X-Park V Choi

8/3/24, 12:22 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 899
G.R. No. 220826. March 27, 2019.*
HUN HYUNG PARK, petitioner, vs. EUNG WON** CHOI,

respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; Motion for

Postponement; The grant or denial of a motion — or, in this case,
motions — for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, which should always be predicated on the
consideration that the ends of justice and fairness are served by the
grant or denial of the motion.—To begin with, the grant or denial
of a motion — or, in this case, motions — for postponement is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should
always be predicated on the consid-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
** Also spelled as “Wong” in some parts of the Rollo.
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Park vs. Choi
eration that the ends of justice and fairness are served by the
grant or denial of the motion. As the Court enunciated in Sibay v.
Bermudez, 831 SCRA 191 (2017): x x x After all, postponements
and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of
dispensing justice. When no substantial rights are affected and
the intention to delay is not manifest with the corresponding
motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the
merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus, in considering
motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1)
the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of
the movant. Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such
discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
https://escra.mycentralapp.com/sfsreader/session/0000019113e5f728ac5cf878000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/33
appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a

movant for postponement should not assume beforehand
that his motion will be granted. Thus, We agree with the
appellate court’s finding that in the absence of any clear and
manifest grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, We cannot overturn the decision of the
court a quo. More so, in this case, where the denial of the motion
for postponement appears to be justified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, although a court may adjourn a
trial from day to day, a motion to postpone trial on the ground of
absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the
materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence
has been used to procure it.—Pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule
30 of the Rules of Court, although a court may adjourn a trial
from day to day, a motion to postpone trial on the ground of
absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing
the materiality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due
diligence has been used to procure it. Rules governing
postponements serve a clear purpose — to avert the erosion of
people’s confidence in the judiciary. Consequently, in granting or
denying motions for postponements, courts must exercise their
discretion constantly mindful of the Constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. In other
words, while it is true that cases must be adjudicated in a manner
that is in accordance with the established rules of procedure, so is
it crucial that cases be promptly disposed to better serve the ends
of justice. After all, justice delayed is justice denied. Excessive
delay in
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Park vs. Choi
the disposition of cases renders inutile the rights of the

people guaranteed by the constitution and by various legislations.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Admissions; Judicial admissions
made by parties in the course of the trial in the same case are
conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them.—
Judicial admissions made by parties in the course of the trial in
the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence
to prove them. They are legally binding on the party making them
except when it is shown that they have been made through
palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made, neither of

which was shown to exist in this case. Thus, Choi himself having
admitted liability, the only question that remains for the Court to
resolve is the extent of such liability.
Civil Law; Interest Rates; In accordance with Article 1956 of
the Civil Code, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing.—The Court finds that Choi is liable to pay
Park the face value of the check in the amount of P1,875,000.00
as principal. The Court notes that the only bases relied upon by
Choi in support of his contention that P1,500,000.00 is the
principal and P375,000.00 to be the interest are his own
allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. Without more, Choi’s bare
allegations on the terms of the loan fail to persuade. This is so
because in accordance with Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing. Here, without further proof of any express agreement
that P375,000.00 of the P1,875,000.00 pertains to interest, the
Court is predisposed, based on the facts of the case, to rule that
the entire principal amount owed by Choi to Park is the face value
of the check, or P1,875,000.00.
Same; Same; Monetary Interest; Compensatory Interest;
Interest as a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or
forbearance of money is referred to as monetary interest, while
interest that may be imposed by law or by courts as penalty for
damages is referred to as compensatory interest.—There are two
types of interest — monetary interest and compensatory interest.
Interest as a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or
forbearance of money is referred to as monetary interest, while
interest that may be imposed by law or by courts as penalty for
damages is referred to as compensatory interest. Right to interest
therefore arises only by virtue of a contract or
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Park vs. Choi
by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal

loan on which interest is demanded.
Same; Same; Same; Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which
states that “[n]o interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing,” operates to preclude the imposition and
running of monetary interest on the principal.—Article 1956 of the
Civil Code, which states that “[n]o interest shall be due unless it
has been expressly stipulated in writing,” operates to preclude the

imposition and running of monetary interest on the principal. In
other words, no monetary interest having been agreed upon
between the parties, none accrues in favor of Park.
Same; Same; Article 2209 of the Civil Code provides that: If
the obligation consists in the payment of sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest,
which is six percent (6%) per annum.—The moment a debtor
incurs in delay in the payment of a sum of money, the creditor is
entitled to the payment of interest as indemnity for damages
arising out of that delay. Article 2209 of the Civil Code provides
that: “[i]f the obligation consists in the payment of sum of money,
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six percent (6%) per annum.” Consequently, by
operation of Article 2209 of the Civil Code, Choi becomes liable to
pay Park compensatory interest to indemnify Park for the
damages the latter suffered as a result of Choi’s delay in the
payment of the loan. Delay in this case, pursuant to Article 1169
of the Civil Code, begins to run from the time Park extrajudicially
demanded from Choi the fulfillment of his loan obligation that is,
on May 19, 2000. There being no stipulation as to the rate of
compensatory interest, the rate is six percent (6%) per annum
pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Compensatory Interest; Article 2212 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “[i]nterest due shall earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation
may be silent upon this point,” does not apply because “interest
due” in Article 2212 refers only to accrued interest.—To be clear,
however,
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Park vs. Choi
Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[i]nterest

due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point,”
does not apply because “interest due” in Article 2212 refers only to
accrued interest. A look at the counterpart provision of Article
2212 of the new Civil Code, Article 1109 of the old Civil Code,
supports this. It provides: Art. 1109. Accrued interest shall
draw interest at the legal rate from the time the suit is filed for
its recovery, even if the obligation should have been silent on this
point. In commercial transactions the provisions of the Code of
Commerce shall govern. Pawnshops and savings banks shall be
governed by their special regulations.
Same; Same; With the issuance of Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799 (S. 2013),
said rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum applies until June 30,
2013, and, from July 1, 2013, the new rate of six percent (6%) per
annum applies.—In accordance Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), as further clarified by the
Court in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), in the
absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that
would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments is twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from
default (i.e., the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand). With the
issuance of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP-MB) Circular No.
799 (S. 2013), said rate of 12% per annum applies until June 30,
2013, and, from July 1, 2013, the new rate of six percent (6%) per
annum applies. Finally, when the judgment of the court awarding
a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, the interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mañacop Law Office for petitioner.
Britanico & Britanico Law Offices for respondent.
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Park vs. Choi
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Petitioner Hun
Hyung Park (Park) against Respondent Eung Won Choi
(Choi), assailing the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision2
dated March 30, 2015 and Resolution3 dated September 30,

