3⁄4 undivided share in the building but also the
1⁄4 share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building
without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the rights
of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner
Eddie , a co-owner of the 3⁄4 share of the building together with the
respondents who owned the 1⁄4 share therein.[21]

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[J27] G.R. NO. 171717

RAMON B. BRITO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. SEVERINO D.

DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA
DEQUINTO, ROSITA DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA AND
JOEL DEQUINTO, RESPONDENTS.
2010-12-15

In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of

the subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs
filed a separate action against respondents for recovery of possession
thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows
that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more
reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is
one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right.

[J28] G.R. NO L-18148

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, EXECUTOR OF THE TESTATE

ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EUSEBIO CAPILI; AND THE
INSTITUTED HEIRS, NAMELY: "ARMANDO CAPILI AND
ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
HERMOGENA REYES, NAMELY: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL.,
AND JOSE ISIDRO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

1963-02-28

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of
certain of the properties involved—whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or
to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course,
the widow, now represented, because of her death, by her heirs who have
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have
appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is
true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is
being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with
the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by respondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

[J29] G.R. NO. 169129

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,
SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS,
ERNESTO F. SANTOS, AND TADEO F. SANTOS,
PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO AND PROSERFINA
LUMBAO, RESPONDENTS.

2007-03-28

After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as
exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject
property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon
Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to
execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in
favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is
concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita
informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject
property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had
not yet been partitioned.

[J30] G.R. NO. 215640

NESTOR CABRERA, PETITIONER, VS. ARNEL CLARIN AND

WIFE; MILAGROS BARRIOS AND HUSBAND; AURORA
SERAFIN AND HUSBAND; AND BONIFACIO MORENO AND
WIFE, RESPONDENTS.

2016-11-28

Guided by the abovementioned jurisprudence, this Court rules that respondents are not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject civil case. Records
reveal that even before filing their Answer, respondents assailed the
jurisdiction of the RTC through a motion to dismiss as there was no mention
of the assessed value of the property in the complaint. We note that the RTC
anchored its denial of respondents' motion to dismiss on the doctrine enunciated in a
1977 case - that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC
regardless of the value - which no longer holds true. Thereafter, the respondents filed
their Answer through an omnibus motion to set aside order of default and to admit
Answer.

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[J31] G.R. NO. 146550

FELIPA DELFIN, GINA MAALAT, SHIRLEY TAMAYO, RECIO
DAÑOS, AND ROBERTO DELFIN, PETITIONERS, VS.
PRESENTACION D. BILLONES, ROSARIO D. DEMONARCA
(ACCOMPANIED BY HUSBAND PEDRO AND DEMONARCA),
WENEFREDO DEGALA (REPRESENTING PEDRO DEGALA),
RAMON DELA CRUZ (REPRESENTING HIS DECEASED WIFE
MARIA DARADAR DELA CRUZ), TERESITA DALIVA
DEVIENTE (DAUGHTER OF ESPERANZA DARADAR
DALIVA), AND JOLLY DATAR (REPRESENTING HIS
DECEASED MOTHER TRINIDAD D. DATAR) AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS

2006-03-17

Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that respondents' claim
of ownership over the subject properties was not established by a preponderance of
evidence. Compared to respondents' verbal claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin
were able to prove that they bought the properties from the original owners, the trial
court added. The trial court held that the deeds of sale being duly executed notarial and
public documents, they enjoy the presumption of regularity which can only be
contradicted by clear and convincing evidence. In addition, respondents' claims
based on fraud were barred by prescription, having been filed more than four
(4) years from the time the instruments were registered with the Register of
Deeds, and they are estopped from annulling the documents by reason of
laches, the action having been filed 15 years after the deeds were
registered. The trial court also denied respondents' claims for damages.[15]

[J32] G.R. NO. 144576

SPOUSES ISABELO AND ERLINDA PAYONGAYONG,

PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
CLEMENTE AND ROSALIA SALVADOR, RESPONDENTS.

2004-05-28

Under the circumstances, this Court cannot come to petitioners’ succor at the
expense of respondents-innocent purchasers in good faith. Petitioners are not
without remedy, however. They may bring an action for damages against the spouses
Mendoza.[34]
[J33] G.R. NO. 198026

NARCISO MELENDRES, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, OFELIA

MELENDRES AND CHILDREN JOSE MARI MELENDRES, AND
NARCISO MELENDRES, JR., PETITIONERS, V. ALICIA
CATAMBAY, LORENZA BENAVIDEZ, IN SUBSTITUTION OF
HER HUSBAND EDMUNDO BENAVIDEZ, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL (MORONG BRANCH),
RESPONDENTS.

2018-11-28

] [According to petitioner Narciso,] in 1971, unknown to him and Ariston, a Cadastral

Survey Team from the Bureau of Lands surveyed the subject property, the property of
[respondent] Catambay, and other properties in Barangay Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal[. ]
[An alleged] gross error [was] committed by the [Cadastral Survey Team of the Bureau
of Lands, which] resulted in the reduction of the original area of the subject property
from 13,742 square meters to 4,762 square meters[, docketed as Lot No.
3300]. Original Certificate of Title [(OCT)] No. 1112, which contains an area of
only 4,762 square meters, was issued to Ariston[. ] On the other hand, OCT
No. M-2177 for Lot No. 3302[, which covers the subject property] was
[supposedly mistakenly] issued [in favor of Alejandro] with an area of 1,622
square meters[. ] [Upon the death of Alejandro,] Transfer Certificate of Title
[(TCT)] No. M-28802 was issued [in favor of respondent Catambay after the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Alejandro. ] [Eventually, TCT No. M-
28802 was cancelled and TCT No. M-39517 was issued in favor of respondents
Spouses Edmundo (Edmundo) and Lorenza (Lorenza) Benavidez (collectively,
respondents Sps. Benavidez) who bought the property from respondent
Catambay] [Petitioner Narciso] discovered the grave errors in the survey and
registration of the subject property sometime on September 13, 1989 and
brought the same to the attention of [respondent] Catambay who pointed to
[respondent] Edmundo as her persistent buyer of the subject property[.

[J34] G.R. NO. 144291

EVADEL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ANTERO AND VIRGINIA
SORIANO, RESPONDENTS.

2001-04-20
Respondent spouses, on the other hand, maintain that there are no genuine
issues of fact in the present case in view of the admission by petitioner of (1)
the existence of the title over the subject property in the name of respondent
spouses; and (2) its encroachment on the northern side of sold Lot 5536-C
which is the area in dispute. It is claimed that such admissions are tantamount to an
admission that respondents have a rightful claim of ownership to the subject property
warranting a summary judgment in their favor.

[J35] G.R. NO. 109312

HEIRS OF PLACIDO MIRANDA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO TOLEDANO,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, IBA, ZAMBALES, BRANCH 69,
AGERICO MIRANDA AND HIS WIFE JUANA MARCIA,
CHARITO MIRANDA AND HER HUSBAND TIMOTEO PAULE,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
EDITHA ZUNIGA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF IBA,
ZAMBALES, RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO. 120245. MARCH 29,
1996]ISMAEL ESMELE, ALFREDO MIRANDA, NOE
MIRANDA, SR., NOE MIRANDA, JR., AMOR LEDINA,
FERDINAND LEDINA, PEDRO REYES, FELIX REYES,
NARCISO REYES, ROY BORJA, REMIGIO ENCARNACION,
ROBERTO DE LUNA, AND SPS. EDEN LEDINA AND HECTOR
SEVILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. FELIX MAMENTA, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BRANCH 70, IBA, ZAMBALES, CHARITO MIRANDA, AND
HER HUSBAND TIMOTEO PAULE, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDITHA ZUNIGA,
RESPONDENTS.

