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Citation: Susen, S. (2015). Emancipation. In: Gibbons, M. T., Coole, D., Ellis, E. and
Ferguson, K. (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought. (pp. 1024-1038). Chichester,
UK: Wiley Blackwell. ISBN 9781118474396

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Emancipation Different Elements of Emancipation
As stated above, in the most general sense, the
Simon Susen
concept of emancipation designates an entity’s
liberation from control, dependence, restraint,
In the most general sense, the concept of
confinement, restriction, repression, slavery, or
emancipation refers to an entity’s liberation
domination. Yet, such a broad definition tells
from control, dependence, restraint, confine-
us little about the nature of emancipation.
ment, restriction, repression, slavery, or
Hence, it makes sense to examine three central
domination. The term has its etymological
dimensions of the above definition in some
origin in the Latin word emancipare, which is
detail: (i) the type of “entity” considered as the
derived from ex manu capere, that is, from the
carrier of emancipation, (ii) the form of
prefix “ex” (“from”), the noun “manus”
“liberation” underlying the process of emanci-
(“hand”), and the verb “capere” (“to take”).
pation, and (iii) the mode of “control” consti-
Thus, while the Latin verb emancipare liter-
tuting an obstacle to emancipation.
ally means “to take from the hand,” the
English verb “to emancipate” is used to i. Carriers of emancipation are generally
capture the idea of “freeing or releasing thought to be human. The view that
something or somebody from dependence human beings have the capacity to convert
upon something or somebody else.” The themselves into protagonists of emancipa-
Latin terms “mancipium” (“slave”), “manci- tion is expressed in various intellectual
pator” (“slaveholder”), and “mancipatio” traditions that are based on different
(“verbal contract concerning the handover of understandings of the subject. Among the
ownership”) indicate that the notion of eman- most influential conceptions of the subject
cipare originally referred to the idea of “trans- in modern social and political thought
ferring ownership of something or somebody are the following: the thinking subject
to someone else,” notably the conveyance of (Descartes), the rational subject (Kant),
an object, a person’s release from slavery, or the sociohistorical subject (Hegel), the
an individual’s exemption from paternal working subject (Marx), the unconscious
authority. In modern English, the term subject (Freud), the linguistic subject
“emancipation” commonly describes the (Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur), the
transition from heteronomy to autonomy, experiencing subject (Husserl), the bodily
from dependence to freedom, or from alien- subject (Merleau-Ponty and Foucault), the
ation to self-realization. Rather than estab- desiring subject (Lacan and Deleuze), and
lishing a universally applicable definition of the communicative subject (Habermas).
the term, however, it is important to bear in Regardless of which particular account of
mind that the concept of emancipation has the subject is chosen to identify an
been, and continues to be, used in different individual or collective carrier of emanci-
contexts and given meaning from diverging pation, entities capable of liberating them-
ideological angles. In order to illustrate the selves from repressive forms of power and
complexity of the term, this entry will control tend to be conceived of as human
consider the following: different elements of actors. In fact, in modern social and
emancipation, different conceptions of political thought, most theories of eman-
emancipation, and different movements of cipation have been inextricably linked to
emancipation. the concept of the subject. Of course, one
 may have good reason to be critical of projects aimed at individual or collective
such an anthropocentric interpretation emancipation; on ethical grounds, one
of emancipation: on religious or quasi- may be wary of the fact that most eman-
religious grounds, one may claim that cipatory processes involve conflict with,
spiritual or divine forces can be a source of or in some cases even the suppression of,
emancipation; on vitalist grounds, one oppositional forces; on pragmatic
may assume that, in principle, all living grounds, one may question the long-term
beings can be emancipated, or even eman- viability and sustainability of emancipa-
cipate themselves, from exogenous forces tory processes. Nevertheless, whatever
controlling their development; on envi- one makes of these objections, it appears
ronmentalist grounds, one may contend to be the case that, rightly or wrongly, all
that the natural world can, and indeed processes of emancipation are oriented
should, be emancipated from being toward achieving particular forms of
exploited by humans. Nonetheless, the liberation.
predominant position among social and iii. Obstacles to emancipation tend to be
political philosophers is that emancipa- regarded as detrimental sources of control.