2015 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124173.
In the assailed Decision and Resolution, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision4 dated December 23, 2011 and
Order5 dated March 28, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City-Branch 142 (RTC-Branch 142), which affirmed
the Decision6 dated April 26, 2011 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City-Branch 65 (MeTC), holding Choi
civilly liable to pay Park the amount of One Million Eight
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P1,875,000.00)
plus interest of 12% percent per annum from August 31,
2000 until the whole amount is paid, P200,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and P9,322.25 as reimbursement for filing
fees.7
The Antecedent Facts
The present petition arose from a complaint8 for

estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 22 filed
by Park against Choi.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-20.

2 Id., at pp. 118-129. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-
Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Melchor Q.C.
Sadang, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 139-140.
4 Id., at pp. 55-59. Through Presiding Judge Dina Pestaño Teves.
5 Id., at p. 61.
6 Id., at pp. 63-66. Through Presiding Judge Henry E. Laron.
7 Id., at p. 66.
8 Id., at p. 75.
96

Park vs. Choi
On June 28, 1999, Park, who was engaged in the

business of lending money, extended a loan to Choi in the
amount of P1,875,000.00.9 As payment for the loan, Choi
issued PNB Check No. 007713310 in the same amount
dated August 28, 1999 in favor of Park.11 On October 5,
1999, Park attempted to deposit the check to his bank
account but the same was returned to him dishonored for

having been drawn against a closed account.12 Thereafter,
Park, through counsel, sent a letter to Choi on May 11,
2000 informing the latter of the dishonored check.13 Based
on the registry return receipt attached to Park’s
Complaint-Affidavit,14 and as stipulated by Choi during the
pretrial conference,15 Choi received the demand letter on
May 19, 2000 through a certain Ina Soliven.16
Nevertheless, Choi failed to resolve the dishonored check.
With the loan remaining unpaid, Park instituted a
complaint against Choi for estafa and violation of B.P. 22.
Following Park’s complaint, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati,17 in an Information18 dated August
31, 2000, charged Choi with one count of violation of B.P.
22. The case was later docketed as Criminal Case No.
294690 before the MeTC.19
On arraignment,20 Choi pleaded not guilty.21 After the
pre-trial conference and the prosecution’s presentation of
evidence, Choi filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Demurrer
_______________
9 Id., at p. 65.
10 Id., at pp. 58, 76.
11 Id., at p. 105.
12 Id., at pp. 9, 79-80.
13 Id., at p. 75.
14 Id., at p. 78.
15 Id., at p. 9.
16 Id., at p. 78.
17 Id., at p. 80. Through Prosecutor Elba G. Tayo-Chua.
18 Id., at p. 81.
19 Id., at p. 63.
20 April 16, 2001, id., at pp. 55, 64.
21 Id.
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Park vs. Choi
to Evidence along with his Demurrer. In his Demurrer, Choi

asserted that the prosecution failed to prove that he
received the notice of dishonor.22 Thus, Choi argued that
since receipt of the notice of dishonor was not proven, then

the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds —
an element for conviction of violation of B.P. 22 — did not
arise.23
Proceedings before the MeTC
The MeTC granted Choi’s Demurrer in an Order dated

February 27, 200324 and dismissed the criminal
complaint. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of
the dismissal was likewise denied, leading Park to appeal
to the RTC of Makati City-Branch 60 (RTC-Branch 60).
25
In his appeal, Park contended that the dismissal of the
criminal case should not carry with it the dismissal of the
civil aspect of the case.26
Ruling of the RTC-Branch 60
The RTC-Branch 60,27 in a Decision28 dated September

11, 2003, granted Park’s appeal. The RTC-Branch 60 held
that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove
Choi’s criminal liability for B.P. 22, it did not altogether
extinguish his civil liability.29 Accordingly, the RTC-Branch
60 ordered
_______________
22 Id., at p. 55.
23 Id.
24 The MeTC’s Order dated February 27, 2003 is not attached to the
Record, id.
25 The Motion for Reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order dated February
27, 2003 is not attached to the Record, id.
26 Id., at p. 55.
27 Id., at p. 56.
28 The RTC-Branch 60’s Decision dated September 11, 2003 is not
attached to the Record, id., at p. 64.
29 Id., at p. 56.
98

Park vs. Choi
Choi to pay Park the face value of the check

(P1,875,000.00) with legal interest.30
Aggrieved by the RTC-Branch 60’s Decision, Choi filed a

Motion for Reconsideration. Acting on Choi’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC-Branch 60 reversed its
September 11, 2003 Decision (finding that Choi was liable
to Park for P1,875,000.00) and instead ordered the
remand of the case to the MeTC so that Choi may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.31
Meanwhile, aggrieved by the RTC-Branch 60’s remand
of the case to the MeTC, Park elevated the matter to the
CA.32 The CA, however, dismissed Park’s petition on
procedural grounds (i.e., the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court;33 failure to attach copies of the
MeTC’s Order dismissing the criminal case, the motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence and the demurrer; and
finally, for attaching an uncertified and illegible copy of the
RTC-Branch 60’s Decision of September 11, 2003).34
Unsatisfied with the CA’s dismissal of his petition on
procedural grounds, Park assailed the CA dismissal of his
petition before the Court, and, in G.R. No. 165496 entitled “
Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi,”35 the Court, through
its Second Division,36 ruled that the remand of the case to
the MeTC
_______________
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id., at p. 64.
33 Id.
34 See Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 544 Phil. 431; 515 SCRA
502 (2007).
35 Id.
36 Id. Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, with
Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tiñga, Presbitero Velasco,
Jr. and Leonardo Quisumbing (on official leave), concurring.
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Park vs. Choi
for reception of Choi’s evidence on the civil aspect of the

case was proper, viz.:
This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to

present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to
file the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which
is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690
for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.37
In a Resolution38 dated June 29, 2007, the Court denied