1996-03-29

All ejectment cases are now covered by the summary procedure regardless of whether
they involve questions of ownership.[13] Under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the adjudication of cases is done on the basis of affidavits and position
papers.[14] The court is no longer allowed to hold hearings to receive testimonial
evidence. Should the Court find it necessary to clarify certain issues, it may require the
parties instead to submit affidavits or other evidence. The proceeding is required to
be summary so as to promote the speedy disposition of ejectment cases.[15]
Show more (24)

[J36] G.R. NO. 161317

CRISTITA ALEGRIA, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND BIBIANO

ALEGRIA, PRAXEDES BANQUERIGO, JOINED BY HER
HUSBAND ROLANDO CABUNILAS, EDUARDO DRILON,
JOINED BY HER WIFE TURTILLANA DRILON, ESTERLORE
DRILON, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND JERRY DRILON,
JUANITA DRILON, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND AND
DEMETRIO DRILON, CEFERINA FORASTEROS, ARITA
MANSING, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND APOLONIO MANSING,
AND GAVINA OLLENA, PETITIONERS, VS. EUSTAQUIA
DRILON AND SPOUSES ALFREDO AND FREDESWENDA
YBIOSA, RESPONDENTS.

2008-07-16

[O]nly the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. Therefore, not being
the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents have
no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in
such suit.[9] In point is De la Peña v. Court of Appeals,[10] which likewise involved an
action for reconveyance and annulment of title on the ground that the free patent and
title over a parcel of land were allegedly obtained through fraud. Like the present
case, the petitioner in De la Peña claimed that private respondent
fraudulently stated in his application for free patent that "the land applied for
is not claimed or occupied by any other person." The Court ruled that
petitioner had no standing to file the case since reconveyance is a remedy
granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in
another's name. In such instances, it is the State which is the proper party to file suit,
thus:

Show more (2)

[J37] G.R. NO. 115402

LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, AND LEE TEK SHENG,
RESPONDENTS.
1998-07-15

Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, one of the issues agreed upon by

the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by
the spouses during their marriage.[18] In addition, private respondent in his
answer with counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots.
Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must
present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations.[19]
Considering that this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the “nature
and extent of title” of the supposed claimant.[20] The title referred to by the rule is the
purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may be considered in the determination of
the former. WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Regalado,
(Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ. , concur.

[J38] G.R. NO. 156125

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. ERLINDA

RAMIREZ AND ELISEO CARLOS, RESPONDENTS.

2010-08-25

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to
compare the respective values of the house and of the lot to determine ownership of
the subject property; it was acquired during their marriage and, therefore, considered
conjugal property. They also submit that the transaction between the parties
was not a sale, but an equitable mortgage because (a) they remained in
possession of the subject property even after the execution of the deed of
absolute sale, (b) they paid the 1993 real property taxes due on the subject
property, and (c) they received P200,000.00 only of the total stated price of
P602,000.00. THE ISSUE The issues in the present case boil down to (1) whether the
subject property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract between the
parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage. OUR RULING We deny the present Petition
but for reasons other than those advanced by the CA.

[J39] G.R. NO. L-47378

MERCEDES U. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO P. DE GUZMAN

(DECEASED) NOW HIS HEIRS, REPRESENTED BY
FELICITACION G. ROXAS (DAUGHTER), PETITIONERS, VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION),
ANTONIO M. AUSTRIA, ROMAN M. UMALI AND JULIANA U.
TRINIDAD, RESPONDENTS.
1987-02-27

It was not necessary for the respondents to prove at the trial that they were
entitled to the partition of the disputed property as co-owners thereof by
right of intestate succession. The reason is that these matters were already covered
by the above-mentioned stipulation of facts. The respondents were willing to submit the
issue for resolution by the trial court without presentation of further proof. The
stipulated facts were already deemed admitted by the parties.

[J40] G.R. NO. 175990

HEIRS OF ALBINA G. AMPIL, NAMELY PRECIOUS A.

ZAVALLA, EDUARDO AMPIL, PEÑAFRANCIA A. OLAÑO,
VICENTE G. AMPIL, JR., FROILAN G. AMPIL AND EXEQUIEL
G. AMPIL, REPRESENTED BY EXEQUIEL G. AMPIL,
PETITIONERS, VS. TERESA MANAHAN AND MARIO
MANAHAN, RESPONDENTS.

2012-10-11

Respondents herein are co-owners of two parcels of land owned by their deceased
mother. The properties were allegedly encroached upon by the petitioner. As co-owner
of the properties, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible
entry, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject
properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. However, if the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims the possession for himself and not for the co-
ownership, the action will not prosper.

[J41] G.R. NO. L-44546

RUSTICO ADILLE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO,
DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO AND SANTIAGO ASEJO,
RESPONDENTS.

1988-01-29
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We
are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had
deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the
estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to
deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is
occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains
to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of
that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the
private respondents had first sought judicial relief.

[J42] G.R. NO. 28595

TANG AH CHAN AND HIS WIFE KWONG KAM KOON,

PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. EDUARDO B.
GONZALEZ, HELEN DAHLKE AND HER HUSBAND A. H.
DAHLKE, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

1928-10-11

(6) Tang Ah Chan took surveyor Bartolome Reyes and the chief surveyor of the General
Land Registration Office, Francisco Alzua, out to the land bought from Gonzalez, and
with a plan thereof before them, inspected the same in order that Reyes might name his
fees for the survey of the land. Surveyor Reyes testified: "He (referring to Tang
Ah Chan) showed me the land, he opened the plan for me and told me that I
had to monument the points which are not monumented and to survey that
exterior part. Q. Please state to the court if he showed you some monuments
there?—A. Yes, sir, there were two mon- uments there, point 1 and point 2 of
lot No. 1." This testimony is corroborated by Mr. Alzua.

[J43] G.R. NO. 158877

JOVEN DE GRANO, REPRESENTED BY VENUS P. DE

GRANO, ERNESTO H. MALABANAN, AND SIMPLICIA D.
MALABANAN, PETITIONER, VS. GREGORIO LACABA,
RESPONDENT.

2009-06-16

For one, we cannot tack respondent's possession of the property on his

alleged tenants' actual possession absent any proof that said tenants
acknowledge that respondent is the owner and that they have occupied the
property as respondent's tenants. For all we know, these tenants could have been
in adverse possession of the property. We cannot simply rely on respondent's self-
serving testimony that he designated the spouses Mojica as his caretakers and allowed
the other families to occupy the property.

