Understanding

Crime Prevention,
Second Edition
National Crime Prevention Institute

Boston Oxford Auckland Johannesburg Melbourne New Delhi

Copyright © 2001 by the National Crime Prevention Institute, Department of Justice Administra-
tion, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
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Understanding crime prevention / by National Crime Prevention Institute.—2nd ed.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7506-7220-X (alk. paper)
1. Crime prevention. 2. Crime prevention—United States. 3. Crime prevention—Citizen
participation. 5. Buildings—Security measures. I. National Crime Prevention Institute (Univer-
sity of Louisville)
HV7431 .U52 2001 364.4—dc21 00-049849

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Preface to the Second Edition..... ?
Preface to the First Edition .......... xv
Acknowledgments ........................ xix
Introduction to Crime
Prevention ..................................... 1
THE MEANING OF CRIME
PREVENTION ............................ 2
HOW CRIME PREVENTION
WORKS ...................................... 3
Opportunity Reduction ................ 3
The Community Response ......... 4
The Crime Prevention
Program ...................................... 5
THE CRIME PREVENTION
PRACTITIONER ......................... 6
CONCLUSION ........................... 7
The Evolution of Crime
Prevention ..................................... 9
ANCIENT TRADITION ............... 9
THE ENGLISH TRADITION ....... 11
CRIME PREVENTION IN
AMERICA ................................... 14
CRIME PREVENTION AND
CRIMINOLOGY/SOCIOLOGY ... 16
The Classical School .................. 16
The Positive School .................... 17
The Sociological School ............. 17
The Contemporary School ......... 17
 CRIME PREVENTION AND
THE POLICE MISSION .............. 18
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF
CRIME PREVENTION ............... 20
CONCLUSION ........................... 22
Roles in Crime Prevention ........... 23
THE ROLES OF THE
PRACTITIONER ......................... 24
Supporting Individual Action ....... 24
Supporting Group Action ............ 27
Guiding Public Policy
Decisions .................................... 31
Developing a Comprehensive
Crime Prevention Program ......... 32
THE ROLES OF OTHERS ......... 33
The Police Role .......................... 33
The Private Security Role ........... 34
The Role of the Building
Professions and Trades ............. 35
The Role of Local Government
Agencies ..................................... 35
The Insurance Industry Role ...... 36
The Role of Civic Groups and
Related Government Activities ... 36
The Communications Industry
Role ............................................ 36
The Role of the Business
Community ................................. 37
The Role of the Citizen
Organization ............................... 37
The State Government Role ....... 37
 The Role of Practitioners
Statewide Associations .............. 38
The Federal Government Role ... 38
The National Association Role ... 38
The National Corporation Role ... 39
The National Crime Prevention
Institute Role .............................. 39
CONCLUSION ........................... 39
Designing Crime Risk
Management Systems .................. 41
UNDERSTANDING CRIME
RISK MANAGEMENT ................ 41
WHO IS THE CLIENT? .............. 43
THE CLIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP ......................... 44
CRIME PATTERN ANALYSIS ... 45
CONDUCTING THE
SECURITY SURVEY ................. 46
DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE MAXIMUM LOSS ... 47
DESIGNING THE SYSTEM ....... 48
Risk Avoidance ........................... 48
Risk Reduction ........................... 49
Risk Spreading ........................... 49
Risk Transfer .............................. 50
Risk Acceptance ......................... 50
Cost Effectiveness ...................... 51
MAKING
RECOMMENDATIONS TO
CLIENTS .................................... 51
CONCLUSION ........................... 53
Security Devices and
Procedures .................................... 55
OVERVIEW ................................ 55
PHYSICAL SECURITY
SYSTEMS .................................. 57
General Functions ...................... 57
Security Functions ...................... 57
Boundary Markers as Barriers .... 60
Perimeter Barriers ...................... 62
Internal Barriers .......................... 79
Building Security Codes ............. 82
ELECTRONIC SECURITY
SYSTEMS .................................. 83
Surveillance Systems ................. 83
Intrusion Detection Systems ....... 89
Sensors (See Figure 5-14) ......... 90
SECURITY PROCEDURES ....... 98
Personal Safety .......................... 99
Asset Control .............................. 101
Security System Protection ........ 108
Security Survey Guidelines ........ 109
CONCLUSION ........................... 111
Applying Environmental
Design Concepts .......................... 113
TRANSITION FROM CLIENT
TO COMMUNITY ....................... 114
LEVELS OF PHYSICAL
DESIGN APPLICATION ............. 114
CRIME RISK REDUCTION
THROUGH PHYSICAL
DESIGN ...................................... 114
 Crime Risk Reduction in the
Existing Physical Environment ... 115
Crime Risk Reduction in the
Future Physical Environment ..... 117
CRIME RISK REDUCTION BY
USERS OF THE PHYSICAL
ENVIRONMENT ......................... 119
Informal Social Control ............... 120
The Influence of Physical
Design ........................................ 120
Defensible Space ....................... 123
CRIME PREVENTION
THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN ...... 125
Cautions ..................................... 126
Recent Projects .......................... 126
The Future of CPTED ................. 130
CONCLUSION ........................... 131
Developing Citizen
Participation .................................. 133
CITIZEN-POLICE
COOPERATION ......................... 133
THE PREPARATION PHASE .... 135
The Crime Prevention
Organization ............................... 136
Participation by
Decision-Makers ......................... 136
Factors in Communicating with
Citizens ....................................... 136
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
STRATEGIES ............................. 138
 Awareness and Knowledge
Strategies ................................... 138
Group Project Strategies ............ 140
Informal Social Control
Strategies ................................... 142
A MODEL APPROACH TO
NEIGHBORHOOD
ORGANIZATION ........................ 146
CONCLUSION ........................... 148
Planning the
CommunityProgram ..................... 151
DESIGNING THE
ORGANIZATION ........................ 152
Design Issues ............................. 152
Formal Sanction ......................... 154
Organizational Structure ............. 154
Law Enforcement Role ............... 155
Citizen Input Mechanism ............ 156
DEFINING THE CRIME
PROBLEMS AND
PRIORITIES ............................... 156
Crime Analysis ........................... 156
Data Sources .............................. 157
Information Provided by Crime
Analysis ...................................... 159
Priority Setting ............................ 163
DEVELOPING PROGRAM
OBJECTIVES ............................. 164
Setting Objectives ...................... 165
CONCLUSION ........................... 169
Managing the Community
Program ......................................... 171
PERSONNEL RESOURCES ..... 172
Staff Training .............................. 172
Supplementary Personnel .......... 173
FINANCIAL AND OTHER
RESOURCES ............................. 173
Budgeting ................................... 173
Other Funding Sources .............. 174
PERFORMANCE AND COST
CONTROL MEASURES ............. 174
Activity Counts and Activity
Cost ............................................ 175
Cost by Activity Unit ................... 176
Acceptance Rates ...................... 177
Result Costs ............................... 177
Cost and Performance
Standards ................................... 178
IMPACT MEASURES ................. 178
WORK ASSIGNMENTS ............. 179
Scheduling Work ........................ 179
Assigning Work .......................... 179
Monitoring Work Progress .......... 179
REPORTING MECHANISMS ..... 180
CONCLUSION ........................... 180
Evaluating Impact ......................... 183
THE PURPOSE OF
EVALUATION ............................. 184
CAUSE AND EFFECT ............... 185
Direct Factors ............................. 186
Indirect Factors ........................... 187
 Control Group ............................. 188
SPECIFIC IMPACTS .................. 189
TOTAL IMPACT ......................... 190
EVALUATION RESOURCES ..... 191
CONCLUSION ........................... 192
The Potential of Crime
Prevention ..................................... 193
Appendix A Index Crime
Definitions Uniform Crime
Reporting Federal Bureau of
Investigation ................................. 197
VIOLENT CRIMES: .................... 197
PROPERTY CRIMES: ................ 198
References .................................... 199
CHAPTER 1 ............................... 199
CHAPTER 2 ............................... 199
CHAPTER 3 ............................... 201
CHAPTER 4 ............................... 202
CHAPTER 5 ............................... 202
CHAPTER 6 ............................... 202
CHAPTER 7 ............................... 203
CHAPTER 8 ............................... 204
CHAPTER 9 ............................... 204
CHAPTER 10 ............................. 204
Index .............................................. 205
Understanding Crime Prevention, Second Edition
 Preface to the
First Edition

The National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI), a Division of the University of

Louisville’s School of Justice Administration, College of Urban and Public Affairs,
was established in 1971. Since then, it has served as the nation’s educational and
technical resource for the development of comprehensive crime prevention programs
at the local, state, and national level.
Crime prevention through criminal opportunity reduction, defined as the antic-
ipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk, and the initiation of some action
to remove or reduce it, is a practical and cost-effective approach to the reduction and
containment of criminal activity. The wide-ranging knowledge and skills of crime
prevention have been taught by NCPI, to over 22,000 crime prevention practition-
ers, criminal justice administrators, planners and trainers, public and private offi-
cials, and citizen leaders from communities and agencies in every state and from
many national agencies and organizations.
Understanding Crime Prevention is a major milestone in NCPI’s continuing
efforts to stimulate the most rapid possible expansion of the ranks of professional
crime prevention practitioners. This volume is addressed to the crime prevention
practitioner. However, it is also designed to be directly relevant to the needs of the
police chief; sheriff; director of public safety; mayor or city manager; institutional
or corporate administrator; regional, state or federal criminal justice administrator;

xv
 xvi Understanding Crime Prevention

service club member; professional, volunteer, trade or labor organization adminis-

trator; primary, secondary, or college-level educator; private security company exec-
utive; insurance underwriter, agent or loss prevention engineer; and many others for
whom crime and its impact are an area of major responsibility or civic concern.
Although high-quality practical and academic learning experiences for crimi-
nal justice professionals is stressed, the principle that the control and management
of crime cannot occur through the efforts of criminal justice professionals alone
is recognized and emphasized. Only through the active participation of every sector
of community interest can crime reduction be achieved. Understanding Crime
Prevention can do much to advance this partnership idea, as well as provide specific
guidance to crime prevention practitioners and their citizen-colleagues.
It is recognized that this volume is not the final word, but rather, the start
of a continuing process by which the staff of NCPI will strive to organize and
disseminate the knowledge and technologies of crime prevention. Your comments,
criticisms, and new ideas will aid in accomplishing this objective.
 Preface to the
Second Edition

Many things have changed in the field of crime prevention since the first edition of
this book published. The changes have often been dramatic and the rate staggering.
The change has, however, been primarily in the technologies now available, not
in the guiding principles of crime prevention. In this edition, we have included the
new technologies, but some will have been updated before publication. We are faced
with unprecedented change, and there is no way to capture current technology on a
daily basis.
The underlying principles of crime prevention have not changed, and this is
the focus of the book. There are still only four things we can hope to do in preven-
tion. The applications of situational crime prevention to community problems are
still the same and we can only strive to make the best choices in determining the
strategies we can employ in any given instance. We must still make every effort to
insure that we do a complete, sound, and practical security survey when called upon
to do so.
Since our founding in 1971, crime prevention practice has evolved into a
sophisticated and highly challenging pursuit. Crime rates fluctuate, and prevention
emphasis shifts. These changes cause the practitioner to modify and adapt in order
to properly perform. This flexibility and willingness to change distinguishes the best
practitioners. The pursuit of crime prevention and reduction as a vocation is fre-

xvii
 xviii Understanding Crime Prevention

quently frustrating and quite often exasperating. The reluctance of some agencies to
incorporate prevention strategies into all aspects of operations is a hurdle that has
yet to be fully overcome. These problems, however, are not insurmountable. Practi-
tioners are still making great efforts to keep prevention at the forefront of agency
activity while maintaining a high level of current knowledge. They are to be com-
mended for this, and NCPI works hard to assist in their efforts.
This edition is designed to assist any who wish to learn the basics of preven-
tion and are willing to undertake the arduous task of the crime prevention practi-
tioner. The professional practitioner is not a dying breed. The future is bright for
those willing to make the best use of all of the knowledge we have contributed in
this text, as well as all else that they can learn to assist in their efforts.
 Acknowledgments

We wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance provided by the current instruc-

tional and administrative staffs of the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) in
preparing this edition. The insights and encouragements they have provided have
made a real difference. We also wish to acknowledge the great contributions made
by the pioneers who have gone before and who contributed not only to the first
edition, but to the practice of crime prevention across America as well. Some are no
longer with us physically, but their spirit is still a large part of NCPI. The is espe-
cially true as we approach our thirtieth anniversary. Without the pioneers, we would
not have this book or a record of thirty years of service in the crime prevention com-
munity. This edition is for all of them and for those who follow.

xix
 1
Introduction to
Crime Prevention

Crime is a costly and demoralizing problem affecting all of us. The victims of crime
suffer injury, financial loss, and intimidation. Everyone is affected by higher prices
for products, taxes, insurance premiums, and the sense of insecurity and fear that
result from criminal acts. Those who live or work in “high crime” areas can be
deprived of some of life’s normal opportunities and pleasures by the social and eco-
nomic impact of crime and by the alienation and despair that accompanies the fear
of crime. This negative effect on the quality of life in our communities is difficult
to measure, but a real factor in our prevention efforts.
Can we hope to eliminate the crime problem? Probably not; but, it is reason-
able to believe that crime and the fear of crime can be reduced and controlled. What
has been developing in our society is a systematic and effective crime control
strategy. Situational crime prevention is a major part of this needed strategy.
Crime prevention is an elegantly simple and direct approach that protects the
potential victim from criminal attack by anticipating the possibility of attack and
eliminating or reducing the opportunity for it to occur—and, the possibility for
personal harm or property loss should it occur.
Crime prevention programs have been developed across the United States
and have attracted the participation of thousands of law enforcement professionals;
public and private officials; leaders of voluntary services, professional and labor
organizations; and millions of citizens.

1
 2 Understanding Crime Prevention

The purpose of Understanding Crime Prevention is to bring together the ingre-

dients of crime prevention practice, and, thus, to provide a road map for those who
may wish to take part in this fascinating and demanding field.

THE MEANING OF CRIME PREVENTION

The phrase crime prevention has been loosely applied to any kind of effort aimed at
controlling criminal behavior. However, as used here, crime prevention applies only
to before-the-fact efforts to reduce criminal opportunity. Crime prevention is a direct
crime control method, in contrast to all other types of crime reduction methods. As
C. Ray Jeffrey points out: direct controls of crime include only those that reduce
environmental opportunities for crime. Indirect controls include all other measures,
such as job training, remedial education, police surveillance, police apprehension,
court action, imprisonment, probation and parole, etc.
Our current method of controlling crime has been predominantly through
indirect measures after the offense has been committed. The failure to control
crime is in no small measure due to the strategies we select to deal with crime. It is
obvious that we do not control crime if we allow it to occur before taking action.
We may attempt to treat offenders or rehabilitate them after they have become crimi-
nals, but we should not confuse the treatment of criminals with the direct preven-
tion of crime.1
The formal definition of crime prevention as adopted in several countries is:
the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some
action to remove or reduce it. Many definitions include fear reduction strategies as
well.
Crime prevention can also be operationally explained as the practice of crime
risk management. Crime risk management involves the development of systematic
approaches to crime risk reduction that are cost effective and that promote both the
security and the socioeconomic well being of the potential victim. Managing crime
risks involves:

• Removing some risks entirely;

• Reducing some risks by decreasing the extent to which injury or loss can occur;
• Spreading some risks through physical, electronic, and procedural security
measures that deny, deter, delay, or detect the criminal attack;
• Transferring some risks through the purchase of insurance or involvement of
other potential victims; and
• Accepting some risks.
 Introduction to Crime Prevention 3

HOW CRIME PREVENTION WORKS

Opportunity Reduction

Three ingredients must be present for a crime to be committed:

• Desire or motivation on the part of the criminal;

• The skills and tools needed to commit the crime; and
• Opportunity.

Crime prevention aims to reduce criminal opportunity, rather than to attack

either criminal desire or criminal skills. The reason for this emphasis is that reduc-
tion of opportunity (by making a potential target of attack inaccessible or unattrac-
tive, and by making the attack itself dangerous or unprofitable to the criminal) is a
practical approach that has proven its value.

Criminal Desire
Working to directly reduce criminal desire before-the-fact is anything but practical.
In the first place, we would need some way to immunize people against criminal
intent. But, we have been unable to develop such a “cure” even for those offenders
whom we catch, imprison, and try to rehabilitate. And, even if we had such a cure,
how could we identify even a fraction of the potential offenders in the general
population? How many have committed crimes without ever having been caught?
How many others might steal, assault or kill, given the temptation and the opportu-
nity? Then, if we had both a cure and a means to identify all actual and potential
offenders, how would we administer the cure without violating civil rights? At
present, preventing crime to any significant degree by directly reducing criminal
desire and motivation is, from a practical standpoint, impossible.

Criminal Skills
It is also impractical to try to deny people the right to own and use tools that might
be applied to criminal activities (except for those few implements defined as illegal
to possess) or to try to deny criminals from associating with—and, thus, learning
from each other. A criminal, like anyone else, learns by doing. He does not neces-
sarily learn his trade at the feet of a more experienced colleague. Such an enormous
variety of tools can be employed in criminal activity that to outlaw the tools could
be to paralyze large sectors of legitimate activity (the plastic credit card can be used
to open spring bolt door locks), and the criminal would presumably develop unlaw-
ful ways to obtain his tools anyway.

Criminal Opportunity
Even if we could somehow greatly improve our ability to identify and treat crimi-
nals or manage effectively to remove both the tools that contribute to crime and the
 4 Understanding Crime Prevention

personal associations that teach crime skills, opportunity reduction would still be the
most practical approach.
The reason for this is that criminal opportunity is controllable to a large degree
at its end point—within the victim’s environment. Potential victims can reduce their
vulnerability to criminal attack by taking proper security precautions. It is not nec-
essary to identify the criminal, to take any action to directly affect his motivation,
or his access to skills and tools. What is necessary is that potential victims reduce
criminal opportunity by understanding criminal attack methods and taking pre-
cautions against them.

The Community Response

Does this mean that potential victims must turn their homes, businesses, and neigh-
borhoods into fortresses? Not at all. But, we must admit that as a society, we
currently encourage impulsive, opportunistic crime by our carelessness. We put inad-
equate locks on our doors that even the unskilled amateur can easily get through.
Then we neglect to even use those poor locks. We let large amounts of cash accu-
mulate in our stores because we would rather not take the trouble to go to the bank.
We don’t report suspicious activity around our neighbor’s house because we think
“it’s none of our business.” We tolerate physical and social environments that invite
criminal attack. So, the task of crime prevention is simply to convince each member
of society to take a few basic precautions and to then convince those who build our
homes and our cars, design our communities, and otherwise create the community
environment to take precautions.
An example of situational response to crime may be found in the mea-
sures taken to reduce the introduction of weapons and explosive devices onto com-
mercial airlines. The criminal impact of these items in the hands of terrorists
is immense. Rather than considering the criminal in such situations, we have
responded by increasing the screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo being trans-
ported by air.
All of the efforts that concentrated on the criminal proved to be ineffective,
dangerous, or both. The situational approach worked, and continues to work, totally
ignoring the offender and instead identifying the weapons (guns, knives, and bombs)
used by terrorists before they can be brought aboard. Now every person boarding a
commercial aircraft in the United States must undergo a screening of self and carry-
on luggage. When this screening process became operational at all airports in this
country, the introduction of weapons virtually ceased. Legitimate travelers have
become accustomed to the screening procedures and have accepted them as a regular
part of air travel.
Terrorism is admittedly a rather dramatic crime, far removed from the crimes
that citizens and police confront in day-to-day life. But, the principles of analytic
thinking and strategic planning, which led to successful reduction of weapons
onboard aircraft, can be applied just as well to preventing most crimes.
 Introduction to Crime Prevention 5

The Crime Prevention Program

The specific techniques of crime prevention are, in many ways, not new at all. Alert
individuals and groups have always been able to find ways to protect themselves
against criminal attack to some degree. In the private sector, crime risk management
techniques have been used for many years to protect specific facilities, operations,
or valuables. What is new, and most promising, about crime prevention is the idea
of managing crime risks on a jurisdiction-wide scale through a crime prevention
program, so that everyone, not just those who are sufficiently affluent or clever,
can enjoy higher levels of security and, equally important, freedom from fear and
enhanced quality of life.
It is assumed that criminals, like everyone else, learn through experience. Suc-
cessful experience strengthens the criminal motivation, and unsuccessful experience
weakens it—whatever the reason for the criminal motivation in the first place. If
criminal opportunity is reduced, the criminal’s “experience-learning curve” is inhib-
ited. However, there is no net effect on successful criminal experience if the crimi-
nal, frustrated at one house, simply goes next door to attack a less cautious neighbor.
So, security measures must be applied as universally as possible, and social groups
must assume a collective responsibility for watching out for each other’s safety and
security. If crime prevention programs are established in all cities, towns, and rural
areas, we will see major national reductions in the impact of crime.
As the governmental arm responsible for public security, law enforcement
agencies must learn to take a leading role in the development of effective
community-wide programs. They must learn to serve not only as crime prevention
consultants in existing community affairs, but also participate in the planning of
future community developments.
Finally, the law enforcement role, though pivotal, is by no means the only
role to be played in a crime prevention program. All interested elements of the public
and private sectors must join in the common effort and fully cooperate with each
other.
The crime prevention program is carried out through a crime prevention orga-
nization, which is usually established in or by a unit of government (often the law
enforcement agency itself). The purpose of the crime prevention organization is to
plan, implement, and manage a comprehensive crime prevention program within its
jurisdiction. The program typically develops a wide range of projects and services
involving three levels of operation:

• At the client level, the objective is to design crime risk management systems for
application to the needs of specific homes, businesses, institutions, or other facil-
ities that are owned or managed by individuals or organizations.
• At the multiple client level, the objective is to design crime risk management
projects through which the many occupants and users of a neighborhood, shop-
ping center, or industrial area, or the members of a special population group, can
collectively improve the security of the area or group.
 6 Understanding Crime Prevention

• At the public policy level, the objective is to design crime risk management
activities that units of government can implement to improve the security
of everyone within jurisdictions and, where appropriate, across jurisdictional
lines.

The strategies used by the crime prevention program include:

• Public awareness—to make citizens aware of crime problems and the services
available to them through the program;
• Crime risk management recommendations—involving services to individual
clients;
• Teaching and counseling services—for specific groups;
• Group projects—through which organizations and agencies are helped to develop
useful crime prevention activities;
• Environmental design—through which efforts are made to modify the existing
and future physical environment to both discourage criminal activity and encour-
age citizen activity in the environment;
• Surveillance and reporting—through which citizens are encouraged to watch for
criminal activity and to report their observations to the police;
• Law enforcement—through which all law enforcement personnel are trained in,
and encouraged to support and promote crime prevention in all contacts with the
public; and
• Private security—to expand the efforts of private security organizations to
provide reliable and cost-effective security products and services.

THE CRIME PREVENTION PRACTITIONER

The crime prevention practitioner must possess a wide, general knowledge of crime
prevention theory and practice. He or she becomes skilled in applying this knowl-
edge to individual client needs and to the design, development, and management of
projects that serve geographic areas and population groups. The work is done within
the context of a jurisdiction-wide crime prevention program.
The typical crime prevention practitioner is a career law enforcement profes-
sional with several years of police experience prior to becoming involved in crime
prevention. Increasingly departments are recognizing the importance of crime
prevention and are providing training for all officers. Either directly, through
crime prevention training, or indirectly, through exposure to other practitioners, the
practitioner has learned that criminal opportunity reduction is the crime control
approach of the future.
A significant number of criminal justice planners, administrators, and instruc-
tors have also been trained in crime prevention. A smaller number of trained prac-
titioners operate within agencies and organizations, which are outside the criminal
justice field.
 Introduction to Crime Prevention 7

The private security field includes a large number of security and loss pre-
vention specialists. Many private security specialists may also be classified as general
practitioners because they have obtained appropriate training. These specialists pri-
marily concentrate their efforts at the individual client level. Law enforcement crime
prevention practitioners have joined the shift away from traditional police methods,
toward the crime prevention approach. This is one of the most significant develop-
ments in the history of American law enforcement, and like most radical changes in
established professional fields, it has not come without difficulty. Thanks to the pio-
neering efforts and support of a small group of police chiefs, sheriffs, and criminal
justice administrators, the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) was able to
train its first few groups of students.
The work of those early practitioners showed their own, and neighboring agen-
cies, the value of the crime prevention approach, and the demand steadily increased.
Not only has the demand for NCPI training increased greatly since 1971, but also
many states have developed their own crime prevention training programs.
Today’s practitioner is part of a growing new professional field. Great op-
portunities exist for professional growth and advancement. It is no coincidence, for
example, that many of NCPI’s early graduates are now high-level law enforcement
and criminal justice administrators as well as private security managers.
The person who enters the crime prevention field today has an even better
chance for professional growth. The training now available, for example, is both of
better quality and is more comprehensive than during those early days. Support for
the idea of the practitioner as a professional is growing rapidly as more and more
state governments establish statewide crime prevention programs, and as increasing
numbers of state crime prevention associations are formed.

CONCLUSION

Crime prevention is a practical method for the direct control of crime. It involves
analyzing criminal attack methods and designing specific actions within the envi-
ronments of potential victims to reduce criminal opportunities and manage crime
risks.
The mechanism through which crime prevention operates is the community-
wide crime prevention program. This program serves as a planning and management
setting through which a range of strategies is developed. The strategies of crime pre-
vention basically aim to stimulate appropriate crime prevention attitudes and behav-
ior on the part of individuals and groups and to work toward physical environment
changes that promote crime prevention.
The key actor in crime prevention is the crime prevention practitioner, who
is typically a law enforcement officer. The wide and diverse body of skills and
knowledge needed by the practitioner is described in the following chapters.
 2
The Evolution of
Crime Prevention

In this chapter, we will deal with the emergence of modern crime prevention from,
and in contrast with, offender-oriented crime control approaches.
Crime, defined by Webster’s dictionary as “an act committed in violation of a
law prohibiting it, an act omitted in violation of a law ordering it, or an offense
against morality,” is as old as mankind, and so is mankind’s interest in eliminating,
reducing, or preventing crime.
Victim-oriented, opportunity-reduction crime prevention, though relatively
recent in terms of widespread practice, grows out of a varied history of society’s
efforts to control and reduce wrongdoing.
Societies have practiced crime prevention of some sort throughout history.1
The use of natural and man-made barriers and military or vigilante forces and a
variety of needed mutual protection activities by members of each community to
defend against attack by enemies or outlaws has occurred in every culture up to and
including modern times. The tradition of a crime prevention approach that went
beyond walls, gates, and armed reprisals, however, had its beginnings in seventeenth
century England.2

ANCIENT TRADITION

Society’s response to crime has been characterized by a range of approaches as varied

as man’s cultures and the historical periods from which they sprang.3 Punishment of

9
 10 Understanding Crime Prevention

the offender, either to “correct” him or to serve some other social purpose has been
but one response. In pre-literate cultures, in contrast, we find:

. . . certain motives and attitudes, which apparently preceded the punitive reaction to
lawbreaking but were not, in themselves, punishment: desire to annihilate an enemy of
the group, sacrifice to appease or fend off the wrath of the gods, social hygiene mea-
sures to rid the community of pollution, self-redress in cases of private injury, and
surprise and disgust at the person who injured his own family. Deliberate and “just”
infliction of pain by the group in its corporate capacity was not invented until later.4

It was only with the rise of the king or other central authority figure that duly
authorized officials took on the task of dealing with wrongdoers on behalf of the
society, or state, as a whole. The state’s reaction to crime tended to be punitive, but
the punishment inflicted did not necessarily reflect a belief that the offender’s pain
itself had some redeeming value. Instead, the purposes of punishment were often
very pragmatic. In many cultures a criminal might be fined, mutilated, or killed. The
fine was levied to repay the victim’s loss. Mutilation served to show others that the
offender was untrustworthy. Execution was used to settle a family feud or remove a
“wild-beast” offender from society.5
On the other hand, at certain times in history, crime control by the state con-
sisted of seemingly vengeful acts against criminals. More often than not, the guilty
one was given an added measure of punishment to ensure that he did not repeat the
act, that he “properly” atoned for it, and that he provided a horrible example for
others who might be tempted. Public spectacles of flogging, amputation of limbs,
branding, and a variety of forms of painful death were the order of the day, even
for trivial criminal offenses and for moral offenses such as adultery, heresy, and
witchcraft.
The most famous early attempt to establish a legal basis for an orderly and
just approach to crime control is Hammurabi’s Code, dating from about 1800 B.C.
Hammurabi, King of Babylon, was an enlightened administrator, and his schedule
of penalties for infractions was restrained, compared to the usual punishment stan-
dards of the day.6 Hammurabi’s Code stated, among other things, the first approach
to crime prevention through environmental design.

• If a builder builds a house for a man and does not make its construction firm,
and the house collapses and causes the death of the owner of the house—that
builder shall be put to death;
• If it causes the death of a son of the owner—they shall put to death the son of
the builder;
• If it causes the death of a slave of the owner—he shall give to the owner a slave
of equal value; and
• If it destroys property—he shall restore whatever is destroyed and because he did
not make the house firm he shall rebuild the house, which collapsed, at his own
expense.
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 11

The Mosaic Code,7 or Law of Moses, set down about a thousand years later,
provided a lengthy and elaborate guide to the conduct of Hebrew affairs, and sti-
pulated, for example, that:

If a person hears a solemn adjuration to give evidence as a witness to something he

has seen or heard and does not declare what he knows, he commits a sin and must
accept responsibility. Leviticus, Chapter 5, Verse 1.
When one man strikes another and kills him, he shall be put to death. Whoever strikes
a beast and kills it shall make restitution, life for life. When one man injures and dis-
figures his fellow countryman, it shall be done to him as he had done; fracture for frac-
ture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; the injury and disfigurement that he has inflicted upon
another shall in turn be inflicted upon him. Leviticus, Chapter 24, Verses 17–20.

Wide and vigorous administration of “just” punishment based on a body of

criminal law has prevailed until modern times, despite the fact that whether “just”
or not, punishment’s effectiveness as a primary crime control measure has always
been dubious at best.
Over the past several hundred years, the modern European and American states
have attempted to control crime by moving from punishment and reprisals to appeals
to man’s better nature, to attempts at reform and rehabilitation of offenders and,
finally, to the beginnings of the pragmatic, scientifically-based management
approach to before-the-fact crime reduction, which we now call crime prevention.8
This evolutionary process has left its traces in the complex and conflicting patterns,
which still characterize our criminal justice system.

THE ENGLISH TRADITION

A departure from the purely punitive or defensive approaches occurred when Oliver
Cromwell, in 1655, attempted to set up a professional police force. He established
12 police jurisdictions in England and Wales, and the forces were organized and
operated along military lines. When strong popular opposition forced Cromwell to
abandon the plan, crime control reverted to the hands of the judicial system and its
enforcers, and, for a time, punishment was once again supreme.9
In 1729, Thomas deVeil of Westminster organized a group of Thief Takers
and Informers in an attempt to provide a police-like alternative to the corrupt, inef-
ficient, and self-serving judicial system. Unfortunately, little improvement was
noted. Because these agents were only paid upon conviction of criminals, they tended
to choose their victims carefully, and, they left organized criminal gangs alone
because of the danger of reprisals. They were not above planting evidence on inno-
cent persons in order to maintain their incomes.
The appointment of Henry Fielding as a London Magistrate in 1748 set the
stage for the first coherent development of police forces in England. Fielding set
forth two objectives for himself. The first, to stamp out existing crime, was hardly
 12 Understanding Crime Prevention

original. But the second, to prevent outbreaks of crime in the future, was truly
revolutionary.10
In Fielding’s view, his objectives could not be achieved without:

• A strong police force;

• The active cooperation of the public; and
• The removal of the causes of crime and the conditions in which it flourishes.

Among his efforts to develop the necessary conditions for crime control and
prevention, Fielding attempted to replace the corrupt or inefficient Parish Consta-
bles under his jurisdiction with handpicked men of proven ability and good charac-
ter. He appealed directly for public cooperation through newspaper advertisements
such as the following:

All persons who shall for the future suffer by robberies, burglaries, etc., are desired
immediately to bring or send the best description they can of such robberies, etc., with
the time and place and circumstances of the fact to Henry Fielding, Esq., at his house
in Bow Street.11

Fielding also started a publication called The Public Advertiser to make people
aware of the kinds of crimes being committed. He published lists of stolen property
to encourage people to help recover the stolen items. Just before he died in 1754,
he received funding to expand the distribution of The Public Advertiser, to
establish a register of criminals, and to recruit more handpicked “runners.” These
were to be on call at all times, ready to investigate and prevent crimes.
John Fielding, Henry’s half-brother, took over as magistrate, and for 26 years,
John tried to further his brother’s plans. He obtained regular budget payments
for street patrols and published pamphlets about police-emphasizing their prevention
role: “It is much better to prevent even one man from being a rogue than appre-
hending and bringing 40 to justice.”
The Fieldings must be credited with planting and nurturing the idea of a
preventive police force, even though there were only a few small organized units at
the time of John’s death. Various attempts were made to establish a formal
police force in London thereafter, but it was another 50 years before the Home
Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, succeeded in influencing Parliament to pass the Metro-
politan Police Act of 1829. As the first squads of Metropolitan Police marched out
into the streets of London, the idea of preventive full-scale police forces became
a reality.12 The first Order of the Metropolitan Police was a triumph of clarity,
simplicity, and vision:

INSTRUCTIONS:
The following General Instructions for the different ranks of the Police Force are
not to be understood as containing roles of conduct applicable to every variety of
circumstances that may occur in the performance of their duty; something must
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 13

necessarily be left to the intelligence and discretion of individuals; and according to

the degree in which they show themselves possessed of these qualities and to their zeal,
activity, and judgment, on all occasions, will be their claims to future promotion and
reward.
IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD, AT THE OUTSET, THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT
TO BE ATTAINED IS THE PREVENTION OF CRIME.
To this great end, every effort of the police is to be directed. The security of person and
property, the preservation of public tranquility, and all the other objects of a Police
Establishment, will thus be better affected, than by the detection and punishment of the
offender, after he has succeeded in committing the crime. Every member of the police
force, as the guide for his own conduct, should constantly keep this in mind. Officers
and Police Constables should endeavor to distinguish themselves by such vigilance and
activity, as may render it extremely difficult for anyone to commit a crime within that
portion of the town under their charge.
When in any Division, offences are frequently committed, there must be a reason
to suspect that the Police is not in that Division properly conducted. The absence of
crime will be considered the best proof of the complete efficiency of the Police.
In Divisions, where this security and good order have been effected, the Officers and
Men belonging to it may feel assured that such conduct will be noticed by rewards
and promotion.

In other handbooks of police duties developed during the next few years, pre-
vention was usually emphasized as the essence of police duty.13 Detection of crimes
was considered important, but only if it supported and did not replace the principles
of crime prevention, namely:

• To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military

force and severity of legal punishment;
• To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the
historic tradition that the police are the public, and the public are the police. The
police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention
to duties, which are incumbent on every citizen, in the interests of community
welfare and existence; and
• To always recognize that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and
disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Thus, the great tradition of an organized police force was established. It grew
steadily throughout Great Britain. By 1856, the process was completed.
The initial emphasis on prevention did not last. Police gradually became
more and more occupied with investigating crimes and apprehending criminals, and
prevention efforts decreased accordingly.
It was not until after World War II that attention in Great Britain once again
turned to the crime prevention concept, through local campaigns at first. (Ironically,
renewed interest in crime prevention efforts at the national level was triggered
 14 Understanding Crime Prevention

by reports that Sweden had established a permanent Crime Prevention Advisory

Bureau, supported by insurance companies and the police.) A national crime
prevention campaign was held during 1950 and 1951, featuring films, exhibits, and
printed material. By 1956, a number of other national-scope activities had appeared,
such as standardized techniques for publicizing crime hazards and for recommend-
ing crime prevention tactics, and formal liaison between police and insurance
companies.
In 1963, the Home Office Crime Prevention Training Centre was established
at Stafford, offering formal training in crime prevention to members of all police
forces in the United Kingdom. In subsequent years, a comprehensive national crime
prevention program was built, featuring not only a wide variety of training activi-
ties, but also the coordination of insurance, private security and police efforts, and
mass media campaigns. Through this process, crime prevention has finally become
an integral part of police activity in the United Kingdom.14

CRIME PREVENTION IN AMERICA

In most respects, the development of police forces in the United States has not been
uniform. The British model of a national police force with local subdivisions did not
develop here, nor did the early British emphasis on preventive policing.15
While crime prevention and loss reduction has been a key activity of the private
security field in the United States since its beginning over 100 years ago, the crime
prevention concept only recently has entered the field of law enforcement in a formal
way. However, as law enforcement developed in the United States, there were spo-
radic attempts to introduce opportunity reduction principles. Early examples include
the branding of cattle and the assumption by citizens of law enforcement respon-
sibilities in such forms as the sheriff’s posse, the vigilante group, and the town
watchman. Later, there developed within law enforcement a strong emphasis on juve-
nile delinquency prevention. Finally, in the early 1960s, opportunity reduction pro-
jects such as Operation Identification began to emerge in a few police departments.
Beyond these limited efforts, little need was felt for police-based before-the-fact
prevention programs until 1968. In that year, John C. Klotter, professor at the
University of Louisville’s School of Justice Administration, undertook a Ford
Foundation-funded program of research in burglary prevention.
Professor Klotter’s admiration for the success of the English system led him
to suggest that the establishment of crime prevention units within police departments
in this country could become a significant factor in crime control. To stimulate the
development of such units, he recommended that:

Crime prevention schools, such as those in England, should be started on a national

or regional basis. At these schools, police personnel should be trained in the methods
of preventing crime. When returning to their respective departments, the specially
trained officers should be assigned exclusively to crime prevention work.16
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 15

As a result of the Klotter study, the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI)
was established as a Division of the School of Police Administration at the
University of Louisville in 1971, under the initial sponsorship of the university, the
Kentucky Crime Commission, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(of the U.S. Department of Justice). Since its inception, NCPI has trained thousands
of police officers, criminal justice planners and administrators, local government
officials, volunteer leaders, national association officials, and private industry rep-
resentatives in the principles and practices of crime prevention, and provided con-
tinuing information, post-graduate training, and technical assistance to them.
NCPI has become a national educational and technical resource for the devel-
opment of local, state, and national crime prevention programs in both the public
and private sectors, and continues to provide crime prevention training, information,
and technical assistance to ever-increasing numbers and kinds of individuals, agen-
cies, and organizations.17 However, there has yet to emerge a comprehensive and
coordinated national crime prevention campaign in the United States. The federal
government has funded a separate organization, the National Crime Prevention
Council (NCPC), to undertake this task. It is now coordinating a national media cam-
paign and the activities of the Crime Prevention Coalition, which includes hundreds
of organizations.
The growth of crime prevention has been significant since 1971. It is currently
estimated that over 85 percent of the cities in this country have a crime prevention
specialist in their police departments or other city agencies.18 Most states have, or
are developing, statewide crime prevention campaigns, and some states have devel-
oped statewide training centers modeled after NCPI. The Texas Crime Prevention
Institute is the leading example, and there are also training programs in California,
Washington, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Florida.
At the federal level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established a
Crime Resistance program involving all of its field offices.19 The U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) developed systematic crime prevention
programs within federally sponsored public housing.20 The Department of Defense
(DoD) and the separate military services designed a coordinated crime prevention
program for all DoD installations. The Department of Commerce is active in cargo
theft reduction, airport security, the development of standards for security devices,
and the prevention of crime against small businesses. The National Institute of
Justice, through program grants and research and information services, is a major
contributor to crime prevention program development at all levels.
National service, voluntary, and public interest organizations are rapidly
entering the ranks of crime prevention proponents. The pioneers in this sector are
the American Association of Retired Persons, which has done much to organize
citizen participation and law enforcement activity; the National Crime Prevention
Council, which sponsors Crime Prevention Month, and other awareness campaigns
for years; and the National Sheriff’s Association, which has helped organize large
numbers of Neighborhood Watch programs through its members.21 The International
Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners (ISCPP) has emerged as a professional
 16 Understanding Crime Prevention

association for crime prevention specialists. Additionally, many group-specific orga-

nizations have entered the crime prevention arena, focusing on youth, seniors,
schools, and industry, have played an important role in crime prevention activity
nationally.
Private business and industry is also manifesting a rapidly increasing level of
interest in crime prevention. The private security field has grown enormously in the
past decade, and the insurance industry focuses increasing attention on crime
prevention and crime-related loss reduction.22
The current status of crime prevention programming in the United States is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. Meanwhile, the establishment of the National
Crime Prevention Institute led to explosive growth of interest and activity in crime
prevention—reaching levels unimaginable in 1971.
From this brief historical discussion, one can see that crime prevention has
arrived—not only as an important component of police work, but also as a signifi-
cant area of activity for every kind of public and private interest in the United States.

CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINOLOGY/SOCIOLOGY

No discussion of the evolution of crime prevention would be complete without

mention of the evolutionary patterns of the science of criminology and their impact
on crime prevention.
From its inception, criminology has had a conflicting and controversial effect
on society’s responses to crime. A young discipline, dating back only to the early
1700s, criminology concerns itself with what causes people to commit crimes, the
social conditions that affect criminal activity, and the methods that can be used to
control crime. As is inevitable in any field of study, several schools of thought have
developed in criminology, including the Classical School, the Positive School, the
Sociological School, and the Contemporary School.

The Classical School

As a reaction to the arbitrary practices that characterized criminal law prior to and
during the 1700s, there developed a movement to reduce and standardize the sever-
ity of punishments. This Classical school of thought holds that punishment should
be used to discourage criminals and prevent crimes instead of retaliating against
convicted offenders. Proponents contend that crime should be defined in legal terms,
with specific punishment assigned to each unlawful act, and with prohibitions against
torture, limits on the admission of evidence, and other protections of the rights of
the accused. Thus, it is held, people will select their behavior on the basis of reward
and punishment, pain and pleasure, and persons will decide whether or not to commit
criminal acts based on their degree of willingness to accept the prescribed punish-
ment. (As Gilbert and Sullivan’s Mikado says, “Let the punishment fit the crime.”)
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 17

The Classical School believes that considerable prevention is achieved from the
deterrent effect of fear of punishment.23

The Positive School

In another movement, which developed in the early 1800s, law was seen not as a
means to deter criminals but, rather, as a way to protect society on the one hand and
reform the criminal on the other. The Positive School does not believe in strict defi-
nitions of crimes or predetermined sentences. Instead, this school advocates broadly
defined criminal laws and sliding scales of punishment, taking into account whether
the offender is “responsible” for his acts.24 Justice can, thus, be exercised in terms
of the particular circumstances at hand, and sentences passed from the dual view-
point of protecting society and rehabilitating the offender. Indeed, the offender, rather
than the offense, is the thing of importance, and all acts performed by society against
the offender (including punishment) are to be taken out of a desire to treat his social
pathology. To the Positive School, law or punishment has little effect as a means of
social control. Rather, treatment and rehabilitation are the issues. The creation
of juvenile court is perhaps the clearest, most tangible reflection of this school.25

The Sociological School

Sociological criminology emerged in the 1920s, primarily at the University of

Chicago, as a way of explaining the origins of criminal behavior. Its proponents hold
that adverse social conditions stimulate criminal learning experiences and anti-social
attitudes.26
There are two important theories flowing from this approach:

• The weakening of family, ethnic, and community traditions weakens society’s

ability to informally control criminal behavior; and
• A state of social and economic deprivation causes the creation of a criminal
subculture.

An outgrowth of the criminal subculture theory, which was popular during the
anti-poverty program years, is that the blocking of legitimate social and economic
opportunity causes delinquency. In general, reduction in crime means modifying the
social and economic conditions that foster crime.27

The Contemporary School

Started more recently, this School concentrates on the environment of the potential
victim rather than that of the criminal.28 It selects some of the features of the earlier
 18 Understanding Crime Prevention

schools, rejects others, and adds some new ones in an effort to prevent crimes, not
criminal careers. The Contemporary School holds that:

• Prevention (and not rehabilitation) should be the major concern of crimino-

logists;
• No one is sure how to rehabilitate offenders;
• Punishment and/or imprisonment may be relevant in controlling certain
offenders;
• Criminal behavior can be controlled primarily through the direct alteration of the
environment of potential victims;
• Crime control programs must focus on crime before it occurs, rather than
afterward;29 and
• As criminal opportunity is reduced, so will be the number of criminals.

The Contemporary School contends that a new model for policing should be
developed that attacks crime before it occurs. The methods to be used include general
and specific improvement of the physical and social environment, and the education
of potential victims as to measures they can take to reduce their risks. This empha-
sis has led to many developments in recent years, including crime prevention through
environmental design, demand reduction drug programs, and others. There has been
a revitalization of governmental education programs, comparable to those of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which represent a foundation of
belief in this approach.

CRIME PREVENTION AND THE POLICE MISSION

Traditional law enforcement focuses on the investigation and apprehension aspects

of crime control, with prevention a sometimes-distant second priority. In this context
victimology was ignored and we looked only at the criminal. This kept practitioners
from making the progression to proactive, victim environment based prevention
programs. Modern law enforcement aligns more with the “Contemporary” School
by placing prevention in the position of primary emphasis. It is important to note
that this is a shift in emphasis rather than in kind. Modern law enforcement does
seek to investigate and apprehend, but holds that success in crime prevention empha-
sis makes apprehension and conviction more effective. By the same token, tradi-
tional law enforcement is capable of preventing criminal behavior to some degree,
but uses apprehension and investigation as its primary tools for this purpose.
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
in its Report on Police30 has this to say about the role of the police:

The police in the United States are not separate from the people. They draw their author-
ity from the will and consent of the people, and they recruit their officers from them.
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 19

The police are the instrument of the people to achieve and maintain order; their efforts
are founded on principles of public service and ultimate responsibility to the public.
To a police officer, public service is more than a vague concept. When people need
help, it is to a police officer that they are most likely to turn. He responds—
immediately—without first ascertaining the status of the person in need.
Police officers are decision makers. A decision—whether to arrest, to make a referral,
to seek prosecution, or to use force—has a profound effect on those a police officer
serves. Most of these decisions must be made within the span of a few moments and
within the physical context of the most aggravated social problems. Yet, the police
officer is just as accountable for these decisions as the judge or corrections official is
for decisions deliberated for months.
The role the police officer plays in society is a difficult one; he must clearly under-
stand complex social relationships to be effective. He is not only a part of the
community he serves, and a part of the government that provides his formal base of
authority, he is also a part of the criminal justice system that determines what course
society will pursue to deter lawbreakers or rehabilitate offenders in the interest of
public order.
Through the identification and arrest of a suspected offender, the police initiate the
criminal justice process. The individual’s guilt or innocence is then determined in
the courts. If the individual is found guilty, an attempt is made to rehabilitate him
through a corrections process that may include probation, confinement, parole, or any
combination of these.
A very high percentage of police work is done in direct response to citizen complaints.
This underlines the frequently unrecognized fact that members of the public are an
integral part of the criminal justice system; in fact, the success of the system depends
more on citizen participation than on any other single factor.
The police are the criminal justice element in closest contact with the public; as a
result, they are often blamed for failures in other parts of the system. In like manner,
public confidence in the criminal justice system depends to a large extent on the trust
that the people have in their police.
The police, the criminal justice system, and government in general could not
control crime without the cooperation of a substantial portion of the people. In the
absence of public support, there would be little that an army could not do better than
the police.

The police mission in the United States is largely determined by the fabric
of the community.31 This concept continues today through the shift to community-
based policing. Current trends place increasing emphasis on the service provided
across the community. The application of innovative problem-solving methods to
community problems has now gained the acceptance and support of police leaders.
It consists of nothing less than the maintenance of social order within carefully
prescribed ethical and constitutional considerations. Specific elements in the police
mission are:
 20 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Suppression of crimes;
• Apprehension of offenders (to discourage others and to permit society to punish
offenders);
• Recovery of property;
• Regulation of non-criminal conduct (such as traffic control, sanitation, and
general public order); and
• Miscellaneous services (such as emergency aid, driver licensing, and a wide
variety of assistance to citizens, including “police-community relations”—an
activity developed in recent years to improve communication patterns between
the citizenry and the police).