Park’s Motion for Reconsideration from the above
Decision. The Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 165496 attained
finality on January 18, 2008.
Proceedings before the MeTC
With the proceedings now before the MeTC, the MeTC

ordered the presentation of Choi’s evidence on the civil
aspect of the case. However, in the course of the
proceedings before MeTC, Choi repeatedly moved for
several postponements, which postponements eventually
led the MeTC to issue its Order39 dated March 7, 2011,
declaring that Choi had waived his right to present
evidence.
_______________
37 Id., at p. 447; p. 516.

38 Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, 553 Phil. 96, 99; 526 SCRA 103,
106 (2007).
39 Rollo, p. 10.
100

Park vs. Choi
The specific incidents leading up to the MeTC’s Order

dated March 7, 2011 are as follows:
The MeTC initially scheduled the case for reception of
Choi’s evidence on July 16, 2008, but the same was
declared a holiday. Hearing was then reset to January 7,

2009, then to April 7, 2009 and to May 19, 2009 upon the
instance of Choi. The case was again rescheduled to August
5, 2009, but the same was again declared a holiday. On
September 15, 2010, Choi asked for postponement on the
ground that he needed the assistance of an interpreter to
assist him in translating his testimony from Korean to
English.40
The MeTC granted Choi’s request to reset the hearing
from September 15, 2010 to November 23, 2010 in an Order
41
issued the same day. In the Order, the court warned that
“[i]n the event that the defense fails to present its evidence
on the next scheduled hearing, its right to do so will be
deemed waived and the case will be considered submitted
for resolution based on the prosecution’s evidence.”42
Notwithstanding the court’s warning, in the scheduled
hearing on November 23, 2010, Choi asked for another
postponement on the ground that the Certification as a
Qualified Interpreter43 issued by the Korean Embassy of
the Philippines and presented by Choi’s interpreter, Han
Jong43a Oh (Oh), certifies Oh’s qualification as an
interpreter in another case and not to the case then before
the court.44
The MeTC again granted Choi’s motion for
postponement, with a warning that the grant of
postponement on November 23, 2010 would be the last. The
MeTC cautioned Choi that
_______________
40 Id., at pp. 9-10.

41 Id., at p. 67.
42 Id.
43 Id., at p. 69.
43a Also referred to as “Jung” in some parts of the Rollo.
44 Rollo, p. 68.
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Park vs. Choi
should he still be not ready by the next hearing, his right to

present evidence would be considered waived.45
Despite the warning, on the scheduled hearing of March

7, 2011, Choi asked for yet another postponement on the
ground that his previous counsel was retired from the
practice of law and his new counsel was not prepared for
the day’s hearing. On that day, Park objected to further
postponement of the case considering that the last two
postponements had already come with the court’s warning
against further postponements.46
Ruling on what was by then the sixth motion for
postponement by Choi, the MeTC, in an Order dated March
7, 2011, denied Choi’s motion for postponement and
declared that his right to present evidence had been
waived. Accordingly, the MeTC ruled that the case was
submitted for resolution.47
Subsequently, on April 26, 2011, the MeTC, rendered a
Decision finding Choi civilly liable to Park, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Eung Won Choi is

ordered to pay private complainant Hun Hyung Park the
amount of P1,875,000.00 representing the face value of the
check subject of this case plus interest of 12% percent per
annum from August 31, 2000 until the whole amount is
paid, the amount of P200,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees,
and the amount of P9,322.25 as reimbursement for the
filing fees.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.48
_______________
45 Id., at p. 10.
46 Id.
47 Id., at p. 70.
48 Id., at p. 66.
102

Park vs. Choi
Insofar as Choi’s alleged indebtedness was concerned,

the MeTC held that the prosecution had proven that the
check subject matter of the case was issued by Choi to Park
in exchange of the cash loaned to him.49 Choi, on the other
hand, did not even adduce any evidence to controvert

Park’s claim of indebtedness.50 Consequently, finding that
Choi had no valid defense against Park’s claim of
indebtedness, the MeTC held that Choi was civilly liable to
Park for the loan.51
On Choi’s repeated motions for postponement, the MeTC
observed that:
As early as May 12, 2008, the defense was ordered to

present its evidence. In the interim, the parties negotiated
for the settlement of the case. The reception of defense
evidence was postponed on several dates to accommodate
the alleged negotiation for the settlement of the case as well
as due to the unavailability of a Korean interpreter to aid
the accused.
In the Order of September 15, 2010, the defense was
given one last chance to present evidence on November 23,
2010. Accused again failed to present its evidence. In order
to afford the accused his constitutional right to defend
himself and to present evidence, he was again given one last
chance to present evidence on March 7, 2011. On said date,
the handling lawyer, sent his son, Atty. Rainald Paggao,
who manifested that his father can no longer handle the
case. On the same day, Atty. Jesus F. Fernandez verbally
entered his appearance as new counsel for the accused.
Atty. Fernandez moved for a resetting of the case, which the
Court denied considering the objection of the private
prosecutor, as well as due to the repeated warnings issued,
and considering further the length of time afforded the
accused to present its (sic) evidence. The defense right (sic)
to present evidence was
_______________
49 Id., at p. 65.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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Park vs. Choi
deemed waived and the case was considered submitted for

resolution.52
Unsatisfied, Choi appealed the above MeTC’s

Decision dated April 26, 2011 to the RTC-Branch 142.
The Ruling of the RTC-Branch 142
In its Decision, dated December 23, 2011, the RTC-

Branch 142 affirmed the MeTC’s Decision and
denied Choi’s appeal, viz.:
All told, this Court finds that the imposition of civil

liability against the accused-appellant is correctly decided
by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED and the Decision dated 26 April 2011, rendered
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.53
In this regard, the RTC-Branch 142 observed that:
In the 15 September 2010 Order of the lower [court],

[Choi] was already given the last opportunity to present his
defense on 23 November 2010, but still failed to introduce
any. [In spite] of the warning, the lower court cancelled the
hearing to afford the defense another day, on 7 March 2011.
It was on said date that the lower court was constrained to
declare the right of [Choi] to present evidence as deemed
waived considering the prosecution’s vigorous objection, the
repeated warnings to [Choi] and the length of time afforded
to [Choi] to present his defense.
xxxx
_______________
52 Id., at pp. 64-65.