[J44] G.R. NO. L-29157

FAUSTINO LUCAS; EULALIO ROSENDO, ACCOMPANIED BY

HIS WIFE, MERCEDES DE GUZMAN; MAMERTA DIZON,
ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ESTEBAN FULGENCIO;
PACITA DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND,
AGAPITO CRUZ; JOVITA DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER
HUSBAND AURELIO PUNZALAN; JALIGUE DIZON; ELVIRA
DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND, RUBEN ROA;
MERCEDES DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND
PABLO FRANCISCO; NARCISO DIZON; JULIA DIZON,
ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND RICARDO JACINTO;
CONCORDIA DIZON, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND
SILVESTRE EUSEBIO; BARTOLOME DIZON, ACCOMPANIED
BY HIS WIFE LITA APOSTOL; ISAIAS ONGJANGCO,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE JOVITA ROSENDO; LAUREANO
ROSENDO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE PRISCILA
VALENZUELA; ALBERTO ROSENDO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
WIFE FLORENCIA DIONISIO; MARIO HERNANDEZ,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE ASUNCION ROSENDO;
GERARDO QUIRO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE ROSARIO
ROSENDO; AMADO GARCIA, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE
NATIVIDAD LUCAS; BALBINO CUSTODIO, ACCOMPANIED
BY HIS WIFE, EUFRACIA LUCAS; CONSTANTE TEODORO,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE ROMERO LUCAS; ELISEO
QUIMSON, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE CRISTINA ROQUE;
AND VICTOR ACAB, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE
VENERANDA LUCAS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE
HERMINIO C. MARIANO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL; RUFINO MANOTOK; PACIFICO C.
GARCIA, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE SALVADORA G.
GARCIA; CIRILO G. GONZALES, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
WIFE LUISA MUñOZ GONZALES; FIDELA MANOTOK,
ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ANTONIO MUñOZ;
PABLO BAIRAN, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, LAUREANA
C. DE BAIRAN; RAFAEL IBOLEON, JR., ACCOMPANIED BY
HIS WIFE, NILDA M. IBOLEON; CHUA BENG SEH;
SANTIAGO GO (ALIAS JAO GO KIM CHU); BARTOLOME
RIVERA; ELEUTERIA RIVERA, ACCOMPANIED BY HER
HUSBAND HERMOGENES BONIFACIO; THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF RIZAL, OR ANY OF HIS DEPUTIES; PELAGIA R.
ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND MAGDALENE
BENEDICTO; VENANCIO R. ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY
HIS WIFE VICTORIA PEREZ; FELIPE R. ANGELES,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE GREGORIA BAETIONG;
MODESTA R. ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND
ARSENIO CUADRA; FIDELA R. ANGELES; JOSEFA R.
AQUINO, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND LEONCIO
CAINA; GREGORIO R. AQUINO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
WIFE CARMEN DELOPIO; ROSAURO R. AQUINO,
ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE MARIA TOLENTINO; PEDRO
BANOS, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE MARIA PARDO Y
VARELA; MARIA ROSELIO ALENAR VDA. DE VIDAL;
CONCEPCION VIDAL, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND
SIMEON HERGUELA; MARIA DE LA CONCEPCION VIDAL;
AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

1972-04-27

GONZALES, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE LUISA MUñOZ GONZALES; FIDELA MANOTOK,

ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ANTONIO MUñOZ; PABLO BAIRAN, ACCOMPANIED BY
HIS WIFE, LAUREANA C.DE BAIRAN; RAFAEL IBOLEON, JR. , ACCOMPANIED BY HIS
WIFE, NILDA M.IBOLEON; CHUA BENG SEH; SANTIAGO GO (ALIAS JAO GO KIM
CHU); BARTOLOME RIVERA; ELEUTERIA RIVERA, ACCOMPANIED BY HER
HUSBAND HERMOGENES BONIFACIO; THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, OR
ANY OF HIS DEPUTIES; PELAGIA R.ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND
MAGDALENE BENEDICTO; VENANCIO R.ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE
VICTORIA PEREZ; FELIPE R.ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE GREGORIA
BAETIONG; MODESTA R.ANGELES, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND ARSENIO
CUADRA; FIDELA R.ANGELES; JOSEFA R.AQUINO, ACCOMPANIED BY HER
HUSBAND LEONCIO CAINA; GREGORIO R.AQUINO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE
CARMEN DELOPIO; ROSAURO R.AQUINO, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE MARIA
TOLENTINO; PEDRO BANOS, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE MARIA PARDO Y
VARELA; MARIA ROSELIO ALENAR VDA. DE VIDAL; CONCEPCION VIDAL,
ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND SIMEON HERGUELA; MARIA DE LA CONCEPCION
VIDAL; AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Show more (10)

[J45] G.R. NO. 23235

JOSE M. PRADO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF

MARIA PRADO, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
VS. CASIMIRO NATIVIDAD, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

1925-08-27

The complaint filed herein contains a detailed statement of the movable and immovable
properties that were acquired during marriage. At the trial of the case, evidence was
introduced tending to show the existence of said properties with their prices and fruits.
Also evidence was introduced in an attempt to show the true expenses incurred during
the administration of the conjugal partnership. With that evidence in the record, it
is not necessary to order the defendant, in his capacity as administrator of
the estate of said partnership, to make a formal liquidation thereof; because
what was done during the trial of the case amounts to a liquidation, and to
make another one would be to do double work, and would give rise to new
controversies when the liquidation is submitted for the contesting thereof by
the adverse party. The trial court has not, therefore, committed any error in not
ordering a formal liquidation.

[J46] G.R. NO. L-45445

THE HEIRS OF JOSE FUENTES, FELICIDAD GALGO VDA. DE

FUENTES, ANTONIO FUENTES AND VIOLETA TUPAS,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIA C. MACANDOG,
PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH X, SAN CARLOS CITY,
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL; AND
FRANCISCO A. JAO RIVERA, AND WIFE ELIZABETH
BARROCA, LORNA A. JAO RIVERA AND HUSBAND CANUTO
DOTE, LOURDES A. JAO RIVERA AND HUSBAND SANTIAGO
SALVILLA, ANASTACIO A. JAO RIVERA AND WIFE
GERTRUDES SOLIDUM, MONSERRAT A. JAO RIVERA, JOSE
A. JAO RIVERA AND WIFE CAROLINA PESUEÑA, ROMEO A.
JAO RIVERA AND ELNORA CABENTA VDA. DE MONTOYA,
RESPONDENTS.

1978-06-16

Accordingly to the very explanation of respondents, there was a failure to notify the
other petitioner herein, Felicidad Galgo Vda. de Fuentes, who is also defendant in
the case below because when the registered mail addressed to her and
containing the notice in question was being delivered at the Hardware and
Auto Supply Store "owned by Fuenteses also located at Sagay," to one of the
employees thereat, the latter refused to accept the same after he had initially
signed the return card, per affidavit of Rodolfo Diokson Sumanting, the letter
carrier in charge of said delivery. Respondents would lay the blame for such failure
upon petitioners.

To address your query on the exceptions to the rule under Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court regarding spouses as parties, we can refer to the relevant jurisprudence
provided.

Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court

This rule states:

"Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law."

Relevant Jurisprudence
1. G.R. No. 153788 (2009) [J2]

o Case Summary: Karen Go filed complaints for replevin and/or sum of

money against Roger Navarro. Navarro contended that Karen Go was not a
real party-in-interest because the lease agreements were signed by her
husband, Glenn Go. The Supreme Court ruled that Karen Go, as the owner
of Kargo Enterprises, was the real party-in-interest and that Glenn Go was
not an indispensable party to the action.
o Excerpt:

"Section 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued

jointly, except as provided by law. Non-joinder of indispensable parties not
ground to dismiss action Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable
party to the action, we have held in a number of cases that the misjoinder
 or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for
dismissal of action."

2. G.R. NO. 160347 (2006) [J10]

o Case Summary: The case involved a loan dispute where the spouses
Arcadio and Maria Luisa Carandang were held liable for a loan. The court
ruled that the spouses were being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors.
o Excerpt:

"Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued

jointly, except as provided by law. Pro-forma parties can either be
indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third
case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property
which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have no
legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she
be joined as a party."

Analysis
The jurisprudence indicates that while Rule 3, Section 4 generally requires spouses to
sue or be sued jointly, there are exceptions:

1. Real Party-in-Interest: If one spouse is the real party-in-interest, they can sue
or be sued without necessarily including the other spouse, as seen in the case of
Karen Go [J2].
2. Pro-Forma Parties: In cases where the spouse is a pro-forma party (neither
indispensable nor necessary), the non-joinder of the spouse does not warrant
dismissal of the action. This is illustrated in the case involving the Carandangs
[J10].

These exceptions are based on the principle that the necessity of joining both spouses
depends on the nature of the action and the specific interests involved. If the action
pertains to the conjugal partnership or if one spouse is the real party-in-interest, the
rule may be relaxed.

Conclusion
The rule under Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has exceptions, particularly when
one spouse is the real party-in-interest or when the spouse is a pro-forma party. The
non-joinder of a spouse in such cases does not automatically lead to the dismissal of the
action.

Disclaimer: While we do our best to ensure our answers are reliable, they do not constitute legal
advice. Consider checking the provided sources or consulting a qualified lawyer. Our service does not
assume liability for actions taken based on our answers.
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[J1] G.R. NO. L-568

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND

APPELLEE, VS. JUAN FRANCISCO, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

1947-07-16

AI SUMMARY

Juan Francisco was convicted of parricide after he stabbed his wife and son at their
home in Mindoro. He confessed to the crime in an affidavit, but later recanted, claiming
he was coerced. The wife's testimony in rebuttal was allowed, despite the general rule
prohibiting spouses from testifying against each other, because Juan accused his wife of
killing their son. The court found Juan guilty of parricide and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, with the evidence suggesting he may have been suffering
from an illness that diminished his willpower. The appeal was denied, and Juan
was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his deceased son and pay the costs. Some
justices concurred with the result, while one justice agreed with the conviction but
dissented on the admissibility of the wife's testimony.

However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed
by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the
general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility. which may be
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

[J2] G.R. NO. 153788

ROGER V. NAVARRO,PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE L.

ESCOBIDO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 37, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY, AND KAREN T. GO, DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE NAME KARGO ENTERPRISES, RESPONDENTS.

2009-11-27

AI SUMMARY

Roger Navarro filed a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Court of
Appeals decision and Resolution that affirmed the Regional Trial Court's
denial of his motion to dismiss. Karen Go filed two complaints for replevin and/or
sum of money with damages against Navarro regarding leased motor vehicles. Navarro
contended that Kargo Enterprises, owned by Karen Go, had no juridical personality to
sue, and that Karen Go was not a real party-in-interest because the lease agreements
were signed by her husband, Glenn Go. The Supreme Court ruled that Kargo Enterprises
is conjugal property and Karen Go is the real party-in-interest. Glenn Go is not an
indispensable party to the action, and the demand is not required prior to filing a
replevin action. Therefore, the petition for review was denied.

Section 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law. Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action Even
assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a
number of cases[26] that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v.
Masirag:[27] Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither
misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action,
thus:

[J3] G.R. NO. 143439

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, PETITIONER, VS. SUSAN RAMIREZ,

RESPONDENT.

2005-10-14
AI SUMMARY

The case involves a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals in a criminal case for arson. The petitioner, Maximo Alvarez, is accused of
setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law, Susan Ramirez, and his estranged wife,
Esperanza Alvarez, testified against him. The main issue is whether Esperanza can
testify against her husband, as there is a marital disqualification rule that generally
prohibits this. However, the court found that the offense of arson directly
impairs the conjugal relationship, making an exception to the marital
disqualification rule. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed, and
Esperanza was allowed to testify against the petitioner.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which
may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a
case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences
of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.[12]

[J4] A.M. NO. MTJ-07-1691 [FORMERLY A.M. NO. 07-7-04-SC]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER, VS.

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, BRANCH 2; JUDGE GIL
R. ACOSTA, BRANCH 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS,
BRANCH 4; AND JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, BRANCH
8; ALL OF MTCC-CEBU CITY; CELESTE P. RETUYA, CLERK
III, MTCC BRANCH 6, CEBU CITY; CORAZON P. RETUYA,
COURT STENOGRAPHER, MTCC, BRANCH 6, CEBU CITY;
RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER I,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC) CEBU CITY; EMMA D. VALENCIA, COURT
STENOGRAPHER III, RTC, BRANCH 18, CEBU CITY;
MARILOU CABANEZ, COURT STENOGRAPHER, MTCC,
BRANCH 4, CEBU CITY; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, PROCESS
SERVER, MTCC, BRANCH 3, CEBU CITY; REBECCA ALESNA,
COURT INTERPRETER, MTCC, BRANCH 1, CEBU CITY; AND
HELEN MONGGAYA, COURT STENOGRAPHER, MTCC,
BRANCH 4, CEBU CITY. RESPONDENTS.

2013-04-02

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The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions
to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license.[126] Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule
should be strictly but reasonably construed.[127] The affidavits of cohabitation should
not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the
Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect
union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.[128] The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the
entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.[129]

[J5] RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES,

RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES PROMULGATED BY

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES EFFECTIVE
JANUARY 1, 1964

1964-01-01

Section 1. Exceptions unnecessary. — Formal exceptions to rulings, orders or a

judgment of the court are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an
exception has heretofore been necessary, it is sufficient that a party, at the
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the
court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the
action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. Sec. 2. Judgments or orders
subject to appeal. — Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor
shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or
the other. A judgment denying relief under Rule 38 is subject to appeal, and in the
course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground
that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law. A party who has been
declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order
of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38. Sec. 3. How appeal is
taken. — Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the
trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal,
an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside
the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless
such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

Show more (11)

[J6] G.R. NO. 164919

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

SPOUSES TOBIAS L. LOZADA AND ERLINA P. LOZADA,
RESPONDENTS.

2008-07-04

The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of

Court contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by
adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.
[54] The co-owner,[55] agricultural tenant,[56] and usufructuary[57] possess the
property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the
right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. The spouses
Lozada cannot claim that their right of possession over Unit No. 402 is analogous to any
of these.

[J7] G.R. NO. 242257

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF

VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ.VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
PSUPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, CHIEF OF POLICE,
SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE STATION; PSSUPT. LEO
IRWIN D. AGPANGAN, PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, PNP-
ANTIQUE; PCSUPT. JOHN C. BULALACAO, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, PNP-REGION VI, AND MEMBERS OF THE PNP
UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

2019-10-15

Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of marital privilege or

disqualification. Among these is when a spouse commits an offense that
"directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]"[58]
This Court expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal
harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic relations, the identity
of interests and the danger of perjury disappear, and the law's aim of
protecting the security of private life also ceases to exist.[59]

[J8] G.R. NO. L-13982

DIEGO DE LA VIÑA, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO VILLAREAL,

AS AUXILIARY JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE, AND NARCISA
GEOPANO, RESPONDENTS.