The amount of effort devoted by police forces to these functions varies, but
knowledgeable observers agree that the regulation of non-criminal conduct and the
provision of miscellaneous services may make up as much as 80 percent of
the average police department’s workload.32 This leaves scant resources available for
crime-related duties, and it is easy to understand how the necessity for responding
to crimes already committed leaves little or no time available for crime prevention,
prevention of delinquency, or recovery of property.
Thus, it is probably accurate to say that many traditional police administrators
do not view crime prevention with enthusiasm. To them, it can only represent an
additional manpower drain in the short term. This attitude is being changed by the
advent of community-based policing.
It is for this reason that a considerable sum of money was made available
through the Community Oriented Policing Services of the Department of Justice,
and through state and municipal budgets to add manpower for the specific purpose
of developing crime prevention programs. Through this kind of support, crime
prevention got started in many communities, and this led to a reordering of police
priorities by community leadership.
In the long term, however, crime prevention effort must pay for itself if it is
to become a significant permanent part of the police mission. For this to occur, police
must be given the opportunity to be trained in and to practice crime prevention
techniques for a long enough period of time to demonstrate the merits of crime pre-
vention on a cost-effective basis in comparison with traditional law enforcement
methods. Fortunately, such opportunities are rapidly increasing among the nation’s
police agencies, and the results so far are encouraging.

THE ASSUMPTIONS OF CRIME PREVENTION

Let us summarize the important operating assumptions of crime prevention practi-

tioners as taught by the National Crime Prevention Institute.

1. Potential crime victims or those responsible for them must be helped to take
action, which reduces their vulnerability to crimes and which reduces their
likelihood of injury or loss should a crime occur.
 The Evolution of Crime Prevention 21

2. At the same time, it must be recognized that potential victims (and those respon-
sible for them) are limited in the action they can take by the limits of their
control over their environments.
3. The environment to be controlled is that of the potential victim, not of the poten-
tial criminal.
4. Direct control over the victim’s environment can, nevertheless, affect criminal
motivation in that reduced criminal opportunity means less temptation to
commit offenses and learn criminal behavior, and, consequently, fewer offend-
ers. In this sense, crime prevention is a practical rather than a moralistic
approach to reducing criminal motivation. The intent is to discourage the
offender.
5. The traditional approaches used by the criminal justice system (such as pun-
ishment and rehabilitation capabilities of courts and prisons, and the inves-
tigative and apprehension functions of police) can increase the risk perceived
by the criminal, and thus have a significant (but secondary) role in criminal
opportunity reduction.
6. Law enforcement agencies have a primary role in crime prevention to the extent
that they are effective in providing opportunity-reduction education, informa-
tion, and guidance to the public and to various organizations, institutions, and
agencies in the community.
7. Many skill and interest groups need to operate in an active and coordinated
fashion if crime prevention is to be effective in a community-wide sense.
8. Crime prevention can be both a cause and an effect of efforts to revitalize urban
and rural communities.
9. The knowledge of crime prevention is interdisciplinary and is in a continual
process of discovery, as well as discarding misinformation. There must be a
continual sifting and integration of discoveries as well as a constant sharing of
new knowledge among practitioners.
10. Crime prevention strategies and techniques must remain flexible and specific.
What will work for one crime in one place may not work for the same crime
in another place. Crime prevention is a “thinking person’s” practice, and
countermeasures must be taken after a thorough analysis of the problem, not
before.

Thus, crime prevention is concerned with protecting people and property. Its
focus is the potential victim and his environment, and it works by analyzing the
vulnerabilities of potential victims and taking countermeasures through which victim
behavior and the immediate social and physical environment are altered so as to
reduce those vulnerabilities.
Crime prevention focuses on the offender only to the extent that the knowl-
edge of criminal characteristics and attack methods is relevant to the design of effec-
tive countermeasures.
Crime prevention holds that each individual is responsible to avoid becoming
a victim, and neighbors are responsible to and for each other. The citizenry, busi-
ness sector, and the government sector are responsible for the allocation of resources
 22 Understanding Crime Prevention

and the development of comprehensive programs, and the police are responsible
for, at the very least, emphasizing prevention in all aspects of their contact with the
public.

CONCLUSION

Despite the rapid development of a crime prevention movement in this country, the
potential power of crime prevention is still held back by conflicting criminological
theories, confused criminal justice system missions, scarce public resources, and tra-
ditional police priorities. Nevertheless, some of the power and much of the appeal
of crime prevention are already evident in the thousands of law enforcement units
that now practice crime prevention at the local level and in the hundreds of other
organizations (and millions of Americans) that practice, advocate, or support crime
prevention at the local, state, and national levels.
Understanding the specific conditions under which a particular crime takes
place leads directly to specific strategies by which a potential victim can improve
his or her security against that crime. Crime prevention thus protects person and
property in the most practical way—the reduction of criminal opportunity in the
potential victim’s own environment.
The creative promise, which this idea of controlling crime by reducing crim-
inal opportunity held for such pioneers as Henry and John Fielding and Sir Robert
Peel, is finally becoming a reality.
 3
Roles in
Crime Prevention

In the first two chapters, we presented the general dimensions of crime prevention
and its historical development as an organized approach to crime control.
In this chapter, we concern ourselves with the central role of the crime pre-
vention practitioner as the teacher, counselor, and catalyst of individual action, group
action, and public policy action within the community. We also briefly sketch the
range of community energies, which the practitioner can mobilize. Finally, we
suggest that the goal of the practitioner’s efforts is the establishment of a compre-
hensive, community-wide crime prevention program.
In doing so, the practitioner must enlist community support from the several
interest groups present in our neighborhoods. These include neighborhood associa-
tions, business groups, schools, and churches. By adding these communities to our
crime prevention efforts, the neighborhood can take an active role in its own
improvement. The involvement of these parties is essential to the development of a
community-wide crime prevention effort. As an enabler of neighborhood initiatives,
the practitioner can assist in leading the community to do what is in its own best
interest to reduce criminal opportunity. This facilitation by the practitioner is the
nexus of the community crime prevention effort.
The practitioner works with individual potential victims, because they have a
vital role to play in crime prevention. This role, at the start, may be no more com-
plicated than the reduction of carelessness. In no sense, should we make the mistake

23
 24 Understanding Crime Prevention

of blaming the victim for the crime, yet how often does utter carelessness lead to
assault, homicide, burglary, and robbery? Acceptance of personal responsibility by
potential victims is a key issue.
The practitioner also works with the groups and organizations that make up
the community, because self-protection by potential victims is only part of the total-
ity of crime prevention. Each segment of society also has a role and a responsibil-
ity because the individual is always limited in what he can do. At some point, a
person or a business needs the help of neighbors, and at a further point, govern-
mental help is required. Crime prevention is most effective when there is a com-
prehensive and cooperative sharing of opportunity-reduction responsibility among
individuals, social groups, and economic and political units.
The following discussion of the crime prevention practitioner’s roles and the
roles of others with whom he works is necessarily brief. Its purpose is to provide a
framework for understanding how the knowledge and skills of crime prevention, as
discussed more extensively in the following chapters, fit into the operational roles
of the practitioner.

THE ROLES OF THE PRACTITIONER

The crime prevention practitioner’s purpose is to serve as the facilitator of crime pre-
vention activities in his community. Carrying out this purpose involves a set of com-
plementary and interacting roles in which he:

• Supports individual action;

• Supports group action;
• Guides public policy decisions; and
• Develops the comprehensive crime prevention program.

Supporting Individual Action

It is relatively easy for the head of a household, the proprietor of a business, or any
person to reduce risk of criminal attack in daily life. This role of the crime pre-
vention practitioner is to serve individual clients by observing, analyzing, rec-
ommending, and teaching. Just as one person might teach safe driving habits to
another person, so the crime prevention practitioner tries to teach individuals, fam-
ilies, businesses, and others how to reduce their own crime risks. For the client, it is
a matter of learning and applying new skills. For the practitioner, the issue is to know
how to teach these skills to achieve maximum impact on the client.
Efforts to improve security at the individual level usually start with public edu-
cation programs and public awareness campaigns. Pamphlets and brochures are
developed and distributed, showing the homeowner or the businessman how to apply
security devices and procedures. Distribution of brochures may be coupled with
 Roles in Crime Prevention 25

exhibits in shopping centers or other public places, television and radio public
service announcements, newspaper articles, and personal presentations in schools
and at group meetings. These general education approaches are typically followed
up by a variety of specific efforts to teach crime risk management.

Teaching Crime Risk Management

Teaching the proper use of elementary security devices and procedures to a home
owner or business person is really only the first step in sensitizing that individual to
the concept of crime risk management. The crime prevention practitioner, who
thinks that security devices and simple procedures are the be-all and end-all of crime
prevention, has missed the fundamental point. That point is that even the most normal
and routine daily life is a constantly shifting and changing situation in which
good habits of attitude and judgment are more important in reducing the risk of crim-
inal attack than the simple devices and procedures. The practitioner must become
knowledgeable in helping clients to make the needed judgment calls in their daily
lives.
Having said that, it should also be pointed out that the rigorous application of
devices and procedures has a basic and important role. Properly ingrained in a
person’s life, good individual risk management consists mostly of judgment, but it
also consists of some very basic and essential “nevers” and “always.” (Always lock
your car. Never leave your home unlocked. Never leave large amounts of cash lying
around your store.) These kinds of absolutes are like the unfailing use of a check-
list by a good pilot. He never takes the chance that memory might fail him as he
inspects the various parts of the plane before flying in it. The use of a checklist does
not guarantee him a safe flight. What it does, is guarantee that he won’t carelessly
omit checking that one defective item on that one fatal occasion.
The support role of the practitioner is to teach people not only the proper appli-
cation of security devices and procedures, but also the essential habits of judgment,
which permit them to routinely avoid crime risk. The crime prevention practitioner
will engage in a wide range of formal and informal teaching and counseling activ-
ities aimed at helping individuals and organizations develop crime risk management
approaches.
For example, people may be counseled concerning such general behavior as
locking their cars and avoiding parts of town where street crime is rife. Women and
older people will be particularly counseled concerning their risk of exposure to
violent crimes. Parents are counseled concerning the risks their children face. Chil-
dren are taught how to be careful of their possessions, themselves, their homes and
their neighbors’ homes, and even how to teach their parents.
The principle behind all of these counseling and teaching efforts is that as
people expose themselves to crime risks by their behavior, they also can reduce that
exposure by modifying their behavior. Very much the same principle is involved in
safe driving. The driver who is skilled in defensive driving is able to identify poten-
tial accident situations while there is still time to avoid those situations, and take the
 26 Understanding Crime Prevention

necessary avoidance action. The unskilled driver, on the other hand, may not be aware
of an accident hazard situation until it is too late to avoid the situation. And, if he
does manage to identify the hazardous situation in time, he may not have the skills
to avoid it.
The crime prevention practitioner, to be effective, must learn how to motivate
as well as to teach practical knowledge.1 He must learn that new ways of doing
things, once taught, must be reinforced time and time again before they become
habitual actions. The crime prevention practitioner must not only teach proper secu-
rity actions to people in the first place, he must continually remind people to make
use of their new knowledge and skills.
His viewpoint needs to be analytical in nature. In other words, he must be con-
cerned that some minimum percent, at least, of the people he talks with not only
comply with his suggestions and recommendations, but also enjoy improved secu-
rity as a result. If he is aware of and concerned for his own batting average, he can
develop techniques to improve it. If, on the other hand, he is merely interested in the
number of people with whom he has made contact, he has no way of knowing how
he is performing in terms of improved client security. He measures his success sta-
tistically—by the degree to which his client group as a whole, over time, benefits
from the application of his teachings.
His concern must be that individuals learn to routinely take the action
that reduces or avoids the risk rather than to worry about whether the risk would
have actually developed into a harmful situation. An individual may never know
whether or not his actions have prevented a crime, just as the good defensive driver
may never know whether an accident would have occurred if he had not acted to
avoid it.
As the teachers of fire prevention, disease prevention, and defensive driving
know only too well, risk is an abstract concept that is hard to teach. The incautious
driver says, “It will never happen to me,” and ignores the risk. The overly cautious
driver says, “It’s going to happen to me,” and magnifies the risk. The concept of risk
implies that there is an appropriate preventive response to be made in each situation
and that what is appropriate in one situation may not be appropriate in another. The
person who is skilled in managing the risks associated with driving knows instinc-
tively that safe travel on a given road may require very different speeds at night than
during the day, in dry weather as opposed to wet weather, in heavy traffic as opposed
to light traffic, and even in one car as opposed to another.

Security Survey (see sample survey guides in Chapter 5)

A specific form of crime risk management counseling is the security survey, an on-
site examination of a physical facility (for example, home, business, industrial plant,
or hospital) and its surroundings.2 In a security survey, a trained crime prevention
practitioner inspects a home or business, and advises the client (occupant, owner, or
manager) of the risks and weaknesses observed and the measures that may be taken
to improve overall security. The facility is analyzed as a system, and recommenda-
 Roles in Crime Prevention 27

tions for improved security are also systematic. The basic idea is to help the client
to design and implement a crime risk management system that uniformly protects
him to some desired level and leaves no weak links for easy attack.
If the practitioner succeeds in his efforts to support individual action, the indi-
vidual will have been helped to develop a risk management system, which is appro-
priate to his lifestyle or type of business, the value and type of property within his
facility, and the existing crime patterns in his area.

Supporting Group Action

At this level of crime prevention action, the practitioner becomes primarily con-
cerned with actions of a group nature that tend to reduce the risk of each member
of a given population whether or not that person is willing to, or capable of,
taking appropriate individual action.3
By analogy to traffic safety, if most drivers on the road are good defensive
drivers, then there is also less chance that a careless driver will have an accident.
Should he have an accident anyway, there is less chance that others will be injured.
Or, if by law we require all cars built after a certain year to be inherently safer than
older cars, then all people who purchase and drive the new car will enjoy a reduced
risk of accident, whether they are skilled drivers or not. This doesn’t mean that a
drunk or careless driver can’t have an accident. We have simply, through collective
action or public policy action, reduced the likelihood of injury or death should a
crash occur.
The practitioner’s role at the group action level is to stimulate action, which
will not only be of great help to the careful individual in reducing his crime risk,
but also will be of some help to the individual who cannot or will not take appro-
priate action on his own behalf.

Examples
One of the more popular group action approaches is the Neighborhood Watch4
program. With the help of the crime prevention practitioner, residents in a given
neighborhood organize themselves to watch for suspicious circumstances and to
report these circumstances to police. Participants are encouraged to take improved
security precautions in their homes and in their daily lives.
At first, the surveillance and reporting function of a Neighborhood Watch
does not prevent crimes as much as it helps police do a better job of detecting
and apprehending criminals.5 However, over time, the fact that neighbors are watch-
ing out for neighbors and reporting to police, and the fact that police are respond-
ing, will become known to the local criminal population. If a would-be criminal
believes that his activities are likely to be seen, reported, and produce a police
response, he may feel that the risk is unacceptably high for him in the project
neighborhood.6
 28 Understanding Crime Prevention

This presence of a credible threat of observation, reporting, and apprehension

for the neighborhood as a whole is sufficient to reduce the level of criminal oppor-
tunity for each resident in the neighborhood, despite the fact that it is extremely
unusual to find a case where all residents of a neighborhood participate in
the program. Thus, if only a fraction of the residents are observing and reporting
suspicious activities for police response, all residents may be protected to some
degree, even those who carelessly expose their own homes and persons to criminal
attack.
On the other hand, Neighborhood Watch cannot completely protect the neigh-
borhood. If the would-be thief, burglar, vandal, or assailant is not aware of the sur-
veillance program, it will not affect his decision to attack. If he is drunk, under the
influence of drugs, or otherwise operating in an irrational manner, even knowledge
of the threat may mean nothing to him.7 Thus, a Neighborhood Watch project, like
a safe automobile, is no guarantee of safety. It merely reduces the probability that a
given resident will be attacked. Each resident (like the defensive driver) can further
reduce his vulnerability through individual security actions.
Neighborhood Watch is but one example of the wide variety of ways in which
the practitioner can stimulate action by, or on behalf of, a group. The well-lighted
parking lot at the shopping center does not guarantee that shoppers will not be
assaulted, robbed, or have their cars broken into. But, it does increase the probabil-
ity that a criminal will be seen by someone during the course of his attack. That
increased probability for surveillance will deter some number of attackers, however,
and the opportunity for crime will be reduced by the lighting program. If we design
a new neighborhood so that commercial and residential structures are intermingled
rather than separated, we create a situation in which people are more likely to be on
the streets day and night, which in turn increases the probability that a criminal will
be observed in the act.8 If we build a small grocery store as part of our high-rise res-
idential development for older people, we reduce the probability for robbery and
mugging of residents as they go to and from a more distant grocery store.
A very good demonstration of the combination effects of individual and group
actions recently occurred in Ocala, Florida.9 The Ocala Police Department has
involved all of its officers in the crime prevention strategy, modern problem-oriented
policing. The department has established working partnerships throughout the com-
munity and has developed several approaches to the specific problems that have been
identified. The Community Council Against Substance Abuse (CCASA), involved
the local governments, schools, the States Attorney’s Office, the Florida Department
of Juvenile Justice, and community-based organizations. The boards of CCASA have
members from all of these groups serving on them, thus maintaining the diversity
of interests needed to accomplish the program goals. The police department has
made full use of existing programs, such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(D.A.R.E.) and Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) in its efforts.
Additionally the Crime Prevention Section of the Police Department supports nearly
30 community activities, from the Business Police Academy to Vacation Bible
Schools, to involve as many citizens as possible.
 Roles in Crime Prevention 29

These actions have led to the recognition of the Ocala Police Department for
its efforts and the attendant reductions in crime. A complete statistical analysis of
Ocala’s and other crime prevention efforts indicates that some percentage of the
reduction may be indicative of the displacement of crime. This effect must be con-
sidered in all major crime prevention efforts since the goal is to prevent crime, not
modify, or move it to other neighborhoods.

Understanding Displacement
It is important for the practitioner to understand that by helping individuals and
groups to reduce their risk of becoming crime victims, however successfully, he may
not reduce the incidence of crime for the community as a whole. The reason for this
lies in the phenomenon of displacement.10
One of the problems associated with the crime prevention approach is that
while it affects criminal behavior, it does not have a direct effect on criminal moti-
vation. The criminal who perceives opportunity to be reduced below an acceptable
level in a given situation will probably simply seek a better opportunity. Thus, we
have displacement. If your home is adequately secured, the would-be criminal may
simply go next door. If all the homes in your block are adequately secured, the
criminal may simply go to the next block.11 If all opportunities for a particular kind
of criminal act are effectively denied him, he may try another kind of crime. Or, if
all opportunities for any kind of crime are denied him at a particular time, he may
simply wait until another time. At first glance, this might seem to present a hope-
less situation. There are, however, some factors that tend to offset the displacement
phenomenon.
It has been observed, for example, that many, if not most, opportunistic, impul-
sive criminals (particularly the younger, less experienced individuals who appear to
be responsible for the great bulk of criminal incidents) will only displace their activ-
ities to a limited degree. They operate most comfortably within their “home turf.” If
opportunity is denied them within that familiar area, they may go somewhat beyond
it to commit crimes. However, there seems to be strong relationship between dis-
tances from immediate home areas and the desire to commit crimes. By the same
token, it appears that the impulsive, opportunistic criminal who is denied opportu-
nity for “low-skill” crimes (for example, random burglary or vandalism) is unlikely
to tackle more difficult crimes.
The exact nature of limits on displacement and the exact degree to which the
limits may be expected to operate in a given situation is difficult to know. That limits
do make a difference has been shown time and time again in the practical experi-
ence of crime prevention practitioners. There have even been a few well-documented
research projects that demonstrate the operation of these limits. For example, a three-
year study of a neighborhood crime prevention project in Seattle12 indicated that if
a fairly large percentage of the residents in a given neighborhood took appropriate
security measures, crime rates decreased both for those protected homes and neigh-
bors who chose not to participate. Moreover, the study indicated that the net decrease
 30 Understanding Crime Prevention

of crime in the project neighborhoods was not offset by net increases of crime in
surrounding neighborhoods.13
It is therefore apparently safe to assume (though this cannot yet be absolutely
proven) that in addition to displacement of time, place, and type of crime, there is
also a phenomenon that we might call absolute displacement. When absolute dis-
placement operates, some percentage of the crimes that might statistically be
expected simply does not occur at all. Absolute displacement is the same as net
crimes prevented.
We will discuss displacement in a more practical sense later. For now, it is
enough to know that as long as crime prevention practitioners are dealing strictly
with individual action crime prevention, crime displacement may occur. Thus, even
though the practitioner has helped selected individuals avoid victimization, he may
have had no effect on the victimization potential of the community as a whole.
On the other hand, the fact that displacement has occurred should not be con-
sidered as entirely negative. In fact, the displacement of crime means that the prac-
titioner has at least partially succeeded in managing crime patterns.

Sustaining Group Action

Group action can be useful in reducing crimes against people in a geographic area
or population group, whether or not each person in the area or group chooses to par-
ticipate, and whether or not displacement results. But, such reduction, once gained,
may not remain in effect.
Increases in physical security do have the advantage of remaining in place, at
least until attack methods are developed that can overcome a particular defense. On
the other hand, a group activity, such as Neighborhood Watch, may retain its oppor-
tunity reduction effect only as long as it continues to operate.14
Clearly, it is more difficult to sustain than to establish any kind of significant
change in the behavior and action patterns of people. One need only look at the expe-
rience of the disease prevention field to realize this. For several generations, Amer-
icans have been taught and urged to adopt good health habits. Yet, it is still possible
for epidemics to occur anytime that public health agency pressure on the public
diminishes. Venereal disease, for example, was brought largely under control during
the 1950s and early 1960s. But it flared up again in the late 1960s and early 1970s
as public health programs turned their attention elsewhere.
There is much evidence to indicate that crime prevention efforts by individu-
als and groups are not necessarily self-perpetuating. Once people feel that they have
achieved some success, their efforts may dwindle or cease altogether. If this occurs,
it is logical to expect that, sooner or later, criminal activity will revert to its original
levels or higher. Thus, the practitioner must help sustain collective action.
The short-lived project may even have a negative effect in the long range. It
is relatively easy to induce significant numbers of people to participate in crime pre-
vention activities. But if the activities cease and crime thereafter returns to its former
levels, people may become disillusioned (whether rightfully so or not), and it may
 Roles in Crime Prevention 31

become difficult to obtain positive responses to crime prevention projects in the

future. Practitioners may be led to conclude, erroneously, that citizens are apathetic.
The lesson to be learned by crime prevention practitioners is that there can be
no such thing as a time-limited effort. There is no question that the crime preven-
tion approach can work, but there is also no question that it must be built into the
fabric of the community and made a permanent program if it is to have continuing
success.
The primary way in which this “building-in” occurs is through a process called
informal social control.

Informal Social Control

Group action works best if it stems from, or grows into, a stable pattern of social
interaction and a stable tendency for members of the social group to enforce
constraints on criminal behavior within the group. In general, the higher the levels
of social interaction, the lower the criminal opportunity.15 All other things being
equal, the neighborhood where people are in constant friendly contact with each
other will have a lower level of criminal activity than the neighborhood in which
people do not tend to interact socially. The first neighborhood tends to create for
itself a naturally hostile environment for criminal behavior, and the second neigh-
borhood does not.16
Where some level of informal social control already exists, the practitioner’s
role is to strengthen it. Where little or no informal social control exists, the practi-
tioner needs to bring to bear a variety of community organization skills primarily
through other people who are able to influence the behavior and attitudes of the
group. The practitioner needs to be very sensitive to informal social control because
the presence or absence of formal social organizations is not the same as the pres-
ence or absence of informal social control.

Guiding Public Policy Decisions

The practitioner’s role at this level is to identify the ways in which public policy
action can support and extend individual and group action, and to guide the
decision-making process leading to appropriate public policy action.
Just as the individual must turn to the group if he is to increase his security
beyond a certain point, so must the group turn to a larger entity at some subsequent
point. For instance, a homeowner can take reasonable security precautions for his
own home, but it takes the cooperation of neighbors to begin to make the streets and
playgrounds secure, and to reduce the crime pressure on the neighborhood as a
whole. However, the neighborhood acting collectively can only go so far. For
example, the neighborhood group cannot improve street lighting by itself, and it
cannot force closure of a neighborhood bar that serves as a crime magnet. For these
types of action, it must turn to appropriate branches of local government.17 The mobi-
 32 Understanding Crime Prevention

lizing of all available community and government assets to prevent crime is, there-
fore, a critical task of the practitioner.
The same kind of cycle repeats itself from the local level to the state level
and from the state level to the national level. Local government can, for example,
install additional street lighting, close the bar, and organize a comprehensive
crime prevention program for the whole community, but it cannot establish a spe-
cialized training center for crime prevention practitioners. State government can do
this, but it cannot create a national network for identification and return of stolen
property.
To more clearly understand the relationship of public policy to crime preven-
tion, we may view crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) (see
information in Chapter 6) as a prime example. As the practice of CPTED has grown,
several components of government have become actively involved. As local gov-
ernment involvement reached its limit, state government and agencies recognized
the benefits and became involved. The adoption of local codes and ordinances was
thus augmented by the development of state law. The involvement of national and
international groups has evolved into the security-related building codes now in
force.
The solution to this problem is the development of a uniform national secu-
rity building code, which can be adopted with minor changes by all communities.
These developments clearly demonstrate the growth potential for crime prevention
strategies. Several Canadian provinces are also currently working toward the adop-
tion of province-wide codes aimed at opportunity reduction.
A final case in point is that appropriate physical design changes in streets,
shopping complexes, neighborhoods, public housing, and other major community
components can directly or indirectly discourage criminal activity. In most cases, the
occupants of such areas lack the ability to change the major features of their phys-
ical environment, and must rely on the public sector (or a large non-government
entity such as an apartment complex owner) to energize or at least approve and coor-
dinate changes in street lighting patterns, roadway configuration, structural alter-
ations in building complexes, and other major environmental alterations.
The practitioner serves as the true intermediary between the crime prevention-
related needs of individuals and groups in the community, and the development and
coordination of action by government on behalf of groups and individuals. In per-
forming this role, he is led to the design of a community-wide program.

Developing a Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program

It is not until the practitioner is capable of working in a coordinated, community-

wide crime prevention program that he really begins to function as the nexus of com-
munity crime prevention efforts.
Any local government can make a public policy decision that can have great
impact on crime; that is, the decision to establish a comprehensive jurisdiction-wide
 Roles in Crime Prevention 33

crime prevention program. Such a program must have a permanent public agency
organizational base (for example, the crime prevention unit of the local police depart-
ment, the mayor’s council on crime prevention, a citizens’ crime prevention task
force, etc.), and should provide for:

• Jurisdiction-wide crime prevention responsibility;

• Capacity to formulate objectives and strategies;
• Ability to establish and sustain projects;
• Capacity to target projects to appropriate citizens groups; and
• Capacity to assess results.

It is only from the position of jurisdiction-wide program scope and responsi-

bility that specific programs and projects can be developed that complement each
other, relate productively to all interests, do not create more problems than they
solve, and lead rationally to the ultimate reduction of crime on a community-wide
basis. It is also only from this position that the full range of community skills and
resources can be mobilized.
The establishment of such a program should be the ultimate goal of all of the
practitioner’s efforts. This means that he must look beyond his own resources and
capabilities and those of his parent organization, to the wealth of resources and
support that can be provided by others.

THE ROLES OF OTHERS

Each significant social, economic, institutional, and political segment of the com-
munity has a number of potential resources that can be brought to bear on crime
prevention through the efforts of the practitioner. One of his major responsibilities
is to identify the specific roles that others can play in the community-wide programs,
and stimulate the various actors to develop and carry out those roles. Some of the
major potential actors and the types of roles that they might play are described below.

The Police Role

Active participation by all aspects of police organizations is essential to the success

of the community crime prevention program. If the practitioner is a member of a
law enforcement agency, he must work to ensure that such participation is devel-
oped and sustained throughout the agency. If he is not a member of a law enforce-
ment agency, he must work with police and other community officials to ensure that
proper participation does develop.
As the public agency responsible for responding to and investigating reported
crimes, and conducting a wide variety of peacekeeping activities, it is up to the police
to create and maintain the threat that a criminal will be identified and arrested. This
 34 Understanding Crime Prevention

threat is a basic part of most crime prevention strategies. As a primary source of

information on crime patterns, police agencies can provide guidance to the com-
munity on prevailing kinds of crime and the specific attack methods used by
criminals.
As the group charged with maintaining the public safety and security, police
are the logical public source of technical expertise for the anticipation, recognition,
and appraisal of crime risks, and the design of actions to remove or reduce crime
risks. Equally important, police can be the primary source of public education cam-
paigns in crime prevention and the communications center that coordinates all crime
prevention activity in a given jurisdiction.
Many police departments now have crime prevention units or crime preven-
tion bureaus. In some cases, the activities conducted are jurisdiction-wide and com-
prehensive in scope. In other cases, they are limited to individual client counseling
services and a few special projects. In any case, each police department should
develop an organizational unit with specific crime prevention responsibilities.
However, outside of their normal law enforcement and public service roles,
police agencies have limited powers. A trained police crime prevention officer can
recommend that a homeowner, businessman, neighborhood, developer, public
housing authority, industrial plant, or school take action to improve security and can,
if asked, provide detailed guidance as to what action to take. In most cases, he has
no legal authority to require that such action be taken (although he might be called
upon to enforce a building security code, a false alarm ordinance, or arrest a motorist
who, contrary to local or state law, leaves the keys in his car).
Police crime prevention programs, therefore, must rely on the cooperation and
voluntary participation of individuals and groups. The police role, though pivotal in
effective crime prevention programming, is that of an educational, technical, and
supportive resource—an “enabler” rather than a primary “doer.”18

The Private Security Role

Although police and other public law enforcement agencies (such as institutional
police forces, sheriffs’ departments, state highway patrols, state bureaus of investi-
gation, the FBI and other federal agencies) are the most visible means by which
society maintains public safety and public order, there is also a vast and diverse secu-
rity industry in this country that performs many of the same functions on a private
basis.19 The elements of the private security industry are:

• Guard, patrol, armored car, and other protective services;

• Security analysis, consultation and management; and
• Manufacture, distribution, sales, and installation of physical and electronic secu-
rity devices and materials.

Historically, the private security industry in the United States has been more
involved in asset protection and loss reduction than the public law enforcement
 Roles in Crime Prevention 35

sector.20 This is a natural consequence of the fact that people and organizations,
which contract for private security services and purchase security equipment, expect
their crime risks to be reduced directly as a result. The major sectors within the
private security industry are not well coordinated in their efforts, and until quite
recently, there has been little in the way of minimum performance standards within
or affecting most of the industry. Nevertheless, many of the specific skills and most
of the security devices in the “tool kit” of today’s crime prevention practitioner have
been adopted or adapted from private security.
The role of private security in comprehensive crime prevention programming
is generally to supplement and extend the crime prevention practitioner’s role in sup-
porting individual action and to perform services, which the practitioner cannot.
These services include management of security programs for private facilities, the
installation of security devices, and the provision of a wide variety of security ser-
vices for private customers.21

The Role of the Building Professions and Trades

Architects, engineers, construction contractors, land developers, carpenters, electri-

cians, plumbers, and the wide variety of other building professionals and skilled
trades need to become knowledgeable of appropriate aspects of crime prevention
practice. Street design, building site layout, building design, and techniques of con-
struction all have relevance to the possibilities for victimization in or near a given
structure.22 The practitioner relates to these individuals as a teacher and advisor.

The Role of Local Government Agencies

There is a significant crime prevention role inherent in the activities of most types
of public agencies, and some types of agencies can play a crucial role. The follow-
ing suggests some of the possibilities.

• Planning, zoning, community development, public works, and traffic engineer-

ing units can stress criminal opportunity reduction principles in both their general
and specific urban development activities;
• Housing and building inspection units can stress the need to develop and apply
good building security codes;
• Human service agencies can advise clients on proper security precautions, help
organize interest in group crime prevention action, and serve as a link between
client population groups and crime prevention practitioners;
• Schools can provide courses of instruction and other educational programs in
crime prevention;
• Fire departments can integrate crime prevention services with their current build-
ing inspection services;
• Public information units can promote crime prevention; and
 36 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Legislative and executive units (for example, council, mayor, etc.) can provide
political and financial support for crime prevention programs, supervise com-
prehensive programming, direct other public agencies to participate, and take the
lead in public policy development.

The practitioner can serve as the stimulus for these and other actions by local
government.

The Insurance Industry Role

Insurance companies and their affiliated and independent agents have a major role
to play in crime prevention. Their estimates of crime costs can, if supplemented with
risk management knowledge, make insurance representatives excellent sources of
advice to clients on proper security measures. Also, they can use premium discounts
as an incentive for clients who practice good self-security. On the other hand, they
can use premium increases or denial of coverage as a penalty for clients who do not.
The practitioner and his counterparts can work with insurance agents at the
local level and through the state and national insurance regulatory agencies, associ-
ations, and corporations. The insurance commissioner in each state is the primary
agent for stimulating this insurance company role. The practitioner will usually find
such groups very receptive to specific project suggestions.

The Role of Civic Groups and Related Government Activities

Service clubs, voluntary organizations, professional associations, labor unions, trade

organizations, and other civic groups can develop crime prevention education pro-
grams for members and can develop a wide variety of crime prevention service pro-
jects for the community. These may be integrated into the government sponsored
crime prevention activities, and these complimentary programs can provide a broad
impact. The concept of community-based government recognizes these vital part-
ners, and those governments that practice this concept see these extant groups as
valuable assets in their crime prevention initiatives.

The Communications Industry Role

Radio and television broadcasters, newspapers, magazines, book publishers, and

other public communicators can be instrumental in developing public information
and education programs in crime prevention. The rapid expansion of the Internet in
all areas of life has not excluded crime prevention. The Internet hosts a rapidly
expanding number of crime prevention related sites that provide a broad range of
 Roles in Crime Prevention 37

crime prevention information. The only problem associated with this development
is the often-staggering amount of information available. Broad category searches can
produce huge amounts of valuable data that must be sorted through in order to find
the best applications. The growth of the Internet has also provided many criminal
opportunities. The amount of information available has spawned new crimes related
to data and identity theft. These issues are being countered and the information
industry is working diligently to eliminate such opportunities in the future.
The practitioner can serve to educate, inform, and advise these groups. The
practitioner may also educate the public about the availability of crime prevention
information on the Internet.

The Role of the Business Community

Businessmen of all kind can help in the development of comprehensive crime pre-
vention programming by taking proper security precautions at their own establish-
ments, cooperating with other business people in group efforts, and providing
financial and political support for comprehensive programs and the development of
appropriate public policy decisions. Because business people can be shown that par-
ticipation in crime prevention activities is both good business and good public rela-
tions, the practitioner can usually obtain major support from this area.

The Role of the Citizen Organization

The many different types of formal and informal neighborhood groups, community
action groups, religious groups, youth groups, women’s groups, senior citizen groups,
ethnic groups, fraternal groups, and others provide a ready-made base for collective
action in crime prevention. These groups can develop a wide variety of projects and
programs in crime prevention for their members, their geographic areas, their groups
(for example, older people and women), or through coordination and political activ-
ity, for the community as a whole. These are important assets to be developed by the
practitioner. Group involvement provides access to larger numbers of citizens than
the practitioner could possibly contact independently. Like the civic groups, these
groups are usually receptive to appropriate projects suggested by the practitioner.

The State Government Role

State agencies with local counterparts can develop statewide emphasis on crime pre-
vention within those local units. State Crime Prevention Commissions, like that in
Virginia, can work with all interested groups to develop statewide training and edu-
cation programs. State police agencies can develop statewide education and advi-
sory programs, particularly for small towns and rural areas that may lack crime
 38 Understanding Crime Prevention

prevention-oriented local law enforcement. Attorneys-general and criminal justice

agencies can provide both political and programmatic sponsorship of coordinated
statewide education and information programs, as well as training programs in crime
prevention for local law enforcement personnel. The Office of the Attorney General
in Kentucky has specific crime prevention programming for senior citizens and
expends much effort on consumer protection against fraud and related crimes. Leg-
islatures can provide political and financial support, as can governors, and both can
be instrumental in key public policy decisions.
The practitioner may find it easier to relate to state government through a
statewide association of crime prevention practitioners or through local public offi-
cials than through his own individual efforts. A specific exception is the state crime
prevention program. Many states have developed or are developing, such a program
to support the efforts of local practitioners. The practitioner should be sure to take
full advantage of services provided by such a program in his state.

The Role of Practitioners’ Statewide Associations

In nearly all states, practitioners have joined to form crime prevention officer’s asso-
ciations. Such associations usually concern themselves with coordinating efforts to
improve crime prevention training throughout the state, with providing problem-
solving assistance to members, and with rallying state government support efforts.
They can also work usefully with other statewide associations (for example, busi-
ness, professional, labor, etc.) to build communication networks affecting every com-
munity. These associations can coordinate crime prevention activities and efforts,
frequently serving as a source for materials and information to individual agencies
and practitioners. For organizations to achieve their potential and for the individual
practitioner to also benefit, the practitioner should join and participate as much as
possible in association activities.

The Federal Government Role

While the activities of federal agencies at the national level are beyond the ability of
the individual practitioner to stimulate or influence, he or she may find a number of
local representatives of those agencies who will be only too glad to work with him
or her. For example, public housing authorities, federal reservations (for example,
military bases, health care institutions, national parks and recreation areas, federal
office complexes, local post offices, etc.), may have both needs, which the practi-
tioner can meet, and resources, they can make available to the community program.

The National Association Role

Each of the multitudes of national associations with a local constituency can develop
crime prevention service programs for that constituency and urge constituents to par-
 Roles in Crime Prevention 39

ticipate in local programs. The practitioner should become aware of those associa-
tions that have active crime prevention projects and work closely with their local
clubs or affiliates (see Chapter 11 for a listing of such associations).

The National Corporation Role

Major corporations and national industry groups can, acting by themselves or in

cooperation with government, develop crime prevention emphases for their prod-
ucts, establish good security programs in their own facilities, and encourage local
subdivisions to participate in local crime prevention programs. A good example of
this is the use of steering column locks in all American cars manufactured after 1971.
The practitioner should develop close relationships with any such corporations with
facilities in his area.

The National Crime Prevention Institute Role

The NCPI, by virtue of its wide-ranging knowledge of crime prevention practices

and its nationwide communications network of crime prevention practitioners, is in
an excellent position to provide national crime prevention strategy guidance to
federal agencies and Congress, as well as to continue serving as the collector and
synthesizer of new information and as the national training resource in crime
prevention.23
Practitioners should arrange to receive NCPI publications, obtain training, or
otherwise ensure that they can benefit from the knowledge and information, which
NCPI has to offer.

CONCLUSION

With appropriate support of the public and the governmental structure, the crime
prevention practitioner functions as teacher and advisor to individuals and groups
carrying out their responsibilities to protect persons and property in their neighbor-
hoods. This function has the greatest impact when the practitioner works out of a
city-wide crime prevention program, where a variety of skills and resources can be
brought to bear with respect to crime prevention projects, including the potential to
obtain funds from local, state, and federal levels. The practitioner must have the
structure and the resources to perform his enabling role in crime prevention.
However, he or she must also have the right perspective. First, he or she must
realize that his job is to guide the individual to protect persons and property within
his span of control. But, there is a limit as to what the individual can do about envi-
ronmental conditions outside of his sphere of control. In some cases, practitioners
must guide government to take action on behalf of its people. In other cases, such
as Neighborhood Watch, people can act in behalf of themselves, but the crime
 40 Understanding Crime Prevention

prevention practitioner is needed to provide guidance, the police are needed to

respond to reported crime, and other kinds of municipal support (as discussed
previously) may be required.
Second, crime prevention requires the broadest possible range of effective
resources, skills and relationships from and among elements in the community. The
practitioner must be able to assist those elements in planning, mobilizing and coor-
dinating their skills and resources. Finally, and most importantly, crime prevention
is a “thinking person’s” game. The practitioner has to know how to analyze crime
problems before making recommendations for solutions. The solutions have to fit
the problems, but he or she must understand the problems first, and he or she must
understand that as the problems change, so must the solutions. This relationship
between problems and solutions is more fully explored in subsequent chapters.
 4
Designing
Crime Risk
Management Systems

Beginning with this chapter, we examine the specific areas of knowledge and skill
needed by the crime prevention practitioner. The first of these areas, Designing
Crime Risk Management Systems, involves the practitioner’s services to—and rela-
tionship with—individual clients. The ability to design cost-effective crime risk man-
agement systems, which are also acceptable to a client, is the single most important
skill to be developed by the crime prevention practitioner. And, it is the primary
building block for all other practitioner skills. In this chapter we are concerned with
defining risk management, discussing the client-practitioner relationship, and
describing the tasks that the practitioner performs on behalf of the client.

UNDERSTANDING CRIME RISK MANAGEMENT

The concept of risk management1 is exemplified by the old saying, “nothing ven-
tured, nothing gained.” If we wish to receive some benefit, we must take some risk.
The risk can involve cost, loss, or both. Risk management attempts to reduce the
possibilities for cost or loss in order to derive the highest possible net benefit.
For example, we might wish to operate a jewelry store in order to benefit finan-
cially from the sale of jewelry. There are numerous risks associated with attaining
this benefit—the cost of our merchandise, the cost of operations, the possibility that

41
 42 Understanding Crime Prevention

we might not be able to sell the merchandise at a high enough price to cover our
costs, and the possibility that we might lose the merchandise through robbery, bur-
glary, or theft—to name a few.
Through application of risk management techniques, we would seek to reduce
these possibilities for cost and loss. Cost of merchandise might be reduced through
arrangements for quick delivery with a wholesaler, which permit us to purchase and
maintain a minimum inventory of jewelry. Also, the lower the inventory, the less the
total loss potential in the event of criminal attacks. On the other hand, low inventory
levels might also cost us some sales from customers who don’t want to wait a few
days for delivery.
We might install physical and electronic security devices to reduce the prob-
ability for loss in case of a criminal attack. Such installation would carry some cost.
Yet, that cost might be less than the cost of fully insuring the merchandise against
criminal attack, or, it might be offset by the reduced insurance premiums, which
would accompany the installation of a security system.
Thus, risk management in general and crime risk management in particular
always involves a variety of specific cost or loss reduction actions taken in some
appropriate relationship with each other to assure a maximum possibility for benefit.
This can be a rather complex undertaking because, as the example suggests, each
risk reduction action may involve a cost or loss. Crime risk management, like crime
prevention itself, must be understood as a “thinking person’s game,” and its essen-
tial basis is the idea of cost effectiveness.
Risk management refers to our efforts to exercise some control over each of
the various dynamic and pure risks we face. NCPI defines risk management as the
anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a risk and the initiation of some action
to remove the risk or reduce the potential loss from it to an acceptable level. (Note
that this is also the basic definition for crime prevention.) A risk management system,
however, implies that we are trying to control our risks in a systematic fashion, so
that all related risks are controlled to about the same degree, and our efforts to reduce
one risk (or maximize its benefit) do not create or increase another.
Any risk situation that carries the potential for both benefit and cost or loss is
called a dynamic risk.2 The manufacturer faces dynamic risk in deciding whether
or not to launch a new product line. The retail merchant faces dynamic risk in decid-
ing how much stock to purchase in advance for the Christmas season. The family
faces dynamic risk in deciding whether or not to purchase a more expensive home.
Here, the decision is based on the relationship between benefit and cost or loss.
A pure risk3 situation, on the other hand, is one in which there is no possibil-
ity for benefit, only for cost or loss. The risks of fire, flood, or other natural disas-
ters and, in many cases, the risk of crime are all pure risks. Here, all we can do is
minimize the potential for loss. The issue is simply how much we are willing to pay
or sacrifice to reduce the risk, and what method of risk reduction we prefer or can
afford.
It has been contended that all criminal activities represent pure risks.4
However, in a risk management systems approach, the countermeasures used against
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 43

pure crime risks may improve overall benefit or profitability because the counter-
measure (a cost item) both reduces potential loss and creates a potential benefit. For
example, television surveillance cameras were installed in a New Jersey shoe store
as an anti-shoplifting measure. To the owner’s surprise, the flow of customers and
purchases actually increased following the installation. Interviews with customers
convinced him that the cameras not only discouraged shoplifters, they made honest
customers feel more secure against purse snatching or other personal attacks, and
thus, more interested in shopping at his store.
In the above illustration, the benefit derived from the countermeasure was acci-
dental. But, the practitioner, who understands both the client’s interests and the ways
in which crime risk management systems are designed, can often produce such ben-
efits deliberately. One practitioner tells the story of a small grocery store in an urban
neighborhood that was plagued with shoplifting almost to the point of bankruptcy.
At the practitioner’s suggestion, the storeowner replaced much of his conventional
food stock with open displays of inexpensive items preferred by the people who lived
in the neighborhood. This attempt to cater to local tastes had the effect of increas-
ing his business and reducing the incidence of shoplifting, with the added benefit of
reducing his costs.
In the case of a family living in a home or apartment, development of a cost-
effective crime risk management system can not only reduce potential loss, it may
also have a beneficial influence on lifestyle. If the family feels more secure, levels
of crime-related fear and anxiety may be reduced accordingly. With the stress of fear
and anxiety reduced, life may become more comfortable and relaxed, with associ-
ated benefits for the entire family.
Thus, the practitioner must not only stress the reduction of potential loss, but
more importantly, the use of security measures that translate potential losses into
potential benefits or gains. Such a perspective allows the practitioner to truly serve
the interests of the client and increases the likelihood that the client will comply with
the practitioner’s recommendations. A crime risk management system, therefore, is
a systematic effort to maintain a balanced level of control over all crime-related risks.

WHO IS THE CLIENT?

A crime risk management system can only be designed on behalf of an individual

client, and a client must have the ability to manage the facilities and activities for
which a crime risk management system is designed. A homeowner, a businessman,
or an institutional administrator could be a client, but a group of homes in a neigh-
borhood or stores in a commercial strip could not. The reason for this restricted def-
inition of “client” is that the crime risk management system is but one consideration
in overall management, and is closely related to the management of funds, staff, pro-
duction, sales, facilities and even—in the case of a home—of lifestyle. In the absence
of a central management focus, a crime risk management system cannot be consid-
ered, let alone designed.
 44 Understanding Crime Prevention

The practitioner can and should apply the principles of crime risk manage-
ment throughout his practice of crime prevention. However, he or she can only
perform the specific task of crime risk management system design on behalf of an
individual client, as defined above.

THE CLIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP

Technical expertise alone is not a sufficient basis for a successful practitioner-client

relationship. The practitioner must, first and foremost, be able to recognize that each
potential client has a unique set of interests and will not knowingly violate those
interests, nor tolerate advisors who press him to violate them. The practitioner will
be ineffective if he or she insists on suggesting crime risk management approaches
that violate the client’s interests, whatever their merits are from a security viewpoint.
For example, putting all retail stock behind counters or in display cases might dis-
courage shoplifting, but it would also eliminate the self-service feature, which many
merchants find to be very attractive to customers.
To be accepted, trusted, and therefore to effectively render service, the practi-
tioner must be perceived as a professional who understands and respects the client’s
needs and wants.
To be effective in serving clients, one must care about them, and caring means
understanding and at least empathizing with (if not totally accepting) their needs,
problems, and viewpoints. Does this mean that we should tell clients whatever they
want to hear? Absolutely not. The doctor does us a disservice if he fails to point out
the health hazards associated with smoking and overeating. The accountant and
lawyer may land us in jail if they condone our income tax cheating. But, one must
first gain the client’s respect and trust if one is to serve him, and this may mean
putting off the hard-to-follow or unwanted advice until a relationship of under-
standing has been built. On the other hand, there may be matters that can’t wait and
force one, like the mule trainer, to “lumber” the client in order to get his attention.
In general, however, the crime prevention practitioner should develop a professional
relationship in which the client’s needs and desires, rather than the practitioner’s, are
used as the building blocks in the relationship.
The practitioner must also become familiar with the basics of his client’s oper-
ations. What kind of business is he or she in? Who are his customers? How does he
or she prefer to conduct operations? In the case of a resident, what kind of lifestyle
does the family prefer? In the case of a school or other institution, what methods of
operation and client groups do policy, tradition, and law require? Accurate answers
to these questions are crucial to the practitioner, because they help him relate to the
client’s unique situation in his crime risk management analysis.
It is crucial for the practitioner to understand the client’s perceptions and
attitudes toward crime because the threat perceived by the client can be very
different from the actual threat the practitioner determines through his crime pattern
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 45

analysis. On the one hand, the client’s fear may be higher than is justified, so the
practitioner may have to accommodate that fear in his crime risk management
system design. On the other hand, the client’s concern may be less than the level
suggested by the crime pattern analysis, so the client may be unwilling to accept
the level of security recommended by the practitioner. In either case, the client’s
perception of the crime threat will greatly influence all of his decision-making in
connection with crime risk management systems, and the practitioner must take this
into account as he works with the client. As part of understanding the client’s per-
ception of crime, the practitioner must also become aware of the client’s previous
victimization experience. This will be a significant factor in the practitioner’s per-
ception of crime and will underlie whatever security precautions the client has
already taken.

