Understanding Consciousness

Understanding Consciousness, second edition provides a unique survey and

evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of con-
sciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense.
Building on the widely praised first edition of the book, this new edition adds
fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of
the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have
taken place over the last ten years.
The book is divided into three parts; Part I surveys current theories of
consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part II reconstructs
an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its
phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious
experience relates to the world described by physics and information process-
ing in the brain. Finally, Part III deals with fundamental issues such as what
consciousness is and does, and how it fits into the evolving universe. As the
structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a succes-
sively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for
more established researchers.
Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end
in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science.
Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the prob-
lems of consciousness and as such will be of great interest to psychologists,
philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/
body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

Max Velmans is currently Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths,

University of London and Visiting Professor of Consciousness Studies at
the University of Plymouth. He has been researching, writing and teaching
consciousness studies for over thirty years and has over ninety publications
in this area.
‘This is an important book. It offers an excellent review of the whole range of philosophical and scientific
attempts to understand consciousness, interwoven with a compelling account of the author’s own preferred
option (i.e “reflexive monism”), for which he is already well known. This further account of his views will
be welcomed by all concerned ’ – Christopher M H Nunn, Associate Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies.
‘What an intellectually rich and readable journey through the tangled fabric of consciousness studies!
The consciousness debate is enriched immeasurably by this fine and disciplined journey, with just a
pinch of “mind-dust” to flavor the universe. Students of mind will find this to be among the finest and
most disciplined journeys into the still dark corners of consciousness studies.’ – Jaak Panksepp, Bailey
Endowed Chair of Animal Well-Being Science, College of Veterinary Medicine, Washington State
University.
Reviews of the First Edition:
‘. . . this is among the best books written about consciousness over the last decade . . . It sets a high
standard in the natural philosophy of mind.’ – Professor Adam Zeman, Department of Clinical Neurosci-
ences, Western General Hospital, Edinburgh, UK, in The Lancet
‘Understanding Consciousness presents a lucid, indeed masterly, account of the philosophical issues
involved.’ – Professor Jeffrey Gray, Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK, in Times Higher Educational
Supplement
‘. . . those who are engaged in the cognitive sciences should read this book so as to stimulate their own
thinking . . . the implications for the field are quire profound.’ – Professor Igor Aleksander, Imperial
College, London, UK, in Trends in Cognitive Science
‘This is a fine book. In what has become a crowded field, it stands out as direct, deep, and daring. It should
place Max Velmans amongst the stars in the field . . .’ – Professor Greg Nixon, Prescott College, Arizona,
USA, in Journal of Consciousness Studies
‘This book is excellent. There are lots of books on consciousness, but few which mix the philosophical,
psychological and neuroscientific, and even fewer which are written without an axe to grind . . . a lovely
book . . . I’ll be recommending it to everyone I see.’ – Professor John Kihlstrom, University of California
at Berkley, USA
‘. . . a splendid assessment of and contribution to the debate about consciousness as it is currently being
waged between psychologists, philosophers, some neuroscientists and AI people.’ – Professor Steven Rose,
The Open University, UK
‘This is a splendid book . . . In my view it should have a profound and lasting effect upon the debate as to
the nature and function of consciousness, and should stimulate much new thinking and investigation.’ –
Professor David Fontana, University of Cardiff, UK and University of Algarve, Portugal
‘Following the best traditions, the book has an explanatory beginning, an unmissable middle and a happy
end. . . . It is refreshing to find amongst the consciousness literature a book that is so accessible and
focused. Velmans maintains a clarity rarely found in the deep abysses of philosophy, psychology and
neurophysiology without departing from the point. Consequently, I would recommend this book equally
both to the connoisseur of consciousness studies and to the mere aficionado.’ – Dora Brown, University of
Surrey, in “The Psychologist”, November 2000
‘Velmans launches a sustained and well-reasoned attack on the prevailing “orthodoxies” of functionalism
and other reductionist so-called explanations of consciousness. . . . [In] arguing for his own position – his
reflexive model – he deeply challenges the reader’s assumptions. . . . The reflexive model touches on deeply
provocative ideas which could yet catalyse the next step forward in understanding consciousness.’ – Les
Lancaster, Liverpool John Moore’s University, “Consciousness & Experiential Psychology”, September,
2000
‘Max Velmans has written a fundamentally important book. At a time when many are expressing an
increasing interest in our experience of “consciousness”, he presents a coherent and comprehensive survey
of the state of knowledge in this field. . . . But he does more than this . . . there is a level of original thinking
in his writing that makes a useful contribution to the debate about one of the most complex issues of our
time.’ – Joan Walton in “Caduceus”, October, 2000
‘Being inspired with lucidity and a true interdisciplinary spirit, Understanding Consciousness is lasting in
value.’ – Alexander Batthyany, University of Vienna, in “Theory & Psychology”
Understanding Consciousness
Second edition