53 Id., at p. 59.
104

Park vs. Choi
[Choi’s] failure to adduce his evidence[,] is, clearly,

attributable not to the lower court but to himself due to his
repeated postponements. If it were true that [Choi] wanted
to adduce his evidence, he could have taken advantage of

the ample opportunity to present, to be heard and to testify
in open court with the assistance of his counsel.54
Maintaining his position that he did not waive his right

to present evidence, Choi filed a Motion for Reconsideration
55
of the above Decision on March 6, 2012, scheduled for
hearing on March 9, 2012.56
On March 7, 2012, the RTC-Branch 142 gave Park ten
(10) days within which to file an Opposition (to the Motion
for Reconsideration) and ten (10) days to Choi to file a
Reply to the Opposition upon receipt thereof.57 On March
13, 2012, Park filed his opposition, which was received by
Choi on March 20, 2012.58
On March 28, 2012, the RTC-Branch 142 issued an
Order denying Choi’s Motion for Reconsideration. On
March 30, 2012 — that is, the day on which his ten (10) day
period to file his Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration was to expire — Choi filed a motion for
extension of time to file his reply.59 Notably, the court had
already denied Choi’s Motion for Reconsideration two days
prior, or on March 28, 2012. Based on the record, Choi did
not file a Reply to the Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Choi filed a petition for review60 under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
_______________
54 Id., at p. 57.
55 Id., at pp. 82-103.
56 Id., at p. 16.
57 Id., at pp. 16, 60.
58 Id., at p. 16.
59 Id., at p. 12.
60 Id., at pp. 21-53.
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Park vs. Choi
In his petition before the CA, Choi’s arguments were

two-fold: (i) the RTC violated his constitutional right to due
process in denying his motion for reconsideration even

before his period to file a reply to Park’s opposition had
expired (i.e., Choi had until March 30, 2012 to file a reply
to the opposition, while the RTC-Branch 142 Order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration was issued on
March 28, 2012)61 and (ii) the RTC erred in declaring his
right to present evidence to have been waived for the
simple reason that the day of presentation of evidence was
the day of the retirement of his lawyer.62
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 30, 2015, the CA reversed

the RTC-Branch 142’s Decision dated December 23, 2011
and Order dated March 28, 2012, viz.:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is

GRANTED. The assailed Regional Trial
Court’s Decision dated December 23, 2011 and its Order of
March 28, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Case is hereby REMANDED to the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City, for the reception of
petitioner’s evidence.
SO ORDERED.63
First, in remanding the case to the MeTC, the CA held

that only a full-blown hearing would guarantee a fair
resolution of the case.64 To the CA, the courts’ strict
adherence to the rules of procedure may be relaxed when a
strict implementation of the rules would cause substantial
injustice to the parties. In particular, the CA held that
several postponements were with
_______________
61 Id., at p. 27.
62 Id., at p. 12.
63 Id., at p. 128.
64 Id.
106

Park vs. Choi
65
“justifiable reasons,” such as, in the instances of the
erroneous certification and the substitution of counsel.66
As to the other instances of postponement, the CA noted
that:
While it is true that several motions for postponements

have been recorded, it behooves on the courts to rationalize
the reasons for the postponements and to treat each case
accordingly. What is foremost is to render substantive
justice and give the parties their day in court.
xxxx
We shall not touch on the claim of payments posed by
[Choi] as the same can be best validated when [Choi] is
allowed to present his evidence.67
Second, with respect to the RTC-Branch 142’s denial of

Choi’s Motion for Reconsideration two (2) days before the
expiration of the period within which he was to file a reply
to the opposition, the CA, without making a categorical
ruling on whether Choi was deprived of his right to due
process, simply ruled that “the failure of [Choi] to present
[his] evidence was because of justified reasons beyond his
control.”68
In a Resolution dated September 30, 2015, the CA
denied Park’s Motion for Reconsideration69 for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
In a Resolution70 dated January 11, 2016, the Court
required Choi to comment on Park’s petition. Choi filed his
_______________
65 Id., at p. 125.
66 Id.
67 Id., at pp. 125-126.
68 Id., at pp. 122-123.
69 Id., at pp. 130-137.
70 Id., at p. 142.
107
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Park vs. Choi
71
Comment on January 16, 2017. On February 3, 2017,
Park filed his Reply.72
Issue
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the

CA committed any reversible error in the issuance of the
assailed Decision dated March 30, 2015 and
Resolution dated September 30, 2015.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the issues raised in the present petition, the
Court emphasizes at the outset that the dispute between
the parties arose in 2000, or almost eighteen (18) years ago,
and that the case has already been remanded to the MeTC
on two occasions (i.e., by the Court’s Second Division in
2007 and by the CA in the assailed Decision and
Resolution in 2015). Justice dictates, therefore, that the
Court resolve the present petition instead of remanding the
same to the lower court. In this regard, the Court finds that
the CA erred in reversing the RTC-Branch 142’s
Decision dated December 23, 2011 and Order dated March
28, 2012, for the reasons that follow.
Contrary to the CA’s rul-

ing, Choi was not deprived
of due process.
The totality of circumstances painstakingly detailed

above reveals that Choi was not deprived of due process,
either: (i) in the MeTC’s Order dated March 7, 2011, as
affirmed by the RTC-Branch 142, declaring Choi to have
waived his right to present evidence after he moved for a
sixth postponement; or
_______________
71 Id., at pp. 148-171.