tion is a process depending on and carried The common assumption that obstacles to
out by human actors, who, as rational emancipation are negative forces, based on
entities, are capable of shaping the condi- the relatively arbitrary and arguably illegiti-
tions of their existence. mate exercise of power, is illustrated in the
ii. In the broadest sense, processes of eman- fact that, in most cases, processes of
cipation are social practices oriented liberation are invoked in opposition to dis-
toward liberation. The supposition that empowering experiences, such as “repres-
emancipatory processes are tantamount sion,” “domination,” “alienation,” “illusion,”
to liberating practices is expressed in the and “deception.” Notwithstanding the fact
use of concepts such as “autonomiza- that, in modern social and political thought,
tion,” “self-realization,” “transformation,” there is substantial disagreement over the
“revolution,” “enlightenment,” and – nature and significance of the main obsta-
more recently – “empowerment.” What cles to emancipation, the theoretical critique
kind of processes can or should be char- and practical rejection of existing barriers to
acterized as “liberating” remains a con- human development aim to deconstruct
troversial question; there is little doubt, and remove both material and symbolic
however, that one feature that all forms of arrangements that obstruct the unfolding of
emancipation have in common is that the self-empowering potential of a given
they involve an individual or collective individual or collective actor. Especially
entity’s assertion of sovereignty and its those subscribing to conservative values
exemption from one or various sources may believe to have convincing reasons to
of relatively arbitrary control. Indeed, be suspicious of both small-scale and large-
from a historical perspective, there is no scale attempts to undermine, or even get rid
doubt that individual or collective actions of, established sources of authority and
oriented toward liberation from repres- control. Nonetheless, from a historical point
sive powers have always been, and will of view, the denunciation of and oppo-
always continue to be, a major normative sition to obstacles preventing individual and
impulse of social and political change. To collective entities from realizing their poten-
be sure, one may have justifiable reserva- tial have been on the agenda for a long time
tions about the possibility of emancipa- and are likely to continue to be of central
tion: on ideological grounds, one may importance to the political organization of
challenge the political legitimacy of social life in the future.
Different Conceptions of Emancipation belong to all and the earth to no one!”
(Rousseau 1996 [1755]: 431, emphasis original)
Similar to other terminological tools in social
and political thought, the concept of emancipa- Thus, far from regarding private property as
tion has acquired various meanings in different a natural right and social inequality as an inevi-
contexts and in diverging intellectual traditions. table given, Rousseau considers both as histor-
In Roman law, it was used primarily as a ical products of bourgeois society. Furthermore,
technical term referring to the granting of legal he takes the pessimistic view that, due to the
rights; in the modern era, it obtained a new and historical transition from the state of nature to
broader meaning: the emphasis shifted from a the establishment of society, human beings
person’s (passive) obtainment of legal rights to a have gradually alienated themselves from the
subject’s (active) self-liberation from disempow- roots of their existence. The state of nature was
ering forms of control. By the end of the eigh- essentially a primitive condition characterized
teenth century, the concept of emancipation had by the absence of law, morality, and social
become a political term describing individual or conventions; the development of society, by
collective processes oriented toward the asser- contrast, is contingent upon the emergence of
tion of personal or social autonomy. Among the an ever greater division of labor and private
most influential thinkers shaping modern property, both of which are protected by
approaches to emancipation were the philoso- political and legal institutions. While rejecting
phers Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), any illusions about the possibility of returning
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Georg W. F. Hegel to the state of nature, Rousseau suggests that,
(1770–1831), and Karl Marx (1818–83). Their by joining together into civil society on the
writings gave rise to the intellectual development basis of a social contract, individuals are not
of Rousseauian, Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxist only able to preserve themselves as human
approaches to emancipation. beings but also have the opportunity to remain
Philosophical approaches to emancipation free as citizens. Rousseau’s defence of freedom
drawing on the work of Rousseau typically and equality, epitomized in the concept of the
refer to his famous assertion that “man is born “general will” (volonté générale), represents a
free, and everywhere he is in chains” (1996 cornerstone for modern conceptions of social
[1762]: 465). Rousseau is widely recognized as and political emancipation based on normative
one of the first philosophers to draw a distinc- ideals such as “popular sovereignty,” “direct
tion between “natural” and “social” inequality. democracy,” and “fairness of opportunity.”
This distinction allows him to argue that, in Philosophical approaches to emancipation
collective life forms whose economic organiza- referring to Kant’s oeuvre draw attention to
tion is based on private property, inequality comments made in The Conflict of the Faculties
derives mainly from social, rather than from (1979 [1798]). In this study, Kant considers the
biological or physical, differences between possibility of overcoming subjugation and
people. Rousseau eloquently articulates this immaturity; he does so by reflecting on the
perspective in the following passage: sociohistorical significance of the French
Revolution and the Enlightenment, both of
The first person who, having enclosed a plot of
which he believes to have substantially con-
land, took it into his head to say this is mine and
tributed to the gradual coming of age of the
found people simple enough to believe him,
was the true founder of civil society. What human race. Similar to other Enlightenment
crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and philosophers, Kant stresses the empowering
horrors would the human race have been potential inherent in human subjects’ ability to
spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or raise themselves out of nature by making use
filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow of their rational capacity (Verstand) and
men: “Do not listen to this impostor. You are thereby gaining control over their environ-
lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth ment. Yet, from a Kantian perspective, society’s
maturation process toward moral progress and whose struggle for power and survival epito-
enlightenment depends on the unfolding of mizes the subject’s ontological dependence
reason (Vernunft): autonomy and responsibility upon processes of mutual recognition. Applied
are derived from the subject’s moral capacity to to modern debates on emancipation, Hegel’s
shape the world on the basis of ethical commit- remarks on the “master–slave dialectic” force-
ments and ideals. On this account, actions driven fully illustrate that human beings, whatever
by inclination or affection lack moral value; an their position in society, are not only cognitive
action has moral worth only insofar as it is moti- but also recognitive entities, implying that they
vated by rational considerations based on univer- are capable of cognition (Verstand) only insofar
salizable principles. This conviction is most as they establish social relations founded on
succinctly expressed in Kant’s “categorical imper- mutual recognition(gegenseitige Anerkennung).