CRIME PATTERN ANALYSIS

Before he or she can begin to provide effective services to clients, the crime pre-
vention practitioner must understand prevailing crime patterns. Given the type of
client (e.g., home, jewelry store, bus depot, service station, etc.) and the client’s loca-
tion, the practitioner must be able to determine what crimes may impact the client,
who is likely to commit them, how they are likely to occur, and when they are likely
to occur. This analysis provides the practitioner with a picture of the crime pressure
to which the client is subject. A convenient way to understand crime pressure is the
crime rate by opportunity, which compares the number of crimes of a particular
type with the number of potential targets of that particular crime over a defined
period of time.
For example, if there were 1,500 residential burglaries in a given jurisdiction
last year, and the number of residences in that jurisdiction was 15,000, then the crime
rate by opportunity for residential burglary was 0.1 (1,500 divided by 15,000). This
rate can also be expressed as the number of crimes per thousand targets (100 in this
example) or as the probability that any given target would have been attacked
(1 chance in 10, in this example).
The crime rate by opportunity is thus usable in a very direct way to inform
both the practitioner and the client of the probability that the client will be victim-
ized by particular kinds of crime this year. This rate can be calculated for each kind
of crime for the jurisdiction as a whole (as in the above example) or for specific parts
of the jurisdiction such as a residential neighborhood or a commercial strip. All that
is required is the knowledge of the number of incidents of each crime and the number
of targets potentially exposed to each crime.
One can easily see from this simple example that although we can easily
discern the rate of victimization there may be a substantial difference at the
jurisdiction-wide level among client types as to their chances of victimization from
a particular type of criminal attack. A similar analysis performed at the neighbor-
 46 Understanding Crime Prevention

hood level would probably reveal an even wider variation in victimization chances.
This would provide the best crime prevention data since we are usually dealing with
the more manageable size of a neighborhood, rather than the whole city, in our
programming.
There are other dimensions of crime pressure that should not be ignored. For
example, what specific attack methods are most commonly used? What is the like-
lihood that crimes in progress will be observed and reported? These and other aspects
of crime patterns are discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. Suffice to say for
now, that the practitioner’s understanding of crime pressure should include the fol-
lowing, at a minimum, for each client type and location, and for each type of crime:

• Crime rate by opportunity;

• Typical and preferred attack methods;
• Typical and preferred times of attack (day, week, month);
• Suspect characteristics;
• Crime reporting patterns; and
• Typical types and amounts of loss.

CONDUCTING THE SECURITY SURVEY

Armed with his knowledge of crime patterns, client perceptions of crime and client
interests, the practitioner is ready to undertake a security survey of the client’s
premises. The purpose of the survey is to examine the client’s physical features, pro-
cedures, activities, and possible targets of criminal attack in order to recognize and
appraise the specific risks that are present.
The purpose of the security survey is to provide the practitioner with sufficient
knowledge so that he or she can map out crime risk management strategies for rec-
ommendation to the client. Note the use of the word strategies. Although the
practitioner must be concerned with detail in his survey, his or her overall objective
is to achieve a balanced crime risk management system design. For this reason, his
or her method of approach to the survey should also be strategic in nature. The format
used is a matter of personal choice, where none is mandated by the agency. This
permits the practitioner to develop an individual style. Where formats are mandated,
they provide a valuable checklist of items to be considered. For this reason the
practitioner should obtain, or develop a specific checklist or form to ensure
thoroughness.
The traditional approach to the security survey is to start with the exterior
of the client’s premises and work inward. The reasoning behind this approach is that
the practitioner puts himself in the place of the attacker and assesses the effective-
ness of each layer of security as he works his way in.
The strategic approach recommended by NCPI is completely the opposite.
NCPI holds that the practitioner should start at the very heart of the client’s opera-
tion by identifying the specific targets of possible criminal attack, whether they are
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 47

cash, property, or person. The first focus of concern then becomes the targets them-
selves, not the security devices and procedures that are being (or might be) used to
generally secure the premises.
For each specific target of criminal attack, the practitioner makes two impact-
related determinations:

• The possible maximum loss; and

• The probable maximum loss.

Possible maximum loss is the maximum loss that would be sustained if

a given target or combination of targets were totally removed, destroyed, or both. In
a retail store, for example, the possible maximum loss would be the store’s entire
stock.
Probable maximum loss, on the other hand, refers to the amount of loss a
target would be likely to sustain. For example, a merchant might have equivalent
value in his inventory of toilet paper and transistor radios. But, it is unlikely that a
criminal would remove dozens of cases of toilet paper when he or she could acquire
merchandise of the same value by removing a single case of radios. In this simplis-
tic example, the possible maximum loss would be the combined value of paper and
radios. The probable maximum loss would be the value of the radios alone. The
importance of the probable maximum loss calculations is that they permit the prac-
titioner to assign priorities to the targets at risk. They also permit him or her to estab-
lish realistic limits on the cost basis for the final crime risk management system
design because it is almost always uneconomical to secure a client beyond the prob-
able maximum loss level.

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE MAXIMUM LOSS

Starting with the identification of specific targets and their possible maximum loss,
the practitioner systematically works toward the outside of the premises, examining
each physical or procedural barrier to access to—or removal of—the target, and each
feature that would permit observation or detection of the criminal in the act of
approaching or removing the target. This may involve the assessment of several rings
of protection: for example, the safe, the room where the safe is kept, the surface of
the building itself, intrusion detection systems near the safe and at the building’s
surface, and any perimeter barriers (or multiple combinations of these). It may also
involve only one ring of protection—the stock in a retail store, which is only pro-
tected by the building shell.
For each component in the existing security system, the practitioner estimates
its effect on probable maximum loss. Upon completion of his assessment of exist-
ing security levels, he or she is able to estimate the net probable maximum loss for
each target. These estimates then become the driving force in his efforts to design
the crime risk management system.
 48 Understanding Crime Prevention

DESIGNING THE SYSTEM

When all crime risks have been identified for their probable maximum loss through
the use of the security survey, the practitioner is ready to consider methods for
managing those risks. He is always careful not to make the mistake of jumping to
solutions before this time, because he or she is aware of the need to design a ratio-
nal security system rather than a patchwork quilt of expedient security measures.
Knowing the targets of attack and their probable maximum loss—both separately
and together—makes it possible for him to apply the five principal methods of risk
management:

• Risk avoidance;
• Risk reduction;
• Risk spreading;
• Risk transfer; and
• Risk acceptance.

All crime risks can be managed to a desired level through application of one
or more (and in some cases, all) of these methods.

Risk Avoidance

This is always the first alternative to be considered. If the target can be removed alto-
gether, the risk can be completely avoided. For the homeowner, this might mean
keeping his valuable coin collection in a safe deposit box. For the merchant, it might
mean depositing his or her cash in a bank. For a gun dealer, it might mean elimi-
nating display stocks. Unfortunately, the application of the risk avoidance method
may often create additional problems that prohibit its use. The gun dealer would soon
lose customers if he or she eliminated his display stock. The merchant would be
unable to conduct business if he or she completely eliminated the use of cash. The
coin collector would probably be most unhappy if he or she could only work with
his collection in a small cubicle near the bank’s safe deposit vault.
Thus, relatively few significant risks can be altogether avoided because such
avoidance is likely to be extremely incompatible with the client’s method of doing
business or his lifestyle. However, it is well worth the practitioner’s energy to con-
scientiously apply this method as far as it will go. For example, the merchant or
homeowner may needlessly keep negotiable securities on the premises when a bank
vault would be just as convenient. Also, risks involving personal injury (such as car-
rying large amounts of money) can be avoided by changing personal behavior, even
if the risk of property loss remains.
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 49

Risk Reduction

If a risk cannot be avoided without creating severe operational difficulties, the next
step is to reduce it to the lowest level that is compatible with the client’s operations.
For example, the merchant can reduce his or her maximum probable loss by keeping
only enough cash on hand for immediate business needs during the hours his or her
store is open and by removing all cash to a bank each night. The coin collector could
schedule himself to work with the collection at home one evening each week and
keep the collection in the bank’s vault the rest of the time. The gun dealer could set
up an inventory control system based on his or her average sales rate for each type
of weapon and on the time delay between ordering and receiving additional inven-
tory, and thus have on hand at any given time only the minimum stock needed.
Risk reduction is probably the most fertile single method the practitioner can
use. Most clients needlessly expose themselves to risk in some significant ways. Risk
reduction is usually an easy and inexpensive way to take up the slack before apply-
ing the more costly and difficult measures. It is also the area in which the practi-
tioner’s knowledge of the client’s interests and ways of doing things pays the biggest
dividends. For example, the neighborhood grocery store owner referred to earlier in
the chapter needlessly exposed himself or herself to the risk of shoplifting by dis-
playing expensive products that his clientele seldom could afford. By converting to
a less expensive, more frequently used type of stock, he or she reduced his or her
maximum probable loss and attracted more customers.
Thus, risk reduction offers a good chance of not only reducing maximum prob-
able loss at little or no cost, it also offers the practitioner a way to provide improved
profits, feelings of personal security, or other benefits valued by the client.

Risk Spreading

Probable maximum losses that remain after the fullest possible use of risk avoidance
and risk reduction methods can be further reduced through risk spreading. This
method involves the application of security devices and procedures in an attempt to
deter possible criminal attacks, delay attackers so that they may be apprehended
before completing the attack, and deny access to high-value targets.
Security devices include barrier systems, surveillance systems, and intrusion
detection systems. Security procedures include those to protect persons and assets,
and those to prevent defeat of the security system itself, as well as a range of stan-
dard management techniques such as proper inventory control, training of supervi-
sors, accountability for employees who deal with purchasing and receiving, and other
procedures which should be used anyway if the establishment is to be managed
properly.
 50 Understanding Crime Prevention

Risk Transfer

Once risks have been avoided, reduced as much as possible, and spread as much as
feasible, the next step is to transfer risk to someone else. The most common kind of
risk transfer is the purchase of insurance. Insurance typically does not become cost-
effective until the first three techniques have been applied. That is, before they have
been applied, more insurance is required, and its unit cost is greater. The homeowner
who has already reduced the risk of losing his wife’s valuable jewelry by putting
most of the collection in a bank safe deposit box and keeping only a few of the most
used pieces in the house, and has spread the risk by good physical security and an
alarm system is now in a position to transfer much of the remaining risk by pur-
chasing special insurance. The cost of insuring a few pieces would be much less
than the cost of insuring a large collection, particularly in the presence of a risk-
spreading security system.
Insurance, however, can be very costly, particularly if it is purchased to cover
a wide range of maximum probable losses. In some situations, insurance may not
be available at all—or if it is, the premiums and the required deductibles are
extremely high. More and more insurance companies, too, are demanding that appli-
cants take reasonable risk avoidance, reduction, and spreading measures as a condi-
tion of insurance. Still, insurance is a valid loss reduction technique if it is used
selectively.
Another widely used risk transfer technique is to pass on crime losses to cus-
tomers in the form of higher prices. Broad application of this technique is to be
avoided, if possible, because it reduces the competitive position of the business.
However, where this form of risk transfer costs less (or no more) than an equivalent
amount of insurance, or where insurance is not available, it may be used in con-
junction with avoidance, reduction, and spreading.
Finally, risk can also be transferred to some degree through liability-limiting
techniques such as incorporation and partnership arrangements.

Risk Acceptance

Having used all other risk management methods to the extent possible, the practi-
tioner finally turns to risk acceptance. In this technique, the businessperson or home-
owner simply accepts residual maximum probable loss as a cost of doing business
or a cost of living. A good example of risk acceptance is the deductible feature of
the insurance policy. The holder of a policy essentially insures him- or herself to the
extent of the deductible amount, thus limiting his maximum out-of-pocket loss while
covering with his insurance any losses beyond his ability to sustain.
The test of risk acceptance should usually be that level of loss that the client
can handle without severely disrupting his operations. Up to that level, risk accep-
tance (in conjunction with adequate risk avoidance and risk reduction measures) may
be less expensive than risk spreading or risk transfer.
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 51

The practitioner must therefore be knowledgeable as to each client’s practical

loss limit.

Cost Effectiveness

The essence of risk management is cost effectiveness. To the practitioner, this does
not mean merely that it is important to keep the cost of security as low as possible
(consistent with good security), it also means that he should apply his knowledge of
risk management in as creative a way as possible, looking for opportunities for profit
or other benefit as well as ways to minimize loss.
For example, insurance rates can be very costly if no other means are used to
reduce crime risk. On the other hand, the use of Underwriters Laboratories-approved
alarm systems can bring as much as a 70 percent reduction in commercial burglary
insurance rates, and the savings may more than offset the cost of installing the alarm.
For another example, use of good procedural security practices may not carry
any cost at all, yet can substantially reduce risk. In addition, improvements in man-
agement practices stemming from security concerns may increase the profitability
of the enterprise as a whole (e.g., tighter inventory control, more effective purchas-
ing procedures).
It should be noted that only one of the five major risk reduction techniques
described above involves security devices. This does not mean that physical and elec-
tronic security systems are unimportant, but it does suggest that the practitioner who
thinks primarily in terms of hardware may be missing some excellent opportunities
to serve his client in more cost-effective ways.
One highly successful company in the labor productivity systems design field
guarantees its work by offering to refund its fee to any client who does not, within
the first year, realize a savings of at least $3 for every dollar invested in the contract.
As they have found, it is no more difficult to take the approach of maximizing profit
than it is to take the approach of minimizing loss. And, while we are not advocating
here that the crime prevention practitioner guarantee his work, we do strongly rec-
ommend that he or she always keep his eye on the goal of improving or expanding
the client’s operation, rather than on merely reducing the harm that might befall the
client.

MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLIENTS

In the course of his survey, the alert practitioner will have taken advantage of every
possible opportunity to develop further rapport with the client and to discuss his or
her methods of crime risk reduction. Thus, by the time the practitioner has finished
his work and submitted a report of findings and recommended actions (always pre-
pared neatly and logically in writing), the client should have an emerging inclina-
tion to start complying with the recommendations. Like the crime risk management
 52 Understanding Crime Prevention

system, which the practitioner has developed in his mind as the survey has pro-
ceeded, the recommendations to the client should be arranged systematically and
logically, each with adequate justification (i.e., with each client expenditure there is
a reduction of risk). To present a brief “laundry list” of miscellaneous recommen-
dations is to virtually ensure that the time of both the practitioner and the client has
been wasted.
Ideally, the practitioner’s report should not simply be mailed to the client, it
should be personally presented so that the practitioner has the opportunity to fully
explain and even to modify his own recommendations should a discussion with
the client produce new information, or should more creative approaches suggest
themselves.
This meeting with the client also permits the practitioner to immediately rein-
force the concept of crime risk management in the client’s mind, and increase his
level of motivation to comply with the recommendations. But, primarily, it provides
the opportunity for both the practitioner and the client to re-examine the recom-
mendations and fine-tune them as needed with respect to cost effectiveness, order
of priority, and applicability.
It is usually wise for the practitioner to revisit the client after some time has
elapsed (30–60 days, for example) since the recommendations were made and dis-
cussed. During this visit, the practitioner can actually observe the extent to which
his recommendations have been carried out, and determine the reasons for any
observed noncompliance. Second thoughts on the feasibility and desirability of the
various security provisions can be discussed and modified again as needed, and the
practitioner can once again stimulate the client and reinforce the risk management
idea.
Thereafter, the practitioner should continue to visit the client periodically to
perform routine check-ups. During these visits, he or she can not only continue to
reinforce the client, he can also provide new information on changing criminal attack
patterns in the area and answer questions that may have arisen in the client’s mind.
Perhaps most importantly, he or she can provide feedback to the client on the actual
effectiveness of similar security programs in other homes or businesses around town.
To perform this task properly, the practitioner must maintain good statistical records
on crime incidence and attack patterns.
Finally, the practitioner should always immediately revisit any client who is
victimized. The purpose of this visit is to analyze the attack pattern used and the
types of losses that occurred in order to yet again adjust the client’s risk manage-
ment system as necessary, and to obtain full knowledge of the reason for failure of
that particular security system.
The practitioner’s performance in the area of service to individual clients
should always be measured by his “batting average” of client compliance with his
recommendations and by the subsequent victimization experience of clients who do
comply. He or she should not only be concerned with the compliance rate but also
the level of effectiveness of the crime risk management system.
 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems 53

CONCLUSION

In summary, the design of crime risk management systems is concerned with serving
the individual client so that the environment for which he or she is responsible is
both secure and consistent with his interests and lifestyle. This requires the practi-
tioner to look systematically at targets of attack and existing security elements in
relation to profit, in the case of business, and to lifestyle, in the case of residence.
It also requires that the practitioner be as concerned with improving the prof-
itability, comfort, and convenience of the client as well as with reducing his risk.
But, reducing the vulnerability of individual clients is not the end-of-the-line for the
practitioner because the criminal may simply displace his or her efforts to more
attractive targets. Thus, the practitioner must also develop group action and public
policy action approaches, which will be discussed in chapters 6 through 10.
 5
Security Devices
and Procedures

The preceding chapter was a review of the basic skills involved in designing crime
risk management systems. In this chapter we present a summary of the security
devices and procedures that can be used in the risk spreading method of crime risk
management. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of security
devices and procedures rather than to equip anyone with immediately applicable
skills. There are numerous publications, which provide the depth and detail on these
subjects, and these should be studied carefully before the practitioner attempts to do
system design.

OVERVIEW

Risk spreading involves physical, electronic, and procedural measures used either
alone or in combination to directly oppose a possible criminal attack. Specifically,
such measures are intended to:

• Deter the criminal from attacking;

• Detect him or her if he or she does attack so that a police (or other) response
may be initiated;
• Delay him or her so that he or she may be apprehended before achieving his
objective; and
• Deny him or her access to particular targets.

55
 56 Understanding Crime Prevention

Physical security places barriers in the path of the potential attacker to deter
him or her from attacking, delay him or her if he or she decides to attack, and deny
him or her access to high-value targets even if he succeeds in penetrating the secu-
rity system. A barrier may be either physical or perceptual. A solid building wall or
steel safe is a physical barrier. A boundary fence, a row of shrubbery or even a
“beware of the dog” sign can serve as a perceptual barrier. Perceptual barriers can
be quite effective in deterring attackers, but for effectiveness, must rely on the pos-
sibility that the attacker will believe them to be effective. They will only deter, and
will not delay or deny should the criminal decide to attack. Physical barriers, on the
other hand, can deter, delay, and deny the attacker.
Electronic security that permits a criminal attack to be detected, will usually
not delay or deny, but can deter to the degree that the attacker is aware that he may
be detected. (In this sense, electronic security systems serve as perceptual barriers.)
Electronic security measures are basically extensions of the human senses (with
the exception of electronic locking devices, which more properly belong in the
physical security category). Surveillance systems provide direct or indirect visual
observation, and intrusion detection systems provide the ability to detect attackers
in the absence of visual observation.
Procedural security measures can deter, delay, detect, or deny by restricting
authorized access to targets; by requiring that several persons cooperate in any effort
to reach a target; by providing for formal or informal observation of targets; by
reducing, dividing, and spreading, or eliminating the targets themselves; and by
many other similar approaches.
The best overall protection results from the interaction of an appropriate
combination of physical, electronic, and procedural measures (Figure 5-1). Where
such interaction is systematically developed, the resulting levels of security can be
far greater than would be provided by any of the parts of the system. Where three
interact, security is greater than where two interact, and so on.

Figure 5-1. Interaction effects of physical, electronic, and procedural security.

 Security Devices and Procedures 57

For example, a relatively secure perimeter barrier system (i.e., walls, doors, and
windows of a structure) may be equipped with an intrusion detection system, and
procedural and electronic controls may be used to restrict access to door keys and
the vital parts of the intrusion detection system. Thus, the physical and procedural
measures protect both the building’s contents and the intrusion detection system, and
the intrusion detection system ensures that unauthorized attempts to break through
the physical security system will be detected.

PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS

Although there is a wide variety of natural and man-made physical and perceptual
barriers that can be part of physical security systems, we will only concern ourselves
here with the most common types, namely:

• Boundary markers as barriers;

• Perimeter barriers;
• Perimeter access systems; and
• Internal barriers.
Before addressing these barrier types, let us consider some of the general and
specific functions of barriers.

General Functions

Most barriers have several functions. Walls and roofs, for example, are designed to
provide shelter against weather, to provide an insulated enclosure for heat and air
conditioning, to provide internal light, to create a pleasing appearance, and to be
cost effective with respect to these functions. In many (if not most) cases, walls and
roofs are not primarily designed to provide security, although they may be relatively
secure as a coincidental by-product. Sometimes, security is a primary consideration
in building and wall design. Even so, security factors must compete with other
functional and cost considerations.
Inevitably in barrier design, some sort of balance must be struck among the
various needs for security, convenience, utility, illumination, access, climate control,
and pleasing appearance. The objective is to design the barrier so that security
features are compatible with all other considerations, are cost effective, and provide
the needed degree of protection.

Security Functions

The use of barriers for protection against unwanted intrusion predates recorded
history. Primitive tribesmen fortified hilltops. These later evolved into elaborate
strongholds with high stone walls surrounded by moats or built on the top of sheer
 58 Understanding Crime Prevention

cliffs. Castles were deliberately built in inaccessible places, and usually consisted of
a maze of small, dark rooms with few windows. They were hard to heat and impos-
sible to clean, but they were also difficult to invade. The castles successfully over-
come were almost always starved into submission after a long siege or betrayed by
internal complicity.
Modern technology, however, can overcome any passive barrier, no matter
how formidable. Any barrier can be penetrated given time, opportunity, skill, and
desire.
But, absolute protection is seldom required of barriers. Unlike an invading
army, the criminal rarely approaches with overwhelming force. In fact, the
overwhelming force is almost always on the side of police and other security forces.
The criminal, therefore, usually tries to attack quickly and quietly, so as not to
attract the attention of reaction forces. This need for stealth necessarily limits both
the techniques the criminal can use and the amount of time he is willing to spend
making his attack. Thus, the primary functions of a barrier are to delay the intruder
as much as possible and to force him or her to use methods of attack that are highly
conspicuous or noisy.

Deterrence
Ideally, a barrier should discourage most potential intruders from trying to penetrate
it. It should also improve the likelihood of detection by requiring that the attacker
make himself conspicuous while attempting his penetration.
A barrier should be at the very least resistant enough to deter casual, oppor-
tunistic, or impulsive intrusion. The unplanned, impulsive attack by the relatively
unskilled intruder is the type that most often plagues residential and commercial
establishments. Here, a single stout barrier may discourage the opportunist.
As the value of the target increases, however, the strength of the barrier must
increase proportionately. High-value targets tend to attract more determined attack-
ers who can often bring considerable expertise to the attack. This type of attacker
can only be deterred if the barrier is strong enough to convince him that the attack
is not worth the risk. In general, the more formidable the barrier appears, the more
potential intruders will be deterred by it.

Delay
Given an attacker with sufficient time, the proper tools, and the necessary skills and
determination, any barrier can be breached. Therefore, if it does not discourage the
attack, the barrier must delay him or her long enough so that he or she can be detected
and apprehended before he or she reaches or removes his target. The amount of delay
a barrier must provide is partially a function of the value of the property to be pro-
tected but, more importantly, it is a function of the likelihood of detection of (and
response to) the attack. If provision can be made for quick detection and rapid
response, a barrier need not provide for extensive delay. On the other hand, if the
attack is not likely to be detected or responded to rapidly, then substantial delay must
 Security Devices and Procedures 59

be built into the barrier. This trade-off between delay time and detection time is
perhaps the single-most important consideration in designing a barrier.

Conspicuousness
Good barrier-design not only delays the attacker, it also forces him or her to use
attack methods that can call attention to his presence. Thus, the fact that an intruder
must use bulky and conspicuous tools and make a lot of noise in order to gain
entrance has its own deterrent potential, even though the barrier design that forces
the conspicuous behavior may have been intended primarily to delay him or her.

Intrusion Versus Escape

Barriers not only make it difficult for an intruder to gain entrance, they should
also increase the difficulty of removing valuable property from the premises. For
example, if the first floor exterior design of the building is such that an intruder can
only gain entrance through second floor windows, and if the first floor barrier design
is as impenetrable from the inside as from the outside, then the intruder is forced
to remove only that property that can be safely handled through the second floor
window. Such anti-removal designs also reduce the attacker’s escape route options.

Circles of Protection
Seldom is there a situation in which only one barrier is used. In most cases, even
where security is not a consideration, there are likely to be at least two layers of
barrier protection around a target. The first barrier might be a fence. The second
might be the walls and roof of the structure itself. Or, the first might be the surface
of the structure, and the second might be a secure interior room.
In security design, the concept of concentric barrier circles should be extended
in depth as much as possible. Not only might there be an outer protective ring (such
as a fence) at the property line and a second ring consisting of the building shell,
but also within the building there might be one or more additional barriers to protect
specific targets. For example, a truck terminal might have a boundary fence, an inner
fence protecting the area where trucks are parked, a building within which freight
is stored, an inner secured area for high-value freight items, a separate secure room
for valuable records, and a safe within that secure room for the storage of cash. Thus,
an intruder intent on reaching the cash would have to overcome several barriers of
increasing difficulty before reaching his target.
The same idea might be used in a home; a fence around some or all of the
property, the shell of the home itself, a secure storage closet, and a money safe inside
that closet.
A single barrier ring (particularly in the case of commercial or industrial
establishments) may be both ineffective and dangerous, because once an intruder
penetrates it, he or she may be free to do as he or she wishes, screened from obser-
vation by the barrier that was intended to keep him out in the first place.
 60 Understanding Crime Prevention

Boundary Markers as Barriers

In the past, it has been customary to treat as barriers all physical objects used to
define the limits of protected property and then to classify as perceptual barriers
those boundary barriers, which were less difficult to penetrate (for example, low
fences and hedges). The growing weight of evidence, however, suggests that no
boundary barrier can serve as anything more than a perceptual barrier because
it has been demonstrated that even the relatively unskilled attacker can go over,
under, or through any boundary barrier in a matter of seconds.
Hence, fences, boundary walls, hedges, and other such obstacles are referred
to by NCPI as boundary markers, to make it clear that boundary marking is their
major function. If boundary markers can also provide a degree of perceptual
security, so much the better, but in no event should they be considered as physical
security systems.
Boundary markers generally take the form of wood or metal fences, and
concrete and masonry walls. Of these, the concrete or masonry wall is the most
substantial, but it is also the most costly. Chain link, barbed wire and wood
stockade fencing provide less overall security, but they are usually much less
expensive.
Boundary markers may attempt to provide perceptual security while serving
other functions. Particularly in residential applications, fences and walls are often
used for privacy purposes. They also enhance the appearance of the property, define
its boundaries, prevent casual trespassing, and confine small children and pets. They
are ordinarily low, insubstantial, and simple to climb.
If a boundary marker is to provide any significant degree of perceptual secu-
rity it must be designed and built with that purpose in mind. Generally, security
fences or walls are stronger, more substantial, higher, and with fewer projections to
aid in climbing than fences and walls built for other purposes.

Concrete and Masonry Walls

Poured concrete, laid-up concrete building blocks, or bricks may be used to build a
solid wall. Poured concrete walls are more expensive than concrete block walls, as
well as more difficult to penetrate, but current tests indicate that any wall can be
penetrated in minutes.
To discourage climbing attacks, such barriers can be topped with broken glass
set in concrete or with barbed wire, often on outriggers, and leave no projections on
the external side to make the wall easier to climb. Even with such provisions,
however, a concrete or masonry wall does not provide much protection against climb-
ing. For example, an 8-foot high masonry wall topped with glass and/or barbed wire
can be climbed in under five seconds.
An important deterrent aspect of concrete and masonry walls is that
the unskilled intruder cannot look through to see what might await him on the
other side.
 Security Devices and Procedures 61

Fences
Three types of boundary marker fencing are currently used; the wood stockade fence,
the barbed wire fence, and the chain link fence. All provide about equal protection,
and all cost less than concrete or masonry walls.
Certain guidelines apply to all. For example, the fence should be relatively
high to discourage climbing (7–8 feet). Sharp projections, such as barbed wire,
barbed tape, and metal, or pointed wooden stakes installed along the top of the fence
provide additional defense against climbing. The exterior surface of the fence should
be free of projections that can serve as hand- or footholds. Fence posts should be
placed in concrete. The fence should extend to within 2 inches off the ground to dis-
courage those who might crawl under it. Concrete curbs or buried wire mesh should
be used to discourage easy underneath entry.
Maintenance is a very important factor with perimeter security fences, because
an improperly maintained fence can quickly lose its effectiveness. Objects that can
serve to reduce the effective height of the fence (such as cartons, crates, and trash
stacked in such a way that they can be used for climbing) should be kept away. Pro-
visions should be made to prevent vehicles from being driven alongside the fence
to aid the climbing attacker. The fence should be visually inspected often for breaks
and evidence of tampering. This reduces the chance that an intruder will weaken the
barrier one day and return later to complete his attack. Additional maintenance items
include the regular clearing of brush and grass, and the regular testing of any alarm
systems or surveillance devices used in conjunction with the fence.
Wood fences are intended only to discourage the relatively unskilled oppor-
tunist. Against skilled and determined intruders, they provide little real protection,
because an attacker can climb the fence quickly, remove portions of the fence, or
even attach a chain to the fence and pull it down with a vehicle.
Barbed wire fences offer no more protection than other fences. Specifically,
the barbed wire fence is quite vulnerable to an intruder equipped with heavy-duty
wire cutters or bolt cutters. However, barbed wire fences cost less to build than
wooden or chain link fences, and thus may be the preferred type of boundary marker
in some situations (e.g., agricultural fencing).
Chain link is by far the most common type of fencing used for boundary
marking. It is relatively attractive, low in maintenance cost, simple to erect, and less
of a safety hazard than barbed wire. Vinyl and wood strips can be inserted into any
standard mesh to restrict visual penetration. However, the best chain link fence can
be climbed or penetrated by determined attack in less than a minute.

Gates
Gates are often the weakest part of the boundary marker. The usual reason for this
weakness is improper design or installation. Gates should fit tightly between posts
(and between each other in the case of double gates) because a gap of only 6 inches
is sufficient to permit the entry of an intruder. Built-in locks are preferable to pad-
 62 Understanding Crime Prevention

locks and chains, because the padlock is totally exposed and subject to a variety of
attacks.
It is particularly important that the gates remain secure from the inside as well
as outside. If target items are so large that they cannot be carried over or through
the fence, a secure gate may foil the attack.

The Boundary Marker-Barrier System

Boundary markers of any kind can be defeated by climbing, tunneling, or breaking
through in less than a minute. A wall or fence used without additional security mea-
sures is merely intended to pose a psychological deterrent to the opportunistic
intruder. For this reason it is important to choose a fence or wall that has a formi-
dable appearance and to avoid a flimsy appearance that would invite attack.
However, it should again be emphasized that no boundary barrier will deter a
skilled and determined intruder. The purpose of the barrier is to delay him or her
until an appropriate response can take place. But since only a limited delay can be
provided, the ability to quickly detect an attack in process becomes crucial. Sur-
veillance and intrusion detection systems (e.g., lighting, visual monitoring, and
alarms), can dramatically increase the risk to the intruder if they are combined with
quick response capability by police or security forces.

Perimeter Barriers

A perimeter barrier is any obstacle that defines the physical limits of a controlled
area, and impedes or restricts entry into the area. It is the first line of defense against
intrusion. In a planned, in-depth security system, it may be only the first of several
obstacles the intruder must overcome before reaching the target area. At a minimum,
a good perimeter barrier should discourage an impulsive attacker. At the maximum,
when used in conjunction with other security measures, it can halt even the most
determined attack.
A variety of obstacles may serve as perimeter barriers, but for our purposes
here, building surfaces (for example., floors, roofs, and walls) are the only type of
perimeter barrier that need be considered.

Floors
Floors are the least likely point of entry in most buildings. Ordinarily, the floor is
either a concrete slab or a wooden surface protected by an enclosed basement or
foundation. Weak spots or openings in foundation walls make it possible for an
intruder to get under the floor where he or she might work for an extended period
of time without visual detection, as do pilings or other openwork foundations, under-
ground sewers and other utility passages. No matter how strong the floor is, it can
 Security Devices and Procedures 63

be penetrated by a determined intruder who has access to the underside of it and

time to employ tools in an unobserved fashion.

Roofs
Sloping roofs (of whatever style) are unattractive to intruders because anyone on a
sloping roof is usually visible from ground level. The slope itself poses a risk of
falling, and the necessary tools must be held in place while not being used. However,
sloping roofs should be analyzed with respect to ventilating ducts, skylights, or other
possible access points.
The flat roofs most often found on commercial buildings can, on the other
hand, be very attractive to intruders. Because the walls on many commercial build-
ings extend a few feet above the roof line, they may provide excellent concealment
for any intruder attempting to penetrate the roof. Large, sophisticated tools can be
used for an extended period of time, and a considerable amount of noise can be made
if the building is unoccupied. Given such favorable attack conditions, no flat roof
except one made out of thick reinforced concrete offers any real resistance to
penetration. However, penetration of the roof itself is seldom required, because the
typical flat commercial roof offers numerous skylights, ventilation openings,
trap doors, and other maintenance access ways that are more convenient points of
penetration than the roof itself. Such access points can and should be strengthened
to the point of at least being as penetration resistant as the rest of the roof.

Walls
Wood frame and masonry are the two basic materials used in most wall construc-
tion. Most single-family residences have wood frame exterior walls, with or without
a surface layer of masonry. The rest have solid masonry walls. For commercial
structures, masonry or concrete is usually the material of choice because of its
durability and resistance to fire.
Wood frame walls are relatively inexpensive, easy to build, durable, and
provide good insulation against noise, weather, and heat loss. But they do not provide
much penetration resistance unless additional protective measures are taken to
strengthen them. However, even frame walls can deter the impulsive intruder. His or
her points of attack will almost always be doors, windows, and other access ways,
and if these are secure he will move on to an easier target unless there are high-value
items inside the structure. But because a determined intruder can break through an
ordinary frame structure in just a few minutes, a frame wall is insufficient protec-
tion for high-value property, unless coupled with an intrusion detection system.
Masonry and concrete walls, more expensive than frame walls, are used
especially in commercial and institutional structures because of their durability and
resistance to fire and insulation against weather, noise, and heat loss. They usually
consist of either poured concrete or concrete block.
 64 Understanding Crime Prevention

As has been mentioned, poured concrete walls are relatively difficult to pene-
trate. However, concrete block walls, which have not been filled with concrete or
reinforced with steel, can be as vulnerable to attack as wood frame walls. On the
other hand, any masonry walls can be penetrated by a determined attack.

Perimeter Access Systems

The most vulnerable points in any building surface are the gaps in the wall, floor,
or roof that can permit entry of an intruder or tool into the protected space inside.
Doors and windows are the most obvious types of access openings, but there are
many others, such as vents, ducts, mail slots, coal chutes, skylights, sewer mains,
utility tunnels, and so on. Any opening of 96 square inches or more, providing that
one side is at least 6–8 inches, is big enough for an intruder to wriggle through. Even
smaller openings can be used to open a larger access barrier from the inside or to
extract target items using suitable tools.

Doors
The door system includes the door itself, the hinges, the lock, the strike, the locking
bolt, the door frame, and the structure of the supporting wall. Glazing adjacent to
the door system must also be considered here as it can, if not given consideration
provide a simple means of defeating the door system. All of these elements (as shown

Figure 5-2. Door system components.

 Security Devices and Procedures 65

in Figure 5-2) must be designed to work together, because a weakness in any one
element can compromise the security of the entire system. Door systems can be made
as strong as necessary (vault doors, for example, can be built to withstand highly
sophisticated attacks for extended periods of time). For most purposes, door systems
used in residential and commercial applications provide adequate security if they
can resist an intruder’s strength supplemented by a limited variety of tools. Unfor-
tunately, many (if not most) door systems currently in use cannot provide this degree
of protection.

Wood Doors (See Figure 5-3). Two types of wooden doors are used for security
purposes: flush doors and panel doors. Screen doors, storm doors, jalousie doors,
and other types of doors used for weatherproofing or decorative purposes are not
suitable as security barriers without substantial reinforcement.
A flush door has flat interior and exterior surfaces and no glass panes, panels,
louvers or grills, and may have a variety of filler materials.
Hollow core doors are not at all suitable as security barriers. The average
person can kick a hole through the door with one or two blows, since the thin wood
skin offers little resistance to penetration. With a hammer or other suitable tools,
passageway can be made to allow direct intrusion, or a smaller hole can be made to
permit the intruder to reach in and unlock the door from the inside. Although the
hollow core door can be reinforced to some degree, the cost of a reinforced hollow
core door would (at best) be little less than the cost of a solid door.

Figure 5-3. Types of wood doors.

 66 Understanding Crime Prevention

In the solid, wood block core door, blocks of wood of varying lengths are usually
glued together and then glued to the face panel. This results in a door that is as sub-
stantial as a solid wood plank door, if not more so. Wood block core doors are the
most expensive of the solid core type but are quite resistant to tool and muscle power
attacks, although they can be breached given sufficient determination and time.
The particleboard core consists of wood particles or sawdust bonded and
formed under pressure. Particleboard offers less penetration protection than solid
wood, but such a door is usually much less expensive than the wood block core door,
and certainly provides, on an average, significantly more protection than a hollow
core door.
The mineral or insulation core door contains fire resistant materials. The
degree of security provided by such doors is only slightly better than that provided
by a hollow core door because the insulation material can easily shatter or crumble
under a determined attack.
Among the solid core flush doors, the wood block core is easily the best choice
for security application. The particle board door (given a high enough density of the
particle material), while significantly less secure than the wood block core, never-
theless provides a distinctly higher level of security than the mineral core or
the hollow core door. The mineral or insulation core door is only slightly more
secure than the hollow core door, and neither one should be considered appropriate
for security applications.
The panel, or stile and rail, door is the only other common type of wooden
door. The basic weakness of the door is the panels themselves. Any panel can be
kicked or knocked out of the door, permitting ready access to the protected interior.
The use of glass in a panel door further compromises its security unless impact resis-
tant glazing material is used. Thus, a panel door can have special security problems.
However, if the panels are too small to permit entry if knocked out, an inside keyed
cylinder will prevent the intruder from reaching in and unlocking the door. In addi-
tion, the panels or vision lites may be backed by break-resistant glazing material or
expanded steel mesh.

Steel Doors (See Figure 5-4). The hollow steel door is generally stronger, more
durable, less susceptible to damage and deterioration, and usually provides better
protection against forced entry.
The standard steel door consists of a steel grid frame or core material around
which is wrapped sheet steel in various thicknesses. For security purposes, the sheet
steel used to face the door should not be thinner than 20 gage. Common standard
steel doors currently in use are described below.
Full flush doors use an enclosed grid type of steel frame and the steel face
panel is wrapped around this grid, but no seams are visible on either face of the door.
In the seamless variety, no seams are visible on the vertical edges either.
The recessed panel door has a panel or panels made of a shingle sheet of
steel. Because of the single sheet panel, it is not ordinarily suitable for security
application.
 Security Devices and Procedures 67

Figure 5-4. Common types of steel doors.

The kalomein door is made by rolling two face panels of light steel around a soft
wood frame and filling the interior cavity with injected plastic. Such doors are vul-
nerable to a variety of attacks unless specially reinforced, but can provide more pro-
tection than a wood panel door, although not as much as a solid wood block core
door, and not nearly as much as a standard steel door.
 68 Understanding Crime Prevention

Core materials used within steel doors have a range of security implications.
A heavy gage steel grid frame in which the framing members are closely spaced
provides the best security barrier. The second best type of core is one that contains
horizontal sheet stiffeners of heavy gage steel. Foam and mineral insulation cores
have no security value.
Reinforcement should be used around the hinges and the locks for increased
protection and durability. All locks should be mounted in a reinforced lock
bracket designed for the type of lock used. Grills should be fabricated of heavy
steel and applied so that no fastener is exposed on the exterior (i.e., security
side) of the door. Glazing should be a material that resists breaking such as
laminated glass, acrylic or polycarbonate glazing material, or available security
film applications.

Aluminum Narrow Stile Glass Doors. Aluminum framed glass doors such as those
used on residential patio doors and the front doors of business establishments have
always posed security problems. Over the years a number of measures have been
developed to reduce the vulnerability of these doors, but basic problems remain that
cannot be entirely eliminated.
The most obvious weakness of the door is the large glass panel itself. Although
crime prevention practitioners tend to agree that intruders will usually avoid break-
ing glass if possible, an intruder who believes that the risk is small will break the
glass if no easier means of entry is available. Glass doors in business storefronts
located in well lit, heavily traveled and well-patrolled commercial areas may be fairly
safe. But, glass patio doors in unlighted residential areas almost invite attack.
Perhaps the single most important reason why intruders do not break more glass
panels is that aluminum-framed glass doors are so easy to open that breaking the
glass is seldom necessary. If such doors are to provide any protection at all, special
hardware must be used.

Swinging Narrow Stile Glass Doors. Swinging storefront aluminum glass doors
have traditionally been locked by a short throw horizontal dead bolt that engaged
the slot cut into the aluminum door jam. However, aluminum is very soft, and the
frame can either be spread to disengage the bolt, or the aluminum around the strike
area can be quickly peeled back to expose the bolt. A partial answer to this type of
problem is the use of door hardware designs that include long-throw pivoting dead
bolts and armored reinforcement fittings around the strike area.

Sliding Narrow Stile Glass Doors. Sliding glass doors, such as those found in patio
installations at homes are difficult to secure. Most residential sliding glass doors are
too narrow to use the locks demanded for swinging doors. As a result, the primary
lock on residential sliding doors is often a hooked spring-loaded latch, which may
be sprung or the frame peeled back and the bolt exposed. Also, it is often possible
to lift the entire door out of its track. Lifting of the door out of the track can be made
more difficult by mounting adjustment screws in the top track so that in its closed
 Security Devices and Procedures 69

position the door cannot be lifted far enough to clear the bottom track. A number of
supplementary locks for sliding glass residential doors are available which also may
help in preventing prying and lifting attacks.
However, nothing will prevent an intruder from breaking through the glass on
the door, except replacing the glass with one of the available break-resistant glazing
materials such as acrylic or polycarbonate using break resistant films or using
expanded metal grating. These solutions are either expensive or unsightly or both,
but they may be less expensive than replacing the sliding door with some other type
of access door. If this degree of protection is needed, other glass access openings in
the building should also be reinforced to provide the same level of security.

Door Frames and Strikes

No door is any more secure than the frame in which it is mounted. Weak doorframes
and improperly designed and mounted locking bolt strikes have consistently been
problem areas in door security. There are two distinct problems in the strike-frame
relationship. First, if the frame is weak, the strike, no matter how strong by itself,
can easily be split out unless the mounting screws extend through the frame and into
the internal structure of the wall. Many communities have adopted codes that
mandate the length and composition of the screws required for this application.
Second, there is normally about 1/8-inch clearance between the door and the frame
on either side of the door. This means that there is a potential gap of 1/4-inch avail-
able for spreading or prying. Since the ordinary bolt extends into the strike for a
maximum of 3/8 inch, if the frame has any “give” to it at all, the door and frame of
an in-swinging door can easily be spread and any door can be pried enough to pop
the bolt out of the strike. The obvious solution to the strike-frame spreading problem
is to use a longer bolt. Crime prevention specialists normally recommend that the
bolt extend into the frame/strike at least 5/8 inch.

Wood Frames. There are several basic security defects in wooden doorframes them-
selves. First, frames are usually made of soft lumber that is easily cracked and splin-
tered. Second, the frame unit is installed in a rough wall opening, which is usually
deliberately oversized for ease in installing the frame. Thus, there is usually a gap
on one or both sides between the frame and the supporting structure, which permits
the frame to be deflected with a suitable pry bar, separating the bolt from the strike.
The basic remedy to this problem is proper construction involving a tight fit between
the edges of the rough door opening and the doorframe. Stopgap remedies, such as
filler plates, interlocking deadbolt locks, and security strikes, can be used on exist-
ing construction to mostly offset the problem (Figure 5-5.). It is almost impossible
to mount a conventional strike securely on a soft wood frame unless the screws used
to mount the strike are long enough to extend solidly into the supporting studs. Also
available are reinforcement metal brackets (Figure 5-5), which spread the mounting
strain across the width of the frame such that the whole frame would have to be
ripped out before the strike could be removed by force.
70 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-5. Measures used to protect against doorframe spreading.

 Security Devices and Procedures 71

Steel Frames. When properly installed, hollow steel frames avoid most of the prob-
lems of wood frames. Steel frames should be made of 18-gage or heavier steel, rein-
forced at the corners and around the hinges and strike. When the frame is installed,
the hollow portions inside should be filled with concrete resulting in a rigid struc-
ture that will resist attempts to spread it (Figure 5-6.). Steel frames should also be
properly anchored to the supporting wall. If an appropriate anchor is not used, the
entire door and frame assembly can sometimes be pushed out of the wall. If these
precautions are taken, however, a steel frame provides excellent protection against
attacks directed against the frame and strike. Wrap-around replacement 18-gage
frames are available on the market.

Aluminum Frames. As was pointed out above, aluminum doorframes are suscep-
tible to peeling and prying attacks. However, they may be strengthened through the
use of multiple layers of aluminum or by the addition of an armored strike.

Supporting Wall Structure

Concrete and masonry walls provide rigid support for doorframes when the frames
are properly mounted. A steel frame properly mounted in a concrete wall will resist
almost any amount of pressure that is possible to apply in an attempt to spread the
frame of an in-swinging door. This is not the case with a wood frame construction,
which may be flexible enough to permit a doorframe to be spread even when it is
solidly fastened to the structure. For example, a 2,000-pound horizontal load applied
to the doorframe with an automobile bumper jack will produce a deflection at the
bolt of about 1/2-inch—sufficient to spring a normal 5/8-inch bolt. A pry bar can
also produce this amount of deflection. However, if additional horizontal reinforce-
ment is built into the wall frame, the deflection can be reduced to almost nothing
unless enough force is applied to actually break the structure.

Hinges
Doors are secured to their frames by hinges. When any force (either of a spreading
or penetrating variety) is placed on these fasteners, they must be strong enough to
absorb the stress without distorting or pulling loose in such a way as to release
the door from the frame. If hinges are appropriate to the size and weight of the
door and installed correctly, they will usually provide sufficient resistance to attack.
However, when possible, hinges on wood frames should always be mounted
with fasteners long enough to go through the jamb and securely into the supporting
structure. Attention should also be given to the pins that hold the leaves of the
hinge together. On a reverse, or outward opening door, this pin is exposed. If the pin
is of a removable type, it can easily be knocked out by an intruder and the
door opened on the hinge side. This weakness can be eliminated by using hinges
with fixed pins or using a steel stud that penetrates each side of the hinge leaf set
(Figure 5-7).
 72 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-6. Steel doorframes filled with concrete.

Locks
The subject of locks is vast and complex. In this discussion we will touch only on
the few points needed for an initial understanding locking. The lock is often the most
vulnerable point on the door, and the first place attacked. Unfortunately, most exte-
rior spring bolt type door locks currently in use in the United States are quite vul-
 Security Devices and Procedures 73

Figure 5-7. Standard security hinges.

nerable to forceful attack. The common key-in-knob lock, for example, is extremely
susceptible to attack by a pipe wrench or similar tool, which simply breaks off the
knob and exposes the bolt to manipulation by hand. Such locks have no security
value and should, without exception, be replaced or supplemented with good dead-
bolt locks.
The three components of any lock are the bolt mechanism, the cylinder,
or actuator, and the strike. The bolt mechanism moves the bolt in and out of the
strike. The cylinder, or actuator, controls access to the bolt mechanism. The strike
engages the bolt and prevents it from being moved in any manner other than in and
out.
There are three basic types of bolt mechanisms (Figure 5-8):

• Spring bolt—bolt is extended into the strike and held in place by a spring;
• Dead bolt—bolt must be moved in and out of the strike mechanically; and
• Interconnected bolt—consists of a spring bolt and a dead bolt which are released
with one motion.

There are only three types of cylinders that need to be understood in connection with
door locks in the United States:

• Warded locks (cylinders);

• Pin tumbler locks (cylinders); and
• Electronic locks.
 74 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-8. Basic types of bolt mechanisms.