72 Id., at pp. 179-182.
108

Park vs. Choi
(ii) in the RTC-Branch 142’s Order dated March 28, 2012

denying his Motion for Reconsideration two days before the
lapse of the ten (10) day period given to him by the RTC to
file his Reply to the Opposition (to the Motion for
Reconsideration).
First, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC-Branch 142, was correct in ruling that
Choi had waived his right to present evidence.
Claiming that substantive justice must be the
determinative end of courts,73 Choi argues that any grant
of postponement must take into consideration the reason
for the postponement and the merits of the case of the
movant.74 To that extent, the Court agrees, and so holds,
that Choi had been provided with more than ample
opportunity to present his case.
To begin with, the grant or denial of a motion — or, in
this case, motions — for postponement is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, which should always be
predicated on the consideration that the ends of justice and
fairness are served by the grant or denial of the motion.
75
As the Court enunciated in Sibay v. Bermudez:76
x x x After all, postponements and continuances are part

and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing justice.
When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to
delay is not manifest with the corresponding motion to
transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is
sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that
the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Thus, in
considering motions for postponements,
_______________
73 Id., at p. 37.
74 Citing Simon v. Canlas, 521 Phil. 558, 572; 487 SCRA 433, 447
(2006); id., at pp. 37-38.
75 Sibay v. Bermudez, G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017, 831 SCRA 191,
197.
76 Id.
109
VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 109

Park vs. Choi
two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the
postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion
will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.77
Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a
movant for postponement should not assume
beforehand that his motion will be granted.78
Thus, We agree with the appellate court’s finding that in
the absence of any clear and manifest grave abuse of
discretion resulting in lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, We cannot overturn the decision of the court
a quo. More so, in this case, where the denial of the motion
for postponement appears to be justified.79 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In fact, pursuant to Sections 280 and 381 of Rule 30 of the

Rules of Court, although a court may adjourn a trial from day to
day, a motion to postpone trial on the ground of absence of
evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the ma-
_______________
77 Id., at pp. 197-198, citing Simon v. Canlas, supra note 74.

78 Id., at p. 198, citing The Philippine American Life & General
Insurance Company v. Enario, 645 Phil. 166, 178; 630 SCRA 607, 619
(2010).
79 Id.
80 SEC. 2. Adjournments and postponements.—A court may adjourn a
trial from day to day, and to any stated time, as the expeditious and
convenient transaction of business may require, but shall have no power
to adjourn a trial for a longer period than one month for each
adjournment, nor more than three months in all, except when authorized
in writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme Court. (3a, R22)
81 SEC. 3. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for absence of
evidence.—A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of
evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality or
relevancy of such evidence, and that due diligence has been used to
procure it. But if the adverse party admits the facts to be given in
evidence, even if he objects or reserves the right to object to their
admissibility, the trial shall not be postponed. (4a, R22; Bar Matter No.
803, July 21, 1998)
110

Park vs. Choi
teriality or relevancy of such evidence, and that due

diligence has been used to procure it. Rules governing
postponements serve a clear purpose — to avert the erosion
of people’s confidence in the judiciary.82
Consequently, in granting or denying motions for
postponements, courts must exercise their discretion
constantly mindful of the Constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. In other
words, while it is true that cases must be adjudicated in a
manner that is in accordance with the established rules of
procedure, so is it crucial that cases be promptly disposed
to better serve the ends of justice. After all, justice delayed
is justice denied.83 Excessive delay in the disposition of
cases renders inutile the rights of the people guaranteed by
the constitution and by various legislations.84
Here, Choi bewails the MeTC’s Order dated March 7,
2011 in which the court, after several warnings, declared
Choi to have waived his right to present evidence. The facts
leading up to the MeTC’s Order dated March 7, 2011,
however, clearly show that the MeTC had been very liberal
in granting Choi’s numerous motions for postponement,
each time reminding Choi to come prepared to present his
evidence. In all these, Choi’s propensity to disregard the
opportunity given to him to present his evidence is
palpable.
To be clear, trial was initially scheduled on July 16,
2008. After four motions for postponement (July 16, 2008
to January 7, 2009, then to April 7, 2009, then to May 19,
2009, and to September 15, 2010) at Choi’s instance, trial
was set to
_______________
82 Rosauro v. Villanueva, Jr., 389 Phil. 699; 334 SCRA 362 (2000).
83 Marcelo v. Peroxide Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 203492, April 24, 2017, 824
SCRA 91, 105, citing Biggel v. Pamintuan, 581 Phil. 319, 325; 559 SCRA
344, 350 (2008).
84 Matias v. Plan, 355 Phil. 274, 282; 293 SCRA 532, 539 (1998).
111
VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 111
Park vs. Choi
proceed on September 15, 2010. Come September 15,

2010, however, Choi again moved that the trial be
postponed to November 23, 2010, asking for the first time
the assistance of an interpreter in translating his
testimony from Korean to English.85
While the lower court granted Choi’s by then sixth
postponement, it did so with a stern warning that his
failure to present evidence on the scheduled date would
result in his right to present evidence being deemed
waived. Yet, on November 23, 2010, Choi again moved for
postponement on the excuse that the Korean Interpreter
who was present to assist him had an erroneous
certification (i.e., was a Certified Qualified Interpreter, but
the Certification issued by the Korean embassy was for
another case). Using the certification issue as reason, Choi
again asked that the trial be postponed to March 7, 2011.
On that day, Choi’s counsel moved for another
postponement on the ground that Choi’s previous counsel
was retiring and this new counsel was not prepared to
present evidence that day.
Based on the foregoing, it does not escape the Court’s
attention that from the time the MeTC gave Choi the
opportunity to present his evidence on July 16, 2008 until
the issuance of the MeTC’s Order dated March 7, 2011
declaring Choi’s right to present evidence to have been
waived, Choi had been given several opportunities —
spanning almost three (3) years — to present his evidence.
There is no deprivation of due process when a party is
given an opportunity to be heard, not only through
hearings, but even through pleadings, so that one may
explain one’s side or arguments.86 Inasmuch as Choi had
been given more than enough opportunity to present his
case, the Court agrees with the MeTC and the RTC that
Choi had waived his right to
_______________
85 Rollo, p. 10.
86 Cabanting v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 781 Phil. 164, 171; 784
SCRA 251, 259-260 (2016).
112