1920-07-31

"Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband,
universal jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule in tbe case where
the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for a
divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily
authorizes her to live elsewhere and to acquire a separate domicile. Cheever
vs. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.), 108; Barber vs. Barber, 21 How. (U. S.), 582; 2
Bishop, Mar. and Div., 475; Schouler, Hus. and Wife, sec. 574; 5 Am. and Eng.
Encyc. of Law, p. 756." (Smith vs. Smith, 43 La. Ann., 1140, 1146.)

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[J9] 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS (RULES 1 – 71,

RULES OF COURT)

1997-07-01

SEC. 10. Exceptions. — The provisions of sections 8 and 9 of this Rule shall not
apply to a witness who resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from
his residence to the place where he is to testify by the ordinary course of
travel, or to a detention prisoner if no permission of the court in which his
case is pending was obtained. (9a, R23) RULE 22 COMPUTATION OF TIME

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[J10] G.R. NO. 160347

ARCADIO AND MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, PETITIONERS,
VS. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, NAMELY:
MILAGROS DE GUZMAN, VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO
DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA AND QUIRINO DE
GUZMAN, JR., RESPONDENTS.

2006-11-29

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law. Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither
indispensable nor necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an
action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The
wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that
she be joined as a party. In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor
necessary, the general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder
is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of
money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional
defect.[26] The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a
formal requirement which may be cured by amendment.[27] Conversely, in the
instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or necessary
parties, the rules concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case
may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party
not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party. Milagros de Guzman, being
presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses Carandang,
seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable
party, dismissal would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not
warranted, whether or not there was an order for her inclusion in the complaint
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.

[J11] RULES OF COURT THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, AND RULES,

RULES OF COURT THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
AND RULES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF CANDIDATES FOR
ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW

1918-10-02

(b) The clerk of the lower court shall give notice in writing, by registered mail, to the
attorneys for the appellant. and appellee, of the date of transmission of the bill of
exceptions or record on appeal to this court, and shall certify to this court that he has
complied with this requirement and shall attach to such certificate the registry return
card. It shall be the duty of the appellant in all civil cases, within ten days from the
expiration of the periods respectively prescribed by rule 13, computed from the date of
the receipt of the notice of the transmission of the bill of exceptions or record, as shown
by the certificate of the clerk of the lower court, and the registry return card, to pay the
clerk of this court the fees for the docketing of the appeal. If the docketing fee is not
paid within the period prescribed by this rule, the appeal shall be deemed
abandoned and dismissed, and the clerk of this court shall return the bill of
exceptions or record to the court below, accompanied by a certificate under
the seal of the court, showing that the appeal has been dismissed pursuant to
section 500 of the Code of Civil Procedure and this rule. Upon the receipt of such
certificate in the court below the case shall stand as though no bill of exceptions had
been allowed or appeal taken.

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[J12] G.R. NO. 193038

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. SHIRLEY B.

NUEGA, RESPONDENT.

2015-03-11

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the
community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The only exceptions from
the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the
Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. Under the first
exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

[J13] G.R. NO. 248063

NILDA ELERIA ZAPANTA AND HUSBAND GERMAN V.

ZAPANTA, PETITIONERS, VS. RUSTAN COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

2021-09-15

Section 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law. As a general rule, the husband and wife shall sue or be sued
jointly[63] as they are co-administrators of the community property under the
system of absolute community of property regime, as well as the conjugal
partnership regime under the Family Code.[64] In this case, impleading German
was proper as RCC prayed for the attachment of properties that may form part of the
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of Nilda and German. However,
this does not mean that they are equally liable for the obligation that may arise out of
the collection suit. While the Court is bereft of information as to which property regime
is observed by Sps. Zapanta, it is worthy to point out that both the absolute community
of property and conjugal partnership regime impose similar restrictions with respect to
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other. Article 94(3)
and Article 121(3) of the Family Code state:

[J14] G.R. NO. 175677

SPOUSES AZUCENA B. CORPUZ AND RENATO S. CORPUZ,

PETITIONERS, VS. CITIBANK, N.A. AND HON. RAUL B.
VILLANUEVA AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 255,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN LAS PIÑAS CITY,
RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO. 177133]CITIBANK, N.A.,
PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES AZUCENA B. CORPUZ AND
RENATO S. CORPUZ, RESPONDENTS.

2009-07-31

While Section 4[31] of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court allows as an exception a

valid cause for the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial, the instances
cited by the spouses and their counsel hardly constitute compelling
exigencies or situations which warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules.

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[J15] A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC,

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE

2019-10-15

Section 4. Spouses as parties. - Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except
as provided by law. (4) Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. - A minor or a person
alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistance of his father,
mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. (5)

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[J16] G.R. NO. 244274

NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

2019-09-03

Such rule, however, admits of exceptions. A court will decide a case which is
otherwise moot and academic if it finds that: (a) there was a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character
and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] We
find that the fourth exception obtains in this case. At this point, tracing the history of
the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the doctrine on mootness is in
order.

[J17] G.R. NO. 191526

SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND CONSOLACION TABALNO,

PETITIONERS, VS. PAULINO T. DINGAL, SR. AND JUANITA
GALOLA VDA. DE DINGAL, RESPONDENTS.

2015-10-05

We are of course aware of Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court that requires
the husband and the wife to sue jointly, otherwise, the non-joining spouse is
deemed to have waived his or her participation in the proceeding. We note,
however, that Juanita did not join the proceeding pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 3 when
she, as Paulino's wife, should have sued jointly with Paulino. Rather, Juanita joined the
proceeding pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 3 which allows her, as her husband's heir, to
substitute for Paulino in the case. In other words, she was merely taking over her
husband's place, not belatedly joining as an additional party, to protect Paulino's rights
and interests that the proceedings may affect.

[J18] REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE (RULES 128-134, RULES OF COURT),

REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE(RULES 128-134, RULES OF

COURT)

1989-07-01
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A
witnesses can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. (30a) 6. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

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[J19] IPI NO. 17-267-CA-J

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF FERNANDO CASTILLO

AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIFLOR PUNZALAN-
CASTILLO, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA.

2018-04-24

It is elementary in procedural rules that spouses shall sue or be sued jointly, except in
cases provided for by law.[15] As pointed out by Justice Punzalan-Castillo, she
was included as party-plaintiff because her husband Elpidio was among the
plaintiffs in the case. It could be reasonably expected that complainant, a layman,
would not be well-versed in traversing the nuances of procedural rules.

[J20] G.R. NO. L-24062

PRESENTACION BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. ANITA F.

FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.

1971-04-30

Article 113 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, re-stated in section 4 of Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, requires the joinder of the husband in all suits for or
against the wife, subject to the exceptions enumerated therein.[7] This case
not constituting an exception, the need to align the husband of the petitioner as party-
defendant arises.

[J21] G.R. NO. L-20607

BENJAMIN NAVARRO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS.