ative,” according to which humans are required to As recognition-dependent and recognition-
act in conformity with moral maxims that can be seeking entities, humans cannot possibly strive
regarded as universal laws to be respected by for self-liberation without immersing them-
everyone (see esp. Kant 2003 [1785]). selves in processes of socialization, through
Although the term “emancipation” is not which they can assert their capacity for
part of Kant’s conceptual apparatus, his emancipation from historically specific forms
“categorical imperative” is founded on the of domination (see also Hegel 1990 [1825–6]).
assumption that humans can liberate them- Philosophical approaches to emancipation
selves from their “lower faculties,” such as incli- developed in the tradition of Marx’s historical
nation and self-interest, because their rational materialism are based on the supposition that
capacity permits them to follow unconditional the possibility of individual and collective self-
moral principles, which can be justified as ends realization is not a merely theoretical matter of
in themselves. On this view, emancipation is abstract speculation but, first and foremost, a
tantamount to rationally motivated enlighten- practical challenge regarding the historical
ment. In his groundbreaking article An Answer conditions underlying processes of social
to the Question: “What Is Enlightenment?” transformation (2000 [1845b]). Marx’s sus-
(2009 [1784]), Kant insists that the coming of tained interest in the concept of emancipation
age of humanity is inconceivable without peo- is expressed particularly in his early works,
ple’s ability to emerge from their self-incurred such as his “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
immaturity by making use of their rational Right” (2000 [1843]), “On the Jewish Question”
capacity, which equips them with a sense of (2000 [1844a]), “Economic and Philosophical
personal autonomy and moral responsibility. Manuscripts” (2000 [1844b]), “The Holy
From this perspective, the free and public use Family” (2000 [1845a]), “Theses on Feuerbach”
of reason is a precondition for society’s emanci- (2000 [1845b]), and the “Grundrisse” (2000
pation from prejudice and superstition. [1857–8]). Given the considerable impact of
Philosophical approaches to emancipation Marxist thought on world history, it is worth
inspired by the writings of Hegel draw on his examining Marx’s conception of emancipation
reflections on the so-called “master–slave in some detail. At least seven key assumptions
dialectic,” sometimes referred to as the underlying his view of emancipation can be
“lordship and bondage” relation, which can identified in his writings.
be found in a famous passage of his First, emancipation is restorative. It allows
Phenomenology of Spirit (1977 [1807]). Given for the recovery of human autonomy, indi-
the abstract and metaphorical language used in cating that people have the capacity to liberate
this section, it can be interpreted in several themselves from detrimental sources of power
ways; it is beyond doubt, however, that one of that estrange them from both themselves
the essential themes of this passage is the and their environment. In Marx’s words, “all
encounter between two self-conscious entities emancipation is bringing back man’s world and
his relationships to man himself ” (2000 Fourth, emancipation is transformative. This
[1844a]: 64). According to this view, the assumption is expressed in Marx’s famous
restorative function of emancipation enables assertion that “the philosophers have only
people to return to the essence of their existence. interpreted the world, in various ways; the
Second, emancipation is potentially point is to change it” (2000 [1845b]: 173). The
universal. One of Marx’s most famous claims is decisive step leading to universal human eman-
that there is a fundamental difference between cipation is the “abolition of private property”
“political” and “human” emancipation (2000 (2000 [1844b]: 97), allowing for “the real reap-
[1844a]: esp. 51–4 and 64). In fact, Marx propriation of the human essence by and for
sharply criticizes the “uncritical confusion of man” (97). Thus, it is through the transition
political emancipation and universal human from private to collective ownership of the
emancipation” (2000 [1844a]: 50): the former means of production that genuine human
is limited to civilizational achievements, such emancipation, understood as a social process,
as the separation of state and church, freedom can be achieved. Marx characterizes the
of opinion and expression, and the right to absence of private property in an advanced
suffrage; the latter, by contrast, has a universal stage of history as “communism,” representing
character in that it transcends the particular “the genuine solution of the antagonism
interests of individual citizens or social groups. between man and nature and between man and
From a Marxian perspective, then, political man” (97). If, following Marx, communism is
emancipation is restricted in that it rests upon regarded as the “whole movement of history”
“the reduction of man, on the one hand to a and “the consciously comprehended process of
member of civil society, an egoistic and its becoming” (97), then human emancipation
independent individual, on the other hand to a can be conceived of as a never-ending process.