Warded Locks (See Figure 5-9). The simplest type of mechanical cylinder is known
as the warded lock. On door applications it is easily recognizable by its large, see-
through keyhole and a long cylindrical key with a slotted tab. Still in use in older
buildings and in many inexpensive padlocks, the warded lock has a bolt that is held
in position by a steel spring. Inserting and turning the key releases the spring tension
and moves the bolt. However, in order to turn at all, the key must pass through a
series of obstacles called wards that are built into the lock case. Not only is it fairly
easy to obtain or create a key, which will open a warded lock, the lock action can
be rotated by a bent coat hanger or other similar improvised device. Warded locks
are therefore no longer considered as security locks unless specially redesigned.

Pin Tumbler Locks (See Figure 5-10). The oldest and most effective cylinder is
called the pin tumbler. It was invented by the ancient Egyptians. The current pin
tumbler was mass-produced for the first time in the nineteenth century and has
become the most widely used lock in this country for exterior and interior doors. As
currently designed and manufactured, it can provide a very high level of lock secu-
rity. As Figure 5-10 shows, pin tumbler locks consist of a plug, which rotates with
the key to throw or withdraw the bolt. Surrounding the plug is the shell, a fixed
assembly into which the plug fits. A series of pins fit into matching cylindrical holes
Security Devices and Procedures 75

Figure 5–9. Typical warded locks.

Figure 5-10. Typical pin tumbler lock.

76 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-11. Electronic locks. (Courtesy of Mas-Hamilton Group,

Inc., Lexington, Kentucky, and Sargent and Greenleaf, Inc.,
Nicholasville, Kentucky.)
 Security Devices and Procedures 77

in these two lock parts. With the key withdrawn, the pins extend through the surface
between the plug and the shell so that the plug cannot turn. Insertion of the correct
key lines up pins in such a way that the outer end of each one matches the surface
separating the plug from the shell (shear line), so the plug can turn to withdraw the
bolt. Higher security applications may include locks which use bi-axial pin con-
figurations. These locks are much more difficult to manipulate than are standard
pin tumbler locks.
More often than not, the pin tumbler lock is attacked with attempts to twist,
punch, or pull either the plug or the entire cylinder out of the locking assembly. Good
metal-to-metal through-bolting of both the lock case and the cylinder and the use of
tapered guards to keep the plug from being pulled out of the cylinder (as well as
punched inward) and the use of a 1-inch-throw deadbolt can make the pin tumbler
lock a very secure type of lock.

Electronic Locks
Residential application of electronic locks is a fairly recent change in security
application. The current generation of electronic locks is frequently designed with
a cylinder lock as another component of the same locking system. These consider-
ations will change generationally as new technologies emerge.
Any type of lock equipped with a spring bolt without an anti-shim device
can be defeated by inserting a credit card or a thin, flexible piece of metal (both
referred to as “shims”) between the bolt and the strike. This simple action presses
against the wedge-shaped outward face of the bolt, exerts pressure on it, and easily
retracts it. Some such locks are equipped with small supplemental deadbolts which,
when properly engaged, can prevent a “shim” attack. However, it is very easy to mis-
mount the locking hardware so that the deadbolt does not engage. Thus, the spring
latch bolt lock offers little security. Short-throw deadbolt locks (5/8-inch long or
less), while resistant to the shim attack, also can be popped out of the strike by
spreading.
Because of these considerations, to obtain even minimum security an exterior
door should be protected by a lock that is equipped with a 1-inch-throw deadbolt or
interlocking deadbolt, which is mounted directly in the door rather than in the door
handle.
A good long-throw or vertical-throw deadbolt lock used with a reinforced
strike, a solid door-frame-to-structure attachment, and good structural reinforcement
in the wall itself will provide adequate protection for most home and business
applications.
Glass located near any lock permits an intruder to break the glass, reach in,
and unlock the lock from the inside. Here, a double cylinder lock may be used so
that a key is required to operate the lock from either inside or outside. Double cylin-
der locks keep the intruder from removing heavy or bulky items through the door.
If children, handicapped, or elderly persons use such a door, the glass should be rein-
forced and an interconnected life safety lock should be used that can be opened in
 78 Understanding Crime Prevention

one motion by someone with no prior training or experience. When use double cylin-
der locks should be designed so that, when locked from the inside, the key cannot
be removed. These are referred to as key retention, or key capture, locks. This type
of lock is required in some applications under fire safety codes.

Windows and Glazing

Windows have always been a particularly difficult problem in building security. Their
primary functions are to provide light and ventilation and to serve as a barrier
to weather. Windows are not ordinarily intended to provide a substantial barrier to
intrusion, and it is often difficult, expensive and unsightly to increase their security
capability without destroying their primary functions.

Window Locks. One helpful assumption is that intruders are reluctant to break
glass, because it creates a distinctive sound, which invites investigation. Thus, simply
locking windows can provide a degree of security. However, existing latches on most
windows cannot resist a strong jimmying or prying attack, and can be opened once
the glass has been broken. Minimum locking protection requires a device that will
resist prying and manipulation.
The only type of window that cannot be easily secured from the inside is the
jalousie window. This type of window is always a poor security risk, and should be
either replaced or covered with bars or grillwork.

Security Grills and Bars. If the risk that an intruder will break the glass is high,
sturdy metal bars, wire grills or expanded mesh placed over vulnerable windows can
usually provide the security needed. If this degree of security is required, it should
be applied to all windows closer than 8 feet to the ground, or to any window higher
than 8 feet that borders on a roof line or is otherwise accessible. Grills and bars
should usually be attached to the inside of windows. In residential applications, if
the window is to be used as an exit in the case of fire or other emergency, fastening
devices should release instantly.

Glazing Material. Glass is by far the most common glazing material. It is found
in both single and double strength single panes, in dual panes for insulating
purposes, in a tempered form two to five times stronger than ordinary plate glass,
and in various laminated forms. Only the laminated forms provide any substantial
protection against breakage by an intruder. Laminated glass is made by bonding
alternate layers of transparent plastic and glass. If sufficiently thick, it can provide
a significant barrier to penetration. Laminated glass, however, can be defeated if
sufficient time is available. Glass with wire imbedded in it was designed exclusively
for safety considerations and is not considered as security glazing. Window
films may be used to reinforce glazing, but these must be installed to manufacturer’s
specifications to be effective.
The two most popular plastic glazing materials are acrylic and polycarbonate.
Both come in various patterns and in transparent, translucent and opaque colors.
 Security Devices and Procedures 79

Acrylic is clearer than polycarbonate, while polycarbonate possesses much greater

strength against impact.
Acrylic material comes in a wide range of thicknesses and is much more
impact resistant than ordinary window glass (17 times more resistant in 1/8- to 1/4-
inch sheets). Also, acrylic does shatter and will burn; it will withstand a wide range
of climate extremes for many years without deterioration.
Polycarbonate material, like acrylic, weighs 50 percent less than glass of equal
thickness. However, polycarbonate has 300 times the impact resistance of glass and
20–30 times the impact strength of acrylic. It is less clear and also somewhat less
weather resistant than glass or acrylic, but still can provide service for a period of
years and will neither burn nor shatter.
The cost of either acrylic or polycarbonate is about four times that of glass.
However, in a situation where frequent glass breakage (due to vandalism or other
factors) occurs, plastic glazing material can pay for its additional cost. For intrusion
resistance purposes, polycarbonate is superior to acrylic. Properly installed poly-
carbonate glazing provides approximately the same degree of window security as do
bars and grills (providing that adequate locking devices are used on the windows).
However, proper installation is quite important with either plastic because, unlike
glass, it is subject to significant shrinkage and expansion because of temperature and
humidity. Also, polycarbonate has a significant degree of flexibility, such that a deter-
mined attacker may be able to force it out of the containing frame. A deeper frame
is therefore needed for polycarbonate.

Other Access Openings

Permanently installed (or hinged and lockable) bars or expanded metal grill work
can be used to secure such building access points as ventilation ducts, utility tunnels,
skylights, and other small openings, which are required for the passage of wires,
pipes, air or light. Other specialized building surface openings include very large
vehicular openings for garages and commercial and industrial structures. Unusually
large openings such as this can be secured following the same general principles dis-
cussed above for door systems, but may require very specialized kinds of hardware
and materials because of their size, shape, or method of operation.

Internal Barriers

Within the structure itself, a variety of barrier arrangements may be set up to protect
specific targets of possible criminal attack. Internal barriers must not only provide
specific security against intruders for high-value target items, they must also provide
security against possible criminal activities by those who may have legitimate reason
to be inside the structure (for example, visitors, customers, clients or patients,
employees, and the general public). Perimeter barrier systems and building surface
barrier systems are of no value whatever in preventing attack by persons who are
entitled to enter—and remain inside—the facility.
 80 Understanding Crime Prevention

Internal barriers generally serve to control movement and limit access in such
a way as to reduce the likelihood for criminal attack to an acceptable level, while
not interfering with normal activity within the building. They consist of both low-
security structures such as interior walls, privacy doors, display cases, counter, racks
of merchandise, light steel mesh screening, glazing materials, even ropes and chains,
and high-security structures such as safes and vaults.

Low-Security Barriers
To illustrate the concept and use of low-security barriers, let us consider a few simple
examples.
The supermarket operation makes a wide variety of merchandise readily avail-
able to customers and protects itself against theft by customers by channeling their
movements. The arrangement of merchandise racks, checkout counters, and entry
and exit points in a supermarket is a kind of a maze in which the customer usually
has only one way to gain access to the merchandise and only one way to leave the
store (the checkout counters). While some opportunity for shoplifting remains in this
kind of system, the fact that a customer must leave through a checkout counter lane
means that any merchandise other than small items, which the customer may be able
to conceal, will be tallied by the cashier. Doors and walls will normally prevent the
customer from entering stock rooms, meat cutting rooms and the like, as well as the
area where cash is counted and kept. Thus, customers enjoy easy access to the mer-
chandise, but their opportunity for unauthorized removal of merchandise is restricted.
Discount stores operate on much the same principal as the supermarket, but
must take additional measures because much of the high-value merchandise consists
of small items, which are relatively easy to conceal. Additional barriers are often
used to help protect particular kinds of high-value merchandise, such as cameras,
small electronic items, firearms, and jewelry, which are often sold from a small island
within the store.
A good example of barriers used to restrict employees can be seen in the parts
department of any large automobile repair shop. Here, counters, doors, walls, steel
mesh screening, and other physical barriers are used to restrict employee and
customer access to the parts stockroom. Under normal conditions, the only way to
obtain a part is to request it from the stockroom clerk.
Simple barriers are ordinarily used in any kind of warehouse operation to
prevent customers from unauthorized access to the main storage area. Within the
main storage area, special rooms, or simply wire mesh cages may be used to provide
barriers against easy employee access to high-value goods.
Even though a relationship of trust presumably exists between the residents of
a home, and visitors and guests in the home, few people would think of leaving small
high-value items such as cash, jewelry, cameras, guns, and so on lying around within
easy reach. Instead, guns may be kept in a gun cabinet. Cameras are kept in a closet,
in a cabinet, or in a drawer. Cash is kept out of sight, even if the barrier is nothing
more than the traditional sugar bowl in a kitchen cabinet. Important family papers,
 Security Devices and Procedures 81

cash, and other small items may even be kept in a small locked cabinet or file drawer.
Closed doors are used to signal areas of the house where the visitor is expected not
to enter without permission.
It should be emphasized that low-security measures such as those described
above are of very little value against determined attack, but may be quite effective
as barriers against impulsive and opportunistic attack. Their effectiveness can
be enhanced by a total system of human and electronic surveillance, intrusion
detection, and procedural security.

High-Security Barriers
Although high-security barriers will also serve the purpose of opportunity reduc-
tion, their primary intent is to defeat the determined attack against high-value targets,
whether carried out by an unauthorized intruder or carried out by someone who has
legitimate access to the premises. They include safes, vaults, money chests, strong
rooms and so forth.

Robbery-Resistive Barriers
Many safes and money chests are primarily designed to protect high-value items
where a custodian is present and there is no substantial physical attack. The essence
of the theft or robbery types of attack is surprise and swiftness, and the attacker
usually has no time to make a determined forced entry. Robbery-resistive contain-
ers need only be sturdy enough to prevent a quick prying or hammering attack and
need to be heavy enough or attached so securely that they cannot be easily carried
off. The under-the-counter moneybox, for example, however sturdy, is not robbery
resistive. A money depository or steel safe, which is anchored in concrete, is robbery
resistive. Multi-level drop safes with time delay on the interior compartment provide
additional robbery resistance.

Burglary-Resistive Barriers
Burglary resistant containers (such as safes and vaults) are designed to resist attacks
by torches, tools, or explosives at some level of intensity for some period of time.
They are usually made of very heavy steel, reinforced concrete, or a combination of
these materials and are used where a determined intruder might have a considerable
period of time for a tool-aided attack. These containers are rated, based upon the
method and duration of attack. Containers with appropriate ratings are highly
recommended.

Fire-Resistive Barriers
Fire protection is mentioned here because attack-resistive construction and fire-
resistive construction are not necessarily the same thing. For example, a burglary-
 82 Understanding Crime Prevention

resistant cash safe made of very thick steel will probably not be fire-resistive, because
heat is readily transferred through the steel, and the contents of the safe might be
destroyed even though the safe remained intact. On the other hand, a fire-resistive
safe is constructed primarily of insulating materials and is vulnerable to a tool-aided
attack. One solution to this problem is to use two different types of containers; fire-
resistive record containers, and a safe for valuable property items. Perhaps the best
solution of all is to install a large fire-resistive container and to place within it a
smaller burglary-resistive container. Also, U-L rated fire doors and fire walls can be
formidable barriers.

Building Security Codes

Unfortunately, good security design has not been a high priority for those who design
and construct buildings in this country. A new trend is beginning to emerge, however,
as crime prevention practitioners and building officials around the country turn their
attention to the development of building security codes.
The intent of building codes in general is to provide for public control over
the construction, use and occupancy of buildings in such a way that reasonable stan-
dards for fire safety, life safety, and occupational safety (among other things) can be
enforced by government.
The addition of security components to local building codes has been seen
by crime prevention practitioners as a way to set in motion an excellent opportunity-
reduction process for the future. However, there are some key cautions that must be
observed if the development of building security codes is to be productive:

• Security code standards should be based on performance specification; (that is,

the required ability of a physical system to withstand attack); and
• Standards should be uniform from one community to another, so that builders,
architects, and the manufacturers of security hardware and materials can them-
selves build, design, and provide standard products.

The International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO), Building Officials

and Code Administrators (BOCA) and Southern Building Code (SBC) have devel-
oped model security codes, which states and communities can adapt to their own
unique circumstances. These model codes are based on performance specifications
and have the capability, if adopted widely, of providing the needed national unifor-
mity. Other national, regional, and state code development organizations are working
along the same lines.
All crime prevention practitioners should be concerned with the development
of building security codes for their communities, but no practitioner should attempt
to develop a local code until he has first obtained the results of appropriate uniform
code development efforts at the state, regional, and national levels and determined
their applicability to his jurisdiction.1
 Security Devices and Procedures 83

ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS

As has been repeatedly pointed out, there is no barrier that cannot be defeated. And
many of the barrier systems typically used to protect person and property are rather
easily defeated, given some degree of determination, skill, and unobserved time on
the part of the attacker. Physical barriers may be an effective deterrent, but, more
importantly, should always serve to delay the attacker until some response can occur.
The function of surveillance and intrusion detection systems is to provide some
means for observing or detecting the criminal attacker during the delay period, so
that appropriate action may be taken against him. The action taken can be anything
from arresting the attacker to taking his picture with a camera.
Surveillance and intrusion detection systems produce two important effects.
On the one hand, they can be instrumental in the apprehension of criminals. On the
other, they can provide a strong deterrent. If the criminal is aware that he or she will
be observed and detected during the attack and believes that this will lead to a high
possibility for identification or arrest, he or she may feel that the risk is too high and
decide not to attack, unless he also feels that he can carry out the attack before a
response occurs.
All barrier systems are passive in the sense that whatever their capacity to deter
or delay an intruder, they cease to be effective as security systems once they are
breached.
Surveillance and intrusion detection systems, where properly designed and
appropriate, can provide a much greater degree of security than that permitted by
the barrier systems themselves. But, the physical barrier system, and the surveil-
lance and intrusion detection system (including the response component) must be
designed in harmony if the total security system is to have a deterrent effect.
Because of the need for great care in the design and installation of electronic
security systems, clients should deal only with well-established electronic security
companies that have good records of successful installations.
Electronic security systems consist of:

• Surveillance systems; and

• Intrusion detection systems.

Surveillance Systems

The purpose of surveillance systems is to provide a direct visual means of observ-

ing possible criminal activities within a defined space. There are really only two ways
to accomplish this: with a human observer or a video system.

The Human Observer

The use of watchmen, lookouts, and guards is as old as humanity. As applied to the
surveillance of a defined area, there are three types of human observation:
 84 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Social observation;
• Patrol observation; and
• Location specific observation.

Social Observation
The simple presence of people (driving, shopping, walking, looking out their
windows, etc.) can have a strong deterrent effect. In the presence of such social
observation, the opportunistic criminal may be discouraged, and the determined
attacker must at least disguise his behavior and conduct his or her attack and escape
so quickly that no one has time to act, intimidate the observers, or determine that
they are not interested in reporting him. However, social observation cannot be
considered a reliable surveillance tactic, since rarely are people present in a given
target area all the time. Furthermore, the likelihood that such observation will be
reported is affected by many factors that are not under the control of the person
needing surveillance.

Patrol Observation
A variety of patrol strategies are used by police and private security personnel
to create some probability of observing criminal activities while they are in progress.
There has been considerable debate as to whether patrol strategies have any
degree of preventive value, but it does seem clear that specialized patrol tactics
may help—neighborhood citizen patrols, tenant patrols in housing projects, and
tactical police patrols placed according to the results of crime pattern analysis, for
example.

Location-Specific Surveillance
It is possible to hire private security personnel who are trained not only to system-
atically observe key aspects of a physical security system but also to report, or
even to take action, in the event of intrusion. However, use of on-site observers is
expensive, even if only done under short-term conditions (for example, the police
stakeout). Furthermore, if the area of interest is at all complex, many people
may be required to perform surveillance adequately.

Surveillance Cameras
The use of video systems for surveillance purposes is superior to any form of direct
human observation in at least three important respects: cost, reliability, and docu-
mentation. Although a camera, its associated equipment, annual maintenance and
film might cost several thousand dollars a year, it can provide full-time coverage of
a given field of view at a very small fraction of the cost of providing the same cov-
erage using human observers. Also, a camera, providing that it remains in working
 Security Devices and Procedures 85

order, is not subject to the kinds of observer error that the human being is. Given
sufficient light and quality design, a camera will faithfully record the field of view
in the same objective way day in and day out. Finally, video documentation can be
used to create a permanent record of any activity that goes on within the camera’s
field of view. Such records can be extremely useful in accurate identification of
suspects, providing evidence for prosecution, and in verifying the true nature of
any activities that went on within the field of view. These are enormous advantages
in a total security system.

Film Cameras
Still or motion picture film cameras are only intended to provide a record of
events that take place within their field of view. They can be operated either sequen-
tially or by demand. A sequence camera is programmed to expose film at some
pre-set rate. A demand-operated camera is activated by a person who wishes to
record a particular event or by an intrusion detection device. For example, a cashier
might punch a concealed activating button during a holdup. A very high risk is
associated with any situation in which an attacker knows he or she will be pho-
tographed. His or her only real recourse in such a situation is to disable the camera,
destroy the film, prevent the camera from being activated, or screen himself from it.
If he can do none of these things, the chances of his deciding to attack are fairly
small. As Thad Webber points out2 . . . after camera systems were installed at all
Chase Manhattan Bank Branches . . . holdup attacks—both professional and
amateur—dropped to nearly zero. In this case, the surveillance cameras, triggered
by holdup alarms, were added to the existing security systems because analysis
revealed that the holdup alarm systems then in use . . . seldom brought police in
time to apprehend bank robbers and prevent losses. The effect of the surveillance
cameras was to eliminate the delay time between alarm signal and response to that
signal.
It should not be thought that such devices are infallible. However, any
measures to defeat the camera add difficulty to the task of completing the attack
and may require extraordinary planning on the part of the criminal. Experience
has shown that as long as there are less formidable targets available, criminals will
shy away from premises protected by film cameras.

Video Cameras
The video camera can be used in the same way as a film camera through video
recording. There are advantages and disadvantages. For example, videotape pictures
may not be as sharp as film images, but the image recovery is instantaneous, and
this can be of great benefit in rapid criminal investigation and apprehension. In addi-
tion, equipment and maintenance costs are likely to be significantly higher than for
an equivalent degree of film coverage, but the supply costs are less, because tapes
can be used over and over again.
 86 Understanding Crime Prevention

The primary advantage of the video camera is that it permits the monitoring,
from a single site, of activities at several sites. For example, the discount store
manager can watch many different parts of the store from his office, and shoppers
(and shoplifters) can even watch themselves via remote monitors. There are many
possible applications of remote monitoring, but the key feature is human surveil-
lance by indirect means. The person monitoring a direct observation system may use
a video tape recorder to permanently record any desired activity, but the main pur-
pose of the surveillance is to provide immediate response to any suspicious activity
observed. Thus, remote video monitoring is a cost-effective way to replace on-site
human observers. Digital recording and data storage systems provide excellent low
light surveillance. They may also provide the ability to observe locations from a
remote location in real time.

Lighting
One application of lighting to surveillance is simply the need to provide sufficient
lighting to permit video surveillance. Here, the challenge is to design the camera
systems and the lighting systems so that they complement each other. Some video
systems are equipped with infrared illumination to permit surveillance in essentially
no light circumstances. A far broader application of lighting to surveillance is to
enhance the effectiveness of the human observer.

Street Lighting
When streets and other areas used by pedestrians are well lighted, criminals are more
easily seen and identified. Knowing this, potential attackers may hesitate to commit
their crimes in well-lighted areas. Adequate street lighting also encourages honest
citizens to move about without fear, thus decreasing the possibility of attack to the
extent that social surveillance permits.
There are several reasons why street lighting as currently installed may not be
appropriate to the specific purpose of crime prevention. Often, streetlights are placed
so as to illuminate the roadway itself, without casting much light on sidewalks, yards,
building surfaces, etc. Thus, it may be difficult to observe suspicious activities on
either side of the roadway, and pedestrian traffic may be reduced. Lighting in resi-
dential areas may be designed primarily to promote the appearance of the neigh-
borhood and the convenience of individual residents. For example, street lighting
may, in historic areas, simulate old-fashioned gaslights—a practice which undoubt-
edly makes the area more attractive, but provides relatively little illumination. Or,
subdivision lighting may be non-uniform. In one case, controversy among resi-
dents—some of whom wanted street lighting and some of whom did not—resulted
in a decision by the traffic department to place lights adjacent to those homes that
desired street lighting and to place no lights near those homes that did not desire
lighting. Such design creates a situation in which surveillance is spotty at best, and
people are discouraged from walking on the sidewalks at night.
 Security Devices and Procedures 87

Existing lighting, however placed, may simply be insufficient for proper

visibility. Illumination for the purposes of reducing crime and the fear of crime
may therefore require substantial redesign of existing street lighting systems and
installation of new lights. The high cost of relighting programs makes it necessary
to carefully examine the question of whether more lighting leads to less crime
before proceeding with new installations.
People are definitely more fearful of crime during the dark hours than they
are in the daylight.3 But, are increased levels of fear during the nighttime hours
justified? Or does darkness simply bring on unreasonable fear? A study conducted
in Minneapolis showed that the citywide rate of street robbery for a recent year
was 33 percent higher during the dark hours than in daylight. Specifically, 70 percent
of all assaults occurred at night, as did 66 percent of thefts from automobiles,
61 percent of automobile thefts, and 73 percent of rapes. In selected neighborhoods,
78 percent of all street assaults and 92 percent of reported rapes occurred during
darkness.4
Relighting programs have been implemented in many cities in hopes of reduc-
ing crimes associated with darkness. Studies of these programs have not produced
conclusive evidence that street lighting alone resulted in reduced crime rates. The
reason seems to be that many other factors can influence crime rates.
For example, increases in police patrol activities may have accompanied the
relighting. Other types of crime prevention programs may have been conducted
simultaneously. And, the relighting program may have simply helped displace crim-
inal activity to other areas, resulting in no net decrease of crime in the community
as a whole. Or, lighting may induce complacency in people to the degree that other
kinds of security measures may be reduced, and as a result, there may even be a net
increase in crime.
On the other hand, there is wide agreement that appropriate lighting is an
important ingredient in reducing criminal opportunity. As a general rule however,
relighting programs, which are specifically intended to reduce crime, should proba-
bly be restricted to areas where a major portion of crime does occur at night or where
crime fear levels are high (whether justified or not). In any case, lighting should be
installed as part of a comprehensive crime prevention program to realize maximum
benefits from this costly investment.
Currently, there are six light sources which can be used in street lighting pro-
grams: incandescent lamps, fluorescent lamps, mercury vapor lamps, low-pressure
sodium vapor lamps, high-pressure sodium vapor lamps, and metal halide lamps.
Generally speaking, incandescent light sources are uneconomical and inefficient
compared to others. For example, a given quantity of electrical energy can produce
up to 20 times more total light in a low-pressure sodium vapor lamp than in an incan-
descent lamp, and vapor discharge lamps can last up to 30 times as long as an incan-
descent lamp.
Providing uniform light requires attention to such things as the height of
the luminary (the lamp and its refractor and reflector), its particular directional
light-emitting characteristics, the spacing of luminaries, the presence or absence of
 88 Understanding Crime Prevention

structures and vegetation, which can shade vital areas, the reflecting capability of
the surface material, other lighting that may be available, and other factors. Also,
minimum lighting standards, as established by the Illuminating Engineering Society
(IESNA), vary widely depending on the setting. For example, the amount of light
per square foot usually suggested for a commercial area is 20 times that suggested
for a residential alley.
In summary, the advantages of darkness to the criminal include the following:

• It is less likely that police patrols, neighbors, or passersby will observe criminal
activity;
• Darkness and shadows provide good cover for watching a target and for escape;
• Fear of being on the streets at night minimizes the number of potential witnesses;
and
• Darkness increases the ease with which a criminal can use surprise to gain control
of his or her victim.

To remove the advantages of darkness to the criminal, the following questions

need to be answered:

• Where should scarce lighting resources be allocated?

• How much light is needed?
• What is the best way to provide light?
• What is the cost to provide adequate lighting?
• What impact would increased lighting have on energy conservation?
• How can crime prevention lighting be funded?

Lighting can be a significant aid in surveillance and thus has an important role
in crime prevention. However, it must be applied properly if it is to be effective (par-
ticularly if cost is a key factor), and it should not be viewed as a crime prevention
strategy that is appropriate for all crime at all times and all places. Lighting pro-
grams should always be used in conjunction with other crime prevention strategies
and with general community improvement strategies.

Exterior Lighting for Specific Facilities

Street lighting itself, while very helpful, may not provide a sufficient surveillance
capability for individual facilities. For example, at least two sides of every structure
are usually shielded from street lighting. The presence of fences, surrounding build-
ings, irregularities in the building wall design, shrubbery, parked vehicles, and
numerous other kinds of obstructions can also negate the surveillance value of street
lighting. Thus, premises security lighting is a very important component in specific
security system design. It can be used either in a diffused way (flood lighting) or
with a specific focus (spot lighting) as appropriate to the circumstances.
Any area adjacent to a building, which remains dark and obscure at night, is
a potential candidate for security lighting. Special consideration should be given to
 Security Devices and Procedures 89

doors, windows, and other access points, and to any area that provides a good place
of concealment, whether or not adjacent to an access point. Infrared “lighting” may
be used to provide coverage, without the provision of visible light. Surveillance of
this type is well suited to large, outdoor, areas where traditional lighting may not be
feasible.
With respect to an individual structure, a distinction needs to be made for
surveillance lighting, which is designed to improve surveillance from the inside out,
and improves visibility from the outside-in. For example, one can install floodlights
on the side of a building that permit anyone inside to see the exterior area very well
at night. However, those same floodlights could effectively blind a policeman or other
person on the outside who wishes to see what may be going on at or near the build-
ing wall. The issue here, like the issue in the broader category of street lighting, is
that building security lighting should always result from proper planning and design.
Improperly designed and installed lighting may not only be ineffective, it may even
create additional security problems. Some locales have opted for a no light approach
since they believe that the presence of light attracts people. Their logic holds that it
is easier to observe for the presence of light, rather than to observe for activities in
the light.

Intrusion Detection Systems

Intrusion detection systems are an extension of the surveillance concept.

Such systems permit activities in a given area to be detected and reported in absence
of any direct form of human observation. They also permit the indirect moni-
toring to be conducted by exception; that is, the constant monitoring needed in
direct observation is replaced by an alerting system that only demands attention
when an undesirable act has occurred. These systems should be integrated with
video systems to permit recording of events at a specific location, in response to an
alarm.
Intrusion detection systems consist of three basic components: the sensor,
the control, and the annunciator. NCPI uses the goose to illustrate these three
functions. (Animals have long served man’s need for intrusion detection systems;
the goose, in particular, was the living intrusion detection “system” of choice in
many societies.)
As Figure 5-12 shows, the sensor component is like the goose’s eye. Its func-
tion is to detect some condition or event. A sensor has no way to determine whether
the sensed event is authorized or not, merely that it has occurred.
The control, like the goose’s brain, nervous system, and circulatory system,
provides the power for the intrusion detection system, receives information from
sensors, evaluates that information and transmits commands for action. For example,
the goose’s eye may see someone approaching and transmit that information to the
brain. However, the brain decides that the approaching person is its owner and takes
no further action except perhaps to waddle toward the person in search of food. On
 90 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-12. Nature’s intrusion detection system.

the other hand, if the approaching person is interpreted as a stranger by the brain,
instructions for action will go to the squawking system rather than the walking
system. The annunciator is that part of the intrusion detection system, which alerts
someone to the fact that a sensor has detected an event. The squawk of the goose
alerts the farmer that someone or something is on the premises.
The fundamental purpose of the intrusion detection system is to generate an
appropriate response to events that the system senses, evaluates, and reports. Without
the response, the intrusion detection system is of no value. Figure 5-13 shows the
flow of information in a total intrusion detection system. The completeness and
balance of this information cycle should be the basis for evaluating the effectiveness
of all intrusion detection systems. It is easy to see from this diagram that an inter-
ruption in the flow of information through the system at any point will render it
useless. Thus, the security of the intrusion detection system itself is just as vital as
the security of the target protected. If the intrusion detection system can be defeated,
it is of no use whatever.

Sensors (See Figure 5-14)

Sensor devices can be grouped roughly by analogy to the human senses of touch,
taste or smell, hearing, and sight.
 Security Devices and Procedures 91

Figure 5-13. Intrusion detection system information flow.

“Touch” Sensors
“Touch” sensors include electromechanical (and electronic) devices that respond to
movement (for example, a magnetic or plunger contact, which senses the opening
and closing of a door or window), applied pressure (for example, a pressure mat
inside a door, which is activated when someone steps on it), and heat (a thermo-
couple on the inside wall of a safe, which senses the heat of a torch). There are also
sensors that respond to a breaking action (for example, glass break sensors, respond-
ing to the frequency of breaking glass, activate when a window is broken) and
sensors that detect vibrations (for example, sensors mounted on a wall which can be
activated by the impact of a sledgehammer on the wall).

“Taste/Smell” Sensors
“Taste/smell” sensors detect changes in the chemical makeup of the air and are
widely used in fire alarm systems, as well as to detect burning attacks against safes
and other hardened targets. These devices are also used to detect the presence of
many types of explosive material.
92 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-14. Typical sensors.

 Security Devices and Procedures 93

“Hearing” Sensors
“Hearing” sensors detect changes in airborne sound. Ultrasonic devices, for
example, transmit sound waves throughout an area and detect the pattern reflected
back. Such a sensor might be “tuned” to remain inactive as long as it receives only
reflected sound waves for the normal pattern of walls and objects within the room.
However, should someone enter the room, the reflection pattern will change, causing
the sensor to be activated. Also included in this category are devices that only receive
sound. For example, a microphone can be set up to detect sounds made within a
given space.

Sight Sensors
“Sight” sensors are activated by electromagnetic, or thermal, radiation. Photoelec-
tric sensors detect changes in light patterns (for example, when a beam of light across
a doorway is interrupted by a person walking through the door, a photoelectric sensor
will be activated). Microwave sensors function like the ultrasonic detectors described
above except that microwave radiation, rather than ultrasonic radiation, is transmit-
ted and received. Electric field, magnetic field, and thermal energy sensing devices
detect changes in energy fields that occur when a person enters a protected space,
an object is moved, and so on (for example, such devices can be used to establish
low-level electric fields in the immediate vicinity of safes and are activated by the
slight change in the field which occurs when a human body approaches or touches
the safe). Passive infrared detectors “see” the presence of people by means of the
heat they give off. These sensors activate when temperatures increase, indicating the
presence of a person.

Sensor Application (See Figure 5-15)

In general, there are four ways in which sensors are applied. These are:

• Point protection;
• Trap protection;
• Space protection; and
• Perimeter protection.

Point Protection
Point protection sensor devices are used to protect specific high-value targets such
as money, jewelry or guns. Such sensors can detect movement of the target itself or
a human body approaching or touching the target, as well as heat or vibration caused
by efforts to penetrate a hardened container.
 94 Understanding Crime Prevention

Figure 5-15. Sensor applications.

Trap Protection
Trap protection is a special application of any sensor device in a manner or location
that would not normally be expected by an intruder (for example, a pressure mat
under a rug).

Space Protection
Space protection sensing devices detect the presence of an intruder in an enclosed
space. The ultrasonic, passive infrared, and microwave sensors described above are
good examples of this type of application.

Perimeter Protection
Perimeter protection devices are used in conjunction with the perimeter barrier or
boundary marker systems that enclose the secured premises. For example, magnetic
contacts and mechanical switches detect the movement of doors, windows, and gates;
vibration sensors and thin wire grids detect attempts to break through walls; glass
break sensors detect the breaking of a window; and vibration sensors, noise detec-
tors, and electric field sensors detect attempts to climb or break through a fence.
The choice and location of sensors requires careful thought because inappro-
priate design can create substantial inconvenience in the conduct of routine
activities and create loopholes in the security system. Thad Webber describes a sit-
uation in which a hasty decision was made to use ultrasonic sensors to protect the
inside of a large warehouse. Plans for the installation of detectors were made before
merchandise was moved into the warehouse and before office walls were erected.
The piled merchandise and the walls obstructed the functioning of the ultrasonic
sensors such that an intruder could penetrate many parts of the building without risk
of detection.
 Security Devices and Procedures 95

Control
The control portion of the intrusion detection system nearly always contains the
following components:

• Power sources provide the energy to operate intrusion detection systems

through primary (nonrechargeable) batteries, public utility electricity, or secondary
(rechargeable) batteries. The most reliable source is a combination of public utility
and uninterrupted powers sources, backed up by batteries.
• Protective circuits provide the means of conveying information from all
sensors in the system to the common control point via wire, radio waves, existing
electrical circuits, or combinations. This component is like the network of nerves
that run from the human senses to the human brain. The protective circuit can be
one of the more vulnerable elements in an intrusion detection system.
• Energizing techniques provide the means for testing the system, and for
programming the system to report the activation of sensory devices. For
example, many of the sensors in a commercial building are shut off during
the business day. They are tested and energized at the time of closing by
key-operated control switches, time delays, and remote signals. A major problem
associated with this component is the potential for false alarms, which may be
created through improper design, installation or use of the energizing
component.
• Signal transmission permits information from the sensor and protective
circuits to be processed, coded, and transmitted. It may include combinations of
relays, switches, telephone dialers, special transmitters, multiplexing equipment, and
other signaling devices. The purpose of this component is to provide a signal, which
is secure from tampering and will transmit the correct information through the
annunciator to the human respondent.
• Annunciation circuitry conveys information from the control to the
annunciator through wire, telephone lines, radio waves, line carriers, coaxial cable,
and other methods.

Annunciation
The annunciation component must provide for reception of signals from the control
device and the initiation of an appropriate response. Since the receiving device
is essentially controlled by the control component, the design of the annunciation
component is largely concerned with its ability to initiate response. There are four
common kinds of annunciation: the local alarm, the proprietary alarm, the central
station alarm, and the police department alarm.

• Local alarms consist of annunciators such as bells, sirens, and flashing

lights, and are used either inside or outside the secured building to scare off an
intruder and to alert responsible people in the vicinity. Local alarms are relatively
 96 Understanding Crime Prevention

inexpensive and may be sufficient in some cases. But, there may not be people in
the vicinity to be alerted and, if alerted, may not respond appropriately.
• Proprietary alarms annunciate at a remote monitoring station maintained
by the owner of the protected structure. This type of annunciation is quite adaptable
to large institutions such as universities, medical centers, apartment complexes, and
public housing. The guard force, which monitors the annunciation devices and
responds to alarms, would normally have access to the interior of all structures and
be knowledgeable as to the layout of those structures.
• Central station alarm service is provided by alarm monitoring compa-
nies that offer services to individual subscribers. Subscribers, who might be store-
owners, office building managers, home owners, plant supervisors, and so on, pay
the central station company to accept and install annunciation devices connected
with their facilities. The central station can notify police, guard forces, the subscriber,
insurance agents, and others if it receives an alarm signal. The central station
company can also maintain records of openings and closings, provide respondents
with key access to the building from which the alarm came, and other services.
• Police department alarm service is provided directly within the police
station where police can be dispatched immediately in response to alarm signals.
Service available under this arrangement is limited to the police response itself, and
other arrangements must be made to provide access into the facility for investiga-
tion and to check the intrusion detection system. Because of the rapid increase in
the number of alarm subscribers, police departments are becoming reluctant to
provide this service unless a town is too small to support a commercial central alarm
operation.
• Other types of alarms may be located almost anywhere—at a telephone
answering service or the homes or businesses of trusted friends.

The selection of annunciator type and location depends largely on the type of
response needed or desired in the event of an alarm. As cost is also a significant
factor, one should usually aim to select the annunciator location that provides the
lowest feasible cost consistent with the security needs of a subscriber.

Response
The type of response that an alarm generates is also an important part of the intru-
sion detection system. Unless the response is appropriate to the circumstances at
hand, the investment in an intrusion detection system will not be cost effective.
Criteria in designing the appropriate response capability are as follows:

• The respondent may be armed;

• The time between alarm and arrival of respondent should be as short as
possible;
• The respondent should be trained in weapons use (where applicable), apprehen-
sion procedures and alarm system operations;
 Security Devices and Procedures 97

• The respondent should have a reliable means of access to the premises and a
knowledge of its layout and contents; and
• Procedures should be in effect to protect persons (including the respondent) who
may be on the premises.

These response services may be provided in a variety of ways and by one or

more agencies. For example, a commercial alarm company may receive the alarm
and dispatch its own employees. Or, the alarm company may simply report to the
police department, which in turn dispatches patrol, and the owner himself may be
notified.

Designing the System

The major considerations in designing an intrusion detection system are as follows:

• Types of targets to be protected;

• Existing barrier systems and security procedures;
• Needed, desired, or available speed of response and degree of skill, or training
required or available from respondent;
• Need for access to keys for entry into premises;
• Familiarity of respondents with the premises themselves;
• Needed levels of security in alarm monitoring facilities;
• Need for records for openings and closings of the premises;
• Desirability and feasibility of using alarms as a psychological deterrent to the
criminal;
• Need for safety precautions for innocent bystanders, employees and police; and
• Cost limitations.

With these considerations in mind, the practitioner can analyze the relative
merits of local, proprietary, centralized, or other alarm locations in terms of needed
security and cost. He or she then proceeds to design the sensor system. He or she
works from perimeter sensors to space sensors to trap sensors to point sensors,
designing sensor layouts that provide a level of security equivalent to that provided
by the annunciation design previously selected. Finally, the practitioner designs the
control element, considering power source, protective circuits, energizing tech-
niques, signal transmission, and annunciation circuitry. The control system should
be designed so as to be compatible with the annunciation component and the sensor
component, maintaining the same level of security, which has already been designed
into the rest of the system.

False Alarms
Alarm effectiveness should be measured in terms of the ability of the system to deter
criminals and assist in their apprehension. False alarms can seriously compromise
 98 Understanding Crime Prevention

alarm effectiveness and are currently the major problem associated with intrusion
detection systems. This problem has two dimensions:

• Quantity of false alarms, if high, can create heavy, unproductive workloads for
police and private security respondents; and
• Ratio of false alarms, if high, to total alarms can create respondent apathy,
regardless of the quantity.

The major cause of false alarms is subscriber error. Other causes include
equipment failure, improper installation, and telephone line problems.
The primary response to false alarm problems should be coordinated efforts
aimed at:

• Reducing false alarms due to subscriber error, substandard equipment, and

improper installation;
• Controlling the use and application of alarm systems, which affect the police
communications center;
• Eliminating questionable alarm dealers;
• Providing feedback on alarm effectiveness to alarm system dealers and users, and
crime prevention practitioners; and
• Encouraging the use of reliable systems designed according to sound principles
of crime risk management.

Effective coalitions of crime prevention practitioners and reputable alarm com-

panies have worked to resolve false alarm problems. Where a need for legislation
became apparent, such coalitions have stimulated effective laws and ordinances.
When law enforcement agencies have caused laws and ordinances to be passed in
absence of coalitions, the results have been to reduce the effective use of alarms as
crime prevention tools.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

Although there is a wide tendency to regard physical security barriers and electronic
security devices as the most important elements in a security program, the fact
is that procedural security is the most important single element in a good crime
risk management system. We can generally categorize security procedures as
follows:

• Personal safety;
• Asset control; and
• Security system protection.
 Security Devices and Procedures 99

Personal Safety

The first concern of the crime prevention practitioner should be to protect the client
and those for whom he is responsible from bodily harm, psychological intimidation,
and fear.

General Life Safety

No part of the security system should create additional hazards for facility occu-
pants. For example, barrier devices should not interfere with the ability of building
occupants to leave quickly in the event of fire or other emergency. Procedural train-
ing may be necessary so that family members, employees, customers, and others on
the premises can quickly defeat the security system if it becomes necessary to
escape.

Safety From Intruder Assault

Burglars, robbers, and thieves primarily seek to remove cash or property. Neverthe-
less, many such intruders are capable of harming people with little provocation.
In general, facility occupants should be trained to avoid confrontation with
the criminal and, instead, report the incident as soon as consistent with self-
protection. For a family member, this might mean leaving the house if a burglary is
discovered in progress and going to the nearest telephone to call the police. For a
store employee, pressing a silent alarm button, going to a distant phone, or alerting
security forces or management within the facility might be the approach. In any case,
procedures should be developed for such situations and all persons trained in their
use.
Should confrontation with the attacker be unavoidable, as in a holdup,
personal safety procedures such as the following should be used:

• Take no action that would jeopardize personal safety (don’t attempt to be a

hero.);
• Treat displayed firearms as if they were loaded;
• Activate alarms only if possible to do so without detection;
• Attempt to alert others, if possible;
• Follow the robber’s directions exactly, but don’t volunteer to do anything; and
• If possible without being obvious, study and memorize any features of the
attacker that will help identify him.

Specific procedures along these lines should be developed by each client and
all personnel (but, particularly those most vulnerable, such as cashiers) trained in
their application.
 100 Understanding Crime Prevention

Sexual Assault
Confrontation with a potential rapist is a particular problem for women. The best
guidance, of course, is to avoid potentially dangerous situations. This translates into
a general set of guidelines:

• Never admit a strange man to the home if alone;

• Lock all doors and windows when alone at home or in the car;
• Keep shades and curtains drawn;
• Leave exterior lights on at night;
• Walk with others, not alone;
• Never hitchhike or accept a ride from a stranger;
• Stay away from dark places;
• Be careful in choice of social companions;
• Never go alone into dark or isolated areas in a place of work; and
• When in doubt, always avoid—don’t be brave.

If the confrontation occurs anyway, the woman may have to choose among
a number of alternative tactics—some of which may be effective, and some which
may be dangerous. Procedural advice given here should be carefully dispensed by
the practitioner, who must be mindful both of the person he or she is advising and
the situations to which the advice might apply. The following tactics are presented
for illustration only:

• Flight—The woman can try to run away if a place of safety is at hand. Oth-
erwise, flight may merely enrage the attacker.
• Scream for help—A viable alternative if a source of help is available.
Shouting “fire” may attract more attention than other types of appeals. Screaming
may frighten the attacker away even if it does not attract attention. Or, it may enrage
him.
• Behave assertively—A growing school of thought suggests that, in the
initial stages of the encounter, the rapist may be testing the victim’s potential behav-
ior. If she appears intimidated by his words and approach, he will continue. If she
appears calm and unafraid, he may desist.
• Fighting—Physically attacking the assailant can be very dangerous. If the
woman is sure that she can immobilize the attacker long enough to escape to safety,
a kick to the groin or instep or a blow to the eyes or nose may be effective. If the
attempt fails, however, the enraged attacker may hurt the woman badly.
• Use of weapons—Firearms, tear gas, and other weapons might be consid-
ered, subject to the danger that the attacker may use them against the woman if she
is unable to use them effectively herself.
• Manipulation—A variety of manipulative tactics have been suggested, pri-
marily of the seductive type. The theory here is that if the woman pretends to be
sexually attracted to her assailant, she may disarm him long enough to escape when
 Security Devices and Procedures 101

he is off-guard. The danger is that if the escape is not made good, the assailant may
become enraged by the ruse.
• Submission—If all else fails, the woman may be well advised to submit,
on the grounds that she may thereby spare herself harm beyond the sexual assault
itself. Many courses on rape awareness and response are available throughout the
country and many are taught by highly reputable service providers.

Other Assaults
Most of the avoidance and confrontation procedures spelled out above also apply to
assault, robbery, mugging, molestation, and other situations that can also involve
men, older people, and children.

Asset Control

A wide variety of procedures are available for use in protection of cash and prop-
erty. The following material is presented primarily with respect to commercial
clients, but the principles apply to other settings as well.

Internal Security
The primary source of asset loss due to crime for most business operations is work-
place theft (also referred to as internal theft, fraud, embezzlement, and shrinkage).
Procedural controls that guide, restrict, or force accountability for employee activi-
ties can accomplish the objective of reducing this source of asset loss, often at little
cost or difficulty. But, the manager must first realize that he or she is sustaining,
or could sustain, loss due to employee theft.
The protection of data and information of all types is a concern of the busi-
ness world, which the practitioner must keep in mind. The complexities of the subject
prohibit an in-depth discussion here, but the fact of their importance cannot be
ignored. The sheer volume of data held in storage dictates that the security of that
information must be considered. Information technology specialists are constantly
developing new, better ways to secure the information of their employers. The
problems of data security and the prevention of such crimes as identity theft are
of concern to all, but their prevention and the resolution of these issues rest in the
arena of the information professional, not the practitioner.
The question of management attitude is all-important in the reduction
of employee theft. The crime prevention practitioner should be prepared to
invest significant effort in gaining the attention of management. In general, this
is best done by appealing to the profit motive or other primary objective of the
organization.
If we define profit as advances made toward the attainment of established
goals, it is then possible to discuss protection of assets for business, government,
 102 Understanding Crime Prevention

institutions, religious organizations, charitable organizations, political groups,

service clubs, and many other forms of activity together.5 Once management’s atten-
tion has been gained, the practitioner can work through a logical series of procedural
safeguards.

Perceptual Security
The concept of perceptual security has many applications, but in general aims to
increase the perceived strength of security in some areas so that management’s
limited resources can be concentrated in other areas.
Whatever the exact mix of security procedures developed for a given organi-
zation, it will be impossible for management to enforce all controls to the same level
of rigor. One excellent way to handle this management function is to institute
a program of irregular, random audits and spot-checks of all protection of assets
procedures. If the spot-check program is truly random in nature, no one can know
when to anticipate audit of a given operation. The uncertainty thus created amounts
to a psychological control of illegal activity.

Purchasing Procedures
The purchasing office or purchasing agent is in a position to victimize an organiza-
tion unmercifully unless proper controls are established in the following major areas:

• Centralize the purchasing function if at all possible. This makes it much easier
to control and may also permit larger purchases at lower unit cost.
• Control purchase orders by pre-numbering them in sequence (for better
accountability) and ensuring ample distribution of copies (central file, accounts
payable, receiving, for example).
• Separate purchasing, receiving, and accounting to reduce opportunities for
fraudulent purchases.
• Avoid conflict of interest situations in which key employees hold interests in
supplying companies.
• Require supporting documentation for each purchase or expense invoice, and
cancel such documentation upon receipt by perforating or otherwise defacing it
so that it cannot be used again.
• Use pre-numbered checks so that all expenditures may be tracked in sequence.

Receiving Procedures
The receiving function offers many opportunities for theft of property or embezzle-
ment of money, unless procedures such as the following are established:

• Secure the area where all merchandise is received.

• Physically separate shipping and receiving areas.
 Security Devices and Procedures 103

• Count or weigh all material received and compare the results with the shipping
documents before verifying receipt.
• File claim forms immediately for damaged merchandise.
• Use pre-numbered receiving control forms to record units received in any ship-
ment. A copy should be attached to each other document related to the shipment.
• Control access to receiving area and prohibit employees from leaving premises
through receiving door or parking nearby, and prohibit drivers of delivery vehi-
cles from entering the secure receiving area.
• Assign two people to verify each shipment received. Change at least one of them
frequently.

Storage Area Procedures

Loosely controlled warehouse, stockroom, or other merchandise and supply storage
areas offer dishonest employees a fine chance to steal. Such opportunities can be
reduced by the following procedures:

• Secure access to storage area so that only authorized persons may enter.
• Arrange stock in a neat and organized manner.
• Inventory stock on hand through perpetual inventory system (first-in, first-out),
supplemented with frequent physical audits.
• Restrict access to separate enclosures containing high-value items.
• Employ responsible persons to supervise the storage area.
• Maintain records of stock in-and-out movements.

Shipping Procedures
The authorization of merchandise shipment and delivery and the actual
shipping process are key risk areas. The following procedures can reduce criminal
opportunity:

• Maintain good documentation from the first moment shipping is authorized.

Itemized invoices permit both control of stock and proper billing.
• Separate selecting and packing functions. Use of one employee to assemble
an order and another to check and pack it helps minimize both errors and theft
opportunities.
• Use factory-sealed cartons, when possible.
• Check merchandise as it is loaded on the truck, when possible.
• Protect vehicles and contents from theft in transit.
• Control movements and access to cargo for vehicles in transit.

Cash Control
The procedures by which cash is handled should include the following, at a
minimum:
 104 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Require that the cash register drawer be closed after every transaction.
• Use a cash limiting register, if possible.
• Provide each customer with a receipt of the transaction.
• Conduct surprise cash counts at registers.
• Require verification of over-rings and under-rings.
• Maintain separate systems for cash-handling and bookkeeping, as shown in
Figure 5-16.

Employee Relations
In addition to the generally beneficial effect of a firm attitude toward employee theft
on the part of management and a series of good procedural controls over goods and
cash, procedures aimed directly at employees can be useful.

• Screen new employees thoroughly, while being mindful of civil rights

regulations.
• Provide surety bonding for all key employees.

Figure 5-16. Retail cash and cash records flow.

 Security Devices and Procedures 105

• Pay all employees by check, and maintain separation of the check preparation-
payment function and the canceled payroll check reconciliation function.
• Watch for telltale employee behavior, such as gambling, excessive drinking,
signs of family problems, and other behavior, which may signal increased desire
to steal. Be prepared to help the employee take positive corrective action.
• Encourage employees to report problems and grievances by being truly con-
cerned for, and responsive to, their needs. Theft-for-spite can be minimized
through a “human needs” orientation on the part of management.

Computer Theft or Embezzlement

The use of computer systems to maintain records and conduct financial transactions
provides a wealth of opportunity for theft. This specialized field is beyond the scope
of this book. The primary concern here is that management be made aware of the
tremendous potential for loss inherent in dishonest use of computer systems and the
need to obtain expert guidance in securing the computer and data.
The kinds of computerized programs that can be manipulated by computer-
embezzlers include: payroll, accounts payable and receivable, inventory records,
cash accounts, customer accounts, scrap and salvage records, and travel and enter-
tainment records.
In general, prevention procedures include the following:

• Document all changes to computer programs before they are made, through
a central supervisory function.
• Restrict access to the computer center.
• Separate responsibility for computer access according to sound rules for
separation of functions such as paying, receiving, accounting, and payroll. Also,
the computer programming function should be separated from the operating
function.
• Require that continuous records be maintained of data use.
• Record all errors, restarts and running times.
• Maintain duplicate copies of important data files in a separate location.
• Simulate a wide variety of possible embezzlement methods and develop
counter-measures for each.

External Security
In this section we shall briefly discuss the major procedural steps used in prevent-
ing crimes committed by persons outside the client’s organization. The types of crime
that we shall deal with are:

• Robbery;
• Fraud; and
• Shoplifting.
 106 Understanding Crime Prevention

Robbery
Robbery is a crime of confrontation and intimidation. Although the target of the
robber is cash and valuable property, personal injury or even death can be a by-
product of the confrontation.
As was discussed under Personal Safety, procedural prevention of robbery
seeks to protect life safety as well as reduce the potential for loss. Accordingly,
all members of the client organization should first and foremost be trained in
personal safety procedures. In addition, the following procedural steps may be
considered:

• Maintain only minimum cash reserves in easily accessible places such as cash
registers. Deposit cash in bank as often as possible and keep cash to be deposited
in robbery-resistive containers.
• Prominently post notices concerning cash precautions. For example, “This
safe can only be opened by armored car messenger,” and “This service station
keeps less than $25 on hand after 9 p.m.”
• Safeguard cash movement processes by using armored cars to take cash to and
from the bank, by hiring an escort service if employees carry the cash with-
drawals and deposits, or by using random time schedules for cash deposits.
• Arrange for maximum possible human surveillance of key parts of the oper-
ation by providing adequate exterior and interior lighting, placing cash register
near front windows, and by removing signs or merchandise from doors or
windows that obscure visibility into the premise.
• Instruct all members of the organization in proper use of holdup alarms and
procedures for identifying robbers, reporting to police, transfer of cash to
robbery-resistive containers, and other preventive techniques used.

Fraud
The most typical kinds of external fraud are fraudulent checks and fraudulent use
of credit cards.

Bad Checks. The main cause for loss from fraudulent checks is the lack of
adequate check cashing procedures. Proper preventive procedures should include
the following, at a minimum:

• Train all personnel involved in check cashing to examine each check carefully
for completeness, accuracy, and legibility.
• Limit the amount of money for which a check will be accepted or cashed.
• Require corroborating (valid) identification from the check casher.
• Use electronic check verification whenever possible.
• Use positive identification techniques, such as video and fingerprinting
methods.
 Security Devices and Procedures 107

• Verify addresses, telephone numbers, and when possible, bank accounts.

• Subscribe to bad checklist services through trade associations, police organi-
zations, or Better Business Bureaus.
• Beware of unusual check features such as counter checks, post-dating,
improper endorsements, apparent erasures or corrections, and differences
between numerical and written amounts.

Fraudulent Credit Cards. Criminals enjoy easy access to credit cards bearing the
names of other persons. Losses due to this type of fraud can be reduced by use of
the following procedures:

• Maintain current files of cancellation bulletins from credit card companies.

These should be used whenever electronic authorization is not possible.
• Use electronic verification/authorization, along with observation of holograms
and I.D. photos on the card.
• Train all members of the organization to follow established credit card proce-
dures without exception.

Shoplifting
Shoplifting is on the increase in many parts of the country, and the primary source
of loss may be ordinary customers rather than professional shoplifters. The follow-
ing procedures can help reduce this type of crime:

• Learn the characteristics of shoplifters and their typical attack methods.

• Train all sales personnel to greet customers promptly, to observe them as closely
as possible, to approach suspected shoplifters-in-progress with a cheerful,
“May I help you?” or other nonthreatening approaches, and to notify appropriate
management personnel if it is believed that a person has already taken
merchandise.
• Display high-value merchandise in such a way that it cannot be easily taken
without sales personnel help.
• Keep merchandise displays neat and orderly.
• Inspect merchandise to be checked out carefully so that large items cannot be
used to conceal smaller ones.
• Tag all merchandise in such a way that the price cannot be altered or
the tag transferred to another item. Special tags may be used that activate
electronic alarms at the door if the cashier does not remove the tag.
• Be prepared to prosecute apprehended shoplifters and post conspicuous
notices to this effect.
• Establish clear and legally sound procedures for detaining suspected
shoplifters and safeguarding evidence.
• Provide each purchaser with a receipt so that shoplifted items cannot later be
exchanged for cash.
 108 Understanding Crime Prevention

Security System Protection

The security system installed in facility is only as good as the procedures used to
maintain and activate it. The major areas of procedural concern are:

• Key and lock personal identification number (PIN) control;

• System activation; and
• System testing and maintenance.

Key and Lock PIN Control

It is essential that keys and PINs, when used for access, be safeguarded. In general,
this requires that keys only be assigned to personnel that absolutely require them;
use of master keys be kept to the absolute minimum; keys be changed upon resig-
nation or termination of key-holding employees; and PINs be entrusted to the
minimum number of people, not be written down, and not derived from birth dates
or other obvious sources.

System Activation
Clear procedures should be in effect for activating the security system. In general,
this requires standard, disciplined opening and closing procedures, and procedures
for use of security systems that must remain in effect during business hours (for
example, closing safes, using locks on interior doors, proper activation of holdup
alarms and cameras).

System Testing and Maintenance

A security system is of no use if it is inoperative. Each client should develop
and employ fail-safe procedures for ensuring that the security system is operating
properly at all times and that standby measures are available to maintain security
in the event the system is “down” for repair.

System Response
In the event that intrusion is detected or suspected, procedures should exist that allow
response forces to enter the premises to investigate and that permit the system itself
to be checked for false signals. In the event that the response finds the system to be
inoperative, standby measures should exist to protect the facility until the system
can be repaired.
 Security Devices and Procedures 109

Security Survey Guidelines

In closing this summary of security devices and procedures, we present sample secu-
rity survey guidelines for the business establishment and the residence. These sample
guidelines indicate the range (and approximate order) of items to be considered by
the practitioner during the survey.

SAMPLE SECURITY SURVEY GUIDELINES-BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT

I. Possible Maximum Loss Through Criminal Attack (Assessment of Targets)

A. Personal safety
B. Cash
C. Merchandise
D. Damage factors
II. Direct Protection of Targets
A. Safe
1. Rating
2. Anchored
3. Lighted
4. Visible from street or mall
B. Cash Registers
1. Visible from street or mall
2. Open at night
3. Limited cash accumulation
4. Locked when unattended
5. Limited access
C. Merchandise
1. Controlled storage room
2. Removed from windows
3. Controlled displays
4. Inventory accountability
5. Identifiable tags, marking system, or electronic article surveillance
D. Deposits
1. Prepared in protected area
2. Made daily
3. Armored service
4. Made by two or more employees
5. Varied times and routes
III. Employee Training
A. Shoplifting
B. Robbery
C. Checks and credit cards
D. Internal controls (opening and closing procedures, cash handling, purchasing and
receiving, etc.)
IV. Building Surfaces
A. Front, left side, right side, rear
1. Construction
 110 Understanding Crime Prevention

2. Doors
3. Windows
4. Vents
5. Lighting
B. Roof
1. Doors
2. Skylights
3. Vents and ducts
4. Lighting
C. Floor
1. Construction
2. Cellar
3. Ongrade
4. Post and lift
D. Key control
1. Changes as necessary
2. Accountability
V. Outside and Perimeter
A. Trees and shrubs
B. Loading docks
C. Trash storage
D. Roof access
E. Fences and gates
F. Police access
VI. Surveillance
A. Lighting
B. Visibility
C. Cameras
VII. Intrusion Detection
A. Sensors
B. Control
C. Annunciation
D. Response

Source: Adapted from NCPI training handout.

SAMPLE SECURITY SURVEY GUIDELINES—RESIDENCE

I. Possible and Probable Maximum Losses Through Criminal Attack (Assessment of

Targets)
A. Personal safety
B. Cash
C. High-value personal possessions
D. Damage factors
II. Direct Protection of Targets
A. Cash storage
B. Storage of jewelry, cameras, guns, silver, etc.
 Security Devices and Procedures 111

III. Family Member Training

A. Telephone/door answering procedures
B. Locking responsibilities
C. Intruder-in-the-house procedures
IV. Building Surfaces
A. Front, left side, right side, rear
1. Construction
2. Doors
3. Windows
4. Vents
5. Lighting
B. Roof
1. Construction
2. Doors
3. Skylights
4. Vents and ducts
5. Lighting
C. Floor
1. Construction
2. Cellar
3. Ongrade
4. Post and lift
D. Key control
1. Changed since occupancy
2. Accountability
V. Outside and Perimeter
A. Trees, shrubs, hedges
B. Roof-garage-cellar access
C. Fences and gates
D. Visibility
VI. Surveillance
A. Lighting
B. Visibility
VII. Intrusion Detection
A. Sensors
B. Controls
C. Annunciation
D. Response
Source: Adapted from NCPI training handout.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have covered a range of security devices and procedures, and their
applications, but have by no means explored their depth. The intent has been to
provide knowledge of an overview nature, rather than, in any sense, to provide the
practitioners with a “how-to” guide.
 112 Understanding Crime Prevention

We must emphasize that many activities of a risk-spreading nature are

likely to be expensive and should only be considered after all possible risk
avoidance and risk reduction measures have been taken. By the same token, the
practitioner needs much more knowledge of the specifics of security devices and
procedures than can be presented in this volume before he or she can make cost-
effective recommendations.
 6
Applying Environmental
Design Concepts

In Chapters 4 and 5, we described the practitioner’s role in helping the individual

client reduce criminal opportunity within the confines of his own environment.
In this chapter and in the remaining chapters, we discuss the practitioner’s roles
in helping to reduce criminal opportunity within the community environment. By
community environment, we mean those combinations of private spaces (homes,
stores, schools, factories, warehouses, etc.) and public spaces (streets, sidewalks,
parks, parking lots, etc.) that make up the block, neighborhood, subdivision, shopping
center, industrial park, downtown area, and other components of the town or city.
Crime prevention is by no means a highly refined technology. Yet, the princi-
ples and techniques of designing crime risk management systems for individual
clients have gone through a several-decade development and refinement process and,
although there is plenty of room for innovation and improvement, the reliability of
these techniques and principles is fairly well established.
The application of crime risk management principles to the community envi-
ronment, however, is still developing and remains part science, part art, and is still
highly experimental. This means that, although a considerable body of conceptual
knowledge is available to guide the practitioner, he must find innovative and creative
ways to apply this conceptual knowledge. Crime prevention in the community envi-
ronment is, thus, an exciting and open-ended field of activity in which the practi-
tioner of today is creating the technology of the future.

113
 114 Understanding Crime Prevention

TRANSITION FROM CLIENT TO COMMUNITY

As he or she moves from the individual to the community environment, the practi-
tioner continues to be concerned with reducing the risks of personal injury and prop-
erty loss due to crime, but there is a significant difference in his outlook.
In serving the individual client, he or she must maintain an essentially private
viewpoint. That is, he is only interested in reducing the victimization potential of
that client. In serving the community, he or she must apply a public interest view-
point. That is, he or she is interested in reducing the risks of personal injury and
property loss due to crime for everyone who occupies or uses the environment, not
just those who choose to become his individual clients.
This transition from the client to the community environment is like moving
from the tree to the forest. The individual is still important, but the object of the
practitioner’s efforts is to improve the security of the community as a whole.
In applying crime risk management principles to the community, the practi-
tioner is dealing with crime risks related to the characteristics of the physical or built
environment, and crime risks related to the behavior of those who create, use, and
occupy the physical environment. These two kinds of crime risk overlap to a large
extent. For purposes of clarity, however, we discuss the practitioner’s roles in influ-
encing physical design and social behavior in two separate chapters. This chapter
primarily describes the ways in which the practitioner may apply risk management
principles to the physical environment. Chapter 7 describes methods for stimulating
appropriate social behavior through citizen participation in community crime pre-
vention programs.

LEVELS OF PHYSICAL DESIGN APPLICATION

There are three levels of crime prevention applications to physical design. The first,
Crime Risk Reduction Through Physical Design, is concerned with alterations in the
physical environment that can directly affect criminal activities. The second, Crime
Risk Reduction by the Users of the Physical Environment, describes the ways in
which physical design can be used to stimulate crime prevention behavior by those
who use the physical environment. The third, Crime Prevention Through Environ-
mental Design (CPTED), summarizes the current state-of-the-art in a rapidly
growing field of study and experimentation which aims for nothing less than the
development of comprehensive crime risk management systems (involving both
physical design and social action strategies) on a community-wide scale.

CRIME RISK REDUCTION THROUGH PHYSICAL DESIGN

At this level, the practitioner is concerned with physical design techniques, which
can directly reduce opportunities for criminal activity. The major difference between
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 115

applying these techniques to the individual client (as described in chapters 4 and 5)
and applying them to the community is that a single individual or group can no
longer manage crime risk. Instead, the practitioner must deal with multiple “clients,”
and this requires that he lay heavy stress on the development of cooperative arrange-
ments with and among individuals, groups, and public agencies.

Crime Risk Reduction in the Existing Physical Environment

It would be ideal, we suppose, if the practitioner could conduct a mammoth secu-

rity survey of each community in his or her jurisdiction, make appropriate (and inter-
connected) recommendations to each of the many private owners and public agencies
that are responsible for the parts of each community, and then work to ensure com-
pliance with those recommendations. Even in a small jurisdiction, however, such an
approach would require an effort of Herculean proportions far beyond the ability of
the practitioner and his organization, even if laws and local custom would allow him
to take such sweeping action.

Client Groups
As a practical matter, the practitioner can only work directly on a security survey
basis with those clients or client groups that request his services. However, he or she
can identify priority communities and priority areas within communities based on
his or her study of crime patterns and attempt to enlist the cooperation of property
owners and agencies within those areas.
His or her approach here is to work with groups of owners toward developing
a more secure collective physical environment, and to stimulate and coordinate the
efforts of appropriate public agencies toward the same goal. He or she can, however,
operate indirectly on a community-wide scale through groups of observer-reporters.

Observer-Reporters
Each municipality typically contains several occupational and professional groups
whose members are in a position to observe physical crime risks in the course of
their normal activities. Among such groups are:

• Building inspectors;
• Fire marshals and other fire service personnel;
• Police officers and other law enforcement personnel; and
• Others who regularly visit buildings and public areas in the community.

The practitioner’s first task is to enlist the cooperation of such groups and train
individual members to observe common kinds of risks in the physical environment
such as:
 116 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Inadequate lighting conditions;

• Inadequate physical security provisions in individual structures;
• Places of concealment for attackers such as vacant structures, dense shrubbery,
trash accumulations, isolated parking areas, bus stations, public rest rooms,
alleys, and so on;
• Situations that create potential access difficulties for police; and
• Local situations which present a variety of security risks such as construction
sites, transportation depots, parking structures, shopping centers, housing pro-
jects, parks, and playgrounds.

Once alerted by reports of specific risks, the practitioner may visit the scene
of the report to make his or her own risk assessment. He or she then can approach
the individuals, organizations, or agencies responsible, discuss the risks observed,
and suggest corrective measures. He or she may offer to perform comprehensive
security surveys and otherwise help to reduce the observed risks. For example, he
or she might offer to contact appropriate municipal agencies for help in reducing
risks that are not under the control of the property owner or manager.
The practitioner should be sure to always inform the observer-reporter of
the action taken in response to each risk report. This can both reinforce the observer-
reporter’s personal motivation and provide a convenient opportunity for further
training. Not the least of the benefits of this approach is that it can lead to the
development of substantial expertise in the observer-reporters. They can, in time,
begin to initiate risk-reduction action themselves—thus, further extending the
practitioner’s ability to apply risk management principles to the existing physical
environment.

Property Owner Associations and Agencies

In another kind of approach to risk reduction in the existing physical environment,
the practitioner can identify and work with organized groups that represent primary
land users in the community, such as:

• Homeowners and renters;

• Apartment owners;
• Subdivision developers;
• Construction firms;
• Shopping center managers;
• Parking facility operators;
• Departments of parks and recreation;
• School boards;
• Housing authorities;
• Industrial park operators; and
• Departments of public works.
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 117

His or her objective should be to stimulate and train such groups to perform
their own physical risk assessments as a normal operational routine and contact him
or her for assistance as necessary.

Crime Risk Reduction in the Future Physical Environment

Through his public awareness campaigns and public education activities (see Chapter
7) the practitioner can create improved levels of public knowledge as to the ways in
which crime risk reduction principles can be incorporated into new construction.
Through specific efforts to inform and educate builders, architects, land developers,
construction contractors, and others primarily responsible for new construction,
he or she can increase the probability that crime risk reduction techniques will
be applied in new construction. However, his primary direct input to the future
physical environment will come through his formal or informal participation in the
jurisdiction’s physical planning process.

The Mandate for Participation in Physical Planning

In recognition of the important relationship between physical planning and future
crime reduction (as well as other aspects of the law enforcement mission), the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in its
Report on Police,1 established the following standard for police-community physi-
cal planning.

Every police agency should participate with local planning agencies and organizations,
public and private, in community physical planning that affects the rate or nature of
crime or the fear of crime.
1. Every government entity should seek police participation with public and private
agencies and organizations involved in community physical planning within the
jurisdiction.
2. Every police agency should assist in planning with public and private organiza-
tions involved in police-related community physical planning. This assistance
should at least include planning involving:
a. Industrial area development;
b. Business and commercial area development;
c. Residential area development, both low rise and high rise;
d. Governmental or health facility complex development;
e. Open area development, both park and other recreation;
f. Redevelopment projects such as urban renewal; and
g. Building requirements (target hardening), both residential and commercial.

Participation in local planning is an essential part of the practice of crime pre-

vention, because it provides the opportunity to reduce or remove crime risks asso-
ciated with the physical environment before construction starts. This emphasis on
 118 Understanding Crime Prevention

police practitioners has been adopted by the Commission on the Accreditation of

Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), the United States Conference of Mayors, and
the International Association of Chief’s of Police (IACP).

The Physical Planning Process

Municipal governments perform four primary physical planning functions:

• Comprehensive land use planning—looks at current land use patterns in the

community and attempts to identify desirable patterns for future growth and
change;
• Zoning—establishes and regulates the conditions under which land is used;
• Development plan approval—determines the precise configuration of any pro-
posed land development or redevelopment; and
• Building code development and enforcement—sets specific standards for build-
ing construction, use, and occupancy.

As a practical matter, the practitioner’s first task is to determine exactly how

these planning functions are handled in his jurisdiction. Most communities have an
independent planning (or planning and zoning) commission consisting of citizens
who are appointed according to provisions of local ordinances or state laws. In some
cases, the commission employs the planning staff. In other cases, a planning depart-
ment within municipal government employs the planning staff. In a few cases, there
is a planning department but no independent commission, with the community advi-
sory function handled through a series of ad hoc committees. In any case, land use
planning, zoning, and platting are handled by some combination of commission,
committee, and planning staff, with the mayor or municipal council serving as arbi-
trator of disputes over land use.
Usually, a separate building inspection department handles building code
development and enforcement. Some communities have established a community
development department, which handles all physical planning functions.

Crime Prevention Contributions to Physical Planning

Having identified the physical planning structure in his community and its key offi-
cials, the practitioner can start developing ways to provide input to the planning
process. Unless a formal procedure already exists for his or her involvement in the
planning process, the practitioner should hold a series of introductory discussions
with appropriate officials. In these sessions, he should explain the importance of
crime prevention in physical planning and offer to provide technical assistance. He
or she can then gradually develop a permanent role as an advisor to planners.
The contributions that a practitioner can make to the physical planning process
are limited only by his technical skill and imagination. There are, however, two major
areas in which he may concentrate his or her efforts.
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 119

Development Plan Review

The practitioner may offer, or be asked, to review proposed development plans for
residential subdivisions, shopping centers, entertainment complexes, medical
centers, and other major proposed construction. He should look for potential crime
risks associated with exterior environment features such as:

• Building setbacks;
• Fences, walls, hedges, and other boundary markers;
• Trees and shrubbery;
• Streets, sidewalks, and alleys;
• Lighting;
• Public areas and facilities; and
• Parking lots and structures.

He or she should also be concerned with crime risks in parts of individual

structures, such as:

• Walls, roofs, and floors;

• Doors, windows, and other external access points;
• Stairways, hallways, restrooms, elevators, lobbies, and other common areas;
• Lighting;
• Internal access points;
• Placement of utilities and ducting; and
• Common overheads.

Building Code Review

Although increasing numbers of municipalities have adopted or are developing secu-
rity components in the local building code, the practitioner may find that building
security provisions are inadequately set forth or enforced. In either case, his or her
approach should be to work closely with local building officials and other interested
parties to develop improved enforcement procedures or an improved code. Several
United States cities and states have enacted codes and ordinances in this context, as
have several Canadian Provinces.
As is discussed in Chapter 5, he or she should stress the necessity for working
with both the public and private sectors, and the need to harmonize local codes with
state and national codes.

CRIME RISK REDUCTION BY USERS OF THE

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Physical design can be used to stimulate social attitudes and behavior, which can
help reduce both the opportunities for crimes and the fear of crime through:
 120 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Intensified use of streets, parks, and land around structures;

• Increased visibility of intruders to legitimate occupants and users;
• Increased tendency for people to look out for each other and to act if a crime is
observed;
• Increased ability to discriminate between people who belong in an area and those
who are intruders; and
• Increased sense of shared interest in improving and maintaining the quality of
the physical and social environment.

Informal Social Control

The presence of these kinds of social attitudes and behavior leads to informal social
control of crime. Informal control is both distinct from and complementary with
formal control (that is, the actions and reactions of the criminal justice system).
The effect of informal social control can be to influence members of a social
group to conform with the group’s norms for appropriate behavior, to influence users
and occupants of an area to protect each other from intruders, and to create the prob-
ability that users and occupants will turn to formal controls when necessary by
calling police and otherwise cooperating with the criminal justice system (giving
testimony in court, for example).

The Influence of Physical Design

The relationship between physical design and informal social control of crime is a
new idea only in the sense of its systematic application to the modern urban scene.
Prior to the development of the modern city, most societies took some precautions
to relate security in the physical environment to a responsibility for security actions
by the inhabitants themselves.
In the rush of modern urban development, however, economic and political
priorities seem to have far outweighed security priorities, with the result that many
urban settings now seem deliberately designed to discourage informal social control.
No colonial community would have done so. Even when stockades were no longer
needed for defense against Indians. New England towns continued to be constructed
so that the homes and stores formed a hollow square around a central Common where
social activities could take place and where livestock could be kept in relative secu-
rity. In this kind of environment, everyone knew everyone else’s business, and while
this meant less personal privacy than the modern city dweller may enjoy, it also
meant a high degree of shared responsibility for controlling undesirable behavior
and unwanted intrusion.
Only recently have students of modern urban society begun again to take
serious note of the relationship between physical design and informal social control.
The concept was first applied to modern cities by Jane Jacobs in 1961. In her book,
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 121

The Death and Life of Great American Cities,2 she theorized that multiple land uses
along residential streets provided an interaction between the physical design and the
users (pedestrians and residents), which promoted natural and informal surveillance
and, therefore, increased the safety of the streets.
Lee Rainwater, in an evaluation of a public housing project in St. Louis (1966),
discussed the effect of physical design on the attitudes of public housing residents,
pointing out that inappropriate architectural design was directly related to anti-social
behavior.3
Elizabeth Wood, writing in 1961 and 1967, suggested that current design pat-
terns in public housing projects appeared to discourage informal social relationships
and gatherings, thus preventing the development of social interactions through which
residents could create informal social controls and self-policing.4
Schlomo Angel, in 1968, found that variations in the level of pedestrian and
vehicular traffic could either encourage or discourage crimes.5 Too few users pro-
vided enough potential victims, but not enough potential witnesses.
Gerald Leudtke and associates found, as the result of studies in Detroit, that
. . . many of the features of urban form and structure . . . could tend to facilitate or
decrease the probability of crime. Such physical features include the condition and
maintenance of buildings, streets and alleys; evidence of recent construction; mix-
tures of land use; rates of pedestrian traffic and pedestrian accumulation within
various land uses; location of structures on an urban grid pattern; and distance to
adjacent structures. Other examples are types of parking facilities; visibility into
structures from roads, sidewalks and adjoining buildings; concealment by trees,
shrubs, parked automobiles, fences, signs and advertising; the visibility of entrance
points; building setbacks; and, the number and arrangement of entrance points in a
building.6
In 1969, Oscar Newman and George Rand7 developed a theory of territor-
iality (now referred to as Defensible Space), which held that proper physical
design of housing encourages residents to extend their social control from their
homes and apartments out into the surrounding common areas. In this way, they
change what previously had been perceived as semi-public or public territory
into private territory. Upgrading the common areas in this way results in increased
social control and an interaction between physical environment and its users that
reduces crime.
As Newman himself defines it, Defensible Space is a surrogate term for the
range of mechanisms—real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influ-
ence, improved opportunities for surveillance—that combine to bring an environ-
ment under the control of its residents. A defensible space is a living residential
environment that can be employed by inhabitants for the enhancement of their lives,
while providing security for their families, neighbors, and friends. The public areas
of a multi-family residential environment devoid of defensible space can make the
act of going from street to apartment equivalent to running the gauntlet. The fear
and uncertainty generated by living in such an environment can slowly eat away and
eventually destroy the security and sanctity of the apartment unit itself. On the other
 122 Understanding Crime Prevention

hand, by grouping dwelling units to reinforce association of mutual benefit, by delin-

eating paths of movement, by defining areas of activity for particular users through
their juxtaposition with internal living areas, and by providing for natural opportu-
nities for visual surveillance, architects can create a clear understanding of the
function of a space, who its users are and ought to be. This, in turn, can lead resi-
dents of all income levels to adopt extremely potent territorial attitudes and polic-
ing measures, which act as a strong deterrent to potential criminals.8
A study by Reppetto,9 in Boston indicated the need to expand the CPTED
process to include whole neighborhoods and to provide for comprehensive data col-
lection efforts, which would both define the nature of crime patterns and suggest
appropriate countermeasures.
Reppetto also was able to show that closely-knit communities do tend to
protect their members through informal social controls, a finding further emphasized
by Conklin in The Impact of Crime: A tightly knit community can minimize
the problem of street crime. However, informal social control also poses a threat to
the diversity of behavior that exists in a pluralistic society, even though it may
curb violent crime. Still, street crime would decline if interaction among the resi-
dents of a community were more frequent, and if social bonds were stronger. A sense
of responsibility for other citizens and for the community as a whole would increase
individuals’ willingness to report crime to the police and the likelihood of their
intervention in a crime in progress. Greater willingness of community residents
to report crime to the police might also obviate the need for civilian police
patrols. More interaction in public places and more human traffic on the sidewalks
would increase surveillance of the places where people now fear to go. More intense
social ties would reinforce surveillance with a willingness to take action against
offenders.10
C. Ray Jeffrey, in his classic theoretical work Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (1971),11 written before Jeffrey became aware of the
works of Newman and others, proposed a three-fold strategy involving not only
physical design, but also increased citizen participation and the more effective use
of police forces. He contended that the way to prevent crime is to design the
total environment in such a manner that the opportunity for crime is reduced or
eliminated.
Jeffrey contends that both the physical and the social characteristics of an
urban area affect crime patterns and that better physical planning is a key to unlock-
ing the potential for improved physical security and the potential for development
of informal social control. He also argues for high levels of precision in the analyt-
ical stages that precede physical planning for crime reduction.
One of the major methodological defects in ecological studies of crime rates
has been use of large units and census tract data as a basis for analysis. The usual
units are rural-urban, intricacy, intercity, regional, and national differences . . . Such
an approach is much too gross for finding the physical features associated with dif-
ferent types of crimes.
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 123

We must look at the physical environment in terms of each building, or each

room of the building, or each floor of the building. Fine-grain resolution is required
in place of the usual large-scale photographs . . . Whenever crime rates are surveyed
at a micro level of analysis, it is revealed that a small area of the city is responsi-
ble for a majority of the crimes. This fact is glossed over by gross statistical corre-
lation analysis of census tract data, which ignore house-by-house or block-by-block
variations in crime rates. For purposes of crime prevention we need data that will
tell us what aspects of the urban environment are responsible for crime, such as the
concentration of homicide or robbery in a very small section of the city.12

Defensible Space

Oscar Newman and others have explored and further defined the defensible space
concept in recent years through design studies and experiments involving existing
and new public housing projects. The following summary of defensible space tech-
niques will give the practitioner an initial understanding of this important applica-
tion of physical design to the urban residential environment.
Design for defensible space involves attempts to strengthen two basic kinds of
social behavior called territoriality and natural surveillance.

Territoriality
The classic example of territoriality is the “man’s home is his castle” tradition of the
American single-family home and its surroundings. In this tradition, the family lays
claim to its own territory and acts to protect it, and this image of the home as a castle
reinforces itself . . . by the very act of its position on an integral piece of land
buffered from neighbors and the public street by intervening grounds.13
As the urban setting has grown, the single family home has become, to devel-
opers, an economic liability. Family housing has moved into the row house, apart-
ment complex, high-rise apartment structure, and massive public housing project.
Whatever the benefits of this transition, the idea of territoriality has been largely lost
in the process. The result is that . . . most families living in an apartment building
experience the space outside their apartment unit as distinctly public; in effect, they
relegate responsibility for all activity outside the immediate confines of their apart-
ment to the public authorities.14
As residents are forced by the physical design of their surroundings to abandon
claim to any part of the outside world, the hallways, stairways, lobbies, grounds,
parking lots, and streets become a kind of no-man’s land in which criminals can
operate almost at will. Public and private law enforcement agencies (formal con-
trols) attempt to take up the slack, but without the essential informal social control
that a well-developed social sense of territoriality brings, law enforcement can do
little to reduce crime.
 124 Understanding Crime Prevention

Natural Surveillance
The increased presence of human observers, which territoriality brings, can lead to
higher levels of natural surveillance in all areas of residential space. However,
the simple presence of increased numbers of potential observers is not enough,
because natural surveillance, to be effective, must include an action component. The
probability that an observer will act to report an observed crime or intervene in it
depends on:

• The degree to which the observer feels that his personal or property rights are
violated by the observed act; or,
• The extent to which the observer is able to identify with the victim or property
under attack; and
• The level of the observer’s belief that his action can help, on the one hand, and
not subject him to reprisals on the other.

Obviously, the probability for both observation and action is greatly improved
by physical conditions, which create the highest possible levels of visibility.

Design Guidelines
Defensible space offers a series of architectural guidelines, which can be used in the
design of new urban residential complexes to promote both the residential group’s
territorial claim to its surroundings and its ability to conduct natural surveillance.15

Site design can stress the clustering of small numbers of residential units around
private hallways, courtyards, and recreation areas. In these restricted zones,
children can play, adults can relax, and strangers can easily be identified and
questioned. Such private spaces can be created by internal and external build-
ing walls and access arrangements, and by the use of perceptual barriers such
as low fences, shrubbery, and other boundary markers.
Site interrelationships design can be used to create semi-private connecting and
common spaces between and among the private family clusters. Walkways,
vehicle access ways, parking areas, recreational facilities, lobbies, and laundry
and shopping areas can be designed so that each cluster relates to them much
as each resident of a cluster relates to his common private space. Physical
design can thus be used to further extend the sense of territoriality and the pos-
sibility for informal social control.
Street design and the design of other public spaces can be engineered to make these
spaces into semi-public extensions of the residential clusters and their con-
nectors. Closing streets to through traffic, installing benches and play areas
near the streets, providing adequate lighting, and placing perceptual barriers
to indicate the semi-public nature of the area can help to define these spaces
as part of the shared residential group territory.
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 125

Surveillance-specific design can be used in each of the above design areas to

increase general visibility by providing adequate lighting, by reducing or elim-
inating physical barriers to visibility, and by the visibility-promoting location
of key areas (for example, entrances, lobbies, elevator waiting areas, recre-
ational and parking areas) so as to be directly visible from as many points of
view as possible.

Modifying Existing Physical Design

Cost limitations prevent substantial reconstruction of most existing urban residen-
tial facilities. However, a number of relatively low-cost techniques can be used to
modify existing facilities so as to promote territoriality and natural surveillance.
These include:

• Installing adequate security devices (locks, doors, and windows) in each resi-
dential unit;
• Dividing common lawn areas (front or back) into private yards and patios through
the use of shrubbery, low fences, and other perceptual barriers;
• Improving the attractiveness and semi-privacy of pathways and other common
outside areas by use of decorative paving and lighting; by installing benches and
other seating arrangements at strategic intervals; by careful landscaping; and by
tying play areas, parking and vehicle access ways to the overall design;
• Reducing the number of public access points and providing the remaining points
with good lighting, visibility and security; and
• Establishing audio and video surveillance (monitored by residents or by security
staff) in strategic internal areas.

It should be emphasized, in summary, that creating defensible space is not the

same as creating a hardened security system (as might be found, for example, in a
high-rise luxury apartment). In fact, it is almost the opposite. Defensible space oper-
ates on the premise that the living environment must be opened up and used by res-
idents and others, not closed in. It is only in the open, used environment that people
can be stimulated to establish the self-policing condition, which is informal social
control. In this open living environment, opportunities for crime may continue to
exist, but the probability for criminal activity is reduced.
It should also be emphasized that the physical design component of defensi-
ble space should always be accompanied by efforts to develop and sustain active
citizen participation and by strategies for improved interaction between citizens and
law enforcement agencies.

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Crime prevention through environmental design, or CPTED, is still a rapidly growing

field of study and experimentation that attempts to apply physical design, citizen
 126 Understanding Crime Prevention

participation and law enforcement strategies in a comprehensive, planned way to

entire neighborhoods and even major urban districts, as well as to specific urban sub-
systems such as public schools and transportation systems.

Cautions

Before summarizing the CPTED approach, we would suggest that the practitioner
view CPTED developments with a healthy skepticism, at least for the present. There
are several reasons why a sense of caution is in order:

• Although the effectiveness of some of the specific techniques used in CPTED

experiments can be verified, the overall effectiveness of the CPTED approach has
yet to be conclusively demonstrated;
• There is some disagreement among crime prevention theorists as to the correct-
ness of the assumptions on which current CPTED programs are based;
• The magnitude of the typical CPTED project may be well beyond the practi-
tioner’s current ability to plan, implement, and manage; and
• The cost of a typical CPTED project can represent a major financial investment,
and unless the investment can be justified on a research and demonstration basis,
there is no guarantee that it will be cost effective.

Despite these cautions, it is useful for the practitioner to be aware of the prin-
ciples and current applications of the CPTED concept so that he or she can watch
its developments and make appropriate use of the knowledge that it may produce.

Recent Projects

In a project combining the best of current community policing techniques with the
principles of CPTED the city of Manchester, New Hampshire, proved the value of
this integrated approach. In Manchester, the police department formed partnerships
with community organizations and provided appropriate crime prevention training,
to include CPTED to all of the officers assigned to the project areas. By combining
the concepts of community policing with the application of CPTED, and other
related crime prevention strategies, the community realized remarkable reductions
in several crime categories. The area encompasses three areas of public housing in
which CPTED principles were applied. The changes in community perceptions about
crime were measured through surveys and the crime statistics were updated fre-
quently to give the police department the best possible data. In this Enterprise Com-
munity area drug activity was reduced 57 percent, robbery fell 54 percent, burglary
was reduced 52 percent, and police calls for service dropped 20 percent. Addition-
ally, the perceptions of the citizens of the area were markedly improved. This
example demonstrates the levels of success possible when sound policing, sound
crime prevention, and the concepts of CPTED are combined in the correct propor-
tions. As a result of these levels of success the project was recognized by HUD
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 127

through the awarding of the John J. Gunther Award. This award recognizes the best
practices and was awarded in this instance in the category of Suitable Living Envi-
ronment.16

Territorial Defense Strategies

Territorial Defense Strategies emphasize prevention of property-related crimes such
as breaking and entering, auto theft, and household larceny. Within this group there
are five related strategy areas: land use planning; building grounds security; build-
ing perimeter security; building interior security; and construction standards.

Land use planning strategies involve planning activities aimed at avoiding land
use mixtures that have a negative impact on neighborhood security, through
zoning ordinances and development plan reviews.
Building grounds security strategies provide the first line of defense against unau-
thorized entry of sites and offer social control mechanisms to prevent danger-
ous and destructive behavior of visitors. The emphasis is on the access control
and surveillance aspects of architectural design. The target environment might
be a residential street, the side of a housing complex, or alleyways behind or
between business establishments.
Building perimeter security strategies provide a second line of defense for pro-
tecting site occupants and property by preventing unauthorized entries of
buildings. They involve physical barriers, surveillance and intrusion detection
systems, and social control mechanisms.
Building interior security strategies provide the third line of defense for protect-
ing site occupants and property by preventing unauthorized access to interior
spaces and valuables through physical barriers, surveillance and intrusion
detection systems, and social control mechanisms.
Construction standards strategies involve building security codes that require con-
struction techniques and materials that tend to reduce crime and safety hazards.
These strategies deal both with code adoption and code enforcement.

Personal Defense Strategies

The second basic strategic approach focused on the prevention of violent or street
crimes such as robbery, assault, and rape, and the reduction of fear associated with
these crimes. Specific strategies included safe-streets-for-people, transportation,
cash-off-the-streets, and citizen intervention.

Safe-streets-for-people strategies involve planning principles derived primarily

from the CPTED concepts of surveillance and activity support. Surveillance
operates to discourage potential offenders because of the apparent risk of being
seen and can be improved through various design modifications of physical
elements of the street environment (e.g., lighting, fencing, and landscaping).
Pedestrian traffic areas can be channeled to increase their use and, hence, the
 128 Understanding Crime Prevention

number of observers through such measures as creating malls, eliminating on-

street parking, and providing centralized parking areas.
Transportation strategies are aimed at reducing exposure to crime by improving
public transportation. For example, transit waiting stations (bus, trolley) can
be located near areas of safe activity and good surveillance, or the distance
between stations can be reduced, thus, improving accessibility to specific res-
idences, business establishments, and other traffic generating points.
Cash-off-the-streets strategies reduce incentives for crime by urging people not to
carry unnecessary cash and to provide commercial services that minimize the
need to carry cash.
Citizen intervention, unlike the three previous activities, consists of strategies
aimed at organizing and mobilizing residents to adopt proprietary interests and
assume responsibility for the maintenance of security.

Law Enforcement Strategies

The third general approach involved police functions that support community-based
prevention activities. There are two activities: police patrol and citizen/police support.

Police patrol strategies focus on ways in which police deployment procedures can
improve their efficiency and effectiveness in responding to calls and appre-
hending offenders.
Citizen/police support strategies consist of police operational support activities
that improve citizen/police relations and encourage citizens to cooperate with
the police in preventing and reporting incidents.

Confidence Restoration Strategies

This fourth general strategy for commercial and residential environments involved
activities that are aimed primarily at mobilizing neighborhood interest and support
to implement needed CPTED changes. Without such interest and support, it is
unlikely that programs of sufficient magnitude to be successful will be possible,
particularly in many high-crime-rate neighborhoods where people have lost
hope. There are two specific strategy areas: investor confidence and neighborhood
identities.

Investor confidence strategies promote economic investment and, therefore, social

and economic vitality.
Neighborhood identity strategies build community pride and foster social cohesion.

Most of these specific strategies are discussed in this and other chapters (some
under different names). As a whole, this list of strategies is well organized and pro-
vides a good framework with which to view the possible interaction of a variety of
crime prevention efforts.
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 129

Demonstrations
To see how these strategies were applied, let us look briefly at the major changes
described in the American Architecture Foundation’s presentation, Back From the
Brink, Saving America’s Cities by Design.17 This provides examples of CPTED
applications, with very little mention of crime, as applied in Portland, Oregon, and
some other locales. The principles applied are sound, workable re-design strategies,
which accomplish the goals of CPTED, without over-reliance on their direct crime
prevention intent. Indeed, they are not presented as crime prevention, but redevel-
opment efforts, which consider the quality of life above most other considerations.
The CPTED applications in the featured cities achieve the following:

• Reduce opportunities for crime and reduce fear of crime by making streets
and open areas more easily observable, and, by increasing activity in the
neighborhood;
• Provide ways in which neighborhood residents, business people, and police can
work together more effectively to reduce opportunities and incentives for crime;
• Increase neighborhood identity, investor confidence, and social cohesion;
• Provide public information programs that help business people and residents
protect themselves from crime;
• Make the area more accessible by improving transportation services;
• Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental operations; and
• Encourage citizens to report crimes.

The steps taken to achieve these objectives included:

• Outdoor lighting, sidewalk, and landscaping improvements;

• Block watch, safe homes, and neighborhood cleanups;
• A campaign to discourage people from carrying cash;
• A major improvement/expansion of public transportation;
• Improved street lighting; and
• Public transportation hubs that are purpose built.

These improvements have enhanced the quality of life and provided an atmos-
phere of improvement in each of the communities featured.
The application of CPTED to school design has been promoted in a number
of locations through the work of local practitioners, and in cooperation with school
district personnel.
Additional CPTED case studies, and information may be found in our text,
written by Tim Crowe, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Applica-
tions of Architectural Design and Space Management Concepts. This text offers
CPTED as a specific topic and is widely used by students, and practitioners.
 130 Understanding Crime Prevention

The Future of CPTED

The most consistent finding in evaluations of CPTED and related projects has been
that the users of space must be involved in design decisions. Their involvement
insures that the designs are realistic and that the users will comply with the behav-
ioral objectives of the plans. Numerous applications of CPTED concepts have been
tried successfully on a spot basis, which has tended to support the idea that the more
simplistic approaches are the most viable. That is, it seems reasonable to assume that
the crime prevention practitioner may confidently use CPTED strategies in very spe-
cific, controlled environmental settings.
There are many hundreds of examples of CPTED strategies in practice today.
It is unfortunate that most of the successful applications have not been publicized
well, since they are usually part of ongoing field activities that do not come to the
attention of evaluators or government agencies. However, it has been noted that most
applications center on some mixture or interaction between the three basic CPTED
processes of natural surveillance, natural access control, and territoriality. The most
basic common thread is the primary emphasis on naturalness—simply doing things
that you already have to do, a little better.
The most productive uses of CPTED, in the foreseeable future, will center on
the following simplistic strategies:

• Provide clear border definition of controlled space;

• Provide clearly marked transitional zones, which indicate movement from public
to semi-public to private space;
• Relocate gathering areas to locations with natural surveillance and access control,
or to locations away from the view of would-be offenders;
• Place safe activities in unsafe locations to bring along the natural surveillance of
these activities (to increase the perception of safety for normal users and risk for
offenders;
• Place unsafe activities in safe spots to overcome the vulnerability of these activ-
ities with the natural surveillance and access control of the safe area;
• Redesignate the use of space to provide natural barriers to conflicting activities;
• Improve scheduling of space to allow for effective use, appropriate “critical inten-
sity,” and the temporal definition of accepted behaviors;
• Redesign or revamp space to increase the perception or reality of natural
surveillance; and
• Overcome distance and isolation through improved communication and design
efficiencies.

The future of CPTED rests with the persons who shape public and private
policy. Crime prevention practitioners will have to communicate CPTED concepts
in terms that relate to the overall priorities of their organizations or communities.
Productivity, profitability, and quality of life are concerns that affect policy makers—
not specifically security or crime prevention for its own sake. Accordingly, chief
 Applying Environmental Design Concepts 131

executives, builders, architects, planners, engineers, and developers will have to

embrace CPTED design objectives. Elected officials and legislative bodies will have
to be held accountable for assuring that CPTED has been considered in capital
improvement and development plans. Property owners and residents of neighbor-
hoods and commercial areas will need the opportunity to question planning, zoning,
and traffic signalization decisions. Finally, strategic plans that encompass 20-year
community development periods will require an assessment of crime prevention
needs and programs.