VICTORIANO BACALLA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

1965-10-14
We agree with appellant that the foregoing evidence is included in the broad scope of
paragraph 4, Article 283, New Civil Code. It is true Sections 30, 31, and 32 of Rule 123
of the Rules of Court adverted to by the court a quo lay down means of proving
relationship or pedigree. Such provisions of the Rules, however, are set forth by way of
exceptions to the hearsay rule. They are, in other words, means of proving relationship
through hearsay evidence. The Rules by no means preclude the proof of
relationship by testimonial evidence based on personal knowledge, that is,
under Section 27 of Rule 123 (now Section 30 of Rule 130).

[J22] G.R. NO. 163209

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO AND FILOMENA LIM, PETITIONERS,

VS. MA. CHERYLS. LIM, FOR HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR CHILDREN LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, AND MARIANO S. LIM, III, RESPONDENTS.

2009-10-30

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners' grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article
204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force
Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband's
infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl's
charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient
evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral
impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of
Article 204, precluding its application.

[J23] G.R. NO. 247234

BBB247234,*PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

2022-08-22

SECTION 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither

the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. In Alvarez v. Ramirez,[73] this Court laid down the rationale for the
rule:There is identity of interests between husband and wife; If one were to
testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; The
policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and Where there is want of domestic tranquility
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other.[74] In Ordoño v. Daquigan,[75] this Court ruled: We think that the correct rule,
which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs. State, 35 ALR
133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

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[J24] G. R. NO. 10396

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND

APPELLEE,VS.TERESA CONCEPCION, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

1915-07-29

The appellant makes another assignment of error which presents an important question
of law. She alleges that the lower court committed an error in permitting the testimony
of her husband to be presented against her over her objection. She alleges that the
admission of that testimony was in violation of paragraph 3 of section 383 of the Code
of Procedure in Civil Actions. Said paragraph provides : "A husband can hot be
examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against
her husband without his consent; nor can either, during the marriage or
afterwards, be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the other during the marriage; but this
exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the
other, or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one
against the other."

[J25] G.R. NO. 152716

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, PETITIONER, VS. BRUNO FEHR,

RESPONDENT.

2003-10-23

The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondent's submission that all the
appellate remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision dated January
30, 1998 became final and executory. What is being questioned in this petition is
not the January 30, 1998 Decision of the trial court declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court dated October 5,
2000 dividing the common properties of petitioner and respondent into
three--1/3 to petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and
affirming its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the
exclusive property of respondent. The issue on the validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has long been settled in the main Decision and may no
longer be the subject of review. There were, however, incidental matters that had to be
addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to the
division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent,
pursuant to the court's directive in its main decision to dissolve the conjugal
partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the
partition of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, and as such it may be
appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However,
considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the
general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just
share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income
to support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care.

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[J26] G. R. NO. L-4475

JOSE TORRES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS.

LUIS MORALES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

1951-09-28

The applicable provisions are section 21, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
states that when the action is for the recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided therefor, and section 2 of Rule 75 which requires that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. Under their first assignment of error, however, the plaintiffs contend that even
admitting the propriety of the dismissal with respect to the first and second causes of
action, the complaint should not have been dismissed as to the third cause of action,
which is for the recovery of damages, in view of section 1 of Rule 88 to the effect that
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator. It is very obvious that the rule cited
is not applicable, because the third cause of action alleged in appellants' complaint is
merely dependent upon or a consequence of the first and second causes of action
founded on the alleged unpaid indebtedness of the defendants-appellees. As a matter of
fact, in alleging the third cause of action, the plaintiffs-appellants reproduced each and
every allegation under the first two causes of action and averred that, as a consequence
of defendants' failure to meet their obligations under said causes of action, the plaintiffs
had suffered the damages sought to be recovered in the third cause of action.
[J27] G.R. NO. 127358

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF

APPEALS AND ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
RESPONDENTS.G.R. NO. 127449NOEL BUENAVENTURA,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, RESPONDENTS;.

2005-03-31

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the

parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i. e. , the declaration
of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.

[J28] G.R. NO. 56479

SOCORRO L. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA, PETITIONER, VS.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK AND
HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, AS JUDGE OF BRANCH I,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, RESPONDENTS.

1982-11-15

The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 7678 is
immaterial. There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to
enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the
conjugal partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by his wife. The contrary
rule is prescribed in Section 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of
the Civil Code, but not the other way around, obviously in recognition of the
legal status of the husband as the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.) There was, therefore, no need of including the
petitioner as a party in Civil Case No. 7678 for the purpose of binding the conjugal
partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment that could be rendered
therein.

[J29] A.M. NO. 19-08-15-SC,

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES

ON EVIDENCE

2019-10-08

However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must
institute summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the
rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse; (x) That acquiescence
resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law
or fact; (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and ordinary habits of life; (z) That persons acting as copartners have
entered into a contract of co-partnership; (aa) That a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage; (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry; (cc) That
in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to
marry each other and who have acquired property through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their
corresponding shares, including joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit, are equal; (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother
contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of
proof to the contrary:

[J30] G.R. NO. 66671

JOSEFINA SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION)
AND SPOUSES PAULA AND ISIDRO ESCOLAR,
RESPONDENTS.
1986-10-28

We find no merit in the above claim of the petitioner. If her husband was merely a
formal party, she could have opted to exclude him because formal parties are
those who may be made parties or not at the option of the complainant. Art.
113 of the New Civil Code gives her liberality of choice. It provides that:

[J31] REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AS (RULES

110-127, RULES OF COURT)

2000-12-01

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary

investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing,
ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided in this Rule. (7a; Sec. 2, R. A. No. 7438)Sec. 8. Records. —(a)
Records supporting the information or complaint. —An information or complaint filed in
court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.
(b) Record of preliminary investigation. —The record of the preliminary investigation,
whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the
case. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may
order the production of the record or any of its part when necessary in the
resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is to be introduced
as an evidence in the case by the requesting party. (8a)Sec. 9. Cases not
requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. —
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. —If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less than four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be
observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed with
the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this
section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed.

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[J32] G.R. NO. 57402

G-TRACTORS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS AND LUIS R. NARCISO AND JOSEFINA SALAK
NARCISO, RESPONDENTS.

1985-02-28

The non-inclusion of the herein petitioner as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 7678 is
immaterial. There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to
enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the
conjugal partnership, the defendant husband must be joined by his wife. The contrary
rule is prescribed in Sec. 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the
Civil Code, but not the other way around, obviously in recognition of the legal
status of the husband as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art.
112, Civil Code) There was, therefore, no need of including the petitioner as a party in
Civil Case No. 7678 for the purpose of binding the conjugal partnership properties for
the satisfaction of the judgment that could be rendered thereon. " (Underscoring
supplied)

[J33] G.R. NO. 199515

RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO

TANAKA," PETITIONER, VS. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR
AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

2018-06-25

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[84]

[J34] G.R. NO. 248355

MARICEL L. RIVERA, PETITIONER, VS. WOO
NAMSUN*AND/OR OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OR LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

2021-11-23

Indeed, the Court has time and again granted liberality in cases involving the
recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a
marriage in which they are the sole remaining party. In the aforementioned cases,
the Court has emphasized that procedural rules are designed to secure and
not override substantial justice, especially here where what is involved is a
matter affecting lives of families.[59] From the foregoing, this Court shall not
deviate from according the same treatment to petitioner. Necessarily, a liberal
application of the rules of procedure is warranted.

