NAV 34—P-0700

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Amphibious Operations

CAPTURE OF OKINAWA
(RYUKYUS OPERATION)

27 MARCH TO 21 JUNE 1945

CAUTION
This Bulletin and the Information Contained Herein
Shall Be Safeguarded in AccordanceWith the Provi­
sions of Article 76, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

et:4

Po.gt9,4Ns-,04,‘,
 NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25,D. C.

22 JANUARY 1946.
This publication "Amphibious Operations—Capture of Okinawa (Ryu­
kyus Operation)-27 March to 21 June 1945" continues the series promul­
gating timely information drawn from action reports. Itfollows"Amphibious
Operations—Capture of Iwo Jima,CominCh P-0012".
Material contained herein has not been subjected to exhaustive study and
analysis, but is issued in this form to make comments, recommendations, and
expressions of opinion concerning war experiences readily available to officers
engaged or interested in amphibious operations. It should be widely circu­
lated among commissioned personnel.
This publication is classified as confidential, nonregistered. It shall be
handled as prescribed by article 76, United States Navy Regulations 1920.
When no longer required it shall be destroyed by burning. No report of
destruction need be submitted.
This publication is under the cognizance of and is distributed by the
Chief of Naval Operations.
R. L. CONNOLLY,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
(Operations).
 DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

CAPTURE OF OKINAWA (OPNAV 34—P-0700)

Standard Navy Distribution List No. 35 (1 December 1945)

List 1: a (1) each, except send CominehPacFlt (5), ComThirdFlt, Com-

FifthFlt (3) each; b (1); c (1); d (1); e (1); g, all PhibGrpCommands (2)
each, Com5thPhibFor (1), ComPhibForPac, ComAdComdPhibForPac (5)
each, ComTraComdPhibForPacFlt (Ad) (35); h (1); i (1); j (1); k (1); 1,
only to Chief of Staff to CominCh Army and Navy White House (1).
List 2: 4-3 (1), a-10 (1), a-18 only FltAircraftRecog,nitionUnit NAS
San Diego, Calif (1), a-19, only Utility Wing SerFor (1); f (1); g (1); n (1);
o (1),v (1).
List 3: b (1); c (1); d (1); f (1); (1); p (1); t (1); u (1); v (:1);
x (1); kk (1); rr (1); vv (1);zz(1); www (1); ffff (1); gggg (1); jjjj (1).
List 6: a (1); b, only ChNavAirOpTra NAS Jacksonville, Fla. (25),
ChNavAirTra NAS Pensacola, Fla. (1) each.
List 7: a-1 (1); d-1, only Commander Naval Air Bases First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth
Naval Districts, ComUSNATB NAS Corpus Christi, Tex.,ComUSNATB NAS
Pensacola, Fla. (1) each; f (10); g (25); h (5); i-3, only CONavTraSta
Newport,R.I. (2). •
List ii: SecNav (1); UnderSecNav (1); AsstSecNav (1) AsstSecNavAir
(1); Chairman, General Board (2); BuAer (5); BuPers (Training Division)
(12); CNO (1); BuOrd (5); BuShips (5); BuDocks (5); Comdt USMC
Hdqtrs (G3 Publication Section) (6); Comdt USMC Hdqtrs (294); Comdt
USCG Hdqtrs (3).
List 14: q (2),
Plus special distribution list. .

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of copies sent to each

addressee.
 CONTENTS
Chapter I. NARRATIVE: Page Chapter III. Ant SUPPORT: Page
Synopsis of the Operation 1-1 General 3-1
Command and Organization Enemy opposition V
1-18 V
3-1
Training and Rehearsal 1-36 Enemy opposition—Enemy air tactics__ 3-1
Movement to the Objective 1-40 Own losses 3-2
General Account of Naval and Air Operations_ 1-44 Enemy losses_ 3-2
Troop Operations 1-58 British Pacific fleet(TF 57)- 3-2
Chapter II. NAVAL GUNFIRE: Operational summary 3-4
Performance 3-5
Defense Against Enemy Attack_ _ _ _ 2-1 Ships 3-5
Suicide or AA attacks 2-1 Planes and pilots_ 3-5
Smoke 2-9 Pilots 3-6
Night retirement 2-13 V
Air-sea rescue 3-6
Suicide Boats V 2-15 V 3-7
Search
Bombardment 2-18 Anti-boat operations 3-8
Preassault 2-18 Briefing 3-8
Preliminary bombardment 2-18 Photography 3-9
Support of minesweeping 2-22 Air traffic control 3-10
Assault 2-22 Composition of carrier forces 3-11
Close support of assault waves 2-22 A. A. gunnery 3-11
After-assault .-_ 2-26 Antisubmarine patrol V3-12
Army support fire—Close support_ _ 2-26 Seaplane operations 3-13
Army support fire—Deep support_ _ _ 2-28 Tactical air force, Tenth Army 3-13
Army support fire—Counter battery_ 2-29 Training 3-14
Army support fire—NGLO's 2-29 • Training of air groups V 3-14
Army support fire—Call fires 2-29 New carriers V V V344
Army support fire—Harassing fires 2-30 Rehearsals and training-attack forces_ _ _ _ 3-14
Army support fire—Coordination of Intelligence and Planning 3-15
services 2-30 Planning, charts and maps V 3-15
Ammunition 2-36 Rubber terrain models 3-16
Rockets 2-36 Comments and recommendations 3-16
Expenditure of ammunition 2-36 Fighter Defense of the Area 3-16
Replenishment and resupply of ammuni- Fighter defense of Task Force 58 3-16
tion V 2-39 Visual fighter direction 3-20
Ammunition in general 2-40 Fighter defense of amphibious forces V 3-21
Surface Actions Target combat air patrol 3-22
2-40
General Air defense control center 3-23
2-41
General effect of naval gunfire Radar pickets 3-24
2-41 Night operations V
General comments 2-46 3-25
Support Craft Direct Support of Ground Forces 3-27
2-48 Close support control
Damage 3-27
2-53 Observation and spotting
Miscellaneous 3-31
2-54 Close support targets V
Aircraft 3-32
2-54 Close support coordination
Training 3-35
2-55 Artillery and air coordination
Maps 3-35
2-57 Tactical bomb line
Personnel 3-37
2-57 Results of close support
Navigation 3-37
2-58 Ordnance_ _ 3-37
Illumination 2-59 Bombs and fuzes 3-37
Communications 2-59 AP bombs 3-38
III
 CONTE

/ IIP TO SHORE:
ItiP Page
Chapter III. AIR SUPPORT—Con.
14 VpjTge- 6-1
Ordnance—Continued
3-38 UDT's 6-3
Napalm
Minesweeping 6-8
Ordnance requirements for neutralizing
Control, Beach and Shore Parties 6-8
Enemy airfields, 3-38
Special Equipment 6-29
Torpedoes on CVE's 3-39 6-30
Miscellaneous
Communications 3-39
Chapter VII. LOGISTICS:
Fighter direction: 3-39 Supply ­ 7-1
Air support communicat ion nets 3-40 Sustained operations at sea 7-1
ASCU communication recommendations 3-42 Fuel oil • 7-4
Miscellaneous 3-43 Diesel oil 7-5
Security 3-43 Lube oils 7-5
Message drops 3-43 Fog oil 7-6
Physchological warfare 3-43 Gasoline 7-7
3-43 Ammunition 7-7
Weather planes
General stores 7-9
Long range Fighter Sweeps against the
Provisions and food 7-9
empire
Water 7-11
AAF Missionsin Support of the Operation_ 3-44 7-11
3-44 Boat pools
DDT Spraying Miscellaneous 7-13
Air Delivery of Supplies 3-46 7-17
Loading
Black-out Suits 3-46 7-17
Organization and planning
Chapter IV. INTELLIGEN CE: Allocation of shipping 7-24
General Comments 4-1 Details of loading 7-32
Enemy Defenses 4-5 Recommendations 7-33
POW Reports and Captured Documents 4-8 Unloading 7-35
Photographic Coverage and Maps 4-9 General narrative 7-35
Weather 4-11 Causeways, pontoons, and special equip-
nce 4-15 ment 7-48
UD'T Reconnaissa
-4-15 Unloading difficulties 7-55
Psychological Warfare
Recommendations 7-59
Chapter V. COMMUNICATIONS: 7-64
5-1 Repairs, Salvage, Maintenance
General Comments General narrative 7-64
Ship to Shore 5-1 7-67
Damage to ships
Preliminary Planning and Training 5-2 Recommendations 7-68
Materiel 5-3 Medical 7-70
Radar 5-4 Own casualties 7-70
Visual 5-6 Enemy casualties 7-71
Landing and Beach Communications 5-7 Evacuation of casualties 7-71
Personnel 5-7 Sanitation 7-73
5-8 Miscellaneous 7-75
Errors and Difficulties

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Page

Letter of promulgation
Distribution list
Table of contents
List of effective pages IV
Frontispiece Follows iv
Chapter I 1-1 to 1-22,1-22a 1-23 to 1-47,1-47a, 1-47b, 1-48 to 1-72
Chapter II 2-1 to 2-60
Chapter III 3-1 to 3-46
Chapter IV 4-1 to 4-16
Chapter V 5-1 to 5-10
Chapter VI 6-1 to 6-32
Chapter VII 7-1 to 7-76
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 • Chapter I. NARRATIVE

SYNOPSIS OF THE OPERATION The Second Marine Division was released from
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet (Officer the target area on 14 April and returned to
Commanding RYUKYUS Operation) Saipan. On 18 May, the Second Marine Divi­
sion (less Eighth RCT) was released from the
On L 6, the Seventy-seventh Infantry Divi­ Tenth Army reserve to commander in chief, Pa­
sion began the capture of Kerama Retto. With cific Ocean areas, control. The Eighty-first
little opposition and vigorous action on the part Infantry Division was released from area reserve
of the division, this group of islands was secured under control of commander in chief, Pacific
on L —3. On L — 1, Keise Shima was taken and Ocean areas, on 18 April and transferred to con­
two battalions of 155-mm. guns emplaced. trol of commander in chief, Southwest Pacific
On L-day and L±1-day, the Second Marine area, upon arrival in Leyte.
Division executed a feint landing on the south­ One RCT of the Twenty-seventh Infantry Divi­
east coast of Okinawa. sion made amphibious assaults on the eastern
On L-day (1 April 1945), troops of the III islands controlling the entrances to Nakagusuku
Amphibious Corps and the XXIV Corps landed Wan on 19 April, while the remainder of the divi­
on the western beaches. The landing was made sion was landed over the Hagushi beaches and
with corps abreast, the III Amphibious Corps placed on the right flank of the XXIV Corps
consisting of the Sixth Marine Division and the north of Machinato. The Ninety-sixth and Sev­
First Marin6 Division on the left, and the XXIV enth Divisions had joined facing south and strong
Corps consisting of the Seventh Infantry Divi­ enemy resistance was being met all across the
sion and the Ninety-sixth Infantry Division on island. This opposition proved to be one of the
the right. Troops advanced with virtually no enemy main lines of defense, and it was expected
opposition and by L+2 the First Marine Division to be strongly,fortified and stubbornly defended.
and the Seventh Infantry Division had pushed At 1200(K) on 18 April,the command post of
across the island rapidly to the east coast,securing the Tenth Army was opened ashore.
both Yontan and Kadena airfields. The Sixth On 19 April,the XXIV Corps launched a coor­
Marine Division turned north against little oppo­ dinated attack along its entire front. This attack
sition and the Ninety-sixth Infantry Division was launched with three divisions abreast, the
turned south where increasing opposition was Twenty-seventh Infantry Division on the right,
met. the Ninety-sixth Infantry Division in the center
The Sixth Marine Division continued,its drive and the Seventh Infantry Division on the left. The
north until strong opposition was met in the attack was preceded by heavy artillery prepara­
mountainous terrain of the Motobu Peninsula. tions from shore batteries and naval gunfire, as"
The enemy here amounted to about 1,500 Japs, well as coordinated air strikes. Slight progress
well dug in. Patrolling continued to secure the was made except on the flanks. The enemy was
northern tip of the island and the eastern portion well entrenched and concealed in caves and tunnels
above the Motobu _Peninsula. After several days along a line extending from the northern tip of
of hard mountain fighting,the Sixth Marine Divi­ Machinato airfield on the west to the northern part
sion secured the Motobu Peninsula, thus paving of Yonabaru airfield on the east. The enemy had
the way for the amphibious assault on Ie Shima the advantage of good observation throughout the
by the Seventy-seventh Division. The Seventy- sector and our troops were up against well-pre­
seventh Division landed on Ie Shima on 16 April pared positions in extremely rugged terrain. It
and all organized resistance was overcome by 22 was apparent that the enemy had elected to de­
April. fend along this line in depth.
 SYNOPSIS OF THE OPERATION
•
During the period.-19 April to 11 May,constant From: Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force
pressure was exerted on the enemy with only slight (CTF 58)(Strategic Striking and Cov­
gains being made at heavy cost to our troops. The ering Force)
Twenty-seventh Division was relieved by the First This support took the form of day and night,
Marine Division and turned over to the island com­ strikes, sweep and search operations against Ky­
mander for garrison duty in the northern part ushu, the neutralization of enemy airfields and
of the island andJe Shima. The Seventy-seventh facilities in Amami Gunto and Minami Daito,the
Division relieved the Ninety-sixth Division. An supplying of day and night CAP and close air
attack was initiated under command of the Tenth support to the occupation forces commencing 18
Army on 11 May. Slow progress was made and March 1945, and still continuing as this report
about 15 May, the Sixth Marine Division was is written.
placed on the right of the First Marine Division It was a trying period as little, if any, warning
and corps boundary established which ran gener­ , was being given by the radars in the force, and
ally south dividing the island between the two at times' the first indication of an aircraft ap­
corps. Constant pressure was maintained upon proaching was visual sighting by the close screen.
the enemy with gains being made on the flanks; The picket destroyers were invaluable with their
only slight gains were made in the rugged area of visual sightings.
the Shuni hill mass. The Seventh Infantry Divi­ Our night fighters were unable to intercept the
sion was placed on the extreme left flank of the enemy owing to their radical maneuvers and in-•
XXIV Corps sector, thus making a total Of five telligent use Of window.
divisions in the line for further drives to the 21 March 1945 was the first known appearance
south. of the Baka. Enemy air oppoition was nonexist­
Poor weather hampered ground troop activity ent and it became increasingly apparent that our
from 22 May until the time of relief of the com­ initial strike on Kyushu facilities had interfered
mander, Fifth Fleet, by the commander, Third with enemy air operations to a greater extent than
Fleet, on 27 May. During this period,in spite of had been hoped for.
poor weather, the two Marine divisions on the The expected all-out effort by the Japanese on
right made consistent gains to the south and east both the beaches and the.supporting forces finally
and the Seventh Infantry Division on the left developed on the 6th of April.
flank gained consistently to the south and west in The task force fighter combat air patrols over
an attempt to encircle Shun. At the time of Okinawa, and fighter sweeps and patrols over the
relief of the Commander, Fifth Fleet, the de­ islands to the northward destroyed 249 airborne
fenses of Shuni were beginning to weaken and pres­ planes. Our own losses in air combat totaled 2for
sure in the center of the XXIV Corps was greatly one day as against 236 for the enemy.
reduced. Altogether the numbers of aircraft launched in
This operation was well planned and it was exe­ the main strike were as follows:
cuted in the initial stages as planned. The plan YF 180
estimated strong enemy defense of the western VB 75
Okinawa beaches and the two airfields (Yontan VT 131
and Kadena). It was a complete surprise to the
• Total 386
attacking forces to discover that the enemy had
withdrawn all defensesfrom this area,the northern The enemy battle fleet, was sighted in position
half of southern Okinawa,includin g the two air­ 30° 34' N., 128° 08' E, approximately 70 miles,
fields, allowing it to be occupied practically un­ 225° from first sighting report. The weather
contested. Naturally, all attack commands were was poor with 8/10 cloud cover at 3,000 feet. The
highly elated with this unexpected situation. The low ceiling and so many aircraft made the attack
fierce fighting and heavy casualties considered un­ most difficult to coordinate. Antiaircraft fire was
avoidable in taking this area had not materialized heavy but inaccurate and a large number of both
due to the southerly withdrawal of the unpredict­ torpedo and bomb hits were claimed on the Ya­
able Jap. mato,the one cruiser and three destroyers by first
two strike groups (58.1 and 58.3 in order). The jective except the Expeditionary Force Floating
strike group of TG 58.4 arrived tofind the Yamato Reserve which remained at Ulithi on call and the
listing appreciably and hit her with many bombs Expeditionary Troops Area Reserve which stood
and six torpedoes,five of them on the high side-1­ by at Noumea to await orders to load. Preceding
the Yamato bleW up. The CL (Agano class) the task force were the minesweepers which
which was found dead in the water was hit by arrived at the objective on Love-8-day to in­
approximately four torpedoes and eight 1,000­ sure the safe approach of the advancing units.
pound bombs to help her on her way to the bottom. Following the minesweepers came the Amphibious
Out of the original force of one BB,one CL, and Support Force and Gunfire and Covering Force
eight destroyers, the Yamato, one CL, and four which arrived atthe objective area on Love—7-day
destroyers were sunk,one destroyer badly damaged and carried out their missions of surface and air
(Terutsuki class) and one left burning. Two de­ bombardment, minesweeping, underwater demoli­
stroyers were apparently not seriously damaged. tions and provided cover at the objective area for
Our own plane losses were light-4 VB,3 VT,and the Expeditionary Force. Next to arrive was the
3 VF. Personnel losses were four pilots and eight Western Island Attack Force.as of Love —6-day,
aircrewmen,the rest being rescued. when landing of the assault troops commenced for
the capture of Kerama Retto and Keise Shima.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF
These islands were secured,a logistics and seaplane
51)(Commander, Joint Expeditionary
base established at Kerama Retto and field artil­
Forces)
lery landed on Keise Shima by Love— 1-day. The
This action report covers phases I and II of the northern and southern attack forces arrived on
amphibious operations for the capture of Okinawa Love-day debarked and landed assault troops over
Guilt° by Task Force 51 (Vice Admiral R. K. the Hagushi beaches on the westshore of Okinawa.
Turner, USN, commander, Amphibious Forces, The Demonstration Group having arrived on
United States Pacific Fleet,and commander,Joint Love-day concurrently executed a diversionary
Expeditionary Force, USS Eldorado,flagship). feint at landing on southwestern Okinawa,repeat­
The period •included in this report dates from ing this feint on Love+1-day, whereupon this
17 February 1945 when the Northern Attack force retired to the rear area after having landed
Force commenced its assembly in the Guadalcanal the Army reserve over the Hagushi beaches. The
area to 0900 (I) 17 May 1945 when command of unloading of ships commenced immediately fol­
Task Force 51 passed to Vice Admiral Hill, Com­ lowing the debarkation of assault troops. The
mander Fifth Amphibious Force. Expeditionary Force Floating Reserve was called
Under phase I the capture of the Kerama Retto, forward and,using one RCT supported by surface
Keise Shima, and the main island of Okinawa craft and air, landed and captured the Eastern
south of the Ishikawa Isthmus together with the Islands on Love+10-day while the remainder of
Eastern Islands was to be executed. Under phase the force was landed over the Hagushi beaches.
II the capture of le Shima and the Motobu Penin­ The Western Island Landing Force embarked at
sula simultaneously, followed by the capture of Kerama Retto, proceeded to le Shima,landed on
the remainder of Okinawa north of the Ishikawa Love+15 and captured that island as of Love+
Isthmus was to be effected. It was further fore­ 20-day. This operation was supported by naval
seen that if during phase I adequate airfields had gunfire, air bombardment, and by artillery previ­
not been captured at an early date,the capture of ously placed on Menha Shima. Following the
le Shima might have to take place during the capture of le Shima the force was withdrawn,and
so-called phase I. landed over the Hagushi beaches. A detachment
Cargo and troops were lifted on the West Coast, of garrison troops supported by light surface ele­
Hawaiian Islands, Southwest Pacific, Marshalls, ments was landed on Tori Shima without opposi­
Carolines,and Leyte an the various elements pro­ tion where it established an air warning and
ceeded to assemble at Ulithi, Guadacanal, Saipan fighter-director station as of Love+41-day. The
and Leyte. Following a period of logistics and area reserve was not called forward to the objec­
rehearsals the several forces departed for the ob­ tive. Ground action in general was characterized
 Qfj
SYNOPSIS OF-T OPVIIATIO.N t -­

by weak opposition to landings. The enlargement the Fifth Fleet continued until 28 May 1945 when
of the beachhead on Okinawa initially was rapid. the Third Fleet relieved the Fifth Fleet. The
Movement to the north was relatively fast against Third Fleet then continued support of the Tenth
scattered resistance resulting in the conclusion of Army,and commander,Fifth Amphibious Force,
phase II of the operation as of Love+20-day. To assumed command of TF 31. On 3 June 1945,
the south combat settled down to an attack against, commander Fifth Amphibious Force, shifted flag
fortified position. Our forces were under con­ and staff to U.S.S.Auburn. Offensive operations
stant attack by hostile aircraft from which we suf­ continued until organized resistance on the island
fered-casualties to ships and personnel through of Okinawa ceased. Outlying islands were occu­
bombing,torpedo,suicide,and Baka attacks. The pied in amphibious shore-to-shore operations and
excellent performance by our CAP and fine team­ without opposition as follows: Kutaka Shima, on
work of our fighter-directors and air- warning 20 May,Iheya Shima. on 3 June, Aguni Shima on
service, together with ships' gunfire did much to 9 June, and Kume Shima on 26 June 1945.
minimize the effect of these attacks. Smoke was
used extensively at night with good results. A From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4(CTF
hostile task force composed of one battleship, one 53)(Northern Attack Force)
cruiser and eight destroyers which sortied from Phase I.—The task was to land the Northern
the Inland Sea passing south of Kyushu into the Landing Force (III Amphibiods Corps, rein­
East China Sea was engaged by planes of Task forced, Major General Geiger, USMC),on desig­
Force 58 on Love+6-day-with only four heavily nated beaches on the western side of Okinawa,
damaged destroyers escaping total destruction. north of the Bisha Gawa,in order to assist in the
Suicide boats and other small craft were active but capture of Okinawa.
were effectively controlled by illumination and The Northern Attack Force was mounted in the
ships'gunfire. Offensive operations were still con­ Guadalcanal-Purvis Bay-Russell Islands area.
tinuing when at 0900 (I) 17 May 1945 command From 1 to 3 March 1945 training was conducted
of TF 51 passed to Vice-Admiral HILL with com­ with the landing force embarked. Following the
mand ok all forces on shore in the Okinawa area rehearsal,ships returned to anchorages for rehabil­
to the commanding general, Tenth Army. itation and final logistics. Movement to the ob­
jective via Ulithi commenced on 12 March with the
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force departure of the Northern Tractor Flotilla. The
(CTF 31 and CTF51) remainder of the force, less the Northern Defense
The period covered by this report dates from and Northern Garrison Groups, left Guadalcanal
0900 Item 17 May 1945,at which time commander, for Ulithi on 15 March. The few days at Ulithi
Fifth Amphibious Force relieved commander, were spent,in providing for logistics needs and in
Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, as CTF 51, to effecting changes and substitutions in the task force
1305 (Item) 21 June 1945 when organized resist­ organization. Movement and approach to the ob­
ance ceased and the island of Okinawa was de­ jective were,executed according to schedule.
clared secured by commanding general, Tenth At dawn on Love-day, 1 April 1945, the fire-
Army. At the same time commanding general, support ships (4 OBB,3 CA,1 CL,10 DD)com­
Tenth Army, assumed command of the Ryukyus. menced delivering fires schedules by commander,
A synopsis of the operation may be generalized Joint Expeditionary Force(CTF 51). Control of
in the following sequence: In accordance with naval gunfire for support of the assault and deep
commander, Fifth Fleet, dispatch order, com­ supporting fire in the zones of action of the III
mander, Fifth Amphibious Force, on board the Amphibious Corps passed to commander, North­
U. S. S. Aneon assumed command of TF 51, re­ ern Attack Force (CTF 53,at H — 35 (0755(I)).
lieving commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Firing of heavy-fire-support ships was closely co­
Fleet. He continued to control air defenses of ordinated with rocket, mortar, and 20-mm. and
Okinawa. Gunto and of naval forces present and 40-mm.fire against beach areas by gunfire support
reported to the commanding general,Tenth Army, craft (6 LCI(G),16 LCI(M),18 LCI(R)(RCM)
for that purpose. Support of the Tenth Army by 6 LCM(R) and 12 LCS(L)). After H-hour call
-

fire, deep support fire and harassing fire were pro­ ships and cargo ships of the first garrison echelon
vided. Coordination of naval gunfire was of a for the area north of Zampa Misaki. On Love+
high order; troop commanders repeatedly praised, 10, all assault ships loaded in the South Pacific
the excellence of the support rendered. area had been completely discharged and had de­
Weather and surf conditions for the initial land­ parted for rear areas.
ing were excellent and preparations for landing The rapid advance of the Sixth Marine Divi­
troops progressed without interruption in spite sion in 'northern Okinawa dictated a revision of
of repeated air alerts during which 4 enemy planes plans as originally projected for phases I and II.
were shot down in the transport area. Troops in It appeared feasible to complete the conquest of
the first wave were.landed on beach Blue 1 at 0830 the Motobu Peninsula and other sectors of the
and in the nextseveral minutesfirst waves hit other island north of Ishikawa Isthmus by overland ad­
beachesin rapid succession. By 0840 allfirst waves vance,reducing the naval requirements to those of
had landed. The scheme of maneuver called for resupply and naval gunfire support. Interpre­
the landing of two divisions abreast: the Sixth tation of photographs made by aerial reconnais­
Marine Division on the left,the First Marine Divi­ sance planes and tree-top-level,observations over
sion on the right, coordinated with the landing of Ie Shima failed to disclose any signs of enemy ac­
two Army divisions of the XXIV Corps on ad­ tivity on that island.
jacent beaches to the south. On 10 April, commander, Amphibious Forces,
All assault battalions landed without incident Pacific Fleet, issued by dispatch Operator Order
and advanced rapidly inland against negligible A8-45, by which commander, Amphibious Group
opposition. Yontan airfield was secured about 4, Pacific Fleet, was designated commander, TG
1100. 51.21,le Shima Attack Group. The task assigned
The rapid advance of the troops required numer­ was to capture and defend Ie Shima and to estab­
ous readjustments in unloading in order to meet lish airbase facilities thereon. Assault shipping
the swiftly changing tactical situation, especially included Transport Squadron Seventeen (Com­
with regard to the Sixth Marine Division's north­ modore Brittain, USN). The Ie Shima Landing
ward advance over rugged terrain. Foul weather Force (Major General Bruce, USA) comprised
on Love+4 made it necessary to keep all landing- the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division plus at­
ships,craft,and boats clear of the reef. An addi­ tached units and one Fleet Marine Force Amphibi­
tional unloading point in Nago Wan northeast of ous reconnaissance battalion. The organization
Zampa Misaki was established for the support of was formulated and the attack plan issued on 12
the Sixth Marine Division. April. William-day,the day for assault landings
Between Love+4 and Love+8,the Sixth Marine on Ie Shima was set for 16 April,and Sugar-hour,
Division advanced considerably ahead of expecta­ the time of the landing for the first assault waves,
tion and occupied the area north of the Ishikawa was tentatively set at 0800. The landing force
Isthmus to the base of the Motobu Peninsula be­ was embarked at Kerama Retto and reported to
yond Nago. Reconnaissance and minesweeping commander,le Shima Attack Group, at Hagushi
operationsconducted by commander,Mine Flotilla, on 13-15 April.
in Nago Wan confirmed the practicability of using Operations preliminary to the main assault
the beaches near Nago for further unloading to landing on Ie Shima included an unopposed land­
supply this division, and a number of ships were ing on the night of William — —3 on
accordingly sent there while unloading was still in Menna Shima,by the Fleet Marine Force amphib­
progress at llagushi. Mass air attacks on several ious reconnaissance battalion; pre-assault bom­
days caused some interruptions. On Love+9, bardment and air strikes, and reconnaissance of.
commander, Southern Attack Force (CTF 55), beaches and buoying of channels by under­
assumed charge of unloading for all beaches in water demolition teams commenced William —1.
the Hagushi area, while commander, Northern Throughout this period designated gunfire sup­
Attack Force, took charge of unloading activities port ships continued to provide night direct sup­
supporting the northward advance of the Sixth port fire to elements of the III Amphibious Corps
Marine Division and the unloading of resupply in northern Okinawa.
r et;*b‘ ";:i 4 "I!
—5
67952 o tf•
,f,42
r *4­
t..=
1
 Sortie was scheduled for 0330 on William-day, enemy had withdrawn to the base of Iegusugu
16 April. Although entire Hagushi anchorage Yama, the pinnacle dominating the island, and
had been,blanketed with,smoke as the result of a was well dug in at concealed positions on its slopes
RED alert at 0220,the task group Was able to get and in the adjacent town of Ie. Enemy fire was
under way .with only slight delay in schedule. delivered from pill boxes and caves. Bands of
Scheduled bombardment commenced at 0530 and infiltrators emerged from cavesto harass our forces
continued until 0725. At . 0534, commander, Ie after dark. The number of enemy troops encoun­
Shima Attack Group, executed the signal "Land tered, as well as the number and variety of their
the Landing Force." Weather was excellent and hideouts, revealed the limitations of photo inter­
landing conditions on all beaches favorable. pretation based on even the closest aerial recon­
Sugar-hour was fixed firmly at 0800. The first naissance. It was therefore recognized that the
wave was dispatched at 0728 and landed on Red' slopes of Iepsugu would require intensive artil­
T-1 at 0759. First waves landed on Red T-2 at lery preparation. This was delivered from Menna
-0800 and on Green 1 at 0806. By 0835 all waves Shima by division artillery on the morning of ­
had landed on these three Leaches. Throughout William+4.
the landing, air support, naval gunfire, and di.vi­ At 0900 the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division
sion artillery were well coordinated. again attacked. After a day of bitterly contested
The landing'.was unopposed and troops ad­ fighting the troops reached the base of the pinnacle,
vanced against negligible • resistance but found and some elements climbed to within a few yards of
beaches, roads, and terrain heavily strewn with the top. At 1045 on the morning of William + 5
land mines. By 1130 ROT 306 had 'reached the (21 April), commander,Ie Shima Attack Grbup,
northeast edge of the airfield. By nightfall two- sent the following message to commander, Joint •
thirds of the island had been secured against in­ Expeditionary Force: "The American flag is now
creasing enemy resistance. The runways of the flying atop the pinnacle Ie Shima." Organized re­
airfields were found to be systematically cratered, sistance has ceased and mopping up operations
trenched with .large ditches, and densely mined. continued ashore, while over the beaches the dis­
During the morning of William-day heavyenemy charge of assault shipping was completed. In ad­
air raids from the nath were launched against dition,eight LST'scarrying aviation engineer bat­
the Okinawa area. Most of the raids were de­ talions, GROPAC 12, and other garrison elements,
stroyed or broken up by the CAP, radar picket were unloaded.
ships, and screening ships before reaching the Throughout the period of the assault and cap­
transport area. Seven planes broke through into ture of le Shima, Commander Amphibious Group
the Ie Shima area, however, and were shot down 4 retained continuing responsibility for naval sup­
by AA 'gunfire from ships of the adjacent screen port of phase I troop operations in northern Oki­
and the attack group. Unloading of ammunition, nawa. Initially these duties were performed under
water,rations,and medical supplies began at 0942. the designation CTF 53; effective 18 April, how­
At midday Green Beach was abandoned and the ever, CTF 51. dissolved TF 53 and named CTG
handling of all supply and evacuation shifted to 51.21 SOPA Ie Shima and Northern Okinawa.
Red beaches. ,LST Units 1 and 2, carrying pri­ Offensive missions,as well as measures for defense,
ority cargo, were completely unloaded by 1300,and were included in the duties assigned. While oper­
excellent progress was reported by the other units ations were still in progress on Ie Shima, there­
of the Tractor Flotilla. General unloading began fore, logistics support and naval gunfire support
on William+1, but was slowed down by heavy were provided to elements of the IIIPhib Corpsin
enemy machine gun and mortar fire directed at the the Motobu Peninsula area. On Love+29 (30
dump areas. April), the III Phib Corps received orders to
The Division. Reserve,ROT 307,waslanded over move to southern Okinawa to join in operations
Red T-3 and T-4 at 1130 on William • + 1 (17 against the enemy there, where the early rapid
April). Ground .fighting continued for the next progress had been checked in mid-April by the
several days against determined resistance. The bitterest of enemy resistance. The Twenty­
 -

NARRATIVE

seventh Army Division relieved the Sixth Marines assault,for use in supporting the landing on west­
in the Motobu area, the transfer being completed ern beaches, and,subsequent operations.
on 5 May. , Leyte was designated as assembly and loading
At Ie Shima re-ewbarkation of assault units of pointfor the task group. TF 55,Southern Attack
the Seventy-Seventh Infantry Division was begun Force,also loaded and sailed from this point. Rear
on William -I-7 and completed on William+10. Admiral J. L. Hall, USN (CTF 55),coordinated
On 26 April GroPac 12 established port director logistics and exercised authority as senior officer
facilities and the island commander, Ie Shima present,Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet,atLeyte,
(Brigadier General Thomas,USA),assumed com­ during the period of preparation for this
mand ashore. Both here and at Nago Wan un­ operation.
loading of garrison shipping continued in spite of Loading was from exposed, and for the most
repeated air attacks at all hours.of day and night, part, undeveloped beaches. Surf and swell dam­
which resulted in damage to two merchant aged many boats, several beyond repair. In spite
vessels. of delayed arrival, inexperienced personnel, and
On 12 May Rear Admiral Cobb, USN, com­ unfavorable weather, loading was completed on
mander, Naval• Forces, Ryukyus, arrived at Ie schedule, with minor exceptions.
Shima in Taney (AGC 37) for conferences pre­ A full week was provided in the schedule for
liminary to his relieving Rear Admiral Reifsnider training. Late arrival of assault LST's, and:bad
as CTG 51.21 and SOPA Ie Shima—Northern Oki­ weather, combined to prevent carrying out. the
nawa. Relief was effected at 0900 on 15 May,and entire comprehensive plan. which was prepared.
Commander Amphibious GrOup 4, Pacific Fleet, Rough seas and excessive swells caused the loss of
returned to Hagushi to report to commander,Am­ three LVT's and three LVT(A)'s, and damaged
phibious Forces(CTF 51),as directed. several other tractors. Army personnel losses were
one"-dead, three missing probably drowned, and
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 two.injured.
(Western Island Attack Group CTG 'Movement to the objective was made in three
51.1) groups. Transports and assault LST's, proceed­
ing separately, arrived on 26 March 1945. A
The Western Islands Atttick Group (TG 51.1) smaller tractor group arrived 5 days later. Most
was composed of one transport squadron with suf­ of the *escorts of the first two groups were fueled
ficient landing ships to lift a reenforced infantry enroute from transports and LST's, respectively.
division. Necessary screening ships and control The assaults were conducte4 generally as
craft were assigned to provide for independent planned,except that the two battalions which were
movement and an amphibious assault on the scale to land from LCVP's on 26 March were landed
of a single division. in LVT's on 27 March,because reports from UDT
The Seventy-seventh Infantry Division, rem- reconnaissance showed that none of the beaches
forced, commanded by Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce, were suitable for landing fromm LCVP's. A gar­
USA,constituted the landing force. In addition rison battalion was-landed administratively with­
a Marine reconnaissance battalion, less one com­ out incident. Three additional landings were
pany, was attached from the Fleet Marine made by shore-to-shore movement. In spite of
Force. narrow beaches with bad approaches, and rugged
The major tasks'assigned this group were: first and difficult terrain, all landings were quickly
to capture Kerama Retto, a group of small islands established against light opposition and control
about 15 miles southwest of Okinawa, the main of the islands was gained rapidly, and on
objective for this operation, commencing 6 days schedule.
prior to the main assault; second, to establish an The landing of artillery and initial supplies.,on
anchorage in this island group for the logistic sup­ Keise Shima was successfully accomplished in- one
port of fleet units; third,to land two battalions of day,so that these, guns were ready to render ,efrec­
155-mm.guns on Keise Shima,within 10,000 yards tive support during the main landings on 1 April
of Okinawa, on the day preceding the Okinawa 1945.
 Except for the 155-mm gun battalions and the Kerama Retto, enclosing an inner anchorage pro­
garrison battalion, no equipment or supplies were tected by a series of light antitorpedo nets, with
landed. By 1 April all other troops and equip­ surrounding anchorage areas outside the nets
mentlanded had been reembarked in readiness for which were used for berthing of ships which could
further operations as directed. not be accommodated inside.
Installation of antitorpedo nets was somewhat Minor naval craft for minesweeping, antisub­
delayed by weather but was completed by 1 April. marine patrol, and screen of western anchorage
Fueling and ammunition replenishment was areas,for anti-small-boat patrols and general gun­
started on 28 March.' The first seaplanes arrived boat duties, And for net maintenance, were as­
and began operation from the seaplane base on signed. In addition LSD,ARL,ARS,and ATF
29 March. types,under control of CTG 51.6, were established
Salvage and repair facilities established at in a well-sheltered part of the anchorage engaged
Kerama Retto, in ships accompanying the assault in emergency repairs of ships which suffered bat­
movement, were fully occupied in emergency re­ tle damage, and ultimately in routine repairs and
pair to battle damaged ships, commencing with maintenance as well.
Kimberly (DD 521) on 26 March 1945, and their In addition to vessels actually assigned'to TO
work load was steadily increasing throughout the 51.15, CTG 52.2, commander, Mine Flotilla, fur­
operation. nished minecraft when not required for primary
No serious opposition or interference by the duties to provide antisubmarine patrols for. the
enemy was encountered in actual landings, and entrances, to provide an A/S screen for the west­
casualties to troops were correspondingly light. ern anchorage and to augment area smoke screen..
Enemy reaction took the form of suicide plane Without this reenforcement, defenses against sub­
attacks principally. In TG 51.1, these caused marines would have been limited to that furnished
serious damage to one destroyer, and two trans-­ by the Transport Screen.
ports, and minor damage to two additional trans­ A boat pool, with headquarters in an LST
ports. One AKA, in addition, received serious mother ship,including LCT's,LCM's,LCVP,and
underwater damage,presumably from a mine,dur­ LCPL,furnished necessary water transport for re­
ing the period of this report. plenishment of ammunition to fire support ships,
On 2 April 1945, at 1900 '(I), as provided in and for boat patrols and smoke protection, as well
plans, and in accordance with orders of CTF 51, as other general services.
command of TO 51.1 was transferred to Commo­ Navigational aids installed prior to 1 April
dore T. B. Brittain, USN,commander, Transport 1945 were maintained for a short time by two
Squadron 17, and Rear Admiral Kiland took the PCS(1-I)'s, but thereafter were lifted or discon­
task designation of SOPA Kerama. Retto, tinued except for those actually required within
CTG 51.15. the anchorage. The Bowditch also conducted sur­
veys and hydrographic investigation, and estab­
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 lished a light on a conspicuous rock, Naji, within
(CTG 51.15) (Western Island Attack the anchorage. This ship also published and is­
Group) sued field charts, corrected to include results of
At 1900(I),2 April 1945,commander,Amphib­ new surveys.
ious Group 7,having transferred command of TO The Seaplane Base Group occupied a consider­
51.1 to Commander T. B. Brittain, USN,assumed able part of the anchorage area and operated
the task designation of SOPA Kerama Retto,CTG search planes, ASP, and Dumbo services on a
51.15, and continueno direct the operations of, steadily increasing scale.
and control naval defenses for, the fleet logistics A nucleus of logistic ships including station
base, Kerama Retto. These duties had already tankers for black oil and diesel oil, were Teplen­
become well established during the previous 8 days ished as necessary from fleet tankers under control
since the initial landings for capture of the island of commander,Logistic Group,CTG 50.8,ordered
group on 26 March.1945. in by CTF 51. One large capacity "water tanker
The command comprised the islands of the was kept at the anchorage,relieved by a full tanker
 _

as soon as emptied. Aviation gasoline was sup­ the anchorage for repairs, from building up.
plied from fleet tankers, most of which carried Shortage of mechanics, and limited material for
part cargoes of this fuel. structural and other repairs, were serious handi­
Two to four ammunition, ships, replaced as caps to be overcome. Loan of CB personnel, and
they were unloaded,supplemented by a final total canpibalizing replacement units and equipment
of 10 LST's, specially equipped for handling am­ from unsalvageable vessels and ships patched up
,munition, which remained at the anchorage, pro­ for return to rear bases helped considerably, but
vided for prompt replenishment of naval ammuni­ wasfar from solving the urgent problem presented
tion' expended in fire support and bombardment by the large numbers of ships and craft with battle
-:missions, as well as in actions against enemy air­ damage and major operational defects which were
craft. Battleships, cruisers, escort carriers, and brought to "Wiseman's Cove." By 22 May the to­
destroyer types arrived daily for ammunition re­ tal number of ships and craft present for repairs
supply and to turn in empty containers. was 47,in spite of the fact that, by that date, 137
Stores ships from rear areas furnished dry and ships and craft had already been returned to duty,
fresh provisions,and general stores,to ships based and 42 additional had been made seaworthy for
at Kerama Retto,to fire support ships,CVE's,and return to rear bases for final repairs. Although
screening ships arriving for fuel or ammunition. these totals include a majority of patrol craft and
The Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and LCI types, and many returned to duty had rela­
Fifth Infantry regiment with radar units, weather tively minor defects not always due to battle dam­
detachment,and other attached special troops,had age, the figures are considered impressive. It
been established as a garrison on ZamamiShima by should be pointed out, that of the 47 ships and
the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division which had craft in repair status, 20 were various destroyer
originally captured the islands. This garrison types (including DD,DE,DM,DAIS) of recent
conducted daily sea patrols around the islands with construction.
landings on selected beaches, investigated reports By 22 May 1945 the following totals of salvage
of enemy activity on shore,and had occasional pa­ and repair ships and maintenance vessels were
trol actions with small units of Japanese troops established at Kerama Retto, or in transit for that
which had avoided capture in the early days of base:
the occupation. They continued to kill or capture One AR,two AD,three ARB,one ARL,one
small numbers of enemy troops almost daily. This LSD,four ARD,one AG,one ARS,one ATF,
detachment maintained a prisoner-of-war center two ATR, one ARG. Work on hand on 22
and stockade and exercised military government May 1945 at Kerama Retto, was sufficient to
for control of native civilians. A particularly im­ require full employment of all these for an
portant part of this service was the establishment estimated period of more than 45 days. This
and maintenance of a military cemetery, where does not take into account the frequent'addi­
many more naval than army dead were cared for. tions to list of seriously damaged ships which
The number of graves increased steadily as naval were arriving for emergency repairs at an
personnel killed in action were brought to the an average, for destroyer types, of four each
chorage almost daily in ships which had been seri­ week.
ously damaged in attack by suicide planes and A very considerable amount of the work re­
Baka bombs. quired of the repair activity was on LCI types,
The salvage and repair base,established initially and patrol craft (PC, SC, PCS, etc.) which had
with two ATF,1 ARS, and 1 ARL on 27 March serious operational defects developed by long op­
1945,was expanded after 1 April 1945 by 2LSD,.2 erating periods with inadequate upkeep oppor­
ARL,3 ARB. The resources of these ships were tunities. A major factor in the number of crippled
quickly overloaded by badly damaged destroyers craft of these two types was the lack of availability
and other ships after the first major air attacks of necessary replacement parts for worn out and
April 6,1945. One ARD followed by an AR and damaged equipment. This also effectively pre­
one AG were still unable to prevent the number vented the expeditious, or even possible, repair of
of ships, particularly destroyers, sent or towed to these types with facilities and equipment in the
 $

objective area, and resulted for many o thes.e The mounting success of air attacks on Jap ship-
craft in long periods of operation on one engine ping by planes from the seaplane base,the increas­
or at reduced speeds. Overtaxed dock schedules ing number of ships basing at Kerama Retto,
and limited numbers of electronic repairmen, with particularly repair ships and many disabled units,
lack of replacement parts,kept many badly needed together with the smaller numbers concentrated
patrol craft out of useful service because of in- off the several unloading areas made it only a ques­
operative sonar and radar equipment. In several tion of time until the enemy should at6,ck Kerama
cases it was found necssary to , send patrol craft, Retto in force, as a particularly choice target.
particularly, back to rear area for repairs'which Furthermore the enforced reduction of ra:dar
could not be accomplished in the vicinity of the; picket stations because of heavy losses of fighter-
objective except after long delays. direction destroyers, and the relocation of the re-
An important service,freqUently called for, was. duced number of such stations, had the.result of
to provide salvage vessels and towing services to leaving Kerama Retto exposed to air attack from
render assistance to ships attacked in the area west the direction of Formosa. Representations made
and southwest of Okinawa. These missions were to CTF 51,and that officer's thorough appreciation
usually accompanied by the POE(R) 853 which. of conditions existing, resulted in action by the
performed invaluable service in collecting casual- island commander to provide urgently required
ties,providing early care,and transporting then'to antiaircraft protection for the base by assigning
large ships available, or a hospital ship for ex- antiaircraft artillery to be established in selected
tended treatment. locations among the various islands surrounding
Prompt handling of casualties from damaged the anchorage. Initial echelons of those units,and
ships, and arranging for burial of naval dead in Of radar air warning and fighter-direction units,
the Zamami cemetery were major tasks. At least began to arrive at Kerama Retto on 18 May 1945,
one casualty evacuation ship was maintained at, with main components arriving 22 May 1945.
Kerama Retto, and frequently all available medi- At 0000 (I) on 17 May 1945, Captain Rhoads,
cal personnel and improvised sick bay space on all USN, under designation of CTG 50.9.5, com-
large ships present were required to care for cas- mander, Service Squadron 10 Representative "B",
ualties brought to the anchorage'. Kerama Retto,relieved CTG 51.15 of the logistics
During the early weeks 'of establishment, the functions relating to replenishment of fuel, water,
Kerama Retto base was surprisingly free from ammunition, and stores, together with direct con-
enemy air attack. Except for the successful attack trol of repair and maintenance facilities, and as-
on 6 April 1945, in which two ships loaded with signment of berths within Kerama Retto
Army ammunition and one LST, all in or ap- anchorages.
proaching the western anchorage, were crashed
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 5(The
by suicide planes and destroyed, no damage was Demonstration Group)(CTG 51.2)
inflicted on ships at the anchorage until 28 April
1945. This was the more remarkable because anti- The Demonstration Group(TG 51.2),consisting
aircraft defenses were limited to the batteries of of Transport Group Charlie (TU 51.2.1), and
ships at the anchorage, none having been estab- Demonstration Tractor Group (TG 51.8), was as­
lished on shore. On 28 April 1945 a suicider signed the task of transporting the Army reserve
crashed'the Pinieney, serving as casualty evacua- consisting of the Second Marine Division and cer­
tion ship, with heavy toll of casualties; on 1 May tain Third Amphibious Corps troops and equip­
1945 another crashed the Terror,,administrative ment, to Okinawa and to land this reserve when
flag ship of Rear Admiral Alexander Sharp,USN, directed by commander, Joint Expeditionaly
commander, Mine Force, Pacific Fleet, causing Force (CTF 51). On Love and Love+1-day the
considerable damage and many casualties; on 6 primary mission of this group was to make a dem-
May 1945, in daylight and clear weather, a third onstration off the southeastern beaches of Oki­
plane in a bold attaek crashed the St. George,for- nawa, coordinating this demonstration on Love-
tunately causing only moderate damage with few day with the actuallanding on the Haguchi beaches
casualties. by Task Force 53 and Task Force 55. In addition,
this group was assigned the task of landing the Attack by enemy planes was undetected by either
Second Marine Division on the eastern islands, radar or visual means until they were close aboard.
Tsugen Shima,Kutaka Shima, Harahika Banare, Flash Blue, Control Green, had been set by CTF
and Ichi Banare, off the east coast of Okinawa on 52, who, at the time, exercised fighter direction.
2 day if CTF Altdrnate Plan was placed in The planes amiroached low on the water in the
effect. Since this group carried the Army reserve, dim light of the early dawn. One unidentified
it was necessary to be prepared to land the Second plane had been obserATed by commander-in-chief in
%,rine Division in whole or in part on any beach the Ancon but the pip for this plane immediately
at any time when directed by CTF 5. Planning merged with those of three divisions of friendly
Koceeded on this basis and references(f), to (i) planes which were orbiting at their designated sta­
were issued to cover the required operations. tions 10 miles westward. This bogey was observed
Staging and preparation for this operation was just prior to the attack and was believed by com­
performed at Saipan. Major General Watson, mander-in-chief personnel to be a friendly plane.
USMC,commanding general,Second Marine Divi­ No other unidentified planes appeared on the radar
sion, was responsible for staging the landing force screen at this time.
and Rear Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, com­ On 2 April the demonstration wtis repeated in
mander, Amphibious Group 5, was designated as its entirety. At 0634 an enemy plane,thought to
the embarkation authority. be a Sonia, appeared out of the clouds over the
The degree to which the demonstration succeeded transport area and crossed the transport area to the
in containing enemy forces in southern Okinawa eastward. The plane was taken under heavy anti­
is difficult to assess from information presently. aircraft fire by all ships in the vicinity but escaped•
available. A possible indication may be mani­ through the clouds. The only other enemy reac­
fested by the following excerpts from a news tion to the demonstration on Love-1-1-day was
broadcast from Radio Tokyo, intercepted by the ope salvo of four rounds which landed close to the
flagship at 1500 (I),2 April 1945. The extent of TI.S.S. Gregory,a screening destroyer. The loca­
enemy action and damage imposed was "slightly" tion of the flying battery was not determined. At
exaggerated: 1200, all boats had been recovered and this group
retired, the Transport Group to Area Niece and
"An enemy landing attempt on the eastern the Tractor Group to Area Cousin,to awaitfurther
cOast of Okinawa on Sunday morning was orders. The transport screen consisted of Van,
completely foiled with heavy losses to the alkenburgh,Brown, Gainard, Cowell,Seid, Lit­
enemy,according to a report from the Ryukyu tle, and Ammo/. At 1101 on 2 April, the Thee-
front. The attempt was made in the vicinity mini,Lacerta,Barrow,and Bladen,escorted by the
of Minato Kawa on the eastern shore, simul­ Gayety and carrying Third Amphibious Corps
taneously with a landing on the southern coast equipment, proceeded to the western beaches on
of the island. orders of CTF 51. At2300,4 April,the Leo,car­
• "The enemy in the landing attempt at 8 rying equipment for MAG 31, was directed by
o'clock Sunday morning, deployed 100 land­ CTG 51 to proceed to western beaches, and a unit
ing barges including 30 large and 70 small consisting of the Leo(OTC),Cowell,Gaillard,and
vessels in the water 5 kilometers off Minato Seid returning to base for fuel,proceeded immedi­
Kawa. ately. Cowell and Gainard, upon refueling, re­
"The Japanese deliberately withheld fire joined the formation at 2342,5 April, and 0225,6
Until the enemy had reached a point860 meters April, respectively; the Seid requiring repairs to
from the shore,then all of a sudden the Jap­ sound equipment, reported to CTG 51.5 and did
anese coastal batteries and garrison troops not return. At 1725, 3 April, Hadley joined the
went into action, showering a concentrated­ screen. The Leray Wilson;was detached from the
fusilade on the enemy. screen of TG 51.8 and ordered to join Transport
"The enemy was forced to withdraw as far Group Charlie in Area Niece at 2400,4 April, to
as 10,000 meters from the shore after being augment the screen and at 1456, 5 April, Bebas
mowed down one after the other." joined screen as replacementfor Seid. During the