citizen, a moral person” (2000 [1844a]: 64). In From this point of view, the abolition of private
order for human emancipation to be possible, property can be only the first, albeit a
“man must recognize his own forces as social fundamental, step toward the consolidation of
forces, organize them, and thus no longer sep- an emancipatory society.
arate social forces from himself in the form of Fifth, emancipation is empowering. Given
political forces” (64). In this sense, human the foundational status ascribed to labor within
emancipation allows for people’s self-realiza- the Marxian architecture of the social, alien-
tion, regardless of their political, economic, or ation from labor is tantamount to alienation
otherwise defined interests and affiliations. from the human condition. To the extent that
Third, emancipation is progressive. Marxian alienated labor is “not the satisfaction of a need
thought stands in the Enlightenment tradition but only a means to satisfy needs outside itself ”
in emphasizing the empowering nature of (2000 [1844b]: 88), emancipated labor is not a
individual and social forms of evolution. means to satisfy needs outside itself but the sat-
Following Marx, we should acknowledge that isfaction of a need itself. According to Marx,
“political emancipation is of course a great the exploited worker is alienated (i) from his
progress” (2000 [1844a]: 54) and that, although product, (ii) from other producers, (iii) from
“it is not the final form of human emancipation the production process, and (iv) from himself
in general, it is nevertheless the final form of as a species-being (2000 [1844b]: 85–95). The
human emancipation inside the present world exploited worker experiences (i) the alienation
order” (54). According to this account, political from his product, which appears “as an alien
concessions made to the working class in object that has power over him” (89), (ii) the
capitalist society can be interpreted as a sign of alienation from other producers, who are
progress toward reaching the final goal of abol- caught up in “the alienation of man from man”
ishing private property through revolutionary (91), (iii) the alienation from the production
class struggle. process, which imposes itself “as an activity
directed against himself, independent of him upon society by the state or an intellectual
and not belonging to him” (89), and (iv) the avant-garde “from above,” but, rather, an
alienation from himself as a species-being, that endogenously realized process, carried out by
is, it alienates from man his “human essence” the revolutionary subject, the working class,
(91). From this perspective, the emancipation “from below.” On the other hand, historical
of the alienated worker is inconceivable examples of socialist revolutions have shown
without the empowering recovery of the (i) that Marx’s plea for a “dictatorship of the prole-
purposive, (ii) cooperative, (iii) creative, and (iv) tariat” is fraught with difficulties and has, in
species-constitutive potentials inherent in labor. practice, often led to the establishment of total-
Sixth, emancipation is unifying. According to itarian regimes, whose working classes were
Marxian parameters, genuine human eman- largely alienated from the political elites by
cipation involves not only the elimination which they were governed. Notwithstanding
of social domination through the abolition the controversial nature of revolutionary pro-
of private property, but also the possibility of jects, the notion that a class “in itself ” (which
self-realization through the abolition of the exists as a class) needs to convert itself into a
division of labor. The proper unfolding of class “for itself ” (which is aware of itself as a
people’s purposive, cooperative, and creative class) remains crucial to the orthodox Marxist
potentials requires the consolidation of a conviction that the historical mission of the
reality that succeeds in overcoming the material working class is to take on its role as the revolu-
and symbolic antagonisms created by class- tionary subject, whose political actions can
divided societies. The artificial separation bet- bring about universal human emancipation.
ween different types of labor – manual versus
intellectual, concrete versus abstract, male Routes to socialist emancipation
versus female, paid versus unpaid, public By the early twentieth century, competing
versus domestic – has no place in a classless traditions and tendencies had emerged within
society in which everybody has not only the the socialist movement, which was profoundly
right but also the opportunity to develop their divided by two major issues: the question of
purposive, cooperative, and creative capacities its goals and objectives and the question of its
and thereby transcend the stratifying logic of means and strategies. The former issue, regarding
class-based realities. In this sense, genuine the ideological question “What do we want?,”
emancipation is a unifying effort guided by the illustrates that different socialist currents
principle “from each according to his ability, to embrace divergent conceptions of socialism;
each according to his needs!” (2000 [1875]: 615). the latter issue, concerning the strategic
Seventh, emancipation is self-initiated. In question “How do we get there?,” is reflected in
fact, according to Marx, genuine emancipation the rivalry between revolutionary and reformist
must be self-initiated: “the proletariat can and routes to socialism.
must free itself. But it cannot free itself without Among the most influential revolutionary
abolishing the conditions of its own life. It socialists were Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–81),
cannot abolish the conditions of its own life Karl Marx (1818–83), Friedrich Engels
without abolishing all the inhuman conditions (1820–95), Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924),
of life of society today which are summed up in and Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919). Despite
its own situation” (2000 [1845a]: 149). Yet, being separated by substantial ideological
Marx’s contention that genuine forms of social differences, they had, among other aspects,
emancipation derive from self-emancipation one important thing in common: they were
appears to provide as many answers as it resolutely opposed to the liberal promises of
poses questions. On the one hand, Marx sug- “bourgeois democracy” and in favor of employ-
gests that genuine emancipation is not an exog- ing revolutionary tactics to overthrow the
enously orchestrated mechanism, imposed “bourgeois state” and thereby convert the
“dictatorship of the proletariat” into a necessary revolutions in the economically developed
step toward human emancipation. countries of “the west” in the twentieth century
Among the most prominent reformist is a sign of the integrative power and ideolog-
socialists were Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64), ical elasticity of capitalism, which turned out
Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), Karl Kautsky to be a much more resilient and adaptable
(1854–1938), Beatrice Webb (1858–1943), economic system than most revolutionary
Sidney Webb (1859–1947), Jean Léon Jaurès socialists had predicted.
