REPUBLIC VS.

VENTURA
G.R. NO. 125925, January 28, 1999
MARTINEZ, J.:

BUOD:
Si Venture Vinuya ay inihabla ng salang panggagahasa na naganap noong ika-24 ng Abril, 1995
sa 10-taong gulang na batang si Bonavi Reyes. Nang si Ventura ay iniharap sa Mababang
Hukuman para litisin ay itinanggi niya ang bintang na panggagahasa, kayat ang habla laban sa
kanya ay sinimulang dinggin. Habang patuloy ang pag-dinig ng usapin, si Ventura, kasama ang
dalawang manananggol na itinalaga ng Mababang Hukuman para sa kanya, ay nagpahiwatig na
nais niyang palitan ang kanyang tugong pagtanggi ng tugong pag-amin sa salang isinampa. Nang
sumunod na mga araw ng pagdinig ay inihayag ng mga manananggol ni Ventura na sa kabila ng
kanilang pagpaliwanag sa kanya kung ano ang maaring mangyari, ay handa pa rin siyang
panindigan na aminin ang nasabing bintang.

Dahil dito ay nagpalabas ang Mababang Hukuman ng Kapasyahan na si Ventura ay nagkasala ng

pang-gagahasa sa nabanggit na bata, hinatulang magdusang kaparusahang reclusion perpetua at
magbayad ng halagang tatlumpong libong piso (P30,000.00) sa bata. Mula sa naturang
kapasyahan ay isinampa ni Ventura ang paghahabol sa Kataas-taasang Hukuman, kung kaya
ipinag-utos ng Mababang Hukuman na isalin ang mga papeles ng usapin, kaya nga lamang ay sa
Hukuman ng Paghahabol (Court of Appeals).

Sa Hukumang ito ay humiling ang manananggol ni Ventura na muling ibalik sa Mababang

Hukuman ang usapin sa kadahilang hiniling nila sa huling Hukumang nabanggit na (a) payagan
si Ventura na palitang muli ang kanyang tugon na pag-amin sa pang-gagahasa; (b) ipawalang-
bisa ang kapasyahan ng Mababang Hukuman; at (k) muling itakda ang pre-trial at plea
bargaining. Ang usaping ito, ay humikayat para muling paluwagin ang pamamaraang itinadhana
ng Kataas-taasang Hukuman.

USAPIN:
Papayagan ba o hindi na muling ibalik sa mababang hukuman ang pagpaptuloy ng pagdinig sa
usapin ayon sa itinatadhana ng mga Alituntunin ng Hukuman.

PAGPAPASYA:
Oo.

Marapat sanang sinuri nang Mababang Hukuman at tinanong ang mga tagapagtanggol ni Ventura
- at hindi lamang si Ventura - para tiyakin na malinaw na naipaliwanag sa nasasakdal ang
kahihinatnan ng kanyang pag-amin. Datapuwat ang pamamaraang ito ay wala sa mga
Alituntunin, ang isang Hukom ay hindi dapat mag-pasya nang ayon lamang sa kung ano ang
sinasaad sa batas kundi kung ano ang nararapat. Ito ay hindi ginawa ng Mababang Hukuman.
Totoong kahindik-hindik ang salang pang-gagahasa lalo na kapag bata ang biktima, subalit ang
nasasakdal, maging sino man siya, ay may mga karapatang pantao, tulad ng kaukulang pag-
dinig, na dapat igalang ayon sa itinatadhana ng Saligang-Batas. Kaya papapayagan na ibalik ang
usapin sa Mababang Hukuman, hindi para muling umpisahan ang usapin, kundi ituloy na lamang
ang natigil na paglalahad ng Taga-usig ng mga patunay bago palitan ni Ventura ang kanyang
tugon na aminin ang bintang. Ito'y batay na rin sa karapatang mabilis na paglitis ng usapin na
itinatadhana hindi lamang ng Saligang-Batas 22 kundi ganoon din ng "Speedy Trial Act of 1998"
sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. 8493 at Supreme Court Circular 38-98." 23.

Ipinag-uutos ng Hukuman na ibalik ang usaping ito sa Mababang Hukuman para ipagpatuloy ang
napigil na paglalahad ng Taga-usig o nagsasakdal ang kanilang mga patunay at ituloy ang
pagdinig sa usapin ayon sa itinatadhana ng mga Alituntunin ng Hukuman.
IMBONG VS. OCHOA
G.R. NO. 204819, April 8, 2014
EN BANC

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its
decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and
on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their
personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution,
and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
 (9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny
C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf
of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member
of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation
Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of
its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation,
Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a

citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY), an

accredited political party.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law is unconstitutional.

RULLING:
Not Unconstitutional
The Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is
as enacted by the lawmaking body. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom
of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of
this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular
law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out
the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation
and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly,
must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking
body.

The petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been herein declared as constitutional.
ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge
Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in
said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to
twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner and is a
resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.5

Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor who stated that "there is no truth as to the veracity of
the allegation" and challenged Estrada to "appear in the open and prove his allegation in the
proper forum."6 Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference on October 12, 2000.

The preliminary conference proceeded with both Estrada and Escritor in attendance. Estrada
confirmed that he filed the letter-complaint for immorality against Escritor because in his
frequent visits to the Hall of Justice of Las Piñas City, he learned from conversations therein that
Escritor was living with a man not her husband and that she had an eighteen to twenty-year old
son by this man.

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,8 she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness,".

Judge Caoibes endorsed the complaint to Executive Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., who, in
turn, endorsed the same to Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. On July 17, 2001, the
Court, upon recommendation of Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, directed
Escritor to comment on the charge against her.

Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the case be referred to
Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas City for investigation,
report and recommendation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of religious freedom is valid.

RULING:
The respondent's claim of religious freedom to the "compelling state interest" test from a
benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to religious
freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her
defense of religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating
a more compelling state interest. In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent's
right to religious freedom has been burdened. Second is to ascertain respondent's sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not
merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality.

To properly settle the issue of this case, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent's stance
that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free
exercise protection. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an
opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state's compelling interest which can
override respondent's religious belief and practice.

The case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
EBRALINAG VS. THE DIVISION SUPERENTNDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
EN BANC

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in
all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:

Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which
shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine
National anthem.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to
be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein
provided.

Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in
accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper
notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to
public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in
a newspaper of general circulation.

In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who
refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic
pledge.

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions for
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to
free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. The petitioners
pray that:

c. Judgment be rendered:

i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners
from their respective schools;

ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their
classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-
admission of petitioners to their respective schools.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955
violates
rights to religious freedom.

RULING:
No.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creature. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a
threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.

The Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse
to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by
the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent.