THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897

The General Clauses Act, 1897 caters the need of unification of terms by giving some
predefined notions, avoids superfluity in drafting and shortens the language of legislature.
There are many instances where these definitions have been aptly subscribed by the
interpreters when either there is no definition in the concerned legislation or the definition
contained therein is not in a position to address correctly the issue involved in the dispute. It
is an instrumental or accessory legislation because it helps to interpret other statute and its
construction. When the concerned statute failed to give meaning to any particular term, this
act is used to derive appropriate meaning to the term. It deals with basic rules of construction
and some pre-determined definitions.

For example- The term Person in the Indian Contract Act empowers company to enter
contract through the interpretation of term 'Person' in the General Clauses Act, 1897 which
includes company.

OBJECT, PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE

The General Clauses Act is very effective in the absence of clear definition in the specific
enactments and where there is a conflict between the pre-constitutional laws and post-
constitutional laws. The Act gives a clear suggestion for the conflicting provisions and
differentiates the legislation according to the commencement and enforcement to avoid
uncertainty. Some of the major objects are as follows-

1. To shorten the language of Central Acts by defining all the legal words used in generality.

2. To provide to the maximum extent possible the uniformity of expression in various

Central acts by giving definition of a series of term which commonly used.

3. It is a legislation which is mainly used to avoid confusion in different statutes for the

meaning of any term

4. One of the major object of the statute is to avoid confusion among various other

legislation

5. It aims at enhancing coherence among various related laws.

6. It also deals with pinking of the notions in a similar set of laws having same subject

matter
7. The general clauses act also serves as role model for various state laws.

Purpose- The main purpose of the act is to place in one single statute different provisions

with respect to interpretation of words and legal principle which would otherwise have to be

e specified in in many different acts and regulations. In the case of Chief Inspector of Mine

v Karam Chand Thapar, the Court explains the purpose of general clauses act which is

mainly to avoid superfluity of language in statute whenever this possible to do so.

Importance

 The Act applies to all the Central Acts.

 It seeks to introduce the certainty in the application of law and it has been called as "Law

of all Laws"

Wherever the law provides that court will have the power to appoint, suspend or remove a

receiver, the legislature simply enacted that wherever convenient the court may appoint

receiver and it was implied within that language that it may also remove or suspend him.

(Rayarappan V. Madhavi Amma, A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140)

IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS UNDER GENERAL CLAUSES ACT

A. "Act" [Section 3(2)]: 'Act', used with reference to an offence or a civil wrong, shall

include a series of acts, and words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal

omissions;

This term is based on Indian Penal Code sections 32 and 33 and relates to both civil and

criminal wrongdoings. The term 'act' encompasses both legal and criminal omissions, but it

excludes non-legal omissions. Because it is only activated when liability is created, the

definition is limited.
Illustration- The act "by which A causes Z's death" in the illustration to section 36 of the

Indian Penal Code consists of a sequence of acts, namely, the blows administered while

beating him, and a series of illegal omissions, namely, wrongly failing or refusing to feed him

with food at appropriate times. Every omission, however, is not an unlawful omission.

Case Law- Failure of the municipality to discharge its liability under the provisions of the

Ajmer-Merwara Municipalities Regulation 1925, as noted by the Supreme Court in

Amalgamated Electricity Co. Belgaum Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Ajmer, will not

ordinarily become an illegal omission because it does not entail penal consequences for the

public official responsible.

For definition of word "Illegal" see section 43, Indian Penal Code, 1860. Omissions to come

within the definition of "act" should be illegal omissions. . Before an omission can be

considered as illegal on the part of an official, it must be shown that the official concerned

had omitted to discharge some official duty imposed on him in public interest. The omission

in question must have a positive content in it. In other words, the non-discharge of that must

amount to an illegality. 13. The term "act" in the context of liability is used in a very wide

sense, meaning "any event which is subject to the control of the human will",. and includes

both positive and negative acts, i.e., "acts of commission or acts of omission".. There are

three constituents of every act: "(1) Its origin in some mental bodily activity of the doer, (2)

its circumstances, and (3) its consequences

B. Affidavit (Section 3(3)) shall include affirmation and declaration in the case of persons
by law allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing.

There are two important points derived from the above definition:

a. Affirmation and declaration,

b. In case of persons allowed affirming or declaring instead of swearing.

The above definition is inclusive in nature. It states that Affidavit shall include affirmation
and declarations. This definition does not define affidavit. However, we can understand this
term in general parlance. Affidavit is a written statement confirmed by oath or affirmation for
use as evidence in Court or before any authority.

In order to be valid, an affidavit must be sworn before, and not simply attested by, a judicial
officer. If it is not so sworn it ceases to be an affidavit of the signatory.

C. Document” [Section 3(18)] : ‘Document’ shall include any matter written, expressed or
described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one
of those means which is intended to be used or which may be used, for the purpose or
recording that matter.

Thus, the term Document includes any substance upon which any matter is written or
expressed by means of letters or figures for recording that matter.

For example, book, file, painting, inscription and even computer files are all documents. Even
in the fictious case of Board of Inland Revenue v Haddock (also known as the negotiable
cow) it was held that the negotiable instrument written on the back of a cow is a document.