CONCLUSION

The application of environmental design concepts by the crime prevention practi-

tioner can be as cost effective as the design of crime risk management systems for
individual clients. Such application must be based, however, on sound analysis of
particular crime patterns and the physical and social conditions that are related to
those patterns. It should stress innovative solutions that are appropriate to the par-
ticular circumstances, that are cost effective and that will not create more problems
than they solve. It should stress working with “things as they are” rather than with
“things as they ought to be.”
The practitioner needs, above all, to become well acquainted with the people
and organizations responsible for physical development and redevelopment in his or
her community. The best opportunities for applying crime prevention through envi-
ronmental design occur when buildings, street layouts, street lighting programs, new
subdivisions, shopping centers, and housing projects are still in the planning stages,
and crime prevention principles can be incorporated before construction starts.
In keeping with the theory that the quality of the physical environment impacts
human behavior, we think that crime prevention and community development
go hand-in-hand. Physical design that enhances the environment from a balanced
economic-social-political standpoint can also discourage criminal activity, and
the concept of crime prevention through environmental design can be used in any
situation—high-density urban areas, small cities and towns, and even rural areas.
The essential role of the practitioner is to see the “whole picture” and to see to it
that physical design, citizen participation, and police activities fit together.
In terms of physical design itself, the major task of the crime prevention prac-
titioner is to analyze existing and planned physical design, determine how it relates
to existing or potential crime patterns, and recommend physical design counter-
measures to the proper person or organization.
Another major task for the crime prevention practitioner is to help develop the
citizen participation strategies needed to complement physical design changes or to
overcome deficiencies in physical design. This task is the subject of the next chapter.
 7
Developing Citizen
Participation

In the community-wide crime prevention program, citizen participation and law

enforcement action strategies work together in altering social and physical environ-
ments so as to reduce criminal opportunity.
Chapter 6 discussed physical design strategies. In this chapter, we turn to an
overview of citizen participation strategies and the role of the crime prevention prac-
titioner in designing and implementing those strategies.
We have already defined the crime prevention practitioner as an enabler, rather
than a doer. We have pointed out that the practitioner enables by working with and
through the citizen-doers, and have suggested a few of the many roles that private
and public organizations and particular areas of skill and interest can play. Now we
turn to the ways in which citizens and police can work together in developing
productive crime prevention programs.

CITIZEN-POLICE COOPERATION

Police-citizen cooperation to prevent crime is probably as old as mankind. Societies

have always designated individual members as watchmen or guards, whose primary
function was to alert the rest of the group to problems requiring emergency action.
The idea of police as a public force organized to protect the community from its

133
 134 Understanding Crime Prevention

deviant members has arisen only in fairly recent times. Even so, as we have
seen, the fundamental purpose of initial police units was to work with an active cit-
izenry to prevent crime from occurring. In our own country, however, police
have become increasingly identified as enforcers of the law rather than as public
service workers. If one is in favor of laws that the police attempt to enforce, one
can look with appreciation at police activities. If one feels, on the other hand, more
like a victim than a beneficiary of those laws, the policeman can hardly be looked
on as an ally. The development of this kind of police-citizen schism in our country
probably reached its height in the urban riots of the late 1960s. Out of this experi-
ence came widespread recognition of a gap between police and some segments
of the public, which led to the development of police-community relations
efforts whose sole purpose was to find ways of building better communication
patterns between citizens and police. And whether or not the police-community
relations approach worked, it did represent a very important return to the old idea
that gaps between interests of police and the interest of citizens are extremely
undesirable.
Crime prevention, contrary to the thinking of some, is neither a facet of nor
an outgrowth of police community relations. Presenting a favorable image of police
to the community is not the primary objective of crime prevention. On the other
hand, crime prevention properly practiced by police does tend to improve police-
community relations. But this is an incidental effect of crime prevention rather than
a primary objective and arises only from citizen appreciation for a valuable service
rendered.
The motivated citizen works with rather than for the crime prevention
officer, who is much more a resource available to the citizen than the reverse. Within
lawful limits, citizen crime prevention activities are in no way directed by
police. However, they may be supported and coordinated by police, and in cases
where citizen activities border on police functions (organized citizen patrols,
for example), police supervision may be needed to avoid violations of the law.
Effective community crime prevention programming results from the proper com-
bination of police and citizen activities. The one cannot be subservient to the other
—instead, both must collaborate as partners. Thus, where citizen participation
strategies are correctly developed, there is no need for conflict over the issue of
program control.
Citizen groups and criminal justice groups have legitimate roles to play in
comprehensive crime prevention that support and complement each other. No inter-
est should dominate the program, on the one hand, but each interest should control
and manage its own activities, on the other. For example, it is no more appropriate
for a police agency to dictate the kind of approach a community group should
develop than it is for a community group to dictate how a police administrator should
allocate police forces.
The crime prevention practitioner (much more likely to be a sworn police
officer than a civilian, but in either case almost surely either employed by or sanc-
tioned by a government agency) is the essential middleman, controlling nothing
 Developing Citizen Participation 135

except his or her own direct program resources, but enabling all community
resources and interests to work together in harmony.
The practitioner operates as a manager rather than as an authority figure, seeing
to it that all essential community interests share in the crime prevention program
planning process, that goals and strategies arrived at through planning are carried
out to the best ability of the groups involved and the resources available, and that
the results of the program are correctly identified, interpreted, and shared so that
strategies and goals can be refined as necessary.

THE PREPARATION PHASE

By the time the practitioner is ready to start reaching out to the public, he or
she should have developed a very clear and detailed understanding of crime patterns
in the jurisdiction and should have formulated general strategies for dealing with
those patterns. This initial planning process by the practitioner will be discussed in
Chapter 8.
There are several reasons why no outreach effort to the public should be made
until the preliminary planning is done:

1. Unless the practitioner has done the necessary homework, there can be no
clear picture as to what the public is expected to do. The only recourse in such a sit-
uation is to put out generic information on home and business security, and to
promote generalized projects such as Operation Identification. While these generic
approaches are not without merit, they are only one part of comprehensive crime
prevention strategies.
2. Without planning, the practitioner may not have the ability to meet demands
for service that will arise from the public—including requests for very specific strate-
gic guidance by citizen groups.
3. Unless planning includes adequate preparation of the members of the local
law enforcement agency, representatives of local government, and other key indi-
viduals, members of the public who ask these individuals for further guidance may
be rebuffed or told that “It’s just another public relations effort.” Such response can
be deadly for a crime prevention program.

Thus, the citizen participation process should not be started until the practi-
tioner is ready to deliver solid, serious information, and back it up with service and
support. This is more than academic advice. Numerous local crime prevention pro-
grams have collapsed, or, at the very least, been set back substantially, because the
practitioners insisted on starting public information campaigns before they were
ready to deliver workable guidance and support to citizens.
 136 Understanding Crime Prevention

The Crime Prevention Organization

An essential part of the preparation phase is the development of an adequate

jurisdiction-wide crime prevention planning and management organization, as
will be discussed in Chapter 8.
The crime prevention organization can help stimulate continuing, purposeful,
and systematic activities generated by individuals, citizen groups, and the neigh-
borhood and public agencies at the community level. It can help direct this activity
toward objectives that are consistent with the philosophy and practice of crime pre-
vention and compatible with the program goals established through the citizen input
mechanism.

Participation by Decision-Makers

An important element in the practitioner’s preparation is to find ways to involve the

key decision-makers in the community. Early participation by public officials and
leaders in the private and voluntary sectors both sanctions and strengthens the
program. The practitioner can use the listing of potential roles presented in Chapter
3 as a guide for this phase of his or her preparation.

Factors in Communicating with Citizens

As part of the preparation phase, the practitioner should make sure that the projects
he wishes citizens to participate in are clearly defined and communicated. Vague-
ness and imprecision in project definition can easily lead to less than desirable levels
of citizen participation. When citizens fail to react as a practitioner might wish, he
or she may be tempted to cry citizen apathy. And while it is true that some individ-
uals and groups may be apathetic to the idea of crime prevention, it is also true that
the phrase citizen apathy can be used as an excuse for the practitioner’s failure to
communicate clearly with citizens. The point is that good communication with cit-
izens is essential to the success of citizen participation strategies.
If citizens are to participate in crime prevention programs (or any other public
endeavor, for that matter), they must be provided with adequate knowledge, justifi-
cation, and opportunity, and their fear and distrust must be neutralized, if possible.

Knowledge
As our society becomes increasingly sophisticated and educated, citizens become
more aware of their right to full information from those who seek their money, time,
or energy. Although our crime prevention cause is worthy, we must realize that no
individual or group should support crime prevention without knowing its purpose,
workings, worth, and the probability that it will deliver the benefits we claim for it.
 Developing Citizen Participation 137

The crime prevention practitioner must, therefore, be able to tell people exactly what
they can do, how they can do it, how much it will cost (in dollars or time), what is
likely to happen (or not happen) as a result, and what resources are available to help
them. People must also be able to determine that what is asked of them is the right
thing to do compared to other actions they might take against crime problems. And,
they need to know that crime prevention action will not needlessly expose them to
new risks.

Justification
Groups and individuals also have every right to demand that the practitioner tell them
why they should become involved with crime prevention. Participation may involve
cost (in money or effort) and risk (real or perceived), both of which must be bal-
anced against the benefit to be obtained. If people say “Why bother?” or “I’m afraid
to do that,” or “It won’t work,” it is a sure sign the practitioner has failed to justify
the proposed participation to them. And, if the practitioner has not done a good job
in developing knowledge and justification, the citizen who says “Why bother?” may
be quite sensible. One way to get around this problem is to involve potential partic-
ipants in the planning process. This, of course, is the secret of success of any kind
of community organization activity and should be stressed in developing citizen
participation in crime prevention. And it is a good way to activate those who are
predisposed to be receptive to crime prevention—previous victims and aware neigh-
borhood leaders, for example.
To repeat, individual or group participation in crime prevention can only flow
from a very clear understanding of why participation is needed and what will be the
personal and community benefits. The facts must be presented, and, in turn, the prac-
titioner must listen to the citizens’ interpretation of those facts, and the activity must
be jointly planned based on the resulting mutual understanding.

Opportunity
The participation activity and the resources necessary to conduct it should be avail-
able to anyone wishing to participate, without significant disturbance to their normal
pattern of activity. Every person has pressing concerns and demands on time. Each
of us is more likely to do something if it is made easy for us, and the crime
prevention practitioner must recognize that chances for participation are greatly
increased if ample opportunity is provided.

Fear and Distrust

It would be naive not to expect a significant portion of the public to reject, at first,
any opportunity to participate in crime prevention programs, particularly in low-
income urban areas where fear of reprisal and distrust of law enforcement or the
criminal justice system may be high. Such situations will call for very careful
 138 Understanding Crime Prevention

approaches by the practitioner, particularly if he or she is the law enforcement officer.

The challenge here is to find imaginative ways to communicate knowledge and
justification through people who are trusted by the group at hand.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES

Citizen participation strategies are categorized as follows:

• Citizen awareness and knowledge strategies;

• Group project strategies; and
• Informal social control strategies.

There is considerable overlap among these strategy types, yet each has a
distinct purpose as described below. They really form a continuum from relatively
superficial citizen contacts to the most intensive community organization leading to
neighborhood solidarity and enduring social control.

Awareness and Knowledge Strategies

Awareness and knowledge strategies are basically aimed at informing the public as
to what crime prevention is, how it works, what citizens can do, why they should
act, and what services and resources are available to help them.

Awareness
The awareness component consists of newspaper articles, television and radio public
service spots and interviews, billboards, posters, shopping center exhibits, brochure
mailings, and other general audience approaches. The information should be simple
and repetitive. The campaign should, if possible, be continued on a perpetual basis,
or at least be repeated at regular intervals. Increasing numbers of states have estab-
lished statewide crime prevention media campaigns, and these can be very helpful
to the local practitioner. However, they should supplement, not replace, the contin-
uing local public awareness program.
The cooperation of the news media, advertising agencies, and other members
of the local communications industry is essential to the success of a public aware-
ness campaign. The practitioner should take pains to explain the program to com-
munications people and request their help. In turn, he or she should learn from them
how and in what format to prepare news releases, promotional copy, visuals, print
materials and so forth. A close working relationship is of the utmost importance.
It should be noted here that the practitioner will hardly ever be working in a
vacuum of awareness. Increasing numbers of national associations, for example,
provide crime prevention educational materials to their local constituents and urge
 Developing Citizen Participation 139

local affiliate organizations to develop local crime prevention education programs.

Local people already touched by crime prevention in this or other ways may be only
too glad to respond to the “awareness call” sounded by the practitioner.

Knowledge
The awareness campaign, though important, only opens the door to citizen partici-
pation. The next step is to add knowledge to awareness. The public awareness cam-
paign will result in widespread recognition of crime prevention, and the purposes
and methods of the local program. It will trigger requests for information, security
surveys, speaking engagements and other direct assistance. And, the practitioner can
expect some direct action to result—usually, simple actions like Operation Identifi-
cation registrations and purchase of deadbolt door locks. The people who make
contact with the practitioner in response to an awareness campaign will be a small
fraction of the population, but they are likely to be people who can lead in further
development of citizen participation.
The practitioner must be prepared to respond quickly and skillfully to all public
requests for assistance, because this is how he or she establishes a track record for
high-quality client service. Such service delivery may mean working overtime;
citizen groups seldom meet during the normal business day. Nevertheless, the ded-
icated practitioner will be prepared to sacrifice his or her own convenience, because
the ultimate success of citizen participation strategies depends on a high-quality
response by the practitioner at this stage.
The primary focus of the practitioner at this citizen knowledge-developing
stage will be to further educate those who have expressed preliminary interest and
to further attract those who, by virtue of position within the community, need to be
involved.
Secondly, the practitioner must be prepared to help those who are ready and
willing to start taking action. For the individual, this means providing crime risk
management guidance and security surveys. For the citizen group or civic group it
means providing accurate information on subjects of interest to members. A busi-
nessmen’s group, for example, might be primarily interested in commercial burglary
or robbery prevention and asset protection. A neighborhood group might be inter-
ested in preventing street crime. Women’s and senior citizen groups may be inter-
ested in reducing crime risk from assault, purse snatching, fraud and so on. Each
special group will have a special need.
The practitioner, in meeting these knowledge needs, sets the stage for
additional knowledge delivery services, because “satisfied customers” create other
clients. If one women’s group hears an interesting talk on rape prevention, the word
will spread and other groups will want to follow suit. This natural process builds
demand for additional services.
Thus, the practitioner builds his wider clientele through delivery of quality ser-
vices and “word of mouth” promotion of those services. This domino effect of his
knowledge-building strategy is both to be desired and to be expected. The practi-
 140 Understanding Crime Prevention

tioner should not hesitate to use volunteers to share and extend the workload. Inter-
ested persons can and should be trained to help in the knowledge-spreading process.
Citizen-volunteer spokesmen, although their total knowledge of crime prevention is
more limited than that of the practitioner, are sometimes more effective in educat-
ing colleagues and social peers than the practitioner.
It is also essential at this stage that the practitioner reach out to provide knowl-
edge to a variety of community officials, starting with members of law enforcement
agencies and extending to elected and appointed officials throughout government.
These are the people who will later provide the political, economic and direct service
support of the comprehensive crime prevention program, and they must become
involved at the knowledge stage if they are to support the program in the action
stages.

Group Project Strategies

As the practitioner carries out the awareness and knowledge strategy components,
an increasing number and variety of groups will be motivated to start crime pre-
vention projects. The practitioner must be prepared to guide such groups into
projects that are both useful to the comprehensive crime prevention program, and
suitable to the interests and characteristics of the group.
To properly carry out group project strategies calls for a great deal of skill,
understanding and creativity on the part of the practitioner. There can be no such
thing as a “standard” group project. And, it must be kept in mind that only a part of
the practitioner’s purpose in helping groups to establish projects is the achievement
of the specific result associated with the project. Just as important is the need to
ensure that the group will have a rewarding experience so that its members will
continue to want to work with crime prevention.
Some groups will be mostly interested in the security of their own members.
Other groups will be oriented toward broad community service. Of the latter type,
some will be interested in short-term ventures, and others will only consider long-
term involvements. Some will be able to marshal substantial resources for a project.
Still others, whatever their interests, will only be capable of performing simple tasks
requiring little effort. But, every group can do something that is useful and
rewarding.
For example, one practitioner was approached by a small group of retired
people whose members had little energy, but who were willing to spend a few hours
a day, on occasion, doing something useful, as long as it didn’t require hard work.
It happened that a high school in their part of town had a high truancy rate, and the
practitioner suspected, but could not prove, that the high incidence of daylight bur-
glaries in the area around the school was related to the high truancy rate. His sug-
gestion to the group was that they assign members on a rotating basis to go to the
school for a couple of hours each morning, receive attendance reports from home-
room teachers, and call the parents of any student not in class to inform them that
 Developing Citizen Participation 141

their child was absent that day. The school principal was in favor, and the work itself
was undemanding.
After a month or so of this very simple effort, the principal was able to report
a substantial decrease in truancy, and the practitioner was able to report a similar
decrease in daylight burglaries near the school. This is an excellent example of a
creative match between a group interest and an activity of potential benefit. It
also exemplifies the desirability of setting up group projects that are inherently ben-
eficial regardless of the crime prevention-specific outcome. Here are some other
examples:

• A Women’s Club might assist in conducting victimization surveys, and this effort
might lead to the decision to form a women’s league against crime;
• A local Chamber of Commerce might sponsor a series of training sessions on
commercial and institutional loss prevention;
• An Exchange Club might raise funds needed to construct and maintain a portable
crime prevention exhibit;
• A senior citizens group might set up a “buddy shopping service” to help older
people travel safely between home and store;
• A PTA might sponsor a series of special crime prevention training sessions for
school children;
• A neighborhood group might develop a “safe house for children” project or a
Neighborhood Watch project;
• A builder’s association might sponsor training sessions in construction site secu-
rity or the use and application of mechanical security devices and materials;
• A labor union might sponsor home security training sessions for members;
• A Lions Club might sponsor a summer crime prevention fair for children;
• A recreation vehicle sales group might donate a second-hand mobile van or trailer
for use as a mobile crime prevention exhibit;
• A consumer advocacy group might sponsor the development of a publicity
campaign directed at door-to-door swindles;
• A youth advocacy group may develop a program for youth community watch
services;
• A citizen’s band radio club might develop a mobile radio watch project among
members;
• A public housing tenants organization might develop a tenant patrol program;
• A youth organization might develop a door-to-door home security campaign;
• A postal workers or sanitation workers organization might develop a surveillance
and reporting project;
• A League of Women Voters group might assist in developing needed informa-
tion on community perception of crime problems;
• The gas, or water, or telephone company might train its meter-readers and main-
tenance workers to observe and report security risks;
• A woman’s group might sponsor rape prevention seminars and a rape-crisis coun-
seling service;
 142 Understanding Crime Prevention

• A civic group might sponsor a community-wide bicycle registration project;

• A church group might sponsor a home-contact project for elderly people;
• A bank, supermarket or drugstore chain might purchase property engravers and
make them available to customers;
• A group of civil engineers or architects might sponsor a physical design crime
risk survey program;
• Any volunteer group might provide clerical assistance to the crime prevention
organization, trained assistants to help in conducting security surveys, or other
“labor-intensive” support of the program;
• A local firm could sponsor weekly or monthly telecasts featuring descriptions of
key current types of crime and suggestions for countermeasures; and
• Any organization can assist in the development, production, and distribution of
educational materials as well as provide citizen input to the crime prevention
planning process.

These possibilities are by no means exhaustive—the actual range of group

project possibilities is limited only by the imagination of the practitioner and his or
her ability to match the interests of a group with an appropriate project.
In a situation where many groups are doing many things, however, the practi-
tioner must be able to provide adequate guidance and coordination. Unless this
important management function is provided by the practitioner, the group project
efforts can become chaotic and even conflicting. The wise practitioner will fully
utilize steering committees, advisory councils, and other project management mech-
anisms to spread the management workload. Through this type of group project
activity, the practitioner is not only able to involve existing community organizations
in conducting most of the tasks needed in the comprehensive crime prevention
program, he or she is also able to set the stage for the third major citizen participa-
tion strategy component.

Informal Social Control Strategies

We have briefly discussed informal social control as a key aspect of crime preven-
tion strategies. In the long run, informal social control is the primary means by which
crime will be prevented. In other words, the goal of the practitioner’s efforts should
be the permanent adoption of effective crime prevention attitudes and behavior by
the social groups that make up the community. The comprehensive crime preven-
tion program should always build toward this end, recognizing that all other strate-
gies (that is, environmental design, law enforcement action, and individual client
risk management) contribute to, stimulate, support or supplement daily life activi-
ties in which people maintain good standards of crime prevention behavior and
assume responsibility for preventing victimization of their neighbors and associates.
As Conklin points out: Informal Social Control in a community operates
through a web of social relationships that develops over time. Relatively trivial inter-
 Developing Citizen Participation 143

personal contacts gradually generate a network of trust and interdependence. This

process is strengthened by the influence of public characters such as shopkeepers
and newspaper salesmen who are in frequent though limited contact with many
residents in the community. They spread news among the people and help bind the
community together . . . (and) . . . help maintain a sense of community that infor-
mally controls deviant behavior in the area. However, if neighbors do not know each
other and if no web of social relationships exists, people will not be able to guard
each other from harm. Without minimal contacts among residents, people will not
even know who is a neighbor and who is a stranger in the area.1
On the negative side, as Conklin points out: If people react to crime with fear
and distrust, they may withdraw from social contacts in public places. As a
result, there will be fewer people on the streets and residents of the area will be less
likely to watch the streets. This weakens social control and leaves public areas to
criminals. They will not be seen committing crimes or will not be reported if they
are seen.2
The importance of informal social controls in determining the extent of crim-
inal behavior is well illustrated by Conklin’s description of a study of two neigh-
borhoods in Cambridge, Massachusetts, one with a high rate of juvenile delinquency
and one with a low rate. Social characteristics in the two neighborhoods were much
alike. But in the high delinquency area, there was higher variation in religion and
ethnic background. Neighbors knew fewer neighbors by name, had fewer interests
in common, and disliked their community more. Persons in the high-delinquency
neighborhood were no more accepting of delinquency, but were less likely to take
action if they were not the direct victims. The residents of the low-rate area were
more likely to take action if they saw a delinquent act in progress. When people
ignore such acts, there develops an atmosphere where delinquency can grow more
easily. The lack of social integration appears to have certain direct effects in a
lowered level of social control of delinquent and pre-delinquent activities.3
On the other hand, where social cohesion is low, one of the most beneficial
spin-off effects of citizen involvement in crime prevention is the increased neighbor
interaction it fosters—restoring concepts of mutual assistance, civic responsibility,
and accountability that are so important to building a “sense of community” and to
building collective involvement in many broad-scale programs for community devel-
opment and neighborhood revitalization.4
There appears to be a powerful linkage between effective crime prevention and
enhanced community life. From the crime prevention practitioner’s perspective, the
citizen participation strategy of developing informal social controls works in
two ways.

Moderate to High Neighborhood Cohesiveness

In neighborhoods where relatively high levels of social interaction and informal
social control already exist, the practitioner’s task is to assist the established social
group and informal leaders in developing refined security tactics. The practitioner
 144 Understanding Crime Prevention

may be able to identify such neighborhoods from his or her crime pattern analysis
as their existing crime rates are likely to be much lower than average. He or she may
also be able to identify such neighborhoods on the basis of the level of social orga-
nization that they display. However, he or she should not be misled by mere appear-
ance and should carefully observe such neighborhoods to determine how cohesive
they really are.
The practitioner will have little difficulty in becoming acquainted with neigh-
borhood leaders—in fact, the leaders may have already responded to awareness,
knowledge, and group project promotions. If not, they will probably welcome the
practitioner’s approach and be very interested in forming a Neighborhood Watch
program or other organized participation in crime prevention.
Good examples of this approach are present in cities across the country. Their
purposes are broad—community service, economic development, local school con-
trol, elderly housing, organizing of low-income tenants, and improved law enforce-
ment and criminal justice operations, to name a few.
These organizations have had significant impact on crime prevention efforts,
including:

• Periodic flyers on criminal victimization that solicit community cooperation in

police investigations;
• An anti-drug and gang campaigns;
• Tenant anti-crime organizations;
• Store-front offices for police and volunteers;
• Escort services for the elderly;
• Volunteer and security patrols;
• Assessment of security needs;
• Neighborhood meetings on crime and crime prevention; and
• Proposal development and identification of funding resources to support anti-
crime initiatives.

Neighborhoods Lacking Cohesiveness

Where neighborhoods lack cohesion and social interaction, the practitioner may well
find crime rates, which are moderate to high, compared with other areas, and is
unlikely to find an existing social structure, which can be used as the immediate
basis for an organized crime prevention effort. However, the practitioner will be able
to identify some people who are leaders and opinion molders, if he or she uses a
careful approach. Such an approach may require that the practitioner consult with
police who patrol that neighborhood, with social service workers, with political lead-
ership from that area, with local ministers, and others who are familiar with the way
things work. If the practitioner has been successful in developing group projects
and programs, some of his or her current crime prevention “constituency” may be
able to help.
In any case, the practitioner’s objective should be to introduce the idea of crime
prevention to the neighborhood through people who know, understand and are
 Developing Citizen Participation 145

trusted by the occupants of the neighborhood. This is particularly true if the practi-
tioner is a police officer and the neighborhood is distrustful of police. It is impor-
tant to realize that the initiative needs to be taken by the local leaders themselves,
for developing crime prevention programs in such neighborhoods is much more a
task of community organization than of crime prevention itself.
An interesting model of the self-initiated multi-neighborhood organization
approach is the formulation of the Block Association of West Philadelphia (BAWP),
described by Alicia Christian as follows:
For the multi-racial community surrounding Philadelphia’s University
of Pennsylvania, the 1971 Christmas season is memorable, not for its holiday joy,
but for a rash of burglaries, rapes, and muggings. West Philadelphia’s 1972 New
Year celebration was marred by three rapes in two weeks. Mrs. Ellie Wegener,
one of the principal organizers of the Block Association of West Philadelphia
(BAWP), noted the general feeling of fear, anger, and outrage that prevailed in the
community: “. . . the fear of crime was producing a barricade mentality; people were
buying more locks and becoming prisoners inside their own homes. People all
around us blamed the court systems, the government, anyone who was convenient to
blame! They did not consider the possibility that they themselves could play a role
in this new crisis.”
Mrs. Wegener and her minister husband invited neighbors to a meeting at their
home. The group decided that the block club structure (with block and regular meet-
ings) would be ideal for building a sense of community strength and unity around
crime prevention, and allow each block to define its own priorities. Within four
months of the initial meeting, neighbors on 13 blocks were attending regular monthly
meetings. Guest speakers such as police officers, narcotics agents, and other pro-
fessionals in law enforcement and criminal justice were invited to provide sugges-
tion on how residents might protect themselves.
BAWP’s organizing model involved two block leaders, one from each side of
a street. Association units were formed by alliances of up to 25 blocks in an area.
BAWP had no formal board structure, although two people were initially elected to
coordinate the program. Monthly meetings were generally informal. The Association
issued a monthly newsletter and sponsored such events as block parties, barbecues,
summer play-in-the-street affairs, and day camp projects. . . .
BAWP’s community walks and the widespread resident use of freon horns were
a part of its program for deterring street crime. Groups of two or three volunteers
regularly walked the neighborhood, watching for suspicious activities. If crimes were
observed, they simply called the police and activated their horns to alert other neigh-
bors. Walkers, who keep logs of events, also distributed BAWP literature, visited aged
residents, watched abandoned homes and homes of vacationers.
All residents in a block were approached to join the club. The secretary kept
an updated listing of members (names, addresses, telephone numbers). In addition,
records were kept as to who was assigned and who actually appeared for block
patrols. Emphasis was placed on cooperation among blocks and maintaining close
communication with police.
 146 Understanding Crime Prevention

BAWP established positive, supportive relationships with the Philadelphia

police department, many of whose members praised its operation. BAWP partici-
pants noted that the program has contributed to neighborhood stability and that
some real estate values, after a period of marked decline, have risen 50 percent since
its inception. BAWP has also succeeded in building a spirit of community solidar-
ity within racially diverse neighborhoods. . . .
In 1973, the Association received $27,000 in Pennsylvania LEAA block grant
funds to train organizers. By 1974, a separate training organization had evolved
from BAWP and became the Citizens Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia (CLASP). In
1975, the CLASP Neighborhood Safety Training Program became statewide receiv-
ing $135,000 from the Governor’s Justice Commission to institute its training/action
model in several towns and cities throughout the state.5 This example is demonstra-
tive of the ability of citizens to have a striking impact in their communities, and also
shows the longevity attainable.

A MODEL APPROACH TO NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION

As adapted from an issue of NCPI Hotline,6 the following provides a good general
summary of an ideal approach to neighborhood organization:

1. Develop and organize community background data such as crime and

loss patterns, police patrol districts, census tracts, natural geographic boundaries,
and other socio-economic and demographic patterns. The purpose of the background
data is to provide a reasonably complete picture of crime patterns and related socioe-
conomic conditions, and to help determine how varied and cohesive the neighbor-
hood population is.7
2. Use collected data to select target areas. High priority areas should
be identified along with control areas so that the true impact of the project
may be assessed. A control area is a comparable neighborhood that does not
participate.
3. Establish criteria for levels, kinds and distribution of participation.
The practitioner should make determinations prior to attempting to organize a
neighborhood as to what a workable participatory model for that neighborhood
should look like. For example, what percentage of residents should be involved?
How should their residences be distributed (e.g., every other house? alternating
facing houses? how many per floor or wing of an apartment building? etc.)? Should
residents remain anonymous for surveillance and reporting purposes? Should poten-
tial participants be screened to eliminate potential suspects? What residents should
take organizing lead? Should police present a low profile at first? What kinds of
project activities are likely to be best received at first? What levels of acceptance (or
suspicion) are likely?
4. Approach neighborhood leader.8 People who have been identified as
having significant influence in the area should be approached first. After they have
been informed as to the possible nature of a project and its potential value to the
 Developing Citizen Participation 147

area, they may be asked to invite friends and other potential group members to par-
ticipate in preliminary, exploratory meetings. It is important to remember that local
leaders serve many important functions such as information dissemination, recruit-
ment, and stimulation of group interest. They also can provide the practitioner with
valuable feedback on the progress and interest in their areas.9
5. Provide education and training. Group members and related police per-
sonnel should become acquainted with their respective roles in the crime prevention
efforts. The goal is to build the basic mechanism necessary for citizens and police
to work together. Initial citizen education and training would probably include crime
reporting procedures, guidance on what to report, and basic security and personal
safety tips. As interest is generated, and people begin to increase interaction with
police, the police must encourage the actions of the group members and provide
guidance for future contacts. It is imperative that not only the beat officer, but also
other police personnel, such as the patrol commander and radio dispatcher, be aware
of the group and lend their cooperation.
6. Provide feedback to police and citizens. If a citizen’s call results in a
good arrest, he should be notified and recognized (this can occur through monthly
bulletins or meetings). If the call resulted in an officer being dispatched in a situa-
tion where police response was inappropriate, he should also be notified and cour-
teously advised on what should and should not be reported to the police. Citizens
should also provide feedback to the police department on police response. Was it
timely, courteous, and accurate?
7. Formulate crime-specific tactics. When project performance reaches a
level that reflects a capacity for the project to function as an efficient, unified, and
directed entity, it is time to look back to the crime data files to determine the most
serious crime problems facing project areas and devise crime specific tactics to
address the problems. Times, places, and methods of criminal attack must be con-
sidered to identify what specific things a citizen can do to reduce the chances of
criminal victimization. For example, if it is determined that most burglaries in the
project area are of single-unit dwellings with little or no force required, then the
project should first attempt to educate its members regarding residential security
hardware and procedures. If these tactics displace burglaries, on-going crime analy-
sis will provide the knowledge to develop redirected tactics.
8. Implement crime-specific tactics throughout the organization as they are
developed. This may be accomplished in several ways, such as the practitioner or
local patrol police attending the periodic group meetings to provide specific train-
ing, or training sessions for group leaders, who, in turn, train the groups and super-
vise the process of implementation. Crime-specific tactics should be implemented
comprehensively throughout the project to achieve maximum effectiveness and avoid
displacement.
9. Assess performance of the organization. Performance assessment
should be provided by formal and informal feedback throughout the organizational
period. At some point, however, the determination must be made that the project is
sufficiently organized, educated, and trained to become essentially self-sustaining
and regenerative with logistical support from the police.
 148 Understanding Crime Prevention

10. Evaluate impact on crime in the project area. The project goal of reduc-
ing crime can only be reliably and validly assessed relative to crime specific tactics.
Also, it is important that the tactics be quickly assessed so that they can be revised
as necessary. When refined tactics have been implemented, the practitioner can legit-
imately establish that specific actions by citizens are affecting the rate of crime in
the neighborhood.
11. Encourage group to take on other needed changes. Once the mecha-
nism for community action has been established and proven effective, it can take on
various community improvement projects. Widening the scope of activities of the
organization can help sustain the crime prevention effort by offering participants a
diversity of activities to meet their interests. Many of these projects will probably
overlap, reinforcing each other, and increasing total chances of success.

Development of informal control can only be successful to the extent that

citizen groups acquire the internal momentum and purposefulness necessary for sus-
tained activity. A neighborhood group, for example, that reduces burglary through
a quick burst of activity and then disbands has accomplished a short-term objective,
but in the future will fail to maintain a burglary reduction without an on-going devel-
opment and review process. The extent to which crime will be reduced and the
reduction maintained is no greater than the extent to which the neighborhood
assumes permanent collective responsibility for suppressing harmful behavior within
the area.
The approaches described here can also be applied to a variety of community
settings—the shopping complex, the public housing project, the high-rise apartment
complex, the mixed residential-commercial area, or any other portion of a commu-
nity. The major ingredient required in establishing a geographic area of any kind as
a target for participatory projects is the actual or potential presence of some kind or
level of cohesiveness around which the people who live or work in the area can build
a common interest.
Finally, it must be clearly understood that the organizing of participatory pro-
jects within groups of citizens is always a delicate matter, requiring skills of sensi-
tivity and understanding from the organizer, as well as varying levels of technical
expertise. Above all, the crime prevention practitioner must be prepared to be the
flexible catalyst for change, rather than its identified leader.

CONCLUSION

The development of citizen participation in a community-wide crime prevention

program must proceed from the concept of the practitioner and the citizen as part-
ners. After all, the community is being asked to assume collective responsibility for
crime reduction rather than to serve as a kind of subordinate extension of the law
enforcement agency.
 Developing Citizen Participation 149

Proper planning and good communication are of the utmost importance in

developing citizen participation, particularly at the outset. Coordination becomes
especially important as the program develops, for the many groups and interests that
can become part of the participatory program need to operate in harmony.
An early priority for the practitioner should be to develop the participation of
key individual groups and agencies in the community. Unless such groups (both at
the jurisdiction-wide and at the neighborhood levels) are behind the program and
actively participating in it, the program may never fully jell.
Finally, the practitioner must be prepared to move with the ever-changing inter-
ests and social characteristics of the community. Priorities may change for individ-
ual groups, neighborhoods, and the community as a whole, and the practitioner must
constantly analyze these shifts, reinforce flagging interest, and if necessary, abandon
groups whose interest has faded so as to concentrate on groups whose interest is
stable or rising. Above all, he must seek and maintain the widest possible circle of
alliances in the public, private, and voluntary sectors because it is from these allies
that the strength and continuity of the program will flow.
 8
Planning the
Community Program

We have indicated how important planning skills are to the crime prevention prac-
titioner throughout this volume. In this chapter we will discuss the key elements of
crime prevention program planning and show how, most of all, the success of a com-
prehensive crime prevention program is dependent upon the quality of the planning
that goes into it.
A plan is quite literally the foundation for any program. It is crucial that the
practitioner understand planning, not as an exercise to be endured, but rather as the
single most important ingredient in determining whether he or she will succeed
in preventing crime. The kind of planning that consists of putting together words
merely to satisfy some bureaucratic requirement is not only useless, but also harmful.
Such an approach practically guarantees that we will never understand what we are
trying to do, let alone achieve success. The only thing it does is produce documents
to decorate a bookshelf or stuff a filing cabinet.
Proper program planning is hard, painstaking work. Most of us find it easier
to simply start doing something—to act rather than to plan. Yet, if we wanted a new
house, would we simply give a carpenter nails, lumber, and a hammer and saw, and
tell him to build something?
The practitioner, who has understood the basis for designing crime risk man-
agement systems, selecting security devices and procedures, applying environmen-
tal design concepts, and developing citizen participation, now must understand the

151
 152 Understanding Crime Prevention

basis for planning the program through which those skills will be applied. In this
chapter we focus on the three main issues of crime prevention program planning:

• Designing the organization;

• Defining the crime problems and priorities; and
• Developing program objectives.

DESIGNING THE ORGANIZATION

The organization established to plan, manage, and coordinate the crime prevention
program is the core of the crime prevention program, and it is crucial that this orga-
nization have the capabilities necessary to get the job done. The following issues
must be considered in designing the organization.

Design Issues

Permanence
Just as there is a continuing need within the community structure for a police or
sheriff’s department, a public health department, and a fire department, so there is
a continuing need for a crime prevention organization. It takes time for the best crime
prevention program to change community patterns to reduce criminal opportunity,
and those changed patterns must then be maintained and continually reinforced. In
addition, crime patterns will always change, and new opportunity reduction strate-
gies will always be required. The practitioner must look for organizational designs
that have a good probability for permanence.

Resources
Comprehensive crime prevention program organizations are not expensive to support
compared with many other types of community programs, because the bulk of the
resources in a well-planned program flow from community efforts and the support-
ing activities of public agencies. Also, the budget of the crime prevention organiza-
tion itself may be small compared to the total quantity of resources involved in the
program. Nevertheless, establishing and maintaining a community-wide program
does require significant resources, and these must be obtained (and retained on a
continuing basis) in competition with the needs of other community programs. Thus,
it is important that the organization be designed to attract ongoing support.

Acceptance
The practitioner may encounter acceptance problems in developing the crime pre-
vention program. One of the most difficult groups to convince of the merits of crime
prevention may be the local law enforcement agency. Other elements in local gov-
 Planning the Community Progran 153

ernment should also be considered as potential sources of difficulty. Private inter-

ests may present acceptance problems, as may citizen groups and others.
While these acceptance problems can usually be solved over time, it is impor-
tant to design the organization in such a way to neutralize as many acceptance prob-
lems as possible. This usually means involving the potential sources of acceptance
problems in the organization design process.

Ripple Effect
Plans for the crime prevention organization design should take into account the types
of activities that can be effectively conducted by individuals and groups outside of
the crime prevention organization itself, and the best means by which these “ripples”
can be started and sustained. In addition to reducing the direct costs of the program,
good ripple-effect planning has the obvious benefit of helping to overcome resource
and acceptance problems. Thus, the practitioner’s aim must be to share program
responsibility as early and as widely as possible.

Coordination
In any locality, there are likely to be a number of activities already underway related
to crime prevention. Schools; neighborhood groups; organizations of youth, older
people and women; established service and voluntary clubs; tenant organizations;
and others may have developed crime prevention projects. There may be a crime pre-
vention unit (CPU) in the police department that provides services, but has not devel-
oped a comprehensive program. Any such existing effort has potential for further
program development. On the other hand, failure to bring together all crime pre-
vention activities during the organization design phase can lead to misunderstand-
ings, competition, and refusals to cooperate as the comprehensive program develops.

Innovation
Experience has shown that where individuals and groups are given the opportunity
to be creative, innovative crime prevention approaches can emerge. Fortunately the
emergence of community-based policing has expanded the acceptable levels of inno-
vation in many departments. All of the standard projects now used by practitioners
developed out of an innovative response to a particular problem situation. Thus, the
organization should be designed to encourage experimentation and innovation on the
part of those who work with it or within it.

Results
The organization should be designed for results. All organizational elements and
their activities should be aimed at producing specific positive impacts on crime.
There is a great difference between the community program that exists simply to
exist, and the program that exists to produce results. The former may never quite get
 154 Understanding Crime Prevention

its act together, and the latter is clear on the basic philosophy that impact is the goal,
rather than activity by itself. With these basic considerations in mind, the practitioner
can begin to develop the program’s organizational structure.

Formal Sanction

The planning process must define and establish a crime prevention organization that
can effectively carry out the crime prevention program. Whatever the exact makeup
of the organization, its responsibilities, structure, and relationships, staffing and other
resource needs should be defined and provided for through some legally-binding
municipal sanction or charter.
Sanction can be provided through departmental order if the crime prevention
organization is entirely located within the police department, sheriff’s department or
department of public safety. It can also be provided by executive order of the munic-
ipality’s chief executive or by city council ordinance, whether or not the crime pre-
vention organization is located entirely within a law enforcement or public safety
agency.
Perhaps the ideal form of charter is a combination of the ordinance, executive
order, and departmental order, each binding the appropriate level of community
government to a defined set of roles and responsibilities.
The need for formal sanction applies even if the crime prevention organiza-
tion is to be established as an independent, not-for-profit corporation, as the arm of
some existing not-for-profit entity, or in some other nongovernmental form. The need
still exists for local government to recognize the organization and affirm its respon-
sibilities and purposes. In addition, local government must approve and affirm the
support from law enforcement and other government agencies that the independent
organization will need.
The importance of formal sanction lies in its ability to clearly define what the
municipality expects from either the government-based or nongovernment-based
crime prevention organization, what resources and other support it is willing to
provide, and what form of broad-based community input will be acceptable. And
while crime prevention programs may be started without formal sanction, it must
sooner or later be obtained, because sanction not only authorizes the program, it also
sets forth the kind of commitment that the municipality is willing to make to the
program. Sanction is a powerful mechanism. Its absence can weaken a program and
dilute its energies, and its presence in proper form can provide a major boost for
program effectiveness and survival.

Organizational Structure

The organizational structure must set forth, in clear and specific terms, the crime
prevention program’s:
 Planning the Community Progran 155

• Governance, management responsibilities, and reporting relationships;

• Internal staffing patterns and arrangements for external staffing support;
• Arrangements for funding, office space, equipment, and other resources; and
• Mechanisms for community input and coordination.

We do not hold that any organizational model is inherently better than any
other, as long as the four basic functions are provided for. In some cases, the orga-
nization may be entirely contained within the local law enforcement agency, with
the citizen input mechanism provided for by an advisory council or citizens’ task
force. In other cases, the citizen input mechanism may be the actual governing body
(for example, the mayor’s commission on crime prevention), with staff responsibil-
ities assigned to the law enforcement agency. Or, the governing body may be the
city council itself, with operating responsibilities delegated to staff agencies, citi-
zens boards of trustees, and the like. If more than one jurisdiction is involved—for
example, a county-wide crime prevention program involving several cities and
unincorporated areas—the governing body may be the sheriff’s office or the board
of county commissioners, with an advisory council consisting of the mayor and chief
law enforcement officer of each incorporated jurisdiction within the county. Each
jurisdiction, in turn, might have its own advisory body.
The suitability of one organizational form over another depends entirely on
the local situation. In one case, the police chief might be such a staunch advocate
of crime prevention that it is appropriate for the community as a whole to delegate
the entire responsibility for managing the crime prevention effort to the police
department. In another case, circumstances might dictate that there be separate staff
units, one within the police department and another in a civilian organization, both
coordinated by a central council of some sort. It is even possible, in situations where
no public agency is interested enough to act, for a group of leading citizens to set
up a private nonprofit organization.
What is important is that the organizational structure chosen is set forth pre-
cisely and rationally, and that it is supported by evidence of commitment from all
key parties to fulfill the responsibilities that the organizational structure calls for.
This latter point is often overlooked. Because informal support arrangements and
oral agreements have a way of breaking down over time, the organization’s planners
should obtain contracts, letters or memos of agreement, and other appropriate doc-
umentation of arrangements for support made with anyone external to the organi-
zation itself.

Law Enforcement Role

As we have said throughout this book, law enforcement agencies must play a pivotal
role in the community-wide crime prevention program. This role can be established
within the program’s organizational structure in a variety of ways, ranging from
locating the organization within the law enforcement agency itself to establishing
 156 Understanding Crime Prevention

specific supporting relationships between the organization and the law enforcement
agency’s crime prevention unit. In any case, it is essential that provisions be made
not only to draw upon the law enforcement agency for specific support, but also to
set a process in motion through which crime prevention can gradually become an
important priority in the total community law enforcement program.

Citizen Input Mechanism

The need for an appropriate advisory group is so important as to deserve special

mention. Whatever the form chosen for this mechanism in the organizational struc-
ture, it should include representatives of all significant community interests—public,
private, voluntary, and citizen-based. The listing of “Other Roles” in Chapter 3
reflects the kinds of interests that should be represented.
The advisory group should be called upon to make genuine contributions to
the planning and, later, to the operational phases of the crime prevention program.
The task of working with a group of diverse citizens can be time consuming, but the
practitioner must look at this activity as being crucial to both the short-range and
long-range success of the program. It may simplify the logistics of working with
such a group to split it into two groups—a relatively small council or executive com-
mittee, which can work with the practitioner on a day-to-day basis, and a much larger
task force or committee, which can assemble periodically to review the work of the
council or executive committee.

DEFINING THE CRIME PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES

There are two distinct phases in this stage of the planning process. The first, crime
analysis, provides for problem definition. The second, priority setting, involves a
decision-making process based on problem definition.

Crime Analysis

The practitioner has two separate tasks to perform in relation to crime analysis. The
first is simply to develop a sufficient crime analysis base for the planning of the
program. The second, and perhaps more crucial, is to develop a permanent crime
analysis function within or available to the crime prevention organization.
If the local law enforcement agency already has a satisfactory crime analysis
capability, the crime prevention practitioner will simply arrange to have access to it,
through interdepartmental arrangements if the crime prevention organization is a
crime prevention unit or bureau within the police department, or by inter-agency
arrangements if the crime prevention organization is based outside the law enforce-
ment agency. Many agencies are using geographic, or geo-based, information
 Planning the Community Progran 157

systems (GIS) to aid in this analysis. This provides a graphic representation of the
patterns of criminal activity that can be used in many ways. These applications,
although similar to the pin maps of old, provide the visual evidence of crime prob-
lems that is a valuable tool in public education and awareness.
If insufficient crime analysis capability exists, the practitioner will have to
build it. This is more likely to be the case than not. To date, there has been little sys-
tematic analysis of the dynamics of crime. Most of the current statistical knowledge
about the dynamics of crime comes from the FBI uniform crime reports. While these
reports have value when presenting a national picture of crime, they do not detail
the geographic distribution of crime nor its operation at the neighborhood level.
A description of crime citywide cannot substitute for further analysis at the
neighborhood level in preparing localized crime prevention programs. Different
neighborhoods have different crime problems. Only through the use of citizen and
police knowledge coupled with localized statistics can the problems in a neighbor-
hood be articulated and appropriate strategies be developed.
A combination of factors must be studied—victim characteristics, the commu-
nity and physical setting, suspect characteristics, and the suspect modus operandi.
With this information it is possible to more clearly define the crime problem. The
availability of this information will facilitate the determination of strategies most
appropriate for preventing and controlling crime.1
The practitioner who is forced to build his own crime analysis capability may
find it necessary to obtain some voluntary or paid professional help in designing a
data collection and analysis system that is within his ability to operate. His or her
crime analysis system need not be highly sophisticated, but it must permit him or
her to easily examine specific types of crime in relationship to the conditions under
which they occur. The types of data he needs and the kinds of planning information,
which his analysis should produce, are described below.2

Data Sources

The primary data sources for crime analysis are as follows:

• Offense reports;
• Citizen interviews and surveys;
• Offender interviews;
• Housing and population data from the census;
• City directories;
• City planning department materials;
• Informal interviews with public officials and community representatives; and
• Direct observation.
 158 Understanding Crime Prevention

Offense Reports
Offense reports prepared by police officers at the scene of a reported crime can be
prolific sources of information, if conscientiously filled out. Statistical analyses of
groups of offense reports can paint a very detailed picture of prevailing crime pat-
terns, by type, by location, by time of the day or day of the week, by attack methods,
and even, to the degree known, by type of suspect. In addition, total and average
loss information can be developed from offense reports. The crime analysis func-
tion should routinely screen and develop detailed breakdowns of the data contained
on offense reports.

Citizen Interviews and Surveys

Offense report information may be incomplete because it can only deal with re-
ported crimes, which may be much less numerous than actual crimes, and because
police officers may have difficulty obtaining all information called for by the offense
report form. Offense report information also does not reveal citizen perceptions
of crime and citizen fear of crime. For these reasons, citizen interviews, also
referred to as victimization surveys, are an important supplementary source of
data. Citizen interviews are used to attempt to measure the actual crime victimiza-
tion experienced by interviewees, the levels and kinds of personal and family con-
cerns about crime, and the degree and nature of security precautions already in
use. These measures are then compared to personal, household, and geographic
characteristics of those interviewed. Citizen interviews can be conducted on a
random sample basis citywide, in selected crime problem areas as revealed by the
study of offense reports, or in any combination. Some jurisdictions are using contact
with the agency as a means of determining whom to poll. Citizen surveys can be
simple or complex. They may be designed within a police agency, by the crime pre-
vention organization, or by students and faculty of local colleges or universities.
These institutions are frequently looking for research projects and they may offer
assistance at little or no cost in preparing and processing a citizen survey. The
Department of Justice has issued several guides to surveying citizens, and these are
readily available.
Some agencies are using “hot spot” or tip cards as a means of gaining citizen
input. These anonymous information-gathering tools provide a method of citizen
sharing of information, without the fear often associated with providing information
to the police. Postage-paid information gathering cards may be distributed through
the crime prevention organization and can be a valuable resource in gathering
crime data.