Max Velmans
First published 2009 by Routledge
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Velmans, Max, 1942–
Understanding consciousness / Max Velmans. – 2nd ed.
p. cm.
1. Consciousness. I. Title.
BF311.V44 2009
126–dc22
2008035695

ISBN 0-203-88272-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN: 978–0–415–42515–5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978–0–415–42516–2 (pbk)
Contents

List of illustrations vii

Preface to second edition ix
Text acknowledgements xii

PART I
Mind–body theories and their problems 1

1 What is consciousness? 3
2 Conscious souls, brains and quantum mechanics 11
3 Are mind and matter the same thing? 31
4 Are mind and consciousness just activities? 58
5 Could robots be conscious? 82

PART II
A new analysis: how to marry science with experience 119

6 Conscious phenomenology and common sense 121

7 The nature and location of experiences 149
8 Experienced worlds, the world described by physics,
and the thing itself 179
9 Subjective, intersubjective and objective science 206
10 How consciousness relates to information processing
in the brain 232
11 The neural causes and correlates of consciousness 266
vi Contents
PART III
A new synthesis: reflexive monism 289

12 What consciousness is 291

13 What consciousness does 300
14 Self-consciousness in a reflexive universe 327

References 355
Author index 381
Subject index 387
Illustrations

Figures
4.1 A visual illusion: ‘Flying Squirrel’ 63
4.2 A rough outline of where some of the mental functions
studied by psychology fit into the flow of human information
processing 67
4.3 A ‘late-selection’ model of selective attention 69
6.1 A dualist model of perception 125
6.2 A reductionist model of perception 126
6.3 A reflexive model of perception 128
6.4 How two-dimensional cues can achieve quite a strong
sense of depth through the use of radial perspective (painting by
Peter Cresswell) 141
6.5 A stereoscopic picture of ‘snowflakes’ 142
6.6 How a reflexive model of perception can be applied to an
understanding of virtual reality 144
7.1 The topographical arrangement of the brain’s ‘body
image’ on the somatosensory cortex 161
9.1 A dualist model of a perception experiment 210
9.2 A reflexive model of what E and S actually observe in a
perception experiment 211
9.3 In what way does the central line tilt? 218
10.1 Referral backwards in time 235

Table
3.1 Ontological identity, correlation and causation 45
Preface to second edition

Consciousness is personal. Indeed it is so close to the core of our being that

it has puzzled thinkers from the beginnings of recorded history. What is it?
What does it do? How does it relate to the physical world and to the workings
of our bodies and brains? At the dawn of the new millennium answers to
these questions are beginning to emerge. However there is not one mind/body
problem, but many. Some of the problems are empirical, some are con-
ceptual, and some are both. This book deals with some of the deepest puzzles
and paradoxes.1
In the nine years or so following the completion of the first edition of this
book I have had the opportunity to debate and discuss the ideas presented
here with many gifted scientists and philosophers, some sympathetic and
some with competing views. Although I believe that my original analysis
remains secure, these engagements have allowed me to clarify, deepen and
update the argument at many points. To accommodate areas in which there
has recently been considerable progress I have also added some new chapters
and chapter sections, for example on the neural causes and correlates of
consciousness, the potential (but disputed) relevance of quantum mechanics,
the vexed problem of free will, and the rather mysterious fact that the phe-
nomenal world seems to be out-there in space, when according to reductionist
science it ought to be inside the brain. As before, this book charts a path
through the mind/body labyrinth that incorporates these and many other
seemingly disparate topics in what (I hope) is a simple, connected way.
A good story has a beginning, a middle, and an end, so this book is
arranged in three parts. The first part, ‘Mind–body theories and their prob-
lems’, summarises currently dominant thinking about the nature and func-
tion of consciousness. We start, as we must in Chapter 1, with some initial
definitions, and then go on in Chapter 2 to look at mind/body dualism, an
ancient way of viewing the relation of mind to body that persists in some
modern interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the Western tradition, this
dualist splitting of the universe has largely given way to efforts to understand
the universe in a unified materialist way, either in terms of its physical struc-
ture or in terms of the ways that it functions. Chapter 3 deals mainly with
attempts to demonstrate that mind and consciousness are nothing more than
x Preface
states of the brain, a position variously known as ‘central state identity
theory’, ‘physicalism’ or ‘biological naturalism’. Chapter 4 turns to dominant
traditions in psychological science that view mind or consciousness as activ-
ities (rather than states) – a tradition that has its roots in a form of behaviour-
ism that was subsequently transformed by the emergence of cognitive science
into a view known as ‘functionalism’ or, more precisely, as ‘psychofunctional-
ism’. Chapter 5 broadens and completes this contemporary story, exploring
the possibilities of mental functioning not just in brains but also in machines,
with a careful look at ‘computational functionalism’, the view that mind and
consciousness are nothing more than certain forms of functioning that
might, in principle, be implemented in systems of many different kinds. While
none of these positions is entirely satisfactory, all have rational grounds for
their support. Rather than dismissing these commonly held views, the aim
of Part I is to pinpoint both their strengths and weaknesses.
In spite of their depth of commitment to one or another theoretical pos-
ition, many philosophers and scientists recognise that this classical dualist
versus materialist debate leaves an uneasy tension. While dualism seems to be
inconsistent with the findings of materialist science, materialist reductionism
seems to be inconsistent with the evidence of ordinary experience. Our chal-
lenge is to understand consciousness in a way that does justice to both. With
this in mind, Part II of this book, ‘A new analysis: how to marry science with
experience’, goes back to first principles. Rather than seeking to defend any
standard position, we start in Chapter 6 with a closer examination of experi-
ence itself. This has a surprising consequence. If one does this with care the
old boundaries that separate the ‘contents of consciousness’ from what we
usually think of as the ‘physical world’ can be seen to be drawn in the wrong
place! What we normally think of as the ‘physical world’ is actually a
phenomenal world or world of appearances. This turns the mind/body prob-
lem round on its axis as it forces one to re-examine how the ‘contents of
consciousness’ relate to what we normally think of as the ‘physical world’.
There are, however, a number of ways in which these altered relationships can
be understood. Chapter 7 compares three major, current alternatives, ‘direct-
realist physicalism’, ‘biological naturalism’ and ‘reflexive monism’ – and
Chapter 8 provides a deeper analysis of how the contents of consciousness,
in the form of a phenomenal world, relate to the world described by theor-
etical physics. This broadened understanding of consciousness also forces
one to completely re-examine the interrelation of subjective, intersubjective
and ‘objective’ knowledge, along with the nature of empirical science, the
topic of Chapter 9. To complete this reanalysis we finally turn to how the
contents of human consciousness relate to what is happening in the human
brain. Chapter 10 presents a close examination of how phenomenal experi-
ences relate to the details of human information processing, and Chapter 11
summarises what is known about the neural causal antecedents and correlates
of such experiences – with some further surprising conclusions. At first glance,
these intricate relationships of consciousness, mind, matter and knowledge
 Preface xi
seem to form an impenetrable ‘world knot’. But, as far as I can tell, it is
possible to unravel it, step by simple step, in a way that is consistent with the
findings of science and with common sense.
Part III of this book on ‘reflexive monism’ provides a new synthesis.
Chapters 12 and 13 suggest what consciousness is and what it does. Chapter
14 then places consciousness within nature, developing a form of reflexive
monism that treats human consciousness as just one manifestation of a
wider self-conscious universe. Although the route to this position is new,
the position itself is ancient. I find this reassuring. Understanding con-
sciousness requires us to move from understanding the things we are
conscious of, to understanding our role as conscious observers, and then
to consciousness itself – an act of self-reflection which requires an outward
journey and a return. If the place of return does not seem familiar, it is
probably the wrong place.
I have many people to thank for their influence on my writings. First, my
thanks to my students whose enthusiasm for learning about consciousness
encouraged me to clarify my thoughts over the thirty-three years or so that I
developed a course on ‘The Psychology of Consciousness’ at the University
of London – and my special thanks to Anthony Freeman, John Kihlstrom,
Chris Nunn, Guy Saunders and Steve Torrance for their kind suggestions
about how to improve the first edition. I am also particularly grateful to the
many, brilliant colleagues around the world with whom I have been privileged
to discuss and debate. Many of you appear in these pages, but a far greater
number have a place in the pages of my mind. My deepest gratitude goes to
those few people who have been very close to me over many years. Thank you
for keeping me watered and fed, and for your love and support. You know
who you are. Much of what appears here is just our long conversation.
I hope that you enjoy reading this book as much as I have enjoyed writing
it. For best results, try to resist starting at the end. As in all good stories, this
ruins the plot.