This definition was taken from section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; but "shall
include" was substituted for the word "means". The words "which is" were inserted and the
word "written" was added at the Select Committee stage to incorporate the definition of
writing (clause 65) and thereby include printing, lithography and photography. See also s. 29
of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 29 of the Indian Penal Code defines the word "document" in the following terms:
"Document" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of
letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which
may be used, as evidence of that matter."

D. “Good Faith” [Section 3(22)] : A thing shall be deemed to be done in “good faith”
where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not;

The question of good faith under the General Clauses Act is one of fact. It is to determine
with reference to the circumstances of each case. The term “Good faith” has been defined
differently in different enactments. This definition of the good faith does not apply to that
enactment which contains a special definition of the term “good faith” and there the
definition given in that particular enactment has to be followed. This definition may be
applied only if there is nothing repugnant in subject or context, and if that is so, the definition
is not applicable. In Maung Aung Pu Vs. Maung Si Maung, it was pointed out that the
expression “good faith” is not defined in the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the definition
given here in the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not expressly apply the term on the Indian
Contract Act. The definition of good faith as is generally understood in the civil law and
which may taken as a practical guide in understanding the expression in the contract Act is
that nothing is said to be done in good faith which is done without due care and attention as is
expected with a man of ordinary prudence. An honest purchase made carelessly without
making proper enquiries cannot be said to have been made in good faith so as to convey good
title.

See section 52, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 2(h), Limitation Act, 1963 which also
define "good faith". Within the definitions under these statutes absence of "due care and
attention" is destructive of good faith; whereas, as defined in the General Clauses Act "good
faith" may exist in spite of negligence. 37. The latter definition is thus equitable and more
reasonable and recognizes as good law, what is after all good sense, that "a careless man is
not dishonest man and no amount of argument will prove that he is one". 38. But when a
person is aware of possible harm and acts in spite of it, his action is reckless and in the eye of
law mala fide.

E. Immovable Property” [Section 3(26)] : ‘Immovable Property’ shall include:

i. Land,
ii. Benefits to arise out of land, and
iii. Things attached to the earth, or
iv. Permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

It is an inclusive definition. It contains four elements: land, benefits to arise out of land,
things attached to the earth and things permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.
Where, in any enactment, the definition of immovable property is in the negative and not
exhaustive, the definition as given in the General Clauses Act will apply to the expression
given in that enactment.

Apart from the General Clauses Act, the expression "immovable property" finds a place in
the Sale of Goods Act, the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act. But it is
nowhere precisely defined since the definitions in all those Acts do not say what exactly
immovable property means. They only specify what is included or not included therein.

In the absence of a special definition, the general definition must prevail. Two tests are
necessary to determine when things attached or annexed to the earth become immovable
property under the Act, (1) the degree or mode of annexation and (2) the object of annexation
and of these two, the latter, which is more important, depends upon the circumstances of each
case. An agreement to convey forest produce like tendu leaves, timber bamboos etc., the soil
for making bricks, the right to build on and occupy the land for business purposes and the
right to grow new trees and to get leaves from trees that grow in further are all included in the
term immovable property. Insurance policies covering immovable properties have been held
to be movable property since the definition of immovable property in the Act does not cover
insurance policies. A sale of right to catch and carry away fish, being a "profit a prendre' is a
profit or benefit arising out of land, and so has to be regarded as immovable property within
the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, read in the light of s.3 (26) of the General
Clauses Act.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

A. “Coming into operation of enactment” [Section 5]: Where any Central Act has not
specifically mentioned a particular date to come into force, it shall be implemented on the
day on which it receives the assent of the Governor General in case of a Central Acts
made before the commencement of the Indian Constitution and/or, of the President in
case of an Act of Parliament.

Example : The Companies Act, 2013 received assent of President of India on 29 th August,
2013 and was notified in Official Gazette on 30th August, 2013 with the enforcement of
section 1 of the Act. Accordingly, the Companies Act, 2013 came into enforcement on the
date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Where, if any specific date of enforcement is prescribed in the Official Gazette, Act shall
come into enforcement from such date.

Example: SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) (Fifth Amendment)

Regulations, 2015 was issued by SEBI vide Notification dated 14 th August, 2015 with effect
from 1 January, 2016. Here, this regulation shall come into enforcement on 1 st January, 2016
rather than the date of its notification in the gazette.
In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mahesh Narain, AIR 2013 SC 1778, Supreme
Court held that Effective date of Rules would be when the Rules are published vide Gazette
notification and not from date when the Rules were under preparation.