(1859–1914), Friedrich Ebert (1871–1925), In line with other critical theorists, Benjamin
and Léon Blum (1872–1950). They essentially is deeply suspicious not only of reformist
took the position that the proletarian struggle approaches to emancipation, particularly those
for emancipation could be successful only advocated by social democrats, but also of
through a shift of emphasis from “class allegedly revolutionary accounts according to
struggle” to “class compromise.” Bernstein which the working class should be “given the
famously claimed that “the movement is every- role of the saviour of future generations”
thing and the goal is nothing” (Heywood 1994: (1961: 275), permitting it to fulfill its mission
110), suggesting that, in order to make genuine of converting its own liberation into the
progress toward human emancipation, the cornerstone of human emancipation. In con-
proletariat should take a pragmatic and con- trast to this view, Benjamin insists that three
sensual, rather than a dogmatic and confronta- dimensions need to be added to the premises
tional, stance. of Marx’s historical materialism: “the discon-
tinuity of historical time; the destructive force
Critical theory of the working class; the tradition of the
Another key source of inspiration for many oppressed” (1972–89: I.3/1246). In other
contemporary approaches to emancipation can words, Benjamin seeks to transcend the evolu-
be found in the works of the Frankfurt School, tionist, romanticist, and idealist presupposi-
notably in the writings of the critical theorists tions underlying orthodox Marxist conceptions
Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), Max of social revolution. From this perspective, it is
Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor W. Adorno erroneous to conceive of emancipation in
(1903–69), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and terms of an outcome produced by continuous
Jürgen Habermas (1929–). Although their historical development; rather, it is to be seen
intellectual contributions are situated in the as the result of largely unforeseeable and dis-
tradition of Marxist thought, their works are continuously occurring eruptions. If “there is
marked by a profound distrust in orthodox not a moment that would not carry with it its
Marxist approaches to society in general and to revolutionary chance” (1972–89: I.3/1231,
human emancipation in particular. A central emphasis original), then radical social trans-
concern in their writings is the categorical formations can, in principle, occur at any point
rejection of economic determinism, thereby in time.
refusing to accept the orthodox Marxist Horkheimer and Adorno’s concern with the
premise that so-called “superstructural” possibility of emancipation focuses on the
dimensions of human reality – such as ideology, place of the individual in mass society (Adorno
philosophy, politics, law, art, and religion – are & Horkheimer 1997 [1944/69]: 120–67). Their
largely determined by the economic “base” of account is deeply pessimistic, seeking to dem-
society (see Marx 2000 [1859]). Furthermore, onstrate that the promises of the Enlightenment
they discard the assumption, presumably have been shattered by the historical experi-
shared by “vulgar Marxists” (Vulgärmarxisten), ences of fascism, state socialism, and consumer
that history is on the side of the working class capitalism.
and that the collapse of capitalism is inevitable. Horkheimer’s writings contain at least two
If anything, the absence or failure of socialist conceptions of emancipation: first, he
vehemently rejects the “bourgeois” conception depend” (305). Fourth, emancipation cannot
of emancipation based on individual liberty as be divorced from the paradoxical need both to
the supreme value of capitalist society (2004 accept and to reject the subject’s material deter-
[1947]: 13 and 92); second, he strongly sup- minacy (Bestimmtheit):
ports a “holistic” conception of emancipation He who asks what is the goal of an emanci-
aimed at “the deliverance of society from atom- pated society is given answers such as the ful-
ization, an atomization that may reach its peaks filment of human possibilities or the richness
in periods of collectivization and mass culture” of life. Just as the inevitable question is illegit-
(92). On this view, there is no individual eman- imate, so the repellent assurance of the
cipation without social transformation, that is, answer is inevitable … There is tenderness
the possibility of genuine self-realization is only in the coarsest demand: that no-one
inconceivable without the overthrow of the shall go hungry any more. Every other seeks
systemic structures leading to human atomiza- to apply to a condition that ought to be deter-
tion. In this sense, Horkheimer’s conception of mined by human needs, a mode of human
conduct adapted to production as an end in
emancipation goes beyond Marx’s paradigm
itself. (Adorno 1978 [1951]: 155–6)
of labor, for the former rejects the latter’s
productivist presupposition that the “working Finally, emancipation cannot be divorced from
subject” can be regarded as the civilizational the subject’s capacity to convert artistic experi-
cornerstone of society in general and of human ence into a source of social explosiveness
self-realization in particular. (Explosivität):
Similar to Horkheimer, Adorno is renowned The source of art’s power of resistance is that
for having little patience with both “bourgeois” a realized materialism would at the same time
and “orthodox Marxist” conceptions of eman- be the abolition of materialism, the abolition
cipation. Yet, despite his skepticism toward of the domination of material interests. In its
utopian blueprints, which may be considered powerlessness, art anticipates a spirit that
as deceptive expressions of “identity thinking” would only then step forth … A liberated
(1973 [1966]), he is willing to attribute a society would be beyond the irrationality of
number of positive meanings to the concept of its faux frais and beyond the ends-means-
emancipation in his writings. First, emancipa- rationality of utility. This is enciphered in art
tion derives from the subject’s assertion of and is the source of art’s social explosiveness.