Max Velmans
May, 2008

Note
1 I have dealt with other aspects of consciousness studies elsewhere. For example,
Velmans and Schneider (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness provides
fifty-five state-of-the-art tutorial reviews of current science and philosophy in
consciousness studies written by many of the protagonists, which form ideal
background reading for this book; the readings in Velmans (2000) Investigating
Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps also introduce a range
of new methodologies appropriate to the study of subjective experience, along with
a number of alternative ‘maps’ of the consciousness studies terrain.
Text acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following for permissions granted.

An extract from ‘Consciousness, Dreams and Virtual Realities’ by A.

Revonsuo (1995) in Philosophical Psychology, 8(1): 35–38. Carfax Publishing,
Taylor & Francis Ltd (www.informaworld.com) Reprinted by permission of
the publisher.
An extract from Memories, Dreams, Reflections by C.G. Jung (1983).
Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers Ltd copyright © C.G.
Jung (1983).
For the same extract from Memories, Dreams, Reflections by C.G. Jung,
edited by Aniela Jaffe, translated by Richard and Clara Winston, translation
copyright © 1961, 1962, 1963 and renewed 1989, 1990, 1991 by Random
House, Inc. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, a division of Random
House, Inc.

Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and obtain permis-
sions. Any omissions brought to our attention will be remedied in future
editions.
Part I

Mind–body theories and

their problems
1 What is consciousness?

Our conscious lives are the sea in which we swim. So it is not surprising that
consciousness is difficult to understand. We consciously experience many
different things, and we can think about the things that we experience. But it
is not so easy to experience or think about consciousness itself. Given this, it is
common within philosophy and science to identify consciousness with some-
thing smaller than itself, for example with some thing that we can observe,
such as a state of the brain, or with some aspect of what we experience, such
as ‘thought’ or ‘language’. One of the themes of this book is that one can
understand consciousness without reducing it in this way.
Our understanding of consciousness is also determined by our intellectual
history. We are the inheritors of ancient debates. Is the universe composed
of one thing (monism) or are there two (dualism)? Does the world have an
observer-independent existence (realism) or does its existence depend in some
way on the operations of our own minds (idealism)? Is knowledge of the
world ‘public’ and ‘objective’, and knowledge of our own experience ‘private’
and ‘subjective’? If so, how is it possible to establish the study of conscious-
ness as a science? A second theme of this book is that we have to take stock
of these ancient debates, but we do not have to be bound by the polarised
choices that they offer.
Current Western philosophical and scientific thought is predominantly
materialistic, inspired by the progress of natural science in understanding the
material world. Yet, as Tarnas (1993) makes clear, the ultimate passion of the
Western mind over 2,500 years has been to understand the ground of its own
being. Being conscious is central to being human – and an understanding of
consciousness has to be reflexive. From studying the things that we experience
we progress to studying the experiencer and the experience. A third theme of
this book is that it is possible to do so in a way that is consistent both with
science and with ‘common sense’.

What’s the problem?

Traditionally, the puzzles surrounding consciousness have been known as the
‘mind–body’ problem. However, it is now clear that ‘mind’ is not quite the
4 Mind–body theories and their problems
same thing as ‘consciousness’, and that the aspect of body most closely
involved with consciousness is the brain. It is also clear that there is not one
consciousness–brain problem, but many, which we will examine in the course
of this book. As a first approximation, these can be divided into five groups,
each focused on a few, central questions:

Problem 1. What and where is consciousness?

Problem 2. How are we to understand the causal relationships between
consciousness and matter and, in particular, the causal relationships
between consciousness and the brain?
Problem 3. What is the function of consciousness? How, for example,
does it relate to human information processing?
Problem 4. What forms of matter are associated with consciousness –
in particular, what are the neural substrates of consciousness in the
human brain?
Problem 5. What are the appropriate ways to examine consciousness, to
discover its nature? Which features can we examine with first-person
methods, which features require third-person methods, and how do
first- and third-person findings relate to each other?

Are some problems hard and others easy?

In a now well known essay on the problems of consciousness, the philosopher
David Chalmers suggested that they may be divided into the ‘easy problems’
and the ‘hard problem’. ‘Easy problems’ are ones that can be researched by
conventional third-person methods of the kind used in cognitive science, for
example investigations of the information processing that accompanies sub-
jective experience. The ‘hard problem’ is posed by subjective experience itself.
As Chalmers notes:

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But

the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is
perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual
and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experi-
ence: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we
explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to
experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a
physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so
arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?
It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. If any
problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one.
(Chalmers, 1995, p. 201)

Given the strenuous efforts in the late twentieth century to demonstrate sub-
jective experience to be nothing more than a state or function of the brain
 What is consciousness? 5
(see Chapters 3, 4 and 5), Chalmers’s ‘easy’ versus ‘hard’ problem distinction
provided a useful reminder that a purely third-person functional analysis
of human information processing cannot reveal what it is like to have a
subjective experience or explain why it arises.1 However, this division of the
problems of consciousness into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ ones was, in turn, an over-
simplification. As Chalmers himself accepted, even so-called ‘easy’ (empiric-
ally researchable) problems can in practice be very difficult to solve. It may
also be that the ‘hard’ problem only seems unusually hard because we have
been thinking about it in the wrong way. If so, changing some of our
unexamined assumptions might be all we need to make the problem ‘easy’ –
and this will be one of the themes of this book. Note, for example, that in
contrast to consciousness, we usually take the existence of matter for granted,
and we assume that physics does not present similarly ‘hard’ problems. But
there are many, as we shall see in Chapter 14.
Given this, it seems more useful to sort the problems of consciousness into
those that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance,
those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assump-
tions, and those that require some combination of all three. If, for example,
the problem is ‘What are the neural substrates of consciousness?’, or, ‘What
forms of information processing are most closely associated with conscious-
ness?’, then conventional cognitive and neuropsychological techniques look
as if they are likely to yield useful results. There are many questions of
this empirical kind and, consequently, the new ‘science of consciousness’ is
already very large (see, for example, the extensive reviews and readings in
Velmans and Schneider, 2007).
Examples of empirical questions and investigations within neuro-
psychology include:

• The search for the neural causes and correlates of major changes in
normal, global conscious states such as deep sleep, rapid eye movement
dreaming, and the awake state.
• The search for added neural conditions that support variations in con-
scious experience within normal, global states, such as visual, auditory
and other sensory experiences, experiences of cognitive functioning (the
phonemic and other imagery accompanying thinking, meta-cognition,
etc.) and affective experience.
• The search for neural conditions that support altered states of con-
sciousness in psychopathology and in non-pathological altered states,
such as the hypnotic state, some drug-induced states, meditation, and
mystical states.

Examples of empirical questions and investigations within cognitive psych-

ology include:

• Examination of the timing of conscious experience: when in the course

6 Mind–body theories and their problems
of human information processing (for example in input analysis) does a
conscious experience arise?
• The determination of functional conditions that suffice to make a stimu-
lus conscious: for example, does material that enters consciousness first
have to be selected, attended to and entered into working memory or a
‘global workspace’?
• The investigation of functional differences between preconscious, uncon-
scious, and conscious processing, for example in studies of non-attended
versus attended material.