B. “Effect of Repeal” [Section 6]: Where any Central legislation or any regulation made
after the commencement of this Act repeals any Act made or yet to be made, unless
another purpose exists, the repeal shall not:
 Revive anything not enforced or prevailed during the period at which repeal is effected
or;
 Affect the prior management of any legislation that is repealed
or anything performed or undergone or;
 Affect any claim, privilege, responsibility or debt obtained, ensued or sustained under

any legislation so repealed or;

 Affect any punishment, forfeiture or penalty sustained with regard to any offence
committed as opposed to any legislation or
 Affect any inquiry, litigation or remedy with regard to such claim, privilege, debt or
responsibility or any inquiry, litigation or remedy may be initiated, continued or insisted.
 In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hirendra Pal Singh, (2011), 5 SCC 305, SC held that
whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. Object of
repeal is to obliterate the Act from statutory books, except for certain purposes as
provided under Section 6 of the Act.
 In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. V, Union of India, AIR 2000, SC 811, Supreme
Court held that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions and applies when
the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a Rule.
 In Navrangpura Gam Dharmada Milkat Trust v. Rmtuji Ramaji, AIR 1994 Guj 75:
‘Repeal’ of provision is in distinction from ‘deletion’ of provision. ‘Repeal’ ordinarily
brings about complete obliteration of the provision as if it never existed, thereby affecting
all incoherent rights and all causes of action related to the ‘repealed’ provision while
‘deletion’ ordinarily takes effect from the date of legislature affecting the said deletion,
never to effect total effecting or wiping out of the provision as if it never existed. For the
purpose of this section, the above distinction between the two is essential.
C. “Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation” [Section 6A]-
Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals
 any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the
express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then unless a different intention
appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the
enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.
D. “Revival of repealed enactments” [Section 7]- (1) In any Central Act or Regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be necessary, for the purpose of
reviving, either wholly or partially, any enactment wholly or partially repealed, expressed
to state that purpose.

(2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1968
and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.

E. Construction of references to repealed enactments” [Section 8]- (1) Where this Act or
Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-
enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then
references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall,
unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-
enacted.

(2) Where before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, any Act of Parliament of the United
Kingdom repealed and re-enacted, with or without modification, any provision of a
former enactment, then reference in any Central Act or in any Regulation or instrument to
the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as
references to the provision so re-enacted.

 In Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 169, it was held that every Act
has its own distinction. If a later Act merely makes a reference to a former Act or existing
law, it is only by reference and all amendments, repeals new law subsequently made will
have effect unless its operation is saved by the relevant provision of the section of the
Act.
 Example: In section 115 JB of the Income tax Act, 1961, for calculation of book profits,
the Companies Act, 1956 are required to be referred. With the advent of Companies Act,
2013, the corresponding change has not been made made in section 115 JB of the Income
tax Act, 1961. On referring of section 8 of the General Clauses Act, book profits to be
calculated under section 115 JB of the Income Tax Act will be as per the Companies Act,
2013.
F. “Commencement and termination of time” [Section 9]: In any legislation or
regulation, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days
or any other period of time to use the word “from” and for the purpose of including the
last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”.

Example: If a company declares dividend for its shareholder in its Annual General Meeting
held on 30/09/2016. Under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, company is required
to pay declared dividend within 30 days from the date of declaration i.e. from 01/10/2016 to
30/10/2016. In this series of 30 days, 30/09/2016 will be excluded and last 30 th day i.e.
30/10/2016 will be included.

G. “Computation of time” [Section 10]: Where by any legislation or regulation, any act or
proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any court or office on a certain
day or within a prescribed period then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or last
day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in
due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is
open.

In K. Soosalrathnam v. Div. Engineer, N.H.C. Tirunelveli, it was held by Madras High

Court that since the last date of the prescribed period was subsequent to the date of
notification, declared to be a holiday on the basis of the principles laid down in this section
the last date of prescribed period for obtaining the tender schedules was extended to the next
working day.

H. “Measurement of Distances” [Section 11]: In the measurement of any distance, for the
purposes of any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, that
distance shall, unless a different intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a
horizontal plane.

I. “Duty to be taken pro rata in enactments” [Section 12] : Where, by any enactment
now in force or hereafter to be in force, any duty of customs or excise or in the nature
thereof, is leviable on any given quantity, by weight, measure or value of any goods or
merchandise, then a like duty is leviable according to the same rate on any greater or less
quantity.

J. “Gender and number ” [Section 13] : In all legislations and regulations, unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context-
 (1) Words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females, and

(2) Words in singular shall include the plural and vice versa.

TOPIC- FUNDAMENTALRIGHTS AND JUDICIAL CREATIVITY

JUDICIAL CREATIVITY

“Judicial Creativity”, if defined purely on the basis of terminology, is a process where judges
use their ability to produce something new, using their skill or imagination. While it is true
that imagination is not bound by the reigns of rules or doctrines, the manifestation of the
same can however be controlled and is in fact essential when it comes to judges. A judge’s
role is to interpret laws however the very essence of the word ‘creativity’ requires the
formation of something new or unknown which goes beyond the scope of interpretation.
Therefore, the true definition of the phrase “Judicial Creativity” not only encompasses the
empowerment of a judge but also attaches a reasonable limitation which is integral to
maintaining equilibrium, keeping in mind the Doctrine of Separation of Powers. To elaborate,
judicial creativity can be defined as the fluid part of the law, where the court develops a
creative thought process to assign a new meaning to the text, however while remaining
cautiously consistent with the context or the true spirit of the law. This true spirit of law thus
acts as compass which helps judges in navigating the waters of their inner creativity.