[J35] G.R. NO. L-25643

JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA AND PAQUITA LEZAMA,

PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, JOSE DINEROS, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS RECEIVER OF THE LA PAZ ICE PLANT &
COLD STORAGE CO., INC., AND THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

1968-06-27

Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to

examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both spouses are
parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are separate or
separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or nominal
party.[13]

[J36] G.R. NO. 256141

BELINDA ALEXANDER, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES JORGE

AND HILARIA ESCALONA, AND REYGAN ESCALONA,
RESPONDENTS.
2022-07-19

Thus, it is an opportune time for the Court to clarify any confusion besetting
the applicable laws and jurisprudence in transactions involving alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal properties, without consent of the other spouse,
which is determinative of the remedies available to the aggrieved parties and
the prescriptive period of actions. At this juncture, the Court holds that more than
the date of the marriage of the spouses, the applicable law must be reckoned on the
date of the alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property made without the
consent of the other spouse, to wit:

[J37] G.R. NO. 212717

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V.S. ARIEL S.

CALINGO AND CYNTHIA MARCELLANA CALINGO,
RESPONDENTS

2022-11-23

(6) the essential marital obligations are not limited to those between spouses
as embraced by Articles 68 up to 71; as well as 220,221, and 225 of the Family
Code. Once the parties decide and do have children, their obligations to their children
become part of their obligations to each other as spouses. But not all kinds of failure to
meet their obligations to their children will nullity the vinculum between the spouses. In
each case, it must be clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature that it reflects on
the capacity of one of the spouses for marriage;

[J38] G.R. NO. 212971

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER,VS.JOHN

ARNEL H. AMATA,RESPONDENT.

2022-11-29

(6) The sixth Molina guideline identifies the essential marital obligations to be
the obligations "embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision." The Tan-Andal case affirms that the
obligation of the spouses to their children becomes part of their obligations to
each other as spouses and, thus, failure to attend to their obligations to their
children may be a ground to nullify the marriage of the parties. However, it
must be clearly shown that such failure reflects on the capacity of at least one of the
spouses.

[J39] G.R. NO. 102726

TSHIATE L. UY AND RAMON UY, PETITIONERS, VS. THE

COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, AND THE
ESTATE OF MENILO B. UY, SR., REPRESENTED BY MENILO
C. UY, JR., NILDA C. UY, MELVIN C. UY AND MERLITO C.
UY, RESPONDENTS.

1994-05-27

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. "If one of the parties is
validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article. "The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. " Parenthetically, closely
intertwined with the legal questions posed by the parties are factual issues which are
yet to be determined in Special Proceedings No. M-2606 filed by herein petitioners.
Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the orders of the trial court on two points: That -
(1) The intervention came too late, citing Section 2, Rule 12, of the Revised Rules of
Court; and (2) The court a quo ignored the rule on finality of judgments.

[J40] G. R. NO. L-11418

ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR. ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND

APPELLANTS VS. RAMON L. KATIGBAK, BT AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

1958-12-27

The Laperals, however, contend that inasmuch as the debts were contracted
and were made payable before the New Civil Code went into effect, then
Article 1408 of the Old Civil Code should apply; and that inasmuch as under
the latter, in relation to third persons, the husband and the conjugal
partnership are considered identical, then the obligations contracted by
Katigbak are chargeable against the conjugal property, except the fruits of
the paraphernal property, even if the obligation did not benefit the family. We
are inclined to agree with the Laperals, on this vital question. For purposes of reference,
we are reproducing Articles 4t 161, 2252 and 2253 of the New Civil Code, and Article
1408 of the Old Civil Code:

[J41] G.R. NO. 154132

HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC. PETITIONER, VS.

HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PAIRING
JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 122,
CALOOCAN CITY, AND ALBERTO MORENO, RESPONDENT.

2006-08-31

In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged
paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the
husband, through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was
substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the
presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must be complied
with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family
Code.

Show more (2)

[J42] G.R. NO. 237524

BEBERY O. SANTOS-MACABATA, PETITIONER, VS.

FLAVIANO MACABATA, JR. AND REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

2022-04-06

(6) The sixth Molina guideline identifies the essential marital obligations to be
the obligations "embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision."[53] The Tan-Andal case affirms that the
obligation of the spouses to their children becomes part of their obligations to
each other as spouses and, thus, failure to attend to their obligations to their
children may be a ground to nullify the marriage of the parties.[54] However, it
must be clearly shown that such failure reflects on the capacity of at least one of the
spouses.[55]

Show more (1)

[J43] G.R. NO. 174168

SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY, JOLIE ROSS TAN,

ROMER TAN, CHARLIE TAN, AND JESSIE JAMES TAN,
PETITIONERS,VS. SY CHIM AND FELICIDAD CHAN SY,
RESPONDENTS.[G.R. NO. 179438]SY CHIM AND
FELICIDAD CHAN SY, PETITIONERS, VS. SY TIONG SHIOU
AND JUANITA TAN, RESPONDENTS.

2009-03-30

The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy should be
admitted. A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for
a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third-party
defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant, although the third-party
defendant's liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead
another as third-party defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter
to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
(b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff
and the defendant.[72]

[J44] G. R. NO. L-3500

ROBERT C. PEYER, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX MARTINEZ,

JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, TERESA
FANLO PEYER, AND HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

1951-01-12
Subparagraph (c) of this section fits into the facts of the present case. Not only are the
plaintiff and her husband living apart but he has deserted and abandoned his wife and
child. More than that, the suit, it is to be kept in mind, is not one against the
husband but one, in the eyes of the law at least, to preserve the property in
which he and the plaintiff have a common interest, and to use it to meet
common responsibilities. From both viewpoints and from the very nature of the
situation, the wife must necessarily sue alone to protect her natural right and manage
the property during her husband's absence. The husband can not expect to be made a
party when it is precisely from his inability to act and from the exigencies of the case
that the wife derives her cause of action. To include him and require that he be served
with process by publication or any other mode would, to a large measure, be a
contradiction and defeat the law's purpose.

[J45] G.R. NO. 205487

ORION SAVINGS BANK, PETITIONER, VS. SHIGEKANE

SUZUKI, RESPONDENT.

2014-11-12

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses.[26] However, the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact
to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of
a foreign law. [27] He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.[28]

[J46] G.R. NO. L-32159

ZOILA MENDEZ, RAFAEL MENDEZ, AND MATILDE

BIONSON, PETITIONERS, VS. MAXIMO, EUGENIA, JUANA,
FORTUNATA, PRUDENCIA, ROMAN, ANECITA, AND MARIA,
ALL SURNAMED BIONSON, AND HON. ALFREDO C. LAYA,
JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XII,
RESPONDENTS.

1977-10-28

ART. 217. Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their
descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters. " The parties are collateral relatives
who are not brothers and sisters.[12] The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin, and
Guerrero, JJ. , concur.

[J47] G.R. NO. 176492

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, PETITIONER, VS. LEONARDO V.

NONATO, RESPONDENT.

2014-10-20

In the analogous case of Valdez,[18] it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to
apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity
on the part of either or both parties in the contract of marriage. The Court held that
the court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the
Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and
all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.[19] The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.[20]

[J48] G.R. NO. 136803

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. MA. ELVIRA

CASTILLO, RESPONDENT.