Questions about how best to study consciousness are also approachable but
subtle, in that they require one to develop epistemology and methodology.2
But questions about the fundamental nature, causal efficacy, and function
of consciousness have proved to be notoriously difficult. There are paradoxes
that need to be resolved. For example, at first glance, it seems obvious that
consciousness has causal efficacy. There is extensive evidence that brain states
have causal influences on conscious experiences, and there is extensive evi-
dence that experiences can have causal influences on the body and brain
(earlier experiences and thoughts, for example, influence later actions). How-
ever, neural material and the ‘stuff’ of conscious experience seem to be very
different, so it is not easy to envisage how these might have causal influences
on each other. Causal interactions between seemingly very different energies
do occur in physics (for example, the interactions between electricity and
magnetism), but the differences between consciousness and the brain seem to
be of a different order. One might ask, ‘How could something subjective have
causal interactions with something objective?’
Similarly, it seems obvious that consciousness has a function. Indeed,
according to evolutionary theory consciousness must have a function, other-
wise it would not have evolved to be so central in our lives. There have been
many proposals in the scientific literature about what that function might be.
Common suggestions are that consciousness is necessary to deal with novelty
or complexity, to provide feedback, to enable memory and learning, to enable
language and problem solving, to enable imaginal short- and long-term plan-
ning in advance of carrying out acts in the real world, to enable creativity and
so on.
However, these proposals face a central dilemma: once one can specify
how such functions work in information processing terms, one no longer
seems to need consciousness to explain the working of the system which
embodies that processing. One can envisage the same processes operating in
mechanical or electrical systems unaccompanied by any subjective conscious
experiences. So, what, if anything, does subjective experience add to effective
functioning? Answers to such questions lie in the borderlands of philosophy
and science.
Problems 1 to 5 also interconnect. If one is not clear about what con-
sciousness is, how can one develop methods to study it, or hope to find its
 What is consciousness? 7
neural substrates in the brain? Nor can questions about causal efficacy be
dissociated from questions about function. If consciousness has no causal
influence on neuronal activity, it is not easy to see what its function in the
brain’s activity could be. Showing how these questions interconnect, and
finding a path through the paradoxes, is one of the main purposes of this
book.
But we need to start somewhere – and it is natural to approach the first ques-
tion first. ‘What is consciousness?’ Let us begin with some simple definitions
and distinctions.

Defining consciousness
According to Thomas Nagel (1974), consciousness is ‘what it is like to be
something’. Without it, after all, it would not be like anything to exist. It is
generally accepted in philosophy of mind that this does capture something of
the essence of the term. At the same time, as George Miller (1962) pointed
out, ‘Consciousness is a word worn smooth by a million tongues.’ The term
means many different things to many different people, and no universally
agreed ‘core meaning’ exists. This is odd, as we each have ‘psychological data’
about what it is like to be conscious or to have consciousness to serve as the
basis for an agreed definition.
This uncertainty about how to define consciousness is partly created by the
way global theories about consciousness (or even the nature of the universe)
have intruded into definitions. For example, ‘substance dualists’ such as
Plato, Descartes and Eccles believe the universe to consist of two fundamen-
tal kinds of stuff, material stuff and the stuff of consciousness (a substance
associated with soul or spirit). ‘Property dualists’ such as Sperry and Libet
take consciousness to be a special kind of property that is itself nonphysical,
but which emerges from physical systems such as the brain once they attain a
certain level of complexity. By contrast, ‘reductionists’, such as Crick (1994)
and Dennett (1991), believe consciousness to be nothing more than a state or
function of the brain. Within cognitive psychology, there have been many
proposals which identify consciousness with some aspect of human informa-
tion processing, for example with working memory, focal attention, a central
executive, and so on.
We will examine the arguments for and against consciousness being a sub-
stance, property, state, or function of the brain in Chapters 2 to 5. The only
point we need to note for now is that these definitions of consciousness start
more from some theory about its nature than from the phenomenology of
consciousness itself. This is to put the cart before the horse. We will proceed in
the opposite direction, starting with the phenomenology and moving only
gradually (in Parts II and III of this book) to a global theory. For this we
need to go back to first principles.
8 Mind–body theories and their problems
To what does the term ‘consciousness’ refer?
As with any term that refers to something that one can observe or experience,
it is useful, if possible, to begin with an ostensive definition. That is, to ‘point
to’ or ‘pick out’ the phenomena to which the term refers and, by implication,
what is excluded. In everyday life there are two contrasting situations which
inform our understanding of the term ‘consciousness’. We have knowledge of
what it is like to be conscious (when we are awake) as opposed to having no
memory of being conscious (when in dreamless sleep). We also understand
what it is like to be conscious of something (when awake or dreaming) as
opposed to not being conscious of that thing.
This everyday understanding provides a simple place to start. A person, or
other entity, is conscious if they experience something; conversely, if a person
or entity experiences nothing they are not conscious. Elaborating slightly, we
can say that when consciousness is present, phenomenal content is present.
Conversely, when phenomenal content is absent, consciousness is absent.3
This stays very close to everyday usage and, to begin with, it is all that we
need. To minimise confusion, I will also stay as close as possible to everyday,
natural language usage for related terms. In common usage, the term ‘con-
sciousness’ is often synonymous with ‘awareness’ or ‘conscious awareness’.
Consequently, I will use these terms interchangeably. For example, it makes
no difference in most contexts to claim that I am ‘conscious of’ what I think,
‘aware of ’ what I think, or ‘consciously aware’ of what I think.4 The ‘contents
of consciousness’ encompass all that we are conscious of, aware of, or experi-
ence. These include not only experiences that we commonly associate with
ourselves, such as thoughts, feelings, images, dreams, body sensations and so
on, but also the experienced three-dimensional world (the phenomenal
world) beyond the body surface.