Therefore, creativity that is expressed by the judges while interpreting any legislation which
is not exactly present in the black letters of law is known as judicial creativity. It is an
evolutionary concept which changes as per the needs of the society.

For example various meaning of meaning and interpretation of the legislation and its specific
words came with the judicial creativity like the meaning of secularism was actually
highlighted in the case of S R Bommai v. Union of India. Similarly the doctrine of eclipse
also came through case law.

CREATION OF NEW FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS THROUGH JUDICIAL CREATIVITY

The chapter on Fundamental Rights, contained in Part III of the Indian Constitution, was not
incorporated as a popular concession to international sentiment prevalent after the conclusion
of the Second World War. It was the ardent desire and persistent demand of our freedom
fighters and Founding Fathers that a future Constitution of India should contain a guarantee
of fundamental entitlements for the people of India.
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution broadly fall into certain
categories. Articles 14 to 16 confer the right to equality in its several manifestations and
prohibit discrimination on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
Article 19 guarantees basic freedoms such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of
peaceful assembly; freedom to form associations or unions; freedom to move freely and
reside and settle in any part of India; and freedom to practice and profess one’s religion, or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business. Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, which guaranteed
property rights were deleted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth) Amendment Act, 1978, with
effect from June 20, 1979. Article 20 provides constitutional guarantees against retrospective
criminal laws, double jeopardy and self-incrimination. Article 21 provides that no person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by
law. Articles 23 and 24 provide for guarantee against exploitation such as traffic in human
beings and forced labor. Articles 25 to 28 deal with freedom of conscience and freedom of
religion. Articles 29 and 30 guarantee rights of the minorities to conserve their language,
script and culture and to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice

A. Interpreting the Preamble of the Constitution

The preamble of the Constitution though not operative but serves various purposes like
highlighting the meaning and object of the Constitution and also indicates the source of the
constitution. In the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Words such as sovereign,
socialist, secular, democratic etc. are used in the constitution, however, no meaning is
provided for the same. Since English language is not accurate, these words can also be used
differently in different circumstances. It is only through constitutional creativity that the
meaning of words like secular has been made certain.

B. Concept of Equality

The concept of equality enshrined in Part III of the Constitution has ever been a matter of
judicial discourse. The Court had occasion to have a thorough excursus into the concept of
equality contained in Article l4 when in the various instances the right to equality was alleged
to have been violated by State action. The concept of equality means equal treatment of
equals and unequal treatment of unequal. Hence, right to equality is violated when there is
discrimination among persons who are equally placed. The fundamental right to equality is
violated when the State discriminates individuals who are equally posited.
The Supreme Court recognized the need to concentrate on the content of the concept of
equality. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court observed the concept should not
be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. The Court observed that the
concept of equality envisaged by Article 14 is a dynamic one with many aspects and
dimensions. The concept of equality cannot therefore be “cribbed, cabined and confined”
within traditional and doctrinaire limits.

Illustration-

One of the most creative attempts of the Court in this respect is found in the matter of
protection of the interests of employees. It is well established that payment of wages to
workers is correlated to the volume and nature of work undertaken by them. If the power,
duty, responsibility and functions of different persons are similar, they all should be paid on
par. There cannot be differential treatment between and among them. Or, in other words,
discrimination among employees who have same responsibility and duty under an employer
for purposes of payment of wages would be violative of the concept of equality. However,
this aspect of equality has not been explicitly covered by Article 14, or Article 16(1).” The
Supreme Court had occasion to deal with that issue in Randhir Singh v. Union of India, the
Court observed that though not a fundamental right, without the right to equal pay for equal
work, the concept of equality as a fundamental right would be meaningless while dealing
with the plea of equal pay for equal work.

C. Concept of Freedom under Article 19

Freedom of the press has been judicially described as the ‘Ark of the Covenant of
Democracy’, and as one of the most precious freedoms in a democratic state. Our Supreme
Court in more than one decision has deduced freedom of the press from Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution on the premise that it is implicit in the said guarantee. Thus, by creative
judicial interpretation, freedom of the press has been given the constitutional status of a
fundamental right in our Constitution.

The Supreme Court in its landmark decision in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India ruled
that freedom of the press cannot be curtailed, unlike the freedom to carry on business, in the
interest of the general public. The only restrictions which may be imposed are those which
clause (2) of Article 19 permits and no other.
In another celebrated decision, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, the Supreme
Court came to the rescue of the press. It held that the Freedom of the Press entitles
newspapers to decide the volume of circulation, and freedom lies both in circulation and in
content.

D. Concept of Life Under Article 21

Another aspect of construction of the fundamental rights in which the Court exhibited
creative response was the interpretation of the concept of right to life contained in Article 21.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, inaugurated a new era in understanding the concepts in
Part III, especially Article 21. As a result of the decision in Maneka Gandhi, the Court was
able to figure out new concepts in fundamental rights. In Maneka Gandhi, the Court held that
fundamental rights were not distinct and mutually exclusive and that legislative and executive
acts should satisfy the test of validity under different Articles.