SI
 L4
lYNOPSIS OF THE OPERATION

,The early radar detection of approaching enemy From: Commander, Cruiser Division 5(CTF
planes was very helpful and contrasted markedly 54) (Gunfire Support and Covering
with the Ling,ayen operations where land masses Force)
enshrouded the enemy's approach. As a conse­ The task force was in the area of operations on
quence, ships were alerted and their gunfire was 5 May. Prior operations of TF 54 are covered
effective in destroying many enemy planes which in the action report submitted by Rear Admiral
otherwise might have reached their targets. M.L. Deyo,commander, Cruiser Division 13.
On 12 April, the enemy introduced our forces The task Rs directed was "Support the capture
to his much discussed secret weapon called "Viper" of Okinawa by sustained neutralizing,d6struction,
-
or piloted rocket flying bomb—one of which•
was counterbattery and harassing bombardments * * *
captured on Okinawa after the landing. This was and by delivering call fire, deep supporting,
later dubbed the"Baka"bomb. counterbattery, illumination and harassing fires.
(c) Motor torpedo boats.—Motor torpedo boats, Destroy shore installations for firing torpedoes.
armed with depth charges, of a type similar to Prevent the movement by sea of enemy troops for
those encountered elsewhere have been used and support or evacuation of the position."
are similar to those described in recent intelligence At the commencement of the period reported on,
documents. The tasks assigned this boat appear all of the ships were disposed in the Okinawa
to have been to harass and destroy shipping in the area.
target area and to endeavor to drive off the bom­ Whenever the flying weather was fair or better,
bardment ships, especially at night or in -low visi­ the Japanese continued their air attacks. The
bility. Upwards of 350 of these boats were cap­ radar pickets bore the brunt of these raids which
tured or destroyed in the Kerama Retto area alone. were notintercepted by the CAP;butsmall groups
No uniform pattern of organization or deploy­ almost daily sifted through to the ships around
ment was observed, except that the mission was Okinawa. The enemy night raids increased in
suicide. strength as the moon waxed fuller. During the
There were reported instances of the enemy in period of the bright moon,the enemy planes were
canoes armed with hand grenades approaching not interfered with except by a few night fighters.
our ships especially those ships near shore at night. The security plans of commander, TG 54.1, and
However, when challenged, instead of attacking commander TF 54, provided for continuing fire
they either rapidly retired or committed suicide support under these diverting conditions day and
by use of the hand grenades. night except when directly under air or suicide
boat attack. Cruising Disposition 6 VT was de­
(d) Suicide swimmers.—As in Lingayen, a few
enemy swimmers armed with explosives were en­ signed and used at dusk for continuing fire sup­
rountered approaching transport shipping. They port while giving the maximum defense against
were ineffective. suiciders.
If the enthusiastic dispatches addressed to CTG
(e) Submarines.—The enemy,for the first time 51.22 and individual ships are a criterion, the fire
in the Central Pacific Campaign, appeared to at­ support was heavily destructive and of a very
tempt to use his submarines aggressively in high standard; and always continuous.
strength in the Okinawa operation. Large sub­ Continuous review of the Flycatcher operations
marines operated to the eastward and midget was made and in cooperation with others,improve­
submarines to the westward of Okinawa. ments were made under commander, TF 51 and
Many torpedo wakes, periscope sightings, and at his direction. Planning for future similar
sound contacts as well as sunken enemy submarines operations was also effected.
testify to their presence. On the whole, his effort
was'-a dismal failure which was a very great boon From: Commander,Amphibious GroupI(CTF
to us. Our dispersal and losses in destroyers might 52)(Support Force)
have resulted in serious setbacks if the enemy had This report covers the operations against Oki­
possessed a skillful and resolute submarine service. nawa Gunto of the Amphibious Support Force
 NARRATIVE

(TF.52); and Western Islands Attack Group (TG was commenced. *Underwater demolition team re­
51.1),during the period 21 March to 1 April prior connaissance of the islands of Kerama Retto pro­
to the arrival of the main landing and assault ceeded according to schedule in preparation for
forces of the Joint Expeditionary Force; and the the assault by TG 51.1. On 26 March,the West­
opeiltions of the Eastern Fire Support and Attack ern Islands Attack Group (TG 51.1) arrived at
Group (TG 51.19) for the period 1 April to 12 Kerama, Retto, and the Seventy-seventh Infantry
April, subsequent to the arrival of the main body Division commenced the seizure of the islands of
of the Joint Expeditionary Force. that group. In the meantime, the fire-support
During the period 24 March to 1 April, this ships, closing the preferred and demonstration
cominand, as CTF 52, doordinated and exercised beaches to the limit of swept areas, commenced
general supervision over all activities at the objec­ systematic bombardment and destruction of de­
tive. At0600 (I) on 1 April CTF 51 also assumed fenses in these areas. The capture of the islands
title CTF 52, and this command thereupon as­ of Kerama, Retto, establishment of a logistics an­
sumed title CTG 51.19, the Eastern Fire Support chorage therein,establishment ofseaplane base and
Group. After the arrival.of the landing and as­ initiation of seaplane searches therefom and re­
sault,elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force fueling and amMunitioning of ships present in
on 1 April, this command supervised all activities the area proceeded in a rapid and orderly manner.
to the south and east of Okinawa until relieved by In addition, the reduction of enemy defenses on
ComCruDiv 4 on 1.2 April. , the preferred and demonstration beaches of Oki­
The mission of this force, during the period nawa by gunfire and underwater demolitions and
Love—8 to Love — 1-day,inclusive, was to capture clearance of mines advanced according to schedule
and defend Kerama Retto and initiate the devel­ so that by the evening of Love-1-day, 31 March,
opment of a logistics anchorage therein; to capture all preparations for the assault on Okinawa had
and defend Keise Shima and establish artillery been completed. Upon arrival of the attack forces
thereon; to neutralize or destroy enemy installa­ on 1 April, Rear Admiral Blandy became CTG
tions in the Okinawa Gunto which threatened the 51.19. This task group provided fire support on
'approach and security of the Joint Expeditionary the eastern and southern coasts of Okinawa,com­
Force; and to effect the maximum possible destruc­ pleted the clearance of mines in the Chimu Wan
tion of enemy forces and defenses of Okinawa and Nakagusuku Wan, supervised reconnaissance
Jima by aircraft and surface ship bombardment), of the eastern islands by the FMF Amphibious
minesweeping, and underwater demolition, in or­ Reconnaissance Battalion, and with BtAT 3/105
der. to facilitate the capture of Okinawa Jima of the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division captured
south of the Ishikawi Isthmus. Tsugen Jima. Estes, with two APA's and four
The Amphibious Support Force, composed of LST's of the Eastern Islands Attack Group, re­
heavy fire support ships from TF 54, carriers and mained at anchor in Nakagusuku Wan on the
aircraftfrom TG 52.1, minesweeping vessels of TG
nights of 10- and 11 April, to better support the
52.2 and one section of the Underwater Demoli­
troops on Tsugen Jima, and expedite their reem­
tion Group (TG 52.11), assembled at Ulithi and
barkation. Battleships were broughtinto Nakagu­
departed in echelons to the objective commencing
suku Wan to augment close support of the seventh
on 19 March. The Western Islands Attack Group
Infantry Division,previously provided by cruisers
mounted at Leyte and departed for the objective
and destroyers from positions inside the bay be­
on 21 March. The first echelon of TF 52, Mine
Group One, arrived at the objective on 24 March hind the enemy lines. Hydrographic survey of
and commenced minesweeping operations under Nakagusuku *Wan was initifited, as was UDT re­
the protection of fast battleship bombardment by connaissance of beaches along the shores of Naka­
TF 59 and air cover provided by TF 58. The re­ crusuku Wan and Chimu Wan to determine their
maining echelons from TF 2 arrived at the objec­ suitability for unloading operations. On 12 April,
tive on 25 March. Systematic minesweeping of ComCruDiv 4 in Wichita assumed command of
channels and approaches to the Kerama Retto and TG 51.19 and ComPhibGrp 1 in Estes reported to
Preferred and Demonstration B.eaches of Okinawa CTF 51 for further assignment.

1-15
 E OPERATION •
-
From: Commander,THIRD Amphibious Corps and naval gunfire preparation bdo're renewing the
(Northern Attack Force) attack.
The Sixth Marine Division,in assault on the left
The seizure of Okinawa Shima,was to have been
of this organization, sped through its lightly held
executed in two phases. Phase I contemplated the
area and by 16 April had elements patrolling the
seizure of the island south of the IshikawaIsthmus
northern tip of the island. The only heavy opposi­
and Phase II the seizure of that part of the island
tion found in its sector was on Motobu Peninsula,
north of Ishikawa Isthmus. As the assault phase
a large area jutting into the China Sea north of
developed it became appatent that the great bulk
Ishikawa Isthmus.
of the Japanese forces were concentrated in the
south. Due to the practically unopposed landing, Initial action in the Nan'sei Shoto wassomething
rapid initial advances, and the light resistance in of a departure from earlier campaigns of this divi­
the north,phase II of the operation was completed sion,,not only in the surprising lack of resistance
but in the type of warfare. Here was the blitz-
before phase I. This contingency was foreseen
style war of speed and movement,combined with
and except for the time element, had little effect
its later stages with the same type aggressive pa­
in the execution of the operation plan.
trolling and mopping up that this division had
The III Amphibious Corpsconducted the seizure
seen earlier on Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester.
of northern Okinawa. Except for a strongly or­
ganized pocket on Motobu Peninsula, enemy re­ The rolling checkerboard terrain of this divi­
sistance was classified at various times as sporadic, sion's zone of action on Okinawa was ideally suited
light, negligible, or entirely lacking. The rate of for defensive tactics. Most of the First Marine
advance was governed mainly by the rugged nature Division sector was excellent defensive country:
of the terrain and poor lines of communication gently rolling, but covered with a multitude of
rather than by enemy opposition. finger ridges and interlocking valleys. A vast part
of the area was covered with emplacements in
From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine varying states of readiness,plainly indicating ear­
Division, Fleet Marine Force (North­ lier Jap intentions to defend this area. The usual
ern Attack Force) caves, many of them civilian shelters, honey-.
combed the entire zone. The hills and terraced
• When assault waves of the First Marine Divi­
fields were interlaced by, as one observer put it,
sion surged onto the western slopes of Okinawa
"an excellent network of very poor roads." Most
Jima on Easter morning of 1945 they came expect­
of the streams were spanned by narrow bridges
ing to wage one of the costliest battles yet fought which the enemy had made little attempt to de­
in the war against Japan—and 3 days later on the stroy. The principal bridge over the Bisha Ggwa
eastern beaches they were still looking for that below Hiza was still intact. High ground to the
battle. The division had raced across its 9-mile­ east of Yontan airfield had excellent command of
widezone of action virtually "standing up"against all landing beaches and observation to the other
light, scattered resistance. coast and far to the north and south. The only
To the south, Army units of the XXIV Corps, thing lacking in the defensive setup was the most
also operating against negligible opposition, important: personnel to defend the ground. .
reached the east coast with similar speed and The air battle raging off Okinawa continued
swung south for a drive on the center of enemy into the night of 6-7 Ap-ril with the results going
resistance above Naha, principal city and capital increasingly in American favor though some Navy
of the island. The American advance continued surface units were reported hit. There was inter­
without pause till it reached the Japanese defen­ mittentAA fire throughoutthe night,but no bombs
sive network running across the island generally or Red alerts in the division area. Ground activity
north of the Naha-Shuri line. There it was halted was nil.
by the enemy for the first time, and our forces Our patrols were operating in cooler weather
paused for an extended period to bring reinforce­ and light rains on 7 April. Japs were still present
ments ashore and allow for extensive air, artillery in this sector and carrying on harassing activity,
 tr,P
NARRATIVE
e

but grddfio r or five now were the largest the infantry at 0905. The entire Fifteenth Ma­
encountered by this organization. rines was ashore by 1530 and had registered along;
By this date, morning and 'dusk patrols of Ma­ the defensive perimeter prior to nightfall. Dur-
rine fighter units were operating from Yontan air­ ing, the day contact was made and maintained
field.jn support of our ground forces and carrier-' with the First Marine Division on the right.
based aircraft. At the close of operations on Love-day,the divi­
The picture of the Japanese defensive plan on sion had secured the 0-2line (see appendix 1) and
'Okinawa had been greatly clarified by 8 April. was well disposed for a vigorous resumption of
The situation still was static in the marine's sector, the attack on the following morning. The Second
but the XXIV Corps were now running into stiff Battalion, Fourth Marines, in division reserve,
resisfance in the south. The enemy held strategic landed shortly after noon and was assembled in the
high ground and was well dug in throughout the. zone of the Fourth Marines preparatory to early
rugged terrain north of Naha and was reported release. The First Battalion, Twenty-ninth Ma­
using massed artillery in that area—almost the rines, released by III Phib Corps to the Sixth
first instance in Pacific warfare. It was now evi­ Division at 1300, was landed at 1500 and was as­
dent that the Japanese commander intended to signed a defensive position in support of the Sec­
make his stand in the south of the island and had ond Battalion,Twenty-second Marines,which was
moved the majority of his troops and equipment to protecting the critical division left flank. Love-
that area. Intelligence estimated some53,000 Japs day had proved successful beyond all expectations;
in that zone,including the Sixty-second Division, the only unsatisfactory element was the slow move­
the Twenty-fourth division, and the Forty-fourth ment ashore of supplies, due, for the most part,
Independent Mixed Brigade. In the late evening to undesirable reef conditions which prevented
of the 8th three battalions of the Eleventh Ma­ LST's from beaching without extended reconnais­
rines were ordered to stand by to move to the sance.
support of the Army.
From: Commanding General, TENTH Army
From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine (Southern Attack Force)
Division (North Attack Force)
Landings commenced at 0837,1 April 1945, un­ The joint Army, Navy, Marine forces which
der ideal sea conditions and covered by excellent comprised the JointExpeditionary Force captured.
air and naval gunfire support. Assault battalions the principal islands in the Okinawa Gunto dur­
•of the Fourth and Twenty-second Marines, land­ ing the period 26 March-30 June. Throughout
ing in accordance with the Preferred Plan (see the entire campaign naval, air, and surface forces
appendix 2) were almost unopposed on the supported the operation and contributed an equal
beaches. They drove rapidly inland over the share to the victory. Assigned tasks were executed
by all components of the Tenth Army, skilfully
rising terraced terrain leading to the Yontan Air­
and expeditiously. Rain, mud, and fatigue were
field and.Hanza Town. Only minor resistance was
overcome by sheer courage. Sustained fighting
met in the division zone and consisted mainly of
and difficult terrain that often required the use of
isolafed pockets built around light machine guns scaling ladders and other special equipment could
in cave emplacements. The Yontan airfield was not stop the relentless destruction of the Japanese
secured by the Fourth Marines by noon of Love- military forces.
day and found to be essentially intact. Following; During the 82-day campaign, the Tenth Army
the assault units, succeeding elements of the divi­ landed on a fortified enemy-held island, trapped
sion moved ashore with great rapidity,until about the principal elements of the Imperial Japanese
noon when the receding tide exposed an exceed­ Thirty-second Army, and gradually destroyed it
ingly rough reef floor, which impeded the landing, in toto. Lt. Gen. Mitsuru Ushigima, who com­
of reserves and supplies. Two assault tank compa­ manded the Thirty-second Army,fought skilfully
nies scheduled to reach the beach at 0850 were and tenaciously along predetermined defensive
actually entirely ashore and moving to support positions; but the American Army,from its corn­
Recommendation 5. Headquarters, USCONARC, determine the
feasibility and desirability of combining
_administration of extension course programs.
In this regard, the Board recommends that the
preparation of instructional material utilized
in the program remain at the various schools.

Recommendation 6. Temporary duty schooling be conducted, to the

maximum extent possible, in conjunction with
permanent change of station.

SERVICE SCHOOL STAFFING

Recommendation 7. Headquarters, USCONARC, submit proposals

to Department of the Army for revision of AR
1-11-1 to adopt a more representative indicator
(such as man-hour workload) for performance
analysis in budgeting, programing and manpower
management of school operations.

Recommendation 8. Evaluation and comparison of service school

staffing be based upon consideration of actual
total workloads required to perform all assigned
functions.

Recommendation 9. Headquarters, USCONARC, in connection with

the planned reorganization of the Army, cen­
tralize the conduct of manpower surveys of all
service schools under its command.

Recommendation 10. Headquarters, USCONARC, in close coordination

with the schools, develop and keep current the
criteria used as a basis for staffing Army
service schools and forward appropriate changes
for inclusion in the Department of the Army
staffing guides.

Recommendation.11. Headquarters, Department of the Army, and

USCONARC, take appropriate action to insure
that the assigned strength of Army service .
schools is maintained as nearly as possible at
100 percent of the approved staffing.

14
 NARRATIVE

threat. Two groups, which included one CVE Supporting forces—Continued

each, were assigned to the operational control of XX Bomber Command:
commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, to whom All available sorties against enemy installa­
was assigned the task of protecting shipping along tions in northern Formosa.
routes and in the objective area. The third ASW XXI Bomber Command:
unit,to which no CVE was attached, was assigned (1) Strikes against Okinawa airfields and
to the operational control of commander,Logistic defenses from L-30- through L-10-day.
Support Group,for ASW employment in the vi­ (2) Strikes against Kyushu fields from
cinity of replenishment groups. Aircraft of the L— 9- through L— 5-day, during carrier
Logistic Support Group were employed with this strikes against Okinawa.
unit. The enemy air forces appeared to be his (3) Strikes against the Tokyo area from
most formidible weapon with which to oppose our L —4-day on.
plans. The objective area was within easy flying (4) Photographic reconnaissance of Oki­
range of Kyushu, and it was possible for the nawa on about L-20- and about L-10-day.
enemy to use the entire strength of Empire-based Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet:
air forces against us. It was imperative that we
(1) Provide intelligence of movements of
neutralize enemy airfields, particularly in Kyushu,
enemy naval units.
Formosa, and the Nansei Shoto to the maximum
practicable extent in order to maintain reasonable (2) Interdict the sea approaches to Oki.,
11aAVa from Japan and Formosa.
control of the air in the Okinawa area.
(3) Provide lifeguard services as required.
A British task force consisting of two BB,four
CV,six CL,and 14 DD,Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Ground forces committed
nard Rawlings, K. C. B., RN, commanding, was The initial ground forces assigned to TF 56
assigned to the Fifth Fleet on 23 March and was (Expeditionary Troops) were as follows:
designated TF 57 and given the task of neutraliz­ Commander Expeditionary Troops—Lieu­
ing air installations in Sakishima Gunto. This tenant General Buckner, USA.
task force provided its own'logistic services from Tenth Army:
British Pacific Fleet sources, and was subject to Headquarters and Army troops:
withdrawal from the operation on 7 days' notice.
XXIV Corps—Major General Hodge,
Commencing on 26 March, TF ,57 was able to
USA.
maintain,a schedule of 2 days of strikes alternated Seventh Infantry Division;
with 2 days of replenishment, until 20 April. Seventy-seventh Infantry Division;
On replenishment days, neutralization of Saki­ Ninety-sixth Infantry Division.
shima Gunto was maintained by CVE groups. III Amphibious Corps—Major General
After a major replenishment period at Leyte, TF Geiger, USMC.
57 resumed operations on 4 May, continuing First Marine Division;
through 25 May, after which it departed for Second Marine Division;
Sydney. Sixth Marine Division.
Floating reserve—Twenty-seventh In­
Supporting forces fantry Division.
Southwest Pacific Force :­ Area, reserve troops (under control
(1) Searches over the China Sea, Strait of CinCP0A)—Eighty-first Infantry
of Formosa,and the sea areas east of Formosa. Division.
(2) Strikes from Luzon on enemy air bases Estimate of'enemy forces
in Formosa and continued neutralization of Prior to the commencement of the operation, it
those air bases. was estimated that the enemy had approximately
China-based air forces: 55,000 troops disposed on Ie Shima and Okinawa
Searches over the Chinese coastal area. under the command of the Thirty-second Army
Recommendation 19. target or ideal school program each year in the
(Cont) light of comparison of previous accomplishments
versus targets.

Recommendation 20. Reaction to minor changes in requirements be

ignored in order to enhance effective utilization
of school capabilities.

Recommendation 2 • USCONARC be established as the agency to con­

trol quotas, and temporary duty funds in support
thereof, for schooling not accomplished in con-.
junction with a permanent change of station.

Recommendation 22. USCONARC establish procedures whereby

school commandants and training center com­
manders can quickly arrange for the transfer of
highly qualified enlisted men from advanced
individual training to higher level school classes
to fill vacancies which would otherwise develop
into shortfalls.

Recommendation 23. Department of the Army undertake a study to

insure accurate prediction and materialization
of input to officer orientation courses from
ROTC.

BUDGETING, FUNDING AND ACCOUNTING

Recommendation. 24. Department of the Army rely upon the Com­

manding General, USCONARC, for any required
details concerning the Army school system.

Recommendation 25. Headquarters, USCONARC, *review annually

the relationship between the fixed and variable
cost factors used in mission costs to insure
accuracy in school programs and budgets.

Recommendation 26. Training prototypes and devices which are cur­

rently charged to Budget Activity Account 2110
be transferred to Budget Activity Account 2140
(Training Devices and Publications).

16
 NARRATIVE

Love+-17-day and Rear Admiral Reifsnider be­ Summary of ships employed

caine SOPA le Shima (CTG 51.21).
.(e) The Southern Attack.Force.(TF 55), Rear Type Type Type Type
Admiral Hall, USN,commanding,-was organized
similarily to the Northern Attack Force with the
AGO 8 ARG 1 CVE 18 LSM 111
addition of an LCT and Pontoon Group and .Port AK 1 ARL 3 DD 82 LSV 5
Director Group. TF 55 transported and landed AKA 53 ARS - 1 DE 54 LST 187
AKN 4 ATF 6 DM 14 OBB 18
the XXIV Army Corps over the southern Hagushi AM 42 ATR 2 DMS 13 PC 16
beaches on Okinawa. Rear Admiral Hall was also AN 12 AV 3 IX 1 POE 7
AP 3 AVD 3 LCI 134 PCS 17
in over-all coMmand of both attack forces for the APA 126 AVP 4 LCI(L) 6 PGM 6
landing of reserves and Garrison forces. TF -55 APD 36 CA 8 LCS(L)3 42 SC 33
APH 2 CL 4 LOT 67 XAK 7
was dissolved on Love+17-day and Rear Admiral A RB 1 CM 3 LSD 6 XAP 3
Hall became SOPA Hagushi(TG 51.22). YMS 40

(f)- The Western Island Attack Group. (TG. Total ships_ 1,213
51.1)., Rear Admiral Kiland, USN, commanding,_
Comprising an Air Support Control •Unit, one
TramsRon, Tractor Flotilla, Assault Tractor Ground forces committed
Group, Reserve Tractor Group,.LSM Group, and The following table lists the troops employed
Control Unit,Beach Party Unit and.Screen trans-­ for phases I and II of the operation. Figures
ported and landed the Seventy-seventh Infantry include the Second Marine Division which was at
Division on Kerama.Retto,and field artillery units the objective but did not land during these phases.
on Keise Shima. TG 51.1 was dissolved on Love+ Summary of expeditionary troops employed
1-day and Rear Admiral Kiland became 'SOPA,
Assault troops Garrison troops
Kerama Retto (TG 51.15).
Total
(g) Demonstration Group (TG 51.2), Rea Ma- Ma-
Army Navy Army rine Navy
rine
Admiral Wright,USN,commanding,and consist­
ing of an Air Support Control Unit, One Trans­
Landing force 98,567 81,165 2,380 182,112
Ron,- Tractor Flotilla, Control Unit and Screen Garrison force 182,137 8,310 79,307 269,754
'transported the. Second Marine Division plus
Net totaltroops
Army reserves, and .after executing diversionary 98,567 81,165 2,380 182,137 8,310 79,307 451,866
feints on the Southeast coast of Okinawa_ and
.landing Army Reserve Units over designated'
Principal Strategic Features of the Operation
beaches, retired with the Second 'Marine.Division
to Saipan. TG 51.2 was dissolved upon arrival at The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the capture
Saipan. • of one or more localities in the Mansei Shoto as a
(A) Area Reserve • (TG 51.4), Commodore phase in the general objective of the armed forces
Loomis, -USN, commanding, consisting of one of the United States in the Western Pacific. The
TransHon,Landing Craft Unit,and Area Reserve Joint Expeditionary Force (Amphibious Forces,
Screen was available and standing by to load U.S.Pacific Fleet) as part of the Fifth Fleet was
transport and land the Thirty-first Infantry Divi­ assigned the mission for the capture, occupation
sion,but this division was.not released by CinePac and defense of the Okinawa Gunto. The Fifth
as"it was.not necessary to the operation. Fleet was assisted by other forces under the con­
trol of the commander in chief,Pacific Ocean area,
Ships employed in the operation. the commander in chief, Southwest Pacific area,
A total of 1,213 . ships listed .as to :type in the the Twentieth Bomber Command, and a British
table below were employed by TF-51.. The list carrier task force. The strategy employed in this
eludes assault shipping and ships of the first gar­ operation may be described as follows:
rison echelon but does not include'ships from other (a) The west coast of the United States,.Ha­
forces which operated temporarily -under senior waiian Islands, Marianas, Marshals, Carolines,
officers present afloat. at the objective. and Leyte in the Philippines served as bases for
 (1) •The duties of an instructor are not defined.

(2) The missions assigned to a given school include much

more than supplying classroom instruction.

In civilian operations a teacher is expected to meet his classes, do

research, write and edit publications, carry on committee assignments,
and perhaps administer, all to varying degrees? Military schools are
expected to carry on resident and nonresident instruction, develop doc­
trine and combat concepts, write training literature for field use, and
support various training activities. The staff needs of various courses
as they may differ in hours devoted to lecture and/or laboratory, and
as some laboratories may involve usage of expensive or hazardous
equipment requiring close instructor supervision, all contribute to
major variations in instructor-student ratio. This is a factor which can
only be measured on a per-course basis.

e. The shortness of time of assignment of personnel to the

teaching function, and the non-productive teacher training required of
each newcomer to make him a good teacher, are factors tending to
raise educational costs. In a changing field, such as the military area,
a permanent career teaching staff would introduce dangers. At the
same time, a two year assignment, of which less than two years is
productive, is much too short.

f. It is argued that it is the teachers who contribute most

to development of combat doctrine, and this justifies adding the prepara­
tion of doctrine as a part of a school's mission. The Consultant feels
this statement needs to be examined, in view of the short time a'teacher
is in a school,: and of the complaint that many of these teachers are new
and inexperienced second lieutenants. We do not propose elimination
of doctrinal responsibility from the schools, since this might be
equivalent to removal of research from a civilian institution; however,
we do suggest that separation of doctrine responsibility and teaching
responsibility might be possible, but with strong coordination and
cooperation achieved between the personnel involved. Costs of education
could be clarified thereby.

g. After consolidation of the teaching and training responsi­

bilities under USCONARC, it is suggested that consideration be given to
establishment of periodic (biennial?) review of each school by boards
comparable to the accreditation committees which visit civilian engi­
neering colleges, under sponsorship of the Engineers Council for Profes­
sional Development. Such boards would be composed of headquarters
personnel and military educators from other Army schools and given the
responsibility to:

18
 4v,

RADAR REFERENCE PLOTTING CHART

CHART NO 1 TO SECTION (E) OF PART(V)
COMPHIBSPAC ACTION REPORT
OKI NAWA GU NTO
PHASES 1 AND 11

QC' In' 28 130'

—28•

Z5*­

Dratted By
Intelligence Section Corn Phibs
22 March 1945
130*

L 1 #14tis
 NARRATIVE

staff and with prqpei.-communication and intelli­ TG 51.19 included (on a 24-hour basis)
gence facilities, he can ensure that the naval bom­ ships for delivery of fire support from the
bardment prior to Love-day achieves maximum eastern side of Okinawa.
efficiency. A commander was designated for each group whose
The employment of an Amphibious Support responsibility was the coordination and control of
Force, headed by an Amphibious Group com­ the movements and actions of the group in ful­
mander embarked in an AGC, should be con­ filling the basic mission. The advantages secured
tinued. The resulting provision of an adequate by the utilization of TF 54 as the basic fire-support
staff with proper communication and intelligence 'organization are as follows:
facilities ensuresthatthe naval bombardment prior
to Dog-day will achieve maximum efficiency (a) Ships assigned to fire-support duty con­
tinued in that duty, with the consequent benefit of
TF 54: A new feature in this operation was the
terrain familiarity, navigational knowledge, fa­
composition and function of TF 54, the Gunfire
miliarity with the communications plan, and up­
and Covering Force. This Task Force organiza­
to-date information on troop locations and
tion had been used first at Iwo Jima but at Oki­
objectives.
nawa a somewhat different procedure was used.
(b) Target destruction became -a continuing
The ships assigned to TF 54 constituted a perma­
program,in place of the former situation in which
nent organization whose functions were:
a ship fired one day at a given target, and that
(a) To compose the covering force for target then went without fire until later located
enemy surface action. by or specifically assigned to another ship.
• (b) To supply fire support ships as re­ (c) Better control of fire-support ships was se­
quired. cured by assignment to subgroups of TF 54, and
few instances of mutual interference or fouling of
Ships once assigned to TF 54 remained assigned lines of fire were reported.
and were not rotated with the screen or with other (d) Dissemination of new maps and current
duties. Periodic.readjustments were made how­ intelligence was greatly simplified due to the
ever to reconcile the composition of the force with necessity of distributing only to a relatively small
other requirements. Initially TF 54 was composed and unchanging group of ships.
of 10 OBB's,10 CA's,2 CL's,and 27 DD's. Atthe (e) General instructions could easily been given
end of the period covered by this report (17 May) all fire-support ships by the relatively simple
TF 54 consisted of 4 OBB's, 5 CA's, 2 CL's, 13 medium of a coded despatch to TF 54.
DD's. .CTF 54 coordinated and conducted night
deployment of the fire-support ships not given From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
night-firing assignments,and coordinated fuel re­ (CTF 31 and CTF51)
plenishment and provisioning. • Fire support ships of Ti?.32 were at all times
After the troop-support program became estab­ assigned to one of the follow task groups: West­
lished and settled into a more or less routine pat­ ern Fire Support Group, Covering and Standby
tern, it was found advisable on 27 April to sub­ Fire Support Group, Logistics Group, and East­
divide TF 54 into various components as follows: ern Fire Support Group. CTG 51/31 made as­
signments to these groups twice daily (night
TG 54.1 included all ships assigned to de­ assignments on the preceding morning and day
liver fire 'support from the :western side of assignments on the preceding evening) based on
Okinawa under the direction of CTG 51.22. the number of ships available for fire support and
TG 54.2 included all ships not assigned fire the request received from the troops ashore. After
support missions, whether at anchor or acting the ships were assigned respective groups, the
as a covering force. command in control of close support fire made
TO 54.3 included all fire support ship en direct assignments of ships to specific units ashore:
route to,from,or at Kerama Retto for repairs' Fire-support requirements from 17 May until
or replenishment. 8 June averaged eight heavy ships and six de­

-23
stroyers. Commencing on the night Ti J-une 8­ (f) 53.3 Northern Tractor Flotilla—Captain
only destroyers were used for fire support at Laidlaw.
night due the limited operating area remaining 53.3.2 Tractor Group Baker—Captain Laid­
for the fire-support ships. While the heavy ships law:1 LC(FF),16 LST's.
were available if needed, they were brought into 53.3.1 Tractor Group Able—Commander
the anchorage at night to avoid needless exposure Ageton:1LC(FF),16 LST's,7LSM's.
to torpedo plane or suicide plane attack. From 53.3.3 Tractor Group Charlie—C apt ain
'Tune 8 until June 20 an average of seven heav Watts: 1 LC(FF), 14 LST's, 8 LSM's, 1
ships and four destroArs were used for fire sup­ LST.
port during the day, and nine destroyers were (g) 53.4 Northern Control Group—C apt ain
used during the night. On June 20 only one bat­ Coleman:1 PCE,5 PCS,4PC,8 SC.
tleship and one destroyer were used for fire sup­ (h) 53.5 Northern Beach Party Group—Lieu­
port during the d4. After the island was se­ tenant Commander Nelson: 6 TransDiv
cured on June 21,destroyers were kept on standby Beach Parties, 1 SC.
at night to furnish emergency illumination until (i) 53.7 Northern Defense Group—Captain
major mopping up operations were completed on Weeden: 1 LC(FF),21 LST's,2IX,2SC.
June 26. (j) 53.8 Northern Garrison Group—Captain
MacGowan:1 AP,1 APA,2'XAP,5 XAK,
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4. 1 LSV,2 CM,4 DE.
Organization of the Northern Attack Force(TF (k) 54.1.4 Fire Support Unit Four—(Control
53) Love-day, 1 April 1945, for the attack on passed to CTF 53 at 11-35):2 OBB,2 CA,
Okinawa. 1 CF,5 DD.
53 Northern Attack Force—Rear Admiral Reif­ (1) 54.15 Fire Support Unit Five—(Control
snider. passed to CTF 53 at 11-35): 2 OBB,2 CA,
(a) Force Flagship,Panamint(AG-13)—Cap­ 5 DD.
tamn Woods:1 AGC. (m 53.11 Northern Support Craft: 6 LCI(G),
(b) 53.10 Northern Air Support ControlfUnit— 18 LCI(R), 6 LSM(R), 12 LCS(L), 16
Commander Perkins. LCI(M).
(c) 56.2 Northern Landing Force—Major Gen­ 53.12 Northern Small Craft Group—Cap­
eral Geiger, USMC. tain Peterson: 3 LSD,1 LST(M).
III Amphibious Corps (reinforced); 53.12.2 Northern LCT Unit—Lieutenant
Corps Troops,plus attached units; Commander Gillette: 30 LCT,1 LC(FF).
Sixth Marine Division, plus attached units; 53.12.3 Northern Pontoon Barge Unit—
First Marine Division, plus attached units; Lieutenant Jamin:
Less detachments to Tenth Army; plus Transport Group Able, Pontoon Barge
Tenth Army troops assigned. Unit—Lieutenant Dorfman,25 barges.
(d) 53.1 Transport Group Able (TransRon Transport Group Baker Pontoon Barge
110)—Commodore Knowles: 16 APA's, 6 Unit—Lieutenant (jg) Von Frellick,
AKA's,1 LSD,1 LSV. 23 barges. •
56.2.1 Landing Group Able—Major General 53.12.4 Northern Pontoon Causeway (hilt—
Shepherd, USMC: Sixth Marine Division, Lieutenant Wallace (headquarters in SC
plus attached units corps,Tenth Army,and 630 until transfer ashore). •
garrison troops assigned. 53.12.5 Transport Group Able Small Boat
(e) 53.2 Transport Group Baker (TransRon Unit—Officer assigned by ComTransRon
18)—Commodore Moyer: 15 APA's, 6 Able (headquarters in Casa Grande);
AKA's,2 LSD's,1 LSV. small boats assigned.
56.2.2 Landing Group Baker—Major Gen­ 53.12.6 Transport Group Baker Small Boat
eral Del Valle,USMC:First Division, plus Unit—Officer assigned by ComTransRon
attached units corps, Tenth Army and gar­ Baker (headquarters in White Marsh);
rison troops assigned. small boats assigned.
 4‘th...RItATIVE.P
1/
1 ., •

PI
(o) 51 1ssj 2VohiePodtgiC 40
. 401Vitit4;—
4 ieu­ Organizcition of the le Slh,ima. Attack Group
- tenant Commander We son: 12 LvT, 12 (TG 51.21) as Of0800Item,William-day,16 April
LCV(P). Landing Boat Unit One—Lieu­ 1945 (ComPhibGrp 4 Attack Plan A406-45).
tenant (jg) Dann. 51.21 Ie Shima Attack Group—Rear Admiral
Reifsnider: 1 AGC.
.71,otas
(a) Group Flagship,Panamint—Captain Woods.
Type No. Type No.
AGO
(b) 53.10 Air Support Control Unit:Commander
1 XAPs 2
APAs 32 XAKs 5
Perkins.
AKAs 12 IXs 9 (c) 56.4 le Shima Landing Force: Major General
LSDs 6 SCs 12 Bruce,USA.:
L§Vs 3 CMs 2 Seventy-seventh Army Division,pips attached
LO(FF) 5 DEs 4
LSTs
units. 1 FMF Amphibious Reconnaissance
68 DDs 10
•
LSMs 15 CAs 4
Battalion.
LSM(R)s 6 CLs 1 51.1.1 TransRon 17—Commodore Brittain:
PCs 4 OBBs 4 11 APAs,5 AKAs,1 APH,2 APD,1 APH.
PCSs 5 LOS(L)s 12 51.1.6 Tractor Flotilla—Capt. Webb:
PCE 1 LCI(M)s 16
AP 1 LCI(R)s
16 LSTs,2 LST(11) . ,1 LC(FF).
18
Lsp(m) 1 LCI(G)s 6
51.1.9 'Reserve Tractor Group—Commander
LCTs 30 LVTs 12 Anderson:
LSV(P)s' 12 Barges 48 11 LST,5 LSAT,1 LC(FF)
Total, ships 366 less 48 barges.
Landing force III Amphibious Corps (reinforced)
(I) 53.4 Control Group—Captain Coleman:
corps traps, plus attached units
53.4.1 Central Control Unit—Captain Cole­
6th Marine Division, plus at­ man :­
tached units 1st Marine Division, 5 SC,2 PC,1 PCE,1 PCS.
plus attached units less detach­ (g) 53.5 Beach Party Group—Lieutenant Com­
ments to Tenth Army; plus 10th mander Nelson:
Army troops assigned.
Landing group 6th Marine Division, plus attached
1 SC,3TransRon,17 Beach Parties—Lieuten­
units corps, Tenth Army,and gar­ ant Commander Lent.
rison troops assigned. (h) 51.5 Transport Screen—Captain Moosbrug­
Landing group 1st Division, plus attached units ger, as assigned.
corps, 10th Army and garrison
(i) 51.21,1 Gunfire Support Group—Rear Ad­
troops assigned.
miral Rodgers: •
Northern Landing Force(TG 56.2) 2 OBB,2 CA,2 CL,7DD.
The Northern Landing Force consisted of, the (j) 51.‘21 Support Craft—Captain Rimer:
III Amphibious Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. 1 LC(FF), 17 LCI(M), 10 LCI(G), 3 LCI
Roy S. Gieger, USMC. Two Marine divisions (M). •
(reinforced) were assigned to the corps, the 1st (k) 51.21.3 Underwater Demolition Unit—Cap­
Marine Division (reinforced) and the 6th Marine tain Williams:
Division (reinforced). The 1st Marine Division 2 APD,4 DD,3 DD.
(reinforced) commanded by Maj. Gen. P. A. del 51.21.34 Fast Transport Unit—Captain Wil­
Valle,'USW, was composed of RCT 1, RCT 5, liams:
RCT 7,Division Artillery (11th Marines),and at 2 APD.
units. The 6th Marine Division (rein­ (1) 51.17 Hydrographic Survey Group—Com­
forced (less RCT 29), commanded by Maj. Gen. mander Saunders: 1 PCS(H). ­
I. C.Shepard,Jr.,USW,comprised RCT 4,RCT (m)51.21.4 Service and Salvage Unit-1 ATF.
22, Division Artillery (15th Marines) and at­ (n) 51.21.5 LOT and Pontoon Barge Unit:
tached units.. Supporting the two attacking di­ Warping Tugs No. 1 and No. 8 Barges and
visions were the corps artillery, antiaircraft artil LCT's as assigned.
lery,corps reserve (RCT 29) and corps troops. (o) 51.21.6 Pontoon Causeway Unit (under Op­
Additional Units: 2 SC, 2 PCE(R). erational Control)—2LST(of CTU 51.1.6).
17-25.
 ••

Ohti1zATJQN
' •11
;fr ; .
(p) 51.21.7 Boat Patrb idifenant Com­ USN,commander, Amphibious Group 12, during
mander R. R. Nelson: 12 landing boats as the capture of Okinawa Jima.
. assigned by CTR 17. It includes the period from March 14, 1945, at
51.21 LSM(R.). Group (temp.)—Commander which time TF 55 (Southern Attack Force) com­
Francis (operating with Gunfire Support menced rehearsal for the assault, until June 9,
Group).: 1 LC(FF),6 LSM(R). • 1945, when Rear Admiral Hall and certain mem­
52.24.2 Mortar Support Division Six (Temp.) bers of his staff left Okinawa and proceeded to
(operating off Sesoka Jima):4 LCI(M). Manila by air.
TF 55 (Southern Attack Force) was composed
le Shima Landing Force (TG 56.4) of the following groups:
The Ie Shima landing force consisted of the
(a) Force Flagship, Teton—Captain Tallman,
Seventy-seventh Infantry Division (reinforced)
USN,commanding.
(USA)commanded by Major General A.D.Bruce,
USA. This force was composed of RCT 305 (Sec-. (b) 55.10 Air Support Control Unit—Capt. M.
ond Battalion), ROT 306, ROT 307, division ar­ F. Leslie, USN, commanding.
tillery, and attached units. Four Field Artillery (c) 56.3 Landing Force—Maj. Gen. J. R.
battalions made up the division artillery, the Hodge, USA, commanding, composed of the
Three Hundred and Fourth, Three Hundred and XXIV Corps less the Seventy-seventh Infantry
Fifth, Nine Hundred and Second (all armed with Division. It included the Seventh Infantry
105-mm. howitzers) and the Three Hundred and Division,Maj. Gen.A.V. Arnold,USA,and the
Sixth (armed with the 155-mm.howitzers). Ninety-sixth Infantry Division, Major General
Bradley, USA.
Totals
No. Type No.
(d) 55.1 Transport Group DOG (TransRon 13)—
Type
AGO 1 POE 1 Commodore Carlson, USN.
APA 11 PCS 1 (e) 55.2 Transport Group EASY (TransRon
AKA 5 OBB 2 14)—Commodore C.G. Richardson,USN,Com­
APH 2 CA 2
manding, second in command Southern Attack
LST 29 CL 2
LST(H) 2 DD 14 Force.
LO(FP) 4 LCI(M) 24 (f) 55.8 Southern Tractor. Flotilla—Captain
APP 6 LCI(G) 10 Brereton, USN 49 LST's, 28 LSM's, 6
LSM 5 ATF 1
LCI(FF)'s.
LSM(R) 6 Total number of
PUS(H) 1 ships 137 (g) 55.4 Southern Control Group—Captain
SC - 6 Plus landing boats 12 Adell, USN:4 PC's,6 PCS's,8 SC's.
PC 2 (1).55.5 Southern Beach Party Group—Com­
. Ground Forces.Committed mander L. C. Leever, USNR, Transport beach
parties, Garrison Beach Battalion No. 1, and
ROT 305 (Second Battalion), ROT 306, ROT
Garrison Beach Battalion No. 2.
307, division artillery, Seventy-seventh Army Di­
vision, plus attached units. Four field artillery (i) 55.6 Southern Attack Force Screen—Cap­
battalions made up the division artillery, the tain Young,USN:16 DD's,4 DE's,3 APD's.
Three Hundred and Fourth, Three Hundred and (j) ,55.7 Southern Defense Group—Commander
Fifth, Nine Hundred and Second and the Three Zelenka, USN: 25 LST's, 14 LSM's, 1 IX, 1
Hundred and Sixth. ARB,1 AO,2LCI(L)'s,1 DE,1 APD,6 YMS.
One FMF amphibious reconnaissance battalion. (k) 55.8 Southern Garrison Group—Captain.
Townsend, USN: 5 APA's, 1 AP, 1 XAP, 5
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 AKA's,1 AK,2 XAK's 6 APD's,1 CGC.
(CTF 55)(Southern Attack Force) (1) 55.9 LOT and Pontoon Barge Group—Com­
This report covers the operations of TF 55 and mander Benline, CEO, : 67 LCrs, 50
TC's 51.22and 31.22,all of which were commanded LCM's, 40 LCM(3)'s, 55 LCVP's, 4 LCI(R)­
successively by Rear Admiral J.. L. Ball, Jr., (RCM)'s,2 LCI(FF)'s,3 LST(M)'s,4 LcI3(R)
 COPY

OP§'OT TR, 3
SUBJECT:.A Study of the .Army School System

c. The instructor to student ratios and other school support

personnel to student ratios required by schools in the various categories
.to accomplish their -training mission.

d. Means for adjusting total school staffing to expected or

actual average student loads.

e. Whether costs attributed to Budget Activity Account 2110

are proper or should be charged against other accounts.

f. Procedures for'monitoring school programs to insure

only those courses are conducted which are necessary for professional
development or to produce required skills.

39 The study should include, in addition to the parameters defined

above, an evaluation of the Navy and Air Force School systems for'com­
parative purposes and so that advantages may be taken of any desirable
.techniques they may have developed. Contact with the other Military
Services, in connection with the study, will be coordinated by Headquar­
ters, Department of the Army.

4, This headquarters will provide funds necessary for the conduct

of the study including funds for the services of a recognized civilian
educator.

54 The schedule. outlined below is predicated on the completed

study being submitted to the Mpartment of Defense prior to the FY 63
apportionment hearings.

a. Proposed scope of the study submitted for approval by the

Department of the Army by 9 January 1962.

1N, Presentation of study results to the Army staff by

0 February 1962.

tiSCONARC study submitted to Headquarters, Department

of the Army for'review and a
­ pproval by I March 1962.

d4 Brief Vnder Secretary of the Army on study on or before

26 March 1962.
 J.% r..

011,CaSfiAitI6ST

the names of ships and craft designated to (i) 51.1.15 Western Islands Fire Support Unit
remain at the objective that night. Order (as assigned by CTF 52)—Senior Officer: 1 CA,
night retirements in accordance with Annex 1 CL,1 DD.
(K). Providelanding craft,boats,and barges (j) 51.1.16 Western Islands Support Craft Flo­
for the ammunition boat pool at Hagushi as tilla (as assigned from TG 52.15) (Com LCI
required by Annex (L)." (The above quoted Flot 14)—Captain Rimmer: 3 LOT(FF), 11
from ComPhibsPac Op—Plan A1-45.) LCI(M), 5 LCI(R)(RCM), 23 LCI(G), 12
LSM(R)
That wherever possible a battleship or cruiser
(k) 51.5 Transport Screen—Captain Moosbrug­
division commander should exercise control as fire
ger:1 AGO.
support group commander under the attack force
(I) 51.1.13 Western Islands Attack Group—
or group commander controlling fire. These two
Captain Moosbrugger:8 DD,6 DE,3 APP.
commands should work interdependently, with
assignment of missions, targets, shore fire-control NOTE: DD's as assigned will be inter­
parties,airspot,and all matters concerning ground changed with DD's of TF 54 Gunfire and
support under the cognizance of the attack force Covering Force,as required by ammunition
commander;protection of ships and assignment of situation.
individual firing stations (within requirements of Plus craft assigned from TU 51.1.11 when
tasks assigned previously by attack force com­ not required for control duties.
mander) under the cognizance of the fire support Plus craft assigned from Western Islands
commander. Support Craft Group when not required by
other duties.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 Screen will be supplemented by mine­
(Western Island Attack Group CTG­ sweepers assigned by CTF 52 from Mine
51.1) Flotilla during darkness and when not re­
Composition of TG 51.1: quired for minesweeping operations.
51.1 Western Islands Attack Group—Rear Ad­ (m) 52.8 Net and Buoy Group—Lieutenant
miral Kiland. Commander King:1 CM,6 AN,1 AKN.
(a) Group flagship, Captain Garnet—Mow/it Mc­ (n) -51.20 Seaplane Base Group—Captain Mc­
Kinley (AGO 7): 1 AGO. Lean: 3 AV,4 AVP,3 AVD.
(b) 51.1.10 Air Support Control Unit—Com­ (o) 51.17 Hydrographic Survey Unit—Lieuten­
mander Buckley. ant Woodke:2 PCS(H).
(c) 56.4 WesternIslands Landing Force—Major (p) 51.6 Service and Salvage Unit—Captain
General Bruce, USA: (From Army troops) Curtis: 1 ARS, 2 ATF, 1 ARL, 2 LOT(L)
Seventh-seventy Infantry Division, plus at­ (Sal), 1 LOT (Sal).
tached units; 1 amphibious reconnaissance bat­ (q) 51.1.17 Western Islands Ponton Barge and
talion, less Company "B" (From fleet Marine Causeway Unit—Lieutenant Zeigler: 7 cause­
forces). ways,8 warping tugs,4 barges.
(d) 51.1.1 Tran,sRon 17: 13 APA, 5 AKA, 1 (r) 51.1.18 LOT Group—Lieutenant Carncross:
APH,2 APD. 18 LOT,1 LST.
(e) 51.1.6 Western Islands Tractor Flotilla— (s) 51.1.19 Kerma Retto Boat Pool—Lieuten­
Captain Webb:2 LCI(FF),11 LSAT, 28 LST. ant Commander Pardee: 1 LST(M), 1 ARL,
(f) 51.1.11 Western Islands Control Unit— 1 LSD.
Lieutenant Baker: 1 POE,2 PC,4 SC,1 POS. (t) 52.6.5 Mine Investigation and Disposal
(g) 51.1.12 Western,Island Beach Party Unit— Unit—Commander Clay: 1 DM, 2 YMS, 1
Lieutenant Commander Lunt:4 TransDiv Beach PGM.
Parties,1 SC,1 POE(R). (u) 52.7.4 • Sweep Unit Nineteen—Commander
(it) 52.12 Underwater Demolition Group Able McEathron: 5 AM.
(upon reporting at the objective)—Commander TG 51.1 -Western Islands Attack Group—Rear
Homer:4 UDT,5 APP,4LOP(R). Admiral Kiland.
••

• ;,;*2_
't•L
'•;;
;
 '7=

(a) 51.1.1 Transport Group Fox—Rear Ad­ to have been as a base for suicide boats, with
miral Kiland: Mt. McKinley (AGO 7) (1')— which to attack any naval forces which might
Captain Garnet: 1 AGC. assault Okinawa.
51.1.21 TransRon 17: 13 APA, 5 AKA, 1
APH. From: Commander,Amphibious Group7(CTG
(b) 51.1.13 Transport Group Fox Screen—Cap­ 51.15)
tain Moosbrugger: Biscayne (AGO 16)(F)., TG 51.15 SOPA Kerama Retto—Rear Admiral
1-AGC,6 DD,4 DE,6 APD,6 UDT,1 ARS, Kiland: Vessels assigned, including Kerama,
1 ATF,1 PCE(R). Retto screen, logistic ships, seaplane base, and
(0) 51.1.2 Support Carrier Unit Four—Rear all vessels while obtaining logistics.
kdmiral Stump: .CarDiv 24-3 CVE, 2'. DD, (a). 51.15.1 Group Flagship—Captain Garnet:
5 DE. Mt. McKinley (AGO 7): 1 AGO.
(d) 51.7.1 Western Islands Tractor Group (b) 51.15.10 Air Support Control Unit (em­
George—Captain Webb: 4 LCI(FF) -18 barked in Group Flagship)—C ommander
LCI(G), 12 LSAI(R), 2 LSM, 11 LCI(M), 5 Buckley.
LCI(R)(RCM) 6 AN, 2 AKN, 20 LST, 1 (c) 51.15.2 Kerama Retto Screen—Lieutenant
LST(M),1 LST (BRODIE),1 ARL. Commander Bowes (ComMinRon 4): Hopkins
(e) 51.7 Western Islands Tractor Group George (DMS 13) (F) destroyers, destroyer escorts,
Screen—Commander Hubbard: 1 DD,2 DE,3 fasttransports,minecraft,patrol craft,and other
AM,4 APD,2 PC,1 PCE,1 PCS,2 PCS(H), screen types as assigned.
5 SC,1 ATF,2LCI(L)(Salvage).
(d) 52.9.5 Kerama Retto Gunboats—Com­
(f) 51.7.9 Western Islands Tractor Group
mander Montgomery (ComLCIFlot 6): LOT
How—Commander McEathron: 7 LST, 1
(FF)782(F).-1 LCI(FF),6 LCI(R)(RCM),
LCI(FF),9 LSM.
12 LCI(G).
(g) 51.7.10 Western Islands Tractor Group
How Screen—Commander McEathron: 1 DD, (e) 51.15.3 Mine Destruction and Investigation
2 AM,3 APD. Unit—Commander Clay:1 DM,1PGM,4 YMS.
The location of Kerama Retto, in close prox­ (f) 51.15.4 Service and Salvage Unit—Com­
imity to Okinawa, the main objective, lent itself mander.Holm: 1 LST,2 ARL,3 ARB,1 LSD,
admirably to the plan to establish and develop 1 ARS,2 ATF,2LOT (Salvage).
there a base for logistic support of the Joint (g) 51.15.5 *Harbor Master Unit—Commander
Expeditionary Force and a seaplane base from Walsh:1 SC.
which search and A/S patrol planes could effec­ (h) 51.15.6 Kerama Retto Boat Pool—Lieuten­
tively operate. The idea of capturing these ant Commander Pardee: 1 LST(M), 20 LCM,
islands, and having the base actively functioning 20 LCVP,2 LCP(R).
as such before the main assault was a bold con­ 51.15.7 LOT Unit—Lieutenant Carnoross:17
ception. LOT.
The period of preparation required to accom­ (i) 51.15.8 Pontoon Barge and Causeway Unit—
plish mine sweeping, amphibious reconnaissance Lieutenant Zeigler:2 causeways,1 barge.
and shore bombardmentfor the Okinawa operation (j) 52.8 Net and Buoy Group—Commander
amounted to 8 days. The ability to replenish fuel King:1 AKN,6 AN.
and ammunition expended from sources so near (k) 51.20 Seaplane Base Group—Captain Mc­
the objective amounted to a most effective increase Lean:3 AV,4 AVP,1 DD,1 AVD.
in the useful hours of the fire support and mine- (1) 51.17.1 Hydrographic Survey Unit—Lieu­
sweeping craft available. tenant Woodke:2 PCS(H),1 AGS.
Apparently the assault on Kerama, Retto came (m) 51.15.9 Fueling and Water Unit—Senior
as a surprise to the enemy because very little prep­ officer:2 AO,1 AO,(Water),1 AOG,3IX.
aration'had been made for defense of the islands, (n) 51.15.11 Ammun,itioning Unit—Commander
and they were held by relatively weak forces. Farnsworth(ComLSTGrp 74):10 LST,4LSM.
The enemy's intended use of the islands appeared (o) 51.15.12 Supply Unit—Senior officer: 1 IX.
 ,D
oamAN NDAMICA WATION •

(2)) Receiving 6'11v-- of ship as­ (i) 51.2.19 Beach Party Group—Lieutenant
signed: 1 APA. Commander Lippincott: 3 Transdiv beach
(g) Casualty Unit—Senior officer: 1 parties.
APH, 1 APA, 1 LST(H), 1
PCE(R) From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF
Western Anchorage Control—Com­ 54)
mander MacKinnon: 1 Sc. The composition of TF 54 was as follows:
(',3) 50.9.5 ComServ.Ron 10 Representative— CTF 54—Rear Admiral Deyo: 10 BB, 8 CA, 3
Commander Gembling:1 AR,1 AG,1 ARD. CL,24 DD,8 DE,3 AVD.
(t) 51.15.13 to 51.15 Return convoys—Each unit Four units were organized as follows:
under senior officer (convoys sailed to rear area 54.1 included the ships on fire-support duties;
by CTG 51.15, as directed by CTF 51). 54.2 the ships of TF 54 in a stand-by status,
With few exceptions the actual ships and craft or for covering duties;
assigned were changing almost daily. 54.3 ships replenishing at Kerama Retto;
From: Commander,Amphibious Group5(CTG 51.19 ships assigned to the operations on the
51.2(The Demonstration Group) East side of Okinawa.
51.2 Demonstration Group—Rear Admiral This organization worked very well and pro­
Wright. vided a definite tactical commander who could take
(a) Group flagship, Aneon----Captain Pearson:-1 charge on any situation under the direction of
AGO. • commander,TF 51.
(b) 51.2.10 Air Support Control - Unit—Com­ Insofar as commander, TF 54 was personally
mander Dickinson. concerned, Command relationships were well
(c) 56.5 Demonstration Landing Force (from understood and were satisfactory from beginning
Army troops)—Major General Watson,USMC: to end.
Second Marine Division, plus attached units. C. Under the directives in the Operation Plan
(d) 51.2.1 TransRon 15—Commodore Flanagan: of Vice Admiral Turner,the ships of TF 51 were
51.2.11 TransDiv 43—Commodore Flanagan: to perform a dual function:
5 APA,2 AKA,1 APH. (a) They were charged with the preparation of
51.2.12 TransDiv 44—Captain Seyfried: 5 enemy-held territory for the assault and with
APA,2 AKA,1 LSV. direct support of the troops after landing. This
51.2.13 TransDiv 45—Captain Sabalot: 5 involved systematic destruction of the enemy
APA,2 AKA. coastal defense artillery positions and strong-
(e) 51.2.6 Demonstration Group Tractor Flo­ points; shore bombardment preparatory to the
tilla—Commander Niekum:1 LCI(FF). Flag- landing,and direct fire support of the troops after
slap:LCI(FF)995,4LST,1LST(M),6LST's, landing and until final victory was assured.
1 LCI(FF), 11 LSM's. (b) They were also to provide ships to a cover­
(f) 51.2.7 Demonstration Group Control Unit— ing force in defense of the objective area against
Lieutenant Kuder:1 PCS,2PC,4 SC. enemy surface raids. A violent Japanese reaction
(g) 51.2.8 Demonstration Group Screen—Cap­ to this entire operation was expected. It was con­
tain Chandler:7 DD,2 DE,2.APD,2SC. templated that surface attempts under conceal­
(A) 51.2.9 Demonstration Support Craft—Lieu­ ment of bad weather or low visibility would be
tenant Cammander McFadden: made upon the area. Therefore,a command set up
51.2.91 Support Unit Able—Lieutenant to quickly meet such a threat had to be established.
Commander Brown:6 LCI(M). This was the principal battle function of corn­
52.24.1 Mortar Support Division Five— mander TF 54.
Lieutenant CommanderBrown: 6LCI(M). While performing the functions under (a)
51.2.92 Support Unit Baker—Lieutenant above,the ships of TF 54 were assigned to TF 52.
Commander McFadden: 6 LCI(G), 6 In their other naval functions, i. e., during move­
LCS(L). ment from the base into the assault area; in
preparation for and in conducting naval surface "Senior officer of group" may likewise make a task
engagements or when acting as covering force for organization valid oirer a longer period of time.
the area,they were under commander TF 54. By There is a tendency in Operation Plans for am­
conferences at Ulithi the Command relationships phibious assaults to consider only the D-day
were clearly worked out so that the execution of organimtion, whereas that day represents only a
the plah proceeded with great smoothness and very small proportion of the time the plan., is
without any question as to Command authority. effective.
During the preparatory period in the assault Changes.—Thousands of officer-hours can be
area, War Admiral Blandy divided the ships as­ saved by issuance of replacement pages wherever
signed to him into fire support units, each com­ possible. This applies particularly to large
manded. by flag officer. This permitted local printed tables and charts.
tactical-sltuations to be met,such as defense against
air attacks, submarines, etc., and afforded a satis­ Front: Commander, Cruiser Division 5(CTF
factory Command relationship. Before dark each 54)
night these units, except for a few ships retained At 1200,5 May 1945,commander, Cruiser Divi­
for night duties, were returned to commander TF sion 5, relieved commander, Cruiser Division 13
54 who conducted their night covering evolutions, (Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo) as commander, TF
releasing the various units in time to take up their 54, and was in turn relieved at 0600,23 May 1945,
fire-support duties the next morning, holding the by commander, Battleship Division 3 (Rear Ad­
force together when threatened by early morning miral L.R. McCormick). Throughout the period
air attacks. of this report, the ships assigned to TF 54 were
On L-day, Vice Admiral Turner assumed the engaged in rendering fire support at Okinawa
duties of commander, TF 52 according to plan. Shima. The destroyers rotated on radar picket
Thereafter,scheduled bombardment ships were in­ duty. Commander, Cruiser Division 5, was, with
dividually assigned to the assault forge com­ the exception of a few ammunition replenishment
manders, commander,TF 53, commander,TF 55, days,in command of TG 54.1 which supported the
and commander,TF 51.19. This was done without western side Okinawa.
regard to tactical organization and without fire-
Fire support missions were as assigned by the
support group commanders. There were doubt­
commander,TG 51.22.
less reasonsfor this arrangement,such as,ammuni­
tion supply and availability,types,and calibers of The task force was organized as follows in ac­
guns,etc. From the Command pointofview,how­ cordance with a message received from com­
ever, and to meet local tactical situations or emer­ mander,TF 51, on 27 April:
gencies,the method used in the period of prepara­ TG 54.1—Western Fire Support Group—as­
tion is believed to be preferable. There is also the signed ships supporting the Twenty-fourth Corps
point that services of rear admirals commanding from the western side of Okinawa with the task
tactical units should be utilized whenever prac­ of furnishing gunfire support as directed by CTG
ticable. 51.22.
Reports.—The inclusion in one section of Opera­ TG 54.2—Covering Group—with the task of
tion Plans of a list of reports of various kinds de­ deploying as a covering force against surface at-
sired by that command would be very helpful. task, otherwise to anchor in the transport area
This would be preferably in tabular form showing and to carry out such maneuvers as to best resist
the nature of the report,to whom made,and when air attack and cover ships in the transport area.
and by what means. TG 54.3—Logistics Group: The composition of
Flexibility.—More widespread use of the grow­ each of these task groups varied from day to day,
ing system of skeleton task organization with an the ships being assigned by commander,TF 51 to
attached annex of assignment of forces is recom­ best carry out the daily tasks and to allow replen­
mended. Such a system permits more convenient ishment of ships of TF 54 and TG 51.19,Eastern
change and reduces the bulk of the Operation Plan Fire Support Group. On the afternoon of 5 May,
per se. The use of the term "Ships assigned" and ships were• organized as follows:
 ••

I,
k k,
WO N.4,0111t n?
From: Commander, Amphibious Group ONE '(57 -Western Islands Control Unit (TU
(CTF 52) (Commander, Amphibious 51.1.11)—Lieutenant Baker: 1 PCE, 1 PCS,
Support Force) 2PC,and 4 SC.
(6) Western Islands Attack Group Screen
The Amphibious Support Force, during the
(TU 51.1.13)—Captain Brown: Biscayne
phase of the operation preceding the assault on
(AGC 18) (flagship of Captain Moosbrugger,
Okinawa, consisted of the following components:
screen commander at the objective); plus 8,
(a) Air Support Control Unit (TG 52.10),
DD,6 DE,3 APP,and 1 PCE(R).
Captain Parker, embarked in Estes (AGC 12).
(b) Gunfire and Covering Force (TF 54) Rear (i) SOPA Kerama Retto (TG 51.15)—Rear
Admiral Deyo;_10 OBB,9 CA,4 CL, 23 DD,3 Admiral Kiland:2 PCS(H),2 ATF,1 ARS,and
AVD,and 6 DE. 1 ARL;plus vessels assigned,Kerama Retto screen,
(c) Support Carrier Group (TG- 52.1), Rear ammunition ships, and oilers and all vessels while
Admiral Durgin: 14 CVE,10 DD,and 17 DE. obtaining logistics.
(d) Mine Flotilla (TG 52.2), Rear Admiral (I) Seaplane Base Group(TO 51.20)—Captain
Sharp: 1 CM,13 DMS,13 DM,36 AM,4 PC,5 McLean: 3 AV,4 AVP,and 3 AVD (AVD's in­
PGM,26 YMS,and 20 LCP (R);one mine inves­ itially part of TF 54).
tigation and disposal unit employing the follow­ Neutralization of enemy air forces in this cam­
ing ships: 1 DM,1 PGM,2 YMS (assigned from paign, outside the Okinawa Gunto, was provided
other sweep units),and 4LCP(R)(assigned from for in plans of higher authority. Likewise,TF 58,
other units). operating to the north and east of Okinawa,could
(e) Net and Buoy Group (TO 52.8), Com­ intercept any enemy surface force approaching the
mander King. Two net and buoy units totalling: objective from Japan east of the Nansei Shoto.
1 CM,7 AN,and 1 AKN. It was felt necessary,however,to give most careful
(f) Underwater Demolition Flotilla (TG consideration to measures for detecting and engag­
52.11), Captain Hanlon: UD Groups Able and ing enemy surface forces which might approach
Baker,consisting of 14 APD with UDT's 4,7,11, west of the Nansei Shoto. It was also necessary
12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, and 21 embarked. to be ready to prevent any "express runs" by the
(g) Advance Support Craft (TG 52.25), Cap enemyfrom islands to the north,either to reinforce
tain Rimer: 4 gunboat support divisions employ­ or to evacuate Okinawa.
ing 24 LCI (G) and 2 LC (FF); 3 mortar sup­ With these considerations in mind, CTG 52.1
port divisions employing 11 LCI (M) and 6 was directed to conduct late afternoon and early
LCI(R)(RCM); and LSM (R) group composed morning aircraft searches in the sectors to the
of 2LCM (R) Units employing 12 LSM (R) and north and northwest of Okinawa until search sea­
1 LC (FF). planes of TO 50.5 arrived and assumed this task.
(h) Western Islands Attack Group (TG 51.1), During the day,fire-support ships while engaged
Real: Admiral Kiland, consisting of: in covering minesweeping, UDT operations, and
(1) Air Support Control Unit (TU 51.1.10) bombardment, were in sufficiently close proximity
embarked in Mt. McKinley (AGC 7). to concentrate for surface action without undue
(2) Western Islands Landing Force (TG delay, if necessary.
56.4)—Major General Bruce:Seventy-seventh
From: Commander, Task Force 52(Amphibi­
Infantry Division plus attached units and
ous Support Force; Com Phib Group
one FMF amphibious reconnaissance bat­
One)
talion,less Company "13," fleet Marine forces.
(3) Transl?on 17 (TU 51.1.1)—Commo­ At night, however, it was considered necessary
dore Brittain:13 APA,5 AKA,1 APH,and to accept a probable inability to concentrate the
2 APP. entire surface fighting force. Had the few fire
(4) Western Islands Tractor Flotilla (TU support ships stationed off southeastern and east­
51.1.6)—Captain France:2LC(FF),25 LST, ern Okinawa joined the ships operating offthe west
1 LST(M), 1 LST (Brodie) and 9 LSM. coastfor night deployment,a loss of many valuable
 bF,

TfvE.
,
hours of'destructive bom-bardmelit Itncf re d6Wr and a number, corresponding to the number used
for minesweeping in the southeastern and eastern for this purpose in GTE`51 OP Plan A1-45, which
areas would inevitably have resulted. This situ­ had been received prior to departure from Iwo
ation was particularly acute during the first few Jima. Included in CTF 52 Op Plan No. A106-45
nights when the presence of mines west of Naha was an Employment Schedule at Objective show­
would haye made it necessary for the Eastern Fire ing the location and duties of each ship of TF 52
Support Group to pass westward of the Kerama and each fire-support ship from L-minus-7- to
Retto in taking station in the morning and joining L-minus-1-day, inclusive.
up at night. Command relationship between OTT` 54 and
Accordingly,about80 percent of the fire-support CTF 52 as planned was that CTF 52 would be
ships deployed nightly to the _northwest of Okin­ responsible for execution of all operations at the
awa and'about 20 percent to the northeast. The objective, while CTF 54 would be responsible for
group to the northwest was sufficiently strong to the movement and approach to the objective of
successfully engage any surface force which the TF 54 and ships of TF 52 moving with TF 54,
enemy could bring against it, and the group to the for fighting surface actions should there be any,
northeast was probably capable of dealing with any for night deployments and for acting as SOPA in
"express runs"from islands to the north,and could the objective area. This situation prevented CTF
count on the support of TF 58 if the enemy sent a 52 from issuing approach or night deployment
larger,slower,and more easily detected force south plans. At the same time it was apparent that ap­
on this side. In grave emergency,the two groups proach and night deployment would need to be
of TF 54 could have concentrated by passing mostcarefully coordinated with CTF 52'sEmploy­
through the unswept but mineable waters to the ment Schedule at the Objective if confusion and
north of Okinawa, which intelligence information delays were to be avoided. Furthermore it was
indicated,and later developments proved,were not known that CTF 54 had not had opportunity to
mined. participate in preliminary planning for the Oki­
As rapidly as minesweeping permitted, ships nawa campaign,and would not reach Ulithi until
were placed on night patrol around Kerama Retto early March. Accordingly the staff of this com­
and between these islands and Okinawa,to protect mand prepared a tentative night-deployment plan
ships in Kerama Retto and to prevent escape or and overlays of a suitable approach plan for possi­
reinforcement of the enemy garrison. Likewise, ble assistance to CTF 54, and sent them to Ulithi
similar night patrols were stationed off eastern, by air mail. Copies were also sent to Commander
southern, and western Okinawa, and as soon as a Mine Flotilla at Ulithi,who was instructed to,con­
swept area was available,off northern Okinawa. sult with CTF 54 to insure that there was no
Actually,the enemy made no attemptto interfere interference between the approach of TF 54 and
with our pre-Love-day operations with his surface units of the Mine Flotilla.
forces,or to evacuate or reinforce his troops. The CTF 52 departed Leyte on 8 March and arrived
only surface actions were with enemy small craft, Ulithi on 11 March. It was then learned that Vice
elsewhere described in this report. Admiral Oldendorf would be unable to act as CTF
Radar picket stations were manned daily to the 54 due to injuries received in a small boat accident
northeast, north,northwest and southwest of Oki­ the day before. Since the Mine Flotilla was to
nawa to give timely warning of the approach of depart Ulithi for Okinawa on 19 March and all
enemy planes,and to direct assigned groups of the other ships present of TF 52 and TF 54 on 21
combat air patrol in intercepting these planes. March, it was of the greatest urgency that plans
Copies of the plan for ships of TF 52 assembling., of CTF 54, integrated with those of CTF 52 and
at Ulithi were forwarded by air to expedite dis­ commander,Mine Flotilla,be prepared and issued
tribution. At the time the plan was issued the at the earliest-possible time. CTF 52 immediately
approximate numbers and types of ships which held conferences with the staff of Vice Admiral
would form the Fire-Support Group were known, Oldendorf and with CominPac and his staff so
but the names of the ships were not known. Each that correlated planning could proceed while des­
fire-support ship was therefore identified by type ignation of a new CTF 54 was being decided by
 (c) Calculation of loads and reconciliation with
Department of the Army ceilings.

(d) Finalization of course requirements.

(e) Scheduling of classes.

.(f) Allocation of quotas to requesting agencies.

2) Evaluate the procedures for a.ssuring that programed

school training is accomplished, to include:

(a) Advance notice of quota cancellations .and

forecasts of expected attendance.

(b)- School training reports of actual attendance.

(c) Principal sop.rces of and reasons.for variations

from program (fluctuations in the draft, PCS„toad limitations, TDY
restrictions, etc).
 REFERENCES

1. Minutes of DCSQPS Conference on Study of Service Schools,

15 November 1961.

2. DA Pamphlet 2021,
- "The Army School Catalog," May 1961.

3. Report of the DA Officer Education and Training Review Board

(Williams Board Report), 1 July 1958.

4. Report of USCONARC AD HOC Committee.on Requirement for

Training in Support of the,Army Aviation Program 1960,,1970
(Rogers Committee on Army Aviation), 22 December 1960.

5. USCONARC Directive 350-19, Program of Input for US Army

Service Schools, 26 September 1961.

6. "SOP for USCONARC CY achool Programing," G3 Section, Flq

USCONARC, undated.

7. DA Letter, AGPA-R(M) 220.01 (3 Feb 60), subject: "Enlisted MOS

Personnel Requirements of The Active Army for Fiscal Years 1961,
1962, and 1963," 16 February 1960. 1The "White Book")

8, DA Pamphlet 20,-558,- "Staffing Guide for U. S. Army. Combat Arms

Service Schools," March 1959 with Ch 3, December 1960.

9. DA Pamphlet 20-565 (Draft), "Staffing Guide for U. S. Army

Technical ervi,ce Schools," August 1961.

10. AFM 25-, "USAF Manpower Validation Program," 9 January 1961,

11. AR 1-11-1, "Army Management Structure."

12. AR 11-2, "Programs - Budget Structure."

13, AR 10-7 with 3 changes "Organization and Functions, United States

Continental Army Command."
 :

TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

before sortie. It is recommended that in future (c) As early as practicable,a training command.
operations,a specific assault frequency assignment should be established at Okinawa, to have cogni­
be made for LSM type ships,mentioned as such in zance over alltraining there,including fire-fighting
the operation and movement orders. Due to the school.
movement of the LSM'§- in and out of our area,no
close contact was maintained with ships originally From:Commander,Amphibious Forces,Pacific
comprising this command. Original ships of the The dispersion of troops and shipping allocated
unit were ordered elsewhere, and other LSM's to the Joint Expeditionary Force (51) for the
joined this unit for varying periods,in such a way Okinawa operation, from the Philippines to the
as to make it impossible to determine at a given west coast and in South Pacific, precluded a joint
moment just what ships, other than the flagship, rehearsal of all units.
would comprise this unit for the operation. The Northern Attack Force (53) loaded, em­
barked troops, and engaged in rehearsal exercises
TRAINING AND REHEARSAL in the Guadalcanal area from 1 to 8 March. The
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet (Officer Southern Attack Force (55) loaded, embarked
Commanding the RYUKYUS Opera­ troops, and engaged in rehearsals in the Leyte
tion) area from 14 to 21 March. Western Islands At­
tack Group (51.1) loaded, embarked troops and
Continuous training is difficult to maintain dur­ engaged in rehearsals in the Leyte area from 9 to
ing preparation for and execution of operations, 15 March. Demonstration Group (51.2) loaded
but a considerable amountis accomplished by those and embarked troops in the Marianas. The force
commanders who recognize the need-for it and who assembled at Saipan and engaged in rehearsals in
utilize their opportunities. The Fast Carrier that area from 16 to 19 March. Garrison force
Force(TF 58) has done wellin this respect. Oper­ troops were embarked on the west coast,in Hawaii,
atingin a comparativelyfirm task organization and the South Pacific, the Carolines and Leyte. The
being able to provide their own services to a large garrison elements accompanying the assault force
extent,they have utilized periods while en route to were assembled with their parent forces and par­
and during fueling operations to conduct trainin ticipated in scheduled rehearsals. The Amphib­
exercises to good advantage. Ships of the am­ ious Support Force (52) (less Support Carrier
phibious force are likely to operate in imperma­ Units 3 (52.1.3) and 5 (51.13.3))held battle and
nent task organizations under a succession of com­ fire support exercises at Ulithi. Support Carrier
manders and to perform more varied tasks which Units 3 (52.1.3) and 5 (51.13.3) accompanied the
afford fewer opportunities for exercises. Northern and Southern Attack Forces (53 and 55,
In-port training at forward area bases has, in respectively) on their rehearsals and provided the
general, been good, but some improvement can be necessary air cover and air support training. The
made. AA services have been plentiful and ex­ Joint Expeditionary Troops Floating Reserve
cellent, but surface services have been limited by (51.3) conducted amphibious training in Noumea
the poor material condition of sled targets. The but'did not conduct rehearsals. Control vessels
main objection to in-port training has been the conducted training and rehearsals with their own
interruption of the upkeep period caused by shift­ attack forces and groups.
ing to and from firing berths. This is a well The various exercises included both actual and
grounded objection since upkeep periods are infre­ simulated troop and vehicle landings with simu­
quent and of limited duration.
lated and actual air and naval bombardment. The
Recommoidations exercises conformed as nearly as possible to the
(a) The supply of TDD units (with spare plan of the Okinawa landings.
parts) and sleeve towing kits for surface units Upon conclusion of the rehearsals each task
should be continued and increased. force or. group completed final logistics in as­
(b) A supply of sled targets should be kept at signed areas, prior to their departure to the
forward bases. mbjective.
'44
 ANNEX 2

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ARMY

SERVrCE SCHOOL SYSTEM

CONTENTS

Appendix A - Major Components of the Army Service School System

.B Enrollment in Extension Course Program

Incl - Enrollment in USAR Schools

C Service Agency Responsibility for ROTC Support

mci - ROTC Students Enrolled Beginning of School

Year 1961 1962
 TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

dress rehearsal.. All of the transports carrying March 14, 1945, to March 21, 1945. These exer­
assault elements participated throughout the cises consisted of a movement and approach from
training period. anchorages offthe southeastern coast of Samar in
the northern part of the gulf and landing on
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 beaches from Bito to Tarraguna on Leyte. The
TF 55 assembled, loaded and trained in Leyte track followed from the anchorage to the beaches
Gulf, Phillippine Islands. From there it pro­ simulated as nearly as possible that which the force
ceeded to the objective in three convoys consisting would have to follow in the approach to the
of the Tractor Flotilla and two Transport Groups Hagushi beaches. Exercises included both actual
respectively. The slow convoy consisting of the and simulated troop landings. Vehicles and stores
Tractor Flotilla left Leyte March 25. The two were not landed. Although provision for this was
fast convoys consisting of the two Transport made in the plan,weather prevented its execution.
Groups left on March 27. All were timed to ar­ Simulated air and surface bombardment in sup­
rive at the entrance to the channels,swept for the port ofthelandings was carried out by planesfrom
approach, immediately after the correspondin Support Carrier Unit 5 then assembled in Leyte
convoys of the Northern Attack Force which pre­ and by destroyers of the escort group. No battle­
ceded the Southern Attack Foice into the trans­ ships or cruisers of the Gunfire SupportForce were
port area. Both movement and approach were ac­ present. No actual firing was carried out because
complished on schedule. The convoys arrived on of the native population in the landing area.
Love-day,landed the troops ofthe landing force on Plans called for troops being boated three times
the western beaches of Okinawa south of Hagushi butlanded only twice. Even this modest schedule
at H-hour and commenced unloadingimmediately. could not be carried out in its entirety, however,
Two other convoys which were included in the because of the heavy surf on the beaches. After
Task Organization of TF 55,the Southern Defense conclusion of the training a critique was held at
Force and the Southern Garrison Group, were not which unsatisfactory performances were brought
properly a part of that force. The former were out and steps taken to remedy them.
loaded in the Hawaiian Islands and were routed Two minor casualties occurred during the exer­
through Eniwetok and Saipan thelatter loaded at cises,one a collission between two LST's,the other
Oahu,Leyte,and west coast ports and were assem­ the broaching of LCI(G) 708. The two LST's
bled at Ulithi. Neither of these came under con­ were repaired locally and the vessels proceeded in
trol of commander, TF 55 until reaching the ob­ the assault convoys as scheduled. Salvage opera­
jective. They were included in the task force tions for LCI(G) 708 were still in progress when
principally because the personnel and material em­ this Force departed Leyte and the services of the
barked were to be landed over the southern craft were lost for the assault.
Hagushi beaches under control of commander,TF
55. :Upon completion of the unloading and depar­ From: Commander,Amphibious Group 5(The
ture from Okinawa of the ships comprising the Demonstration Group)
convoys mentioned above,TF 55 ceased to exist as Commander, Amphibious Group 5 arrived in
an operational force and commander, TF 55, be­ Saipan on 27 February 1945 and became SOPA
came commander, TG 51.22 (SOPA Hagushi and Embarkation Authority atthat port, Loading
Anchorage). When the Expeditionary. Force was plans for vessels of TG 51.2 had been made and
transferred from the Fifth Fleet to the Third loading was scheduled to commence on March 3.
Fleet, this designation became 31.22, but with no TransRon 15 and many of the LST's assigned to
changein duties. Commander,Amphibious Group this group, however, were delayed in departing
12 continued to act in this capacity until relieved from Iwo Jima and the initial units did not arrive
on L plus 68. as scheduled on 1 March but on 3 March. Many
The Southern Attack Force after loading and of the transports had casualties on board and were
embarking troops from the Leyte beaches con­ diverted to Guam for debarkation. Loading of
ducted training exercises in Leyte Gulf from transports commenced on 6 March and proceeded
c.•
expeditiously thereafter and without incident. ing ships from open beaches, and, by correlation,
The LST group arrived on 5 March and loading in unloading under similar circumstances.
commenced on 9 March. During the period 6 to The training sch6dule provided for individual
15 March battle damage sustained by vessels at ship and unit training in Tarraguna anchorage
Iwo Jima was repaired, all vessels were replen­ from 9-11 March, and coordinated rehearsals in
ished with fuel and provisions, and stores and Hinuhangan Bay on 13, 14 and 15 March with
equipMent were brought up to the required levels. return to San Pedro Bay on 16 March.
The LSM's assigned to this group did not arrive The late arrival of certain shipping,and the con­
for loading until 24 March, 21 hours before the sistently poor weather conditionsfor loading,made
scheduted departure of the Tractor Group but all a 24-hour delay in the coordinated rehearsal neces­
loading was completed in time to permit all vessels sary. Such individual ships and units as were
of the Tractor Group to depart on scheduled time. loaded made use of the allotted time in the Tar­
On 21 March the Southern Defense Group arrived ragun . a anchorage for exercises, when the weather
and logistics services yere rendered and all vessels permitted. Shipping required for the main re­
of that Group except LSM 244 and YMS 93 de­ hearsal sailed on 13 March,held gunnery exercises
parted on schedule on 26 March. LSM 244, upon during the day and made a formal approach and
entering the inner harbor, damaged *a shaft and deployment off Hinunangan Bay prior to.daylight
propellor, both of which had to be replaced. Re­ 14 March 1945.
pairs were completed and the vessel, accompanied The positions of Cabugan Grande and Cabugan
by U.S.S.'Whippet and escorted by YMS 93sailed Chico in Hinunangan Bay made possible a re­
at 2200, 26 March on a direct route to join the markably exact reproduction of the intended op­
Southern Defense Group at 0600 28 March. Com- erations of L-6 and L-5 days in the Kerama,
PhibsPac OpPlan A1-45 and ComPhibGroup 5 Retto. Heavy swells, wind and almost continual
Operation Order A501-45 became effective at 0500 rainy conditions caused delays in the schedule of
on 24 March. landings on 14 March and exercises were cancelled
Since the operations of this group required it about noon and troops were reembarked.
to be ready to land in reserve, or to make an as­ The exercise for 15 March was to have been a
saultlanding,in addition to the demonstration,the rehearsal for a full scale assault on a six-battalion
Rehearsal Order was prepared to cover all phases front. The weather nothavingimproved,however,
of the possible operations. This group departed it was decided to land only those BLT's boated in
Saipan on 16 March to conductthe rehearsal offthe LCVP. This last-minute change in plans.caused
western beaches of Tinian. March 17 was devoted some confusion and delay but troops were put
to individual combat team landing exercises, ashore without loss. Full beach, shore, salvage,
March 18 to division landing exercises and March and evacuation services were established and prac­
19 to rehearsal of the demonstration. The re­ ticed, and a token unloading exercise was carried
hearsal was conducted in accordance with the or­ out. Two battalions of DUKW-mounted light
der, with the exception that LVT's were not artillery were launched and landed.
launched because of unfavorable wind and sea con­ It had been intended to rehearse troops of the
ditions. The rehearsal served to coordinate the Division Reserve in making a transfer from LCVP
activities of all units involved and was of great to INT on 15 March, but LVT(4) were not
value. launched. Since the weather was abating it was
decided to hold this exercise in the lee of Cabugan
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 Chico during the morning of 16 March. The pur­
The principal training for beach and shore pose of this training was to rehearse the reserve in
parties was provided during the loading period a possible maneuver for reinforcement of troops
from 25 February to 8 March, during which time already ashore on a small island,over a beach that
the full shore and beach organization was estab­ would not permit landing of LCVP. This exercise
lished on Tarraguna beaches. The ships and their was carried out, and all shipping returned to San
personnel ashore thus gained experience in load­ Pedro Bay before darkness 16 March 1945.

•
 MOVEMENT TO- TH1 OBACTIVR,

From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 From: Commander, Transport Division 101

(Western Island Attack Group CTG Training of APD's and UDT's.—Operations
51.1) suffered somewhat from lack of thorough training
Considering the complexity of the operation in APD work. The first APD's to carry UDT
and the relative inexperience of naval personnel personnel had been thoroughly trained in carry­
involved, the curtailment of these exercises by ing troops, and were able to adapt their methods
weather conditions made the training provided to UDT requirements with little trouble. The
entirely inadequate. present group has had no training in carrying
Training and _rehearsal of transport beach par­ troops, and not very thorough training in the
ties was urgently required because most of the APD phase of UDT work. This deficiency is
officers and men composing them were without ex­ potentially dangerous.
perience in an actual operation,and in many cases
were operating as a unit to perform beach party MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE
duties for the first time. In order to obtain the From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF
maximum amount of training, transport beach 51)
parties were ordered on shore and billeted with
the shore party with which they were to work. There were three objectives for the principal
During loading, beach parties from the various Movement Groups of the Joint Expeditionary
transports were set up on shore and actually con­ Force. The Western Islands Attack Group plus
trolled the loading of the ships and division to attached and supporting units was scheduled to
which they were assigned, under the•supervision arrive at Kerama Retto the Northern Attack
of the transport division and squadron beachmas­ Force and Southern Attack Force plus their re­
spective attached and supporting units had for
ters. This provided most useful and realistic
their objective the area off the main landing
training, particularly in use of communications,
beaches on the western side of Okinawa. The
and control of ferry craft.
Demonstration Group plus attached and support­
Although bad weather conditions reduced the ing units was assigned to conduct a-demonstration
over-all value of the rehearsal, necessary beach off the southeastern beaches of Okinawa on Love-
and shore parties were landed to set up the com­ day and again on Love+1.
plete control organization. Simulated casualties The principal assembly and staging areas for
were handled in sufficient numbers to ensure that elements of the Join Expeditionary Force were
this important duty could be carried out with the Ulithi, Saipan, and Leyte. The Northern At­
equipment and personnel assigned. Although tack Force, having assembled in SoPac staged
only token unloading was possible or carried out, from Ulithi, the Southern Attack Force and the
it was sufficient to test the operation of the beach Western Islands Attack Group from Leyte, and
and shore party control and to make reasonably the Demonstration Group from Saipan. Between
certain that it,would actually function as planned the time of assembly and departure,provision was
in the actual operation. made for a period in which to effect interim load­
Use and drill of the beach parties during load­ ing, repairs, upkeep, and logistics for all groups.
ing period permitted a thorough operational check From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
of their equipment. Some deficiencies were found,
The Northern Attack Force moved to the objec­
and available equipment was redistributed, or ad­
tive in accordance with the Movement Plan. This
justed and repaired,to the end that beach parties plan provided for the formation of six groups,
were satisfactorily outfitted and supplied. comprising the Northern Attack Force, the two
By full utililation of the loading period for Transport Groups,the Support Carrier Unit, the
practical training, beach parties were prepared to Northern Tractor Flotilla, the Northern Defense
carry out rehearsal duties properly, and demon­ Group, and the Northern Garrison Group, each
strated that they were reasonably ready for the including its screen. Each group proceeded inde­
operation in provect. pendently from Guadalcanal to Ulithi and thence
'

•
 to the target with the Support Carrier Unit cov- ceeded to Ie Shima,arriving in the transport area
ering the two Transport Groups en route. at 0530 as scheduled.
Intensive training was conducted en route, in- The movement to the objective was made with­
cluding: tactical exercises and emergency maneu- out incident.
vering;_damage control and other ships' drills;
AA gunnery,tracking, and rangefinding;IFF ob­ From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
servation and check; recognition and identifica­ (CTF 55)
tion; defense against air and torpedo attacks; The Southern Tractor Flotilla departed Leyte
fighter-direction; and fire-control radar adjust- March 25. Its progress was delayed by bad
ment. weather and at one time it was nearly 12 hours
Screening vessels were fueled from transports behind schedule. This necessitated some departure
on 30 March en route from Ulithi to the objective. from the prescribed track and proceeding by a
Roper(APD 20) received structural damage while more direct route in order to arrive on schedule.
fueling from Middleton(APA 25) to such extent By cutting corners and running at maximum pos­
that Commander,Northern Attack Force directed sible sustained speed,the Tractor Flotilla made up
her to return to base at Ulithi. its lost time and arrived in the transport area in
Original plans contemplated that the Northern time to launch the assault on schedule.
Defense Group would arrive Okinawa at 1000 Transport Groups Dog and Easy and Support
(Item) 2 April. However,in order to avoid un- Carrier Unit Five proceeded separately but within
necessary overcrowding at the Western Okinawa mutual supporting distance. These convoys too
Anchorage and the necessity for night retirement, were diverted from their planned track by weather.
this group, less vessels required for prompt un- In their case, however, the initial deflection was
loading, was diverted to Kerama Retto. made to avoid a tropical disturbance which was
During the passage from Ulithi to Okinawa,an forming when they left Leyte. Later it was neces­
incipient typhoon to the south and west ofthe vari­ sary for them too,to cut corners in order to arrive
ous groups en route became a matter of consider- atthe objective on time. Navigation was uncertain
able concern regarding possible damage to the because of the almost continuous overcast during
heavily laden ships of the LST groups as well as de­ the entire voyage and the positions of both TF 55
lay in arrival at the objective. This storm finally and other task forcesconverging into the approach
passed clear but heavy seas were nevertheless en- channel were not exactly known. This resulted in
countered, resulting in some damage and loss of a very hectic evening and night preceeding L-day
equipment. but after considerable scrambling, the leading
While the movement to the objective was ac- convoy began the last leg of the approach exactly
complished on scheduled time and without inci­ on time and arrived in the transport area precisely
dent,except as noted above,it should be mentioned as planned. At 0751 30 March, Support Carrier
that the material failures of some of the trans- Unit 5 was detached to proceed to rendezvous with
ports and the inexperience of some of their watch
Support Carrier Unit 3. Upon passing PointZoro
officers was a matter ofserious concern throughout.
at 0406 1 April the screen of Transport Group Dog
The unusually large number of steering casualties
and the frequency 1-vith which ships failed to ex- was detached to make a sweep ahead through the
ecute proper "turns" while zigzagging created a transport and tractor areas. During the move­
constant hazard to the safe conduct of the move- ment the lack of reserve speed on the part of the
ment. LSD's,the salvage tug, and the Teton were a con-
TG 51.21,le Shima Attack Group, assembled at stant souree of anxiety to the task force com-
Hagushi anchorage,off the west coast of Okinawa mander. These vessels were pushed to the limit
on 14 April. Berths were assigned in such manner to maintain the average convoy speed and had the
as to facilitate sortie and forming-up for approach convoy been seriously delayed by any cause it
to the objective. would have been impossible to speed up sufficiently
Commencing at 0330 (Item) 16 April, the le to recover the lost mileage. No enemy opposition
Shima Attack Group departed Hagushi and - of any kind was encountered during the movement
• . 4. • •
,:st4

1•. pro•
 •
MOVEMENT TO T QBJ cr4,14.
••••.`..

until the night of L-1-day when during the ap­ OTC of Transport Group Fox and CTG 51.1
proach,several enemy scouting planes approached (commander,Western Islands Attack Group).
the convoy. One of these was shot down by the The third group, the Western Islands Tractor
destroyer Bennett. Group How, consisting of seven LST's, nine
LSM's with attached screen, sortied from Leyte,
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 P. I. at 0900 (Item) on 24 March 1945 and fir-
(Western Island Attack Group CTG rived at the objective in the early morning of 31
51.1) March. Commander McEathron (ComMinRon
The movement from Leyte,P.I. to the Kerama 10) was OTC of this group. On arrival at Point
Retto followed the route prescribed in ComPhibs- Mustard at 1345 (Item) on 30 March, this group
Pac Operation Plan No. A1-45. Certain devia­ commenced the approach to Keise Shima. When
tions from the route were made by cutting corners about 3 miles west of Kuba Shima four LSM's
in order to gain distance which had been lost due and five LST's with Group How screen left for­
mation and proceeded to Keise Shima,arriving at
to wind and sea conditions.
0700 (Item) on 31 March, for the landing on.
The movement was made in three major sub­
Keise Shima. The remainder of this group pro­
divisions of the Western Islands Attack Group: ceeded to an anchorage east of Kuba Shima.
one fast convoy consisting principally of large On departure from Leyte, AA practices were
ships with their screen, accompanied by Support fired using sleeves towed by shore-based aircraft.
Carrier Unit Four; and two separate slow convoys Transports were exercised at streaming paravanes
of landing ships and craft,one arriving at the ob­ and tactical exercises were held. On the forenoon
jective on 26 March and the other on 31 March of 22 March, AA exercises were again conducted
1945. . using towed sleeves from two shore based aircraft.
The Western Islands Tractor Group George In the forenoon and afternoon of 22 and 23 March
consisting principally of LST's,support craft, net simulated air attacks were made by carrier-based
and buoy group, plus 'attached screen, departed planes. Fighter director exercises were held dur­
• Leyte,P.I. at 1100 (Item) on 19 March 1945 and ing these simulated attacks.
arrived at the objective at 0600 (Item) on 26 Escorts were fueled enroute to the objective.
March. Captain Webb,USN (ComLST Flot 16) On 23 March, escorts of Tractor Group George,
was OTC of Tractor Group George. burning diesel oil,were fueled from LST's. On 24
Transport Group Fox consisting of TransRon 17 March,the escorts of Transport Group Fox,burn­
less Butte, Kenton, Ach,ernar, Samuel Chase phis ing black oil, were fueled from APA.'s. Bunch
Pitt with attached screen, departed from Leyte, (APD 79), Hopping (APD 51) and Obeirender
P.I. at 1300 (Item) on 21 March 1945 and arrived (DE 344) were not fueled, due to the unfavorable
in Transport Area Fox at the objective at 0451 wind and sea conditions in the late afternoon.
(Item) on 26 March. Support Carrier UnitFour, No attacks were made on any of the three groups
consisting of the CVE's Marcus Island, Savo while proceeding to the objective. The movement
Island, and Anzio with attached screen departed was made without major incident. At 0925
Leyte,P.I. at 1130 (Item) 21 March and accom­ (Item) 22 March, Oberon reported engine casu­
panied Transport Group Fox to the objective. alty which limited her speed to 11 knots. Stern
The carriers provided antisubmarine and combat (DE 187) was directed to escort Oberon and
air patrols en route untilthey were detached at1900 Oberon was directed to shape course to join at
(Item) on 25 March and proceeded as directed by Point Pelican about 1100 (Item) on 24 March.
CTF 52. Underwater Demolition Group Baker At 1730 Item on 24 March Oberon and Stern re­
less Griffin and Reeves plus Kinzer and Scribner joined formation. At 0110 (Item) 23 March,
with Marine amphibious reconnaissance troops em­ Clamp (ARS 33) reported steering casualty
barked also accompanied Transport Group Fox to which limited her speed to 4 knots with hand
the objective. Rear Admiral Kiland, USN was steering. PCE (R) 853 was directed to escort
 NARRATIVE

Clamp. At 1640 (Item) arch ny and radar by the leading ships of the columns, and
PCE(R)853 rejoined formation. were used for guiding the task force through the
Several floating mines were sighted enroute. swept channel.
At 1625 (Item), 24 March, in latitude 21°09' N.,
longitude 130058' E., the Robert F. Keller.(DE From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Amphib­
419) destroyed three mines by exploding two and ious Support Force)
sinking one. The mines were secured together. CTF 52 in Estes moved to the objective in com-
At 0639 on 25 March, Rixey (APR 3) reported pany with TF 54, Rear Admiral Deyo (CTF 54)
passing mine 50 yards on starboard beam in lati- being OTC. TF 54sortie from Ulithi on 21 March
tude 23°33' N., longitude 129°26' E. At 0714 commenced at 0830 (K). The carriers of TG 52.1
(Item) same date, Wyandot(AKA 42) reported had completed sortie about 0730 (K) and pro-
possible mine 2,000 yards off starboard beam, ap- ceeded to the objective in close vicinity of Ti? 54,
proximate position latitude 23°27' N., longitude affording CAP and ASP cover. Movement to the
129°22' E. All ships w.ere directed to be alert for objective was uneventful. Antiaircraft target
floating mines in this area. At 1150 (Item),.25 practices and other training exercises were con-
March, Hopping (APD 51) destroyed a mine ducted enroute.
described as Japanese Type 93. At 0050 (Item), At 1546 (I) 24 March in latitude 24°13' N.,
26 March, R. W. Suessens (DE 342) reported longitude 129°25'E.,CTF 54formed approach dis-
passing a mine 200 feet on port beam. positions,dividingshipsinto thefollowing groups:
Tonachi Fire-Support Unit, consisting of Bir-
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 5(The
mingham,Biloxi and three DD,which were sched-
Demonstration Group)
uled to cover minesweeping in the passage between
The Tractor Group (TG 51.8) departed•Saipan Kerama Retto and Tonachi Shima; UD Group
at 0630,25 March and arrived in the objective area, Able,consisting of APD's with underwater Demo-
on scheduled time. Transport Group Charlie de- lition teams and destroyers for support of the un­
parted Saipan at 0900, 27 March, and proceeded derwater demolition team operations and mine-
to the objective in accordance with Annex (F) to sweeping in Kerama Retto; Fire-Support Unit
reference (a) and reference (d). From 1300 to One, which was scheduled to cover minesweeping
1700, 27 March, the Transport Group conducted and commence bombardment of the demonstration
antiaircraftgunnery practice against sleevestowed beaches on the southeast coast of Okinawa: The
by planes of Squadron VJ 7. On 29 March de­ remainder of TF 54 remained concentrated. CTF
stroyers were fueled from the transports. Four 52 in-Estes approached the objective in company
underwater sound contacts were made by the screen with UD Group Able.
during the passage to the objective, all of which In the meantime on 24 March, Mine Group One
were evaluated as nonsubmarine. Other than the had arrived in the objective area and commenced
events stated above,the passage from Saipan until minesweeping operations which were planned to
0530,1 April, was uneventful. provide for the approach of the fast battleships
From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF of TF 59 within bombardment ranges off south­
east Okinawa, outside the 100-fathom curve; to
54)
clear,approaches to the Kerama Retto and the
The initial approach to the objective area was passage between Kerama Retto and Tonachi
made without incident and landfall by radar was Shima; and to finch the northern limits ofthe mine-
made on schedule. field between Okinawa Gunto and Sakishima
There was sufficient moonlight on the approach Gunto, including the clearance of the shoal in
to the assault area during the night of25-26 March latitude 26'14' N., longitude 127°31' E. These
for visual bearings of Tonachi Shima and the operations were completed according to plan, TF
islands of Kerama Retto, which proved the long 59 bombarding the southern defenses of Okinawa
range SP radar fixes to be excellent. Radar reflec- and supporting minesweeping operations. Air
tor buoys laid by the minesweepers to mark the cover was furnished by TF 58. TF 58 also sent
swept channel were satisfactorily picked up by air strikes in to destroy enemy planes and render

•
•
 z
F •
•

qi
ERAL Aèddi; 4,,
4 011ERATIONS
7

on Okinawainoperative. In the late after­ assault anc,— capture of Ie Shima, which was com­
noon fast battleships of TF 59 proceeded to rejoin menced on 15 April and completed on 20 April
;IT 58, and Mine Group One retired to the south. 1945 and then went into the line on Okinawa.
The Mine Group (TG 52.2) commenced mine-
GENERAL ACCOUNT OF NAVAL AND AIR sweeping operations on Love—8 in both Kerama,..,
OPERATIONS Retto and Okinawa areas. Its first task was to
insure a safe approach for TF 52,the Amphibious
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF
Support Force TG 51.1, the Western Islands At­
51)
tack Group and TF 54,the Gunfire and Covering
The operation for the capture of Okinawa Gunto Force (Rear Admiral Deyo). Its first day's oper­
was the largest of its kind yet undertaken in the ation was covered by gunfire from the fast battle­
Pacific. Over 1,200 ships of all types participated, ships ofTF 58. Thenceforth,minesweeping of all
as parts of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Load­ waters surrounding Okinawa.and adjacent islands
ings, lifting of troops and cargo, assembly, and was carried out in accordance with plan, and, in
staging proceeded in a satisfactory manner from addition, daily clearance sweeps maintained of
ports on The west coast of the United States and transport areas and approach channels. TF 52,
from the Hawaiian, Marshalls, Carolines, Mari­ consisting of a Support Carrier Group, Air Sup­
anas, South Pacific and Philippine areas. Move­ port Control Unit, Mine Flotilla, Underwater
ment of all forces to the objective was carried out, Demolition Flotilla,GunboatSupportFlotilla and
without enemy interference. Operational break­ Mortar SupportFlotilla,conducted,in conjunction
downs enroute were insignificant, a fact which with TF 54 bombardments, minesweeps, beach
speaks well for the efficiency of those upon whom reconnaissance,and demolition missions,according
have devolved the responsibilities_of sailing,main­ to plan. Upon the arrival of CTF 51 on Love-day,
tenance,and repair of our ships and craft. Rear Admiral Blandy assumed duties as CTG
Prior to the landings of the main assault forces 51.19, Eastern Fire Support Group,to the east of
over western Okinawa beaches on Love-day (1 Okinawa until relieved by Rear Admiral Fahrion
April 1945),it was necessary to seize the islands of on Love+11. TF 54 delivered destructive fires
Kerama Retto,20 miles to the southwest,in order againstenemy positionsin the softening up process
to establish therein a logistics supply and repair prior to Love-day,supported the main assault,and
base and also a seaplane base. This was the best thereafter continued to support the'ground forces.
sheltered anchorage for the purpose required, and Rear Admiral Deyo was relieved by Rear Admiral
its capture was commenced on schedule by the _ A.E.Smith as CTF 54 on 4 May 1945.
Western Islands Attack Group (TG 51.1) (Rear The Love-day schedule was me't in all respects.
Admiral Kiland) under the direction of Com­ There was a slight surface haze which reduced
mander Amphibious Support Force (CTF 52) visibility to about 6,000 yards in the early morning
(Rear Admiral Blandy) on Love—6 with the oper­ during the final approach to the transport areas,
ation successfully completed on Love— 2. Nets but otherwise -weather and hydrographic condi­
were immediately laid-to close the entrances to the tions were excellent. Ten battleships, 9 cruisers,
anchorage area, and the seaplane base established. 23 destroyers,and 177gunboats provided pre-How­
Tankers,ammunition ships,and small repair tend­ hour bombardments of beaches,closely coordinated
ers were brought directly to this anchorage. with pre-How-hour air strikes. The Northern
Kerama, Retto assumed a progressively more Attack Force(TF 53) (Rear Admiral Reifsnider)
important role as the operation against Okinawa and Southern Attack Force (TF 55) (Rear Ad­
continued. It became the principal haven for miral Hall) landed the assault waves simultane­
damaged ships, both for complete repairs and ously on schedule. The enemy offered virtually no
emergency repairs to render them seaworthy for opposition, and unloading was initiated and pro­
retirement to rear area. Ships of all types were gressed favorably throughoutthe day. Meanwhile
replenished and rearmed there. The troops em­ the Demonstration Group (TG 51.2) (Redr Ad­
ployed in the capture of Kerama Retto (Seventy­ miral Wright) executed a feint at landing off the
seventh Army Division) were later employed in the southeast beaches of Plcinawa on Love-day and
again on Love plus 1 in order to contain enemy Eleven ships reported having been under fire
forces in that area. From all indications these from enemy shore batteries, but of these only five
feint landings were successful in accomplishing were actually hit up to 17 May. No serious dam­
their purpose. age was inflicted. Immediate and heavy counter
Naval gunfire was cont inually employed in sup­ battery from ships proved an effective antidote
port of the troops ashore with devastating effect for enemy shore fire. Five ships struck enemy
upon the enemy. Several POW's, in separate in­ mines including Halligan, ,Skylaple and PGAI 18
terviews,stated that it was the weapon most feared which sank. YMS 103 is probably a total loss,
by the enemy. Direct and general support as well although it was successfully beached.
as night harassing fire and illumination were pro­ Weather and surf conditions were generally
vided on an unprecedented scale. Over 25,000 tons favorable for landing craft operations except
of ammunition had been expended as of 16 May. April 4 and 5. During this period, 21 landing
The bombardment preceding the all-out attack by craft including 1,ST, LCI,LSM, and LCM were
our troops on 19 April by 8 battleships,9 cruisers, damaged in varying degrees from broaching and
15 destroyers, plus 3 fast battleships from TF 58, dragging into collision. These craft were in most
WaS probably the heaviest ever given to United instances unable to retract because of heavy load­
States troops for the size of the target involved. ing and the condition of the sea and tides:In
Commencing Love+2, fire support from ships addition, 0 collisions and 11. groundings occurred
was delivered from both the eastern and western during the period 1 April to 0900 (I), 17 May.
sides of Okinawa. Fire-support ships aided ma­ Casualty evacuation of all personnel was pro­
terially in repulsing enemy counterattacks on sev­ vided by seven AH,eight LST(11), three APH,
eral occasions. One counterlanding attempt was and several PCE(R). The latter proved invalu­
smashed in the Machinato area during the night able in rendering emergency first aid to stricken
of May 14-15 by naval craft which destroyed at ships on station even while action continued. De­
least 3 enemy troop-laden barges. Three others tails regarding the operation of all casualty evacu­
may have been destroyed. ation ships are contained elsewhere in this report.
Enemy suicide boats were active more or less Pinkney (APH) and Comfort (All) were both
sporadically operating almost, entirely from the damaged by enemy action .28 April. Comfort,en-
Naha and Yonabaru Wan area at night. A con­ route Guam, was observing full hospital proce­
siderable portion of this threat was eliminated dure when she was crashed by an enemy suicide
with the capture of about 400 suicide boats during plane. Thereafter, hospital ships were not retired
the conquest of Kerama Retto. The presence and at night while at the objective. it was also de­
potential danger of this enemy weapon was never cided to assign one DD type to trial 3 miles astern
discounted. Five large ships and three small craft of hospital ships for 24 hours after departure and
were damaged by these boats. prior to arrival Okinawa area.
Our alert gunboats alone destroyed 71 suicide Enemy submarines were not particularly ag­
boats. It is likely that several hundred more were gressive. Numerous contacts and some visual
destroyed by other patrol vessels, fire-support sightings were made. Details of these encormters
ships, and aircraft, both on the water and on the together with an evaluation of all attacks made,
beaches. "Flycatcher missions"contributed largely appear in other sections of this report.
to the successful defense against suicide-boat tac­ The Okinawa campaign introduced large scale
tics. A "Flycatcher" detail consisted usually of a suicide tactics by enemy aircraft in force against
destroyer and a cruiser plus the gunboat support our surface forces. There were bombings and tor­
craft assigned to a particular area. Surveillance pedo attacks both by day and at night, and occa­
of suspected small-boat locations was maintained sionally brilliant flares were dropped. But- it was
throughout the night by intermittent fire and very soon apparent that,the enemy had designated
illumination. This method provided early warn­ the Kamikaze Corps of suicide pilots to deliver
ing and was successful in destroying the enemy be­ his most telling blows with their "one-way ram­
fore he reached the transport areas except in one ming" tactics. The Baka-bomb, a piloted, jet-
instance. propelled explosive launched usually from a twin
,‘
 C 0 T NT- OF'NAVAL' ND AIR OPERATIONS

engine plane, also made its debut here but with made to complete shore radar installations as soon
questionable success. The Baka, in a direct hit, as possible in order to withdraw the radar picket
roved capable of inflicting great damage as in ships where feasible. To this end, air warning
he case of M.L. Abele,sunk 12 April; but it is station facilities were emplaced on Zamami Jima
ulnerable to effective gunfire, and its very high in Kerama Retto prior to Love-day, and on Nag­
speed apparently tends to make the pilot "over­ annu, a small island west of Naha on Love-day::
shoot". There were numerous "misses" as com- Upon completion of installations at Hedo Misaki
compared with "hits" by Baka-bomb. on 21 April and on Ie Shima on 23 April, it was
The details of the operations and functions of possible to reduce the number of radar pickets to
radar pickets and. their supporting elements are five and still retain effective coverage. Other in­
set forth in other sections of this report. It is stallations were in operation in the Eastern Islands
nevertheless appropriate to include herein some by 10 May and on newly captured ToriShima by 13'
mention of their splendid performance. May. With the capture of other small islands in
The radar picket line was established.and main­ this theater, a further reduction in the number of
tained to provide early warning of the approach radar pickets appears practicable.
of enemy aircraft, particularly low flying planes, The gallant ships in these stations were at all
and also to facilitate interceptions at as great times, and in a very literal sense, in the first line
a distance as possible from the transport area. In of defense at Okinawa. Their expert raid re­
the early stages of this campaign, destroyer and. porting and efficient fighter direction made pos­
destroyer types were assigned to these exposed sta­ sible the timely interception of enemy aircraft
tions. It soon became necessary to augment them which would otherwise have been able successfully
with gunboats (LOS) and later LSM(R) types in to attack our transport and'supply ships in force
order to add fire power and provide immediate The enemy pressed his attacks with fanatical de­
assistance for stricken ships. The gunboat types termination and still failed to disrupt our prog­
proved valuable additions by their AA armament, ress, largely because the radar pickets were an
and by the fact that they are a difficult target to obstacle he could not overcome. By their stead­
hit. Of 51 planes destroyed by gunboats, most of fast courage and magnificent performance of duty
them were accounted for while supporting radar in a nerve-wracking job under morale-shattering
pickets. The LSM(R) types were detailed for conditions,the crews of the ships and craft in the
their ability to tow damaged ships until tugs could radar picket stations have emblazoned a glorious
reach and relieve them. new chapter in naval tradition.
These ships and their supporting craft absorbed. The most damaging air attack occurred 6 April
the brunt of 540 raids from 228 enemy planes dur­ when 19 ships were hit by suicide planes. In­
ing the period from 1 April to 0900 17 May. Attri­ cluded in this number were Bush, Colhoun, Em­
tion was severe. Of the original 19 ships in which mons, LST 447, Hobbs Victory and Logan Vic­
fighter-director equipment was installed,Halligan tory, all of which were sunk. Seventeen ships
was sunk by an enemy mine;Bush,Colhoun, M.L. were hit on 12 April including M. L. Abele and
Abele,and.Luee were sunk by the enemy"Sure Hit, LOS 33 which were sunk. Eleven ships were sui­
Sure Death" corps 8 others were seriously dam­ cided 16 April,including Pringle which was sunk.
aged, and 3 received minor damage from suicide Our own air power was extensively employed
attacks. As replacements, 14 other ships were during this operation. Prior to the landings both
equipped in the combat area for fighter direction on Kerama Retto and Okinawa, the fast carriers
during the course of this operation, and fighter- of TF 58 and escort carriers of TG 52.1 made
director teams from previously damaged ships strikes to destroy installations and neutralize
were placed aboard. Of these 14 additional ships, enemy defenses on these islands. Close air strikes
Morrison was sunk,5 were seriously damaged,and were launched to support the landings, and air
2 others received minor damage, all from enemy support of our troops continued throughout the
suicide crashes. campaign.
A minimum of nine stations was necessary for Airfields in the Amami group to the north were
complete, effective coverage. Every effort was continuously hammered by TF 58 while a British
 PERIODIC FRONT LINES

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 NARRATIVE
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carrier force as TF 57 maintained neutralization The captured fields were hastily repaired and the
of the Sakishima Gunto to the southwest. During first garrison planes landed 6 April with others
the period when 1:01? 57 replenished or conducted arriving on 8 April. was glibordi­
upkeep and logistics, a task unit of TO 52.1 was nated to that of aviation,.and air operations com­
withdrawn from direct support at Okinawa and menced within a few daysfrom these fie)110, ­
employed at Sakishima. CinCSWPac undertook Meanwhile,fr om the seaplane base which was es­
long range bombing missions over Formosa fields tablished at Kerama Retto above Love minus 1,
at regular intervals to neutralize them. PMI's and later PB2Y's commenced operations.
After the troops were put ashore on Love-day, All facilities were afloat. Five AV's and six
air power was constantly employed to support AVP's were employed. A six-sector ASP about
them. Close direct support was not required for Okinawa was*flown day and night,and this patrol
the initial surge because of the light opposition was of great value. Antishipping strikes and
encountered. Targets of opportunity were hit by searches were flown day and night from Formosa
our planes which roamed over our advancing., to Korea,along the coast of China and Kyushu as
troops. Stronger opposition developed as the ad­ far north as Tsushima Strait. Later PB4Y'sfrom
vance of our forces continued to the south and Yontan augmented this armed reconnaissance.
close direct support to the ground forces was Aggressive attacks were made,and enemy shipping
maintained thereafter. The rapid advance to the was sunk in harbors and on the open sea. PBM
north required little direct support but aircraft Dumbo planes based at Kerama Retto performed
were always available to deliver strikes against highly creditable missionsin rescuing aviators and
occasional strong points encountered. The land­ others adrift at sea. They covered the area from
ings le Shima likewise received very close sup­ Formosa to Kyushu. Rescues were made by these
port from the air. Heavy concentrations for intrepid pilots under the most difficult conditions,
special attacks were provided as requested. attimes in heavy seas and during foul weather,and
To protect our surface forces from hostile air also under enemy fire.
attack a large combat air patrol was maintained, As soon as they could be spared from direct sup­
deployed in a circle in depth. The size of this port at Okinawa, Tulagi, and Anzio, two special
CAP varied from 48 planes during comparatively ASW CVE's commenced antisubmarine patrol of
quiet periods to 120 or more planes during criti­ the shipping lanes to the southeast. Tulagi later
cal periods. Planes were provided by both TO conducted one strike against Rasa Island. She
52.1 support carriers, and TF 58 fast carriers, and also acted as station ship for special flights from
later by the Tactical Air Force, Ryukyus (TO Guam and furnished fighter escort when required.
9.2). The latter, when sufficiently well estab­ Initially,mail and press material from this area
lished in strength, took over the neutralization of were transported to Guam via FBI'seaplanes op­
Kikai in the Amami group to permit TF 58 to 'ending from Kerama Retto. On 8 April land
strike targets in Kyushu. plane service employing NATS R-5--D's and ATC
A special CAP of 2 planes was maintained dur­ C-54's was inaugurated. Until early in May these
ing daylight over each radar picket as added pro­ planes from Guam were required to carry their
tection to these vessels in addition to the normal own gas for the return trip because of the shortage
CAP controlled by'each picket. A night CAP was of aviation fuel on hand here. Mail, passengers,
also maintained during the early stages by TF 58, and freight were brought in by air. Casualty
then later by TO 99.2. Finally, carrier task evacuation was given'top priority on flights from
groups maintained CAP over their own formation. this area.
The record of the encounters of the CAP with
enemy aircraft appears elsewhere in this report. From: Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force
The rapid capture of Yontan and Kadena air­ Atthe time' of assumptioil pfthe duties of SOPA.,
fields during the morning of Love-day caused a, Okinawa,by commander,Fifth AmphibiousForce,
modification in the arrival dates of the first garri­ the land operations on Okinawa had progressed
son aircraft. These were embarked in four CATE's to a point slightly north of Naha. Fire-support,
at Ulithi and were ordered forward on Love-day. screening,and radar-picket requirements remained
 :•
•..

GENERqk F 'AIR: OPERAilIONS

.t •
•
heavy, with 5 radar picket stations manned, and damaged ships present at Kerama. Repair per­
with 14 destroyers, 8 cruisers, and 6 battleships sonnel did excellent work with materials avail­
assigned to fire-support duties. Kerama Retto was able in readying battle-damaged ships for return
in use as a repair and seaplane base, and Chimu to rear areas.
Wan and Nakagusuku Wan were being used to a Operational requirements prevented for a pro­
limited extent for unloading. Use of the latter longed period the retirement of destroyers and
was handicapped by the fact that the enemy held gunboat types to rear areas for upkeep or reha­
considerable portions of the shoreline. Unloading bilitation, and also prohibited the establishment
operations were in progress at Ie Shima, and of a systematic upkeep program. Destroyers ar­
Nago Wan was still being used to a limited extent. riving from rear areas were only sufficient to re­
Carrier forces, both CVE and fast carrier groups, place damaged ships. Fire-support ships exceeded
were still being used to support land operations. by large amounts prescribed ESR's for their bat­
Continual concern was felt from the outset of teries. Personnel fatigue, particularly in ships
the operation for the safety of radar picket vessels, on radar picket stations, became marked, and ma­
which were taking the brunt of Japanese air effort. terial deficiencies increased appreciably during the
Antiaircraft firepower of these stations was aug­ latter part of the operation.
mented as practicable, and finally standardized at In order to establish radar outposts, and abolish
three destroyers and four LCS's in each station. the need for the majority of the radar picket sta­
Destroyer types on picket station were further tions, operations against Iheya Shima, to the
increased when air attack was expected. This north Aguni,to the northwest and Kume Shima,
policy,combined with heavy combat air patrols in to the west, were planned and conducted. A brief
the vicinity of the pickets, eventually resulted in discussion of these follows;
a decrease in the concentration of Japanese effort
on picket ships. Transport areas were protected Ocupation of Iheya Shima and Aguni Shima
as practicable by dividing ships with good anti­ By Com5thPhibFor Operation Order A 210-45,
aircraft batteries between anchorages and by sta­ TG 31.25 under Rear Admiral Reifsnider, Com-
tioning antiaircraft screens consisting of destroyer PhibGrp 4, was organized for the capture of
types temporarily in the anchorage area and gun­ Iheya Shima and Aguni Shima in order to estab­
boattypes assigned to the area in a perimeter screen lish air warning and fighter director stations
outboard of anchoraged ships. The exposed posi­ thereon. This group consisted of 27 LST's, 4
tion of Ie Shimar and Nakagasuku-Chimu Wan LC(FF)'s, 4 LSM(R)'s, 1 LSD, 1 PCE(R), 7
anchorages made them preferred targets for the patrol craft,1 ATF,1 APD with UDT embarked,
Japs during daylight raids,whereas the proximity 8 destroyers, 3 destroyer escorts, 6 LCS(L)'s, 12
of the Okinawa and Ie fields to the Hagushi and Ie LCI(M)'s,1 CGC,and 1 LCT. Support aircraft
anchorages caused the major portion of night activ­ were provided by CTF 31. Assault troops con­
ity to take place in their vicinity. An increasing sisted of RCT .8, reinforced, from the Second
tendency to drop bombs at random in smoked-in Marine Division. The above TG was assembled
anchorages was noted during the latter part of the at Hagushi anchorage Okinawa on 30 May. Oc­
campaign. cupation of Iheya Shima and Aguni Shima was
•A major repair and upkeep problem arose at accomplished on 3 June and 9 'Tune respectively
Okinawa for perhaps the first time in the Pacific without opposition. Detailed account of this
Campaign. The large number of battle-damaged operation will be found in action report of CTG
ships, and the unexpectedly prolonged require­ 31.25.
mentfor large naval forces at the objective created
an enormous load upon repair facilities, which had Occupation of Kume Shima
to be increased by a great amount over that ini­ On the night of 13 June reconnaissance of
tially proposed. It was not until four floating Kume Shima was made by FMF PAC Reconnais­
docks were broughtinto the area,and not until the sance Battalion under Major Jones, USMCR.
scale of Jap air effort reduced,that an appreciable Reconnaissance troops were transported in two
decrease could be made in the back-log of battle APD's and made the landing in rubber boats un­
der cover of darkness. The actual landing was southern portion. No enemy a rference was
made without detection. No enemy military per­ experienced during the above sweep except for
sonnel or defensive installations were found. high-altitude snoopers on 18 and 19 June.
Two Okinawa civilians were taken into custody Great concern was felt over the possibility of
and evacuated for interrogation. From the re­ typhoon damage to ships in the Okinawa area,and
sults of this reconnaissance it was learned that comprehensive plans were issued in the initial
probably not more.than 50 Japanese military per­ Operation Plan in order to minimize this danger.
sonnel were on the island of Kume Shima which These plans were augmented and made more de­
was otherwise virtually undefended. Previous tailed as the composition of forces became more
intelligence information indicated that the occu­ firmly established and as additional sheltered areas
pation of Kume Shima would be a comparatively became'available. Fortunately, no typhoons af­
large military operation. Therefore this recon­ fecting the Okinawa area developed during the
naissance of the island permitted a much earlier critical period in which a large number of battle-
occupation with a far less force than was orig­ damaged ships were present without adequate
inally planned. facilities for repair or salvage.
By Com5thPhibFor Operation Order A207-45, Extensive reduction in shipping present in the
TG 31.24 under Capt. C. A. Buchanan, ComDes- Okinawa area could not be accomplished until the
Ron 63, was organized for the capture of Kume end of the land campaign. However, some re­
Shima in order to establish air warning and duction was accomplished by reducing the num­
fighter director stations thereon. The above TG ber of fire-support ships and by reducing the num­
consisted of three LST's, one LC(FF), five ber of escort carriers operating in the area. Fast
LCS(L)'s,one PCE(R),one PCE,one AGS,one carrier forces were withdrawn from support on 12
APD with UDT embarked, one ARS, and three June. Heavy-fire-support ships of TF 32 with es­
DD's. Air support was furnished by CTF 31. corts were directed to operate to the southeastward
Assault troops consisted of the FMF Reconnais­ of Okinawa beyond range of normal enemy air at­
sance Battalion reinforced, plus one rifle company tacks.. Reorganization of forces to conform to es­
reinforced from the First Marine Division. TG tablished garrison esimates was commenced on the
31.24 was assembled at Hagushi anchorage Oki­ completion of the battle of Okinawa,and were sub­
nawa on 24 June. The occupation of Kume Shima stantially completed by 1 July, at which time
was accomplished on 26 June without opposition. responsibility for defense of the Okinawa area
Detailed account of this operation will be found
was transferred to CTF 99.
in action report of CTG 31.24.
From: Commander Amphibious Group 4
Mine-sweeping operations
Throughout the assembly and rehearsal period
Routine daily sweeps of Nakagusuku Wan
in the South Solomons area 7 February-7 March,
anchorage and the shipping lanes in the approach
air protection was furnished by No. 20 (Fighter)
to Hagushi anchorage were conducted by Com­
Squadron of No. 1 Island Group,RNZAF,which
mander Mine Craft. On 14 June TG 32.3, under
kept between two and four Corsairs on 5-10 min­
command of Capt.A.M.Townsend,began a sweep
of the area bounded by the following points Z1, utes notice during daylight to intercept unidenti­
latitude 25°17' N.,longitude 126°36' E.; Z2,lati­ fied planes approaching the area. Panamint
tude 24°44' N., longitude 126°00' E.; Z3,latitude maintained continuous air radar search and
25°18' N., longitude 125°23' E.; Z4, latitude fighter direction. An aircraft approach proce­
25°40' N., longitude 125°49' E.; Z5, latitude dure was inaugurated and all flight plans for
25°43' N., longitude 126°07' E. The above tank plane movements in and out of Guadalcanal and
group consisted of 6 DM's, 12 AM's, 6 YMS's,6 Purvis Bay were reported to this flagship.
LCSs,6 PGM's,and 1 ABS. Air cover was pro­ 7 March-14 March, ships were distributed be­
vided by CTF 31. Completion of sweep of the tween Guadalcanal, Purvis Bay, and the Russell
above area was accomplished on 23 June. A total Islands, for logistics, loading, and upkeep. Dur­
of 101 mines were swept,most of which were in the ing this time training was continued :
 ,
arry N4VAL,,WND AIR OPERATIONS
I
(a) AA gunnery, ,_J mini41 by LST's discharging cargo at the edge of
(b) Air search radar calibration and drill, the reef. Small boats suffered severely.
(c) Fighter direction (visual and radar), During the period after Love-day enemy planes
(d) AA tracking runs, repeatedly attacked or madereconnaissance flights
(e) Day and night field carrier landing over shipping in this area. These raids are re
practice for pilots of Sutvanee (CVE 27) ported in section (B),part(IV),of this report
and Chenango(CVE 28) Carrier Air Groups. Large scale attacks were made on our forces on
Love+5(6 April). These raids resulted in nearly
Task Group 51.11 designations were assumed complete destruction of the attacking air forces,
for movement from Guadalcanal via Ulithi to the but also resulted in losses and damage to ships,
objective, 12 March to 1 April. Training exer­ particularly radar picket and screening vessels.
cises were held enroute by Transport Groups Able To prepare for using the Nago beaches for ship­
and Baker and the Support Carrier Group in AA ping or assault,the waters of Nago Wan were swept
gunnery, maneuvering, and air defense. for mines. By Love+5 the beaches were in the
Between 0400 and dawn on Love-day, 1 April, hands of the Sixth Marine Division which had
while approaching the transport area,four enemy advanced overland from Hagushi far ahead of
planes were seen from the flag bridge to have been schedule. Underwater Demolition Team 16 sur­
shot down; one landed about a half mile ahead of veyed the Nago area,blasted obstacles, and buoyed
the leading transports. These were just a few of a channel to allow ships to unload at the beaches.
the total number shot down in the objective area,. On Love+9 (10 April), commander, Northern
On arrival at the objective, TG 51.11 was dis­ Attack Force, was relieved of responsibility for
solved and ComPhibGroup 4 assumed designation unloadingoperations at the northern Hagushi
of commander, TF 53 (Northern Attack Force). beaches,retaining thatfor the area north ofZampa
At about 0630 the time of How-hour was set ten­ Misaki. It having been decided to proceed with
tatively at 0830 by CTF 51 and that time was later phase II without delay, commander, Amphibious
confirmed. Details of the landing were executed Group 4,was also designated commander,TG 51.21,
according to plan. The first wave landed at 0830 then organized for the capture and defense of Ie
on Blue Beach One; by 0640 the first wave had Shima and the establishment of an air base thereon.
landed on all beaches. There was no opposition. William-day, the day of the assault landing, was
All waves landed in good order and without diffi­ set for 16 April.
culty. Ammunition and supplies were unloaded On the night of William —4, William —3, the
rapidly and as scheduled. At 1230 General Geiger reconnaissance Unit,operating under commander,
and his chief of staff went ashore to observe Ie Shima Attack Group,landed the Fleet Marine
progress. Force Reconnaissance Battalion on Menna Shima,
Transport squadrons of TF 53 retired for the and secured that island for installation of artillery
night and returned on the morning of Love+1. in order to support the assault on Ie Shima. Field
Panamint remained at anchor off Hagushi. Dur­ Artillery Battalions 305 and 902 landed on Menna
ing the night the retirement group was attacked Shima on the morning of William —1 and em-
by enemy planes. U.S. S.Barnett(APA 5) shot placed their artillery.,
down one enemy plane at close range. No damage TheIe Shima Attack Group made its sortie from
was sustained by ships of TF 53. Hagushi in the early morning of William-day,16
LST 599 was hit by a suicide plane during a raid April. At 0530 the transports, and at 0645 the
on the morning of Love+2,with extensive damage Tractor Group, took station in their respective
by fire to the ship and cargo consisting of equip­ areas and prepared for the assault on Ie Shima.
ment for Marine Air Group 33. At 0534 the order was given "Land the Landing
Bad weather seriously interfered with unloading Force." At 0719 Sugar-hour was confirmed as
operations at Hagushi on Love+3 and Love+4 0800. Thelanding wasexecuted according to plan
and again on Love+9 and Love+10. High winds with the first wave landing at 0759 on Red T-7.1
and heavy swells fromm the northwest created dan­ beach. By 0806 first waves had landed on all
gerous surf conditions, and some damage was sus­ beaches.
 -
4.9

At0809 airraid condition"Flash RED—Cmitrol ened air attack,uñtif1100 when normal operations
GREEN"was set because of enemy air raid closing were resumed, vessels returning to Hagushi at
from the northeast. During the period 0800 to about 1930. On William+6 all organized re­
1100 seven enemy planes were shot down by AA_ sistance on the island ofle Shima was overcome.
gunfire within visual distance of the flagship. The period from 23 April until 15 May 1945,
One Oscar which penetrated to the transport area while ComPhibGroup 4 was still SOPA at Ie
was shot down by.Panamint and other vessels at Shima, and Nago Wan, was characterized by
0941. enemy air activity in the Okinawa area every
The Gunfire Support Group in addition to its night the weather permitted,especially during the
fire-support missionsfurnished valuable protection period of moonlight. These raids, plus the few
against attacking enemy planes, shooting down large-settle day raids, resulted in damage to ship­
three of them. ping at Ie and Nago. Unloading of ships was
Initially, resistance on the beaches and most of pushed with utmost vigor in order to establish
the island was light. The assault phase was com­ air base facilities at the earliest possible date.
pleted on all beaches by 1120. Landing of ammu­ The beaches north of Motobu were reconnoit­
nitions, rations, and other essential supplies ered by UDT 16 on 22 April and excellent LST
progressed rapidly. All large ships and LST's beaches and a channel were found at Unten-Ko
retired to Hagushi anchorage for the night and and Katena-Ko. Japs attempting to escape from
returned on the morning of William+1. Two Ie Shima were discovered heading for Okinawa in
DD's and two CL's remained in the area for fire small boats on the nights of 22 and 26 April.
support. Eight were killed, seven probably killed and 13
On William -1-1-day at 1130, two battalions of captured.
ROT 307 were landed on RED beaches T-3 and On William+7 (23 April) the Garrison beach
T-4for the purpose ofsecuring them and the chan­ party relieved the assault beach parties on the
nel approaching them for unloading. The under­ same day the Seventy-seventb Division Artillery
water demolition team blasted coral heads to clear and Battery C,Seventh AAA Battalion on Menna,
a channel for unloading. All large ships and Shima,and the Three Hundred and Fourth Field
LST's not unloading retired for the night to Artillery Battalion on Ie Shima were embarked
NAGO WAN,and returned to le Shima early the for the Hagushi beaches. By William+11 (27
following morning. April) evacuation and transportation of the
On William+2 •resistance stiffened. Mortar Seventy-seventh Division, less garrison units, to
and machine-gun fire was encountered by an LST Hagushi had been completed.
at the beach. Sniper and machine-gun fire made I-13*Tdrographic survey of the south Ie Shima
dump areas untenable. Tank Companies A706 beaches was completed on 24 April. The island
and 0706 were landed. Large ships and LST's commander, Ie Shima, assumed his functions on
were again retired to NAGO WAN for the night William+10 (26 April). On the same day
and returned at daylighton William+3. GroPac 12 assumed its functions ashore.
On William+3 unloading conditions improved On 28 April all transport type ships retired
in spite of determined resistance. LST 1418 re­ from Ie Shima to Hagushi returning to Ie Shima
ceived some mortar fire and the dump areas were in the morning. On 29 April these ships retired
still under fire, but the enemy was finally driven to Nago Wan, where enemy planes attacked dur­
back by a heavy bombardment from our artillery ing the night. ,Epping Forest was attacked by a
on Menna Shima. At night the heavy ships and suicider which crashed close aboard. Another
LST's retired to Nagushi and returned the follow­ plane made a suicide attack on the merchant ship
ing morning. On William+4 the night retire­ S. Hall Young. The plane fuselage and bomb
ment was again to Hagushi. During the night a penetrated the port side above the waterline into
large number of enemy planes attacked this area. No. 5 hold. The resulting explosion in this hold
On William+5 (21 April) the American flag blew a large hole through the hull on the star­
was raised on Iecusugu Yama, Ie Shima. De­ board side from the waterline to the main deck
parture from Hagushi was delayed,due to threat­ and started a serious fire. The hold flooded but
,
 PERATIONS
e
During the period from 1 April to 15 May there
the fire was promptly extinguished by fire-fight­
ing parties from Panamint and Epping Forest were in the Okinawa area approximately:
and from the several LCI's which immediately Enemy air raids comprised of 1,590 enemy aircraft__ 309
­
went alongside. No injury to personnel resulted. "RED" alerts affecting this Command 109
Large scale day air attacks on 6 May resulted in Days with enemy air raids 36
the Pathfinder, nearby, being hit aft by a suicide Days without enemy air raids

plane with only minor damage resulting. Epping From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
Forest at Nago Wan was again attacked by a, (CTF 55)
suicide plane and again narrowly missed. An­
other suicide plane dived for the Panamint Unloading the troops and equipment of the
through heavy AA fire. The cockpit inside was landing force was conducted according to plan
observed to be in flames and just before crashing with little loss due to the almost complete absence
the plane leveled off,cleared the masts by a narrow of enemy opposition except from the air. The
margin and went through some wild acrobatics unloading was slowed down, however, by the un­
before crashing harmlessly in the water. favorable nature of the beaches, particularly
A survey of Unten-Ko was started on 10 May White and Brown beaches, over which Transport
by Hopkins and YMS 319 and continued during Squadron 14 was discharging,and by the inability
the period of this report. of the shore party to unload the landing craft as
On 11 May two low-flying Jills broke through fast as they could be loaded from the ships and
the combat air patrols and attacked the ships at sent to the beach. Landing craft of all types and
anchor off Ie Shima. The first plane dropped a pontoon barges suffered considerable damage ­
torpedo and continued through heavy AA fire, from the landing on the fringing coral reef which
enveloped in flames, finally crashing on the for­ covered the entire shore line in the landing area.
ward deck of the Dutch merchant ship Tjisadane, In the early morning of 1 April (Love-day),
doing relatively small damage and resulting in a assault and follow-up waves were dispatched and
few casualties to personnel. The second plane landed on time. Because of the light resistance
also dropped a torpedo but retired under heavy and the rapid advance of the troops inland from
fire. As the attack started, the Panamint went the beaches, transports were moved inshore from
the transport area on order from commander,TF
ahead full speed with hardover rudder and swung
51 early in the afternoon in order to facilitate un­
around its anchor. By so doing, the first torpedo
loading which was progressing rapidly.
missed by 20 yards under the stern and the second
Because of a misunderstanding by this com­
torpedo track was paralleled and passed 75 yards
mand, transports of TF 55 were not ready for
abeam.
night retirement at the time specified. When they
Late in the afternoon H. TV. Hadley (DD 724)
did get underway shortly before dark, they were
and Evans(DD 552) were towed into theIe Shima just leaving the anchorage when a number of en­
anchorage,severely damaged by suicide plane hits emy planes attacked inflicting damage on the
while on radar picket duty. With the assistance
U. S. S. Elmore and Alpine. Because of the re­
of Tawakoni (ATF 114), Cree (ATF 84), Ari­ tirement of most transports there was little un­
kara(ATF 98),and Shackle(ARS 9) emergency loading during the night of 1-2 April.
repairs were made. All possible steps were;taken At 0043 2 April the Achernar(AKA 92),while
to insure that the destroyers remained afloat and underway in night retirement, was hit by a suicide
to care for the crews. On 14 May these two valiant plane at No. 3.hatch. Fire broke out, but was
ships were towed to Kerama Retto for further quickly extinguished, and the ship maintained po­
repairs, having shot down on 1 day a total of 38 sition in formation.
enemy planes and absorbed many suicide crashes. At 0555 2 April the Tyrrell(AKA 80) while in
Rear Admiral Cobb (commander,Naval Forces, formation and returning to the transport area af­
Ryukyus) arrived at le Shima on 11 May in Taney ter night retirement was struck by a two-engined
(CGC 37) and on 15 May at 0900 relieved Com- enemy plane, which in an attempted suicide attack
PhibGroup 4 as CTG 51.21 (SOPA Ie Shima) sheared off one wing on the mainmast and crashed

••••
 ARRATIVE

into the sea. Damage to the Tyrrell was only driven on the reef and sustained damage. In spite
superficial. of unfavorable sea conditions on 5 April,however,
Full unloading was resumed with the return of seven transports completed unloading. Sea con­
the transports and landing craft on the morning ditions did not permit the resumption of full un­
of 2 April, and progressed steadily, although loading of all types until noon of 6 April. This
shore facilities were inadequate to handle the ton­ period of unfavorable weather from 4-6 April was
nage which lighterage available was capable of the most serious interruption of unloading experi­
putting ashore and there were numerous instance enced by this command during its stay at Okinawa.
of loaded landing craft waiting long periods be­ At 0800 on 5 April the first return convoy, con­
fore the shore party could unload them. To ex­ sisting of 11 APAs and 1 AKA was sailed from
pedite unloading, which was not progressing as the soutli'ern Hagushi anchorage for Guam. At
rapidly as desired,a considerable number of trans­ 1200 5 April, commander, Southern Attack Force
ports were retained in the area on the night of 2-3 (CTF 55),relieved commander, Northern Attack
April,and progress was made,although unloading Force (CTF 53),of the responsibility for unload­
was hampered by the numerous RED alerts dur­ ing over northern Hagushi beaches,thereafter con­
ing the night. Smoke was used to cover the an­ trolling unloading over both northern and south­
chorage and there was no damage sustained by our ern Hagushi beaches. At09006 April another con­
ships or inflicted on the few enemy planes flying voy of nine APAs and one AKA was sailed from
in the area until dawn at which time the combined southern Hagushi for Saipan.
fire of 10 transports destroyed one Tony. In the During the late afternoon of 6 April a small
afternoon of 3 April CTF 51 directed that trans­ number of Japanese planes made an attack on
ports would not retire at night if sufficient berths ships in the anchorage and several were shot down.
were available to anchor them. During this period two friendly planes coming in
Unloading progressed steadily during daylight for forced landings on Yontan airfield were also
3 April although still hampered by lack of shore shot down by ships' gunfire. Antiaircraft fire
unloading facilities and amphibious vehicles. struck two pontoon barges loaded with oil drums,
During the night of 3-4 April there were numer­ setting them on fire.
ous RED alerts smoke was again made and no During the period from 0600,1 April,to 1200,8
damage was sustained by our ships. This became April, all aircraft in support of troops of the
the general pattern for subsequent nights at Oki­ XXIV Corps were directly controlled by com­
nawa. Raids at dusk and around 0400 were of mander, Air Support Control Unit, Amphibious
almost nightly occurrence with additional raids at Group 12.
various times throughout the night. On Love-day and during the next 3 or 4 days
On 4 April wind rose from 10 knots at 1100 to relatively few support missions were requested,
23 knots at 1300, and sea and swell began to build because of the rapid advance of our troops and
up rapidly creating dangerous conditions for ships because many of the previously located enemy in­
and craft on the reef. At1320ships and craft were stallations proved to have been abandoned.
directed to clear the beach until weather abated As enemy resistance stiffened along the front
and special precautions were taken to secure pon­ more combat missions were requested, and these
toon barges and causeways. At 1520 all unloading sorties were accomplished in a highly satisfactory
including transfers from ship to landing craft was manner. At1200,8 April,control of troop support
ceased. Wind velocity reached a maximum of 30 aircraft for the XXIV Corps was relinquished to
knots at 2100 and held throughout the next day at commander, Landing Force Air Support Control
approximately 22 knots. Twelve LSTs and one Unit. Thereafter commander, Air Support Con­
LSM sustained damage from pounding on the reef trol Unit, Amphibious Group 12, under CTF 55
before they were able to retract. LST 675 became stand-by for ComLanForAscu and moni­
broached, striking LSM 1.2 and driving it broad­ tored all nets. All air activities controlled by Am­
side upon the reef. LSM 12 began to break up and phibious Group 12 are reported in detail in section
her crew abandoned ship. A few small boats were (E) of Special Reports.
lost and other boats and pontoon barges were Beginning at H— 35 minutes on 1 April (Love­
 ,
AN,IMAIrt i0P4RATIONS
- A lk
day),control of naval gunfire in close suppOit a lov,0 rovided, by planes of Amphib­
the XXIV Corps was exercised by commander, ious Support Force, TF 58, and the Tactical Air
Southern Attack Force. Beginning April 7, per­ Force was expellent,and few enemy planes reached.
, tain ships from the Eastern Islands Group were the anchorage. c.Most of those reaching the'an­
detailed to support the eastern flank of the XXIV chorage were disposed of by the heavy volume of
Corps. Commander, Southern Attack Force, antiaircraft fire although the accuracy of tliisfire
exercised over-all but not direct control over gun­ was not impressive. In addition to the Elmore
fire support ships on the east side of the island. and Alpine, the following were damaged in day­
When the southern front became a two-corps front light raids on the dates indicated :_ Minot Victory
on May 7,commander,Amphibious Group 12,exer­ on 12 April, Birmingham, on 4 May, and New
cised direct control of naval gunfire supporting 111exico on 12 May. For protection at night, re­
the III Amphibious Corps on the western flank, liance was placed upon smoke for concealment.
and over-all supervision,under CTF 51,of support No ship well covered by smoke was damaged by
furnished to XXIV Corps and III Amphibious enemy air attack. The limited number of smoke
Corps by ships of the eastern and western fire craft available, occasional fresh or.shifting winds
support groups. The narrowness of the island and the necessity for isolating ammunitions ships
made it possible for naval gunfire to support from other ships in the anchorage resulted in
troops to the very end of the campaign. As at­ some ships being without full smoke cover for
tested by statements of prisoners of war, this limited periods. At 2210 on 27 April, Canada
support was very effective in breaking down the Victory, an ammunition ship, while lying in a
strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. rift in the smoke was crashed in No. 5 hold by a
Night illumination from gunfire support ships suicide plane and sank almost immediately. For­
was very helpful in breaking up many serious tunately the ammunition did not explode and loss
enemy counter attacks. Details of naval gunfire of life was small. On 30 April in order to permit
support are given in section .(C) of. part (V), more effective smoke cover CTF 51 reduced the
Special Reports. safety distance from 1,500 yards to 1,000 yards
Succeeding echelons of shipping were unloaded from ships not loaded with large quantities of
as they arrived. At times because of a shortage brisant explosives. In the early morning of 25
of certain items of supply ashore it was necesSary May the O'Neill and the Guest—neither covered
to reSort to priority unloading which unduly by smoke—were hit by suicide planes and sus­
lengthened unloading time for the ships involved.. tained limited damage.
Lack of adequate numbers of shore party per­ The use of suicide boats by the enemy against
sonnel and equipment was a continuing bottle­ ships in the anchorage obtained only very limited
neck and caused apparent shortages of lighterage success. Most suicide boats were stopped by fire
at times through inability of the shore party to support ships and craft before reaching the an­
unload lighterage expeditiously. Pontoon cause­ chorage. On 9 April a suicide boat exploded pre­
ways proved of particular value in the unloading maturely off the Starr with little damage to the
of LST's and LSM's. Because of the structural ship. The Bozeman TTictory was hit by a suicide
damage sustained by LSM's from lying on the boat on 28 April, sustaining a sheared main bear­
reef fully loaded for long periods, it was finally ing on her propeller shaft. In neither of these
ordered that they would be unloaded only at pon­ instances of a successful approach by a suicide-
toon causeways. boat was warning given by small boats on flank
At 0000, 18 April, TF 55 was dissolved and patrol. The use of smoke complicates the problem
commander, Amphibious Group 12 became CTG­ of detection of suicide boats in their approach,
51.22,SOPA Hagushi anchorage. This command although,in turn,the problem of the suicide boats
as CTF 55 and later as CTG 51.22 had the respon­ in locating worthwhile targets is increased. The
sibility for anchoring ships in order to provide value of smoke in preventing successful air attacks
maximum antiaircraft protection and maximum is considered to far outweigh the added risk of
smoke coverage. The enemy scored few successes successful suicide boat attacks.
in his daylight air attacks on ships in the anchor­ At0615 26 April shells of approximately 5-inch

101111111111111S
 •

. i) •
caliber began to fall in the solitl;ern.Secta df thti ,extent possible for training CIC personnel,fighter
anchorage. The enemy battery firing could not director teams, and for AA tracking and firing
be located butfiring ceased at0700 with no damage. exercises by transports and screen. Aircraft of
At 1806 27 April shells of 4-inch or 5-inch began VJ-2 detachment stationed on Samar were used
to fall at 2-minute intervals into the southern for AA firing practices. Aircraft provided by
anchorages. Ships were moved to northern Support Carrier Unit 4 were used for CIC and
berths. After some delay the enemy battery firing F/D training.
was located taken under fire and silenced. A few En route to the objective, AA firing was con-
enemy shells were reported as falling near ships ducted at sleeves towed by VJ-2 on 22 March 1945.
in southern berths at varying times on 28 April, Simulated attacks were made on the disposition
1 May,and 2May. In each case nearby ships were by relieved patrols from Support Carrier Unit 4
shifted to more northerly berths. All firing ap- for half'-:hour periods both morning and afternoon
peared to be at extreme ranges. on 22 and 23 March 1945. Combat air patrols and
On 19 May after preliminary surveys Brown antisubmarine patrols were provided by Support
Five beach was opened near Machinato in order Carrier Unit 4 commencing at sortie and until
to deliver supplies nearer to the front lines. Ships sunset on 25 March 1945. Combat air patrol for
with supplies for this beach were anchored, in CTU 51.1.2 was provided by Support Carrier Unit
southern Hagushi anchorages and transfer made 4from 1000 until sunset on 25 March 1945.
by LCT's and DUKW's. Commencing on 26 March 1945 aircraft were as-
At0000 28 May with the shift of command from signed from support carrier units for the direct
commander, Fifth Fleet, to commander, Third support oflandingsin accordance with Annex IIto
Fleet, CTG 51.22 became CTG 31.22. At 1200 ComPhibsPac Op Plan No.A1-45 with appendices
3June garrison beach battalions,BoatPool Baker, and Annex F to ComPhib Grp 7 Attack Order No.
pontoon barges and causeways, and LCT's were A701-45 with appendices.
turned over to commander,Naval Operating Base On the night of 26 March,Transport Group Fox
(CTU 99.3.4), who was the responsible authority and screen(TU 54.3.4) Tractor Group George and
under the island commander's plan.
screen (Tt 54.3.5) conducted night retirements
On 4 June precautions were taken against the
typhoon 300 miles away to the southeast the track on Route Purple One as prescribed in ComPhibs­
of which indicated that it might pass near Pac Op Plan No. A1-45 and ComBatRon 1 No.
Okinawa. LST's were sent to Nago Wan;LCT's 1-45,Retirement Plan. Courses were adjusted to
to Unten Ko;Yogi's,pontoon barges,and all boats avoid unswept area B-6. Rear Admiral Kiland
which could not be hoisted were placed in the (CTG 51.1) was OTC of the Transport Retire-
Bisha Gawa. At 0456 5 June, CTF 31 advised ment Group and Captain Webb (commannder
storm danger had passed. Unloading was, re- LST Flotilla 16) was OTC of the Tractor Retire­
sumed immediately using the LSM's present, and ment Group. A small number of ships were des-
LST's and LCT's were recalled to the anchorage. ignated to remain at the objective. Eleven LCI-
Unloading operations were in full progress by the type craft were assigned to provide antismallboat
early afternoon. patrols in and around the Kerama Retto. A night
On 6 June 'Wesleyan Victory loaded with am- antisubmarine screen (Plan KC) was established
munition was anchored near Asa Kama in order around the Kerama,Retto with Captain Moosbrug­
to unload by DUKW's over the beach just north of ger in Biscayne (AGO
e 18) in charge. This screen
Naha. Ship was retired nightly to Hagushi an-
was composed of DD—DE types plus ships as­
chorage.
signed from minesweeping units.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 At daylight on 27 March the transport and trac­
(Western Island Attack Group CTG tor groups returned to their respective transport
51.1) and tractor areas from night retirement. An in­
During the rehearsal period commencing on 9 nbr and outer antisubmarine screen was established
March, aircraft were employed to the maximum around the Transport Area George (Plan KB).
 GENERAL ACCOUNT

Prior to darkness an antisubmarine screen was es­ units. The following ships remained at thdob­
tablished around the Kerama Retto (Plan KC). jective: Control craft,support craft, Sweep Units
Twenty-four support craft were assigned for.anti­ 6,7, 9, 11 and 14, Net and Buoy Group, Seaplane
smallboat patrolin and around the Kerama Retto. Base Group,Mine Investigation Unit,Service and
Transports (TU 54.3.4) and Tractor Group (TU Salvage Unit,Hydrographic Unit,Pitt, Wyandot,
54.3.5) of the Western Islands Attack Group,con­ LST(M)575, plus 8 ammunition LST's,CTGX.1
ducted night retirement as on previous night. in Mount McKinley,SOPA.
Pitt (APA 223) and other designated control On return of night retirement groups on 30
craft and sweep units plus net and buoy groups March CTU 51.1.13 assigned the following ships
remained at the objective, screened by APD's and to screening stations in Plan KC:Swearer, Kim­
ships from Sweep Unit9. CTF 52in Estes(AGC berly, Picking, Suessens, Execute, Kinzer, Aber­
12) retired with Transport Group Fox. Captain crombie, Stern, Reeves, Oberrender, Badger,
Moosbrugger in Biscayne was screen commander Sproston, Porter, Isherwood. Wickes was as­
and Captain Haff,chief of staff, to ComTransRon signed to R.P.Station 9. For the night a total of
17,/in PCE 873 was designated SOPA_ at the ob­ 16 support craft were assigned to anti-small-boat
jective during night retirement. patrols at Kerama, Retto. Commander LST
Fr the night of 28 March, 23 support craft Group 47 as OTC of TU 54.3.4 conducted night
were assigned for anti-small-boat patrols in and retirement Western Islands Tractor Group less
around the Kerama Retto. An antisubmarine Assault Unit 4 on route Purple Two so as not to
screen (Plan KC) was established around the interfere with Tractor Group How, arriving ,at
Kerama Retto. Night retirement for night 28-29 the objective. The Transport Group (TransRan
March- was organized as follows: Tractors (TU 17) did not retire. A doubled screen was estab­
54.3.9), Captain Webb (commander,.LST Flo­ lished around the western anchorages by adding
tilla 16) OTC. Tiiansports (TU 54.3.8), com­ additional ships to Screen Plan KC. The follow­
prised of TransRon 17 less Pitt plus PCE(R) 853 ing ships remained at the objective night 30-31
and screen, assembled south of Transport Area March: Biscayne; Pitt; Wyandot; five LST's all
George at 1730 and conducted night retirement support craft, TG's 52.8, 51.20, 51.17, 51.6; TU
via route Purple One. Commodore Brittain 52.6.5; eight ammunition LST's, Sweep Units 6,
(commander, TransRon 17) was OTC of the 10, 12, 13, and 16; Oilers Brazos, Atascosa, Kish­
Transport Group. CTG 51.1 in Mount McKinley waukee. TransRon 17 less Pitt and Wyandot re­
(AGC 7) remained at the objective. A number of mained in Northwestern anchorage. CTG 51.1
control craft plus Pitt, support craft, Mine De­ in Mount McKinley, SOPA at Kerama Retto.
struction Unit, Service and Salvage Unit, Sea­ On morning of 31 March, commander, LST
plane Base Group, Hydrographic Unit, Net and Flotilla 16 (Captain Webb) conducted the landing
Buoy Group,and Sweep Units 8,9, 11, 14, and 15 on Keise Shima. First waves landed on Black
remained at the objective. CTG 51.1 in Mount Z-1 Beach at 0756 I. Keise Shima was secured at
McKinley was SOPA. 1015 I.
During night of 29-30 March CTU 51.1.6 (Com­ On night of 31 March-1 April Transport and
mander,LST Flotilla 16) conducted night retire­ Tractor Groups remained in the western and
ment on prescribed route for Tractor Group (TU northwestern anchorages: The following ships
remained in Kerama Retto: TG's 51.1, 52.8,
54.3.6), CTU 51.1.1 (commander, TransRon 17)
51.20, 51.17, 51.6; TU 52.6.5;8 ammunition LST's;
conducted night retirement on prescribed route for
Oilers Brazos, Tomahawk, Kishwaukee; Sweep
Transport Group (TU 54.3.5). A total of 23 Units 9,10, 11, and 13;five APD's and all support
support craft were assigned to anti-small-boat craft. Fourteen support craft were assigned for
patrol in and around the Kerama Retto (Patrol anti-smallboat patrol in Plan KD. The anti­
Plan 1(D). CTU 51.1.13 (Captain Moosbrugger) submarine screen around Kerama Retto,Plan KC,
continued to maintain an anti-submarine screen was continued until0600(I)on 1 April when CTG
around the Kerama Retto. The night screen was 51.5 (Captain Moosbrugger) placed Plan Able
augmented by ships from various mine sweeping (commander,PhibsPac Op Plan A1-45) in effect.
 On 1 April, Kinzer and Scribner were directed From: Commander,Amphibious Group7(CTG
to .establish antisubmarine patrols Off the northern 51.15)
and southern entrances Kerama Retto, prior to DEFENSE OF KERAMA RETTO
darkness. CTG 51.1 directed CTU 51.1.1, Corn Anti-sub patrol
LST Group 47 and CTU 51.14 to operate in ac­
During the period covered by this report an
cordance with CTF 51, enclosure C to appendix 4
antisubmarine patrol was maintained day and
to Annex.K and to use route Purple One in retir­
night off the northern and southern entrances to
ing. The following ships remained at the objec­ the Kerama Retto and an antisubmarine screen.
tive night of - 1-2 April: La Grange; Pitt; Was established at night off the western and north­
Wyandot; Kenton; Hinsdale;- nine LST's; LSM west anchorages of the Kerama Retto.
15,83;LSM (R) 188;LCI(G) 558,560,462;five The'antisubmarine patrol off the entrances to
APD's,Buoyant;Device; Adams;PC 1603; SC's Kerama Retto consisted of 2 A/S ships off the
1341,1349;PCS (II)'s 1404,1457; Clamp;Yuma; northern entrance and two off the southern en­
Tekesta,;Egeria;LCI (L)'s 564,676;TU's 52.6.5; trance. During the day these patrols were fur­
TG 52.8; TG 51.20 less Thornton, Indianapolis, nished as follows: CTG 51.5 provided an AM for
Arkansas, Terror, Ponag4nsett, Brazos, ToMa-_ the outer northern entrance patrol and CTG 51.15
hawk,Kishwaukee,illanderson TTictory,Las Vegas provided PC and SC type craft for the inner
Victory. CTG 51.1 in Mount McKinley,Sopa. northern entrance patrol and for the inner and
CTG 51.1 directed CTU 51.1.1, CTU 51.1.6, outer southern entrance patrol. At night,the en­
commander LST Group 47, and CTU 51.1.14 to trance patrols, except the outer northern entrance
patrol were provided by CTU 51.15.3 using YMS
retire unless otherwise directed with Transport
type craft plus the Breese (DM18). The PC and
and Tractor Groups of TG 51.1 on night of 2-3
SC type craft when relieved were assigned at night
April on route Purple One. The following ships
in the Kerama Retto smoke screen. The AM on
remained at the objective during the night of 2-3 the outer northern entrance patrol continued on
April: Mount McKinley, Pitt, Wyandot, Hins­ this patrol day and night. In addition at night,
dale, Kenton, 8 ammunition• LST's, Bowditch, a listening watch at anchor, was established in the
Gunston Hall, Clamp, Ymnia, Tekesta, Egeria, vicinity of the northern and southern H. E. C.
Endymion, Oceanus, Indianapolis, Nevada, Ter­ vessels by minecraft from TU 51.51.3.
ror, Ponagansett, Brazos, Tomahawk, Elk, The antisubmarine screen established off the
TV,hippet, Giiummium, Kishwaukee, Xanderson western and northwestern anchorage consisted
Victory, Las Vegas Victory plus numerous small originally of control craft from CTG 51.15 and
craft. The following remained in western and minecraft from TG 52.2. Later, ships for this
northwestern anchorages: All Western Island screen were provided entirely by CTG 52.2.
Tractor Flotilla plus 31 LST's and 14 LSM's from Screen Plan KC was modified in order that ade­
CTF 55 and a number of'mine craft. At 1835, quate coverage could be given to the western and
CTG 52.6 in Hopkins (DMS 13) was designated northwestern anchorages with fewer ships avail­
screen commander of the Kerama Retto screen. able for this screen. The composition of. the
Screen Plan KC Was established, stations being screen usually varied from 2 to 9 ships, depend­
ing upon number of ships anchored in this area
filled by control craft and Y:MS's.
and the number of A/S craft available. During
At 1900 (I) on 2 April, CTG 51.1 transferred
the latter part of the period covered by this report,
command of TG 51.1 to Commander,TransRon 17 no ships were anchored in the western anchorage
who assumed the designation and duties of CTG and only two YMS type craft were asigned to the
51.1. Admiral Kiland at this time assumed the screen—mainly as an anti-small boat patrol and to
designation and duties of CTG 51.15 (SOPA, prevent movement between the islands. Lieu­
Kerama Retto). Commander, PhibGroup 7, tenant Commander Bowes,CTG 52.6,in Hopkins
Operation Order A704-45 was placed in effect at (DMS 13) was originally assigned as commander
1900 (Item). of the screen in the western anchorage.
 - TROOP OPERATIONS

Atoke icr e41 by swimming to shore. The LOS 21 shot a Jap

From 23 to 37 LCI-type craft were stationed swimmer northwest of Amuro Shima.
nightly for duty in the smoke screen. The screen On 17 April, due to reduced use of western an­
was•augmented by all available control craft plus chorage, Commander MacKinnon, USN, com­
minecraft and LCVP's equipped to make smoke. mander,LST Group 61,SOPA of the western an­
The harbormaster assigned LCVP's from the boat chorage,was released to CTF 55,for return to LST
pool, equipped with Besler generators and smoke 587 to resume his regular duties. On 9 May CTG
pots, to all large ships in the harbor which were 52.2 relieved commander, MinRon 4, who was as­
unable to provide their own smoke protection. signed to other duties, and assumed the responsi­
On most occasions, an excellent smoke screen was bility for the control and assignment of minecraft
obtained and the smoke appeared to be an effective to the antisubmarine screen around the western
passive defense. Commander,LCI Flot 16(CTU anchorage.
50.9.5) was in direct charge of stationing the At 0900, 22 May, Rear Admiral Price, com­
LCI's in the smoke screen. mander, Fleet Air Wing 1 (CTG 50.5), relieved
Rear Admiral Kiland (CTG 51.15) as SOPA
AA defense. Kerama Retto.
Duiing the day, all available LCI-type craft
were anchored near large ships to provide addi­ TROOP OPERATIONS
tional antiaircraft protection. All destroyers and
destroyer escorts that had completed repairs and From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
were awaiting assignment and ships remaining The Tenth Army in conjunction with naval at­
over night for logistics, were anchored in the tack forces, was charged with the mission of at­
southern part of the anchorage, to provide addi­ tacking, occupying and defending the Nansei
tional AA protection during the critical dusk and Shoto area. The Army Operation Plan called for
dawn periods. the seizure of Kerama Retto on 26 March 1945 to
On 5 April, the 'Wayne (APA 54) arrived and be followed by the assault on Okinawa 1 April
was designated as receiving ship in the Kerama 1945 with two corps abreast, each corps with two
Retto. divisions in the assault,one Marine division afloat
On 7 April Commander T. F. Donahue, USN, in Army reserve and one infantry division em­
commander,MinRon 4,relieved CTG 52.6 as screen barked and held at Ulithi in area reserve. The
commander, Western Anchorage. Commander general plan placed the XXIV Corps with the
R.M. MacKinnon,commander,LST Group 61,re­ Seventh and Ninety-sixth Infantry Divisions on
ported as SOPA Western anchorage to control the right, the III Phib Corps with the First and
ships, principally LST's from Okinawa anchored Sixth Marine Divisions on the left in the assault,
in that area. the Second Marine Division in Army reserve and
On 10 April,the commanding general, Seventy- the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division in area
seventh Division and staff transferred from the reserve. Each assault division was to land two
Mount McKinley to the Natrona (APA 214) for RCT's in line. Upon landing,the two corps were
lift and further transfer to the Panamint (AGC to drive eastward across the island. The XXIV
13). Appling (APA 58) was ordered to depart Corps upon reaching the east coast, was to pivot
and the Natrona (APA 214) was ordered to re­ on its right flank to seize a general east-west line
place Appling as receiving ship Kerama Retto, as from Kuba-Saki in order to prevent enemy rein­
of 11 April. forcements from the south. The division on the
On the night of 16-17 April,two ships assigned right of the IIIPhib Corps was to drive to the east
to the western anchorage screen,the Staunch(AM coast while the left flank division turned to the
307) and Recruit (AM 285) encountered armed north to seize the Ishikawa Isthmus in, order to
Japs north of Zamami,in a canoe and two rafts. prevent reinforcements from Motobu Peninsula or
All craft were destroyed and at least seven Japs the northern part of Okinawa, thus effectively
were killed. Fourto six may possibly have escaped blocking off the central portion of Okinawa. The

-.•
must employ more precise methods of measuring workload. At these
levels, the "resident student load" is virtually useless as a workload
index for the purpose of determining total staffing requirements.

c. All command levels concerned in evaluating program

performance and manpower utilization in the operation Of Army schools
wbuld benefit from a more meaningful presentation of school workload
data. Section 2, Appendix III of AR 1-11-1, which covers operation of,
schools under major activity code 2110, should be revised to incorporate
a more representative performance factor than simply the "average
number of resident students." Some combination of factors may be
necessary. Consideration should be given to expressing a performance
.factor in such terms as "man-hours of school workload."

SECTION II

_STAFFING CRITERIA AND INSTRUCTOR STANDARDS

4. Army Staffing Guides, S

a.. -Army marTower management has...followed.a.tx'en.d,- begin­

livoTrla..War_
- ning-.during-. IL‘- toward increasing.devel.-opment and. applica­
tiOi'::of staffing'.standards'based on.workloads..and. performance..•capabil­
ities.. of personnel. These factors,. in The form of •"yardsticks aid .in
:estimating personnel requiements..'anclin making local surveys to
'review existing .pergonnel.
. Such -standards.- have been most
easily developed for those duties which are broadly:.baSed:on large
. numbers:of. workers.in.generally uniform situations.

b. A comparatively recent step in Army development of

staffing standards is the publication of staffing guides for Army,Service
Schools. The first such guide (DA Pamphlet 20-558),was published.in
1959 and applied specifically to the Combat Arms Schools. A corre­
sponding guide for the Technical Service_ schools ,(DA Pamphlet 20-565),
was issued in draft form in August 1961 and is now being published.
These guides contain experience data and methods of computing personnel
requirements. The guides themselves recognize the non-standardized
nature.of individual school functions, operations, and. organization, and
provide considerable flexibility in local application. New criteria for
determining instructional personnel requirements recently were incor­
.porated in the guides.

5. Instructional Duties.

a. The Department of the Army,staffing guide defines an

instructor as an "an individual assigned to an academic department who

3-3
 •

pr.
.

The teli"aln-- -IfedJIQ

- sputh of this line was landed at 171130 to reinforce the assault troops.
admirably suited for defense and delaying action Some mines were encountered, on the beaches and
tactics. The enemy defenses consisted of block­ the entire inland area surrounding the airfield
houses, pillboxes, extensive minefields protected and the field itself was heavily mined with, all
by double apron barbed wire,caves,and minefields. types of mines and 300 pound bombs. Intense
The enemy artillery was used unstintingly and fighting continued both day and night and on 20
their defensive tactics were described as "artful April the pinnaele (Iegusuku Yama) was com­
and fantastic". pletely encircled. An all-out assault was made
• By 9 April the reaction of the enemy to the the following morning and at 211035 the island
occupation of Okinawa was evidenced by day and was announced secured with considerable mopping
night air attacks, assaults by suicide boats and up yet to be completed. Following thecapture
swimmers and accelerated activity on the XXIV of this island troops of the Seventy-seventh In­
Corps front. The progress of the III Phib Corps fantry Division were reembarked for movement
was limited only by the lack of transportation and to Okinawa. The capture of le Shima and the
the limitation of physical endurance. The tactics announcement by the CGIII Phib Corps that all
of this corps were those of "pursuit and elimina­ organized. resistance had ceased on Motobu Penin­
tion-". Scattered groups of enemy were encoun­ sula and the northern sector of Okinawa ended
tered and destroyed with but little delay in the phase II of the operation far ahead of planned .
advance. On 10 April approximately one half of operations.
Motobu Peninsula and the major portion of north­ A night reconnaissance was made of the Eastern
ern Okinawa had been cleared of enemy resistance Islands by the FMF Reconnaissance Battalion on
and was in our hands. One strong center of re­ the night 8 April. Enemy troops were reported
sistance was encountered on Motobu Peninsula only on Tsugen Shima. BLT 3/105, Twenty-
which was reduced- with difficulty. Qn 21 April seventh Infantry Division, landed on this island
CG III Phib Corps reported that all organized at 0840 10 April and by 1635 had overcome all
resistance had ceased on Motobu Peninsula and. resistance. 150 enemy were killed. The assault
northern Okinawa, but that considerable patrol­ troops had 8 KIA,34 WIA,and 3 MIA.
ling would be required to mop up remaining enemy Enemy resistance on the XXIV Corps front
remnants. increased in intensity and from 10 to 18 April the
With the successes on Okinawa far ahead of the Corps made limited advances against a strongly
planned operation it was determined to occupy defended enemy line. On 14 April the troops were
the island of Ie Shima on 16 April as a part of ordered to consolidate their positions while con­
phase I. Naval bombardment and air strikes in tinuing to press the enemy, reorganize, build up
support of the landing commenced on 14 April. an adequate level of supplies and prepare for an
Following underwater demolition team recon­ all-out attack 19 April. Heavy air, artillery and
naissance of the beaches, three field artillery bat­ naval gunfire bombardments hit the enemy de­
talions of the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division fenses both day and night. Many enemy installa­
were ,landed on Menna,Shima 15 April,against no tions were destroyed and the troop assaults com­
enemy resistance,to support the Ie Shima,assault. pressed the outposts of this first enemy defensive
position. Following the conquest of the Eastern
At 0900, 16 April the Seventy-seventh Infantry
Islands the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division
Division supported by aerial bombardment,naval
was landed over the Hagushi beaches and on 17
gunfire and artillery previously emplaced on April one RCT of the Twenty-seventh Infantry
Menna Shima,landed on le Shima with two RCT's Division entered the line on the corps right flank.
abreast against light resistance. Troops moved. The assault on 19 April was successfulin capturing
inland rapidly and by 1800 the airfield and ap­ the strongly defended high ground on the corpsim­
proximatelTtwo-thirds of the island was secured. mediate front with all troops advancing from 800
Troops moving to the east encountered intense to 1,000 yards. Casualties were comparatively
enemy resistance centered around Ie town and heavy with approximately 18,000 total in the
Iegusuku Yama. RCT 307,less one battalion, was. Tenth Army including 6,000 nonbattle casualties.
 NARRATIVE
, 4, •
These casualties, the bulk off which had been sus- Seventy-seventh Infantry. Division and Seventh
tained in the XXIV Corps, reduced the combat Infantry Division. The Tenth Army, strength-
efficiency and a reorganization of lines was ened by two comparatively fresh divisions, made
necessary. a coordinated attack on 2 May. This attack was
At 1025, on 21 April, the American flag was held to limited gains by a desperate resistance from
raised on Ie Shima and all organized enemy re- caves and pillboxes which was supported by heavy
sistance had been overcome. A total of 3,326 en- enemy artillery, mortar,and small arms fire.
emy were killed, 252 captured and 982 civilians During the night of3-4 May the enemy launched
interned by the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division coordinated air, ground and sea attacks against
in the conquest of this island. On 22 April the the Tenth Army front. Counter-attacks against
Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed on both flanks of the First Marine Division on the
Sesoko Shima (TA 9423) at 1200 and, by the end right (west) flank were immediately followed by
of the day, had covered the island, reporting no an amphibious landing by an estimated enemy
resistance. On 24 April, elements of the Twenty- battalion in rear of their lines. These landings
seventh Infantry Division were landed on Tsugen were simultaneous with a heavy air attack on the
Shima and by 1800 that date had cleared it of shipping in the Okinawa anchorages. Several
enemy resistance, reporting 51 enemy killed and barges were sunk by gunfire while others were suc­
366 civilians taken into custody. cessful in landing. 350 enemy were killed during
The XXIV Corps during 19 April to 2May con- the landing and the others were mopped up in the
tinued to make daily attacks against the enemy rear areas. Little damage was done to our forces.
positions and in turn were subjected to many On 4 May the XXIV Corps repulsed strong
counter-attacks. Some terrain changed hands sev- counter-attacks resulting in heavy losses to the
eral times during this period as the battle waxed enemy. Over 3,000 enemy were killed during the
furiously. Casualties were heavy in both forces, night and day attacks.
many enemy positions were destroyed and mod- Daily attacks were continued all along the front
erate gains were registered but the enemy defenses securing dominating terrain and destroying enemy
were not materially weakened. At 1145,24 April, positions but little advance was made during the
the First Marine Division was placed in Army re- period 2 May to 11 May at which time another
serve with one ROT prepared to move on 12 hours strong attack was launched by the Tenth Army
notice. Front lines had been reorganized and a with Corps abreast. The Sixth Marine Division
coordinated attack was launched by the XXIV entered the line on the right of the First Marine
Corps on 26 April against the enemy holding the Division on 8 May,when the front was reorganized
line Kashukai-Onaga-Kochi-Hill 196 (TA 7974)- into a two-corps front.
Machinato airfield. This attack failed to register On 11 May the Tenth Army made a coordinated
any material gains although local advances up to attack with the corps abreast in an effort to elimi­
1,000 yards were made in the center of the corps . nate the enemy in the vicinity of Shun. This at-
front. The Ninety-sixth Infantry Division, weak- tack was supported by artillery, air strikes, and
ened by front-line casualties which were particu- naval gunfire and the main effort of each Corps
larly heavy in the rifle companies, was relieved by. was directed toward the enemy stronghold at
the Seventy-seventh Infantry Division in the cen- Shun. A well entrenched and fanatical enemy
ter of the corps front on 30 April. The First resistance held our advance to limited local gains
Marine Division was released from Army reserve, although several key terrain features were cap-
placed under XXIV Corps control and commenced tured. The attack was continued vigorously dur­
the relief of the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division ing the following days with heavy casualties on
on 30 April and on 1 May the commanding general, both sides. The enemy fought on with dogged
First Marine Division, assumed control of the determination, skillfully defending the Shun
front previously held by the Twenty-seventh Tn- position, aggressively counter-attacking and em­
fantry Division. ploying all the types of weapons at his command.
The divisions on the XXIV Corps front from Our lines continued to move forward slowly, with
right to left were the First Marine Division, heavy cost in casualties.
 7. Instructor-Student Ratios'and Over'all Staffing,Ratios.'

a. A direct comparison of instructors to average numbers

of resident students, or of total school support personnel to students,
cannot be considered significant. Broad overall ratios contain the
arithT.etical averages of so much dissimilar data that they are valueless
and even misleading until subjected to detailed analysis.

b, The total authorized number of instru.ctors'in. Army

Service Schools in FY 1961 was slightly more than 11,,000. This figure
includes many positions in which the duties are divided part-time
between instruction and other functions. Classification of instructor ­
positions is subject to varying interpretation of definitions. The compu­
tation of the. total number, therefore, is arbitrary. The "resident stu­
dent load" for FY 1961 was approximately 26,000 (exclusive,of students
in separate courses at facilities other than schools). ComiDarison of
these figures produces an overall ratio of 41.7 instructors per 100 stu­
dents.

c. The ratio for the Service Colleges is 18.8 instructors per

100 students. Ratios for other schools vary within a wide range. This
is due in partto differences in types of courses taught and to differences
in school functions. A more meaningful:ratio would require expression
.of the "number of instructors" in man-years spent in preparation and
presentation of resident instruction. Even such a ratio, when it repre­
sents an average of different types of courses, provides only a super.,..
ficial index for purposes of analysis.

d. Comparisons of total school staffing to student loads

similarly are invalidated by differences in organization and functions of
schoois. Some schools have a significant workload in support tof non­
resident instruction; other schools have none. Schools differ widely in.
the amount of internal school support which they perform.for themselves
Or receivefrom support activities at the same installation.

8. Inter-service Comparisons of Staffing.

a. All of the military services have sought some formula,or

standard which can be used as an aid in computing instructor require­
ments (Annex 7),,

b. Staffing comparisons among the schools of the several

military services are extremely difficult. This is because of significant
differences in organization of the school systems, philosophy of School
training, and tasks performed by schools, Full understanding'requires
consideration of the schools within the larger contexi,of the training
s'Sittenis of the respective services.
3-6
 c. The Army conducts basic training and over 80 per cent of
its entry-level specialist training in Army Training Centers, which are
a part of the school system. Army Service Schools train less than 20
per. cent of the entry-level specialists.

d. the Air Training Command and Navy schools and train­

ing centers, about two-thirds of the enlisted students enter courses from
basic training.

e. Army training centers generally have a low ratio of train7­

ing overhead personnel to trainees, because of their large volume and
standardized training. In contrast to the training centers, the Army
schools teach all levels of courses from enlisted technical specialists to
officer advanced professional courses. The 19 BrancirService Schools,
which have four-fifths of the students and operating personnel on the 3;
Army, school system, cover this entire spectrum. They cannot be equated
functionally or organizationally with the schools of the other services,
so there is no common basis for comparing staffing by schools or groups
of schools.

SECTION In

CONTROL OF SERVICE SCHOOL STAFFING

9. Staffing Adjustments.

a. Army schools are not actually staffed on the basis of broad

planning factors or ratios. Staffing guides, as the name implies, pro­
vide useful tools for measurement but are subject to adaptation when
applied to a specific local situation. Fundamentally, the authorized
strength of each school is established and adjusted within available re­
sources on the basis of actual requirements as determined by on-site
appraisal.

b. Service school staffing, aside from emergency situations

which may arise,(such as the outbreak,of hostilities in Korea in 1950, or
the Berlin crisis), has reflected a reasonable continuity of operations
and. a fa.irly, constant workload from year.to year. Annual program
adjustments have been minor • in relation to the entire school system.
Internally, of course„ there have been major readjustments of courses
. affecting certain schools. Stability in staffing results .from continual
planning effort to achieve..and maintain optimum scheduling,of classes
and other workload throughout the year and from one ,year to another.

3-7
 TROOP OPERA IONS

for 0830 and Love-day as 1 April (III Amphibi­ OpPlan A1-45,and for which this task force lvd
ous Corps Operation Plan No.1-45). prepared plans. The Twenty-second Marines and
The Troop Landing Plan for the assault pro­ the Fourth Marines of the Sixth Marine Division
vided for the Sixth Marine Division, less ROT 29 continued to advance up the main axis of the island
(in Corps reserve),to be landed on the left, over and reached a line running across the island just
Green and Red Beaches, and the First Marine north of Motobu Peninsula.
Division to be landed on the right, over Blue and By Love+9,the.Twenty-ninth Marines had ail­
Yellow Beaches. One assault BLT was to be vanced half-way to the head of Motobu Peninsula,
landed on each,beach with the exception of Red-2 while lines of the Twenty-second and Fourth Ma­
and Red-3, both of which were to be used by a, rines remained stable.
single BLT. In all other respects the plan fol­ During the two following days, the Twenty-
lowed;in general,standard procedure for landings ninth Marines made only small gains on the
over reef-fringed beaches. Motobu Peninsula. The terrain was rugged and
On the eve of Love-day,the Corps was prepared such roads as existed were in poor shape, due to
for an intensely contested landing and a hard fight rains. Supply was a major problem. On Love+
inland against• a numerous and well-entrenched 11, the Third Battalion, Twenty-ninth Marines,
enemy. was heavily engaged in the hills in the west portion
On Love-day, 1 April, the main landing on. of the Motobu Peninsula and reported Japs on all
Okinawa was executed in accordanCe with the pre­ sides.
ferred plan. The tentative How-hour of 0830 was On Love+12, the First and Second Battalions,
confirmed, and the first wave hit the northern Twenty-ninth Marines, were moving west on
Hagushi beaches on schedule in an unopposed land­ Motobu Peninsula to the aid of the Third Bat­
ing. Thereafter, succeeding waves landed as talion, which was closing on, and still heavily
scheduled. engaged with, an estimated 2,500 Japs equipped
By 1130 on Love-d4,the Sixth Marine Division with artillery mortars and machine guns. A bat­
had seized the Yontan airfield without opposition, talion of the Fourth Marines was moving north
and by that night, the First and Sixth Divisions from the vicinity of Awa toward the same enemy
were on or very close to the Love+3line along most concentration. Our forces in the area were sup­
of the corps front. On the afternoon of Love-day, ported by naval gunfire and air cover.
all battalion and regimental reserves were landed. On Motobu during the above period, from
During the two succeeding days, the First and Love+10 to Love+12,F Company,Twenty-ninth
Sixth Divisions pushed across the island against Marines, and the Sixth Reconnaissance Company
scattered and weak opposition, and the Twenty- had covered both coast roads and secured Bise.
ninth Marines (in corps reserve) were landed. Elements of the Twenty-second and Fourth
On Love plus 3,the First Marine Division had Marines were patrolling northern Okinawa and
reached the east coast along the entire division the Second Battalion, Twenty-second Marines,
front,and had begun mopping Up operations. The was advancing toward the northern tip of the
Sixth Marine Division had secured the Ishikawa island along the west coast road. In the First
Isthmus and had reached a line across the island
Marine Division zone of action, the Seventh Ma­
at the northern end of the isthmus.
rines had engaged a group of 100 Japs,in the hills
During the next 3 days, the Sixth Marine Di­
of the northern end of Ishikawa Isthmus.
vision pushed to the northward up the island,using
Two battalions of the Fourth Marines joined
both coast roads, as far as the base of the Motobu
Peninsula, advancing several thousand yards per the Twenty-ninth Marines in the attack against
day,still against negligible opposition. the enemy on Motobu Peninsula during the ensu­
On Love+7, the Twenty-ninth Marines of the ing 2 days, and the Seventh Marines (First Ma­
Sixth Marine Division, advancing west on the rine Division) continued to engage the enemy in
Motobu Peninsula, had cleared the Nago Wan its zone of action.
beaches, obviating the necessity for an assault Throughout Love+15 and 16, the Fourth
landing there as called for in ComPhibsPac- and Twenty-ninth Marines made steady progress
 c. Following submission, review, and approval of the troop
bases of subordinate commands, manpower resources are allocated from
higher to lower commands. Actual authorization of military and civilian
personnel is accomplished by means.of quarterly manpower authoriza­
tion vouchers, issued at the beginning of the fiscal quarter to which they.
apply. Because they relate to the current time frame, they are suscep­
tible to adjustment to support a change in actual requirements or a short-
range projection of requirements.

d. Approximately once every two years, each school under­

goes a complete formal manpower survey, conducted by the headquar­
ters which establishes the school manpower authorization. This is a
detailed on-site appraisal of actual workload and staffing. The school'',
strength authorization is adjusted as appropriate based on approved
findings of the survey.

11. Command Relationships.

a. Because manpower authorizations follow command channels,

the present responsibilities for controlling strengths and conducting man­
power surveys of Army service schools are fragmented. Under the-pres-­
ent '.structure,, inconsistencies have developed in the application of man­
power control policies among schools under different commands. Head­
quarters, Department of the Army is the only level which has supervision
over all commands which operate schools. Within USCONARC, man­
power responsibilities for schools are further decentralized to the ZI
Armies.

b. As fart of the Army reorganization, the school system

(with only limited exceptions) will be consolidated under the Commanding
General, USCONARG. This will bring proponency for schools together
with the present responsibilities for directing and coordinating instruc­
tion. This will facilitate consistency in implementation of policies and
uniformity in resources utilization. It should also aid in the study and
adoption of improvement in organization and operation of the school sys­
tem, with possible resultant savings in manpower.

c. In assuming proponent responsibility,for 17 additional

schools and to improve its supervision of the presently assigned schools,
Headquarters, USCONARC should deal directly with the schools concern­
ing allocation of manpower resources. The present decentralized system
of control, which follows multiple command channels through the ZI
Armies, separates manpower control responsibilities from control of
school missions and supervision of school operations. The ZI Army
commanders are not in the ,best position to determine the share of avail­
able resources to be allotted to schools. Inconsistencies which may

3-9
 and ROT 307, in reserve over beaches Blue T-2 On William+5 (21 April) the American flag
and Blue T-3 on order. (See Seventy-seventh was raised on Iegusugu Yama and the last centei
Division Field Order No.26.) of organized resistance were attacked. On Wil­
Menna Shima was secured and three field artil­ liam+6, phase II was declared completed with
, lery battalions emplaced there as scheduled. the end of organized resistance on Ie Shima, and
On the morning of William-day (16 April) the the mopping up of isolated caves was begun.
Ie Shima Attack Group arrived at the target, the From William+6 until William+10 isolated
preferred plan for the landing was executed, and Jap snipers were eliminated, caves sealed up,
the first waves hit Green and Red Beaches at 0800, and civilians rounded up while the division pre­
supported by naval gunfire and division artillery pared to move to southern Okinawa to take part
emplaced the preceding day on Menna Shima. In in the operations in that area.
the beginning there was little enemy resistance. On William+11 (27 April) the Seventy-seventh
By 1130 ROT 306, which had landed over beach Division command post closed on Ie Shima and.
Green T-1, had reached the northeast edge of the shifted to southern Okinawa.
airfield by evening,the western two-thirds of the The primary reason for the attack on Ie Shima
island had been seized against increasing resist­ was to secure it for development of an air base.
ance. Prisoners reported that about 1,000 Japs This the Japs undoubtedly realized. Conse­
had withdrawn to the base of Iegusugu Yania,the quently they took every measure to mine and wreck
pinnacle which was the predominating land fea­ the existing airfield and delay our final control
ture. On the night of William-day, beach Green. of the island. The garrison of2,000 combattroops
T-1 was ordered abandoned for unloading pur­ was reinforced by combatant civilians, including
poses, in favor of the more suitable beaches Red a few women,with the result that more than 4,800
T-1 and Red T-2. enemy had to be annihilated during the operation.
On William+1,fighting continued on Ie Shima. These foughtfiercely from every pillbox,cave,and
A change in the beaches designated for the landing wrecked house, using counter-attack, infiltration,
of the division reserve was decided upon and ROT and other familiar Japanese tactics.
307 began landing over beaches Red T-3 and Red While the viciousness and tenacity of the Japs
T-4 at 1130 behind friendly troops. on Je Shima had its counterpart in previous ac­
On William+2, the • troOps made some gains tions against the enemy,it is doubted that he ever
against heavy resistance, but beach Red T-4 was before achieved such success in concealing his
rendered unusable by enemy sniper and machine- personnel, equipment, and dispositions up to the
gun fire, and it was thought advisable to delay time of our initial attack. This concealment was
landing any garrison cargo. During this day's carried to such extremes that our air observers,
fighting,Ernie Pyle,the noted war correspondent, who flew over the island day after day at tree­
was killed by enemy machine-gun fire. top level, picked up almost no signs of human
After a night of attempted infiltrations by the activity prior to the assault.
enemy, the Seventy-seventh Division jumped off In revised estimates of the population on 26
again in its attack on the pinnacle and the town April, reports totaled 4,801 dead, 119 prisoners
area to the south, and some progress was made. of war and 1,932 noncombatant civilians. Sev­
Unloading conditions on Red T-4 improved. enty-seventh Division's casualties were as follows:
On William+4, after intensive preparation by KIA 172
division artillery based on Menna Shima,the Sev­ WIA 902
enty-seventh Division attacked again at0900. Re­ MIA 46
NBC 170
sistance was heavy during,the day from enemy
caves and pill boxes. By nightfall the base of the Total 1.290
pinnacle was reached on the north and west, and
elements of the Three Hundred and Sixth Regi­ From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
ment had climbed to within a few yards of the top. (CTF 55)
On the south and southwest of the pinnacle gains The Tenth Army was assigned the mission of
were made,butfurther stifffighting lay ahead. attacking, occupying, and defending Okinawa
 island. The Army plan called foi- 111e-simulta­ Twenty-seventh on the right or west flank, the
neous landing of four divisions on the western Ninety-sixth in the center, and the Seventh on the
beaches of Okinawa south of Zampa Misaki. The left or east flank.
First and Sixth Divisions of the Third Marine An all out attack was opened at 0640, 19 April.
Amphibious Corps were to cross the island just However,our troops ran into very heavy machine
north of the Bisha Gawa River and then turn gun and mortar fire, reinforced by artillery and
northward as far as the Ishikawa Isthmus, while antitank guns covering all approaches; and the
the Seventh and Ninety-sixth Divisions of the attack stopped after a very limited advance. The
XXIV Army Corps advanced across the island attack was continued each day thereafter, moving
just south of the river and turned south. The un­ slowly forward after intense bombardment by our
expectedly rapid advance northward of the two artillery and naval gunfire. By 24 April, enemy
Marine divisions does not fall within the purview resistance was` weakened and the enemy appeared
of this report. to be withdrawing his main forces to the south,
The XXIV Corps made its assault landings at without, however,abandoning his positions. The
0830 on 1 April, and the beaches were quickly center of the corps front was unable to advance
secured, and the troops pushed rapidly inland because of stiffening opposition. The left flank
against light opposition from the enemy. Kadena encountered increasing resistance. •
Airfield was captured within a few hours. By 2 On 26 April a new attack was commenced. The
April the assault troops of the Seventh Division on left flank division was able to advance its right;
the north or left flank of the XXIV Corps had but its left flank remained in practically the same
reached the east coast,and mopping up operations position because of heavy machine-gun and mortar
were in progress in rear of these troops. The fire from high ground on its flanks. The center
Ninety-sixth Division on the south or right flank division pushed forward and captured the high
had run into increasing enemy resistance in the ground to itsfront which had held up the division's
hills overlooking the assault beaches as well as advance. The right division made the better
difficult terrain and mined roads. On the third progress and captured the majority of the Machi­
day the corps front changed to the south and rapid nato airfield, but, was later forced to withdraw.
progress was made against light opposition and All divisions reached their assigned objectives by
with light casualties. At 1000 5 April, command­ nightfall. During darkness the enemy attempted
ing general, XXIV Corps, assumed command many counterattacks in small groups, the largest
ashore. After several days of increasing resist­ being about one company. Many infiltration at­
ance,the corps on 9 April came up against highly tempts were repulsed. The corps front was sub­
organized enemy positions and was forced to dis­ jected to harassing fire from artillery as well as
continue the attack until supplies could be as­ mortar and machine-gun fire.
sembled. On 29 April plans were initiated to replace two
The next large-scale attack was scheduled for 19 of the front line Divisions, the Seventy-seventh
April. In the several days preceding the attack, Division to replace the Ninety-sixth Division and
the corps made small gains and consolidated the the First Marine Division to replace the Twenty-
front, while ammunition and other supplies were seventh Division. The Ninety-sixth Division was
being brought forward. During the period, the relieved at 1300, but the Twenty-seventh Division
enemy made small counter-attacks and attempts at was not relieved for 3 more days. During this
infiltration, but these were repulsed with heavy period the corps repulsed several counterattacks of
losses. The hostile positions were well developed varying strength, the strongest being in the center
and gave every indication of being skillfully pre­ and consisting of an estimated battalion of enemy
pared and well organized. Harassing fire from troops. Slight gains were made on the left flank
enemy artillery and mortars fell in our area, par­ of the corps.
ticularly at night. The Twenty-seventh Division, Heavy fighting continued along the entire front
Tenth Army Reserve Afloat, was landed and at­ of the corps, with the stiffest resistance in the zone
tached to the XXIV Corps. The three divisions of action of the Seventh Division. Nights were
were then distributed along the front with the marked with frequent small counterattacks and

•••
 ?

r
f%:

infiltration attempts. On 3 May, the First Ma­ couni-ertattack on the right of our line, in an at- --'
rine Division relieved the Twenty-seventh Divi­ tempt to drive the Sixth Marine Division off the
sion on the right flank of the corps. On 4 May high ground north of Naha. Numerousinfiltration .
the enemy attempted its strongest counterattacks attempts were made and repulsed;and an amphibi­
to date. Coordinated with a counterattack in the ous movement to the rear of the III Phib Corps
center of the line, landings were made in rear of lines was broken up by naval gunfire, which de­
both flank divisions in ,an attempt to knock out stroyed three out of six barges. Considerable
Blue artillery and to join forces in rear of our enemy artillery fire fell on the troops of the XXIV
front lines. Strong air attacks and suicide boat Corps and there were some attempts at infiltration
operations against our ships were made in support through them. However,- some advances were
of these counterlandings. The two landings were made in this sector, principally in the sector of the
partially thwarted by fire from naval vessels and. Seventy-seventh Division on the right of the corps.
from troops on shore; but some enemy troops suc­ During the periods 15 to 19 May,gradual prog­
ceeded in landing. The majority of these troops ress was made all along the front,in spite of tem­
were intercepted, but some individuals apparently porary local reverses due to fanatical enemy
succeeded in entering our area. The counter­ counter-attacks. During this period ground forces
attack in the center of our lines consisted of a gave much credit to the assistance rendered by
regiment reinforced by.12 to 15 tanks. Air sup­ naval gunfire. On 19 May the supply of the III
port planes caught the concentration of troops and Phib Corps was somewhat improved when Beach
virtually wiped out the attack by bombing and Brown Five became operational at Machinato. On
strafing. 21 May the Seventh Division advanced against stiff
On 8 May IIIPhib Corps assumed control of the resistance and the next day captured Yonabaru.
sector occupied by the First Marine Division. The Meanwhile our right flank was still held up along
Sixth Marine Division was in the process of mov­ the Asato River in Naha and at the outskirts of
ing into the lines on the right of the Corps, being Shun.
replaced in the northern part of the island by the During the nextfew days the Sixth Marine Divi­
Twenty-seventh Division. XXIV Corps retained sion consolidated its position on Sugar Loaf Hill,
the remainder of the front. Enemy artillery fire which had changed hands several times. From it
during this period was light and intermittent. they could dominate the approaches to both Shuni
Many enemy infiltrations were attempted and en­ and Naha.
emy troops killed along the entire front. A few On the left flank the Ninety-sixth Division con­
enemy troops still remained in rear of our lines as tinued its advance south of Yonabaru, thereby
a result of their counterlanding on 4 May. turning the flank of the Jap line at Shun. Dur­
At 1700, 11 May, the Tenth Army jumped off ing this period an increased number of native
for a coordinated attack against the enemy lines, conscripts and naval personnel were encountered
with the intention of enveloping Shuni town. The in the Jap front line, thereby indicating marked
Sixth Marine Division on the right flank of the deterioration in the quality of their troops.
Army advanced 700 yards with only light resist­ On May 25, several plane loads of Japanese
ance between it and Naha. However, since the suicide demolition troops attempted to land on
First Marine Division and the Seventy-seventh In­ Yontan airfield. Two planes were shot down,but
fantry Divisions were held up by enemy machine one made a crash landing on the field, and the
gun fire from the high ground to their front, the occupants succeeded in destroying at least seven
Sixth Marine Division was forced to stop its ad­ of our planes. On the same day large groups of
vance. The Ninety-sixthinfantry Division,on the the enemy were spotted heading south from Shun,
left flank of the Army,advanced about 300 yards and air strikes and naval gunfire inflicted many
against intense enemy machine gun and rifle fire. casualties among them.
The second day of the attack resulted in gains in In spite of continuous rains and deep mud both
the center of the line, with consolidation on the our flanks continued to advance. The Seventh
right and some advance on the left. On the night Division continued its drive south of Yonabaru
of 14-15 May the enemy attempted a coordinated and began to push westward, while the Sixth Ma­
 c. Ratios of instructors'to students, or of other school sup­
port personnel to students, are an erroneous index for evaluation and
comparison of school operations.

d. The Army, through its manpower control procedures, has

workable means for adjusting school staffing to expected or actual work­
loads. ,These means are designed to promote economy in use of per­
sonnel resources.

e. Centralization under USCONARC of manpower control

responsibilities for service schools, now dispersed among'sixteen agen­
cies, will improve administration and lead to greater consistency in
service school staffing.

f, Valid evaluation.of school personnel requirements requires

. understanding and.consideration,.of individual school situations and.work­
loads, which can be gained Only thr,ough on-site appraisals.

g. Criteria used as a basis for staffing Army service schools

must be kept current and responsive to changing requirements and should
be developed by USCONARC in close coordination with the schools.
•rr

h. Department of the Army should publish changes to required

staffing guides as developed by USCON.ARC.

1. Schaal strengths should be maintained as nearly as• possible

at 100% of approved staffing authorization.

j. Longer tours of duty for instructors and better selection

of technically qualified personnel for instructor duty would enhaxice effi­
ciency and contribute to higher standards of instruction.

.3-13
 TROOP OPERATIONS

During the approach of this force to the ob- U. S. S. Mount McKinley and commanded troops-,
jective the underwater demolition teams reported ashore in this area. On 10 April the commanding
that while all beaches were suitable for ',VT's, general and his staff shifted to the U.S.S. Natrona
none were suitable for LCVP. The alternate for lift to the U.S. S. Panamint at Okinawa. At
plan, which provided for this contingency, was time the command of garrison forces in
not used, since late intelligence indicated slight Kerama Retto passed to the island commander,_
resistance was to be expected. The preferred plan Okinawa.
was modified by dispatch to the effect that the Changes in the garrison force occurred as fol-
four BLT in LST would assault as scheduled lows:
and: (a) LVT from Aka Shima would reembark On 18 April, Battery D, Seventh AAA (AW)
in their LST immediately after their assault,(b) Battalion and Company B, Two-hundred and
BLT 2/307 would be transferred from Eastland Forty-second Engineer Corps Battalion (shore
to these LST commencing at Mike-hour, (e) this party) were withdrawn to Okinawa. On 29 April,
newly-constituted assault team would assault Detachment 62, Seventh Weather Squadron, was
Yakabi Shima at Mike+3-hour, (d) BLT 2/307 withdrawn.
would move one company shore-to-shore to assault On 8 May the Five Hundred and Fifth AAA
Kuba Shima on L—5-day,(e) BLT 3/306 would Gun Battalion (90-mm.) with First Platoon, C
remain afloatuntilL— 5-day,when they would land Battery, Eight Hundred and Sixty-sixth AAA
in reserve on Tokashiki Shima. (AW) Battalion attached, was attached to the
All landings were made on the day scheduled island commander, Kerama Retto, and movement
and approximately on time except the assault on was ordered. Transportation was made available
Yakabi which involved a transfer from APA to on 18 May 1945. The first echelon arrived by LST
LST,the organization of waves and the launching at 0745 on 22 May.
of an unscheduled and •unrehearsed assault with On 15 May, commanding general, Air Defense
less than 12 hours' notice. This operation was Command,requested transportation to move vari­
delayed three hours. Since Geruma Shima and ous units of radar, both warning and fighter
1.1okaji Shima were secured by 1130 on L—6-day, director, from le Shima, Okinawa Shima and
troops and LVT's were reembarked in LST on Nagannu Shima to Kerama Retto to reinforce the
L—6 afternoon and made their scheduled assault detachment of AWS 8 already installed on Za-
on Tokashiki Shima by a ship-to-shore movement mami Shima. Transportation was made avail-
rather than by the planned shore-to-shore move- able on 16 May. On 16 May,a fire broke out in the
ment. Tonaki Shima was not assaulted inasmuch fuel issuing point adjacent to the radar position of
as no enemy installations were found thereon. AWS 8. An exploding Diesel fuel drum caused
serious burns to 3 officers and 31 men of AWS 8
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 7(CTG and disabled the power van of this detachment. As
51.15) a result, the sequence of radar reinforcement was
changed. A unit with early warning characteris-
On 2 April, the Kerama Retto garrison, com­ tics arrived on 20 May, and was in operation by
pleted unloading all personnel and supplies. The midnight 21-22 May.
garrison consisted of the Second Battalion, Three On 19 May the Eight Hundred and Seventieth
hundred fifth Infantry, command by Lt. Col. AAA (AW) Battalion (colored) was ordered
James F. Doyle, Inf., USA, with attachments equipped as infantry and moved from Okinawa to
from the Seventy-seventh Division,XXIV Corps, Zamami to relieve BLT 2/305 as garrison infantry.
and Tenth Army consisting briefly of engineer, This unit arrived by LST at 0745 on 22 May.
medical, military government, AAA (AW), The intention of island command Okinawa was
meterological and Marine air warning troops, all to reconstitute the garrison force Kerama Retto,
located on Zamami Shima. On 10 May the island under Colonel Hampton,to consist of Five Hun-
of Tokashiki was garrisoned. dred and Fifth AA Gun Battalion (Lieutenant
On 2 April, the commanding general, Seventy- Colonel Beaver) and Eight Hundred and Seven-
seventh Infantry Division, was on board the tieth AAA (AW) Battalion constituted as infan­
 ' NARRATIVE
• A .
stry (Lieutenant Colonel Las uc)er'
t‘silita
1
le the only feasible landing point - for wheeled
attachments. t vehicles.
During the period 2 April to 22 May,the gar On 9 April the naval trash and garbage disposal
rison, with few exceptions, sent a daily water­ area on Zamami Shima was ready for use. Un­
bourne patrol to the vicinity of all beaches other­ burnable refuse is buried and the garrison fur­
wise unoccupied,in order to detect atan early stage nishes a bulldozer for this service. The location
any preparation being made by the Japanese to was selected because it is available over the only
dig out and prepare suicide boats for use against "all-tide" beach in the area, and also did not
shipping. Daily landings were made on at least require special Army protection.
one unoccupied island to inspect the areas sur­ On 2 May a naval recreation area was prepared
rounding all beaches suitable for launching boats. by garrison troops,who bulldozed a partial pier out
During the period 10-15 April, company- from a beach on the eastern end of Zamami.
strength patrols were used on Zamami, Aka, Gabi Shima,an unocupied small island in the sea­
Geruma,and Hokaji in order to clear these islands. drome area was made available for recreation
Due to the movement of civilians to the Kerama parties from the seaplane group.
Retto from Ie Shima,the garrison commander was By 22 May two cub strips were operational on
ordered,on 8 May,to clear the island of Tokashiki. Zamami Shima.
The period 9-11 May,inclusive, was characterized
by rifle company patrols on Tokashiki with only From: Comnzander,Amphibious Group5(CTG
four'Taps being sighted. E Company,reinforced, 51.2)
garrisoned the island atTokashikitown on 10 May. Transport Group Charlie arrived atPointRoger
The movement of 3,000 civilians with possessions, One at 0400 1 April,and the transports proceeded
including cattle, commenced on 20 May. to Transport Area Charlie off the southeastern
Enemy actions occurred as follows: beaches. The Tractor Group had been contacted
About midnight 12-13 May the Tokashiki gar­ at about 0128 and was proceeding to its LST area.
rison was attacked by a force of Japs using banga­ TG 51.19, which was designated to furnish gunfire
lore torpedoes,satchel charges,rifles, and mortars. and air support for the demonstration, were in
Four army were wounded. When the garrison their assigned stations as TG 51.2 approached the
opened fire with automatic weapons the Japs fired transport and tractor area.
15 rounds of mortars at the flashes. A booby- The demonstration was planned to be as realistic
trapped area prepared by the garrison was in­ as possible in order to deceive the enemy into be­
spected the next day and though much blood and lieving thatlandings were to be made on the south­
bits of flesh were found, Jap bodies had been re­ eastern beaches as well as on the western beaches
moved. • G Company was moved to Tokashiki on of Okinawa. It is believed that the enemy was
13 May,later withdrawing and leaving one platoon deceived and that enemy troop movements were
to reinforce the garrison. delayed by the presence of the Demonstration
On the basis of reports submitted by the garri­ Group off the southeastern beaches on Love- and
son, the following tabulation shows the period Love-plus-1-days.
totals of Japs killed or captured and of Korean This demonstration consisted of the dispatching
laborers captured in the Retto: of7boat waves composed of 24LCVP's each,from
Period-22 April-22 May
the line of departure at 5-minute intervals. Each
• Captured
boat carried about one squad of Second Marine
• Killed Jap Korean Division troops. The LCVP waves were preceded
Total 63 91 154 by two divisions of LCI(G)'s and flanked by two
During the entire period the garrison was en­ divisions of Lar(M)'s on the left and two LCS(L)
gaged in various engineering projects, particularly divisions on the right. When the fourth wave
the building and maintaining of a road net on crossed the line of departure,at 11-hour (0830) (I)
Zamami. On 26 April a pier with pontoon exten­ all boat waves reversed course and returned to
sion was ready for use on Zamami Shima, and is their parent ships. A smoke screen was laid at
usable at all states of the 11-10 minutes by aircraft controlled by CTG
 ,

,
51.19 and at B-4 minutes by all LCI types to lieved that with praper training and equipment
cover the reversal of course and retirement. The these intervals can be inaterially reduced.
screen was laid effectively and obscured operations The air liaison parties did not function as
from the beach. No enemy reaction to the demon­ smoothly as was considered desirable. Most of
stration was noted, and this group was not taken the officers lacked experience and were not thor­
under enemy fire. During the approach and with­ oughly conversant in aerial tactics and aircraft
drawal, TG 51.19 maintained neutralizing fire on employment.
the southern end of Okinawa on both sides of the Liaison with both artillery and naval gunfire
demonstration beaches. was effectively coordinated by the target informa­
All boats were recovered by 1500 and TG 51.2 tion centers of each unit.
retired from the demonstration area at 1530 on Radio communication between the ALP's and
prescribed retirement courses. The retirement CASCO- or LFASCU was frequently unsatisfac­
during the night of 1 April was without incident tory. The signal strength of present communica­
except at 1910 the Brown opened fire to the south­ tions equipment of ALP's is considered too weak.
ward on a reported group of planes. Flash RED, Ranges of over 15 miles and masking terrain fre­
Control YELLOW was ordered by CTG 51.2. No quently necessitated relaying. In. some cases the
attack dev-eloped and no planes were sighted at SAR net was the only ready means of communica­
any time by this command. Although there were tion with isolated units which resulted in the use
frequent reports of bogies in the vicinity, none of this net for tactical and administrative traffic.
closed the formation. Communications between CASCU or LFASCU
and support aircraft, air coordinators, and ob­
From: Commanding General, Headquarters,
servers were normally satisfactory, except for
III Amphibious Corps
communications with OY airplanes. The present
The average elapsed time from the time of the radio equipment of the OY airplane is decidedly
request to the time of starting the attack was 55 unsatisfactory both as to range and dependability.
minutes, while the average interval from the time By order commanding general, Tenth Army,
of request of a mission until its completion, was corps artillery officers were made responsible for
102 minutes. These intervals of time are consid­ the coordination of artillery, naval gunfire, and
ered excessive. (NoTE.—Missions requested the air. This coordination was maintained through­
day preceding the date on which the strike was out the operation. Fire plans were prepared
completed are notincluded in these computations.) daily,covering both night and day fires.
Some of the reasons for the delays were: Com­ The LST 's functioned in a highly satisfac­
plete or partial failure of communications; jam­ tory manner during the assault phase, acting as
ming activities by the enemy; frequent failure to reef edge transfer points, and as centers of distri­
include all necessary information in the original bution of casualties to the various ships in an
request; the necessity of requiring that the next equitable manner,thus preventing overloading of
senior echelon to approve all requests before they any one ship's medical and surgical facilities.
could be consumated; the practice of making re­ They also provided care for those injured who
peated dummy runs prior to a, strike. It is be­ were too ill to proceed further.