Park vs. Choi
present evidence. In this regard, Choi cannot claim that he

was “prevented from testifying”87 by the trial court,
considering that all the postponements in the proceedings
were at the instance of Choi.
In any event, the unpreparedness of counsel that led to
the MeTC’s Order of March 7, 2011 cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, justify further delay in the proceedings to
the detriment of Park’s right to an expeditious resolution of
what really is, at the end of the day, a simple money claim.
Second, that the RTC-Branch 142 denied Choi’s Motion
for Reconsideration on March 28, 2012, or two days before
the lapse of the ten (10) day period given to Choi by the
RTC to file his Reply to the Opposition (to the Motion for
Reconsideration) does not, by and of itself, support Choi’s
claim of a violation of due process considering that, to begin
with, the Reply to Opposition is limited to issues and
arguments raised in Park’s Opposition, which in turn, is
limited to the issues and arguments raised in Choi’s own
Motion for Reconsideration.
Choi is liable to pay Park

the principal amount of
P1,875,000.00 and corre-
sponding legal interests
thereon.
Having dispensed with the procedural issues, the Court

proceeds to determine the extent of Choi’s liability to Park.
Suffice it to state that based on the records, it is clear
that Choi is liable to Park for the loan extended by the
latter to him. This is so because, Choi in his Counter-
Affidavit, already admitted that he borrowed money from
Park, arguing only regarding the extent of his liability —
i.e., that what he owed was P1,500,000.00 and not
P1,875,000.00. In his Counter-Affidavit, Choi himself
stipulated:
_______________
87 Rollo, p. 28.
113
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Park vs. Choi
“2. That the truth of the matter is that I borrowed

from said complainant the amount of P1,500,000.00 on
June 29, 1999 and he thereupon issued to me two (2)
International Bank Manager’s Checks, to wit:
3. That in place of a formal document such as a

promissory note, [Park] required me instead to give him the
subject check in the amount of P1,875,000.00 which
includes the interest of Twenty-Five percent (25%) which is
equivalent to P375,000.00 and the date of said check of
August 28, 1999 served to indicate the maturity date of the
two-month period within which the aforementioned loan
was to be paid. In other words, the subject check was not
intended by us to be in payment of the loan but to serve
merely as an evidence of my indebtedness to the complaint
in lieu of a promissory note as I have duly informed the
complainant of the lack of sufficient funds to cover the same
check when I handed over to him that check. ”88 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Judicial admissions made by parties in the course of the

trial in the same case are conclusive and do not require
further evidence to prove them.89 They are legally binding
on the party making them90 except when it is shown that
they have been made through palpable mistake, or that no
such admission was made,91 neither of which was shown to
exist in this case. Thus, Choi himself having admitted
liability, the only
_______________
88 See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 23 December

2011), id., at pp. 98-99.
89 Odiamar v. Valencia, 788 Phil. 451, 459; 795 SCRA 18, 26 (2016),
citing Josefa v. Manila Electric Company, 739 Phil. 114, 129; 730 SCRA
126, 144 (2014).
90 Id., citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp.,
750 Phil. 95, 118; 745 SCRA 98, 121 (2015).
91 Id., citing Josefa v. Manila Electric Company, supra.
114

Park vs. Choi
question that remains for the Court to resolve is the extent

of such liability.
In this regard, the Court finds that Choi is liable to pay
Park the face value of the check in the amount of
P1,875,000.00 as principal. The Court notes that the only
bases relied upon by Choi in support of his contention that
P1,500,000.00 is the principal and P375,000.00 to be the
interest are his own allegations in his Counter-Affidavit.
Without more, Choi’s bare allegations on the terms of the
loan fail to persuade. This is so because in accordance with
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.92 Here,
without further proof of any express agreement that
P375,000.00 of the P1,875,000.00 pertains to interest, the
Court is predisposed, based on the facts of the case, to rule
that the entire principal amount owed by Choi to Park is
the face value of the check, or P1,875,000.00.
In an attempt to further minimize liability, Choi raises
the defense of payment and insists that he already paid the
sum of P1,590,000.00 (P1,500,000.00 as principal and
P90,000.00 as interest), and that the remaining amount
that he owes Park is P285,000.00.93 In his Counter-
Affidavit, Choi claims:
“5. That complainant is now demanding still for the

payment of the face value of the check which is
P1,875,000.00 notwithstanding his awareness of the fact
that I have already paid to him the total amount of
P1,590,000.00 as of this date, thereby leaving an unpaid
balance of only P285,000.00.
6. That, attached hereto as Annex ‘A’ the LIST of the
instalment payments I made to complainant from August
28, 1999 up to February 22, 2000, together with documents
evidencing some of such payments, as Annexes
_______________
92 See Anchor Savings Bank (now Equicom Savings Bank) v. Pinzman

Realty and Development Corporation, 741 Phil. 190, 194; 732 SCRA 678,
683 (2014).
93 Rollo, p. 58.
115
VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 115

Park vs. Choi
‘B,’ ‘C’ and ‘D.”’94 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;

italics omitted)
Yet, other than mere allegation of payment of

P1,590,000.00, Choi has adduced no evidence to prove the
fact of payment. A party claiming that an obligation has
been discharged by payment has the burden of proving the
same.95 As aptly elucidated by the Court in Alonzo v. San
Juan:96
The law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the
duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or
any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law.
In this case, the burden of proof is on the respondents
because they allege an affirmative defense, namely
payment. As a rule, one who pleads payment has the
burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must
allege [nonpayment], the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove [nonpayment].
The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
97
(Emphasis supplied)
As against Choi’s allegation of payment, Park’s

categorical testimony that Choi owed him P1,875,000.00,
coupled with the presentation of the subject check
constituting evidence of indebtedness and absent evidence
on the part of Choi to the
_______________
94 See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated December 23,
2011), id., at p. 92.
95 Multi-International Business Data System, Inc. v. Martinez, 113
Phil. 1; 774 SCRA 574 (2015); Philippine National Bank v. Caibal, G.R.
No. 199779, February 12, 2018 (Unsigned Resolution), citing Alonzo v.