The ever-expanding scope of Article 21 is the result of judicial creativity itself. Article 21 not
only envisages right to life and personal liberty but has enshrined rights such as Right to
Livelihood in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. Judicial creativity
is an art which requires a creative approach by the judges and it is only possible when
evolution is diffused with creativity in order to give life to the provisions of the constitution
like the Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar which recognized the Right to Speedy Trial
under the Article 21 of the Constitution. In the case of Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, Observing the fundamental right to get their life breath from directive principles,
the majority of a constitutional bench consisting of five Judges held that the concept of right
to life in Article 21 should be explained and understood in the light of what is contained in
directive principles. The Court concluded that right to education was implicit in the right to
life under Article 21.

For making Article 21 of contemporary relevance, in the case of Peoples Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India, the Court relied on the directive contained in Article 51(c) and
used it as a device to read the right to privacy contained in the international covenants into
the fundamental right in Article 21 of the Constitution. The innovative creativity of the
decision lies not in reading privacy as an ingredient of right to life, for, it already had found a
place in the concept of right to personal liberty under Article 21 by virtue of judicial
decisions It, on the other hand, lies in using the directive principles contained in Article 51 to
give the Article 21 the contents of international covenant.
E. CONCLUSION

In many instances, inaction on the part of the State led to denial of social and economic
justice to the people. The Court realized that without timely implementation of the directives,
fundamental rights would become empty promises. It may be in such a context that the Court
began to read the contents of Part IV into the provisions of Part III. In other words, it is the
inaction of the legislature and the executive that led to the judicial process of implementing
directive principles in the form of fundamental rights. Even if the State had taken timely
action to implement directive principles, through legislative and executive measures, they
would have remained mere statutory rights which require a lengthy process for enforcement.
But their incorporation into the fundamental rights by the judiciary paved the way to a
situation in which they became enforceable as fundamental rights under Article 32.

TOPIC- RULES OF INTERPRETATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. Governmental power has been divided
into three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of
statues to render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to
interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute. By interpretation one means
the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through a
medium of authoritative forms. Thus, it is a mechanism by way of which the real meaning of
an act and the intention of the legislature is ascertained.

Interpretation can be done by way of basic logical rules (which are rules that are reasonable)
and basic principles of law (which include justice, equity and good conscience). In the case of
Chandrima Das v. Railway Authorities, right to life was interpreted. Another instance is that
of the Motor Vehicles Act, wherein ‘no fault liability’ which is to say that in the first instance
compensation is paid.

The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in
a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim “A
Verbislegis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the statute
while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of
the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi Swarup Sarkar
V Pradeep Kumar Sarkar, the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of
the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred.

B. PRIMARY RULES OF INTERPRETATION

I. LITERAL RULE

It means that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language of the
statute unless a statute explicitly defines some of its terms otherwise. In other words, the law
must be read, word for word, and it should not divert from its true meaning.

A statue often contains a "definitions" section, which explicitly defines the most important
terms used in that statute. However, some statutes omit a definition section entirely or fail to
define a particular term. The literal rule, which is also known as the plain meaning rule,
attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term not defined
by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.

According to this rule, when a word does not contain any definition in a statute, it must be
given its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning. If the word is clear, it must be applied, even
though the intention of the legislature may have been different or the result is harsh or
undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of what the law means. This is the
oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges are not
supposed to legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the
equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal wording.

When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning,
no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. The meaning must
be collected from the expressed intention of the legislature (State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand,
AIR 1963 SC 946). A word which has a definite and clear meaning should be interpreted
with that meaning only, irrespective of its consequences.

Sometimes, occasions may arise when a choice has to be made between two interpretations –
one narrower and the other wider or bolder. In such a situation, if the narrower interpretation
would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, one should rather adopt the
wider one.

For example, when we talk of disclosure of the nature of concern or interest, financial or
otherwise’ of a director or the manager of a company in the subject matter of a proposed
motion (as referred to in section 102 of the Companies Act, 2013), we have to interpret in its
broader sense that any concern or interest containing any information and facts that may
enable members to understand the meaning, scope and implications of the items of business
and to take decision thereon. Whatever, What is required is a full and frank disclosure
without reservation or suppression, as, for instance where a son or daughter or father or
mother or brother or sister is concerned in any contract or matter, the shareholders ought
fairly to be informed of it and the material facts disclosed to them. Here a restricted narrow
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the disclosure.

Words used in the popular sense: It dealing with mattes regarding the general public,
statute are presumed to use words in their popular sense. But to deal with particular business
or transaction, words are presumed to be used with the particular meaning in which they are
used and understood in the particular business. However, words in statutes are generally
construed in their popular meaning and not in their technical meaning.

It is the general rule that omissions are not likely to be inferred. From this it brings another
rule that nothing is to be added to or taken away from a statute unless there are some
adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it
omitted to express. “It is a wrong thing to add into an Act of Parliament words which are not
there and, in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do.” If a case has not been
provided for in a statute. It is not to be dealt with merely because there seems to be no good
reason why it should have been omitted, and the omission appears to be consequentially
unintentional.

Reasonable corrections are not to over-ride plain terms of a statute. A construction that
will render ineffective any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.