(Adorno 1997 [1970]: 29 and 227)
autonomy (Mündigkeit): emancipation occurs
when the subject, “on the basis of its own Paradoxically, then, the realization of materi-
impulse, liberates itself from social convention alism is contingent upon the abolition of
and controls” (1997 [1970]: 231). Second, materialism.
emancipation can be brought about by the sub- One of Marcuse’s main concerns is the study
ject’s use of rationality (Vernunft): “rationality of the systemic elasticity and relative stability
would become rational only once it no longer of late capitalist society (1991 [1964]). Not only
repressed the individuated in whose unfolding has liberal democracy become the victorious
rationality has its right to exist” (1997 [1970]: political model and liberal capitalism the tri-
305); from this perspective, the establishment umphant economic system in most advanced
of “a reasonable order of the public world” societies, but the belief in the possibility of a
(305) is the precondition for the emergence of viable alternative appears to be largely discred-
an emancipatory society. Third, emancipation ited, both among an increasing number of left-
does not transcend but reaffirms the subject’s wing intellectuals and among ordinary
dependence upon society (Gesellschaftlichkeit): members of society, including the working
“the emancipation of the individual could suc- classes. How, Marcuse asks, can we criticize
ceed only to the extent that the individual relations of domination and claim to uncover
grasps the universal on which individuals the systemic forces leading to social alienation,
if most people not only consider the social both its critique of social domination and its
order in place to be legitimate but also seem to pursuit of social liberation can be justified.
enjoy actively participating in its reproduction? Paving the way for taking on the ambitious task
Why should we seek to emancipate those who of providing normative foundations for critical
do not want to be emancipated or consider theory, Habermas examines the concept of
themselves to be already emancipated when emancipation on three inter-related levels.
the satisfaction of the “false needs” created by First, on the epistemological level, the early
consumer capitalism “might be most gratifying Habermas distinguishes between three
to the individual” (1991 [1964]: 5)? knowledge-constitutive interests (1987 [1968]:
Of course, although it may be relatively simple 301–17), whose historical significance is
to pose these questions, it is extremely difficult reflected in the emergence of three spheres of
to respond to them in a persuasive manner. scientific activity: (i) the empirical-analytic sci-
Grappling with these questions, social commen- ences are driven by our technical cognitive
tators inspired by the writings of Marcuse share interest in controlling the world; (ii) the
one key assumption: if the comprehensive historical-hermeneutic sciences are guided by
integration of the working classes into the our practical cognitive interest in reaching
capitalist system is indicative of anything, it is communicatively mediated forms of under-
the elasticity and adaptability, rather than the standing about the world; and (iii) the critically
instability and illegitimacy, of liberal society. In oriented sciences articulate our emancipatory
his social diagnosis, Marcuse introduces the cognitive interest in liberating the human
concept of “enforced tolerance” (1991 [1964]: world from dependence on repressive forms of
226) to account for the fact that advanced power. In brief, human beings are purposive,
capitalist societies have unprecedented material communicative, and reflective entities capable
and ideological resources to assert their systemic of controlling, coordinating, and criticizing the
sovereignty and political legitimacy on the basis conditions of their existence.
of a seemingly limitless, but structurally con- Second, on the philosophical level, Habermas
fined, celebration of individual liberty. From a considers language to be the key anthropolog-
Marcusian perspective, newly emerging social ical force allowing for the construction of a
movements, including anti-authoritarian stu- symbolically mediated and normatively struc-
dent and peace movements, can play a pivotal tured world. “What raises us out of nature is
role in transforming behavioral, ideological, and the only thing whose nature we can know:
institutional patterns under capitalism, thereby language. Through its structure, autonomy and
subverting the total domination of the responsibility [Mündigkeit] are posited for us.
established order and contributing to the Our first sentence expresses unequivocally
construction of emancipatory life forms. the intention of universal and unconstrained
While Habermas has been criticized for consensus” (1987 [1968]: 314, emphasis original).