San Juan, 491 Phil. 233; 451 SCRA 45 (2005).
96 Alonzo v. San Juan, id.; see also Philippine National Bank v.
Caibal, Id.
97 Alonzo v. San Juan, id., at pp. 243-244; pp. 55-56.
116

Park vs. Choi
contrary, leads to the conclusion that Choi in fact owes

Park the full amount of P1,875,000.00.98
More importantly, Park, in his Reply-Affidavit,
categorically testified that although Choi gave him a check
for P1,590,000.00, that amount was not in payment of PNB
Check No. 0077133 (the P1,875,000.00 check dated June
28, 1999), but was for the payment of PNB Check No.
0077134 in the amount of P750,000.00 dated August 28,
1999 and PNB Check No. 0008013 in the amount of
P700,000.00 dated September 7, 1999.99
Given these facts, as correctly observed by the RTC-
Branch 142, if Choi really did make a partial payment on
the loan, then he would have taken the check back as
debtors would in the ordinary course of business.100 Quite
the contrary, the check for P1,875,000.00 remained in
Park’s possession who continued to make demands on the
basis of the check.
Finally, even if the Court were to indulge Choi’s claim
that he handed Park a check for P1,590,000.00, it has not
been shown, much less proven, to the satisfaction of the
Court whether those payments were made specifically by
Choi for the purpose of discharging his loan obligations to
Park. As shown in Park’s Reply-Affidavit:
“2. That after I gave him the cash of P1,875,000.00, he

gave P100,000.00 to Moo Pyung Park as the latter’s
commission for bringing him to me; then he handed
P196,000.00 to me to pay for and in his behalf the rentals
for 14 months of the warehouse he is renting through me
from Mr. Tony Arellano located at Cubao, Quezon City;
likewise, he handed P1,500,000.00 to me to change it to
manager’s checks which he said he will use in paying
Samsung Electric Company which he did not want to
pay in cash for fear of bringing that much
_______________
98 Rollo, p. 58.
99 Id., at p. 93.
100 Id.
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Park vs. Choi
with him and which account (sic) for IEB Checks Nos.
01022 and 01023; and lastly[,] he gave me the balance of
P69,000.00 in payment on interest on the
P1,875,000.00 for two months, i.e., July and August.
3. That I admit that he had indorsed in my favor
several checks from different owners as enumerated in
Annex ‘A’ of his counter-affidavit and he had issued two
checks in my favor in the sum total of P1,590,000.00 but
not in payment of the PNB Check No. 0077133 in the
amount of P1,875,000.00 he issued to me in June 28,
1999 but of PNB Check No. 0077134 in the amount of
P750,000.00 dated August 28, 1999 and the PNB Check
No. 0008013 in the amount of P700,000.00 dated
September 7, 1999 which he encash (sic) with me also
in July 1999 and which he told me not to present for
payment anymore as he will just replace them with other
checks. Copies of said checks are hereto attached as
Annexes ‘D’ and ‘E’ and made as integral parts hereof.”101
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Given the foregoing, the Court therefore finds that:

first, Choi was not deprived of due process, and was in
fact, given more than ample opportunity to present his
case; and second, that, as correctly observed by the MeTC
and subsequently affirmed by the RTC-Branch 142, Choi is
liable to pay Park the amount P1,875,000.00 along with its
corresponding legal interest.
A final note on interest. There are two types of
interest — monetary interest and compensatory interest.
102
Interest as a compensation fixed by the parties for the
use or forbearance of money is referred to as monetary
interest,103 while interest that may be imposed by law or by
courts as penalty for dam-
_______________
101 See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 23 December
2011), id.
102 Siga-An v. Villanueva, 596 Phil. 760; 576 SCRA 696 (2009); Isla v.
Estorga, G.R. No. 233974, July 2, 2018, 869 SCRA 410, 417.
103 Siga-An v. Villanueva, id., at p. 769; p. 704.
118

Park vs. Choi
ages is referred to as compensatory interest.104 Right to

interest therefore arises only by virtue of a contract or by
virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal
loan on which interest is demanded.105
Inasmuch as the parties did not execute a written loan
agreement, and consequently, did not stipulate on the
imposition of interest, Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which
states that “[n]o interest shall be due unless it has been
expressly stipulated in writing,” operates to preclude the
imposition and running of monetary interest on the
principal. In other words, no monetary interest having
been agreed upon between the parties, none accrues in
favor of Park.
Nevertheless, the moment a debtor incurs in delay in
the payment of a sum of money, the creditor is entitled to
the payment of interest as indemnity for damages arising
out of that delay. Article 2209 of the Civil Code provides
that: “[i]f the obligation consists in the payment of sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall
be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
percent (6%) per annum.”
Consequently, by operation of Article 2209 of the Civil
Code, Choi becomes liable to pay Park compensatory
interest to indemnify Park for the damages the latter
suffered as a result of Choi’s delay in the payment of the
loan. Delay in this case, pursuant to Article 1169 of the
Civil Code,106 begins to run from the time Park
extrajudicially demanded from Choi
_______________
104 Id., citing Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, p. 854
(Volume V, 13th edition, 1995,); Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil
Law, p. 260 (Volume VI, 1st edition).
105 Id., citing Baretto v. Santa Marina and “La Insular,” 37 Phil. 568,
571 (1918).
106 ART. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or do something incur in
delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from
them the fulfillment of their obligation.
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Park vs. Choi
the fulfillment of his loan obligation that is, on May 19,