For example, if an Act plainly gave a right of appeal from one Court of Quarter Sessions to
another, it was held that such a provision though extraordinary and perhaps an oversight
could not be eliminated.

This Rule of literal interpretation can be read and understood under the following headings:
1. Natural and grammatical meaning: Statutes are to be first understood in their natural,
ordinary, or popular sense and must be construed according to their plain, literal and
grammatical meaning. If there is an inconsistency with any express intention or declared
purpose of the statute, or it involves any absurdity, repugnancy, inconsistency, the
 grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged only to avoid such an
inconvenience, but no further. [(State of HP v. Pawan Kumar(2005)]

Example:

In a question before the court whether the sale of betel leaves was subject to sales tax. In
this matter SC held that betel leaves could not be given the dictionary, technical or
botanical meaning when the ordinary and natural meaning is clear and unambiguous.
Being the word of everyday use it must be understood in its popular sense by which people
are conversant with it as also the meaning which the statute dealing with the matter would
attribute to it. Therefore, the sale of betel leaves was liable to sale tax. (Ramavtar V.
Assistant Sales Tax Officer,)

2. Explanation of the Rule: When it is said that words are to be understood first in their
natural, ordinary or popular sense, it is meant that the words must be qualified that
natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter
with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the statute. The
meaning of a word depends upon its text and context. In the construction of statutes, the
context means the statute as a whole and other statute in pari materia (where two
enactments have common purpose in an analogous case).

Example:

In construing of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957, the words
“Livestock” means all domestic animals will not include ‘chicks’ construing in the popular
sense although in literal sense animal refers to any and every animate object as distinct
from inanimate object. (Royal Hatcheries Pvt. Ltd v. State of AP, AIR 1994 SC 666)

3. Exact meaning preferred to lose meaning: This is the another point regarding the rule of
literal construction that exact meaning is preferred to lose meaning in an Act of
Parliament. As every word has a secondary meaning too. Therefore, in applying this rule
one should be careful not to mix up the secondary meaning with the loose meaning.
Wherever the secondary meaning points to that meaning which statute meant, preference
should be given to that secondary meaning.

Example:
 Word ‘obtain ’in it general sense means some request or effort to acquire or get something
but its secondary meaning is to acquire or get without any qualification and if in a statute
the secondary meaning is preferred, it cannot be said that preference has been given to lose
meaning.

4. Technical words in technical sense: This point of literal construction is that technical words
are understood in the technical sense only.

Example,

In construing of word ‘practice’ in Supreme Court Advocates Act, 1951, it was observed
that practice of law generally involves the exercise of both the functions of acting and
pleading on behalf of a litigant party. When legislature confers upon an advocate the right
to practice in a court, it is legitimate to understand that expression as authorizing him to
appear and plead as well as to act on behalf of suitors in that court.(Ashwini Kumar Ghose
V. Arabinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369)

2. Mischief Rule

This rule attempts to determine the legislator's intention. Originating from a 16th century case
in the United Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute
in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
The rule was explained in the case of Smith vs. Hughes.

The mischief rule is used by judges in statutory interpretation in order to discover

legislature’s intention. It essentially asks the question – By creating an Act of Parliament
what was the "mischief" that the previous or existing law did not cover and this act covers.
This rule was developed by Lord Coke in Sir John Heydon's Case, 1584, where it was stated
that there were four points to be taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:

1. What was the common law before the making of the act?
2. What was the mischief or defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule
as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. Legislative intent is determined
by examining secondary sources such as committee reports, treaties, law review articles and
corresponding statutes.

The rule was further illustrated in the case of Smith v Hughes, where under the Street
Offences Act 1959, it was a crime for prostitutes to "loiter or solicit in the street for the
purposes of prostitution". The defendants were calling to men in the street from balconies and
tapping on windows. They claimed they were not guilty as they were not in the "street." The
judge applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the
intention of the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.

The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which ‘shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy.’

Therefore, even in a case where the usual meaning of the language used falls short of the
whole object of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to the words,
provided they are fairly susceptible of it. If, however, the circumstances show that the
phraseology in the Act is used in a larger sense than its ordinary meaning then that sense may
be given to it. If the object of a statute is public safety then its working must be interpreted
widely to give effect to that object. Thus, the legislature having intended, while passing the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 that every workman in the prescribed trade should be
entitled to compensation, it was held that the Act ought to be so construed, as far as possible,
as to give effect to its primary provisions.

Example, a statute which requires notice of action for anything done, are to be construed as
including an omission of an act which ought to be done as well as the commission of a
wrongful act. Where a statute requires something to be done by a person, it would generally
be sufficient compliance with it if the thing is done by another person on his behalf and by his
authority, for it would be presumed that the statute does not intend to prevent the application
of the general principle of law: ‘qui facit per alium facit per se’ (he who acts though another
is deemed to act in person).This would be so unless there is something in either the language
or the object of the statute which shows that personal act alone was intended.