abandoning the radical spirit of early critical According to this contention, people’s commu-
theory, his writings demonstrate a firm com- nicative orientation toward reaching mutual
mitment to exploring the possibility of emanci- understanding (Verständigung) is the basis of
pation from established mechanisms of social their discursive ability to reach agreements
domination. In fact, as he asserts on a number (Einverständnisse) with one another. In fact,
of occasions, the central objective of his Habermas goes as far as to assert that the
“linguistic turn” is to provide normative foun- emancipatory potential of the human condition
dations for critical theory (1987 [1981a] and is built into the very structure of language: “in
1987 [1981b]). This undertaking is motivated every discourse we are mutually required to
by the assumption that any social theory presuppose an ideal speech situation,” in which
concerned with the possibility of human eman- communication is not impeded by external or
cipation needs to demonstrate on what grounds internal forces other than “the unforced force
of the better argument” and which, empowering potential inherent in modern
consequently, “excludes systematic distortion communicative processes is reflected in the
of communication” (2001 [1984]: 97). It is, in discursive challenges posed by social move-
other words, because our communicative com- ments. Their historical significance in shaping
petence equips us with a critical capacity that contemporary discourses of emancipation
we, as a species, have developed a “rational will shall be considered in the following section.
that allows itself to be determined by good
reasons” (2000: 328) and that puts us in the
Different Movements of Emancipation
privileged position of being able to claim
authorship for our personal and collective life Different movements of emancipation are
histories. In short, emancipation begins with aimed at different forms of transformation and
rational self-determination. opposed to different modes of domination.
Third, on the sociological level, Habermas The plurality of modern discourses of emanci-
conceives of the relationship between emanci- pation manifests itself in the multiplicity of
pation and domination in terms of the interplay normative agendas produced by different
between lifeworld and system (1987 [1981a] social movements with competing conceptions
and 1987 [1981b]). The empowering force of of emancipation: individual emancipation,
communicative reason is anchored in the life- social emancipation, political emancipation,
world, whereas the disempowering force of economic emancipation, cultural emancipa-
functionalist reason is imposed upon society tion, national emancipation, religious eman-
by the system. On this view, the lifeworld, due cipation, spiritual emancipation, sexual
to its predominantly communicative nature, is emancipation, and bodily emancipation – to
the cradle of social emancipation, while the mention only a few examples. In light of these
system, because of its instrumental nature, is multiple discourses, it is hardly possible to
the main structural source of social domina- attribute normative primacy to one particular
tion. Thus, according to Habermas, social life agenda of emancipation. Rather, we need to
is fundamentally shaped by two forms of ratio- face up to the fact that we live in a world of
nality: communicative rationality, which is inter-related, and to some extent interdepen-
oriented toward mutual understanding, and dent, systems of domination and struggles for
instrumental rationality, which is oriented emancipation.
toward success. The former is the main In contemporary political theory, it is gener-
symbolic resource of the lifeworld, in which we ally accepted that modern discourses of eman-
coordinate our actions by communicating with cipation cannot be separated from the
one another. The latter is the driving force of emergence of social movements (Scott 1990;
the system, which essentially consists of the Laraña, Johnston, & Gusfield 1994; della
state and the economy. The detrimental Porta & Mario Diani 2006 [1999]). Social move-
influence of the system manifests itself in the ments are widely regarded as potentially pow-
increasing bureaucratization and commodifi- erful actors capable of generating discourses of
cation of society, leading to the gradual colo- emancipation and thereby asserting themselves
nization of the lifeworld by the systemic as collective forces of political transformation.
imperatives of functionalist reason. Despite his Most social movements have five essential fea-
critical account of the pathological develop- tures. First, they are composed of individuals
ments caused by systemically steered modern- who share similar interests (collective interests):
ization processes, Habermas insists that the for instance, an interest in emancipation from
“necessary conditions of an emancipated form discrimination on ethnic, “racial,” religious,
of life” (2001 [1984]: 99) are built into the political, economic, or sexual grounds. Second,
communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld. they are held together by individuals who are
From this perspective, it appears that the united by a sense of common identity (collective
identity): for example, by a sense of identity social movements that have had a significant
defined in ethnic, “racial,” religious, political, impact on discourses of emancipation in the
socioeconomic, sexual, or gender-specific late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
terms. Third, they are created and sustained by Among the most significant of these move-
individuals who are both able and willing to ments are the following: environmentalist
mobilize themselves by virtue of collective movements, peace movements, antinuclear
forms of action (collective action): through movements, civil rights movements, human
violent or peaceful means, small-scale or rights movements, animal rights movements,
large-scale events, ephemeral or continuous gay and lesbian movements, indigenous move-
practices, physical or virtual gatherings. Fourth, ments, and antiglobalization movements. To be
they tend to be situated outside conventional sure, the emergence of “new” social move-
institutions, such as the state, thereby asserting ments does not necessarily mean that “old”
a sense of material and symbolic sovereignty social movements have disappeared or that
based on the experience of a shared reality “modern” political discourses can be consid-
(collective situation): notably, the experience of ered to be irrelevant in an era variously
ethnic, racialized, political, economic, and described as “late modernity,” “second moder-
gender-specific realities. Fifth, they aim to defend nity,” “reflexive modernity,” “postindustrial
or change society, or the position of a specific modernity,” and “postmodernity.” The rise of
group within it (collective project): in any case, “new” social movements indicates, however,
their projects are concerned with the material that the discourses of emancipation that
and symbolic construction of social reality. In emerged in early modern society are increas-
brief, members belonging to a particular social ingly competing with the diversified political
movement seek to emancipate themselves col- agendas of the late twentieth and early twenty-
lectively on the basis of shared interests, iden- first centuries.