1111111111111111. 1-72
 Chapter II. NAVAL GUNFIRE

DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK radar picket vessels as soon as possible from their
SUICIDE OR AA ATTACKS
highly vulnerable and dangerous stations.
(b) To improve nightfighter direction it is nec­
From: Commander,FIFTH Fleet essary to start interception at greater range from
Throughout this operation, the major threat to the transport area than is now possible. This can
our naval forces came from enemy suicide aircraft be accomplished beforeland-based radars are oper­
attacks. Some bombing and torpedo attacks were ating by equipping at least six destroyers with SP
made,but most of the serious damage was received type radar, and trained day and night direction
from suicide attacks. That the large majority of personnel. Also, the most experienced night
such planes did not reach the inner areas and that fighter squadrons with the latest and best equipped
sufficient losses and damage to interfere seriously planes should be made available to defend the am­
with the operation were not incurred is due to the phibious forces.
excellent performance of combat air patrols and This is a report of encounters by the ships and
fighter director teams,to the highly commendable aircraft of TF 51 with attacking enemy aircraft
work of destroyers and small types in radar picket and of the attacks by aircraft of TF 51 against en­
stations and screens, and to the tendency of the emy planes on the ground. It does not include ac­
enemy to concentrate his attacks on outlying sta­ tions by aircraft of TF 58 even when under the
tions. Defense against suiciders has not been per­ control of CTF 51. The Okinawa area for pur­
fected and they remain a major threat. The best poses of this report includes the Sakishima Gunto
defense is destruction before take-off or by the and Amami group.
CAP - before they reach their targets. Those Total enemy planes shot down by our planes 392
which evade the CAP must be made to penetrate Total enemy planes shot down by AA fire 501
a large volume of fire from all guns which bear. Total enemy suiciders 166
Evasive action and speed should be used,but their Total enemy destroyed or probably destroyed on
effect is limited by the rapidity of the action. The ground 125
volume of fire cannot be discontinued when the Grand total enemy destroyed by TF 51 1,184
attacker bursts into flame, but must continue until
he disintegrates or crashes into the sea. Some From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
planes of several making a coordinated attack on The bulk of the suicide-plane attacks have oc­
the same target will be successful, unless all at­ curred in daylight. During periods of heavy
tackers are taken under fire by all ships within attack, planes have come in in small groups, usu­
range. It is noted that a study of defense against
ally from 3 to 8, and have concentrated on the
suicide attack has been directed by commander in
pickets. In many cases the attack appeared to
chief, United States Fleet.
be directed by a controlling officer in, an accom­
From:
. Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF panying fighter, and in several instances two or
51) three planes have made excellent coordinated
(a) In planning,- consideration should be given attacks while the remainder circled around in the
to the early securing of outlying land. areas or vicinity until they noted the result of that attack.
islands and the rapid installation thereon of ade­ During the later phases of the operation they dis­
quate shore-based- radar equipment and fighter- continued this procedure and attempted driving
director units. The purpose of this is to relieve the attack home on the transport area.
 11 B trAGIC'

One common fault of the Japanese in their air much needed drone training. Give necessary pri­
attacks was the policy of Making numerous and ority to TDD program in order to accomplish this.
successive small-scale attacks instead of putting (g) Augment the number of salvage vessels and
all their power into one big attack. rescue vessels assigned to the operation. Provide
In broad daylight the majority of the suicide spare fire-fighting teams.
attacks have been made in fairly steep dives out of (h) Fit all destroyers as fighter director vessels
the lower cloud level. At dusk and at night the and provide with fighter director teams.
attacks have all been low-level attacks, coming in (i) On LCS(L)'s replace single 40-mm. with
extremely close to the water. twin 40-mm.
Commander,CruDiv 5,has advocated a cruising (j) Provide rocket launchers as antisuicide
disposition for fire-support vessels operating in. weapon. Rockets should be armed with VT fuze.
close support. This disposition in general pro­ (k)In order to reduce their silhouette in bright
vides for heavy ships in column with a close-in moonlight and against starshells, fire-support
screen across each e.nd to protect the column from ships were directed to head toward the moon or
enfilading attack. starshells, insofar as practicable, when air attacks
Throughout the Okinawa operation there was were expected.
a constant- scarcity of fighter-director ships and (1) The small rescue vessels (PCE(R))proved
fighter-director teams. invaluable in this operation, picking up survivors
Mouse-trap operations using a privateer as bait and rendering medical aid wherever casualties
teamed up with P-47's were tried with no success. occurred.
The normal antisubmarine screen with vessels Although there have been some torpedo attacks
of7,000 yardsinterval and therefore out of mutual made during daylighthours on days of heavy raids,
supporting range of each other presents an ex­ the majority of these attacks have been at night
cellent target for Jap air attack. by low-flying planes.
The following improyements to combat the sui­ Below is listed a summarized table of enemy air­
cide menace should be given the highest possible craft destroyed by planes and guns of TF 31 and
priority in order to accomplish them on the maxi­ by planes and guns of TF 99. No planes destroyed
mum number of ships prior to the next operation. by units of TF 38 are included. Each designated
(a) Install Mark 63 directors for 40-mm. raid is considered an "encounter" for purposes of
control. this summary. All planes destroyed were airborne
(b) Remove the after torpedo mount on all de­ unless marked by an asterisk in which case they
stroyers and substitute a 40-mm. quad or two were caught on ground or water.
40-mm. twins. It is understood that all DD's 17 18 19 20 21 22
coming from the east coast will have all tubes May May May May May May
replaced by 40-mm.guns on destroyer types.
Number of raids 18 10 3 11 3 4
(c) Where practicable, replace 20-mm. with Direction from which
40-mm. Where not feasible, replace 20-mm. raids originated 3NE 1 W 3 N 8 N 3SW 2NE
4 SW 9 N 3 W 2 N
singles with 20-mm.twins. 11 N
(d) Install where needed, open ring sights for Total estimate number
of enemy planes in .
Mark 51 directors. volved 20-25 30-35 3-5 35 12-15 5-7
(e)Install at least four.50 caliber guns on small Enemy planes destroyed •
screening craft,LCI,and destroyer types for anti- by—
Local day CAP
suicide boat protection. These should be capable Local night CAP
2 4
5 2
of depressing enough to reach craft 10 to 15 feet Distant plane sweeps
Ships antiaircraft
off the ship's side. Shore antiaircraft
8 10 19 9
. 4 .
(f) Make specific provision for antiaircraft Miscellaneous(crashes,
practices, both sleeve and TDD at the target area ASP planes,etc.)____ '1 1 1
at the earliest practicable time. At Okinawa two Total de.stroyed for
day 11 24 0 28 9 3
LSM's were rigged with TDD catapult- and gave
 •

NAVAL GUNFIR4
' •
.., '
23 24 25 26 27 28 ' , .-.:
May May May May May May
} '.... ..., f 10Jun,
,..,
Y ; s ,
.' 1`4213', i'''
11,nue,,,.- 17...Iiine 15June June
t).14111).
, k
­
• Number of raids 7 29 32 1 25 37
Direction from which Number ofraids 3 3
.-...'...73 :-..
.,
--'' 4 4
raids originated 7N 27 N 30 N iN 11 NE 32 N Direction from which
2 W 2 SW 14 NW 2 SE raids originated 3N 3N 2 NW 4W
and N 3 SW 2SW
Total estimate number Total estimate number
of enemy planes in- of enemy planes in­
volved 14 75 150 6-10 50 125-150 volved 3 10 6 4
---
Enemy planes destroyed Enemy planesdestroyed
by— by—
Local day CAP 9 75 4 4 20 Local day CAP 1
Local night CAP 7 4 3 Local night CAP . 1 • 2 2
Distant sweeps 1 17 Distant plane sweeps.._ 2 35
Ships,antiaircraft 4 7 50 2 24 35 Ships antiaircraft 1
Shore,antiaircraft 29 Shore antiaircraft 1
Miscellaneous(crashes, Miscellaneous(crashes
ASP planes,etc.) 1 1 ASP planes,etc.) 1
Total destroyed for
Total destroyed for day • 38 13 2 3
day 4 53 126 6 32 76

29 30 31 2 17June 18June 19June 20June 21 June Total

3
May May May Juno June June
Number of raids 3 4 1 1 286
Number of raids - 8 1 3 11 Direction from which
Direction from which
raids originated 2 NW 3N 1N 1N
raids originated 6 W 1 W IN 2N 11 N
-------

1 SW 1 NW
2N 2N Total estimate number
Total estimate number
of enemy planes in-
of enemy planes in­
volved 3 4 9_3 1 769
volved 10-15 1 4 6 60-70
Enemy planesdestroyed
Enemy planes destroyed
by—
by— Local day CAP
Local day CAP 2 201
36 Local night CAP__ _ _
Local night CAP 2 32
Distant plane sweeps 76
Distant sweeps 1 Ships antiaircraft 229
Ships,antiaircraft 8 2 1 10 Shore antiaircraft 36
Shore, antiaircraft
Miscellaneous(crashes
Miscellaneous(crashes,
ASP planes,etc.) 07
ASP planes, etc.) 1
Total destroyed for
Total destroyed for day 2 581
day . 8 4 2 48

4June 5June 6June 7June 8June 9June 2 17 destroyed on ground at Kyushyu.

Number of raids 3 10 12 35 15 Baka bombs

Direction from which
raids originated 3SW 7N 6 SW 31 N 13 N
The number of these attacks,has been relatively
and 6N 3 SW 1W small. The Bakas are brought to the scene by
NW and 1 NE 1 NW
3SW NW Betty's and are launched at altitudes from 5,000
Total estimate number to 10,000 feet while the Betty circles outside of
of enemy planes in­
volved 10 50 15 40-50 15-20
gun range. After launching, the Baka has pro­
ceeded direct to its objective in a straight glide
Enemy planesdestroyed
by— developing speeds of 400-500 miles per hour. The
Local day CAP 13 6 12 2 Betty while carrying the Baka is unwieldly and un-
Local night CAP 2
Distant plane sweeps 8 8 12 maneuverabLe, and a good many have been shot
Ships antiaircraft 19 6 3 1 down without difficulty by the CAP before con-
Shore antiaircraft 1
Miscellaneous(crashes tact with their target.
ASP planes,etc.)
Total destroyed for From: Conunander, Amphibious Group 12
day 40 20 15 8
During the period of this report there were a
1 2 destroyed on water at Kyushyu. total of 4,385 radar and visual detections of enemy
 DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY ATTACK

aircraft of sufficient importance to be designated From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4

as raids and the Teton went to general quarters Organization for repelling enemy air attacks
for air-raid defense on 183 separate occasions. was effective and extensive. Radar picket ships
On only about one-third of these occasions, how­ with fighter-director teams on board were sta­
ever, did enemy aircraft actually penetrate to the tioned in outlying positions to assist interception
transport area and most of them did so at night of enemy'planes. Closer in, a destroyer screen
when ships were covered with smoke. Some of surrounded the objective area. Combatair patrols
these night raids in which enemy planes are known were stationed at various orbit points to intercept
to have reached the anchorage resulted in engage­ enemy planes. These combat air patrols were
ments with AA fire and bombs dropped or suicide controlled by the Joint Expeditionary Force
attempts by enemy planes, but for the most part fighter director and assigned to fighter director
they proved abortive with planes flying around and radar picket ships as necessary.
overhead or in the vicinity of the anchorage, but The enemy air attacks covered in this report
apparently unable to locate targets and eventu­ were made by groups of planes having a high per­
ally opening and disappearing from the radar centage of old and nearly obsolete types, piloted,
screen. it is believed, by meagerly trained pilots whose
No account of the air actions in the Okinawa sole function was to steer the plane into a colli­
campaign would be complete without a tribute to sion with the target. Twin engine planes and
the epic performances of the fighter-director de­ other bombers or torpedo planes were a small
stroyers and their supports on radar picket sta­ minority.
tions, who time after time absorbed the brunt of The Northern Attack Force weathered these at­
the enemy air attacks and fought back savagely, tacks with the following results:
(1) One LST (No. 599),hit by suicider.
frequently against overwhelming odds until they
(2) Two enemy planes shot down by AA fire
were knocked out, and also to the superb protec­
by transports off Hagushi.
tion provided by our own combat air patrol. This (3) Enemy plane shot down by Barnett at sea.
gallant team of surface and air functioned so The enemy air attacks, as in phase I, were made
efficiently that ships unloading in the anchorage by groups of old and nearly obsolete planes,piloted
were relatively undisturbed despite the thousands by inexperienced pilots. Very little use was made
of enemy planes which were thrown against them, of twin-engine planes and other bombers or
and wrote a new chapter in the history of heroic torpedo planes.
achievement in this war. To their protection of The le Shima,Attack Group came through with
the unloading anchorages can be attributed in a these results:
large measure the final success of the invasion. Forty-one enemy planes shot down by CAP con­
Invariably there were too few destroyers avail­ trolled by Panamint.
able to provide adequate antiaircraft protection Seven planes shot down by gunfire supportships
for the heavy fire-support ships. It was likewise and transports.
impossible to assign sufficientLCItype smoke craft No ships sunk or damaged.
for adequate coverage apart from the main trans­ Enemy air activities during this period were
port anchorage. of three general types:
(1) Mass suicide attacks on radar picket
It is recommended:
stations.
(1) That protection of the fire-support ships
(2) High altitude day reconnaissance.
be the responsibility of a fire-support group com­ (3) Night reconnaissance, bombing, and heck­
mander. (See par. 5.) ling flights.
(2) That anchorages be laid out with possible In a mass suicide attack on a radar picket station
fire-support requirements in view. a concentration of 30 to 70 planes would attack
(3) That where possible sufficient destroyers be the vessels there, while an equal or greater number
assigned to a given fire-support group to provide of planes tried to break through our combat air
adequate antiaircraft protection underway. patrols. The radar picket stations suffered heavily

24
 ATrait

riazt

le"V"11194,1.
z44741

it!

k1.4'

. .

U. S. Landing Craft Hit by a Suicide Plane, Off Okinawa Shima,L Plus 5.

tactical employment of other services can be readily seen by comparing
the broad generalized instruction of the Air Command and Staff College
and the far more complex tactical, operational and logistical studies at
the U$ Army Command and General Staff College. Courses in main­
tenance of long land lines of communication, Combat engineering, and
tactical employment of Armor, Artillery and Infantry with the need to
learn small unit tactics, large integrated force battle maneuvers, a
multiplicity of weapons and influence of terrain are illustrative of
courses without counterpart in the other services.

• SECTION III

CONCLUSIONS

9. •The Board found that:

a. A sound and logical procedure:for reviewing and mon­

itoring Army school courses of instruction has been established at
Hq VSCONARc butthe agency responsible- for administering this
program is inadequately staffed to perform its responsibilities to
the extent desired. : An inadequate evaluation, however, is made of
the possibility for use of civilian schools.

b. Action should be continued or initiated, as appropriate,

to consider elimination•or combination.of the courses listed in Ap­
pendix F, noting that elimination of two of these courses would result
in elimination of one school.

c. If carried to conclusion, the actions proposed will not

imperil professional career development or the production of required
skilled personnel.

4-6
 NAVAL GUNFIRE

the ship, while, with heavy ships,the great danger The conceptfor a disposition againstthe suiqider•
is destruction of personnel and topside control differs from the concept against the enemy torpedo
equipment with the result that the ship loses some plane where speed and maneuverability (especially
operational usefulness. the turn away from the torpedo plane) have a
No precise priority of targets seems established greater weight. The antitorpedo plane disposi­
for these attacks. During this operation there tion is opened up to reduce the continuity of
was.a strong tendency for the planes to go for targets;to protect the ships inside the disposition;
small, isolated, and lightly armored vessels even while retaining good volume against a plane which
though there were more important targets in the is limited to a straight line low approach or glide;
area. Yet occasionally they seemed to single out always from the outside of the disposition.
battleships as targets.
From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF
From: Commander, Cruiser Division 5(CTF 54)
54) The effectiveness of antiaircraft fire, although
When sizeable enemy air raids threatened the improved leaves much to be desired. Much of
transport and fire-support areas, the usual pro­ the apparent increase in effectiveness is due to in­
cedure was for the fire-support ships to form an experienced flyers attacking with comparatively
antiaircraft disposition and start cruising away little evasive action. By far, the most extensive
from the transport area. In such a disposition damage suffered by ships of this force resulted
mutual support remains paramount but the cruis­ from suicide attacks. Those planes that elude the
ers and destroyers lost the advantage of their high CAP must be destroyed by ships' AA fire before
speed and maneuverability by being tied to the they reach the ships. This is primarily a prob­
OBB at 12 to 14 knots. If stations were provided lem for the 5-inch batteries since the automatic
in a semicircle around the transport area for these weapons have neither the range nor the destructive
ships, they and the transports would gain mutual power to be fully effective against these planes
support. which,in at least some cases,are armored.
The suicide bomber has a selected target; a The following was promulgated as doctrine to
definite ship. If he gets into his dive or close this Force against suicide planes by AA fire:
approach and misses, it is a very close miss and (1) Prompt detection—radar or visual.
adjacent ships are not endangered. This shows (2) Expert recognition.
that dispositions with reduced distances offer n'o (3) Maximum volume of fire starting at maxi­
special advantage to a suicider. mum effective range of the batteries concerned.
The ideal AA battery for defense against a Fire should be opened early without waiting for
suicider would be one fired from a pin point. As solution to steady.
fire power is the main defense against the suicider, (4) Standby set-ups on computers should have
the distance between ships should be the smallest target speed set at 350 knots or greater so that
safe maneuvering distance. This is stated as solution rate controls down to meet the target and
1,000 yards for low-speed dispositions, and 1,200 avoids trailing behind as we usually do.
for the fast carrier groups. In the fast carrier (5) Use as many directors (to obtain multiple
groups, if timely warning is received, and flight solutions) as are available for each target and
operations can be avoided during the suicide- employ full rate controlthroughout.
attack period, then the disposition should be con­ (6) Use at least 75 percent -VT fuzes where
tracted toward the center even though more units practicable.
are placed inside. Only in this way can the (7) Maintain maximtim fire until plane disin­
batteries give mutual support by pulling them to­ tegrates. Hits are not sufficient. Yet ships were
gether to approximate firing from a point. Speed, observed to cease firing when plane was set on fire.
maneuvering, unmasking the full broadside are (8) Ceaseless vigilance and instant readiness to
other factors and somewhat in conflict, and which fire on "any type of run".
modify concentration of the batteries toward a (9) Installation of additional 40-mm. guns
point. where possible to increase volume of fire against
those planes which get in before the 5-inch pick piclief's a He (rot a big return for his at­
them up. tacks on isolated ships or ships weakly supported.
It appears best to present the ship's beam to The attrition upon our destroyers was very seri­
the plAne whenever possible. This results in max­ ous. Their performance under these most trying
imum fire power, thwarts the usual attack from. conditions was beyond praise.
the stern, and probably results in decreased dam­ (e) In many cases the enemy appears to be using
age if the plane does hit. decoys on another bearing to attract attention from
The warning to keep all nonessential personnel the real attack. He also appears often to be using
below decks is worth repeating as onlookers con- a coordinating plane in large suicide attacks.
tine to be hit. (f) The enemy's attacks, when coordinated, are
Five-inch fire was usually opened late and well executed, with deceptive approaches from
volume of fire was seldom maximum. Solutions various bearings and altitudes.
tended to trail behind the target,in some instances, (y) The enemy's day suicide attacks on large
quite badly. Volume of fire from the machine formations,while by no means as frequent as those
guns was much better but accuracy was poor. on isolated ships, are well executed and generally
They tended to open fire beyond effective range at low level. Even with the comparatively small
and instances of extremely erratic or wild firing numbers (about 10) attacking the formation, sev­
were noted. It appeared that some ships were eral hits were made each time an attack was
having difficulty getting fire-control radars on launched. Hits ran around 30 percent.
targets at night inasmuch as they did not fire on (h) The enemy's night attacks on formations
close-in bogeys which had been picked up by search were not successful,in spite of the use of window,
radars considerably earlier. All of these short­ and on one occasion of flares. Maneuvering and
comings can, and must, be overcome by drill. In­ radar jamming were of great assistance in prevent­
tensive and continuous training is essential to ing successful attacks. Enemy lack of the high
produce the requisite volume of accurate fire. In­ skill necessary to succeed in such attacks was
termittent training, no matter how intensive, can­ apparent.
not keep AA batteries at peak performance. Par­ (i) Smoke again proved its usefulness in pre­
ticularly needed are more drone firings and more venting successful attacks on anchored ships at
tracking on simulated strafing runs by fighters night. The period just before dark and at early
using high speeds and radical maneuvers. daylight was not well exploited by the enemy at
The salient facts concerning air attacks are: the anchorages off Okinawa.
(a) While continuing his attacks by small (5) Although he would attack large formations
groups usually carrying torpedoes, at night, and on occasion, the enemy was usually reluctant to
at dawn and dusk, he has mounted all out day air do so. ­
attacks on our forces on an average of above once From: Commander,Battleship Division 3
every 5 or 6 days. The attack groups are princi­ While I concur with the need for early 5-inch
pally suicide planes (often of obsolete model), fire on attacking planes,I will not say that 20-mm.
but also include bombers and planes carrying jet is too light to stop suicide planes. In other en­
propelled bombs. dorsementsI have pointed out that20-mm.,despite
(b) The large attacks are directed principally its lightness, can stop suicide planes if the volume
against a main objective which may be our fast of fire is heavy and accurate.
carrier force or men of war or shipping around From: Commander, Battleship Division 9
Okinawa; but subsidiary attacks were also made
If our single planes are absolutely forbidden to
on objectives other than the principal one.
approach the formation except when so instructed,
(c) Our combat air patrol can destroy most of it is felt that the number of successful suicide at­
the enemy planes, but a certain number (possibly tacks will be substantially reduced. Too much
15 percent) will always get through. time is /wasted in making certain that we do not
(d) The enemy is definitely interested in iso­ shoot down a friend, not to mention the strain on
lated ships,or pairs of ships, particularly in radar the nerves of all hands.
 •

(1UNFIRE
• .•

From: Commander, Carrier Divaio4 5 (CTG Smoke was commenced on orders of the SOPA
58.1) when "bogeys" were observed on the radar screen
The average weather conditions encountered in such a position and such a course that an
during this period were favorable to operations. air attack seemed likely, giving consideration for
Of the 48 days spent at sea,flying conditions were the time required after smoking was commenced
above average or better on 38 days with undesira­ to form a good cover. The use of smoke more
ble or bad flying.conditions prevailing on 5 days. or less paralleled "Flash Red."
Surface winds less than 3 knots were observed 30 Smoke was used only during darkness.
percent of the time spentin the Okinawa Area. Recommendations
These operations demonstrated that concen­ CincPac has directed ComServPac to provide
trated task group gunfire can defeat the Kamikaze merchant ships participating in future operations
under good visibility conditions in the daytime. with smoke boats.
Over 90 potential suiciders came under the gunfire
of TG 58.1 and only 1 succeeded in crashing a ship. From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
Also not one got away. Fifty-one were splashed Better generator repair facilities and additional
by ship gunfire. One succeeded in hitting Sigsbee, ships equipped with smoke boats will cause a. rela­
a radar picket destroyer, where concentrated gun­ tive increase in future expenditures of smoke ma­
fire was not available, but all the others were shot terials. In planning future operations a mini­
down by CAP. mum of 8,000 drums fog oil,18,000 floats and 6,000
Night and dusk AA gunnery training must be pots should be used as a basis for determining re­
stressed, especially in the rear areas where this quirements for an operation equal in size to the
type of training can be conducted. The Japanese operation covered by this report. This amount
have exploited the vulnerable period just at dusk should be increased if more enemy air activity is
when the carriers are landing or have landed their anticipated.
planes. Night fighters cannot repel all planes in Shipments of smoke materials should include
a large dusk or night attack. fog oil, mogas,smoke pots and floats in the same
SMOKE
shipment and in the same ratio as estimated re­
quirements in order to simplify supply at the
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF objective.
51) Shipments of smoke materials to the objective
The effectiveness of a. properly executed smoke should arrive at least 1 week prior to the period
plan in protecting anchored ships against enemy for which use is contemplated.
air attack at nights is unquestioned. Trained personnel should be organized and util­
The plan, used at Okinawa consisted basically ized for operating fog generators ashore. This
of stationing all available LST's, LSM's, LCI should be their sole duty.
types and other craft equipped with fog generators All fog generator operators should be thor­
on a line across the windward side of the anchor­ oughly trained in the operation of generators.
age area. In addition, each transport stationed Stationing of smoke craft and berthing of heavy
two LCVP's equipped with fog generators (or ships requires constant supervision by the SOPA.
smoke pots) to windward of the parent vessel. Storage ashore of smoke matrials should be
Heavy combatant ships and other heavy ships provided as soon as possible and a stock built up
loaded with troops or important cargo which were as emergency supply. •
not equipped wall smoke boats were provided_ The total expenditures of fog oil, smoke pots,
smoke boats. Each heavy ship equipped for smok­ and floats from 1 April through 16 May is esti­
ing also made smoke. mated as:
Drums
In addition to smoke from vessels afloat,45 fog Fog oil 32,000
generators were set up ashore to assist in covering Smoke floats 60,000
the anchorage. 20,000
p-7 Smoke pots
 .s
1111111
1 1111111
1 1
i.f.:.
ATTACK
-
This gives a weekly average of approximately: (b) **houid install a Lportable
s
Drums generator on the bow. Ships usually swing into
Fog oil_ 4,900 the wind and this will assist in covering the super­
Smoke pots 3,100
,Smoke floats
structure in light winds.
9,300
(c) All merchant ships entering the combat
The biggest problem in connection with the use area should be equipped with a smoke generator
of smoke was providing adequate smoke material and 50 drums of fog oil.
at the objective. This problem was complicated (d) In addition to ARL's being assigned to
by the fact that expenditures were greater than repair smoke generators,a limited number ofLCI's
anticipated and by the fact that the reserves of should be equipped to assist in this work.
fog oil in the forward area and at Pearl were not From the 17th of May to 21 June,enemy aircraft
provided in the amounts requested prior to the were in the area practically every night. Despite
operation. thislarge number of air attacks only minor damage
In addition to shipments to the objective, all was suffered by ships covered by smoke in the
fog-oil pots and floats were removed from ships transport anchorage. The importance of smoke
prior to their departure from the objective and in providing protective cover for ships in the an­
re-issued to ships remaining. chorage cannot be over emphasized.
The total supply offog oil,smoke pots,and floats Smoke was used 72 times for a total of 51 hours
which arrived at the objective prior to 17 May is and 57 minutes for an average of 1 hour and 27
listed below (these figures do notinclude the origi­ minutes. The times varied from no smoke to as
nal allowance of ships participating in the opera­ much as 8 hours during a single night. No smoke
tion). was used to screen the anchorage during daylight.
Drums
Fog oil 24,500
Approximately 3,500 drums of fog oil,7,500 floats,
Smoke floats 38,000 and 3,000 pots were used each week.
Smoke pots 13,000 The misfires encountered with M4A2 floats was,
The above figures give an average weekly sup­ a definite nuisance. As many as 40 out of 45 were
ply of: found to be duds. Modifications should be made
Drums as this float is invaluable in assisting smoke gener­
Fog oil 3,750 ators to screen the anchorage; providing numerous
Smoke floats___5,850 long burning sources.
Smoke pots 2,000 Prior to dark each night, LCI's were anchored
The requested weekly repleiiishment requirements 1,000 yards to windward of the windward ships
of 4,000 drums fog oil, 9,000 floats, and 3,000 pots of the anchorage. It was found that the distance
would have been used if they had been supplied. between smokers should not exceed 200 yards and
CTF 51 smoke plan provided a plan for cover that 150 yards is the.correct distance for average
ing anchorages with smoke during enemy air at­ wind conditions. All smokers operated under a
tacks at night and directed attack force and group single unit commander.
commanders to provide their forces or groups with
detailed plans for other uses of Smoke. Except From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
during enemy air attacks smoke was :used only,in Experience at Okinawa confirmed beyond all
limited amounts-:. possible doubt what was already generally known,
(a) airing UDT operations.. namely that for ships at anchor at night, the best
(b) During mock landings. possible protection against attack by enemy air­
(c) During the landing at le Shima. craft is to withhold AA fire and cover the anchor­
(d) During minesweeping operations. age with smoke.
It is recognized that when the operation is
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force directed against a large land mass where enemy
(a) Egli* as practicable, all vessels partici­ planes may attack overland from fields on the
pating in amphibious -operations with portable same land mass, early warning radars employed
smoke generators. so successfully on picket vessels at Okinawa may

2-10
 t CINS-ENEMY 'ATTACK

not 1e very effective and . um­ ated by trained personnel attached to the beach
ber, possibly the majority, of air attacks will not party. It is desired to emphasize that the opera­
be detected until the planes are practically at the tion of generators ashore should not be left to the
anchorage. Some will argue that under such cir­ ordinary beach party personnel. They are not
cumstances smoke is a greater handicap to the de­ trained and they have other duties. Personnel of
fender than to the attacker and consequently its the Army Chemical Warfare Service would be
use is not justified. Obviously the best defenses ideal for this duty, if available. They should be
against such a situation are in the order named: attached to the beach party and under command of
the beachmaster so that orders to make smoke and
(1) To destroy the enemy air force before
stop smoke may be transmitted from the responsi­
the assault.
ble authority in the anchorage through naval
(2) To destroy or neutralize all enemy air
channels.
fields within striking distance of the anchor­
There is a gap between planning and execution
age.
of special smoke plans these plans because of non-
(3) To establish early warning radars in­ use in the past have come to be "paper" plans.
cluding shore stations as far away.from the Consequently, when a need for smoke (offensive
anchorage as practical in order to get advance smoke) exists it is not always recognized,and if it
notice of a pending attack. is recognized there is confusion as to how it should
It is highly improbable, however, that any or all be Obtained.
of these will be completely successful and on the The smoke boats taken from transports and as­
contrary it is almost certain that there will be signed to the boat pool operated inefficiently at
some, perhaps many, attacks which are not de­ first, and an excessive number of boats were in­
tected until delivered. Despite this, this com­ operable because:
mand considers that the employment of smoke in (1) The boat pool was not set up in advance to
large quantities is justified. Althpugh it may not take care of these extra boats, their personnel or
prevent, or even seriously hinder, the delivery of their smoke generators.
the initial attack,it will be a potent defense against (2) The smoke boats could not operate from the
continued or repeated attacks. boat pool basin because of shallow water in the
As the operation progresses and the percentage Bisha Gawa.
of merchant craft and naval craft at the anchorage (3) More than half the boats,taken off ships on
increases, the problem of providing adequate short notice, were in poor operating condition,
smoke coverage increases accordingly. To rem- without proper equipment, with defective smoke
force the smoke screen within the anchorage and generators, and with crews untrained in the oper­
to provide cover for those ships having no smoke ation of smoke equipment.
making apparatus at Okinawa, it was necessary
Recommendations
to employ an average of 30 to 50 LCI's,6 LSM's,
and 23 LCVP's and all LST's available, nightly in (1) That complete realistic rehearsals of smoke
and about the Hagushi anchorage. The employ­ plans be held prior to operations. These should
ment of smoke generators ashore to assist in cover­ include but not be limited to training separate
ing the anchorage when the wind was off-shore, from the main rehearsals.
was also very effective. In order to obtain ade­ (2) That control personnel and naval gunfire
quate smoke coverage in future operations, it is liaison officers be thoroughly briefed in smoke
recommended that every vessel arriving at the ob­ capabilities prior to an operation.
jective and particularly every vessel remaining at (3) That aircraft smoke bombs M77 be made
the anchorage for a protracted period,be equipped available for laying aircraft screens over land.
with smoke-making apparatus, preferably smoke (4) That special smoke plans provide definite
generators,and that this include one or more boats alternative maneuvers for different wind direc­
equipped with a generator,smoke floats,and smoke tions.
pots. It is also recommended that provision be (5) That berth assignments be made with smoke
made for smoke generators on the beach to be oper­ requirements in mind and that vigorous measures

2-11
 ••

.frt
DEP'EStS' A 11 CK
_crJ
be taken not only to ensure assigned berths are jective immediately available. Experience has
clear, but also that assigned berths are occupied shown that usual estimates of smoke materials and
exactly. smoke making equipment are considerably below
(6) That a special smoke patrol be made prior expenditures to be expected in present and prob­
to (Risk daily to ensure that smoke boats are in able future assault areas.
proper stations. After the assault, assign and reserve the LCVP,
(7) That boat pool advance planning take into equipped with smoke generators, for sole use as
account smoke boat requirements, and that stand­ smokers. When such boats are used for other pur­
ard landing craft units be equipped to take care poses during the day smoke generators are fre­
of these requirements. The smoke personnel quently damaged, or there is insufficient time to
should be chosen and trained in advance. replenish smoke materials and to service and main­
(8) That SOPA instructions be augmented by tain the generators.
verbal instructions by boarding officers with re­
May:
gard to making smoke, especially in the case of Total time smoked 50 hours 9 minutes.
merchant vessels. Average per night 2 hours 23 minutes.
(9) That advance planning include personnel Total time smoked (2 Apr. to 22
for operation of shore smoke generators. May) 91 hours 39 minutes.
Final average per night 1 hour 50 minutes.
(10) That sufficient smoke boats be assigned to
an anchorage to leave a comfortable margin for From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF
isolated ships or groups of ships. That special 54)
smoke boats be assigned fire support ships.
The use of smoke on radar picket stations for
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 protection against enemy air attacks at night is
Increase to the maximum,limited by storage not recommended. It is very difficult if not im­
space available in individual ships, the amount of possible to effectively screen small isolated units
smoke making materials to be carried by assault even if ships to be screened are anchored, unless a
shipping. Material for 20 hours smoke operation large number of smoke craft are available. At
should be considered a minimum. least four LCI-type craft would be required to
Provide increased numbers of portable Besler screen one destroyer. The entire formation would.
type generators for installation in LCVP's. Four be required to lie to with the LCI's on the wind­
for each APA or AKA of assault and reserve eche­ ward side of the destroyer. Such procedure would
lons is recommended. This allocation is based on give little protection to the LCI's and with such a
having two available for protection of APA or small number of ships present, each source of
AKA concerned and two additional for emergency smoke would define the locations of the various
or use of shipping arriving in assault area not so ships and establish excellent targets. It is felt
equipped. that better protection is obtained by ships'gunfire
All logistics shipping sent into combat areas and by maneuvering.
should be equipped with smoke generators and Smoke cover for the protection of ships in the
with two small portable generators (in boats if anchorage from air attacks was used with much
possible.) success during this operation. Smoke was fur­
Load several LST's completely with fog oil and nished by LCI's equipped with generators or by
corresponding motor gasoline for fog generators, LCVP's also so equipped or carrying smoke floats.
smoke pots, and smoke floats, to arrive at the ob­ The use of smoke had an additional favorable
jective with assault echelons. One such LST for effect. It reduced the promiscuous automatic
shipping to lift each assault division of the landing weapon firing by anchored ships because ships
force is recommended. Each such LST should also under smoke were directed to "hold fire". (Some
carry 12 spare Besler type generators, with an did not always comply.) This saved lives and.
ample stock ofspare and replacement parts to keep ammunition,and denied to the Japanese informa­
these units in operating condition for 1.month. tion concerning locations of ships heretofore ex­
This would provide an adequate reserve at the ob- posed by firing automatic weapons.
 4rAL GUNFIRE
L
Communication was not always go&FltWeen be widely distributed along beach—not concen­
smoke vessels and the ships they covered. This is trated in a few spots.
important. Daily inspection of smoke boat equip­
ment is strongly recommended. NIGHT RETIREMENT

From: Commander, Transport Division 51 From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF

(CTU 51.1.5) 54)
Smoke,rather than retirement during the night, During nightly retirements radar ranges and
is the best protection against suicide planes and bearings of Tonachi Shima, Tori Shima, Iheya
bombing, especially when the number of small Retto, and le Shima provided excellent fixes.
craft available for smoking is adequate and ships Both visual bearings and soundings proved the
may be concentrated for mutual smoke protection. charts of this area (H.0. Nos. 2338 and 2722) to
be accurate. During night retirements it was dis­
From: Commander,LCI(R)Flotilla 16 covered that when within radar range of land,
CTG 52.20 acted as LCI smoke coordinator at frequent navigational checks should be made as
Hagushi Anchorage for over 2 months. Briefly, currents were observed which could not be pre­
smokers should be stationed 1,000 to 1,500 yards dicted from information on hand. Subsequent to
to windward of the unit covered so that the unit the grounding of Tolman on Nagannu Shima.dur­
is covered with a smoke haze. The greatest diffi­ ing the early morning of 19 April the following
culty experienced was in convincing large ships despatch was sent to TF 54:
that smoke boats should be placed well to wind- "It has been recently learned that in some
w-ard and not right under the bows. It is believed ships junior officers have been given the re­
that area coverage, that is anchoring a line of sponsibility of night navigation in CM
smokers to windward of the anchorage,is far more Sound seamanship and Navy Regulations dic­
satisfactory and more conservative of smokers tate otherwise. As an aid to navigation, CO,
than individual coverage. Navigator and 00D,should use GIG as much
as possible in keeping with its capabilities
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. St. Louis
buttheir responsibilities as prescribed in Navy
(CL 49)
Regulations are in no way reduced by its use.
For heavy vessels anchored and lying to in out­ Current should be considered when obtaining
lying positions,engaged in night fire-support mis­ fixes by DRT positions and LLI readings.
sions,it is suggested that smoke floats be provided. Available information on currents in Gulf of
These can be placed to windward using ship's boat Okinawa are not accurate as some have been
if necessary. There is a natural reluctance, for found to be stronger than was believed, and
heavy ships operating singly,to continue starshell should be considered as variable."
illumination during red alerts, because of the ex­
During the period when the transports were
cellent silhouetting effect of such starshells, which
returning from night retirement the dawn ap­
provide points of aim for enemy planes. No such
proach of TF 54 to day firing stations presented a
reluctance is felt in firing starshells from smoke
definite problem. The large number of transports
screens in event of an attack by enemy ground
and sweep units, in addition to the many ships
forces being coordinated with air attacks on ship­
of TF 54 operating in such a restricted area,caused
ping,continuous illumination during air attacks is
serious congestion. When smoke was laid down
frequently requested.
over the transport area, early morning approach
From: Commander, LST Group 62 (Com­ to the fire support stations was virtually impos­
mander, LST Tractor unit 14) sible mitil the smoke lifted.
No ships on the beach received adequate smoke Theslow speed ofour battleships and the obvious
protection from the beach for the first 5 or 6 days. enemy objective in any surface attempt against
This was caused by insufficient smoke and im­ us dictated our remaining close in to the objective
proper distribution along beach. Smoke pots must area near the Western beaches and to Kerama

2-13
 "444

EMY ATTACK

Retto. It was essential that TF 54 should be goronz: Commander, Task Force 54 (Com­
disposed, and that its battle plans must assure, mander, Cruiser Division 13)
that it would always be interposed between an Circular dispositions were always arranged .so
enemy surface raid and the objective area. We that §hips of given tactical units could be quickly
must prevent any "end runs." It was, therefore, assembled for deployment and commanded by
decided that during the night retirements the force their regular unit commanders. Own ships were
would never be more than about 40 miles, or less divided into various groups of varying degrees of
than 3 hours steaming,from Okinawa Bay. gun power, such as 16-, 14,, and 12-inch, but this
Defense dispositions alone was not enough, the question of the type of
Three considerations governed the disposition fire control radars had much weight. Thus, the
of the force in night retirements: Mk VIII radar, where installed, increased the
(1) Readiness to deploy for surface action; night gunnery potentiality so greatly as to give a
(2) Defense against air; ship,so equipped,a definite superiority over a ship
(3) Defense against submarines. with equal main battery but notso equipped. The
West Virginia,for example, with Mk VIII radar,
The same forces were not always present,so con­
has greater fire effect probabilities than has the
siderable juggling was necessary,but the effort was
Colorado with Mk III radar. Likewise,the loca­
always to dispose the heavy ships by tactical units
tion of the cruisers, whether to van or rear, is in
in a circular disposition so that they could easily
part governed by whether the cruisers are 6-inch
assemble for an approach disposition under their
or 8-inch, and by whether the action is to be day
proper tactical commanders. The disposition axis
or night. The axis was always placed as a possible
was usually north, as this was generally the
general bearing line so that if necessary, a quick
direction of enemy approach. This consider­
probale
deployment could be achieved direct from the
ation being disposed of, the disposition was de­
circular disposition without firsf forming for ap­
signed to give best protection against air attack.
proach. Each night a message was sent out giving
Fortunately, enemy submarines were not aggres­
the tactical organization for units present.
sive. Perhaps the area screen and hunter killer
There is no question that circular dispositions
groups gave them caution. This was a blessing in
are the most easily maneuverable and the most
view of our shortage of destroyers which became
satisfactory to take when ships are joining and
progressively worse as losses multiplied. Toward
leaving at various times and when the composition
the middle of April there were sometimes more
of the force keeps changing. It makes tactical
heavy ships than destroyers for night retirement,
handling very simple indeed, as well as providing
after which commander,TF 51 retained all of the
the most uniform defense against aircraft.
battleships in the assault area at night under
smoke, retiring only a relatively few cruisers and The time to break up the night retirement dis­
destroyers. This was possible in view of the de­ position and send units to their day fire support
struction of the Yamato and the consequent dis­ stations and to Kerama Retto was always a matter
couragement of the enemy in similar attempts. of some concern. Ships were desired early at
Had the Japanese played their cards more wisely Kerama, Retto, but if the disposition was broken
and delayed their attempt for a couple of weeks, up before full daylight, with air raids in the vi­
carefully choosing their weather,they might have cinity, the enemy would have been given a con­
had a much better chance of success. Later on all siderable advantage. Usually the disposition was
retirement ceased and all fire support ships not held intact when there were bogeys near until the
engaged in missions at night remained under CAP was judged to be present. Several air at­
smoke in or near the transport area. Defense dis­ tacks were made about his time, but not so many
positions are usually a compromise. AA disposi­ as anticipated. The enemy could also have in­
tions are discussed in Part VIII E. A/S dispo­ flicted more damage if he had concentrated more
sitions, as stated elsewhere, were not so great a, on evening twilight attacks when night disposi­
problem as had been expected, since enemy sub­ tions were being formed and just about the time
marines were not much of a problem. the day's CAP was landing. It is important that
 [DIMAS
an effovt be made to maintain a strong CAP during
the twilight periods. As it was,the following air
VAL GUNFIRE

ing in a small area, and the surface radar screen

was so full of"pips"that it was practically useless.
attacks were made while TF 54 was assembled. This vessel had great difficulty in clearing the area
Results and comments are given. safely and joining formation. It is believed that,
there was much more danger of damage from col­
From: Commander, LST Group 86 lision with other vessels than from enemy action.
Where a beachhead has been established to the It is recommended that when a night retirement
extent that the beach is considered secure,it is felt such as this is contemplated,that it be commenced
that more hazard is incurred by vessels of the LST early enough to clear all vessels from the area
class with their limited maneuverability when before sunset and before any ship makes smoke.
night retirement is ordered,than if they remained
in an area adjacent to the beach. This command SUICIDE BOATS
only retired on the night of Love-day, and this From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
retirement was not initiated until well after dark­
Mention has previously been made of the exten­
ness had set in. Great difficulty was experienced
sive numbers of suicide craft encountered in the
in maneuvering clear of the assembled shipping in
Okinawa area. After an enemy counter-landing
the transport areas. In addition,extra hazard was
had been attempted against our artillery positions
caused by the heavy smoke generated by vessels
on Keise Shima on 8 April and several other en­
remaining in the transport areas during the night.
counters had been had with enemy small craft, a
Navigation during the period of this retirement
program was instituted to search out and destroy
necessarily had to be almost entirely by radar and
the boats and their hiding places. The plan was
the small scope of the SO radar is not adapted
described in a despatch to all concerned, outlining
to navigation of a formation in extremely crowded specific search sectors along the enemy held shores,
waters. designating the composition of each unit as six
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Kittson LCI(G)'s or LCS(L)(3)'s and two DD's and
(APA 123) specifying that an unused call fire frequency would
be assigned to each unit for coordination and com­
During the evening of 1 April most of the
munication. The term "Setting Sun Unit" was
transports were ordered to retire during the night.
coined for easy reference and was derived as a
The ships got under way about one-half hour after
contradistinction to the enemy's "Rising Sun."
sunset. Many ships had been making smoke and
The plan designed was to be set into operation
visibility was very poor, being less than 100 yards
when required by a short voice or ciphered mes­
at times. Ships,large and small, were maneuver-
sage as follows: "Setting Sun Unit ONE today,

Prepared Cave for Co e ling Boat (Note Ramp). Boat Cave and Ramp.
 ,IujtJit)11

411
DEFENSE AGAINST EN4EMY ATTACK

Depth Charges off Boat.

Boat Hidden by Camouflage.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF
Goatfish, and Moon Mullins 3, Zone 14. Fre­ 51)
quency COCA COLA." It was hoped that these During the period covered by this report, the
units,with the support craft working close inshore enemy made a number of efforts to effect counter-
covered by the larger fire support ships, would landings, and to attack ships by suicide boats.
effectively search the entire coast line and be suc­ Support craft were stationed on both coasts as an
cessful in destroying many enemy boats and their anti-small-boat screen,and were kept continuously
installations. However, it was found that the advised of the location of our front lines. In ad­
light weight and shallow draft of the suicide boats dition, fire-support ships were designated nightly
enabled the enemy to hide them in revetments in to illuminate the coast line with emphasis on pos­
river banks, irrigation ditches, under inland sible enemy boat hideouts,and harassing fires were
bridges, and similar locations. A few instances maintained on suspected boat locations. The as­
were verified in which the boats were kept far signed heavy ship coordinated all movements, and.
from water and were carried in trucks or wagons the support craft requested and spotted illumina­
to the waters edge under the cover of darkness. tion at points of activity and fired at the boats.
Also the Setting Sun units were hampered by reefs The fire-support ships assigned to this duty were
and the net result was that such organizations dubbed "Flycatchers" as a result of their success
were not extensively employed. . after a night following an injunction by CTF 51

44§41*

Captured Suicide Boat (Without Depth Charges). *year -View of Boat.

 Side View of Boat.
Front View of Boat.
pared to destroy survivors of sunken boats who
to "be particularly alert as this looks like a fine may swim ashore.
night to catch flies." Ships and craft assigned
this duty assembled near their night positions at From: Commander, Minesweeper Division 60
about 1600 each day, and perfected coordination An ideal weapon for "Flycatcher" operations
of movement and communication by a brief daily against suicide boats, midget submarines,landing
rehearsal. The effectiveness of the program is craft and the like would have been motor torpedo
best illustrated by the fact that only four counter- boats without torpedoes and stationed inshore
landings were accomplished out of the many at­ during darkness. These boats were similarly used
tempted,and on those four only a small portion of in the Normandy operations, where their services
the enemy boats succeeded in getting through the were invaluable.
patrol. Only one suicide type boat succeeded in
reaching the transport area on each coast. "Fly­ From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
catcher" ships also performed the additional tasks It is expected that enemy counter-landing units
of dusk and dawn harassment of Naha, Itoman, "suicide" boats,etc., will be encountered in greater
and Yonabaru airfields, to prevent enemy planes numbers in future operations, and future plans
from taking off and landing.
A nightly "Flycatcher" detail was organized to
cope with the numerous suicide boats encountered
at Okinawa. This detail consisted usually of one
cruiser and one destroyer, plus all patrol craft in
the vicinity designated. By shooting intermit­
tently at suspected boat bases, and keeping the
shore line illuminated at intervals, boat activity
was kept to a minimum and what boats did appear
were usually promptly sunk.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
(CTF 55)
Ground forces responsible for protection of
shore area contiguous to that in which "Fly­
catcher" operations are being conducted should be
notified as soon as possible of any suspicious ac­
Japanese Suicide Boats in Front of Caves Where They Are
tivity in order thatthey may be alerted for possible Stored. Length 18' 6": Beata 5' 8"; Carries two 5"
counter landings and al mAgps Rockets and One 640-lb. Explosive Charge.

FJfl
 ft
by the coltmander, Amphibious Support Force
(ComPhibGrp 1 embarked in an AGC) Sched­
ules of fires preliminary to LoYe-day (except for
the landings on Kerama Retto) were largely time,
area responsibility, and movement schedules.
Specific targets were designated daily as a result
of continuously evaluated destruction reports and
reports of new discoveries. Activities of fire-sup­
port ships were coordinated with the progress of
minesweeping.
The preliminary fires were delivered as sched­
uled with good effect. Large caliber fire success­
fully breached the heavy sea walls in sufficient
places to provide exits at every beach. Enemy
defenses in the vicinity of the beaches, were in
large proportion, damaged or destroyed. As a,
Japanese 47-mm. AT Gun.
result of either tactical surprise or deliberate de­
must consequently provide anti-small-boat screens, sign on the part of the enemy to avoid the heavy
"Flycatcher" assignments, and similar defensive bombardment, all landings met very light resist­
measures. Such defenses should be carefully ance. In several cases, emplacements were found
planned in advance to ensure uniform efficiency in good condition with weapons intact, but aban­
and a common understanding of the tactics and doned by the enemy without a fight. Some held
responsibilities. The ships or craft engaged the opinion that this was due to the desire to avoid
therein should conduct operations in accord with the effects of our concentrated prelanding fires,
the plan. To this end ComPhibsPac is distribut­ but later developments indicate that it hight have
ing a temporary doctrine. been a predetermined plan to retire to strong pre­
From: Commanding Officer, LCS(L) Group 8 pared defensive positions in the hills near Shun.
(a) The suicide boat is a very small target to From: Commander,Amphibious Group 1(CTF
pick up at night and requires well-trained radar 52)
operators as well as outstanding lookouts.
(b) It is difficult to maneuver into position to Inasmuch as the size of the objective prevented
fire on the suicide boat without firing on friendly attempting destruction of all possible targets,prin­
craft due to the tactics of the enemy being to get cipal efforts were directed to: (a) Destruction of
into such a position so as to limit the fire of the defenses opposing the landing;(b) destruction of
ship. weapons threatening ships and aircraft with em­
(c) A good searchlight is absolutely necessary phasis on the Naha, airfield area; (c) supporting
in order to verify the target and to illuminate it the illusion of preparations for a landing on the
so as to bring to bear accurate fire. southeastshore;and(d)supporting subsidiary op­
(d) At least one vessel in an antisuicide boat erations,such as the seizure of Kerama,Retto,UDT
team should be faster and as maneuverable as the operations and minesweeping. Target priorities
suicide boat itself (PT-type craft best). were prescribed with this in view. It was recog­
nized that extensive areas, possibly containing in­
BOMBARDMENT stallations which could oppose troop operations
PRE-ASSAULT
after the landing, would be comparatively un­
PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT touched. In attacking these areas, the troops
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF would have further naval gunfire and air support
51) as well as their own artillery, etc.
Following the favorable results experienced at Fire-support ships were organized in five major
Iwo Jima, all pre-D-day operations were directed fire-support units.
 Preinvasion Bombardment of Landing Beaches, Okinawa Shinia. L-Dag, H-Hour Minus.