2000-06-16

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were
not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been
living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code,
in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a
woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is
presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not
capacitated to marry each other.
[J49] G.R. NO. 119064

NENG “KAGUI KADIGUIA” MALANG, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

COROCOY MOSON, PRESIDING JUDGE OF 5TH SHARI’A
DISTRICT COURT, COTABATO CITY, HADJI MOHAMMAD
ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG,
FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI
MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG
AND MABAY GANAP MALANG, RESPONDENTS.

2000-08-22

If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties
“live together as husband and wife” the Family Code in Article 147 specifies
that they “live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. ” Also, in
contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by jurisprudence,
Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of
cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage,
provided that the parties prove their “actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry” and only to the extent of their proportionate interest
therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102
Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148,
which declares that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the
property regime of such existing marriage. Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on
Succession and Dissolution of Property RegimesHadji Abdula died intestate on
December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the
identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares
of the heirs. Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual
parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law
in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite. The status and capacity to
succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or
birth of the child.

[J50] G.R. NO. 196359

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, PETITIONER, VS. MARIO VICTOR

M. ANDAL, RESPONDENT.

2021-05-11
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party
can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendant, each vacant share shall belong to their
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation. On the other hand, Article 148 provides:

[J51] G.R. NO. 202805

ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, PETITIONER, VS.

WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, RESPONDENT.

2015-03-23

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse”
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.[47]
(Emphasis supplied)

[J52] G.R. NO. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARELYN

TANEDO MANALO, RESPONDENT.
2018-04-24

The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.x x If we are to give
meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must
be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In
view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows: There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

[J53] G.R. NO. 236659

BERNARD B. BENASA, PETITIONER, VS. PRESENTACION R.

MAHOR, RESPONDENT.

2022-08-31

[43] We ruled that for the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage, the applicable law is Article 148 of the Family Code, which has "filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code," and has a retroactive application so long as
vested rights remain unimpaired. [44] Thus, it is now settled that Article 148 of the
Family Code governs the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man or
woman and the properties acquired through their actual joint contribution shall belong
to the co-ownership. [45] Article 148 of the Family Code provides: Article 148. In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. According to petitioner, he had
no intention of abandoning respondent and that it was only by the nature of
his work as a seafarer that he had to leave every so often.
[J54] G.R. NO. 85140

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALEJANDRO

M. VELEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 20, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPUTY SHERIFF
JOHNSON TAN, JR., DEPUTY SHERIFF OF BRANCH 20,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THE PETITIONERS IN SP.
PROC. NO. 88-55, FOR "HABEAS CORPUS", NAMELY:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, RAYMUNDO VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA
VARGAS?CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS
AND NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, RESPONDENTS.[G.R.
NO. 86470. MAY 17, 1990]TOMAS EUGENIO, PETITIONER-
APPELLANT, VS. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX
VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-
CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS?
DE LOS SANTOS AND NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN,
RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

1990-05-17

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto.[23] But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to they
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

[J55] G.R. NO. 166738

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, PETITIONER, VS. EDWARD
RUMBAUA, RESPONDENT.

2009-08-14

The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may
indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to
live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
[41]

[J56] G.R. NO. L-4085

AGAPITO LORENZO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. FLORENCIO

NICOLAS ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

1952-07-30

The learned trial court sustained plaintiffs' pretension on the strength of Art.
1407 of the Civil Code which declares that "all the property of the spouses
shall be deemed partnership property, in the absence of proof that it belongs
exclusively to the husband or to the wife", thereby establishing a
presumption which may be "overcome by the introduction of competent
evidence to the contrary" (Casiano vs. Samaniego, 30 Phil., 135). We hold that
the evidence adduced to rebut this presumption, is not only most competent but is also
convincing, as has heretofore been discussed.

[J57] G.R. NO. 97903

ELMER F. ESPINA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, ROMMEL
L. MANIKAN, LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEYTE IV ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., AND MIGUEL COTIAMCO,
RESPONDENTS.
1998-08-24

Section 3. Joint Membership. A husband and wife may apply for a joint membership and,
subject to their compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 1 of this Article,
may be accepted for such membership. The term “member” as used in these bylaws
shall be deemed to include a husband and wife holding a joint membership and any
provisions relating to the rights and liabilities of membership shall apply equally with
respect to the holders of a joint membership. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the effect of the hereinafter specified actions by or in respect of
the holders of a joint membership shall be as follows: (a) The presence at a
meeting of either or both shall be regarded as the presence of one member
and shall constitute a joint waiver of notice of the meeting; (b) The vote of
either separately or both jointly shall constitute one joint vote; (c) A waiver of
notice signed by either or both shall constitute a joint waiver; (d) Notice to
either shall constitute notice to both; (e) Expulsion of either shall terminate
the joint membership; (f) Withdrawal of either terminate the joint
membership; (g) Either but not both may be elected or appointed as an officer
or board member, provided that both meet the qualifications for such office.

[J58] G.R. NO. 254484

IN RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN

JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WITH PRAYER TO CHANGE CIVIL
STATUS OF JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA FROM MARRIED
TO SINGLE, JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA, REPRESENTED
BY: RICKY O. ORDANEZA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

2021-11-24

Article 732. A person who has a spouse may not effect an additional marriage. "[55]

[J59] G.R. NO. 159220

MA. DARLENE DIMAYUGA-LAURENA, PETITIONER, COURT

OF APPEALS AND JESSE LAURO LAURENA, RESPONDENTS.

2008-09-22
(a) Gravity - It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Judicial Antecedence - It
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability - It must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[13] In Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] (Molina case), the Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code as follows:

[J60] G.R. NO. 114791

NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG
AND JANE C. ONG, RESPONDENTS.

1997-05-29

We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of
the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that
it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private
respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private
respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that
contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.[13]

[J61] G.R. NO. L-2368

CARMEN DE LA ROSA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS.

NICOMEDES BARRUGA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

1950-06-30

ART. 1433. Either the husband or the wife may sue for. a separation of property,
and it shall be decreed whenever the spouse of the plaintiff shall have been
condemned to a penalty which carries with it that of civil interdiction, or shall
have been declared an absentee, or shall have given cause for divorce. In order
that such separation may be decreed, it shall be sufficient to present the final judgment
rendered against the guilty or absent spouse in any one of the three cases above
mentioned. The appellant Carmen de la Rosa maintains that article 1433 should be
applied, because her husband (the appellee) has given cause for divorce, inasmuch as it
is admitted that he lives with his common-law wife. But she overlooks her own
admission that she (appellant) is staying with her common-law husband, forgetting,
furthermore, that under the divorce law (Act 2710, sec. 3), she may not sue for divorce,
being herself guilty of adultery.
[J62] G.R. NO. 185286

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON

REYES, RESPONDENT.

2010-08-18

On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert's opinion concerning the
supposed psychological incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25] we
ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic
v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the stringent requisites provided in Santos
v. Court of Appeals[27] must be independently met by the party alleging the
nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared,
thus:

[J63] G.R. NO. 178044

ALAIN M. DIÑO , PETITIONER, VS. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,

RESPONDENT.

2011-01-19

We agree with petitioner. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City
that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.[7] Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,[8] such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.