tities, practices, realities, and projects. “Old” social movements (OSMs) and “new”
In the literature, it has become increasingly social movements (NSMs) can be compared
common to distinguish between “old” and and contrasted on a number of levels. (i)
“new” social movements. According to this Objectives: OSMs tend to aim at the transfor-
typology, we can identify at least six “old” mation of social order, whereas NSMs are pri-
social movements, all of which have had, and marily concerned with the alteration of social
con- tinue to have, a substantial impact on values and norms. (ii) Ideology: While OSMs
modern discourses of emancipation: (i) ethnic commonly subscribe to sets of universal
move- ments, which aim for the recognition values, NSMs tend to be rather diversified and
of a common culture, language, or history; (ii) normally lack ambitious agendas based on
“racial” movements, which either support or ideological metanarratives. (iii) Social base:
oppose social discrimination on “racial” OSMs are relatively homogeneous and largely
grounds; (iii) religious movements, whose monolithic, as their membership is commonly
members share a particular faith, expressed in defined by social determinants such as eth-
specific patterns of belonging and believing; nicity, “race,” religion, class, or gender. NSMs
(iv) suffrage movements, which struggle for the tend to be heterogeneous and hybrid, and
universal recognition of democratic and par- thus their members’ interests and practices
ticipatory rights; (v) class movements, which largely transcend sociostructural divisions.
seek to defend the collective interests of socio- (iv) Orientation: OSMs seek to engineer social
economically defined groups; and (vi) feminist transformations “from above” by conquering,
movements, which are opposed to sexual and or participating in, institutional forms of
gender-based forms of discrimination. political power. NSMs aim to bring about
In addition to these “classical” collective social change “from below” by mobilizing
actors, we can identify a large number of “new” the democratic forces of civil society.
(v) Organization: OSMs are not necessarily Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer, M. (1997 [1944/69])
hostile to the logic of formal, bureaucratic, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans.
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horizontal forms of collective deliberation.
Suhrkamp.
(vi) Power: OSMs tend to be “power-affirma-
Benjamin, W. (1972–89) Gesammelte Schriften, with
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seizure of, or at least the participation in, and H. Schweppenhäuser. Frankfurt am Main:
political power. NSMs tend to be “power- Suhrkamp.
skeptical” in the sense that their discourses della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006 [1999]) Social
and practices tend to be suspicious of Movements. An Introduction, 2nd ed. Oxford:
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exercised by the state. (vii) Context: OSMs Habermas, J. (1987 [1968]) Knowledge and Human
emerged in the context of “modern” or Interests, trans. J. J. Shapiro. Cambridge: Polity.
“industrial” society, arguably the age of ideo- Habermas, J. (1987 [1981a]) The Theory of
Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the
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Rationalization of Society, trans. T. McCarthy.
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To the extent that the political landscape of (2000) “From Kant to Hegel: On
advanced societies is shaped by “old” and Robert Brandom’s Pragmatic Philosophy of
“new” social movements, both the modern Language,” European Journal of Philosophy, 8 (3),
322–55.
quest for universal human emancipation
Habermas, J. (2001 [1984]) On the Pragmatics of
(“society-as-a-project”) and the postmodern
Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the
search for local and diversified realms of trans- Theory of Communicative Action, trans.
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the development of contemporary forms of Hegel, G. W. F. (1977 [1807]) Phenomenology of
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J. N. Findlay, Oxford: Clarendon.
SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–69); Hegel, G. W. F. (1990 [1825–6]) Lectures on the
Alienation; Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940); Critical History of Philosophy: The Lectures of 1825–1826,
Theory; Enlightenment, The; Habermas, Jürgen ed. R. F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M.
(1929–); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770– Stewart with H. S. Harris. Berkeley: University of
1831); Horkheimer, Max (1895–1973); Kant, California Press.
Immanuel (1724–1804); Marcuse, Herbert (1898– Heywood, A. (1994) Political Ideas and Concepts: An
1979); Marx, Karl (1818–83); Modernity; Power; Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–78); Social Horkheimer, M. (2004 [1947]) Eclipse of Reason, rev.
Movements ed. London: Continuum.
Kant, I. (1979 [1798]) The Conflict of the Faculties,
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