Available intelligence indicated a relative scar- Constant emphasis was laid on the desirability of
city of defensive installations of the usual type firing from the closest ranges suitable to the target
in Hagushi beach areas. Consequently ships were under attack and permitted by navigation and the
enjoined to seek profitable targets by close observa- progress of minesweeping. Provision was made
tion in conjunction with exploratory firing when for frequent reporting of observed results of firing
high priority targets could not be readily located. by each ship, these reports to be evaluated within
679527-46--7 2-19
 ;744747 .
Nava/ Bombardment of Ie Shima, Okinawa Gunto,L Plus 15.
 NAVAL GUNFIRE

the flagship in conjunction with photographic in­ and rocky points overlooking and flanking the
terpretation and other intelligence, so as to main­ beaches to disclose defensive positions,such as the
tain a record of progress and permit timely re­ Japanese have frequently used in similar places,
assignment of target areas if necessary. but few were found. The enemy had apparently
In view of the possibility of surface action dur­ relied primarily upon: (1) Mines,(2) reefs,(3)
ing the pre-Love-day operations the initial ammu­ beach obstacles, (4) seawalls for defense of this
nition loading instructions required battleships, area against a landing. They all failed him.
heavy and light cruisers to load 40, 60 and 100 (b) No return fire was received during the
rounds,respectively,of AP per gun. The schedule bombardment except for a small amount of small
prescribed periods for the resupply of ammunition, armsfire during the UDT operations. We did not
allowing for each battleship one day,and for each conclude from this silence that all defense installa­
cruiser and destroyer of the Fire-Support Group, tions had been destroyed, as a dormant attitude
one-half day, in Kerma Retto. Ammunition for during bombardment has been typical of the
resupply was provided in assault shipping of the Japanese in recent operations.
Western Islands Attack Group (8-inch and (c) On the basis of reports of firing and an­
smaller) and in nine LTS's of the Logistics Sup­ alysis of photographs taken during bombardment,
port Group, to be available in Kerama Retto on the conclusion was reached by- the afternoon of
Love-4-day. Love minus 1, that the preparation was sufficient
The schedule as originally prescribed prior to for a successful landing. Late analysis revealed
arrival at the objective worked out very well, all certain potentially dangerous installations near
factors considered. The principal variations Naha, probably still effective and information of
were: (a) actual presence of mines slowed the this was transmitted to the commander,Joint Ex­
minesweeping, prevented fire-support ships from peditionary Force, so that measures for their
closing the range as rapidly as desired,and delayed neutralization might be taken during the landing.
the initiation of UDT operations by 24 hours The time allowed for operations at the objective
(b), the requirements for UDT operations were prior to Love-day turned,out to be exactly what
not as extensive as originally provided for (c), was needed. These operations were quite exten­
damage from enemy action and various other con­ sive, both in area and in scope, as narrated else­
siderations caused numerous changes in scheduled where in this report. The schedule originally
employment of fire-support destroyers,but did not planned had to be adjusfed by CTF 52 in certain
greatly affect the bombardment. respects as the operations progressed, mainly due
(a) As indicated in preliminary intelligence, to the actual presence of mines slowing down the
and as confirmed by observation and reports dur­ rate of completion of the minesweeping areas.
ing the bombardment,and such other information But there was still enough time to get everything
as has subsequently come to the attention of this done.
command, beach defense weapons and positions It is recommended that similar ample time be
;were not numerous. They were scattered and allowed in the prelanding phase of future opera­
generally well camouflaged. There were a few tions. Our naval forces have shown that they can
heavy pillbox-type installations along the beaches now remain for prolonged periodsin waters within
and inland, and numerous open emplacements. air striking distance of the Japanese home islands,
Some of the emplacements contained AA weapons, so that there is no need to rush things on this ac­
but many were empty. Whether the weapons were count. The tremendous momentum of the assault
removed or never provided is not known. Pre­ forces moving forward to the objective in a large
liminary intelligence studies may have over-em­ amphibious operation certainly renders highly un­
phasized the importance of some of the suspected desirable any delay in the landing date,consequent
installations. Ships continually indicated diffi­ upon delay in completion of prelanding operations,
culty in finding targets of importance,and showed if it can possibly be avoided.
commendable reluctance to fire at easy targets of In the case of a heavily fortified objective, it is
dubious value, such as buildings and the numer­ particularly advantageous to allow 2 or 3 days
ous tombs. re was extensive firing into cliffs of close range destructive fire, after all mines are
cleared, and the fire support ships have become HF call fire frequency between fire-support ships
familiar with their target areas from actual ob­ and the sweep unitcommander. In all cases,cover
servation, before sending the UDT's in to make was effective and no enemy fire from shore caused
their reconnaissance of the beaches. damage to the sweepers.
(d) The defenses of the beach area as a whole As a result of experiences at Iwo Jima, much
not being strong, in fact, relatively very weak as care was taken in the positioning of heavy counter-
compared, for instance, with those of Iwo Jima, battery ships covering the activities of the under­
the vigorous bombardment which sought out and water demolition teams. From selected positions,
destroyed the strong points, may well have in­ these ships kept the areas inland from the beach
fluenced the Japs to make the withdrawal which well covered with slow harassing fire, and were
they appear to have effected from this area on on continual look-out for enemy batteries. For­
about Love-2-day. tunately, no intensive enemy fire was. experienced
on any of the beaches reconnoitered. Close sup­
From: Commanding General, Headquarters, port was furnished by DD's, LCI(G)'s and
THIRD Amphibious Corps LOS(L)'s working from positions close inshore.
The period during which heavy ships can bom­ Little opposition was experienced other than spo­
bard from effective ranges under favorable radic small-arms fire, and the UDT's suffered very
weather conditions and the resultant destruction light casualties.
to the enemy's defense should be the controlling ASSAULT
factors in determining the overall length of the
period of preliminary operations. The length of CLOSE SUPPORT OF ASSAULT WAVES
this period could be determined by either of two '
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CH,
methods, namely: Setting the period with provi­ 51)
sion to extend it by delaying Dog-day, or by set­
ting Dog-day and allowing a sufficient time prior As has previously been stated, all direct support
thereto to accomplish the necessary destruction, of troops was under command of the respective
taking in consideration unforeseen circumstances Attack Force commanders. Initially CTF 53
such as bad weather, difficult mine sweeping and (later CTG 51.21) was in command of direct sup­
added enemy installations. These unforeseen cir­ port for the III Phib Corps who landed on the
cumstances are likely to be present in either case northern beaches,and attacked northward. Little
and for that reason it would seem that the first concerted opposition was offered by the enemy and
plan, that of delaying Dog-day, would be prefer­ direct support was consequently very light. CTF
able, since it is much easier to deal with facts at 53 coordinated the movements of his support ships
first hand than it is to try to guess what they will with the progress of minesweeping off the western
be and provide for them. coast. Fires for the III Phib Corps were deliv­
ered from the eastern side of the island by CTG
SUPPORT OF MINESWEEPING 51.19 upon request from CTF 53. Minesweeping
on the eastern side of the island did not progress
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces(CTF as rapidly as did that on the west, due to the
51) necessity for capture of the Eastern Islands.
Prelanding support of minesweepers was de­ Consequently,supportfrom the east was not avail-.
livered by fire-support units under the direction able to the III Phib Corps until 6 April. In a
of the commander, Amphibious Support Force. similar fashion CTF 55 (latter CTG 51.22) was
After the landing, many of the sweeps were cov­ in command of directsupportfor the XXIV Army
ered by DM's and DMS's of the Mine Flotilla. Corps who landed on the southern beaches, and
As additional cover, particularly for the inshore attacked to the south. Fires from the eastern side
sweeps, specific support ships were designated by of the island were delivered by ships under the
CTF 51. The usual formation was one cruiser command of CTG 51.19 upon request from CTF
and one destroyer in support of a sweep unit. 55. On 7 May,the III Phib Corps (having pre­
Communications were established on an unused viously secured the northern part of Okinawa) was
 -
e1,
0

NAVAL GU] FIR

• •"*. •'
P.
committed on the southern front, resulting in two LCI(M)'s. Full preparation fires were delivered
corps attacking abreast (the III Prib Corps on on both days,and each feint included the approach
the right or west) on a relatively narrow front. oflanding boats toward the beach,and the delivery
At this time, CTG 51.19 commanded the direct of rocket and mortar fire from support craft.
support of the XXIV Army Corps from the east, The actual diversionary effect of these feints is
and CTG 51.22 commanded the direct support of difficult to assess, and it is virtually impossible at
the III Phib Corps from the west,with CTG 51.22 this writing to determine the effect of gunfire.
designated as responsible for coordination of fires Such details as are available will be covered in
along the entire front. the report of ComPhibGrp 1. Upon completion
The Love-day landing was made by two corps, of the demonstration on Love+1, CTG 51.19 be­
of two divisions each, landing abreast. The ex­ came responsible for the delivery of naval gunfire
treme length of the beach and contiguousness of supportfrom the eastern side of Okinawa.
units made it necessary that all fires immediately
Subsitliavy landings and feints
before and immediately following the landing be
closely controlled to avoid endangering adjoining The scope of the operation included other.land­
units. With one or two minor exceptions,- all ings and feints for which gunfire support was pro­
fire-support ships were supplied with "Air Spot," vided and for which fire support ships were allo­
utilizing either battleship and cruiser float planes cated by CTF 51. Details of such subsidiary ef­
or VOF planes from VOC Squadrons 1 and 2. forts are contained in the reports of the respon­
The schedules of fires for the period near How- sible commandersin each case, while the following
hour were drawn to provide for progressive shifts brief mention is included as an indication of the
of fire inland dependent not on time but upon the many and varied operations in which fire support
position of the leading wave of boats. Specific ships participated.
targets within each area were assigned priorities, (a) Eastern Islands.—Commencing on 10 April,
but in the absence of specific targets, the entire troops of the Twenty-seventh Division occupied
area was to be covered by progressive shifts. In the islands off the eastern coast of Okinawa. Fire
each case, the itrea, assigned was within the zone support was provided by CTG 51.19 utilizing ships
of action of the battalion which the firing ship assigned to him for fire support from the east.
was to support. Little opposition was encoUntered except on
As an additional safety factor, NGF Line No.1 Tsuken Jima where a flurry of resistance was cli­
was established,500 yards inshore,-NGF Line No. maxed by destroyer fire silencing an active artil­
2 was established 1,000 yards inshore, and NGF lery piece which was firing on our landing craft.
Line No.3 was established 200 yards inshore. All The capture of these islands permitted minesweep­
ships were instructed to lift fire progressively ing within the Nakagusuku Wan and the Kimmu
beyond these lines in accord with the progress Wan, which, in turn, enabled fire support ships
of the leading waves as shown in the following to enter these. areas and deliver close. range sup­
schedule: porting fire for our troops on Okinawa proper.
(b) le Shima.—Commencing on 16 April,
. Yards from beach Time troops of the Seventy-seventh Division landed on
Ie Shima following a 3-day preliminary bombard­
1,000 600 300 11-hour 11+3 11+10
ment. Naval gunfire support was provided by
12-inch-11-inch-12-inch NGF 2 NM'3
2 BB's, 2 CA's, 2 CL's, 7 DD's, 8 LCI(G)'s and
8-inch-6-inch NGF 1 NGF 2 NGF 3 12 LCI(M)'s under the command of CTG 51.21
5-inch NGF 1 NGIT 2 NOF 3
(ComPhibGrp 4). The landing preparation was
effectively delivered and troops landed without ex­
On Love-day and on Love+1-day, CTG 51.19 cessive resistance. The enemy garrison concen­
was in command of scheduled gunfire in support trated their efforts in defending the bill in the
of diversionary feint landings off the southern east central portion of the island, and a consider­
• beaches. For this purpose,he was assigned 3BB's, able amount of call fire and night illumination
2 CA's. 7 DD's,6 LCI(G)'s,6 LCS(L)'s and 12 was delivered at the request of the troops.
 4111111111. 4i; • • •

(c) 19 April attack and demonstration.—On 19 call for any desired type of fire from any of the
April (Love-I-18) an additional feint at landing craft included.
was made,at the southern beaches as a part of a
comprehensive "all-out" attack intended to break From: Commander, Amphibious 12(CTF 55)
the apparent stalemate which had developed at Briefly,the Love-day support schedule specified
the enemy defensive line north of Shun. Com- that heavy ships commence firing at 0600 on tar­
PhibGrp 1, acting as CTG 51.23, was in command gets behind and on the flanks of the landing
of the demonstration. Fire support for the entire beaches. Designated ships gradually closed the
attack was delivered by 15 heavy ships and 13 range keeping ahead of the tractor groups as they
destroyers plus Washington, North Carolina and advanced shoreward,so as notto interfere with as­
South Dakota from TF 58. As in the case of sembly of the landing, waves. At How-35, 5
previous demonstrations, results are difficult to DD's,2 CL's,and 1 BB were lying to,spaced about
evaluate, although the net result of the "all-out" 1,000 yards apartin a line roughly 2,500 yardsfrom
attack was an advance not. a great as had been the landing beach. As far as possible the fire
hoped for. support ships were in spaces between boat lanes.
(d) Tori Shima:—On 12 May (Love+41) a Two CA's and one BB were stationed along the
small detachment under the command of CTG flanking shoulder of land to the south. Mean­
51.24 (supported by one destroyer) occupied the while, the fire-support craft, which had accompa­
island of Tori Shima. No resistance was en­ nied the tractor groups to the objective, also took
countered. position. Two LCS(L), one LCI(0), and three
The islands of the Keramo Retto were occupied LCI(M)divisions were deployed as a wave ahead
on Love—6 and Love-5. Keise Shima was oc­ of the leading LVT(A)'s, and preceded them to
cupied on Love-1 under the direction of Com- the beach. The 125-yard interval at which these
PhibGrp 1 acting as CTF 52 and ComPhibGrp support craft were spaced did not leave much
7 acting as CTG 51.1. Fire-support ships and room for maneuvering. Two LCI(R) and one
support craft were allocated by the commander, LSM(R) divisions were assigned targets on the
Amphibious Support Force. Fire support for flanks of the beach. Commencing at 11-35 all
these operations consisted of the following: ships laid down a drenching fire on the beach
areas and a few minutes later the craft began their
2 battleships 18 LCI(G)'s run to the beach. All support craft commenced
2 CA's 12 LCI(M)'s firing as soon as within range. Fire was continued
5 DD's 12 LSM(R)'s by gunfire support ships as scheduled until
Support craft were positioned to cover the var­ How+4 hours except where shore fire-control
ious landings with rocket, mortar and 40-mm.fire parties, all of whom established communications
to offset the limitations imposed uPon larger ships with assigned ships readily, requested otherwise.
by restricted waters between the various islands. In order to provide for observation in case the
landing was opposed, certain regimental naval
The landings achieved tactical surprise and little
gunfire liaison officers were embarked in LVT's
need was found for naval gunfire support after
in one of the immediate follow-up waves.
the preparatory fires. Of particular interest are
the following: From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
(a) The employment of "support teams" to
Destroyer fire support was given directly on the
achieve balanced support for the small landings
beach from the respective stations up to a point
involved. For instance, Support Team Yellow when the boats were about 800 yards from the
(which was to fire at Beach Yellow) on Geruma beach. At this point fire was shifted inland and
Shima consisted of 6 LCI(G) employing 4'.'5 to the flanks. All fires were delivered on sched­
rockets and 40-mm., 3 LCI(M) employing 4'.'2 ule. In the case of the landing on Violet Beach,
mortars, and one destroyer. All were assigned a 5-inch fire was reported by air observer as falling
common HF spotting frequency for mutual co­ near craft at the line of departure. Destroyer
ordination, on which the SFGP later came up to fire was immediately ceased although it is quite

2-24
LVT's Making Final Run to Beach With Bombardment Still Underway. Note Craters in Fields to Right. Okinawa Shima, L-Day,
H-Hour Minus.
 Course Nr Title Length'Increased
From . To
55 Army Intelligence School Wk/Days , .. Wk/Days

30-R-969.1 Image LiterprietatiOn (En) 17/0 18/0

30-A-8503 Image Interpretation
Officer 19/0 23/5
. ..
'US Army Air Defense School

44-N-1184 HAWK Organizational

Maint Supervisor 32/0 36/0
44-N-F14 Missile Master. Btry
Terminal Equip Maint •9/0 10/0
44-R-221.1 HAWK CW Radar Maint 25/0 28/0
44-A-F2 Senior.Air Def _A/sty -
Officer 1/5 3/0
44-A-F21 Surface-To-Air Missile
Staff Officer (Hawk) 35/0 37/0
44-A-1181 Guided Missile Systems
Off 38/0 39/0

US Army Transportation School

55-B-4823 Aircraft Maintenance

Officer 14/0 15/3
55-A-C22 Transportation Officer
Career 24/0 34/0

US Army Cold Weather and Mountain School

900-D-F4 Cold Weather & ­

Mountain - Summer 5/0 6/0
900-D-F5 Cold- Weather.. &
Mountain - Winter 4/0 9/0

•-•-.•

4-26
normal ratio be reduced to one fire support, per any time, but, after the routine became estab­
regiment, except in case of special attacks. All lished, all agencies became very proficient in
night illumination was controlled by regiment, anticipating requirements and very few emer­
and, in most cases, was coordinated within divi­ gency requests were received. Upon receiving all
sions. During the period covered by this report, requests, CTF 51 reconciled them with available
only one verified instance was reported of a ship ships considering requirements for logistics, up­
firing within our front lines, andthere were fewer keep, and other factors. Assignments were then
instances of empty star shell projectiles endanger­ made and promulgated to the interested com­
ing our troops than in any previous operation. mands. Publication was usually made by ciphered
Insofar as possible, all direct-support ships despatch to all fire support ships and to the in­
were assigned an air spot to supplement the Ob­ terested commanders view of the lack of secu­
servation of the shore fire-control party. Cruiser rity of HF voice circuits. When time was press­
and battleship planes were extensively employed, ing, voice circuits, particularly the Fire Support
displaying great courage, and efficiency both to TBS, were employed. In all cases, assignments
work with their parent ships and with destroyers. were made with the object of having each ship
The high performance planes of VOC-1 and continue to operate for the same command and
VOC-2 performed excellently throughout,and are in the same sector for several days if possible
deserving of high praise. Initially (on Love-day, in order to minimize communication changes,and
and for a few days thereafter) each squadron sup­ to secure the advantage of familiarity with ter­
plied 8 planes on station,for a total of 16 available. rain and methods.
This was later reduced to six planes per squadron,
then four per squadron,and finally, as the carriers From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
had to withdraw for fueling, availability, etc., Close support was provided in accordance with
only one squadron was available at a time,and that standard Pacific Fleet doctrines. It is note­
squadron supplied from four to seven planes per worthy, however, that the attitude of responsible
day depending upon requests. Requests for VOF ground force commanders underwent considerable
planes for the following day were submitted to change with regard to naval gunfire during the
CTF 51 separately from the requests for fire- course of the operation. The best example of
support ships, and were included in the CASCIT this is the Seventh Division, whose commanding
request for air support for the succeeding day. general without consulting naval commanders did
Close support fires were used to particularly
good advantage by the Sixth Marine Division on
Okinawa who reported numerous enemy killed
and installations destroyed. Coordination with
all supported units was highly successful.
The Army understood the potentialities of naval
gunfire in delivering flanking fire near the coast
and bringing all the enemy's rear areas under
heavy interdiction, harassing, or destruction fire.
They also showed skill in their excellent use . of
LCI(M) Division 6 on the flank to assist, prepare,
and observe their advance along the coast.
All requests for fire support were forwarded
upward through the chain of command, thereby
insuring coordination within each echelon. Re­
quests for ships for night assignments were
Panels Indicate American Front Lines so That Friendly
timed to reach CTF 51 prior to 1000 daily, and Aircraft and Artillery May Direct Fire.
requests for . the following day were timed to
reach CTF 51 prior to 2000 daily. Emergency not desire naval gunfire within 2,000 yards of the
requests for additional ships could be made at front lines at the outset of the campaign. This

679527--46 S 2-27

ONCLASSE
 BOMBARDMENT

margin was progressively reduced as time passed destruction.'A ilotable example of this type of
until no arbitrary safety margin was imposed arrangement was the counter-battery program
(leaving fife margin to the judgment of the shore maintained by the XXIV Army Corps in the
-fire-control party). As has so often been the case, vicinity of Naha. Corps also assumed the re­
it took actual familiarity with naval gunfire to sponsibility for coordinating all night harassing
erase preconceived erroneous impressions of its fires. Nightly lists were prepared of critical road
effect.
junctions,suspected and known points of activity,
ARMY SUPPORT FIRE-DEEP SUPPORT and enemy storing points. These targets were
Throughout all phases of the operation, much fired each night by ships assigned to corps.
use of division deep-support ships was made. Tenth Army designated initial corps zones of
Each division usually requested a cruiser or a action and issued later modifications based on
battleship, with own air spot. These ships oper­ troop progress. Deep support outside those corps
ated under the direct control of the division naval zones was delivered by CTF 51, assisted on the
gunfire officer against specific targets developed
eastern side of the island by the ships assigned
by division intelligence agencies within the di­
vision sector. By direction of Tenth Army, the to CTG 51.19. Little support was delivered in
burden of coordination of supporting weapons, the Army Zone at the northern end of Okinawa
and the selection and allocation of targets were as troop progress was so rapid against feeble
the responsibility of the appropriate artillery resistance, that, in many cases they over-ran the
commander. The division naval gunfire officer mineswept areas,and ships could not be positioned
consequently worked in close contact with the for support. In the southern Army sector, how­
division artillery commander, and duplication of ever, an intensive program was maintained until
effort was kept to a minimum. Love plus 10. Targets were designated by Tenth
Each corps artillery headquarters maintained Army Artillery and were assigned to ships oper­
a target information center covering all targets ating under CTG 51.19 and CTF 51. A nightly
within the corps zone of action. All target dis­
harassing program was maintained, and destruc­
coveries, and all destruction reports were fun­
tion reports evaluated and recorded. On 14
nelled through this center, and it therefore be­
came the basic source of targets, both for ships April, the zone of action of the XXIV Army
directly controlled by corps, and to supplement Corps was extended to the south shore of Okinawa
the target lists developed by divisions. When and further support was under corps direction.
ships were available for the purpose, one or two
battleships or cruisers were assigned to corps, From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
and were given a list of selected deep targets for Control of all sources of support for the in­
fantry, in the larger sense, was vested in the
commanding general of Corps Artillery, or his
equivalent on lower echelons. Where there was
a question as to the most appropriate arm: Ar­
tillery, air or naval gunfire, to use, the decision
was his.
This command maintained a modified target
information center including a record of all de­
struction by naval gunfire and new targets as
reported. Where possible, late air photographs
of deep-support targets were studied and anno­
tated by photographic interpreters of this com­
mand and given to ships assigned to deep sup­
Infantry Cleaning Out Caves. port missions.
 NAVAL GUNFIRE
45,
It is of Interest to note that ere From: Commanding General, TENTH Army
many targets reported destroyed, some were re-
Counterbattery fires were executed at night with
ported "destroyed" as many as three times, one
excellent neutralizing effect. Day fires reached
in particular (a. four-gun 3-5 inch battery on
maximum effectiveness when conducted under
Senaga Shima) as many .as six times. In some
shore fire control party and plane spot combined.
cases, of course, good positions were .merely re-
Deep supporting fires were effective when plane
occupied. In others, however, over optimistic
spot was used,otherwise harassing effect only was
reports of air spotters were relied on to too great
achieved. Night fires proved of value in that
a degree.
enemy artillery fires were greatly reduced when­
ARMY SUPPORT FIRE—COUNTER BATTERY ever ships were firing. The result of this was to
assure the almost continuous deliverance of fire
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces throughout the night and increased consumption
All fire support ships were directed to be always of ammunition. Two breakthroughs were pre-
ready for immediate counter-battery fire. This vented at night by naval gunfire, from reports
general caution was found to be insufficient on 27 available at present. One attempted break-
April when an enemy gun firing from position in through in the sector of the Sixth Marine Division
the vicinity of Naha fired at the transport area. and one in the Ninety-sixth Infantry Division's
It has previously been noted that it was virtually sector were both covered by heavy naval gunfire
impossible to locate enemy guns by flashes, and which was delivered on call.
that the enemy apparently fired from several posi-
tions, caves, etc. Consequently, each fire-support ARMY SUPPORT FillE—NGLOs
ship thereafter was assigned a specific sector for From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
counter-battery coverage. Those areas were cov-
With division and regimental naval liaison offi­
ered on order upon detection of enemy fire. Such
cers remaining afloat during the landings on all
coverage resulted in questionable destruction of
beaches the control of call fire was administered
the enemy guns, but provided effective neutraliza­
tion, as the enemy invariably ceased firing when from the gunfire control officer directly to the
area coverage was delivered. The enemy made battalion naval liaison officers. Communication
greater use of artillery in this operation than had with ships and personnel ashore was excellent ex-
preyiously been experienced. Much of the enemy cept when the control ship became land blocked
fire was delivered at night, firing a few rounds by one or more islands, in which case it was nec­
from one position and then moving to other posi- essary to use relays through ships clear of land
tions, all of which were well defiladed and ex- masses.
tremely difficult to cletect. Of particular interest
is that fact that the troops determined that a ARMY SUPPORT FORCE-CALLI FIRES
definite inverse ratio existed between the amount
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4
of naval harassing fire delivered, and the volume
of enemy mortar and artillery fire received by the Call fire in support of the Ic Shima operation
troops. were restricted by the requirement of the Seventy-
seventh Infantry Division that all call fires of the
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 Three Hundred and Fifth Regiment were to be
Instances of shore batteries firing on ships were cleared before execution by the target information
remarkably few. It has been learned from pris- center on Pavamiint. They were also restricted
oners of war statements and captured documents by the tactical situation. On William-day a rapid
that shore batteries were under specific orders not advance was made to the vicinity of Iegusugu­
to reveal their position by firing on ships. Yama. On William+one-day the peak was sur-
It is recommended that a plan for general coun- rounded on three sides making exact fire neces­
ter battery be held in readiness at all times for sary to avoid hitting our own forces. Artillery,
instant use. with plunging fire, was better adapted to avoid

111111111111111,
 INCLOSURE 3 TO APPENDIX F TO ANNEX 4

MOTOR SUPERVISORY COURSES

Course No. Title

6-R-631.7 (632.7) Arty Vehicle Maint. Supervision

7-R-631.6 Inf Automotive Supervision
17-R-632.6 Armor Vehicle Maint. Supervision

COMMENT:

1. All courses are concerned with supervision of vehicle

maintenance. Courses vary slightly in length and in the amount of
time devoted to track vehicles.

2. Hq IUSCONARC recommended to DA in 1961 that the three

MOS producing courses be consolidated into one MOS course (636.6)
, to be conducted at one school, preferably Fort Knox.

3. DA has not acted on this recommendation.

BOARD RECOMMENDATION:

4. That DA approve the USCONARC recommendation.

4-30
 4 I:­
„A. NAktL'-itIUNFIllett .`•

for army missions nor did Army targets hiterfue on the control frequencies of the corps and of
with the corps. As the situation developed very PhibsPac, intercept was available of all traffic
rapidly in the northern part of Okinawa, the of any command or control nature other than
Army boundary as such ceased to exist on 10 spotting frequencies . of the shore fire. control par­
April and all Army fires were delivered in the ties which could be monitored .at will. Any re­
southern and eastern part of Okinawa. Some ports received by PhibsPac which were of in­
Army fires were conducted in conjunction with terest to the ground forces were verified by Phibs-
naval antisuicide missions, in particular off the Vac and immediately transmitted to the Army
coast of Naha. Ammunition was not restricted artillery • officer by voice message, thereby elimi­
and ammunition for main and secondary batteries nating delay and permitting Tenth Army to take
was allotted on an average of 50 rounds per target any action desired. CO'Ordination between corps
for each mission fired. Many night missions were was maintained both by .radio and telephone
executed. The purpose of these harassing fires when the CP was established ashore.
was to interrupt the enemy's communication fa­ On 4 April, when both Corps had crossed
cilities, disturb his rest, and restrict his move­ Okinawa in an east-west direction, the attack
ment. No attempt was made at destruction dur­ of the III Phib Corps turned north and that of
ing night fires. Day fires, conducted generally the XXIV Corps turned south. On 7 May the
through ComPhibsGroup 1,involved certain spec­ III Phib Corps was inOvecl to the satithern, front
ified targets for which destruction fire Was re­ and assigned a zone of tietion which included•the
quired. Spotting for Army missions was done west half of the island. During this period from
by direct spot from the ships or the ships' own 4 April to May 7, no coordination between corps
planes in order to permit the maximum use by was necessary. Since the number of'fire-support
the corps of the VOF spotting planes. These ships was ample to supply the requirements of
types of fires were continued until 14 April when both corps, it was not necessary for the Army ar­
the southern Army zone of responsibility for the tillery officer to adjust any conflict in the corps
attack of ground targets was eliminated. From requests for ,fire-,support ships'. From 7 May to
that - date, all fires in the southern section of 27 June, as the number of fire support ships de­
Okinawa were entirely controlled by the corps. creaSed and the requests for ships outnumbered
The organization for naval gunfire coordi­ the amount available, it became necessary for the
nation and control was unchanged until 18 April army artillery officer to arbitrate the situation
at which time the artillery section and the CP from time to time. The procedure used during
ComGenTen moved ashore. The Army naval this period is outlined in a subparagraph above.
gunfire officer was left aboard the flagship to con­ On Okinawa, need .ior sustained coordination
tinue coordination and to maintain representa­ of artillery„ naval gunfire,' and air support has
tion and liaison for the artillery section. The existed, to a greater or lesser extent, throughout
assistant naval gunfire officer and the naval li­ the operation. When the corps Zones of action
aison officer were set up ashore prior to the ar­ were contiguous and army zones of responsibility
rival of the remainder of the army artillery sec­ for the attack of ground. targets existed, coordi­
tion, and radio and message center equipment
nation problems were obviously more frequent
were installed for communications between the
and more necessary.. The amount of, support
artillery section and the gunnery section of Phibs-
Pac. The artillery section was informed twice furnished has been tremendous. On the -,day of
daily, by dispatch, of the availability of support the landing,43 ships, DD or larger, and 1,027 air
ships. In addition, a 12-hour summary in out­ sorties supported the assault on the 10,000 yards
line form was forwarded, giving all informatioh of beach. During the slow reduction of the Shuni
on naval gunfire available at the time. These Line,36 field artillery battalions supported action
summaries were forwarded once daily each morn­ on the 7,000-yard front. At the smile time, ships
ing for the previous 24 hours, while assignments supported from both flanks and the air attacked
were sent in advance of their action. As the naval targets in areas extending froM near the front
gunfire radios of the artillery section were set up lines to the southern tip Of'Okinawa. The great

$
 '9 0 0

majority of this coordination was accomplished at destroyers which were ordered to close and fire on
corps level. the southeastern beaches in addition to two OBB's,
In the majority of cases, close association be­ one CA, and four DD's furnished by ComPhibs-
tween the'coordinating agents of artillery, naval Pac. For support of the XXIV Corps, four
gunfire, and air proved the soundness of the OBB's,one CA,two CL's,and four DD's were as­
system prescribed in Operational Directive No. 9. signed to fire from the western side of Okinawa
In the corps echelon, the CASCU and naval gun­ two OBB's,two CA's,one CL,and four DD's were
fire officer set up apart from the corps artillery assigned to delivered support from inside Naka­
fire direction center. Their bulky radio equip­ ausuku Wan on the eastern side of Okinawa. In
ment made the physical separation necessary. addition to the above,it was considered necessary
However,each had a capable commissioned repre­ to assign one CA and one DD to assure support of
sentative at the artillery fire direction center who III Phib Corps in case of any ene-my action in the
had wire communication with his superior. northern part of Okinawa. The support rendered
When planning ahead, artillery, naval gunfire, by the Navy was the largest ever made available
and air officers conferred together. In one di­ for an attack by an Army corps. As the Army
vision, the air liaison officer was kept at the di­ zone of responsibility for the attack of ground tar­
vision CP while the other coordinators were at gets ceased to exist, effective 14 April, direct co­
the artillery fire direction center. It is believed ordination of naval gunfire by Tenth Army also
that coordination would have been more certain ceased on that date except for the planning of the
and expeditious if the three coordinating agents coordinated attack on 19 April. Tenth Army,
had been together at the division artillery CP from that date on, was concerned only in the as-.
as prescribed. . signment of fire-support ships to each corps in ac­
• Each task force commander had, aboard his cordance with the tactical situation.
flagship the naval gunfire officer of his respective The initial allowance of ships for support of the
supporting landing force. These officers worked operation was set at 9 OBB's,10 CA's,4 CL's,and
directly with the gunnery officers to assure that 24 DD's,exclusive of the fast battleships and their
representation was continuous as regards naval escorts. Because of possible damage and sinkings,
gunfire support for the troops. this original allowance was increased to 10 OBB's
The figures indicate that a greater amount of and 38 DD's, with cruisers remaining constant.
support was available for the III Phibs Corps Ships closed into the target areas as near as the
than for. the XXIV Corps. Such was not the case, reef line permitted but in general were out to the
however. Initially,foul ground and theformation 10-fathom line. Foul ground . existed all around
of the coast line were such as to permit a greater the island of Okinawa and navigational problems
number of support ships for the support of the were constantly involved in the proper delivery of
III Corps than for the support of the XXIV support. Target terrain often presented many
Corps. However,ships with the greatest number difficulties and it was possible to reach sections in
of guns to bear and with the best fire-control in­ the southern part of Okinawa only by very deep
struments were putin support of the XXIV Corps plunging fires which at best were inaccurate. The
in order to balance the support between the two ability of ships to move almost at will within the
corps. destroyer screen did, however, permit the ships to
For the coordinated attack executed by the cover targets from various locations which,if they
XXIV Corps on 19 April,plans were made by the were not originally accessible, became so upon
corps, submitted to ComPhibsGroup Twelve, and movement of the ship. Because of the necessity
worked outby the Tenth Army in conjunction with of keeping ships resupplied with ammunition, it
the XXIV Corps naval gunfire officer and Com- was the rule and not the exception that ships
PhibsGroup 12. In addition to the coordinated would fire for 24 hours or more, then load am­
attack, a diversionary attack was planned by munition for the next 12, and in many instances,
Tenth Army and ships were supplied from the immediately return and resume firing.
Fifth Fleet to add realism to the diversion. These (a) That a system for coordination of artillery,
ships consisted of three fastlia tles11,. anil four naval gunfire, and air support similar to thai used
-

,-.
242
,
 c-42

CAD
CAD

ictoollaseitiv„

mas•

Naha City, Looking to Seaward, Okinawa Shima L-1. Note 90% Destruction of City.
 INCLOSURE 7 TO APPENDIX F TO ANNEX 4.

MANAGEMENT COURSES

Course No. Title

.900-G-F1 Army Management

Pwks for Lt Col and above

900-G-F3 Army Management

(1 wk for Gen Os)

COMMENT:

1. Both courses provide instruction on the Army Command

Management System and an opportunity for the exchange of ideas
among senior commanders and staff officers. The courses have
filled a gap for senior officers who have not received instruction
on Command Management and are not acquainted with the ACMS
system.

2. Management instruction is included in career, command

and general staff, logistics management and other special courses,
such as the Comptroller course at Syracuse University. ACMS has
been in operation Army-wide for over five years. These considera­
tions place the Army Management courses in.a "nice-to-attend"
category.

BOARD RECOMMENDATION:

3. That CONARC study the need for the Army Management

courses in light of instruction given in management at other schools.
 41

,
44•

Rocket Ship. (LSM (R)) Laying Down Barrage in Support of Initial Landing. Okinawa Shima, L-Day, H-Hout Minus.
 a
0
6 ••
arms was highly effective in furnishing eachiiith
Fired
with the type target it was best suited to destroy. prior
Total
Love-
This method of coordination should be preserved day
in future optrations.
16"ITC 1,025 475 1,000 800 3,300
14" ITC 3,275 1,325 5.,500 2,300 12,400
AMMUNITION 12"ITC 575 175 1,600 350 2,700
8"ITC 3,700 2,100 11,000 7,700 24,500
ROCKETS 6"ITC 4,200 3,000 18,000 8,600 33,800
5"/51 ITC 3,000 2,000 9,000 3,500 17,500
5"138 AAC
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 5"/38 Star
21,000 29,000 115,000 63,000 228,000
500 1,000 18,000 10,500 30,000
5"/25 AAC 3,750 5,250
All results of firing spin stabilized rockets indi­ 5"/25 Star
27,000 13,500 49,500
0 500 8,870 5,300 14,670
cated the accuracy of these projectiles. Tons 4,684 2,737 11,870 6,204 25,495
Recommendations
(1) That-the margin of safety for 5-inch spin Ammunition expenditures were enormous. Up
stabilized rockets be reduced to 1,000 yards, and to 16 May, 25,000 tons of projectiles were fired,
that these rockets be fired over the heads of troops nearly twice the total at Iwo Jima, the previous
or landing craft if the tactical situation demands. greatest expenditure. Due to the use of Kerama
(2) That use of 4'.'5 rockets be abandoned in Retto as a logistics base and the extensive em­
favor of 4'.'2 mortars in support of a landing-. ploythent of ammunition LSrs, no serious diffi­
culty was experienced regarding replenishment.
From: Commander, LCI(R) Flotilla 16
Rocket fire is extremely effective and surpris­ From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
ingly accurate within its limitations. An arbi­ The large expenditure of ammunition during
trary limit Of 1,000 yards was set as a safety factor the operation greatly increased the wear of the
for firing close support over own troops, although 5-inch guns on our fire support ships. As of 19
several call fire missions were executed within 800 May the average ESR of the fire-support destroy­
yards of our own front lines. At 5,000 yards a ers. was over 3,000 per gun. Hall and R.P. Leary
full salvo of 5-inch SSR can be placed in a 1,000 fired an offset practice at 6,000 and 12,000 yards
yard square with most of the rockets landing in a to determine average patterns to be expected
500 yard square in moderate weather. Bomb-dis­ with batteries having high ESR. Data from
posal personnel reported finding very few rocket R. P. Leary (4,270 ESR) is given below:
duds and firing ships reported seeing no duds.
Range
From: Commander, LCI(R) Group 48 pattern
No. (rake)
Effectiveness of the bursting charge was clearly Range: salvos yards
observed for the first time by this command. One 6,000, 10 260
12,000 10 470
village was demolished. A direct hit by a single
projectile on a tile-roofed wooden house was ob­ No accurate deflection data was obtained due to
served to completely demolish the structure. Sev­ bad flying conditions for the photographic plane.
eral hits on a coral sea wall were *observed to However, as observed from the firing ship, the
demolish this ection of the wall. Many hits on deflection patterns did not appear excessive nor
was ',there any appreciable shift of M. P. I.
the table-like top (200 yards by 400 yards) of a
noticed in deflection.
ridge were very effective.
- Ammunition expenditures were extremely high.
EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION However, it was felt that as long as the supply
was adequate, no restrictions should be placed
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
on reasonable expenditures to meet the troop re­
Expenditure data quests. The only restriction actually placed was
The following table gives the amount of am­ on starshells, where beginning 17 May, 720
munition expended through 16 May 1945. rounds were allowed per night.
 ,

Clu43
4,11_3 rams
room
C003
coo* mC002
4rel
otarma­ ripir
rein .
C=P - ,
,
-" 1
4`1`
00,0
•

Naval Gun and Rocket Fire Produce Clouds of Smoke Over Aguni Sh,ima-Able Day-9 June 1945.
 The following are expenditures o hiajo'r types
Caliber Number of Weight of Total
of ammunition from 17 May until 21 June: rounds projectile weight

16" HC 510 /38 Star

5 13,150
16".HC 600 1,900 1,140,000
14" HC 4,300 %8 WP 2,180 16" AP 45 2,700 121,500
8" IIC 7,050 5A5 Star ._____ 4,500 14" HC 2,554 1,275 3,256, 350
6" ITC 11,650 5/25 AAC 14,925 14" AP 12 1,500 18,000
%8 AAC 99,525 /;51 FIC 2,COO 8" HC 1,938 260 503,880
6" HC 2,388 105 250,740
5"38 AAC 38,812 54 2,095,848
From: Commander, Amphibious Group I 5"38 WP 989 50 49,450
5"38 COM 245 54 13,230.
5"51 HC 2,522 50 126,100
Pre-Love-day ammunition expenditures 4!2 mortars
6,431 40 257,240
5"rockets
16" 14" 12" / 6,, AAC 5" Corn., 5" WP Total
5"/51 HC star
56,536 7,832,338

- L-1 214 587 207 788 511 2,785 2,222 150 115 5,292
L-2 115 568 168 541 873 10,536 1,430 28 7912,333 In addition 4,118 5-inch star shells provided
L-3 165 272 95 1,028 1,139 6,040 473 138 111 6,482
L-4 174 681 694 1,198 1,577 227 11 36 1,851 * illumination throughout the period.
L-5 178 732 4 281 280 2,845 205 199 43 3,292 While these figures in themselves give a good
L-6 144 395 270 511 407 4 '23 14 448
L-7 43 50 148 1,626 1,626 over-all picture of the expenditure of naval ammu­
nition,they in no way describe the damage wrought
Totalrounds_ 1,033 3,285 567 3,750 4,511 25,816 1 4,561 549 398 31,324
Shore born­ by its excellent usage. Shuni Castle alone was
bardment 1,033 3,285 567 3,750 4,511 21,718 4,561 549 398 27,226 under ceaseless bombardment for a 10-day period.
AA action _ 4,098 4,098
Sixteen-inch shells from the U.S. S. Colorado and
Rounds
14-inch shells from the U. S. S. New, Mexico were
1511/51 HC 3,756 registered with precision adjustments by forward
5" common 805
2 AAC (approximate) 4,098
observer and air spot on this. enemy-held bastion.
VT (estimated) 4,488 Caves were sealed, artillery emfilacements de­
Total r,-inch used in AA actions(approximate) 8,586
stroyed, Japanese weapons silenced, and the area
itself devastated by the merciless pounding.
Ammunition Expended by Tons-Shore Bombardment
Major Caliber 4,446 From: Commander, Cruiser Division 5 (CTP
5 inch 716 54)

TOTAL 5,162 Number Direct Number Number

Type targets
fired on hits destroyed damaged
From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine
Division,Fleet Mar Force Gun emplacements 122 84 78 29
Blockhouses 12 25 7 4
Strong points 5 13 1 4
Naval gun re played one of its most important Caves 120 102 69 23
roles to date in the Pacific war in the support Buildings 47 137 20 23
Pillboxes 20 41 8 9
of the ground forces throughout the southern AA-gun emplacements__ _ 16 16 5 11
Okinawa campaign. Seven battleships, 7 heavy Trenches and earth­
.works 8 9 6 2
cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 14 destroyers were
utilized throughout the 52-day period to lend close
support to the advancing infantrymen of the First Evaluation was made by ships'spotters,observa­
Marine Division. One thousand and sixty-three tion planes, and shore fire-control spotters. Al­
call-fire missions were handled by these ships util­ though there is no distinction made in the destruc­
izing ground and air spot, and 567 harassing or tion reports between direct and indirect targets,
• interdicting night missions were also fired. The it can be assumed that most of the targets were
chart below shows the caliber, number of rounds, indirect because of the nature of the land area.
and the wieiotht of ammunition expended from 30 Previous analysis of indirectfire in shore bombard­
April through 19 June, when naval gunfire was mentindicates that the reported results of damage
secured. are usually too high.
 i7 * "a
NFIRE
• " a
REPLENISHMENT AND RESUPPLY OF 'fle"limited the amount available at the objective.
AMMUNITION With the above exceptions adequate ammunition of
From: Conzmander, Amphibious Forces all types was available at all times to meet re­
After the qapture of Kerama, Hetto, replenish­ plenishment requirements and none of the above
ment of ammunition and servicing of sea planes shortages seriously affected fire support.
were included in the general pattern of coordina­ Resupply ammunition was delivered to the ob­
tion. In this manner, the bombardment pro­ jective prior to 17 May 1945 in the following ship­
gressed in an orderly fashion, always directed at ping:
specific known targets of importance. There was (a) Assault loaded transports.
a minimum of wasted effort on unprofitable tar­ (b) Assault loaded LST's.
gets, and the fire support ships ended up on Love- (c) Nine ammunition., LST's (specially pre­
day with sufficient ammunition to fulfill their loaded for the operation).
scheduled commitments. (d) Four LST's used to bring ammunition for­
The plan of using Kerama Retto as a logistics ward from Ulithi after Love-day. Two of these
base proved very satisfactory. Fire support ships LST's were specially loaded at Ulithi (upon re­
were scheduled for ammunition replenishment 36 quest) with nothing but five inch. The other two
hours in advance. The number of fire-support arrived at Ulithi from the United States with gen­
ships replenishing usually varied between three eyal ammunition and were sailed to the objective
and eight per day plus additional ships of the to prevent the necessity of transferring to other
screen as required. In general, replenishment was shipping at Ulithi.
conducted only during daylight hours with ships (e) AE's and AKE's.
arriving at Kerama Retto about 0700 (I) and de­ The nine ammunition LST's mentioned in sub­
parting about 1700(I). Very little replenishment paragraph (e) above were issue loaded at Ulithi
was conducted at night primarily because daylight to provide approximately three-fourths bombard­
hours proved adequate in most cases. ment allowance for all ships of TF 54. Eight of
Ammunition carried in assault transports and these LST's arrived at Kerama Retto on Love-4­
LST's was tranferred to fire support ships in the day. The other LST was originally scheduled to
transport area. CTF 53 and CTF 55 each had an arrive at the same time but the 14"/45 powder
ammunition boat pool to assist in these transfers. tank explosion mentioned in paragraph 2 above
The lack of empty ships available prior to Love- necessitated an investigation and reloading which
day to receive empties provided a problem. This delayed arrival at Kerama Retto until Love-Ftwo­
was partially solved by transferring as many day.
empties ashore as possible with the boats available. These ammunition LST's proved particularly
However, it was necessary in a few instances for beneficial in providing rapid replenishment for
ships to throw empties overboard, puncturing the fire-support ships at Kerama Retto commencing
cans beforehand to ensure that they would sink. Love — 3, thus preventing the difficulty encoun­
After Love-day two or three empty LST's or AK's tered in previous operations of having fire-sup­
were maintained at Kerama Retto and others made port ships practically empty upon completion of
available in the transport area to receive empties. Love-day (or Dog-day) missions. A total of ap­
Expenditure of ammunition was not limited. proximately 3,000 tons of naval ammunition was
Ships were directed however from time to time to transferred from these LST's to fire support ships
use one type of ammunition in preference to an­ prior to Love-day.
other when practicable in order to equalize the After Love-day these LST's were used not only
reserve on hand. On one occasion the supply of for supplying fire-support ships but also to re­
8-inch HC available for resupply was nilfor 3days move ammunition for the AE's and AKE's when­
and on two occasions the supply of 5"/38 available ever the AE's and AKE's were not discharging
for 1 day. A shortage of 14"/45 also occurred directly to fire-support ships. The ammunition
when 14"/45 batleships were retained at the objec­ so received was later transferred to fire-support
tive after having been previously scheduled to re­ ships. This procedure permitted rapid discharge
turn to the forward area. Production of 12-inch of AE's and AKE's thereby reducing the number

111111111111111111m
to utilize them or return.them expeditiously for reallocation. TAG
retains control of all remaining quotas. Input to fill these quotas is
obtained through award of enlistment and reenlistment options, selec­
tion of qualified U. S. Army Reserve and, National Guard Reserve
Forces Act personnel and by gilocation of quotas requested by field
commanders based on individual applications for the training of per­
manent party personnel. TAG retains central control to permit flexi­
bility in the selection and assignment of personnel. Occasionally,
mandatory requirements are placed on field commands to furnish in­
puts from the permanent party. to avoid a continuing severe shortfall
in some courses. .4

(5) Officer Assignment Directorate (OAD), DCSPER,

- DA controls assignments to officer career. courses. Allocation and
control is discussed below.

b. Officer and warrant officer school courses:

(1) Basic or orientation courses:

(a) Input of newly commissioned'Regular Army

officers from USMA and the Distinguished Military Graduates of the
ROTC is determined by DA apportionment to branches during the
school year prior to graduation. There is negligible shortfall from
programed inputs from this source.

(b) Input to orientation courses from ROTC sources

is determined by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components
(ACSRC) and furnished to USCONARC, through TAG, in early January.
USCONARC reconciles these requirements with DA imposed ceilings,
input phasing and established priorities. Quotas are then established
for major commands. Significant shortfall is experienced from ROTC
sources. This is attributed to fluctuating concern with military status
which varies with the individual's evaluation of the current national and
world situation and the draft rate, as,well as increasing tendency on the
part of commissioned graduates to request deferment for pursuit of
graduate studies. The Board considers that this area should be studied
further by the ACSRC to reduce the shortfall or to adjust realistically
the quotas.

(2) Career (advanced) courses: Department of the Army

assigns officers. to.. branch career courses as a part of long-term officer
career planning. Shortfall from programed inputs.to these courses is
negligible.