Offender Interviews
Interviews with selected prison inmates and other ex-offenders may be a good source
of information on typical offender likes and dislikes with respect to different types
 Planning the Community Progran 159

of targets, security devices, escape routes, and parts of town, as well as preferred
attack methods and the ways in which the local criminals assess their own risk. Such
information will probably not be an accurate cross-section of the views of the total
criminal population, and may be suspect on the grounds of being self-serving.
Nevertheless, offender interviews can provide a good cross-check on the validity of
information from offense reports and other sources.

Demographic Information
Census data, city directory information, city maps, and other urban planning infor-
mation can help the crime analysis unit establish the characteristics of the targets-
at-risk. This can be done both on a citywide scale (for example, the numbers of single
family housing units, convenience stores, supermarkets, jewelry stores, liquor stores,
etc.) and on a neighborhood scale (for example, housing by income level, occupa-
tion, family status, and other measures). Knowledge of targets-at-risk, which is over-
laid with GIS crime data, can be extremely valuable to properly understand crime
patterns and the impact of crime.

Interviews With Officials and Community Representatives

Informal interviews with public officials such as police officers, other criminal
justice professionals, representatives of other government agencies, and community
representatives such as ministers, and leaders of various civic, service, voluntary
and neighborhood groups can extend, enlighten, and perhaps most importantly
explain the relevance of most of the statistical information gathered through
other means.

Direct Observation
Another valuable aid in the process of understanding community crime patterns is
direct observation of selected areas in the community. Much information on poten-
tial criminal opportunity can be gained by simply driving or walking through sub-
divisions, shopping areas, other residential neighborhoods, parks, and other settings,
and observing key characteristics of individual targets and areas as a whole. Such
“windshield surveys” take relatively little time but add an invaluable dimension to
the informational perspective of the crime analysis process. The practitioner can
enlist police patrolmen, housing inspectors, fire marshals, and others (see Chapter
6) to help in this direct observation process.

Information Provided by Crime Analysis

Cost is an important dimension that is often absent from crime prevention planning
at the community level. The practitioner first must be able to understand the direct
 160 Understanding Crime Prevention

cost of crime (value of property stolen and cost of lost work time or medical treat-
ment resulting from crime-related injury). Property loss cost can be estimated from
offense report data. Costs and losses due to injury, fear, intimidation, and other per-
sonal crime effects are more difficult, but can be estimated to some degree through
citizen interviews. For example, an elderly woman who was actively involved in
community housing and crime issues stated in conversation that she was afraid to
go out at night. She indicated that at 7:30 p.m. she was inside her home with the
doors locked. What cost figure can be assigned to exclusion from community meet-
ings and functions that she missed due to her fear-induced curfew? In addition, the
cost of operating criminal justice system activities in the community can be deter-
mined through examination of the municipal budget, and the cost of risk manage-
ment measures, such as security devices, security personnel, and insurance, can be
estimated from interviews.
These and other types of direct crime cost information can be used to develop
the dollar cost dimensions of general and specific crime problems, and the potential
value of prevention efforts. For example, it might be interesting to know the average
value of preventing a liquor store robbery or a home burglary. It might also be inter-
esting to know what the cost/value relationships of a particular preventive result
might be. For example, what would be the value of a 5 percent reduction in com-
mercial burglary? How much might it cost to achieve that benefit?
There are other, less obvious, costs that are also important to understand. One
of the most significant of these is the possible cost of neighborhood decline due
to crime and the fear of crime. If fear of victimization causes people to move out
of high crime areas, and demand for housing and store space in those areas
consequently decreases, property values and public tax revenues from those areas
will also decrease. At the same time, declining neighborhoods tend to require
increased municipal services. For example, a Minneapolis study showed that in the
area most highly victimized by residential burglars, the average value of an owner-
occupied home was $3,300 less than the citywide average. And in the most highly
vandalized area, the average value of an owner-occupied housing unit was about
$2,100 less than the citywide average. The study also revealed that these two spe-
cific crimes generate a total estimated tax revenue loss of about $17 million. Given
this figure, a reduction in the residential burglary rate and vandalism rates by just
10 percent would correspond to an increase in the property tax revenue of about $1.7
million.3
This kind of information obviously permits an additional cost/benefit
dimension to be added to the crime prevention planning process by making it
even more obvious that effective crime prevention strategies can tend to pay for
themselves.

Citizen Concern About Crime

There are usually substantial differences in the way people perceive crime, depend-
ing on their personal, social, and economic circumstances. Consequently, it should
 Planning the Community Progran 161

be expected that there will be substantial variations in community opinion concern-

ing the importance of various crime problems. For example, a population group that
is highly concerned about robbery might tend not to cooperate with a proposed crime
prevention strategy, which emphasized burglary prevention. In addition, groups of
people who have either much higher or much lower levels of concern about crime
than is warranted by actual crime patterns may need special educational efforts or
modified crime prevention strategies.
The issue of crime fear is a sensitive one and must be handled carefully in the
crime prevention program planning process. It is not advisable, for example, to use
scare tactics as a method for motivating citizen participation in crime prevention
strategy. On the other hand, where there is significant crime fear, even if statistically
unwarranted, there may be a motivational factor, which can be used in promoting
crime prevention strategies.
A particular aspect of citizen concern is usually the fear of injury associated
with crime. Through crime analysis, the practitioner may find that the risk of per-
sonal injury varies greatly with the type of crime and with victim behavior during
the criminal attack. Such information can be useful in formulating strategies for
reducing irrational fear.

Crime Rate by Opportunity

The population’s risk of a particular crime can be measured with the least distortion
by comparing crime incidence with number of opportunities for that crime
within an area. Only the crime rate by opportunity is easily converted into the prob-
ability that a given target will be attacked during a given period of time. If the
practitioner calculates crime rates on the basis of available targets, rather than
on a population basis or simply in terms of numbers of crimes, he or she has a
very useful way to display and understand crime patterns. Such an approach, for
example, permits clear distinctions to be made among high, moderate, and low
crime areas.
In addition, one can determine opportunity rates by particular target sub-types.
For example, instead of residential burglary as a single category, one might look sep-
arately at single-family homes, two- to four-family homes, and apartment units, and
burglaries involving garages and residential storage areas. Each represents a signif-
icant variation in target type and perhaps attack method. As this kind of analysis is
carried out in finer and finer detail, patterns, which can be dealt with by crime pre-
vention strategies, will begin to emerge.

Time of Occurrence
It is essential to determine the distribution of crimes by target type, by hour of the
day, day of the week, and month of the year. Unfortunately, much of the time-related
information available is of limited value. If the victim is not present during the crime,
for example, the time may be recorded as range of hours and days during which the
 162 Understanding Crime Prevention

crime probably occurred. On the other hand, the time of occurrence for crimes such
as robbery and assault can be more precisely identified. Understanding the hourly,
daily, weekly, and monthly fluctuations in target-specific crimes may be of great help
in developing specific preventive strategies.

Attack Methods
The methods by which crimes are committed are very important to understand if
one is to plan effective strategies. For example, if we learn that a high percentage of
residential burglaries involved unforced entry, we may conclude that a significant
percentage of residential burglaries could be prevented simply by the use of
appropriate locking devices. Or, if we find that the rate of unforced entries into
apartments is much higher than that for single-family dwellings, we might conclude
that a primary problem in apartments is lack of key control or failure to change
locks between tenants. Or, we might find that most commercial burglaries involve
entrance at the side or back, which permits us to stress security for such entrances
accordingly.
Attack methods need our most serious scrutiny during the planning process,
for unless we understand the ways in which crimes are committed, we cannot pos-
sibly develop effective opportunity reduction strategies.

Suspect Characteristics
Depending on the type of crime, information on suspects may either not be avail-
able or not be reliable. Nevertheless, where possible, tentative estimates of suspect
characteristics may be useful in adding a further dimension to the practitioner’s
understanding of crime patterns. Knowledge of age, sex, or race may help in
establishing cause and effect relationships (as, for example, in the case of the
high school referred to in Chapter 7, where daylight burglaries in the vicinity could
be correlated with school truancy rates because of the age of the few suspects
for whom information was available). If place of residence is known for a few
suspects, it may be possible to develop some tentative conclusions on suspect mobil-
ity. In Minneapolis, for example, analysts found that 82 percent of known residen-
tial burglary suspects lived within 1/2-mile of their target. On the other hand, the
analysts found that burglaries in a few residential areas were primarily committed
by persons living in other areas some distance away. This kind of knowledge can be
of great use in plotting prevention strategies on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood
basis.4
The value of crime analysis to the practitioner is that it makes possible a very
detailed understanding of the relationships between specific crime patterns and
specific local environments, as well as more general patterns and relationships on a
citywide scale. Thus, crime analysis, like the physician’s diagnosis, becomes the
essential basis for development of problem-solving strategies. The practitioner who
uses general approaches without first conducting an adequate crime analysis is like
 Planning the Community Progran 163

a doctor who would automatically prescribe penicillin to everyone who walks into
his office. Such an approach may be of some random benefit, but will be ineffective
or even harmful in some cases.

Priority Setting

The crime analysis will probably reveal a wide variety of significant crime problems,
and the practitioner will be faced with the need to make choices involving types of
crime, types of targets, and parts of the community. Crime prevention programs, par-
ticularly in the early phases of program development, cannot possibly deal with all
crime problems simultaneously. Thus, the practitioner will be faced with the need to
make choices as to how, where, and why to focus his or her efforts.
Priority-setting can be both a major challenge and a major need. As we have
seen, the crime prevention approach must be strategic in nature if it is to accomplish
anything. The practitioner must resist the temptation to do a little something about
every problem, because the shotgun approach is usually both wasteful and incon-
clusive. On the other hand, the practitioner may be exposed to substantial political
or administrative pressure to prove the value of crime prevention or deal with a wide
variety of troublesome crimes or both. The way to avoid this kind of problem is to
involve a range of people in the decision-making process.
The organizational mechanism for broad-based citizen input described earlier
should become deeply involved in priority-setting. This advisory council, citizens’
task force, mayor’s commission, or other body must have the opportunity to thor-
oughly review the practitioner’s general recommendations for action. Then, the advi-
sory body can make its own priority recommendations to the practitioner. Such
recommendations can be further refined by the practitioner, re-reviewed by the advi-
sors, and the process recycled as necessary to achieve a set of priorities, which is
both feasible from a crime analysis viewpoint and desirable from a community view-
point. It should be stressed that while crime analysis will produce objective recom-
mendations, value judgments by community groups and public officials must also
be taken into account.
Key administrators (the police chief, the mayor, criminal justice plan-
ning bodies and so forth) should also review and provide input to the priority
setting process, because it is through these administrators that program resources
will flow. The result will be a ranking of targets for the practitioner’s efforts. For
example:

• School vandalism;
• Rape;
• Residential burglary in a subdivision;
• Bicycle theft;
• Street robbery and assault in a commercial area; and
• Commercial burglary in the warehouse district.
 164 Understanding Crime Prevention

It may be that the target crime problems and the order of priority for their solu-
tion are not entirely consistent with the actual seriousness and quantitative impact
of those problems. Instead, the priorities will be aligned according to the perceived
importance of the problems. For example, bicycle theft may not have much eco-
nomic impact compared to burglary and robbery, but it is an annoying type of crime
affecting many people. Rape, though perhaps low in incidence compared to other
types of crimes, may be considered by the community as a much more serious
problem than some of the more numerous types of crime.
The practitioner must accept such apparent inconsistencies, not merely
because it is politically expedient to do so. In the end, community cooperation is the
essence of crime prevention. The practitioner who responds enthusiastically to the
priority recommendations of community representatives helps encourage the active
community participation so essential to the long-range success of crime prevention
programs.
On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the practitioner from develop-
ing a few priorities of his or her own. Where important crime issues exist that are
lost in the community consensus of priority, the practitioner may be able to obtain
approval to experiment with approaches, which can be converted to major thrusts
later as the experiments bear fruit and the community is persuaded to adjust its pri-
ority viewpoints.

DEVELOPING PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

Having developed the crime analysis base and determined the priorities for action,
the practitioner must develop and implement the strategies by which the desired
results are to be achieved. This conclusive part of the planning process, referred to
as strategic planning, involves making action decisions systematically and with the
greatest possible awareness of their potential results. Strategic planning attempts to
answer the following question, “Given the problems we face, the resources available
to do the job, and all of the things we might do to solve the problems, what actions
have the greatest likelihood of producing the results we desire?”
It is important to distinguish this approach from the much more common kind
of planning, which asks, “Given the problems we face and all of the things we might
do about them, for what actions can we find the necessary resources?” This latter
approach is like the doctor who says, “There are several drugs that might help my
patient. Which of them do I have as free samples in my drawer?” We would, of
course, prefer that he asked himself, “Which drug will do the most good?” Thus,
the crime prevention practitioner’s task in strategic planning is to develop that strat-
egy for action that will do the most good for the problem at hand.
 Planning the Community Progran 165

Setting Objectives

The primary task of strategy development is to set objectives. By objec-

tives, we do not mean statements of general direction and purpose or hoped for
results. Instead we mean specific, concrete statements of results to be achieved.
For xample, “to reduce vandalism,” is not a statement of objective, but, “to reduce
the dollar cost of vandalism at high school X by 50 percent within one year,” is an
objective.
Objectives are not abstractions. They are the action commitments through
which results are to be achieved. They are also the standards against which achieve-
ment is to be measured. They focus and direct the crime prevention program and
serve as its fundamental strategy. Thus, they must be capable of translation into spe-
cific tactics and must enable resources and efforts to be concentrated. They must
winnow out the trivial actions and focus on the key actions needed to achieve
program results. They must therefore be selective.
Objectives must lead directly to work. Work itself is always specific, has clear,
unambiguous results, a deadline, a performance standard and a specific assignment
of accountability. (By definition, work excludes all of those activities, which, while
energy consuming, have no specific purpose or result. This is no mere play on
words. Unless the practitioner’s efforts are work, as defined above, they will lead
nowhere.)
In a nutshell, objectives provide direction and make action commitments. They
do not determine the future, but they are the essential means by which energy
and resources are mobilized for the making of the future. Thus, they must state
a specific target for work, a specific result to be obtained through work, and a spe-
cific deadline for accomplishment of the result.
The importance of proper objective-setting simply cannot be overstated.
Objectives determine the program—for good or ill. If the objectives are arbitrary or
vague, the program will be arbitrary or vague. If the objectives call for minimal
accomplishment, the program may produce minimal results. If the objectives call for
unrealistically high results, the program will be an exercise in frustration. If the set
of objectives is incomplete, the program will stumble. If individual objectives are in
conflict with each other, the program will become chaotic. If no objectives are set,
the program will simply spin its wheels.

Direct Objectives
Many local crime prevention programs have failed to live up to their potential
promise because of deficiencies in crime-specific objective setting. For example, in
a southwestern city of about 100,000 population, the police department crime pre-
vention unit established the following as one specific objective for the second year
of their program: To stabilize the incidence of residential burglary throughout the
city. The following table summarizes their work in connection with this objective
and the specific results attained:
 166 Understanding Crime Prevention

Planned activity Measured activity Measured impact

Establish and sustain 40 57 established, CPU staff None of 600 participant

new neighborhood meets about once a households burglarized (daily
groups month with each group burglary reports)
Conduct 250 residential 538 surveys conducted Burglary 0.9% in surveyed
security surveys homes, vs. 1.6% citywide:
surveyed victims apparently
did not follow
recommendations: local sales
of “improved” security hard-
ware doubled
Enroll 700 new Operation 1056 new participants Burglary 0.4% compared to
ID participants 1.6% and some attempts
aborted because of marked
property
Conduct 200 public 136 conducted 80% of participants
presentations subsequently requested
specific CP service
Disseminate public Radio/TV announcements Some services requested as a
information newspaper articles talk result, staff concluded that “it
shows carton stuffers helps”
Welcome Wagon
Establish patrol focus Provided weekly crime Report “useful”
in high crime activity report to Patrol
residential areas Division Pin map “marginal”
Maintained pin map
(burglary) in Patrol
Squad Room
Draft a security code Not drafted but key actors “Education” process working
for adoption by city “educated” OK, first draft expected next
year.

From the information presented in this table, it appears that the work was generally
successful. The practitioners established almost 50 percent more neighbor-
hood groups than they had planned, and they delivered over twice the planned
number of security surveys. The areas where the planned activity was not com-
pletely achieved (public presentations, drafting of security code) show reasonable
progress. The “measured impact” of most of the activities is encouraging or at least
revealing.
One can easily imagine, therefore, the sense of dismay when the Uniform
Crime Reports at the end of the year revealed a 61 percent increase in residential
burglary compared to the previous year.
Why such a disappointing result? One can’t say for sure, but there are some
obvious contributing factors.
 Planning the Community Progran 167

• It is easy to imagine that the public awareness campaign could have resulted
in an increased tendency for citizens to report residential burglary—thus creating,
to some degree, a statistical increase in crime rather than a real one.
• The direct service activities of the Crime Prevention Unit or CPU (neigh-
borhood groups, security surveys, Operation ID enrollment, public presentations)
from which citizen action could be expected, touched only a small fraction of the
city’s residential units, many of whose occupants may already have been more
security-conscious than the average.

In essence, the stated objective of stabilizing residential burglary citywide was

a severe overreaching of the CPU’s capability during that year. On the other hand,
the planned activities themselves more nearly approached reasonable statements of
objective. The practitioners might have stated a series of objectives for the year
related to residential burglary as follows:

• To stabilize the incidence of residential burglary in 40 selected neighborhoods

through establishment of Neighborhood Watch groups;
• To reduce the incidence of residential burglary compared to the city-wide average
for 250 selected homes through security surveys and for 700 homes through
Operation ID enrollment;
• To generate requests for crime prevention services through public presentations;
• To increase the reporting of residential burglary through a city-wide public
awareness campaign; and
• To obtain agreement from key public and private officials to work together on
the drafting of a building security code.

Such objectives obviously set the stage for useful work. They are direct,
limited, and specific.
The crime prevention unit in another southwestern city during the same time
period set for itself the following objective (among others); to stabilize the rate of
increase of residential burglary in Patrol District X.
Having selected a limited target area, a limited target crime and a modest quan-
titative result, the practitioners saturated that patrol district with daily, door-to-door
appeals to residents to accept security surveys and with invitations to form neigh-
borhood groups. The following table summarizes their work:

Planned activity Measured activity Measured impact

Conduct security surveys on 522 surveys in District X 56% reduction in

a saturation basis (burglary victims surveyed residential
first, then adjacent homes burglary compared
Establish neighborhood 74 neighborhood group to previous year
group through a meetings held, averaging 22
saturation process people each for total of 1,600
 168 Understanding Crime Prevention

Given the way in which the stated objective was transformed into specific work, it
is not surprising that a significant reduction was achieved. However, the objective
would have been even more appropriate had it been stated as follows: Achieve a
major decrease in residential burglary in Patrol District X through saturation
programming involving security surveys and neighborhood group establish-
ment. This was apparently the true objective in the minds of the practitioners
anyway; the stated objective may have been worded cautiously to avoid setting an
unrealistic objective.
In these examples, we have described one situation in which the objective as
stated was almost totally unrelated to the specific work conducted. And although the
work itself was useful, the comparison between the work and its results in terms of
the objective was painfully inadequate. In the other situation, the stated objective
was overly vague and, in retrospect, overly conservative, but it did directly relate
to the work that was conducted and the results that were achieved. This is an all-
important distinction that the practitioner should not fail to observe in setting
results-oriented objectives.

Indirect Objectives
So far, we have only discussed objectives that aim to directly reduce specific crimes.
There are also indirect kinds of objectives that are just as important to the overall
program as the direct objectives.

Promotional objectives set forth strategies for specific and general improvement in
public knowledge and understanding of crime prevention programs and for
building the foundation for subsequent direct action. To obtain agreement
from public and private officials to work together on the drafting of a
building security code is a promotional objective, as is to generate requests
for crime prevention services through public presentations. There
should be an objective stated for each area of promotional interest, and such
objectives should in no way be confused or associated with crime-specific
objectives.
Resource objectives deal with the human, financial, and physical resources needed
to carry out all other objectives. Though often taken for granted, or submerged
in budgeting processes, resource objectives need to be the subject of conscious
and deliberate thought and objective setting. Otherwise, the program will
remain at the mercy of whatever resources may come its way or (all too often)
may find itself entirely without resources.
Reporting objectives acknowledge and deal with the fact that any crime prevention
program only exists as long as relevant elements in the community believe that
it does a necessary, useful, and productive job. Reporting objectives relate
directly to program survival. It is crucially important, therefore, that the prac-
titioner develops specific objectives for reporting progress to the individuals
and organizations to whom the program is (even informally) accountable. This
 Planning the Community Progran 169

can even include the public as a whole—objectives for regular reports to the
public through the newspapers, for example.
Productivity objectives deal with the way in which resources are used and their
contribution to the total program effort. Of primary value to program man-
agement, productivity objectives attempt to define, for example, the way in
which security surveys will be conducted and the average amount of time
involved, methods and time allocations for work with neighborhood groups,
and so on. While many people rightly object to working “by the numbers,”
appropriate productivity objectives help everyone in the crime prevention orga-
nization understand what is expected of themselves, and what to expect from
each other. Moreover, these objectives are the primary source of performance
guidance to the program manager.
Innovation objectives, finally, provide an excellent basis for moving toward greater
program productivity and effectiveness. By clearly identifying those areas in
which current service delivery methods can be improved, where new services
and approaches are needed, where (perhaps) current services may be elimi-
nated, and where program management processes may be improved, innova-
tion objectives permit a clear working focus on desired program change. Thus,
more than any other single kind of objective, they contribute to continued
increase in program effectiveness and explicitly demand a creative approach
to the total program effort by all members of the organization.

CONCLUSION

We have briefly described in this chapter the major elements involved in planning
the community-wide crime prevention program. As is true for the other matters dis-
cussed in this introductory volume, we do not expect that the practitioner has learned,
in detail, how to plan as the result of reading this chapter. We do expect the practi-
tioner to understand the essential role of planning and to appreciate the key thought
processes that go into planning. These thought processes will be explored further as
we discuss program management and impact evaluation in the next two chapters, for
there really can be no arbitrary separation of planning, management, and evaluation
functions. Planning sets objectives, management carries them out, and evaluation
determines the actual results, which then become new input to the planning func-
tion . . . and so the cycle continues as long as the program exists.
 9
Managing the
Community Program

The value of a crime prevention program needs to be apparent in terms of actual

performance. Without proper management, it is impossible to deliver valuable per-
formance.
This chapter briefly describes the key elements in proper crime prevention
program management.
Management consists of the principles, practices, and techniques used in
achieving the objectives of the organization and is the process through which an
organization operates. It plans, organizes, and controls organizational activities so
that the crime prevention program’s objectives may be accomplished. The degree to
which a crime prevention organization uses its resources efficiently to effectively
attain its objectives is the degree to which it may be said to have good management.
Management is a systematic activity that must be focused on performance and
results. Cost control is needed too, but above all else, the practitioner-manager must
emphasize results. He or she must learn to manage the crime prevention program
for performance; unless high quality management is a first priority of organizational
activities, no crime prevention program can possibly achieve its potential for helping
people.
The tools of the crime prevention practitioner-manager are:

• Personnel resources;
• Financial and other resources;

171
 172 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Performance and cost control measures;

• Impact measures;
• Work assignments; and
• Reporting mechanisms.

With these tools, the manager can begin and continue the task of achieving
the objectives set forth in the planning stage.

PERSONNEL RESOURCES

There have been a number of attempts to determine the minimum staff size for a
crime prevention program. Texas, for example, set forth the requirement that a police
department-based crime prevention unit should have two full-time sworn officers or
one percent of the authorized strength, whichever is greater.1 In fact, the number of
staff personnel in the crime prevention program should be determined by the work-
load requirements inherent in the program’s objectives. Staff people should be
employed or assigned full-time to the crime prevention program, and their working
hours should be established as appropriate for the specific tasks of crime prevention
as opposed to the general tasks of any agency.

Staff Training

The manager should arrange for the crime prevention program staff to be trained at
the earliest possible time, preferably before the program gets underway. Many states
now offer one-week basic training programs, some states provide two-week inter-
mediate training, and NCPI provides a one-week basic course and a two-week com-
prehensive course. The three-week NCPI training program is the ideal, but as a
practical matter, the program may not need or be able to afford such training for
each staff member. However, each person should be trained for at least one week,
and preferably two. The manager and any supervisory staff should have three weeks
of training, as should any staff persons who must operate independent of direct
supervision (as in a police precinct, for example, or in one of the several communi-
ties, which make up a county-wide program). NCPI’s training courses will provide
advanced security, loss reduction, and crime prevention training for the public and
private sectors. This program will be geared to the person who must assume a high
level of management or service responsibility.
Sources of staff manpower can be varied. However, each staff person should
have background and experience that is related to the practice of crime prevention.
Experienced police officers, for example, can become excellent crime prevention
practitioners. Persons with experience in community organization, private security,
building inspection, fire prevention, human services delivery, urban planning, and
crime analysis also can adapt readily to crime prevention practice.
 Managing the Community Program 173

Supplementary Personnel

Supplementary personnel resources can be a large factor in the crime prevention

program’s work. All members of local law enforcement agencies should become
capable of applying crime prevention practices to a degree consistent with their daily
work (for example, patrol). Other public employees, such as firefighters, may be able
to make significant crime prevention contributions. Chapters 3, 6, and 7 provide
additional examples of potential sources of supplementary manpower. The manager’s
task with regard to supplementary personnel is primarily that of providing training.
The more people who can be trained—even briefly—the more supplementary
manpower is potentially available.

FINANCIAL AND OTHER RESOURCES

Normally, financial resources must be obtained before staff can be employed or

assigned. However, in many cases, core staff can be reallocated from other duties at
no cost to the program. While this expedient is useful in getting the program started,
permanent-staffing patterns should be based on financial resources, which are under
the control of the manager. Thus, the manager must develop and maintain a flow of
funds sufficient to take care of all program needs. This means that the manager-
practitioner must become skilled in budgeting.

Budgeting

The budget is the work program of the crime prevention organization expressed in
dollar terms. Its purpose is twofold: (1) from the viewpoint of the program manager,
the budget’s purpose is to obtain funds necessary for program operation; and (2)
from the viewpoint of the supervisory organization (police department, city council,
mayor’s office, citizen organization, state or federal grant monitor), the budget’s
purpose is to limit and control the program’s expenditures. Budgets fall into two
general categories: line-item budgets and program budgets.
Line-item budgets break down planned expenditures according to category of
expenditure: salaries, operating expenses, equipment purchase and so forth.
Program budgets break down expenditures by program objectives. Of the two, the
program budget offers much more potential for management control, since it
ties expenditures directly to the work of the program. Line item budgets are only
useful in a gross management sense (for example, have we spent all of our travel
money yet?) and, to be helpful to the manager, must be reconstructed in terms of
the objectives.
In order to deal effectively with the public budgeting process, the practitioner-
manager must learn how that process works through all levels above the crime
prevention program. This process-learning includes:
 174 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Budget preparation formats;

• Timing of budget submission;
• Location of budget submission;
• Key personnel in the budget review and approval process and their viewpoints;
and
• Sources of decision-making support.

In addition, the manager must learn to make realistic, defendable, and justifi-
able budget requests.

Other Funding Sources

There are many potential non-government sources of funds at the local level. Service
organizations, for example, often have small amounts of money that are available
for projects of community benefit. Local service and business organizations can
also stage or sponsor fund drives on behalf of crime prevention programs, or
campaigns to generate other kinds of resources (for example, free printing of
brochures, donated physical resources such as office furniture and equipment,
portable display panels, and even mobile vans to house displays). Foundations at
the local level can be sources of support (refer to The Foundation Directory,2 or
check the Internet, for information on foundations in your area). Insurance compa-
nies and chambers of commerce also have the potential capability to provide
resources.
The key to unlocking all of these other resources is to first determine the local
groups that might be of assistance, identify their types of interest and activity,
develop specific project ideas that seem to fit with those interests and activities, and
then approach organizational leaders to discuss the possibilities.
Whatever methods the manager uses to develop initial funding, it should
be understood that maintaining an adequate fund flow and increasing that flow
for program expansion purposes is a constant challenge for the manager. This is
why it is so important to have resource objectives. Such objectives stimulate
the manager to keep a lively interest in potential sources of funds and to develop
methods for securing those funds well in advance of need. This is particularly
important if state or federal grant funds are a significant factor in the initial funding
pattern. Grant funds sooner or later run out, and the manager who has not taken the
pains to develop alternative funding sources may find that his or her program runs
out, too.

PERFORMANCE AND COST CONTROL MEASURES

The manager must constantly make decisions regarding the flow of work. Is enough
effort being applied to a given objective to achieve the result in a timely fashion?
 Managing the Community Program 175

Is the quality of work high enough? Is too much effort being invested? All
managers make seat-of-the-pants decisions in these areas. The good manager devel-
ops performance measures to guide his decision-making.
The manager makes specific work assignments, which result in work being
accomplished. Performance and results are then measured, permitting the manager
to make better decisions regarding the next round of work assignments. If the
methods used to measure performance and results are appropriate, the manager’s
decisions will get better and better as time goes on. On the other hand, if no mea-
surement is attempted, each round of decision-making is of the same “by guess and
by gosh” nature as the preceding round.
It is safe to say that the single most important activity for the manager, once
appropriate objectives have been set and funds and staff obtained, is the develop-
ment and use of good performance measures. With them, he can constantly improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of program operations and even correct for bad deci-
sions of the past before they prove harmful. Without good performance measures,
the manager is at the mercy of whatever feedback he may randomly receive.
Thus, the practitioner-manager needs clear and common measures covering all
areas of program work. The measures need not (and should not) be rigidly quanti-
tative, nor need they be exact. But they must be clear, simple and rational. They must
be relevant—in order to direct attention and efforts where they belong. They must
work reliably, and their potential for error must be known and understood. They must
be self-explanatory—that is, understandable without the need for complex interpre-
tation or philosophic discussion. They need to focus on results, and they need to
cover both quantifiable and nonquantifiable events. They must be received in a timely
fashion by whoever needs them. They must be economical—providing the minimum
amount of information needed. They must be operational—made to serve an action
purpose in an action environment. Finally, they must be simple to use; complicated
measurement methods do not work, because they confuse people, and they direct
attention away from that which needs measuring and toward the measurement
methodologies themselves.

Activity Counts and Activity Cost

This is the simplest kind of crime prevention program performance measure. It con-
sists of listing the number of speeches made, number of security surveys conducted,
number of brochures given out, and so on. Such measures have limited value in that
although they do indicate the gross volume of work performed, they cannot reveal
how well the work was performed or what its results were. Activity counts are often
illegitimately used as the primary or only measure of productivity. Such a “numbers
game” is totally inconsistent with good management practice.
If, in addition to measuring the number of times a given activity is conducted,
the manager also measures the total cost of that activity in labor-hours or dollars, he
or she can begin to understand how resources are being used.
 176 Understanding Crime Prevention

Cost by Activity Unit

A further refinement in activity cost measurement, this type of measure focuses

on the average cost of each unit of activity. For example, the manager might
set up a simple time sheet to record estimated security survey time units as
follows:

Residential Security Survey Time Sheet

Arrangements Travel Survey Report Preparation Total

Having logged the time expenditures in this activity for a suitable period of time,
the manager can compute average costs, as shown in the table below. The times used
in the sample time sheet to calculate average costs are arbitrary and used for example
only. We do not know how much time an average security survey takes, and the point
is that neither does the manager, unless he or she sets up measures to find out. In
any case, what is the value of knowing that the average residential security survey
cost is $35 (plus mileage and other incidental costs)? With this information, the
manager can work to reduce average cost. For example, scheduling all surveys in
the same geographic area for the same day might save travel time. Use of a stan-
dardized report format might save report preparation time. Perhaps more importantly,
the manager is now in a position to begin to assess result costs, which will be further
discussed in the following pages.

Cost per Average Residential Security Survey

Component Average time (hour) Unit cost* Average cost

Arrangements 0.5 $10 $5

Travel 0.5 $10 $5
Survey 1.5 $10 $15
Report preparation 1 $10 $10
Total cost $35

* Unit cost is the dollar value of a particular unit of effort, such as a day or hour of labor. In the
case of labor, it is calculated as follows: total cost per year (salary, fringes, and any overhead
as a percent of salary) divided by net number of working days (365 minus weekends,
holidays, vacation, and sick leave time and any non-program administrative time) equals unit cost
per available day divided by 8 equals unit cost per hour. For example, an annual cost of $17,600
divided by 220 days equals $80 per day divided by 8 equals $10 per labor hour.
 Managing the Community Program 177

Acceptance Rates

Most crime prevention program activity is aimed, in one way or another, at

persuading people to engage in some kind of new or modified opportunity reduc-
tion activity. Whether the practitioner is making crime risk management recom-
mendations to a businessman, providing guidance to a Neighborhood Watch group,
or working with an ad hoc group of architects, planners, building officials, and
developers to design a building security code, the desired result is some sort of
action. We can define this desired action result as acceptance, and we can measure
acceptance rates.
Let us consider, for example, the development of acceptance rates for the secu-
rity survey. First, we need to have a numerical scale for the various kinds of accep-
tances we might expect. If we make five recommendations to a homeowner, the first
priority recommendation might be worth five points, the second—four points, the
third—three points, the fourth—two points, and the fifth—one point, and the total
value of all recommendations would be 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 15.
Upon checking back with that homeowner 60 days later, we might find that
recommendations one and three had been carried out, and the rest had not. The
acceptance rate would be 5 plus 3 divided by 15 equals 0.53. We can compare accep-
tance rates for all homes we survey using the same method, no matter how many
recommendations we make in each case. For example, if the acceptance rates for
five surveyed homes are as follows: No. 1—0.53; No. 2—0.22; No. 3—0.75; No.
4—0; No. 5—0.91, our average acceptance rate for the five homes would be 0.53 +
0.22 + 0.75 + 0 + 0.91 = 2.41 divided by 5 = 0.4. In other words, our average accep-
tance rate is 40 percent.

Result Costs

We are now ready to calculate result costs, by comparing the cost of the average
security survey to the acceptance rate.

Average survey cost = $35

Average acceptance rate = 0.4
Average result cost = $35 divided by 0.4 = $87.50

Thus, in our arbitrary example, we have learned that if our batting average for secu-
rity survey acceptances is 40 percent, our average result cost for each home surveyed
is $87.50. It is very clear from this comparison that whatever our average survey
cost, its value as a result is very strongly affected by the acceptance rate. To visual-
ize this more clearly, let us look at a range of result costs. Given that the average
survey costs $35:
 178 Understanding Crime Prevention

Acceptance rate (%) Result cost ($)

10 350
20 175
30 116.67
40 87.50
50 70
60 58.33
70 50
80 43.75
90 38.89
100 35

From this illustration we can see how costly the security survey process is if we
are not obtaining at least a 40–50 percent acceptance rate. We can also see how
important it is from a management viewpoint to measure both the costs of crime
prevention activities and the acceptance levels that result from crime prevention
activities.

Cost and Performance Standards

It is impossible, at present, to provide any universal guidelines for cost and

performance standards in crime prevention. However, each practitioner-manager,
through measurement and analysis processes such as briefly illustrated above,
can begin to determine what the standards can be and should be for his or
her particular program, and can work to improve those standards with time and
experience.

IMPACT MEASURES

We must clearly distinguish between performance and impact. Performance, in all

cases, relates to the direct results of the practitioner’s efforts, which almost always
can be defined in terms of some new or modified action on the part of a client, an
organization, or members of an informal social group. Performance, as we have dis-
cussed it here, does not refer to the reduction of crime itself, unless such reduction
results directly from the practitioner’s own efforts, and such direct reduction by the
practitioner will rarely occur. Impact, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which
new or modified opportunity reduction actions by people in the community reduce
crime. Thus, there is a relationship between performance and impact, but impact
must be measured separate from performance. Impact assessment is discussed by
itself in Chapter 10.
 Managing the Community Program 179

WORK ASSIGNMENTS

As we have said, the achievement of the program objectives developed during the
planning process depends on how well these objectives are translated into work. The
job of scheduling work, assigning tasks to appropriate individuals and organizations,
and monitoring work progress will occupy a large portion of the manager’s time,
whether or not the scheduling, assigning, and monitoring task is done well. So, it
behooves the manager to approach this job in the most organized way possible.

Scheduling Work

In general, work should be scheduled in such a way that its desired results will occur
by the date called for in the stated objective. This normally requires the manager
to break down each objective into a series of specific tasks, each task with its own
deadline for accomplishment, arranged in such a way that the total work flows as
expeditiously as possible toward completion.

Assigning Work

Each specific task should be assigned to a specific person for accomplishment. The
practice of specific assignment and accountability is extremely important, because
this is the only method available to the manager to ensure that the work is done. If
the manager, instead, relies on general understandings of responsibilities for work,
he or she will all too often discover too late that each staff person thought that the
task was someone else’s responsibility. In short, there must be an assigned crew chief
for every significant work unit—someone who is responsible to the manager for its
accomplishment, and to whom the manager can turn for progress reports and other
information. This is especially important for work that is to be done by people or
organizations outside the crime prevention organization. In the case of work under-
taken by external groups and individuals, the only control the manager has is
specific prior agreements on the work to be done and the time by which it is to
be accomplished.

Monitoring Work Progress

The manager must state very explicitly the reporting requirements associated with
each work unit. How often is the crew chief to report progress to the manager? What
form shall the report take? Who else (and how and when) should be made aware of
progress in that particular work unit? What performance and cost measures need to
be associated with the work? When and how should measures be made? When and
 180 Understanding Crime Prevention

how should they be reported? These kinds of understandings, like the work assign-
ments and schedules themselves, must be very precise. The manager must receive
needed monitoring information in a timely manner, on the one hand, and should be
spared unnecessary, untimely information, on the other. Precision in this area will
not only provide the manager with appropriate decision-making information, it will
also help ensure that his or her time is not constantly occupied with work-related
conversations which, however interesting, are irrelevant.
In the end, the manager’s own time is the most precious of anyone connected
with the program. All too many managers occupy themselves with conversations and
crises to the extent that they fail to conduct their most important task, which is to
serve as the source of constant direction for the progress of the work itself.

REPORTING MECHANISMS

The manager’s job is to ensure effective and efficient accomplishment of the

program’s work. In turn, the manager is always responsible to others for the results
of the program. Whether the manager’s accountability relationships are simple (for
example, he or she reports directly and only to the chief of police or sheriff) or
complex (an advisory board, the chief, the mayor, the city council, the Chamber of
Commerce, state and federal grant monitors, etc.) there should be clearly developed
reporting mechanisms that properly fulfill the need for accountability. This area
of the manager’s responsibility is so important that specific objectives should be
established for reporting (as was discussed in Chapter 8).
Reporting mechanisms may be of a chain-of-command, coordinative or infor-
mative nature. Chain-of-command reports are prepared for information and deci-
sion-making by those who directly supervise the program manager. Coordinative
reports are made to those whose activities relate to the program, but who neither
control nor are controlled by the program manager. Information reports are made to
those who are or should be interested in the program’s progress, but who neither
supervise nor work directly with the program.
Through these reporting mechanisms, the manager seeks not only to maintain
and expand the program itself but also to communicate its purposes and activities
to all relevant groups and individuals so that the program may develop a firm
foothold in the general context of community affairs. This matter of weaving the
crime prevention program into the permanent fabric of community activities is the
ultimate responsibility of the manager-practitioner.

CONCLUSION

Managing the crime prevention program consists of using resources effectively to

accomplish specific work objectives, which, in turn, lead to the achievement of a
specific series of desired results. The mission of the crime prevention program is to
 Managing the Community Program 181

cause or stimulate crime reduction activities in the community, and the task of the
manager is to see that the program’s mission is accomplished.
The manager must have a set of specific objectives to begin with. Then, he
must be able to obtain resources, assign and monitor specific work tasks, develop
and apply performance and cost control measures in order to determine the work’s
effectiveness, report the results of the work to appropriate individuals and groups,
and finally, develop and apply impact measure to determine the results of the work.
If these management practices are not applied in a disciplined and consistent
manner, the work of the crime prevention program can become confused and
capricious, and the desired results may never be obtained.
 10
Evaluating Impact

As a practical matter, there is a great deal of difference between evaluating the

ongoing crime prevention program and evaluating the experimental or demonstra-
tion crime prevention program. In the ongoing program, the primary purpose of
impact evaluation is to help the program manager make better decisions about future
program developments. He or she may (and perhaps should) have access to a limited
amount of specialized help in designing his evaluation process, but the evaluation
effort itself can be but a minor portion of the total program effort.
In the experimental or demonstration program, the primary purpose of impact
evaluation is to develop knowledge for use by researchers and by agencies that
might wish to duplicate the experiment. The evaluation component is likely to be a
large fraction of the total effort, involving rigorous scientific work by specialized
professionals.
This chapter deals only with impact evaluation in the ongoing program. Our
purpose is to show the manager-practitioner that the impact of any crime prevention
program can be evaluated in a manner and degree sufficient to serve the needs of
the program decision-maker.
The basic requirement for accomplishing effective impact evaluation is not the
availability of specialized evaluation skills. These skills, while important, are only
tools. Rather, the key factor in impact evaluation is the practitioner’s own attitude.
If the practitioner lacks this essential, critical attitude, the most complex, costly, and
professional evaluation program will be of little use.

183
 184 Understanding Crime Prevention

Thus impact evaluation is, in essence, a critical point of view applied system-
atically to the crime prevention program.

THE PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

In the long run, evaluation may be the single most important task faced by the crime
prevention program. Unless the program is capable of measuring its actual effect on
crime patterns, the degree to which its plans and activities achieved results cannot
be determined. Without this knowledge as to results, it is impossible to accurately
plan for subsequent activities. Moreover, it may be difficult to convince the com-
munity that it is worthwhile to continue investing in and cooperating with the crime
prevention program.
Specifically, evaluation can help the practitioner-manager to:

• Measure the degree of progress toward specific objectives and toward the general
goal of reducing crime;
• Identify weak and strong points of program operations and suggest changes;
• Compare efficiency and effectiveness of existing program activities with other
possible program activities;
• Challenge underlying program assumptions and improve the quality of program
objectives;
• Suggest new procedures and approaches;
• Provide for timely recognition of negative program effects;
• Help establish priorities for resource allocation;
• Increase public support for successful approaches and reduce emphasis on
unsuccessful approaches;
• Provide standards against which to measure achievement; and
• Develop a critical attitude among staff and advisory personnel, and increase
communication and coordination among them.

It is also important to understand some of the things that should not be con-
sidered as part of the purpose of evaluation. Edward Suchman1 has compiled a list
of the undesirable purposes for which evaluation is often used.

Eyewash—an attempt to justify a program by evaluating only those parts of it that

look good.
Whitewash—an attempt to cover up program failure or errors by avoiding any objec-
tive appraisal and relying instead on unsolicited testimonials.
Submarine—an attempt to torpedo a program regardless of its worth in order to get
rid of it.
Posturing—an attempt to use evaluation to impress others with the program’s
scientific approach and the professionalism of its staff.
 Evaluating Impact 185

Postponement—an attempt to delay action by pretending to seek the facts in hopes

that a storm of protest will blow over by the time the study is completed.
Substitution—an attempt to cloud over or disguise failure in an essential part of the
program by shifting attention to a less relevant but more defensible program
part.

Such pseudo-evaluative tactics may have political uses, at times, but have no rela-
tionship whatsoever with the true purpose of impact evaluation. However, they may
be confused with proper impact evaluation both in the mind of the practitioner and
in the minds of those to whom evaluative information is presented.
It behooves the practitioner-manager to evaluate honestly, for his overriding
concern should be the quality, strength, and results of his program. Politics may be
important to program survival in the short term, but in the long run, only program
results count.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Stripped of its professional jargon, the impact evaluation approach consists of

systematically linking cause with effect. Thus, the evaluation process is basically
no different than the process of developing an unbroken chain of evidence to
link a suspect with a crime. In the case of the crime prevention program, the causes
are opportunity reduction efforts by (or on behalf of) potential victims, and the
effects are changes in crime patterns that result from those opportunity reduction
activities.
It is not enough, however, to compare general causes and general effects. For
example, if we determine from police offense reports that the opportunity rate
of residential burglary in a given neighborhood is 100 per 1,000 homes, and if
we develop a Neighborhood Watch program in that neighborhood along with
security survey and other services, and a year later we determine, again from police
offense reports, that the opportunity rate has dropped to 50 per 1,000 homes,
can we conclude that our program has reduced residential burglary in that neigh-
borhood by 50 percent? The answer, of course, is no, because we do not have con-
clusive cause-and-effect evidence, only circumstantial evidence, and our case in
“evaluation court” can easily be destroyed by our inability to answer questions such
as the following:

• What was the actual rate of residential burglary prior to and after your program
(i.e., how reliable an indicator of the total burglary problem was your summary
of reported burglary)?
• What was the actual rate of participation in the burglary prevention program (how
many residences complied with security survey recommendations, and what was
the nature and quality of citizen reports during the program)?
 186 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Can you prove that events, unrelated to the program, did not cause the apparent
reduction (for example, increased police patrol, installation of streetlights,
changes in neighborhood population, the economy, traffic patterns, and the
weather)?
• Did displacement occur (i.e., did burglars simply shift their operations to an
adjacent neighborhood)?
• Did the decrease occur because of efforts by the residents themselves or simply
because of the presence of crime prevention program staff in the neighborhood?

On the other hand, if reported burglary in the neighborhood increased by 50

percent, could we conclude that our program did not work? The answer, again, is no.
We might have stimulated much higher levels of reporting and thus created a sta-
tistical crime wave. Unrelated local, regional, and national conditions might have
been a factor. Police patrol might have decreased. Or, the average loss might have
decreased substantially. Thus, the general, circumstantial approach to cause-and-
effect linkage is of little value in honest evaluation.

Direct Factors

The first thing we need to do in constructing the evaluative cause-and-effect chain

is to determine all of the factors that go into it. Then we must develop reasonable
methods for measuring all of those factors.
Pre-program crime patterns need to be clearly understood if we are to
develop and implement an effective strategy, let alone accurately determine the
outcome of that strategy. So, for the type of crime and the targets of that crime we
wish to deal with, we must obtain historical crime data in at least the following
dimensions:

• Reported versus actual crime. We must always anticipate that the total
incidence of crime will be greater than the reported incidence. We must also
anticipate that one of the effects of any crime prevention project may be to
increase the reporting rate. In order to make this necessary baseline measure-
ment, some form of citizen victimization data survey is needed as a comparison
with police offense report data (both types of information are discussed in
Chapter 8).
• Attempted versus successful crime. Because the usual crime statistics
reports do not discriminate between successful and unsuccessful crime attempts, it
is useful to make a special effort to extract this comparison data from offense reports
and victimization surveys.
• Types and amounts of loss. Also obtainable from a combination of
offense reports and victimization surveys, this type of data is useful in before-after
comparisons.
 Evaluating Impact 187

• Methods of attack may be analyzed from offense reports and victimiza-

tion survey data, and used in before-after crime pattern comparisons.
• Reporting patterns. As distinct from the reported versus actual crime
comparison, the actual patterns of reports can provide useful comparison data. Police
dispatch records can provide information on such things as percent of reports made
by non-victims and delay time between incident and report.

Program performance data provides the next major link in the cause-effect
chain. As discussed in Chapter 9, such information should be collected as part of
the project management function and should include, in addition to simple activity
counts:

• Acceptance rates or the extent to which persons in the target population both
participate in some way and comply with the recommendations made by project
staff;
• Reporting patterns directly connected with the project (surveillance and report-
ing activities in Neighborhood Watch, for example) should be measured in terms
of quality, quantity, and direct result;
• Law enforcement response is another important project performance dimen-
sion, particularly for citizen crime reporting types of projects such as Neighbor-
hood Watch. How do police dispatch personnel handle citizen reports? How do
patrol units respond? Is feedback provided to project participants? etc.; and
• Related social and physical changes, such as modified street lighting, removal
of barriers to visibility, citizen patrol activities, and other efforts aimed at secur-
ing the general project environment should be carefully documented.