However, it has been emphasized by the Supreme Court that the rule in Heydon’s case is
applicable only when the words used are ambiguous and are reasonably capable of more than
one meaning (CIT vs. Sodra Devi,).
Example of application of this mischief rule is also well-found in the construction of section
2(d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1955. This section defines ‘prize competition’ as “any
competition in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building
up arrangement, combination or permutation of letters, words or figures”. The issue is
whether Act applies to competitions which involve substantial skill and are not in the nature
of gambling. Supreme Court, after referring to the previous state of law, to the mischief that
continued under that law and to the resolutions of various states under Article 252(1)
authorizing Parliament to pass the Act. It was stated that having regard to the history of the
legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion that
the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those
competitions in which success does not depend on any substantial degree of skill. (RMD
Chamarbaugwalla V. Union of India,).

The correct principle is that after the words have been construed in their context and it is
found that the language is capable of bearing only one construction, the rule in Heydon’s case
ceases to be controlling and gives way to the plain meaning rule. Lord Simon explains this
aspect that Heydon’s case is available at two stages:

(i) Before ascertaining the plain and primary meaning of the statute, and

(ii) Secondly, at the stage when the court reaches the conclusion that there is no such
plain meaning.

3. GOLDEN RULE

It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However,
when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the
judge can depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more
than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning. If the word only has one
meaning, and applying this meaning would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a
completely different meaning.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute as it allows to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance
with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any
manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case it allows the language to be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience.

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where
there is some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves. For example, imagine there
may be a sign saying "Do not use lifts in case of fire." Under the literal interpretation of this
sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However, this would be an absurd
result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to prevent people from
using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.

In the case of Bedford v. Bedford, is another interesting case that highlighted the use of this
rule. It concerned a case where a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts
were required to rule on who then inherited the estate, the mother's family, or the son's
descendants. The mother had not made a will and under the Administration of Justice Act
1925 her estate would be inherited by her next of kin, i.e. her son. There was no ambiguity in
the words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let the son who had murdered his
mother benefit from his crime. It was held that the literal rule should not apply and that the
golden rule should be used to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. The court
held that if the son inherits the estate that would amount to profiting from a crime and that
would be repugnant to the act.

Thus, the Golden rule implies that if a strict interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd
result then the meaning of the words should be so construed so as to lead to the avoidance of
such absurdity. A further corollary to this rule is that in case there are multiple constructions
to affect the Golden rule the one which favors the assessed should always be taken. This rule
is also known as the Rule of Reasonable Construction.

Case Analysis

An example of the same is S. 125 of the CrPC which deals with maintenance given to
women. The court while interpreting the term ‘wife’ included those women who have entered
into bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced women. The court has stated that even though a
woman may have relinquished her rights on divorce, she may claim maintenance u/s 125 as
she will she be regarded as a ‘wife’ 10 years after such divorce.
Further, in the case of Chandrima Das the courts interpreted that Article 21 shall be available
to non-citizens as well as citizens

Justice Holmes stated, “A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged. It is the skin of the
living thought and it may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which the word is used.”

In the Sussex Peerage Case it was held that the golden rule is the modified form of the
principle of grammatical interpretation.

Further, in the case of Kartar Singh v. S.O. Punjab under the rent control act while
interpreting ‘the landlord requires his land for his bona fideown use’, the courts stated that
that his own use would include the even the requirements of the landlord’s son’s use.

Thus, through this rule of interpretation, it becomes evident that, the text of law along with
the context in which it is applied, must be given due consideration.

4. Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in conflict with each other, they should
be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and the construction which renders either
of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort. This was
observed in the case of Bengal Immunity Co. vs. State of Bihar.

When there is doubt about the meaning of the words of a statute, these should be understood
in the sense in which they harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which
the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or
etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the
occasion on which they are used and the object to be attained.

Where there are in an enactment two or more provisions which cannot be reconciled with
each other, they should be so interpreted, wherever possible, as to give effect to all of them.
This is what is known as the Rule of Harmonious Construction. An effort should be made to
interpret a statute in such a way as harmonises with the object of the statute.

Example: As per the facts given in the Raj Krishna V. Binod, there was a conflict between
section 33(2) and 123(8) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Section 33(2) stated that
a government servant may nominate or second a candidate seeking election, whereas section
123(8) provided that a government servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in an election
in any manner except by casting his vote. SC observed that both these provision should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a government servant was entitled to nominate or
second a candidate seeking election to the state legislature assembly. This harmony could be
achieved only if section 123(8) of the Act is interpreted as conferring power on a government
servant of voting as well as of proposing and seconding a candidature and forbidding him
from assisting a candidate in any other manner.

Example: Conflict between section 17(1) and section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 applies the principal of Harmonious construction by harmonizing apparent conflict
between two or more of its provisions. Section 17 of the Act provides that (1) Every report of
a Board or court together with any minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration
award and every award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a
period of thirty days from the date of its receipt by the appropriate government, be published
in such manner as the appropriate government thinks fit. Whereas sub-section (2) provides
that the award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in
question by any court in any manner whatsoever.

Section 18(1) of the Act provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the
employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be
binding on the parties to the agreement.