Some important distinctions

In some writings ‘consciousness’ is synonymous with ‘mind’. However, given
the extensive evidence for nonconscious mental processing, this definition of
consciousness is too broad.5 In this book, ‘mind’ refers to psychological states
and processes that may or may not be ‘conscious’.
In other writings ‘consciousness’ is synonymous with ‘self-consciousness’.
As one can be conscious of many things other than oneself (other people, the
external world, etc.), this definition is too narrow. Here, self-consciousness is
taken to be a special form of reflexive consciousness in which the object of
consciousness is the self or some aspect of the self.
The term ‘consciousness’ is also commonly used to refer to a state of wake-
fulness. Being awake or asleep or in some other state such as coma clearly
influences what one can be conscious of, but it is not the same as being
conscious in the sense of having ‘phenomenal contents’. When sleeping, for
example, one can still have visual and auditory experiences in the form of
 What is consciousness? 9
dreams. Conversely, when awake there are many things at any given moment
that one does not experience. So in a variety of contexts it is necessary to
distinguish ‘consciousness’ in the sense of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ from
wakefulness and other states of arousal, such as dream sleep, deep sleep, and
coma.6
Finally, ‘consciousness’ is sometimes used to mean ‘knowledge’, in the
sense that if one is conscious of something one also has knowledge of it. The
relation of consciousness to knowledge turns out to be very important. How-
ever, at any moment, much knowledge is nonconscious, or implicit (for
example, the knowledge gained over a lifetime, stored in long-term memory).
So consciousness and knowledge cannot be co-extensive. We return to this in
Part III of this book.
The above, broad definitions and distinctions have been quite widely
accepted in the contemporary scientific literature (see, for example, Farthing,
1992; and readings in Velmans, 1996a and Velmans and Schneider, 2007),
although it is unfortunate that various writers continue to use the term ‘con-
sciousness’ in ways that have little to do with its everyday meaning. Agreeing
on definitions is important. Once a given reference for the term ‘conscious-
ness’ is fixed in its phenomenology, the investigation of its nature can begin,
and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As Dewey
(1910) notes, to grasp the meaning of a thing, an event or situation is to see it
in its relations to other things – to note how it operates or functions, what
consequences follow from it, what causes it, and what uses it can be put
to. Thus, to understand what consciousness is, we need to understand what
causes it, what its function(s) may be, how it relates to nonconscious process-
ing in the brain, and so on. As our scientific understanding of these matters
deepens, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A
similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with
basic terms in physics such as ‘energy’, and ‘time’.

Notes
1 An earlier analysis of the difficulties of incorporating the phenomenology of con-
sciousness into a purely third-person information processing model of the mind
was also made from within cognitive science itself by Velmans (1991a, 1991b). This
is a somewhat different way to express why consciousness is a ‘hard’ problem – and
we will return to various aspects of this problem and how to resolve it in Chapters 4,
5, 10 and 13.
2 See Chapter 9, and additional readings in Varela and Shear, 1999; Velmans, 2000;
Jack and Roepstorff, 2003, 2004.
3 This may seem obvious to the point of being trivial. However, in the philosophical
and scientific literature this restricted use of the term consciousness, sometimes
known as ‘phenomenal consciousness’, has been challenged. For example, a number
of theorists have argued that there are other forms of consciousness such as ‘access
consciousness’ (Block, 1995), ‘executive consciousness’, ‘control consciousness’ and
so on. In Chapters 4 and 9, I argue that such proposals are counterproductive
for the reason that they import nonconscious information processing operations
10 Mind–body theories and their problems
(e.g. the nonconscious operations involved in accessing information throughout the
brain) into the ordinary meaning of ‘consciousness’, making it more difficult to be
clear about how the phenomenology of consciousness relates to such nonconscious
information processing. It is also worth noting that Eastern philosophies refer to
a state of ‘pure consciousness’, without any phenomenal contents (Fontana, 2007;
Shear and Jevning, 1999; Shear, 2007). As this possibility does not have a direct
bearing on the issues on which we focus, we can safely leave it to one side for now,
without dismissing it.
4 Note that in some theories ‘awareness’ is thought of as a form of low-level con-
sciousness that is distinct from full consciousness. This is not a serious problem for
the present usage, provided that the situation described has some phenomenal con-
tent (for example where one is dimly aware of a stimulus). However, confusions
arise in situations where the term ‘awareness’ is applied to situations where there
is no relevant phenomenal content, for example when ‘awareness’ refers to pre-
conscious information processing, or, worse, to the nonconscious information pro-
cessing which accompanies consciousness (as proposed by Chalmers, 1995). In the
present usage, being ‘aware of’ nonconscious information processing is a contradic-
tion in terms.
5 See, for example, Dixon (1981), Kihlstrom (1987), Velmans (1991a), Reber (1993),
de Gelder et al. (2001), Wilson (2002), Goodale and Milner (2004), Jeannerod
(2007), Kihlstrom et al. (2007), Merikle (2007).
6 For various purposes it remains useful to distinguish the conditions for the exist-
ence of consciousness (for example the difference between being awake and in deep
coma) from the added conditions which determine its varied phenomenal contents
(for example having visual rather than auditory experiences). However, for the
purposes of my analysis I will retain the convention that unless one is conscious of
something one is not conscious. A useful introduction to some of these problems
of definition is given by Güzeldere (1997).
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Velmans, M. (1996c) ‘Consciousness and the “causal paradox” ’, Behavioral and Brain
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Velmans, M. (1997) ‘Review of D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind’, Network 64: 57–60;
reprinted in Consciousness and Experiential Psychology (1998) 1(1): 14–17. Also
available at http://cogprints.org/386/
Velmans, M. (1998a) ‘Goodbye to reductionism’, in S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak and A.
Scott (eds) Towards a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions
and Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Velmans, M. (1998b) ‘Physical, psychological and virtual realities’, in J. Wood (ed.)
The Virtual Embodied. London: Routledge.
Velmans, M. (1999a) ‘Intersubjective science’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(2/3):
299–306.
Velmans, M. (1999b) ‘When perception becomes conscious’, British Journal of Psych-
ology 90(4): 543–566.
Velmans, M. (ed.) (2000) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies
and Maps. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Velmans, M. (2001) ‘Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology: a dia-
logue with Dan Dennett’, online debate at http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/
disk0/00/17/95/index.html
Velmans, M. (2002a) ‘How could conscious experiences affect brains?’, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 9(11): 3–29.
Velmans, M. (2002b) ‘Making sense of causal interactions between consciousness
and brain’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(11): 69–95.
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Academic.
Velmans, M. (2003b) ‘Preconscious free will’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(12):
42–61.
Velmans, M. (2004) ‘Why conscious free will both is and isn’t an illusion’, Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 27(5): 677.
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Note
Most of the Velmans papers are available online at http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/ (via
an author search).