The disciplined collection of program performance data is perhaps the single

most important part of impact evaluation. Not only is it a crucial link in the cause-
and-effect chain (What happened as a direct result of our project activities?), it is
also an excellent way to reinforce the all-important habit of routine program self-
examination.
Post-program crime patterns will involve the same kind of measure-
ments described for pre-project crime patterns with one additional feature—
displacement. In order to measure displacement as a project outcome (either in its
presence or its absence) it will be necessary to conduct pre- and post-project crime
pattern measurement in areas adjacent to the project target area, and it will
be desirable to perform such measurement in selected areas distant from the
project area.

Indirect Factors

As we have discussed, the cause-and-effect chain may be influenced by factors that

have no direct relationship to the project itself. Such factors include:
 188 Understanding Crime Prevention

• Changes in police patrol patterns;

• Major physical changes such as citywide or area-wide installation of improved
street lighting, new commercial or residential construction, and alterations in
traffic flow patterns;
• Major economic changes in areas such as unemployment, commercial activity,
inflation and recession;
• Seasonal variations in climate;
• Other yearly pattern changes such as school vacations;
• Changes in legal definitions of crimes;
• Major jurisdiction-wide crime scares and anti-crime promotions; and
• Changes in criminal activity patterns in adjacent jurisdictions.

Any such factors, which are not part of the project strategy or not under control
of project management, must be identified and, to the extent possible, their poten-
tial effects on the cause-and-effect chain understood.
Some factors, such as changes in police patrol patterns or major physical
changes affecting the project area, are best dealt with by anticipation. The practi-
tioner should make it a point early in the project design phase to establish relation-
ship with public agencies and other groups that might instigate physical change, and
either allow for such planned change in the project design or persuade those respon-
sible to delay the planned activity until the project can be assessed. Possible changes
in police patrol patterns may be handled through cooperative negotiations with the
chief law enforcement officer and his patrol commanders so that every effort is made
to minimize such change during the project period.

Control Group

Other factors, such as major economic change, climate change, and other periodic
variations, jurisdiction-wide crime promotions, and changes in the crime patterns of
adjacent jurisdictions are best handled by setting up a control group. A control group
is an area or population group, located at a reasonable distance from the project area
or group, which displays social, physical, economic, and crime pattern characteris-
tics similar to the project area or group. Pre- and post-measurement is conducted for
the control group in the same manner as for the project group, and crime pattern
changes in the control group are, in essence, subtracted from the results measured
for the project group. Through this technique, major, jurisdiction-wide changes in
crime patterns may be isolated from the actual project results.
The use of control groups is a key concept of evaluation, because it may be
the only way to conclusively demonstrate that observed effects in a target area or
target population can be attributed to program activities and not to any other cause.
Back in “evaluation court,” we can imagine the conscientious program manager—
who has just laid out an excellent cause-and-effect chain linking program activities
 Evaluating Impact 189

with specific results—being devastated by the question, “That’s very interesting, but
how do you know for sure that it wouldn’t have happened anyway?”
Ideally, data from a control group that has not been exposed to program activ-
ities can be used to answer this question. In the laboratory, for example, a scientist
can randomly divide his mice into two groups—one to receive the experimental treat-
ment and one to be left alone. He or she can then readily compare the treated to the
untreated mice. Unfortunately, such a clean matching of control and experimental
groups is seldom possible in the real world. Even more difficult, considering the
community-wide thrust of many elements in a crime prevention program, is the
matter of finding a control group that can be “left alone” by the program or by related
activity over which the practitioner has no control.
Despite the difficulties inherent in the control group concept, the practitioner-
manager should attempt to establish such groups where possible, because even a
rough idea of what might have happened in absence of program activities is better
than no idea at all.

SPECIFIC IMPACTS

From before-during-and-after measurements such as described above, a number of

specific kinds of results can be determined.

Reported crime may increase as a percentage of total crime. While this may be
embarrassing to explain, it is a logical consequence of increased citizen
concern for and participation in crime prevention programs. If total crime
incidence can be measured or estimated through victimization surveys, it may
be possible to show increases in reported crime as positive, rather than nega-
tive, effects of the program.
Reporting of crime may change in significant ways. Ability to measure such
changes can document significant project results such as:

• More reports of crimes-in-progress;

• More reports by observers in addition to victims;
• Less time between the occurrence of the crime and the report; and
• More feedback and cooperation between citizens who make reports and police
who dispatch or respond to those reports.

Crime success ratios are a subtle, but useful indicator of program impact. In theory,
an effective crime prevention project should lead to increasing proportions of
failed attempts compared to total crimes committees. This change may be of
more significance than changes in the numbers of total attempts.
Total and average losses from criminal attack may change significantly. The total
or average loss might decline more steeply than the crime rate, or even the
 190 Understanding Crime Prevention

crime success rate. In any case, loss is as important a dimension of crime

prevention program results as the crime incidence itself.
Fear and concern for crime may change as a direct result of the program. If citi-
zens feel more secure and comfortable, the program has had a significant
impact.
Displacement (that is, geographic, temporal, or crime mode) can be a good indica-
tor of program impact, even if there is no net reduction in total crime. The fact
that the crime prevention program can significantly change crime patterns is
certainly an indication of the success of specific strategies. The next step in
such a situation is to follow the displacement pattern with additional specific
strategies. On the other hand, if no displacement occurs—or is less in quan-
tity or effect than the target-specific crime reduction that produced it—then
the program has resulted in a net crime reduction.
Citizen participation can be related to program impact if care is taken to measure
the kind and quality of participation. In the long run, the degree to which
people accept and use security procedures, devices, and informal social control
mechanisms, and participate in organized approaches to altering the physical
environment, determines the impact of crime prevention.
Police participation can also be a significant indicator. If interest in crime preven-
tion practice and police/citizen cooperation becomes manifested throughout
the local criminal justice structure, the most likely result will be a gradual
refocusing of law enforcement priorities toward prevention as a primary means
of reducing crime. This also has very high long-range value.

TOTAL IMPACT

As was pointed out in Chapter 8, the beginning community-wide crime prevention

program cannot and should not attempt to prevent all crimes for all groups in
all places. The strategic approach dictates action priorities, which are a reasonable
mix of the crime problems themselves, the concerns of citizens, and the resources
available for the program. Total impact, therefore, must be carefully defined as
that which can reasonably be expected to result from the specific program strategies,
not as that which might be hoped for over the life of the program. Crime prevention
programs will fail almost by definition if they are forced to prove their worth in a
global impact sense during any specific time interval. The crime prevention program
can bear fruit, but it must be judged on a strategy-by-strategy, year-by-year basis.
If crime prevention works at all, it works in the most specific crime/target situation
possible, and it is only by gradually building a wider and wider circle of effective
prevention situations over time that crime prevention develops its community-wide
impact.
The kinds of specific results described above can be used both to inform
program decision-makers and to build support for the program. But it is essential
that the crime prevention practitioner condition those to whom he reports to expect
 Evaluating Impact 191

a series of specific impact indicators rather than impact statements of global

generality.
On the other hand, where the cause-and-effect chain produces enough specific
impact indicators to justify statements of across-the-board crime reduction, the prac-
titioner should not hesitate to make such statements.

EVALUATION RESOURCES

True evaluative research, with its emphasis on scientific rigor, extensive statistical
analysis and precision of results can probably only be conducted in those few situ-
ations where the crime prevention program or some of its projects are deliberately
designed to be experimental in nature, and where a large part of the resources avail-
able to the program are earmarked for evaluation. However, the information needs
and measurement techniques described above can be fulfilled to an adequate degree
of accuracy within the range of resources available to the average jurisdiction-wide
program.
In addition to project management and staff, who should use every opportu-
nity to learn about crime analysis and relatively unsophisticated evaluation tech-
niques,2 other resources for both the design and conduct of evaluation processes may
be conveniently available. Such potential resources include, but are not limited to
the following.

Crime analysis units in many law enforcement agencies possess a significant capa-
bility for supporting the crime prevention program. Energizing this resource
may require no more than a series of detailed discussions between project staff
and crime analysis unit staff through which the specific information needs of
the crime prevention program may be identified.
Urban planning units in city government may possess most of the resources needed
to design an evaluation process and conduct the analysis of data.
Departments of business, criminal justice, or social sciences at nearby colleges
and universities may be an excellent source of evaluation support. In addition
to the expertise needed to design the evaluation process and help analyze
information, such departments may have undergraduate or graduate students
who can directly assist in information collection and analysis through intern-
ship programs, required research assignments, and dissertation requirements
for advanced degrees. Also, such students may be available to work for
nominal sums outside of the formal academic structure.
Marketing organizations in local banks, advertising agencies, insurance compa-
nies, or manufacturing firms may be able to help in the design, conduct, and
analysis phases of crime prevention evaluation as a public service.
Chambers of commerce can sometimes locate members who have appropriate
expertise in the areas needed by the crime prevention program.
 192 Understanding Crime Prevention

Civic groups and volunteer organizations may be able to furnish workers to

conduct surveys, extract information from offense reports, and other labor-
intensive evaluative applications.
State and local agencies in the criminal justice or human services, or housing and
urban development areas may be able to provide consulting services, computer
services or other resources.
Evaluation consultants may be employed—not so much to conduct the entire eval-
uation, which can be very expensive, but to provide a few days of professional
time during the design phase and to consult occasionally thereafter as the
evaluation process unfolds. Consultants can be extremely useful as evaluation
program designers and trouble-shooters.

Finally, state crime prevention program agencies, as well as NCPI, can provide
evaluation training or technical assistance or both. The practitioner should make
every effort to use these resources.

CONCLUSION

As was discussed in chapters 7, 8, and 9, community crime prevention programs can

develop and implement a wide range of strategies, which can have many different
effects on crime patterns. As the program unfolds, evaluation can play a crucial role
in guiding selection of the most effective techniques, as well as in providing needed
planning and management information and in maintaining and improving the base
of community support for the program. While few local programs will have access
to the kinds of resources needed to develop complex and sophisticated evaluation
approaches, any program can do much to assess its own impact through specific
cause and effect linkages, providing that program management develops and main-
tains an intense critical interest in the results of the program.
Techniques used in evaluation need not be highly accurate, but they must be
capable of developing a wide range of measurements—since it is very clear that
there exists no simple set of indicators, which will provide all the answers. Individ-
ual indicators of impact are useful in themselves, and may be, but do not have to be,
sufficiently powerful en masse to prove significant general impact.
Finally, the resources potentially available in any community to help in the
evaluation process may only be limited by the imagination of project personnel, if
they are willing to seek such help in a wholehearted fashion.
 11
The Potential of
Crime Prevention

We have discussed, in admittedly brief fashion, what crime prevention is, where it
came from, and how it works at every level from the focused task of providing crime
risk management guidance to individual clients to the complex job of organizing a
comprehensive, community-wide crime prevention program. We have shown that
opportunity reduction, though complementary with other kinds of crime control
activities, nevertheless represents a very distinct break with past theories of crime
control.
Crime prevention is, above all else, a management approach to crime control.
It deals with the practical, everyday realities of our environment. It says that physi-
cal and procedural arrangements, and personal and social behavior can either encour-
age or discourage crime. Since we do have the choice, says crime prevention, why
not discourage crime?
Many people still ask that crime prevention prove itself workable before they
will support it. It is not unreasonable to ask for proof. On the other hand, in order
to test the effectiveness of crime prevention one must assume that it can work, for
success in crime prevention depends on one’s ability to convince others to properly
apply crime risk management principles. Crime prevention rests on the activist
assumption that potential victims can reduce their own crime risks—if provided with
adequate guidance and support. Crime prevention is no passive thing that society
can leave up to the police, the courts, the jails, or the rehabilitation specialists.

193
 194 Understanding Crime Prevention

Once we accept the idea of crime prevention, we can begin to develop appro-
priate strategies and techniques. To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, some people
look at crime and ask, “Why?” Crime prevention practitioners look at the potential
for reducing criminal opportunity, and ask, “Why not?”
Our country has a magnificent record of achievement based on “Why nots?”
Why not establish a constitutionally-base, democratic republic and make it work?
Why not develop an almost frightening ability to overcome material problems
through a superb technology? Why not put a man on the moon? Why not prevent
contagious disease? Why not feed our people and provide them with standards of
living unmatched anywhere in the world? So, why not roll up our sleeves and tackle
the task of reducing crime?
But, we must give the critics their due. Crime preventers, up to now, have pro-
ceeded so powerfully on faith and conviction that they have not often stopped to
verify the assumptions, prove the case, and in general mold crime prevention knowl-
edge and experience into a comprehensive, reliable technology. Although there have
been a number of recent evaluations of various crime prevention strategies the total
impact of crime prevention has not been measured. Much of crime prevention’s
current power lies in the firm conviction that most practitioners and adherents bring
to their tasks, and the techniques they use are “tried and true,” building on the
successes of the past.
On the other hand, crime prevention’s grass-roots appeal is probably the best
possible indicator of its ultimate validity. People, whether as practitioners, support-
ers or volunteers, are working nights and weekends all over the country to bring forth
crime prevention projects and programs. Governors and other powerful individuals
are investing priceless political capital in their support of crime prevention cam-
paigns. An ever-growing number of powerful national associations (The American
Association of Retired Persons, The National Exchange Club, Kiwanis International,
U.S. Jaycees, Boy Scouts of America, American Bar Association, National Sheriffs’
Association, International Congress of Building Officials, American Society for
Industrial Security, Service Corps of Retired Executives, Association of Junior
Leagues, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Burglar and Fire Alarm Associa-
tion, National Retail Merchants Association, International Association of Chiefs of
Police, and The American Management Associations, among others) have adopted
crime prevention initiatives, projects, and programs as priority activity focuses for
their national and local membership efforts.
Practitioners themselves are becoming a powerful force. Thousands of indi-
viduals have now received at least basic training in the practice of crime prevention
and are operating in law enforcement and civilian-based programs at the local, state,
and national level all over the country. An international organization called the Inter-
national Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners (ISCPP) was formed to provide
a focal point for professional activities. In addition, most of the states have statewide
crime prevention officers associations in existence or under development.
Most states have a statewide crime prevention program underway. Private
industry, too, through the American Society for Industrial Security and other
 The Potential of Crime Prevention 195

industry-oriented groups is beginning to take an active role in crime prevention.

Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce,
and, of course, the Department of Justice are also developing specific or compre-
hensive thrusts in the crime prevention area. The Department of Justice has contin-
ued to sponsor the efforts of the National Crime Prevention Council, which conducts
a national media campaign, annual seminars, and many other services.
Industry, too, is rapidly entering the crime prevention picture. The private
security field is developing a host of cooperative arrangements with public crime
prevention programs. The insurance industry has made strides in the area of crime
insurance premium discounts for clients who apply crime risk management princi-
ples. Oil and automobile companies are working to reduce auto theft. Computer
companies are concerned with data security and all forms of cyber-crime. The con-
struction industry is working to reduce crime at construction sites. The health indus-
try is developing methods to reduce victimization at hospitals and medical
complexes. Hotel and motel chains are becoming more security conscious. These
and many more such examples indicate the great potential willingness on the part
of the private sector to work with crime prevention programs.
Finally, professionals in the social and behavioral sciences and in the physical
planning sciences are taking an active interest in the various applications of crime
prevention through environmental design.
It is extremely significant that such a volume and variety of interest and effort
should have arisen in so short a time before national seminars, campaigns, and infor-
mation sharing became the norm. Uniquely among large-scale social change move-
ments of the past few decades, crime prevention has neither been started nor
sustained by national political initiatives, nor has it been the object of great out-
pourings of federal funds that have characterized the move toward community polic-
ing or the national campaigns toward curing specific diseases.
The virtual explosion of grass-roots interest in crime prevention has been the
primary factor in the quickening pace with which state and national organizations
and government agencies are developing outreach, service, and financial support
programs. We believe that the American public is demanding crime prevention, and
that the state and national organizations mentioned here are quite sensibly respond-
ing to that demand.
Still, there are many who wonder if crime prevention is really no more than a
passing fad—a will-of-the-wisp that will blow away. And, they have a point. As we
have seen in this volume, crime prevention is a simple, practical idea—a great idea,
really, but it can only fulfill its promise through hard, diligent, strategic work at many
levels. Those who feel that the potential of crime prevention can be realized through
promotional campaigns and general application of a few standard types of projects
are misguided, to say the least.
The crime prevention field in the United States is still a growing and rapidly
changing area of knowledge. The current state-of-the-art is highly developmental in
nature and is characterized by much activity and experimentation and relatively little
scientific documentation. Technological advances are changing the face of crime
 196 Understanding Crime Prevention

prevention and should continue to do so for the foreseeable future. As the number
increases of local, state, and national governmental agencies and non-governmental
organizations desiring to establish or participate in crime prevention programs, and
as current program managers reach for higher levels of program effectiveness, a great
demand is created for usable knowledge. And this is as it should be. At some point
in the evolution of any field of activity, the initial excitement and experimentation
begins to give way to demand for reliable performance criteria and standards, for
organization of what is known into readily adaptable packages, and for documented
proof that recommended methods and approaches will work. It is at this point that
the field begins to get organized.
The challenge falls squarely on the shoulders of crime prevention practition-
ers and organizations such as NCPI. We must continue to organize the knowledge
of crime prevention and provide proof that crime prevention strategies will work. In
no other way will the field get organized, stay organized and develop the powerful,
disciplined technology to augment the strength of this existing, creative approach.
It would be unreasonable to hope that we can provide absolute security against
criminal attack in American life. However, in time, we can hope to manage crime in
the same way that contagious disease is managed through strategies, which reduce
its current opportunities and contain and limit its new outbreaks. Through this man-
agement of crime, we can also hope to increase and improve the well being of people
everywhere. Fulfillment of these hopes is the end product of all of the crime pre-
vention practitioner’s efforts. But, to even begin the task, practitioners must master
the current knowledge and skills of this practice of crime prevention, and work
steadily to improve the quality of that knowledge and those skills.
This volume presents, an organized compendium of current crime prevention
knowledge and skills. It is our hope that the development and refinement of knowl-
edge in this field will be so rapid as to force frequent updates. It is our intention to
keep in touch with the continual discovery of new knowledge, to sift this knowl-
edge, integrate what is of value and discard what is no longer meaningful, to publish
this ongoing synthesis, and disseminate it to practitioners everywhere. To accom-
plish this aim, we must rely on you, the practitioner, to not only generate and refine
knowledge through your own experience, but also to share it with us. Please keep
us informed of your discoveries as you practice crime prevention.
Understanding Crime Prevention is not the last word, but rather a step
in a continuing effort to assemble, refine, and publish the knowledge of crime
prevention.
 Appendix
A
Index Crime
Definitions Uniform
Crime Reporting
Federal Bureau of
Investigation

VIOLENT CRIMES:

1. Criminal Homicide.
1a. Criminal Homicide: Murder and non-negligent manslaughter—The willful
(non-negligent) killing of one human being by another
1b. Criminal Homicide: Manslaughter by negligence—The killing of another
person through gross negligence
2. Rape—The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
2a. Rape by Force
2b. Attempts to commit forcible rape
3. Robbery—The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care,
custody, or control of a person or persons by force, threat of force, or violence,
or by putting the victim in fear.
3a. Robbery—Firearm
3b. Robbery—Knife or other cutting instrument
3c. Robbery—Other dangerous weapon
3d. Robbery—Strong-arm (hands, fists, feet, etc.)

197
 198 Understanding Crime Prevention

4. Aggravated Assault—An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the
purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault is
usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to produce
death or great bodily harm. (Attempts are included since it is not necessary that
an injury result when a gun, knife, or other weapon is used which could and
probably would result in serious personal injury if the crime were successfully
completed.)
4a. Assault—Firearm
4b. Assault—Knife or cutting instrument
4c. Assault—Other dangerous weapon
4d. Assault—Hands, fists, feet, etc. with aggravated injury
4e. Other Assaults—Simple, not aggravated. (Counted with Assaults, but not
the Crime Index)

PROPERTY CRIMES:

5. Burglary (Breaking or Entering)—The unlawful entry of a structure to commit

a felony or a theft.
5a. Burglary—Forcible entry
5b. Burglary—Unlawful entry, no force
5c. Burglary—Attempted forcible entry
6. Larceny Theft—The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of prop-
erty from the possession or constructive possession of another.
6a. Larceny Theft—Pocket-picking
6b. Larceny Theft—Purse snatching
6c. Larceny Theft—Shoplifting
6d. Larceny Theft—Thefts from Motor Vehicles (except theft of motor vehicle
parts and accessories)
6e. Larceny Theft—Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories
6f. Larceny Theft—Theft of Bicycles
6g. Larceny Theft—Theft from Buildings
6h. Larceny Theft—Theft from Coin-operated Device or Machines
6i. Larceny Theft—All other larceny, theft not specifically classified
7. Motor Vehicle Theft—The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle.
7a. Motor Vehicle Theft—Autos
7b. Motor Vehicle Theft—Trucks and buses
7c. Motor Vehicle Theft—Other vehicles
8. Arson—Any willful or malicious burning or attempt to burn, with or without
intent to defraud, a house, public building, motor vehicle or aircraft, personal
property of another.
8a–g. Arson—Structural
8h–I. Arson—Mobile
8j. Arson—Other
 References

CHAPTER 1

1. C. Ray Jefferey, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Sage

Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif. p. 20.

CHAPTER 2

1. Walter McQuade, Cities Fit to Live In, Macmillan Co., New York, 1971, p.
5–19.
2. F.W. Hudson, “Crime Prevention—Past and Present (Part 1),” Security Gazette,
August 1974, p. 292.
3. Edwin N. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Criminology, 9th Edition, J.B.
Lippincott Co., New York, 1974, p. 300.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, p. 301.
6. Harry Keeney, “Building Security Code,” NCPI Hotline February 1977. (Note
original source of Hammurabi’s Code provided by the Masonry Institute, San
Francisco, California.)
7. Holy Bible, Book of “Leviticus,” Chapter 5, Verse 1 and Chapter 24, Verses
17–20.

199
 200 Understanding Crime Prevention

8. C. Ray Jefferey, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Sage Pub-

lications, Beverly Hills, California, p. 17–25, 85, 167–187.
9. Op. cit., Hudson, p. 292.
10. Ibid.
11. NCPI Four Week Course Class Notebook with historical material compiled by
Doyle Shackelford, NCPI staff member. Specific reference here from Inspec-
tor Ronald Dawson, Home Office Crime Prevention Center, Stafford, England,
History of Police Service, p. 3.
12. Ibid, p. 5.
13. Op. cit., Hudson, p. 293.
14. Ibid, p. 294.
15. Richard Post and Arthur Kingsbury, Security Administration, 3rd Edition,
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill., 1977, p. 32–34.
16. “The History and Development of the National Crime Prevention Institute,”
NCPI Bulletin, January/February 1976, Vol. IV, No. 4.
17. Ibid.
18. NCPI Four Week Course Class Notebook.
19. The FBI’s Crime Prevention program is illustrated in the FBI publication
Crime Resistance, USGPO, 1975.
20. HUD’s interest in crime prevention is reflected in such exemplary documents
as A Design Guide for Improving Residential Security written for HUD by
Oscar Newman, USGPO, 1973.
21. The National Sheriff’s Association was the original sponsor of Neighborhood
Watch.
22. Op. cit., Security Administration, p. 35.
23. Op. cit., Jefferey, p. 24.
24. Ibid.
25. Op. cit., Sutherland and Cressey, p. 7, 350, 410, 438, 440–443.
26. Op. cit., Jefferey, p. 98–104; op. cit. Sutherland and Cressey, p. 49, 55–56.
27. Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, A Theory of
Delinquent Gangs, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, p. 108–109.
28. Op. cit., Jefferey, p. 214–225.
29. Op. cit., Jefferey, p. 19; Wilbur Rykert, “Crime is a Thief’s Business, Preven-
tion is Yours,” in Deterrence of Crime In and Around Residences, NILECJ,
1973, p. 66–77.
30. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals,
Report on Police, LEAA, 1973, p. 9.
31. Ibid, p. 9–11.
32. Ibid, p. 120; also author’s estimate from numerous discussions with police
officers attending programs at NCPI.
 References 201

CHAPTER 3

1. Interview of Richard Mellard during his teaching visit at NCPI in December

1977.
2. Arthur A. Kingsbury, Introduction to Security and Crime Prevention Surveys,
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1973, Chapter 1.
3. Michael T. Farmer, Police Direct Crime Prevention, State of the Art and Direc-
tions for the Future; see also Assessing Criminal Justice Projects: Findings
from the National Evaluation Program (Executive Summary), NILECJ, 1977.
4. Carl L. Cunningham, et al., The National Sheriff’s Association National Neigh-
borhood Watch Program, Midwest Research Institute, 1974.
5. Ibid, p. 9.
6. Ibid, p. 2–3.
7. Thomas Reppetto, Residential Crime, Ballinger Press, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, 1974, p. 72. Here Reppetto implies a possible relationship between
increase in burglary in Boston with increase in number of drug addicts.
8. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Vintage Books,
New York, 1961.
9. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Executive office of
Weed and Seed, Weed and Seed Best Practices, 1999, pp. 1–5.
10. Thomas Reppetto, “Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon,”
Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 1976, p. 166–168; Arnold
Sagalyn, et al., Residential Security, NILECJ, Monograph Series, 1973,
Chapter 1.
11. Ibid, Sagalyn, p. 7.
12. Paul Cirel, et al., Seattle Study, An Exemplary Project: Community Crime
Prevention Program, Seattle, Washington, NILECJ, September 1977.
13. Ibid, p. 51.
14. Op. cit., Cunningham, p. 10.
15. John Conklin, Impact of Crime, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1975,
p. 249.
16. Ibid, p. 141.
17. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Elements of CPTED; “Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Policy,” American Political Scientist, Vol. 20, No. 2,
November/December 1976.
18. Op. cit., Farmer, p. 20.
19. Ibid.
20. Richard S. Post and Arthur Kingsbury, Security Administration, Third Edition,
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1977, p. 6, 35–36.
21. Ibid, p. 6–7.
22. Oscar Newman, A Design Guide for Improving Residential Security, HUD,
1973, p. 3.
23. “The History and Development of the National Crime Prevention Insti-
tute,”NCPI Bulletin, January/February 1976.
 202 Understanding Crime Prevention

CHAPTER 4

1. NCPI Class Notebook. See O.C. Foster’s presentation of “Crime Risk Man-
agement.” See also Richard B. Cole, Protection Management & Crime Pre-
vention, W.H. Anderson Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1974, p. 13–31.
2. Ibid, O.C. Foster.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

1. “Building Security Codes,” NCPI Hotline, National Crime Prevention Insti-

tute, Louisville, Kentucky, February 1977 issue.
2. Thad L. Webber, Alarm Systems and Theft Protection, Security World Pub-
lishing Co. Inc., Los Angeles, California, 1973, p. 179.
3. Douglas W. Frisbie, et. al., Crime in Minneapolis, Proposals for Preven-
tion, Governor’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, St. Paul,
Minnesota, 1977.
4. Ibid, p. 232–235.
5. O.C. Foster, An Introduction to Retail Security, NCPI Classroom Handout,
p. 4.

The majority of the material used in the Electronic Security section of this chapter
was adapted from classroom material prepared by Carl Kellem, MSEE, and updated
by NCPI Staff.

CHAPTER 6

1. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals,

Report on Police, p. 129.
2. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Vintage Books,
New York, 1961, No. 3.
3. Lee Rainwater, “Fear and the Home-as-Haven in the Lower Class,” Journal of
the American Institute of Planners, January 1966, p. 23–37.
4. Elizabeth Wood, Housing Design, A Social Theory, Citizens’ Housing and
Planning Counsel of New York, Inc., New York, 1961.
5. Schlomo Angel, Discouraging Crime Through City Planning, University of
California, Berkeley, 1968.
6. Gerald Leudtke and E. Lystad, Crime in the Physical City, Final Report, LEAA
Grant No. NI 69-078, 1970.
7. Newman-Rand study (1969), published by Oscar Newman, Defensible Space,
Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1972.
 References 203

8. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Urban Design,

Security and Crime, Proceedings of a seminar held April 12–13, 1972, pub-
lished by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), p. 15.
9. Thomas A. Reppetto, Residential Crime, Ballinger Publishing Co., Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1974.
10. John Conklin, The Impact of Crime, Macmillan Co., New York, 1975, p. 299.
11. C. Ray Jefferey, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1971.
12. C. Ray Jefferey, “Behavior Control Techniques and Criminology: 1975–2075,”
Ecology Youth Development Workshop, University of Hawaii School of Social
Work, Honolulu, December 1975.
13. Op. cit., Newman, p. 51–52.
14. Ibid.
15. Oscar Newman, Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space, LEAA,
Washington, D.C., 1976.
16. Ronald L. Robidas, “Reports on Activity in Project Area for the Manchester
(NH) Police Department,” 1996.
17. American Architecture Foundation, Back from the Brink, Saving America’s
Cities By Design, 56 Min, AAF, 1996, videocasette.

CHAPTER 7

1. John E. Conklin, The Impact of Crime, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York,
1975, p. 131.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Alicia Christian, The Community’s Stake in Crime Prevention: A Guide for
Action, The Center for Community Change, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 28–30.
6. “Developing Citizen Participation,” NCPI Hotline, National Crime Prevention
Institute, Louisville, Kentucky, August 1977 issue.
7. Donald L. Warren and Rachelle B. Warren, The Neighborhood Organizer’s
Handbook, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1977, Chapter
5.
8. Ibid, Chapter 4.
9. The importance of small groups to local crime prevention efforts is further
discussed in these sources: Ed Good, “Citizen Initiative Programs,” paper pre-
sented at the National Crime Prevention Institute’s Program on Community
Crime Prevention in Louisville, Kentucky, June 1977; and Lois Mock, “Citizen
Crime Prevention Programs: Some Implications of Past Research,” presented
at LEAA’s Community Crime Prevention Conference, Washington, D.C., July
1977. Also read Sy Rosenthal’s “Turf Reclamation: An Approach to Neigh-
borhood Security,” HUD Challenge, March 1974.
 204 Understanding Crime Prevention

CHAPTER 8

1. Crime in Minneapolis: Proposals for Prevention, Governor’s Commission on

Crime Prevention and Control, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 1977, p. 11–12.
2. A useful reference on developing a crime analysis capability is Police Crime
Analysis Unit Handbook, published by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in 1973. Crime in Minneapolis, referenced above, provides
excellent practical information on crime prevention-oriented crime analysis,
as does: An Exemplary Project-Community Crime Prevention Program,
Seattle, Washington, published in 1977 by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration.
3. Op. cit., Crime in Minneapolis, p. 26–27.
4. Ibid.

CHAPTER 9

1. 1974 Criminal Justice Plan for Texas, Office of the Governor, Austin, Texas,
1974, p. 157.
2. Foundation Directory, 2000 Edition, compiled and published by the Founda-
tion Center, New York, 2000.

CHAPTER 10

1. Edward A. Suchman, Evaluation Research-Principles and Practices in Public

Service and Social Action Programs, Russell Sage Foundation, New York,
1967, p. 143.
2. For further information on unsophisticated evaluation techniques, see refer-
ences cited under Reference 2, Chapter 8.
 Index

Acceptance rates, 177 Barriers

Access openings, miscellaneous, 79 boundary markers as, 60–62
Access systems, perimeter, 64–79 burglary-resistive, 81
Action fire-resistive, 81–82
group, 27–31 high-security, 81–82
individual, 24–27 internal, 79–82
Activity cost, 175 low-security, 80–81
Activity counts, 175 perimeter, 62–79
Activity unit, cost by, 176 robbery-resistive, 81
Agencies, role of local government, 35–36 BAWP (Block Association of West
Alarms, false, 97–98 Philadelphia), 145–46
Aluminum frames, 71 Block Association of West Philadelphia
America, crime prevention in, 14–16 (BAWP), 145–46
American life, security against criminal BOCA (Building Officials and Code
attack in, 196 Administrators), 82
Assault, safety from intruder, 99–101 Bolt mechanisms, 73–74
Asset control, 101–7 Boundary markers as barriers, 60–62
Association role. national, 38–39 Budgeting, 173–74
Associations, role of practitioners’ Building
statewide, 38 code review, 119
Attack methods, crime, 162 professions and trades, 35
Awareness strategies, 138–40 security codes, 82

205
 206 Index

Building Officials and Code Administrators neighborhoods lacking, 144–46

(BOCA), 82 Commission on the Accreditation of Law
Burglary-resistive barriers, 81 Enforcement Agencies (CALEA),
Business community, role of, 37 118
Communications industry role, 36–37
CALEA (Commission on the Accreditation Community
of Law Enforcement Agencies), 118 role of business, 37
Cameras transition from client to, 114
film, 85 Community programs
surveillance, 84 –86 managing, 171–81
video, 85–86 financial and other resources, 173–74
Cash control, 103–4 impact measures, 178
Cause and effect, 185–89 performance and cost control
control groups, 188–89 measures, 174–78
direct factors, 186–87 personnel resources, 172–73
indirect factors, 187–88 reporting mechanisms, 180
Characteristics, suspect, 162–63 work assignments, 179–80
Circle of protection, 59 planning, 151–69
Citizen organizations, role of, 37 defining crime problems and priorities,
Citizen participation, developing, 133–49 156–64
citizen participation strategies, 138–46 designing organizations, 152–56
citizen-police cooperation, 133–35 developing program objectives, 164–69
model approach to neighborhood Community representatives, interviews
organization, 146–48 with, 159
preparation phase, 135–38 Computer theft or embezzlement, 105
Citizen-police cooperation, 133–35 Concrete walls, 60
Citizens Confidence restoration strategies, 128
concerns about crime, 160–61 Conspicuousness, 59
factors in communicating with, 136–38 Contemporary school, 17–18
fear and distrust, 137 Control
justification, 137 asset, 101–7
knowledge, 136–37 cash, 103–4
opportunity, 137 informal social, 31
input mechanisms, 156 key and lock PIN, 108
interviews and surveys, 158 Control groups, 188–89
participation strategies, 138–46 Cooperation, citizen-police, 133–35
Civic groups, role of, 36 Corporation role, national, 39
CLASP (Citizens Alliance for a Safer Cost
Philadelphia), 146 activity, 175
Classical school, 16–17 by activity unit, 176
Client groups, 115 effectiveness and risk management, 51
Client level, 5 Cost and performance standards, 178
Client-practitioner relationship, 44–45 Cost control measures, performance and,
Client to community, transition from, 114 174–78
Clients Costs, result, 177–78
defined, 43–44 CPTED (Crime Prevention Through
making recommendations to, 51–52 Environmental Design), 32, 114,
Codes 122, 125–28
building, 119 cautions, 126
building security, 82 future of, 130–31
Cohesiveness recent projects, 126–29
neighborhood, 143–44 confidence restoration strategies, 128
 Index 207

demonstrations, 129 Crime prevention programs, 5–6, 32–33

law enforcement strategies, 128 Crime Prevention Through Environmental
personal defense strategies, 127–28 Design (CPTED), 32, 114, 122,
territorial defense strategies, 127 125–31, 195
CPU (Crime Prevention Unit), 167 cautions, 126
Crime future of, 130–31
attack methods, 162 recent projects, 126–29
citizen concern about, 160–61 confidence restoration strategies, 128
time of occurrence of, 161–62 demonstrations, 129
Crime analysis law enforcement strategies, 128
data sources, 157–59 personal defense strategies, 127–28
citizen interviews and surveys, 158 territorial defense strategies, 127
demographic information, 159 Crime Prevention Unit (CPU), 167
direct observation, 159 Crime prevention, workings of, 3–6
interviews with community community response, 4
representatives, 159 crime prevention program, 5–6
interviews with officials, 159 opportunity reduction, 3–4
offender interviews, 158–59 criminal desire, 3
offense reports, 158 criminal opportunity, 3–4
information provided by, 159–63 criminal skills, 3
Crime definitions, index, 197–98 Crime problems and priorities, defining,
Crime pattern analysis, 45–46 156–64
Crime preventers, techniques of, 194 crime analysis, 156–57
Crime prevention data sources, 157–59
in America, 14–16 information provided by crime analysis,
assumptions of, 20–22 159–63
contributions to physical planning, priority setting, 163–64
118–19 Crime reporting, uniform, 197–98
and criminology/sociology, 16–18 Crime risk management
evolution of, 9–22 systems, 41–53
ancient tradition, 9–11 teaching, 25–26
crime prevention and understanding, 41–43
criminology/sociology, 16–18 Crime risk reduction
crime prevention in America, 14–16 in existing physical environment, 115–17
English tradition, 11–14 in future physical environment, 117–19
field in United States is growing, 195 crime prevention contributions to
grass-roots appeal of, 194 physical planning, 118–19
grass-roots interest in, 195 participation in physical planning,
industry entering, 195 117–18
introduction to, 1–7 physical planning process, 118
management approach to crime control, through physical design, 114–19
193 by users of physical environment,
meaning of, 2 119–25
organization, 136 Crime role by opportunity, 161
organize knowledge of, 196 Crimes
passing fad of, 195 property, 198
and police mission, 18–20 violent, 197–98
potential of, 193–96 Criminal attack in American life, security
practitioners, 6–7 against, 196
roles in, 23–40 Criminal desire, 3
roles of others, 33–39 Criminal opportunity, 3–4
roles of practitioners, 24–33 Criminal skills, 3
 208 Index

Criminology/sociology, crime prevention crime risk reduction in future physical,

and, 16–18 117–19
Environmental design concepts, applying,
Data sources, crime analysis, 157–59 113–31
Decision-makers, participation of, 136 crime risk reduction by users of physical
Defense strategies environment, 119–25
personal, 127–28 crime risk reduction through
territorial, 127 environmental design, 125–31
Defensible space, 123–25 crime risk reduction through physical
design guidelines, 124 –25 design, 114–19
modifying existing physical design, 125 levels of physical design applications,
natural surveillance, 124 114
territoriality, 123 transition from client to community, 114
Delay, 58–59 Environmental design, crime prevention
Demographic information, 159 through, 125–31
Department of Defense (DoD), 15 Escape, intrusion versus, 59
Design Evaluation resources, 191–92
crime prevention through environmental, Evaluations, purpose of, 184–85
125–31 Exterior lighting, 88–89
crime risk reduction through physical, External security, 105–7
114 –19
influence of physical, 120–23 False alarms, 97–98
modifying existing physical, 125 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 15,
Design application, levels of physical, 114 197–98
Design concepts, environmental, 113–31 Fear and distrust, 137
Designing organizations, 152–56 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 15,
Detection systems, intrusion, 89–90 197–98
Deterrence, 58 Federal government role, 38
Direct objectives, 165–68 Fences, 61
Direct observation, 159 Film cameras, 85
Displacement, understanding, 29–30 Financial and other resources, 173–74
Distrust, fear and, 137 Fire-resistive barriers, 81–82
DoD (Department of Defense), 15 Floors, 62–63
Door frames and strikes, 69–71 Frames
Doors, 64 –69 aluminum, 71
glass, 68–69 door, 69–71
steel, 66–68 steel, 71
wood, 65–66 wood, 69–70
Dynamic risks, 42 Fraud, 106–7
Funding sources, miscellaneous, 174
Effect, cause and, 185–89
Electronic locks, 76–78 Gates, 61–62
Electronic security, 56 GIS (geographic information systems),
Electronic security systems, 83–98 156–57
Embezzlement, 105 Glass doors, 68–69
Employee relations, 104–5 Glazing, windows and, 78–79
Enforcement role, law, 155–56 Government activities, role of related, 36
Environment Government agencies, role of local, 35–36
crime risk reduction by users of physical, Group action, 27–31
119–25 sustaining, 30–31
crime risk reduction in existing physical, Group project strategies, 140–42
115–17 Groups
 Index 209

client, 115 Law enforcement

control, 188–89 roles, 155–56
Guidelines, security survey, 109–11 strategies, 128
Law Enforcement Assistance
Hearing sensors, 93 Administration (LEAA), 18
High-security barriers, 81–82 LEAA (Law Enforcement Assistance
Hinges, 71, 73 Administration), 18
HUD (Housing and Urban Development), 15 Life safety, general, 99
Human observer, 83–84 Lighting
exterior, 88–89
ICBO (International Conference of Building street, 86–88
Officials), 82 Local government agencies, role of local,
IESNA (Illuminating Engineering Society), 35–36
88 Location-specific surveillance, 84
Impact measures, 178 Lock PIN control, 108
Impacts Locks, 72–73
evaluating, 183–92 electronic, 76–78
specific, 189–90 pin tumbler, 74–77
total, 190–91 tumbler, 75
Indirect objectives, 168–69 warded, 74–75
Individual action, 24 –27 Loss
Industry entering crime prevention, 195 possible maximum, 47
Informal social control, 31 probable maximum, 47
strategies, 142–46 Low-security barriers, 80–81
Insurance industry role, 36
Internal barriers, 79–82 Masonry walls, 60
Internal security, 101–5 Multiple client level, 5
International Conference of Building
Officials (ICBO), 82 National association role, 38–39
International Society of Crime Prevention National corporation role, 39
Practitioners (ISCPP), 15, 194 Natural surveillance, 123–24
Interviews NCPC (National Crime Prevention
citizen, 158 Council), 15
with community representatives, 159 NCPI (National Crime Prevention Institute),
offender, 158–59 7, 15, 39, 89, 172, 196
with officials, 159 Neighborhood cohesiveness, 143–44
Intruder assault, safety from, 99–101 Neighborhood organization, model
Intrusion detection systems, 89–90 approach to, 146–48
annunciation, 95–96 Neighborhoods lacking cohesiveness,
control, 95 144–46
designing systems, 97
false alarms, 97–98 Objectives
response, 96–97 developing program, 164–69
Intrusion versus escape, 59 direct, 165–68
ISCPP (International Society of Crime indirect, 168–69
Prevention Practitioners), 15, 194 setting, 165–69
Observation
Justification, 137 direct, 159
patrol, 84
Key and lock PIN control, 108 social, 84
Knowledge, 136–37 Observer, human, 83–84
strategies, 138–40 Observer-reporters, 115–16
 210 Index

Offender interviews, 158–59 circle of protection, 59

Offense reports, 158 conspicuousness, 59
Officials, interviews with, 159 delay, 58–59
Opportunity, 137 deterrence, 58
Organizations intrusion versus escape, 59
crime prevention, 136 PIN control, key and lock, 108
designing, 152–56 PIN (personal identification number), 108
citizen input mechanism, 156 Pin tumbler locks, 74–77
design issues, 152–54 Planning
formal sanction, 154 crime prevention contributions to
law enforcement role, 155–56 physical, 118–19
organizational structure, 154–55 participation in physical, 117–18
model approach to neighborhood, 146–48 strategic, 164
role of citizen, 37 Point protection, 93
Police cooperation, citizen, 133–35
Participation, developing citizen, 133–49 Police mission and crime prevention,
Participation strategies, citizen, 138–46 18–20
Patrol observation, 84 Police role, 33–34
Perceptual security, 102 Policy level, public, 6
Performance and cost control measures, Positive school, 17
174 –78 Possible maximum loss, 47
Performance standards, 178 Practitioner relationship, client, 44–45
Perimeter Practitioners
access systems, 64–79 are powerful force, 194
barriers, 62–79 crime prevention, 6–7
protection, 94 roles of, 24–33
Personal defense strategies, 127–28 developing comprehensive crime
Personal identification number (PIN), 108 prevention program, 32–33
Personal safety, 99–101 guiding public policy decisions, 31–32
Personnel resources, 172–73 supporting group action, 27–31
Personnel, supplementary, 173 supporting individual action, 24–27
Physical design Prevention, crime; See Crime prevention
crime risk reduction through, 114–19 Private security role, 34–35
influence of, 120–23 Probable maximum loss, 47
modifying existing, 125 Procedural security, 56
Physical design application, levels of, 114 Program objectives, developing, 164–69
Physical environment Programs, planning community, 151–69
crime risk reduction by users of, 119–25 Property crimes, 198
crime risk reduction in existing, 115–17 Property owner associations and agencies,
crime risk reduction in future, 117–19 116–17
Physical planning Protection
crime prevention contributions to, circle of, 59
118–19 perimeter, 94
participation in, 117–18 point, 93
process, 118 security system, 108
Physical security, 56 space, 94
Physical security systems, 57–82 trap, 94
boundary markers as barriers, 60–62 Public policy
general functions, 57 decisions, 31–32
internal barriers, 79–82 levels, 6
perimeter barriers, 62–79 Purchasing procedures, 102
security functions, 57–59 Pure risks, 42
 Index 211

Rates, acceptance, 177 from intruder assault, 99–101

Receiving procedures, 102–3 personal, 99–101
Relationship, client-practitioner, 44–45 SBC (Southern Building Code), 82
Reporters, observer, 115–16 Schools
Reporting mechanisms, 180 Classical, 16–17
Reports, offense, 158 Contemporary, 17–18
Resources Positive, 17
evaluation, 191–92 Sociological, 17
financial and other, 173–74 Security
personnel, 172–73 electronic, 56
Result costs, 177–78 external, 105–7
Risk internal, 101–5
acceptance, 50–51 perceptual, 102
avoidance, 48 physical, 56
dynamic, 42 procedural, 56
pure, 42 Security codes, building, 82
reduction, 49 Security devices and procedures, 55–112
transfer, 50 electronic security systems, 83–98
Risk management overview, 55–57
cost effectiveness and, 51 physical security systems, 57–82
crime, 25–26 security procedures, 98–111
defined, 42 Security procedures, 98–111
Risk, spreading, 49 personal safety, 99–101
Risk spreading method, 55 general life safety, 99
Robbery, 106 safety from intruder assault, 99–101
Robbery-resistive barriers, 81 security survey guidelines, 109–11
Roles security system protection, 108
of building professions and trades, 35 Security role, private, 34–35
of business community, 37 Security survey, 26–27
of citizen organizations, 37 conducting, 46–47
of civic groups, 36 guidelines, 109–11
communications industry, 36–37 Security system protection, 108
in crime prevention, 23–40 key and lock PIN control, 108
federal government, 38 system activation, 108
insurance industry, 36 system response, 108
law enforcement, 155–56 system testing and maintenance, 108
of local government agencies, 35–36 Security systems
national association, 38–39 asset control, 101–7
national corporation, 39 electronic, 83–98
NCPI (National Crime Prevention physical, 57–82
Institute), 39 Sensors, 90–98
of others, 33–39 applications of, 93–94
police, 33–34 perimeter protection, 94
of practitioners, 24–33 point protection, 93
of practitioners’ statewide associations, 38 space protection, 94
private security, 34 –35 trap protection, 94
of related government activities, 36 hearing, 93
state government, 37–38 sight, 93
Roofs, 63 taste/smell, 91
touch, 91
Safety typical, 92
general life, 99 Shipping procedures, 103
 212 Index

Shoplifting, 107 human observer, 83–84

Sight sensors, 93 intrusion detection systems, 89–90
Smell sensors, 91 lighting, 86–89
Social control, informal, 31, 120 sensors, 90–98
Social control strategies, informal, 142–46 surveillance cameras, 84–86
Social observation, 84 Surveys
Sociological school, 17 citizen, 158
Sociology, crime prevention and conducting security, 46–47
criminology, 16–18 security, 26–27
Southern Building Code (SBC), 82 Suspect characteristics, 162–63
Space, defensible, 123–25
Space protection, 94 Taste/smell sensors, 91
Staff training, 172 Territorial defense strategies, 127
Standards, performance, 178 Territoriality, 123
State government role, 37–38 Theft, computer, 105
Statewide associations, role of Touch sensors, 91
practitioners’, 38 Trades, role of building professions and,
Steel doors, 66–68 35
Steel frames, 71 Training, staff, 172
Storage area procedures, 103 Trap protection, 94
Strategic planning, 164 Tumbler locks, 75
Strategies
awareness, 138–40 Video cameras, 85–86
citizen participation, 138–46 Violent crimes, 197–98
confidence restoration, 128
group project, 140–42 Wall structures, supporting, 71
informal social control, 142–46 Walls, 63–64
knowledge, 138–40 concrete and masonry, 60
law enforcement, 128 Warded locks, 74–75
Street lighting, 86–88 Windows and glazing, 78–79
Strikes, door frames and, 69–71 Wood doors, 65–66
Supplementary personnel, 173 Wood frames, 69–70
Surveillance Work
location-specific, 84 assigning, 179
natural, 123–24 assignments, 179–80
Surveillance cameras, 84 –86 scheduling, 179
Surveillance systems, 83–89 Work progress, monitoring, 179–80