In case where a settlement is arrived after receipt of the award of the Labour Tribunal by the
Government before its publication, the issue was whether the Government was still required
by section 17(1) to publish the award. On construction of these two provisions, Supreme
Court held that settlement which becomes effective from the date of signing, the industrial
dispute comes to an end and the award becomes ineffective and the government cannot
publish it. [Sirsilk Ltd. V. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh]

It must always be borne in mind that a statute is passed as a whole and not in sections and it
may well be assumed to be animated by one general purpose and intent. The Court’s duty is
to give effect to all the parts of a statute, if possible. But this general principle is meant to
guide the courts in furthering the intent of the legislature, not overriding it. When rigid
adherence to the general rule would require disregard of clear indications to the contrary, this
rule must be applied. The sections and sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole
and being inter-dependent. Therefore, importance should not be attached to a single clause in
one section overlooking the provisions of another section. If it is impossible to avoid
inconsistency, the provision which was enacted or amended later in point of time must
prevail.

The Rule of Harmonious Construction is applicable only when there is a real and not merely
apparent conflict between the provisions of an Act, and one of them has not been made
subject to the other. When after having construed their context the words are capable of only
a single meaning, the rule of harmonious construction disappears and is replaced by the rule
of literal construction.

Secondary Rules

A. Rule of Ejusdem Generis:

The term ‘ejusdem generis’ means ‘of the same kind or species’. Simply stated, the rule
means:

Where any Act enumerates different subjects, general words following specific words are to
be construed (and understood) with reference to the words that precede them. Those general
words are to be taken as applying to things of the same kind as the specific words previously
mentioned, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. Thus, the rule
of ejusdem generis means that where specific words are used and after those specific words,
some general words are used, the general words would take their colour from the specific
words used earlier.

For instance

‘In the expression in consequence of war, disturbance or any other cause’, the words ‘any
other cause’ would take colour from the earlier words ‘war, disturbance’ and therefore, would
be limited to causes of the same kind as the two named instances. Similarly, where an Act
permits keeping of dogs, cats, cows, buffaloes and other animals, the expression ‘other
animals’ would not include wild animals like lions and tigers, but would mean only
domesticated animals like horses, etc.

Where there was prohibition on importation of ‘arms, ammunition, or gunpower or any other
goods’ the words ‘any other goods’ were construed as referring to goods similar to ‘arms,
ammunition or gun powder’ (AG vs. Brown).

 If the particular words used exhaust the whole genus (category), then the general words
are to be construed as covering a larger genus.
 We must note, however, that the general principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ applies only
where the specific words are all the same nature. When they are of different categories,
then the meaning of the general words following those specific words remains unaffected-
those general words then would not take colour from the earlier specific words.

In the expression charges, rates, duties and taxes’, the term charges was read ejusdem generis
taking colour from the succeeding terms rates, duties, and taxes. Here, the general category
preceded the enumeration of specific categories and so rule of ejusdem generis was
technically not applicable and the court in fact applied the more general rule- Noscitur a
sociis and rightly limited the meaning of the term charges.

In UP State Electricity Board vs Harishankar held that the following conditions must exist
for the application of this rule -

 The statue contains an enumeration of specific words

 The subject of the enumeration constitute a class or a category

 The class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration

 A general term is present at the end of the enumeration

 There is no indication of a different legislative intent

It is also to be noted that the courts have a discretion whether to apply the ‘ejusdem generis’
doctrine in particular case or not. For example, the ‘just and equitable’ clause in the
winding-up powers of the Courts is held to be not restricted by the first five situations in
which the Court may wind up a company.

Justice Hidayatullah explained the principles of this rule through the following example
- In the expression, "books, pamphlets, newspapers, and other documents", private letters
may not be held included if "other documents" be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes
before. But in a provision which reads, "newspapers or other documents likely to convey
secrets to the enemy", the words "other documents" would include documents of any kind
and would not take their meaning from newspaper.

B. Noscitur a sociis –

When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the
statute. Noscere means to know and sociis means association. Thus it means knowing from
association. Thus, under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the questionable meaning of a
word or doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words within the
context of the phrase. This means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are
related to each other. If multiple words having similar meaning are put together, they are to
be understood in their collective meaning.

According to Maxwell, "this rule means that when two or more words susceptible to
analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate
sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, i.e. the more general is restricted to a
sense analoguous to a less general".

C. Reddendo Singula Singulis

When a list of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last
word, e.g., firemen, policemen, and doctors in a hospital. Here,"in a hospital" only applies to
doctors and not to firemen or policemen. The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns
the use of words distributively.Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and
more than one object, it may be the right construction to render each to each, by reading the
provision distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar
principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of speech.

Example- A typical application of this principle is where a testator says 'I devise and
bequeath all my real and personal property to B. The term devise is appropriate only to real
property. The term bequeath is appropriate only to personal property. According to the
principle the testamentary disposition is read as if it were worded 'I devise all my real
property, and bequeath all my personal property, to B'.

This rule has been applied in the case of Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga,
in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads, "Provided
that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or moved in the
legislature of a state without the previous sanction of the President". It was held that the
word introduced applies to bill and moved applies to amendment