2000. There being no stipulation as to the rate of
compensatory interest, the rate is six percent (6%) per
annum pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
To be clear, however, Article 2212 of the Civil Code,
which provides that “[i]nterest due shall earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point,” does not apply
because “interest due” in Article 2212 refers only to accrued
interest. A look at the counterpart provision of Article 2212
of the new Civil Code, Article 1109 of the old Civil Code,
supports this. It provides:
Art. 1109. Accrued interest shall draw interest at the

legal rate from the time the suit is filed for its recovery,
even if the obligation should have been silent on this point.
In commercial transactions the provisions of the Code of
Commerce shall govern.
Pawnshops and savings banks shall be governed by their
special regulations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In interpreting the above provision of the old Civil Code,

the Court in Zobel v. City of Manila,107 ruled that Article
1109 applies only to conventional obligations containing a
stipulation on interest. Similarly, Article 2212 of the new
Civil Code contemplates, and therefore applies, only when
there exists stipulated or conventional interest.108
Finally, in accordance Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals109 as further clarified by the Court in
Nacar v.
_______________
107 47 Phil. 169, 187 (1925).

108 The Phil. American Accident Insurance Company Inc. v. Flores, 186
Phil. 563, 566; 97 SCRA 811, 814 (1980); David v. Court of Appeals, 375
Phil. 177; 316 SCRA 710 (1999).
109 304 Phil. 236; 234 SCRA 78 (1994).
120

Park vs. Choi
Gallery Frames,110 in the absence of an express stipulation

as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the
rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments is
twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from default (i.e
., the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand). With the
issuance of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP-MB) Circular
No. 799 (S. 2013), said rate of 12% per annum applies until
June 30, 2013, and, from July 1, 2013, the new rate of six
percent (6%) per annum applies. Finally, when the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes
final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 6%
per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, the
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to
a forbearance of credit.111
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated March
30, 2015 and Resolution dated September 30, 2015 in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 124173 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
142 dated December 23, 2011 and Order dated March 28,
2012, which affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City-Branch 65’s Decision dated April 26, 2011, are
hereby REINSTATED.
Respondent Eung Won Choi is hereby ordered to pay
Petitioner Hun Hyung Park the amount of One Million
Eight Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P1,875,000.00) representing the principal amount of the
unpaid PNB Check No. 0077133 dated August 28, 1999,
with legal interest at the rate
_______________
110 716 Phil. 267; 703 SCRA 439 (2013).

111 Id., at p. 283; p. 454.
121
VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 121

Park vs. Choi
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from May 19, 2000, the
date of extrajudicial demand, until June 30, 2013;112 and
thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum113 until this
Decision becomes final and executory.
Further, this sum shall further earn interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until full payment,114 in accordance with the
Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Circular No. 799 (S. 2013).
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, J. Reyes,

Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside. Judgment and order of RTC of Makati, Br. 142
reinstated.
_______________
112 Republic v. Mupas, 769 Phil. 21; 769 SCRA 384 (2015), citing
Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 109; see Reyes v.
National Housing Authority, 443 Phil. 603; 395 SCRA 494 (2003); Land
Bank of the Philippines. v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83; 419 SCRA 67 (2004);
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 494; 454 SCRA 516 (2005); Land
Bank of the Philippines. v. Imperial, 544 Phil. 378; 515 SCRA 449 (2007);
Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc, 557 Phil. 737; 531 SCRA
198 (2007); Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 608 Phil. 9; 590 SCRA
214 (2009); Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation v. Republic, G.R. Nos.
218628 & 218631, September 6, 2017, 839 SCRA 200.
113 Republic v. Mupas, citing Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of
Appeals; Republic v. Court of Appeals; Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Imperial; Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority; Evergreen Manufacturing
Corporation v. Republic, id.
114 See Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hababag, Sr., 786 Phil. 503,
509-510; 792 SCRA 399, 407 (2016).
122

Park vs. Choi
It is settled that a judicial admission is binding on the

person who makes it, and absent any showing that it was
made through palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset such admission. (City of Bacolod
vs. Phuture Visions Co., Inc., 851 SCRA 324 [2018])
——o0o——
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8/3/24, 12:22 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 899

G.R. No. 220826. March 27, 2019.*

HUN HYUNG PARK, petitioner, vs. EUNG WON** CHOI,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; Motion for

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 91

appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the disposition of cases renders inutile the rights of the

palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made, neither of

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 93

by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal

has been expressly stipulated in writing,” operates to preclude the

94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Article 2212 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[i]nterest

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 95

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1

dated March 30, 2015 and Resolution3 dated September 30,

The Antecedent Facts

The present petition arose from a complaint8 for

1 Rollo, pp. 8-20.

96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On June 28, 1999, Park, who was engaged in the

account but the same was returned to him dishonored for

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 97

to Evidence along with his Demurrer. In his Demurrer, Choi

since receipt of the notice of dishonor was not proven, then

Proceedings before the MeTC

The MeTC granted Choi’s Demurrer in an Order dated

Ruling of the RTC-Branch 60

The RTC-Branch 60,27 in a Decision28 dated September

98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Choi to pay Park the face value of the check

Aggrieved by the RTC-Branch 60’s Decision, Choi filed a

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 99

for reception of Choi’s evidence on the civil aspect of the

This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to

In a Resolution38 dated June 29, 2007, the Court denied

Proceedings before the MeTC

With the proceedings now before the MeTC, the MeTC

37 Id., at p. 447; p. 516.

100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The specific incidents leading up to the MeTC’s Order

declared a holiday. Hearing was then reset to January 7,

40 Id., at pp. 9-10.

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 101

should he still be not ready by the next hearing, his right to

Despite the warning, on the scheduled hearing of March

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Eung Won Choi is

102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Insofar as Choi’s alleged indebtedness was concerned,

hand, did not even adduce any evidence to controvert

As early as May 12, 2008, the defense was ordered to

VOL. 899, MARCH 27, 2019 103

deemed waived and the case was considered submitted for

Unsatisfied, Choi appealed the above MeTC’s

The Ruling of the RTC-Branch 142