(3 Associate career courses:

5-4
 All of the suicide boats encountered ashore and That control of naval gunfire from ashore would
" at sea, were of a standard design,though the Jap­ be improved in quality by the establishment of a
anese have often utilized any available type of continuing plan for training of Army shore fire-
small boat or motor launch in suicide attacks. control personnel.
This standard design is briefly described as fol­ That the Target Information Center represents
lows: the most workable plan yet advanced for assem­
Length 18 feet. bling,correlating,and utilizing all target informa­
Beam 6 feet. tion.
Maximum speed 35 knots. That maximum use is not being made of target
Minimum speed 61/2 knots. information developed by fire support ships, and
Composition Light plywood.
Charge 2 250-pound depth charges to be
that much information now being reported is of
dropped from stern. dubious value.
Crew 1. That better information and evaluation can be
obtained by attaching a specially briefed and
GENERAL trained intelligence officer to each major fire sup­
GENERAL EFFECT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE port ship for operations,and by exploiting the use
of target photography.
Prom: Commander, Amphibious Forces Thatthe LSM(R)definitely proved its value and
As has previously been stated, all fire-support will be of increasing importance in support duties.
ships did an excellent job of maintaining a strenu­
ous schedule of fires. The ground forces were ex­ From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4
tremely complimentary regarding the quality of At both assault landings the two major objec­
the support given,.and the XXIV Army Corps tives of Naval Gunfire Bombardment were accom­
reported that on two successive days,POW's (one plished, i. e.:
of which was an officer) reported that naval gun­ (a) All units,including fire support ships, air­
fire was our most'feared weapon. craft, and transports, were enabled to reach as­
That the present technique for training for and signed stations for supporting and launching the
delivery of shore bombardment is sound and that assault.
the results achieved are effective. (b) Troops were enabled to land and capture
That present materiel for naval gunfire support positions with minimum losses.
of troops is adequate, but that efforts to improve Air-bursts were not used extensively due to the
both it and the technique must be continued. preponderance of prepared positions.
That the Amphibious Support Force provides More use should be made of flanking fire and
the most efficient medium for coordinating all pre­ observation from LCI(M), LCI(G) and larger
landing activities. types whenever assistance is needed by troops.
That the greatest factor in overcoming fixed Ships which have fired night support should
defensive positions is precise control of fire. remain on station until preparation firesfor morn­
That Air Spot is the most efficient agency for ing jmp-off have been completed.
observing and spotting fire. The LSM(R) proved valuable for night har­
That VOF planes, with their high performance, assing fires and are capable of keeping compara­
satisfy a long felt need, particularly when enemy tively large areas neutralized with a minimum use
AA is active, and before definite air superiority of ammunition. LSM rs were employed with
is established. After the establishment of air good result in the prebombardment of Ie Shima.
superiority and elimination of AA opposition, They have the advantage of a 5-inch gun for coun­
float planes from battleships and cruisers are supe­ terbattery and illumination enabling them to sup­
rior because of their greater ease of obesrvation ply their own protection, and in addition, have a
(due to slower speed and a separate observer) and large ammunition capacity. It is recommended
because of the manifold advantages of consulta­ their use be expanded and developed for future
tion with gunnery officers and commanding officers operations.
prior to launching. The peak of Iegusugu Yama was believed to
 i •
1re. • :
• .;
4
• ) , ;

contain observation posts or concealed guns and SFCP's and air spotters were well satisfied with
was covered by smoke from Sugar-hour minus 20 the ship's fire in area neutralization and in de­
to Sugar-hour plus 34 minutes. This screen was struction of larger targets. However,caves were
effective except when rate of fire of WP projec­ the most frequent targets for destructive fire. A
tiles fell below 10 rounds per minute for a short large expenditure of ammunition is necessary to
period. ApprOximately 500 rounds of WP were close the caves or destroy whatever is in them.
fired on this mission. Whenever possible, the ship used direct fire,
From: Commander, Amphibious Group .1 with director control of train and elevation,firing
single, aimed shots. Results were good with rea­
Operations to the south and east of Ok.nawa on sonable expenditures of ammunition.
and after Love-day, involved a large number of After the landing, however, most firing was
ships. However,several factors limited the scope done on targets well back from the beach, where
of bombardment. Strategic and tactical consid­ indirect fire had to be used. Here again, single-
erations frequently dictated late arrivals and gun salvos were used unless the SFCP insisted on
early departure of heavy units or concentration, larger salvos. Shots required to destroy a cave,
while on station, for defense against air attack. pillbox, or reveted gun emplacement, varied
The necessity of minesweeping, and particularly widely but was generally large, with an average
the discovery of numerous mines in Nakagusuku of about 40 rounds of 5-inch or 6-inch required.
Wan, prevented furnishing close support to the As far as possible, shore artillery and aircraft
troops from the eastern flank inside the bay until
should be used for destruction of inland targets.
progress of minesweeping permitted entry of fire-
Naval gunfire should be permitted to concentrate
support ships.
In the region assigned to TG 51.19 the area gen­ on targets visible from the ships, so that they can
erally south and east of Naha, and excluding the take advantage of the inherently greater accuracy
Naha airfield area, there was never a great num­ of direct fire.
ber of profitable known targets, either before or Six-inch HC projectiles were not able to breech
during the operation. Particularly, there was a the sea wall which runs inshore of most of the
scarcity of targets vulnerable from the open sea. beaches of Okinawa. Projectiles pierced and det­
Such as could be found were attacked extensively onated satisfactorily when fired with steel nose
and it is considered that the bombardments con­ plugs, but holes produced were small. Hundreds
tributed effectively to preventing the enemy from of rounds of deliberate, short-range fire would
utilizing any resources in this area and to its soft­ have been necessary to make breeches large enough
ening-up for the eventual advance. to pass LVT's; 14-inch and 16-inch projectiles are
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Birming­ required for this job.
ham(CL 62) Six-inch HC projectiles with steel-nose plugs or
PD fuzes, and 5-inch AAC projectiles with PD
Night harassing fire by ships and shore artillery
fuzes would frequently ricochet when fired at
was reported to be effective in preventing the
hard beaches or airstrips, and fail to detonate
enemy from moving guns to new positions and
bringing up reenforcements. This vessel was Five-inch AAC, with time fuzes, was never ob­
frequently ordered to use main battery for night served to ricochet. The reason for this difference
harassing. There is little chance of destroying, or is not known,and seems contrary to what could be
even hitting, enemy installations with nonspotted expected. Five-inch AAC,with PD fuzes,fired at
naval gunfire. Birmingham believes that 5-inch is Naha airfield from a range of 9,000 yards showed
just as effective in harassing the enemy and in­ about 10 percent ricochets.
terfering with his movements as is G-inch or larger Use of reduced iv powder would probably elim­
caliber fire;it is therefore recommended that ships inate ricochets. However,6-inch reduced iv pow­
be permitted to use 5-inch guns for all night ha­ der was not available during this operation. Such
rassing to reduce ammunition cost and lengthen powder for 5-inch was available in small quanti­
(run life. ties, but was never used.
 11.
.4
•.:
.4 1
NATVAT 14.1-FIRE
,
-
' 11/ Niel. IVO •0
1

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.Biloxi(CL 30 to 100 feet of earth and • stone is essentially
80) undestructible. It was on this principle that the
It was again fourld that it is very difficult for cave defense was conceived.
naval gunfire to hit a pin-point target at moderate­ From: Commanding General, TENTH Army
to-long range with indirect fire without a large
expenditure of ammunition. It usually requires This was the heaviest concentration of naval
several "no-change" salvos to get a direct hit. gunfire ever delivered in support of the landing
of troops. The fires were delivered in such mass
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Picking so as to prevent the enemy from interdicting the
(DD 685) beaches. The target area rapidly became covered
The commanding officer was later afforded the with smoke, dust, and debris so that fires became
opportunity to inspect some of the Jap defense the harassing type about 1 hour after the start
positions on Okinawa. His strongest impression of the bombardment, except for those fires deliv­
was that five-inch fire against caves was little ered on the immediate beach area. Fires were
better than harassing—with no destruction there­ moved inland,as planned,to neutralize the enemy
of possible. In most instances, entrances were mortars that might exist in the rear of the
such that a direct hit on the mouth of the cave beaches. Naval gunfire continued for 4 hours
would cause little or no damage inside. Even if after the initial handing. No appreciable mortar
"caved-in", the entrances could be cleared in a fire was received on the landing beaches. Other
short time by a few men with shovels. There­ fires were delivered to interdict radio and cOm­
fore,it would seem that of our 16,000 rounds fired munication centers and for counterbattery pur­
during this campaign, more than half of which poses. These fires did pin the enemy down and
were fired at caves, this half must be! recorded seriously hampered his communication facilities.
as "harassing fire". The Army seemed to know Enemy batteries were effectively neutralized and
that and to desire it notwithstanding. If such no such enemy fires were received on the beaches.
expenditures are warranted by the results of Inasmuch as the troops advanced rapidly, the
harassing, then it should be continued; but, it actual evaluation of this bombardment is im­
would seem that for the same shipping space, possible. Further, as the fires delivered were
much greater destruction could be had from larger primarily of neutralizing type,.destruction of tar­
caliber guns with delay-fuzes. gets was accomplished by the volume of fire only
and not by pinpointing of targets. This further
From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine reduced any proper evaluation of destruction.
Division The primary factor of consideration is that troops
From careful analysis of the cave-defense landed without enemy interference and were not
system coupled with interrogation of prisoners of subject to the usual violent counterattacks during
war,it appears that the enemy decided,following the first night. The diversion bombardment of
defeats in the Marshalls and Marianas, to aban­ the southeast coast was conducted in a similar
don the log and pillbox scheme in favor of one manner in an attempt to indicate to the enemy
which would provide greater protection against that landings would be accomplished to his rear
our air, naval gunfire, and - artillery superiority. and thereby pin down his reserves. Evaluation
It was considered that organization of each hill of this fire is impossible inasmuch as no landing
and hill system into a large scale pillbox, by con­ was contemplated or accomplished.
struction of extensive tunnels and caves within Plans and orders covering the control and exe­
the hill itself, would result in positions which cution of naval gunfire are standardized by the
were almost impervious to our supporting arms, Navy to such an extent that those* prepared for
and at the same time would provide the defending this operation should successfully constitute a
force with strong tactical positions and adequate model for all future operations as long as the
cover for personnel and supplies. While even the present doctrine remains in force, excepting in­
strongest pillbox is subject to destructive bom­ sofar as new weapons are developed. This is
bardment, a hill with caves and tunnels under also true insofar as the landing force orders and
 .
7

•••

plans are concerned, and only minute chang6s in not visible from seaward.' Plane spot of the ships'
accordance with the tactical situation should be own plane, and not combined with shore fire con­
required. This latter modification should primar­ trol party spot or control, was well handled and
ily be based upon the requests for preliminary utilized to the maximum in very deep support. In.
bombardment submitted by the respective landing general, naval gunfire in this operation was em­
force units in that, as control of naval gunfire ployed to very near maximum advantage. The
actually rests with the Navy, a semistandardized terrain of the island and the formation of the
form of request for targets is desirable. seacoast afforded opportunity for such use and,
It is not possible to judge accurately the effect with few exceptions, all advantages were consid­
of naval gunfire in this operation for several rea­ ered and utilized. Credit and praise has been
sons. Artillery has fired on many of the same passed on to the ships and the support com­
targets. Air bombing has also covered, in many manders directly and indirectly. Confidence in
cases, the same targets and in other eases oblit­ the use of this fire continued to increase from day
erated existing damage. Further, necessary im­ to day as the operation progressed.
mediate repairs, road work, and other construc­
tion activities have effectively obliterated damage Recommendations
and destruction. Also, enemy batteries were neu­ (a) That naval gunfire in proportion to the
tralized and the damage- repaired, although such amount of ammunition available and the number
damage at the time would tend to indicate that and types of ships available is of great value in
the battery or gun had been destroyed. There aiding the initial landing and in supporting the
exists no question, however,that great destruction troops after they are ashore. It is of greatest
and casualties were inflicted by naval gunfire, par­ value ashore in providing deep supporting fires,
ticularly in the heavy caliber firing. Harassing harassing fires, and illumination. Large expendi
and interdiction fires were delivered as deep sup­ tures of ammunition are required to achieve de­
port primarily and with excellent effect. In sev­ struction but such expenditures cannot be meas­
eral instances, prisoners of war reported that the ured in monetary value inasmuch as morale factors
most demoralizing and feared support weapon also must be considered both from the standpoint
utilized in the attack was naval gunfire. These of decreasing the enemy's morale and increasing
fires were continued on a 24-hour basis so that that of our own troops.
enemy movemenis at night and enemy rest would (b) That naval gunfire can and has been
be interrupted. Starshells were fired at night effectively coordinated with artillery and air sup­
and were effective in aiding in the discovery and port, thereby achieving maximum use of support
repulsing of enemy counter-attacks. Counter- weapons involved.
battery fire was excellent. The use of this type (c) That naval gunfire and air support tend
of fire and also harassing fires at night, particu­ to supplement each other. Many targets suitable
larly after support ships were able to enter and for air are not suitable for naval gunfire and vice-
fire from Nakagusuku Wan, were of great benefit versa. In addition, air bombing can strip camou­
to the troops, as they permitted them to get rest flage and thereby make targets visible for destruc­
by restricting the enemy's use of artillery. Fires tion by gunfire. Most bombing and strafing runs
at night had definite limitations, however,because can be coordinated so that they are conducted
of the fact that ships fired with radar fix; errors simultaneously with naval gunfire or else with
induced thereby, except in range, caused these naval gunfire temporarily shifted to other targets
fires to consist primarily of area coverage and so that no gap in support is evident.
of little destructive value. Call fires, delivered (d) That the employment and effectiveness of
upon request of shore fire-control parties, and gunfire increases in direct proportion to the ex­
when deep inside the enemy's lines, by plane, were perience of the landing forces in its use.
the most effective fires. This method of fire con­ (e) That coordination between artillery, naval
trol was utilized for all purposes from adjusting gunfire,.and air is best handled by the respective
.starshell to counterbattery. Direct spot by firing artillery sections of the various echelons of com­
ship was not normally used; as most targets were mand. The artillery sections especially in opera­

„
 NAVAL GUNFIRE

s I atm 4 ver 1 month, ordination thereof with artillery. In addition,

are equipped to handle target information and, indoctrination and designated basic instruction
through the respective naval gunfire and air offi­ of such a course should be given to all field officers
cers, allocate targets. at the Field Artillery School and the Infantry
(f) That effectiveness of naval gunfire is in School. Staff,officers should be given an indoctri­
direct proportion to the observation of the target nation course at the Command and General Staff
obtained. This is a trite conclusion but inasmuch School.
as it is impossible for fire support ships to make (o) That the field artillery officers of divisions,
accurate transfers of fire as does field artillery, corps, and armies be given fixed and definite re­
all deep supporting missions (except harassing sponsibility for the coordination of naval gunfire,
and illuminating fires) must be adjusted by air air, and artillery, with the naval gunfire officers
spot and all close support missions must be ad­ thereof designated as the coordinating agent for
justed by shore fire control party or air spot. naval gunfire.
(g) That the present JASCO as now organized (p) That further experimentation and training
is not suitable for the work to be performed. This to be conducted in the use of radar beacons before
is particularly true so far as the battalion naval any definite conclusions are formulated.
liaison parties are concerned,since their duties are (q) That the naval gunfire sections of the pres­
limited after the regimental naval liaison officers ent JASCO's be divorced therefrom and formed
are established ashore. into naval gunfire-control battalions.
(h) That JASCO's must be considered the pri­ (r) That such naval gunfire-control battalions
mary factor in the control and delivery of naval be commanded by field artillery officers.
gunfire in close support after the troops have (s) That such naval gunfire-control battalions
landed, even though air spot is available, as the be organized so as to permit the attachment of one
JASCO officers are in touch with their respective company to each infantry division which is to be
units and are familiar with their requirements. supported by naval gunfire. Each company should
(i)- That plane and shore fire-control spot again be composed of7naval liaison teams and 12spotter
have proved to be the best all around spot when teams to function as follows: One naval liaison
the two are combined and tied in by radio with team with each division headquarters to work with
the supporting ship and with each other. the division naval gunfire and assist the artillery
(j) That shore fire-control parties again proved section in planning and coordination two naval
to be valuable sources of combat intelligence. liaison teams per regiment to give continuous
(k) That the use of radar beacons for naval liaison, increased communications facilities, in­
gunfire control has not been used sufficiently to creased regimental control of fires,a small casualty
base conclusions as to their effectiveness or lack replacement pool, and,if desired by the regiment,
thereof. to be attached to each battalion in the initial land­
(1) That the plans and orders for this operation ing one spotter team per battalion and one per
were well prepared and adequate and that these regiment to permit relief of spotters during pro­
plans and orders, both army and navy, can con­ longed operations and to allow for small casualty
stitute a successful model for future operations. replacement.
(m) That a standard army doctrine of the pro­
(t) That a centralized agency be established
cedure for the employment of naval gunfire, in
under War Department control for the training;
support of landing operations, be prepared by
the War Department either as a field manual or and administration of naval gunfire control bat­
as a chapter of an existing applicable field manual. talions, such agency to be representative of both
(n) That the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, naval and military authority, in order that com­
Okla.,institute a course of not more than 4 week's plete coordination of doctrine, policy, training.
duration for the purpose of instructing and train­ and administration can best be accomplished for
ing naval air observers and shore fire-control party all problems involved.
spotters in the principles and application of naval (u) That such an agency as indicated above be
gunfire in support of ground forces and the co­ formed of officers, both military and naval, who
 ir 4

11' *
L

have had battle experience with naval gunfire and The existence of extensive sea walls along a large
the problems inherent thereto. portion of the beach frontage which had to be
(v) That commanders and staff officers of all breached in order to provide exits for tanks and
infantry echelons be given training in the policies amtracks.
for employment control, and coordination of The lack of definite knowledge as to the over-all
naval gunfire. defensive plan of the enemy and its relation to the
(w) That inasmuch as the Marine JASCO's beaches selected for the landing.
have been permanently assigned to their respective The fact'that the enemy possessed on Okinawa
divisions that no change be made therein but that a large number of troops, almost any units of
all advantage be taken of experience gained in which could reach the scene of the landing in a few
operations by the Marines in the promulgation of hours unless continuous interdiction was main­
doctrine for Army units. tained on numerous roads.
The numerous coast defense guns which had to
GENERAL COMMENTS
be destroyed before ships could close to medium
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces and close ranges and deliver effective destruction
The defense employed by the enemy in this fire on enemy defenses opposing the landing.
operation was centered in the steep, rugged hills
immediately, north of Shun. Slopes were almost From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
vertical, and were honeycombed with caves, em­ During the early stages of the operation a criti­
placements, and burial vaults, all of which were cal shortage of artillery ammunition seriously
used for artillery, motor, and machine gun posi­ hampered artillery operations ashore.
tions. Troop advances were slow and were de­ Naval gunfire support for the Okinawa cam­
pendent upon the destruction of many interlock­ paign was the logical outgrowth of trends and
ing enemy defense units. Rarely were any enemy Policies proven sound in previous central Pacific
troops caught in the open or in uncovered trenches. area operations, particularly Iwo Jima. It dif­
As a consequence, practically all naval gunfire fered from its predecessors chiefly in the greater
and all artillery, whether in close support or deep time during which support was provided, the
support, was necessarily directed at pin-point tar­ greater complexity of the control system entailed
gets for which definite destruction was desired. by the greater number of ground forces involved,
This type of firing, entailing the use of one or and, it is believed, the closer cooperation between
two guns, very precise registration, and many naval gunfire and artillery support. In a more
rounds of deliberate fire was very exacting for all nearly perfect sense than ever before, as far as
fire support ships. In most cases, air spot proved known to this command, naval gunfire was a con­
superior to ground observation. Air spotters, tinuing integral part of support, complementary
both from VOC squadrons, and from battleships rather than supplementary to artillery. Naval
and cruisers flew long, exhaustive hours, and the gunfire expenditures show that a greater weight
destruction achieved is a tribute to their efforts. of projectiles was delivered in this campaign than
Definite statistics are not available, but all troop in any previous one. Daily destruction reports to
agencies were enthusiastic and highly compli­ this command indicate that results commensurate
mentary toward the ships of the fire support force. with expenditures were attained. The following
Of particular interest is the change in attitude comments are presented in order to indicate de­
of some Army divisions, who prior to this oper­ velopments in technique, possible avenues for
ation, had not used much naval gunfire and were further development, and in some few cases, defi­
somewhat unfamiliar with its capabilities. ciencies in planning or operation.
The fact that, for the first time, a total of four The pre-landing bombardment plans incaude
divisions. were to land abreast over a beach front­ provision for searching out and destroying suicide
age aggregating almost 10,000 yards. boat pens with a high target priority assignment.
The navigational hazards off the beaches, which During the early stages of the operation it was
with the length of the beaches, limited the density the policy of commander,Southern Attack Force,
of fire which could be provided. to anchor fire-support ships assigned him in the
•
 &•

N ANAD
. .

southern sector of the transport anchorage in be necessary to assign such missions to highly re­
order to take advantage of the transport areh ­ liable vessels to inure the greatest safety of our
smoke screen. Intlividual smoke boats and LCI's forces ashore, but the added effectiveness in the
were assigned each heavy fire support ship. Later, destruction of enemy installations should more
as the ground forces advanced south, it became than compensate for the problem of assignments
impossible to deliver required support from these which would be created by the necessity for the
anchorages, and it was necessary for the fire sup­ choice of individual ships.
port ships to remain underway off the southwest 8. It is, therefore, recommended that—
coast. At this time the ships remained underway (a) The present training of shore fire-control
together for mutual protection until Za.rk, and units be continued and the widest possible exten­
then took up stations for fire support duties. By sion be made of their employment.
the end ofthe campaign it had become necessary for (b) Insofar as possible deep supporting fire be
ships on the western side of the island to operate directed by shore parties from advantageous ob­
in two groups, one far enough north to achieve a servation posts.
safe line of fire for illumination, and the other far (c) Ships be ordered to fire major calibers in
enough south to deliver desired harassing fire. deep support only against individual targets and
never in area, coverage except to neutralize a de­
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.Tennessee structive battery or to disperse troop concentra­
(BB 43) tions or movements.
It is recommended that the use of shore fire-con­ (d) At all times when it is safe to do so major-
trol parties be extended on a large scale to major caliber fire be employed in close support under the
caliber fire. In this operation with the single ex-. direction of shore fire-control parties.
ception of firing delivered from Nago Wan in sup­
port of the forces on Motobu Peninsula only the From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine
secondary battery worked with the shore fire- Division, Fleet Marine Force
control parties. On Motobu the main battery was The most accurate main battery fire ever de­
extremely effective under the expert direction of livered for this division on a shore installation
the controlling units ashore. was delivered by the battleship Colorado on Shuni
It is, of course, clear that the over-all plan was Castle. No correction was necessary greater than
the use of 5-inch fire in close support, and the MO yards and frequently the initial salvo was a
reservation of the major calibers for deep support direct hit.
activity. Such a plan, however, overlooks two When the report reached division that the en­
important considerations. First, the difficulty emy was evacuating Shuni under cover of rain and
faced by this ship is not one of hitting the target low ceiling, the U. S. S. New York was requested
but of locating the target. When deep supporting to send up its plane to investigate. Thirteen min­
fire with main battery is called for against an utes after the request was received the battleship
active gun in a certain area, the problem of locat­ had opened fire. Other fire support ships, as well
ing the gun is paramount. Since the areas are as artillery and air, were quickly brought to bear
not visible from the ship in most instances, if the on the target with devastating results, the roads
target is not seen by an air spotter the ship's bat­ becoming littered with enemy dead and wounded.
tery is• stalemated. Area coverage in such a case Ships were positioned throughout the operation
is at best a poor substitute, for only with excep­ to give the most effective line of fire to the desired
tional good fortune can more than temporary neu­ target. In this manner naval gunfire was enabled
tralization be achieved-c--and such neutralization at, to hammer reverse slopes and to fire into draws in
the expense of an ammunition expenditure far be­ which it is normally difficult to obtain results.
yond that justified by results. 4.2 mortars and 5-inch rockets from LCI(Q)'s
7. Second, the accuracy and care with which and LSM(R)'s were utilized with excellent results
main battery fire can be delivered is such that close on the southern ridges where the ships could use
supporting fire with major calibers is sufficiently their own spot. 40-mm. fire from ships was also
safe to permit its use in close support. It would effective on these beach areas.

;
 b. Criticism of the Army school system has been directed
at inaccuracy in planning manifested by the difference between pro­
grams and their accomplishment. In part this has been justified. The
planned annual inputs to the school system have fallen short in recent
yeas. However, after determining and evaluating the procedures used
to develop annual school programs, the Board believes that the predic­
tions have been reasonably accurate When considered in relation to the
lead time required. However, adequate consideration has not been
made of an overall allowance for unpredictable circumstances which
seem to affect each annual program, causing a shortfall of about 10%
of required annual student inputs originally planned for target year
accomplishment.

c. Student input requirements must,be developed and trans­

lated into school operating programs as attainable objectives tempered
by consideration of past experience. Requirements must be adjusted to
account for what appears to be an unavoidable shortfall so as .tv elimi­
nate the significant discrepancy between the operating school program
and the budgeted school program. Factors used for such adjustments
require annual review and re-determination to retain accuracy. Input
quotas will still require close monitoring and control throughout the
year of execution to insure that the program is met. •The argument
may be advanced that, application of this technique may cause shortfalls
in meeting.actual requirements. Such an argument begs.the issue,
since the past record demonstrates.that shortfalls in meeting programed
inputs have repeatedly,occurred. Careful control of this technique should
produce output more in line with actual requirements.

d. The Board Considers that a careful review of past pro­

grams and actual results must be made as soon as possible.by appro­
priate action agencies to establish current adjustment factors to be ,
used for program and budget estimates.

e. Complexity of the Army's command structure is an

important factor contributing to difficulty in administering and develop­
ing annual school programs. Too many a.gencies are involved.
USCONARC, while responsible for overall development of the school
program, is subordinate to Department of the Army, yet must coordi­
nate_ in the development process with many DA staff agencies. The
reorganization of the Army should materially reduce the number of
agencies involved and should alleviate some problems now caused by a
.division of responsibility.

1. The school system has attempted to react promptly and

decisively to meet frequent and often radical changes in Army structure.

5-12
4 •

'

Jap Covered CD Gun Located in Naha Airfield Area, Okinawa Shima,L Plus 3.
 •.•• •:• .. = •

SUPPORT CRAFT i
j '­
LCI(M) and one of LCI(R) fired on Naha and landings could. not be rendered, in all cases, as
the Oroku Peninsula daily. After 4 days this was close to the time of landing as might be desired.
reduced to one division of support craft daily,and Necessarily concentrated support scheduled for
later two LSM(R)s were used. All the LCI(R) a certain period and already begun, had to be
fired from the fin-stabilized rockets. These bom­ spread thinner over a longer period of time be­
bardments were very successful, particularly on cause of fixed expenditure allowances.
Naha itself, the destruction of which was com­ In support of the Seventy-seventh Infantry
pleted by the LCI(M)s. Division landings on beaches Violet, Green, Gold,
During the latter part of May,the Seventh Divi­ Yellow, apd Blue on L-6 and on beaches Red,
sion began using one division of LCI(R) daily for Purple, (gnu Orange on L— 5, destroyer, mortar
support. These craft worked under the division rocket, and automatic weapon fire was used for
naval gunffre officer,and one forward observer was immediate preparation fire on the beaches.
embarked for liaison. Targets were usually areas Where possible, each support craft team closed
or specific installations, in some cases personnel the beach 300 yards ahead of the leading assault
who had been driven into the open. These craft wave,delivered fire to their minimum range, main­
were also very successful in providing the support tained steerageway until all assault waves had
desired. passed through their formation and then retired to
seaward by the flanks.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 The Support Craft Flotilla was composed of 2
On dogleg approaches where support had to be mortar divisions, 1 RCM and rocket division, 4
rendered from a fixed position in lieu of preceding gunboat divisions (LCI(G)'s) and' 2 LSM(R)
the assault waves to the beach, support team fire Divisions, a total of 54 support craft. This Sup-
ceased just before the leading wave came into the port•Craft Flotilla was organized into teams com­
line of fire of the support craft team. posed of the various types of craft and each team
Mortar fire was commenced at a range of about assigned the support of a specific beach and land­
3,200 yards from the beach, controlled by varied ing. Further, units of the Support Craft Flotilla
propellant charges to give a heavy saturation fire were assigned to the support of UDrs in the
on the beach and lighter density back of the beach. reconnaissance of specific beaches.
Rocket fire (LCI(G))was commenced at a range
of about 1,100 yards and distributed from the shore From: Commander,LCI(R) Group 48
line inland. Automatic fire was used when within The ships fired for the first time under the direc­
effective range and no boat waves were in the line tion of .naval shore gunfire liaison officers. An
of fire. Particular attention was paid to areas Army captain attached to a fire control unit was
back of the beaches suitable for enemy mortar embarked in the flagship. All fire was controlled
locations. by the division flagship. This unit was assigned
Support rendered by LCI(G)'s as compared to target areas between high ridges which could not
,LSM(R)'s was superior because of the lesser be reached by artillery or naval gunfire. The tar­
ranges involved in such support, the resultant get areas were in all cases 1,000 yards square or
lesser effect of atmospheric conditions on the tra­ smaller, the depth of the target areas from the
jectory of the smaller rocket and the greater ex­ beach varied from 500 to 4,000 yards, the average
perience of these craft. LSM(R)'s were used for height of the ridge was 500 feet. Advantage was
the first time in this operation. taken of the high ordnantand long range of the 5'10
Kerama Retto being a group of eight principal spin stabilized rocket. Since the ammunition sup­
islands on which a total of nine different landings ply was critical ships were limited to about 30 rock­
were planned, many innovations in support of ets per ship per run. The division was formed into
landings had to be effected. .The support plan was two sections of three ships each,ships in each sec­
therefore made flexible. With very limited navi­ tion formed 90° relative from the guides. The
gational approaches to the eight §mall islands, interval between section leaders was 400 yards;the
the resultant congestion of many ships and craft, interval between ships was 75 to 100 yards. This
and the fixed directions of fire, the support of plan is a modification of Rocket Delivery

•
 ,

NAVAL GUNFIRE
-

Sugar Roger Baker. The modifidation was made formed by any number of other landing cra t
and the ships divided into sections to give a more whose primary function is more closely coincident
concentrated rolling barrage and because Yona­ with screening operations.
'baru-Wan and Yonabaru-Ko were narrow and LSM(R)'s not particularly suited as AA screen
flanked by reefs. Observers ashore, one spotting ships because the 5"/38 and two 40-mm.guns have
plane, and the Army officer embarked all reported not adequate fire-control mechanisms and only
excellent results and thorough coverage of each three 20-mm.'s are present.
target area. LSM(R)'s are very well suited to act as indi­
From: Commander, LCI(R) Flotilla 16 viduals in destroying or neutralizing enemy po­
sitions. Their use as a wave seems a waste if
In view of the excellent performance of the enough other targets are present to use them
LCI(R)s on fire support duties during the latter singly.
part of May and during June it is strongly recom­ LSM(R)'s well suited as screening ships against
mended that they be used primarily for close fire surface targets. The 5"/38 is a formidable weapon
support and not but to uses that completely ignore and the40-mm.'s are enough to destroy small boats.
their tremendous fire power. Their radar is good,allowing effective station keep­
From: Commander, LCI Flotilla 21 ing on night patrols. In general better suited as
flycatchers than smokers. They can provide their
The use of Plan Baker (line abreast) mortar own illumination.
fire ahead of boat wave was very satisfactory as
arranged in this assault. From: Commander LCI(R) Group 47
Use of these ships for smoke coverage at night The close-in fire support craft showed their
for transport area anchorage was very practical worth by taking the reverse slopes under rocket
and efficient. fire with outstanding results. It was also found
LST mother ships appear to be one solution to that the close-in craft could act as spotters for
the logistics problem but more of them are needed the heavy Fox Sugars. Many times the small
and each should be responsible for a designated craft pointed out potential targets to the heavy
unit which it can adequately supply. ships and these targets were taken under heavy
fire with good results. The psychological boost
From: Commander, LSM Flotilla 9 given to the morale of the troops ashore by the
LSM(R)'s of this command have been assigned presence of the rapid-firing close-in craft was also
to act as radar picketfire-support ships during the demonstrated to be very effective.
period of time covered by this report. It is be­ In the planning of future operations it is re­
lieved that these ships are not particularly suited spectfully suggested that the close-in fire support
for this duty. Since their primary function is craft be assigned to work with the heavy fire sup­
to deliver rockets during invasion operations, it port craft continuously from the initial assault
seems feasible that subjecting them to continual phase of the operation until such time as the area
enemy air attack will allow a secondard duty to is declared secured. It is further suggested that
seriously affect their ability to perform their pri­ enough close-in fire-support craft be made avail­
mary function due to mechanical damage. They able so that they may work on a 24-hour basis.
have no great value in combating enemy aircraft From: Commander, LCI Flotilla 14
due to the absence of air search radar, adequate (1) Deploy LCI(G)'s in advance of LVT or
director control for the 5"/38 main battery, and LCVP assault waves. LVT's and LCVP's should
director control for the 40-mm. single guns. The keep position 50 yards astern of the LCI(G)'s.
fact that they carry a considerable quantity of This permits earliest arrival of assault waves
high explosive rockets in their magazines presents on the beachhead after cessation ot firing of
another hazard. In general, it is believed that LCI(G)'s. Also LCI(G)'s equipped with three
assigning them to this duty should be avoided since 40-mm weapons are better equipped to strafe the
it means risking the operation of a limited number beachhead than LCI(M)'s with a maximum of one
of specialized ships for duty which could be per­ 40-mm.
 ,

Ak.

,
41

4,
44
.
•
40*

41%
•

Destruction of Seawall by ATaral Gunfire. Walls Composed From Rubble and Cement. Okinawa Shima. L Pins 1.
 •

(2) Place LCI(M)'s on the flanks where they (d) Causes of damage: Damaged Sunk
can more slowly close the beachhead and roll their (1) Suicide planes 36 2
_barrage inland. Tljey should close the beach- (2) Enemy gunfire 1 1
head as close as safe navigation permits and the ,(3) Our gunfire 3
(4) Bombs 3
schedule of fires should specify that considerable (5) Torpedo 3 1
,mortar fire be placed 2,000 to 2,500 yards behind .(6) Strafed 1 _
the beach. Due to enemy observance of our tactics
in previous operations, a considerable amount of Total 47 4
qheir beachhead defenses are now disposed in the From: Commanding Officer, U. S.S. Colorado .
area 2,000 to 3,000 yards inland. If LSM(R)'s
(BB 45)
are available they can also be readily adapted to
the delivery of fire on suspected deep defenses. In The influence of many years of target practice
their employment where approach is limited they rules which confined firing to 30° or 40° forward
should be committed to delivery of their barrage and abaft the beam was reflected in the consider-
commencing one half hour prior to "jump off" of able amount of minor damage sustained when the
the assault wavesfrom the line of departure. This main battery was fired on the bow and quarter.
would permit the LSM(R)'s to fire and thence The ship itself, the important auxiliary and dock.
retire. machinery located forward and aft, piping and
(3) LCI(M)'s should be deployed in section electrical equipage must be designed to withstand
formation, in order to provide greater flexibility gunfire at any.angle. We cannot prove the.design
in maneuvering as a unit. and construction without frequent firing tests un­
(4) Under favorable wind conditions, the use der war conditions.•
of 25 -percent of white phosphorus (4.2 mortar
From: Commander,LCI(R) Flotilla 16
ammunition) is recommended.
It was noted that 5-inch rockets invariably set
DAMAGE fires in enemy target area. Destruction of built-
From: Commander FIFTH Amphibious Force up areas appeared to be excellent, demolishing
During the period 17 May until the island of stone and cement walls as well as ordinary build-
Okinawa was officially secured on 21 June 1945,the ings. Commander,LCI(R) Flotilla,16 inspected
following units of TF 31 received damage inflicted areas bombarded almost entirely by rockets. De-
by the enemy. struction of installations was impressive—particu­
(a) Combatant ships: Damaged Sunk larly where direct hits had been made inside the
Battleships 1 entrance to revetted caves. The rocket bombard-
Cruiser 1
Destroyers 8 3
ments appear to have caught the Jap flat-footed
Destroyer escorts 5 in naturally defensible positions such as draws,
Destroyer minelayers 2 narrow valleys and positions sheltered by cliffs,
Destroyer minesweepers 3
Destroyer transports
•••
hillocks and large boulders. From the appearance,
9
Other'mine craft 2 it would appear that fragmentation is excellent
Patrol craft 2 _ and that there is considerable blast effect. POW
(b) Landing craft: Damaged interrogation by Army units brought out the
LSD
LST following:
LCI
1. Rockets severely damaged defensive po-
LCS 3
(c) Other types: sitions.
(1) Navy: Damaged
2. The concussion (blast?) effect was "tre-
APA 1 mendous."
AK 1 3. The fire was first ascribed to heavy fire-
AKN 1
ATF support units by the Jap stair and it wassome
(2) Merchant: time before they realized that landing craft
XAK 4 had such tremendous fire power.
 - .

-
Army officers stated that rocket preparation Was • tinder fire is safe in respect to the po­
of great advantage in assault as relatively little sitioii-oftis own troops.
opposition was encountered in areas thoroughly
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
covered.by 5-inch rocket fire. They also said that
the noise of the rockets in flight and the heavy The length of the campaign was particularly
detonations were an appreciable lift to the morale trying to the VOS pilots on the battleships and
of the attacking troops and that they believed that cruisers, almost all of whom were required to
the reverse must be true of enemy units. fly long hours. It was also difficult to keep planes,
particularly the SC-1, operational, and there
MISCELLANEOUS were long periods when some ships had no planes
AIRCRAFT at all.
The work of the VOC pilots was outstanding,
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces and too high tribute cannot be paid to the serv­
The availability of VOC squadrons should be ices they performed. Where targets were inac­
increased to provide one such squadron with each cessible to naval gunfire they were often able to
CVE division. When not required for spotting, destroy them with rockets. Their intimate knowl­
their planes can be utilized for CAP or for air edge of the terrain and dispositions made them
support missions. extremely adept at searching out targets of op­
The following deficiencies encountered in the portunity. At one point during the operation,
use of VO—VS float planes from battleships and because of repeated strafing of own front lines
cruisers should be corrected: by friendly planes, these planes were prohibited
(a) The SC-2 has numerous "bugs" which from carrying rockets and loaded machine guns,
reauce its availability and usefulness; but this restriction was soon rescinded.
(b) Insufficient replacement planes and The success of VOC planes should not be al­
spare parts are provided to meet the heavy lowed to overemphasize them as a replacement
attrition during extensive use. for float planes.
(c) Insufficient pilots are assigned to Recommendations.
properly execute the heavy flight schedules (1) That the number of VOC squadrons be
imposed by an extended operation. increased.
(d) No replacement, pilots are provided. (2) That replacement VOS planes be made
VO—VS air spotters should receive the same available at the objective.
training in spotting gunfire at shore targets as (3) That VOS pilots be given training at Fort
is now given VOF pilots. Sill, or otherwise, in recognizing ground targets
and observing fire on them.
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force (4) That when a long campaign is anticipated
An average of six VOF aircraft continued to additional pilots be ordered to cruisers and bat­
be used for spotting naval gunfire until the is­ tleships as reliefs.
land was secured on June 21. After this time no The III Amphibious Corps Landing Force Air
VOF were requested. Support Control Unit requested that notice of
VOF aircraft added materially to the success each air strike be broadcast on the control fre­
of naval gunfire with their excellent•job of ad­ quency. This request was complied with for a
justing fire. At times ships registered the com­ time until what had been feared occurred: un­
plaint that the shore fire-control party's delay necessary and prolonged stoppages of fire. The
in giving the VOF spotter permission to take system was then abandoned.
targets tinder fire allowed •the enemy to take
cover before effective fire could be delivered. In Recommendations—Air Strike Warning
this connection it must be remembered that the (1) That the present sound system of senior
shore fire-control party is responsible for all fire artillery commander imposing Plan Negat or
delivered, and must be sure that the target to Victor be continued.
 0­
4.-­

— ,r .,.ft- • - ,.
(2) That notice of small strikes not requring plane is' used and as long as we are fighting an
Plant Negat or Victor be given by battalion enemy skilled in camouflage which makes it neces­
shore fire-control parties to close support ships. ' sary to go to low altitudes on spotting missions.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4 TRAINING
During the period from 1 April to 15 May there
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
were in the Okinawa area approximately:
Commencing on about Love+25, Commanding
Enemy air raids comprising 1,590 enemy aircraft 309
Red alerts affecting this command General Tenth Army assisted in a program of
• 109
Days with enemy air raids 36 bringing flag officers, commanding officers, and
Days without enemy air raids 9 gunnery officers of fire-support ships and staffs
ashore for inspection tours. The naval personnel
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 received a new appreciation of terrain difficulties
In general, enemy air tactics followed the pat­ and troop problems,shore naval gunfire personnel
tern previously observed against major landings learned of the problems of the fir -support ships,
in the Philippines and elsewhere. Enemy planes and both sides benefitted by meeting the men on
approached from the southwest (Formosa and the other end of the radio channel.
Sakishima Gunto) and from the north and north­ The Army command agencies should improve
east (Kyushu). These raids consisted usually of the quality of the naval gunfire support of Army
10 to 30 planes, which split up into smaller groups troops by establishing a continuing program of
when about 20 miles from the target area and at­ administration and training for Army shore fire-
tempted to penetrate the outer screen of TG 51.1 control personnel.
from different directions. "Window" was em­ Visits to shore installations by ships' officers,and
ployed by enemy aircraft on several occasions but visits to firing ships by shore fire-control personnel
was not followed through to maximum advantage. do much to promote mutual understanding. These
All types of enemy aircraft were employed in visits should be continued and fostered, both be­
suicide attacks with obsolescent types predominat­ fore,- during, and after operations.
ing. Training, conducted in accordance with Com-
PhibGrp 4 Training Order A401-45, was limited
From: Commander, Battleship Division 5
during rehearsal by the fact that noships of the
While the battleship and cruiser planes per­ fire-support group were present. Every effort was
formed excellent and at times outstanding serv­ made to obtain realism at the rehearsal. Destroy­
ices as spotting planes, and while it is thoroughly ers from the screen were assigned fire-support
realized that a ship based aviator has the distinct
stations and duties.
advantage of conferences and discussions with
The opportunity for combined rehearsal was es­
ship's personnel, still the present type of plane
sential to working out the details of coordinated
is rapidly being outmoded because of its slow
speed and weak offensive armament. The SC1 support of a landing where difficult navigational
plane, now taking its place on board ships, has conditions were expected. Destroyers were util­
not yet proved itself, and in the interim it is be­ ized to represent fire-support ships stationed in
lieved that the VOF plane is the best available or between boat lanes and LCI (R) RCM craft
type for heavy ship's spotting. It was noted that were substituted for those LCI(G) and LCI(M)
in the Normandy operation ships aviators were assigned but not available at the rehearsal area.
checked out in Spitfires and other high-speed No scheduled rehearsals or training as such were
planes and used them for spotting rather than practicable or required for phase 2.
the 'ship-based planes. It is believed that the
attrition rate of 0S2U's and SOC planes in the From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
Okinawa operation was higher than the acceptable It is recommended:
maximum. It is further believed that this rate (1) That every effort be made at staff and com­
of attrition will continue as long as this type of mand schools to inform responsible troop corn­

• -2-65
•Air.‘L.
Target No. 809X1. Concrete Blockhouse Destroyed by Naval Gunfire. Firing Port Had
Enfilade for the Entire Length of Beach Yellow 1.
 GTJTFIRE

manderS of the capabilities and limitations of PERSONNEL

naval gunfire. From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Texas(BB
(2) That no arbitrary limitations on naval gun­ 35)
fire contrary to doctrine be imposed by troop com­ It is worthy of comment that this vessel re­
manders without consultation with Attack Force mained in condition -I or I Easy throughout the
commanders. entire period off the coast of Okinawa, some 7
From: Commander,Cruiser Division 13 weeks. That the men took this without undue
fatigue is a tribute to their spirit and physical
t. It was at once apparent that Battleship Squad­
condition. It is not believed that any lesser con­
ron 1 had experienced very little tactical training.
dition of readiness can meet adequately the emer­
For that matter,the same was true of cruisers and
ffencies of suicide bombers and suicide boats. The
destroyers in preparation for surface action. The only answer to the approaching suicide bomber is
nature of their duties was such that little if any early and great volume of fire, using every gun
time was available for correcting this deficiency.
that will possibly bear,and early warning by radar
MAPS
cannot always be relied upon. The men realized
this and preferred to remain at their stations,rest­
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces ing and sleeping there as opportunity offered,
This was the first operation in which maps em­ rather than be called up frequently from below
ploying the world polyconic grid were used. The as would inevitably have happened. The rest
four digit target square numbers caused no appre­ period when it finally came, however, was much
ciable confusion over the previous systemof arbi­ appreciated.
trary numbering, and provided an easy reference From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.New Mexi­
for points located throughout the extensive area co(BB 40)
of operations. Details concerning maps are con­
2. Morale of gun crews definitely goes down hill
tained in the intelligence report, and will not be in direct proportion to length of operation. They
mentioned here, except to say that the types and
continue to be worried about suiciders. Their
scales as distributed were entirely adequate for
attention to primary duties is distracted as an
naval gunfire purposes. The initial Army Map
attack develops. A full solution for this has not
Service 1/25000 target map did not contain com­
yet been found however, enclosed 5-inch mounts
plete contour information, and this deficiency
and 40-mm,mount shields would do much to help
created some difficulties in determining target al­
this situation as the distracted personnel present a
titude for indirect fire. However, XXIV Army
grave problem to fire discipline.
Corps captured a Japanese map of the entire
southern sector of Okinawa which contained com­ From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.St. Louis
plete and reportedly accurate contours. Copies (CL 49)
of these maps were distributed by CTF 51 to all It is strongly recommended that, wherever
units of TF 54. The thirtieth Engineer Topo­ practicable, ships be alternated or rotated, suffi­
graphical Battalion later issued a reprint of the ciently to provide periods for adequate rest and
1/25000 Army Map Service map,including Japa­ equipment maintenance during operations. By
nese contours, and a corrected road and highway virtue of one of the finest crews afloat and great
net from more recent photos. Copies of these good fortune, this ship came through a gruelling
maps were also distributed by CTF 61. schedule without misadventure and with a stout
record of which this report is testimony but the
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4 commanding officer does not recommend a repe­
The special grid map system is again highly tition.
recommended as it lends itself so readily to se­ From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.Biloxi(CL
curity of communications. With the compromise 80)
of the grid map,target information which would It is considered that it would be virtually im­
have been of use to the enemy was shackled. possible for a ship to operate with any real degree
 ISCELliA
•4 tc
4

of efficiency under the strenuous co— nditions exist­ beacons, combining -,both:radar-'and iisual char­
ing in this operation if the normally prescribed acteristic's, would increase the accuracy of navi­
conditions of readiness for action and watertight gational fixes during darkness and low visibility,
integrity were observed. Realizing this, the with resultant improvement in the accuracy of
Biloxi set up a condition 1/ 2 bombardment bill
1 gunfire. Certain low points and islands which
which consisted of two sections capable of han­ gave poor visual cuts during low visibility and
dling any but the mostiintensive of bombardments which were unsuitable for radar cuts would have
and still take care of surprise air attacks. For any afforded excellent sites for these beacons. The
but large air attacks, condition 1 was set in anti­ visual beacons which were established during this
aircraft batteries alone (condition 1 AA). Along operations had a high visibility and were of great
the same line of thought,it was found that a work­ value once their position was determined. Infor­
able maximum of watertightintegrity with a mini- mation regarding the position of numerous navi­
mum. of inconveniences to the crew could be main­ gational aids was not generally promulgated. It
tained with a modified condition B instead of is recommended that in future operations, a few
condition A,in many cases. Consequently,it was good white beacons with large radar reflecting
seldom necessary to send all hands to battle sta­ surfaces be placed as early as possible in selected
tions and completely "button up" the ship. By locations and their positions promptly dissemi­
following this policy it was possible for each man nated to all hands. As the operation progressed,
to have a shower,three hot meals each day and to additional beacons would be of great value to fire-
get at least some rest in his bunk. The slight re­ support ships who must obtain accurate fixes in
laxation in the conditions of readiness-for-action positions near the front lines.
and material readiness were far more than offset From: Commanding Officer,U.S.S.Wadsworth
by the comparative freshness and alertness of the (DD 516)
officers and crew even at the end of the operation. Ship should be anchored or be kept in exact sta­
Only during one period of 4 days and nights of tion on marker buoy in order to obtain the pin­
continuous bombardmentor standing by for imme­ point accuracy required by shore bombardment.
diate call fire was excessive fatigue noted. Con­ Spots of 5 or 10 yards are often demanded by the
sidering the strain imposed on the crew,especially shore fire control party when the range to the tar­
of the gunnery and communication departments, get is from 6,000 to 10,000 yards. Any movement
by a great deal of day and night bombardment, of the ship, therefoie, is disastrous. Further, it
frequent air attacks, and replenishment of am­ has been determined that in firing on such targets
munition and stores, the relatively fine physical
as caves or gun emplacements where pinpoint ac­
and mental condition of the men in the latter
curacy is needed,several rapid one-gun salvos will
phases of the operation was heartening.
usually produce one or more direct hits.
NAVIGATION
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. William D.
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Metcalf Porter(DD 579)
(DD 595) Accuracy in furnishing call fire requires that the
Due to the inaccuracies of the bombardment ship be as nearly stationary as possible. Steam­
charts of this particular area,it was necessary that ing atspeeds below about7knots is unsatisfactory
the ship's position be established by objects near because of error of the pitometer log and steaming
the target area. Range-finder ranges and bearings at higher speeds is unsatisfactory because proper
were used to establish the ship's position. Pre­ position and line of fire cannot be maintained.
vious experience had shown that visual cuts on Anchoring is recommended when conditions per­
land marks do not give a position sufficiently ac­ mit. When anchoring is impracticable, lying to
curate to get on the target with the first salvo. and making careful determinations of and allow­
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. New Or­ ances for current is recommended. It is believed
leans(CA 32) that this involves no hazard not justified by the
While navigational fixes were,in general, good results obtained unless threat of air, submarine,
and easily obtained,it is believed that a system of mr nu:#1Poat attack is known to be present.
--
.
';:r 1,4 t
 NAVAL GUNFIRE

restricting illumination to 360 star shells per corps

From: Commander,Amphibiousin Oti#4 nightly. This proved to be the needed curb and
Illuminating ships were furnished as requested expenditures thereafter were within reason. All.
Ry corps and divisions'. Illumination was used on emergencies were met.
call to prevent infiltration or enemy movement. From: Commander,LCI Flotilla 21
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 The use of illuminating shells has been very
practical in detecting suicide boats as they are ex­
Despite the faults in star-shell control, the illu­
tremely difficultto see on moonless nights untilthey
mination provided was largely instrumental in
are too close to be destroyed by gunfire before find­
Breaking up many serious enemy counterattacks.
ing their target.
On one occasion 400-500 Japanese were killed with
the loss of a single Marine: On another instance From: Commander,-LCI(R)Flotilla 16
the Ninety-sixth Division reported that the illumi­ Development of a 5-inch rocket illuminating
nation provided spelled the difference between re­ projectile for flycatcher and night harrassing
pulse and break-through. (where cases would fall in enemy-held areas) is
indicated.
Recommendations
(1) That greater stress be laid on the control COMMUNICATIONS
of star shells in shore fire-control party training:. From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
(2) That greater emphasis on safe lines of illu­ A bare description of circuits, as contained in
mination fire be made by all concerned particu­ the preceding paragraph, perhaps gives an im­
larly the shore-fire control parties who must have pression of duplication and overlapping func­
knowledge at all times of the position of adjacent tions. Some confusion on the part of certain fire
units, but also by firing ships, attack force com­ support ships as to the intended purpose of the
manders,and fire-support group commanders. various circuits was evident during the first few
The most common faults in star-shell control days. Several ships reported to the area without
were: the necessary crystals for the 74.7 megacycles TBS
(1) Failure to take into consideration position frequency and were supplied from the flagship.
of adjacent units with consequent casualties in The apparently inevitable scattered instances of
those units from star-shell cases. violation of voice security were experienced.
(2) Panicky calls for"continuous"illumination, However, once the over-all picture became fixed
including calls for more star shells than were in the minds of the users, the plan resulted in a
necessary. \ well coordinated,extremely flexible system of con­
(3) Improper adjustment of star shells so that trol frequencies that proved entirely adequate to
proper effect was not obtained. deal with the many and varied phases of support
On an average some 100 to 200 rounds per ship required. Circuit discipline was in general ex­
was delivered nightly, with the heavier assign­ cellent. During the first few days, CTF 51 em­
ments going to the ships with no illumination phasized the necessity for speaking slowly and dis­
missions. tincily to allow sufficient time for copyists, for
No single problem of support caused more con­ spelling out doubtful words,and for breaking long
cern than illumination,and in no other single phase messages into groups with a pause at the end of
of support was the need for training of shore fire- each group in order to allow urgent traffic to be
control parties more apparent. The Southern cleared. As a result"repeats" were kept to a mini­
Attack Force began the campaign with a policy mum and at no time did traffic on any of the control
of six star shells per hour per regiment normal frequencies get out of hand.
illumination, unlimited illumination for emer­ The ships' gunfire-support plan designated five
gencies. As the definition of an "emergency" HF control frequencies, all of which iere em­
was more and more abused,it became necessary to ployed during the operation. In addition thereto,
exercise more stringent controls, and after con­ the communications plan designated a second
sultation, CT]? 51 in mid-May issued an order VHF TBS frequency for fire-support use. The

-,, •
 -73*
E0:414I
•

'''';«;.* 4* • I;n:

following paragraphs outline the use to which That if a long -campaign involving the use of
those frequencies were put. naval gunfire is deemed probable, division naval
gunfire officers be provided with vehicular
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4 mounted SCR 193 radios.
Call fire assignments and gunnery communica­ That every opportunity for conference and
tions in general functioned excellently, with occa­ visiting between shore fire-control parties and
sional delays experienced during night or early firing ships be exploited.
morning. As the shore fire-control party moved That carriers on which •VOC squadrons are
inland andlurther north, distancesincreased up to based make special effort to calibrate and check
40 miles and communication became more difficult. radios prior to each flight.
Relays were sometimes necessary. That sufficient VOC planes be made available to
The shore fire-control party and. the VOF supply all destroyers assigned to actual fire sup­
spotting plane supplemented each other on the port duties at a given time.
spotting frequency to attain best results with the Communications were in general extremely
firing ships. satisfactory. It is believed that the over-all con­
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 trol net set-up was sound, and the nets themselves
were fast and normally clear.
Recommendations—
That Amphibious Group commanders should
That the shore fire-control parties be removed maintain a modified target information center as
from the joint assault signal companies and all a necessary source of target information.
shore fire-control parties be adthinistered in a bat­ As an index of the scope of the radio com­
talion or regiment under a central control. It is munications'handled by the gunnery office, the
understood that recommendations to this end have
following statistics are reported:
already been made and the proposal is at present
under discussion. Number of circuits operated 4 constantly,
That the make-up of the shore fire-control par­ 1 part of the operation.
ties be changed to eliminate battalion naval.gun­ Number of incoming messages, 14,518
fire liaison officers, and that four additional naval daily average,207.4, not including intercepts
officers be assigned to work,with present regiment complete logs were kept on all circuits.
and division naval gunfire liaison officers. This Number of outgoing messages, 8,125 daily
would enable a 24-hour officer watch to be stood average, 116.1.
at these stations. The additional officers should
There were several unmistakable incidents of
be ordered to work with battalions on detached gunnery circuits being used by Japanese. Mes­
duty or otherwise . away from direct regimental
sages of this type are avoided whenever possible
control in particular,they should land with as-.
but are sometimes heard. In any event there
sault battalions and revert to. regiment when the
.latter is established. ashore. seems to be no further use for retaining self-evi­
That Army shore fire-control parties be pro­ dent call signs, as all of the battalions are given
vided with SCR 300 sets for lateral -com­ calls in appropriate publications. It is believed
munication. that these calls preceded or.followed by "Charlie"
That intensive field training be included in or "Oboe"should be used. As at present,the sim­
the training of naval gunfire liaison officers and ple terms "Charlie" and "Oboe" would be used
shore fire-control parties. .where there was no likelihood of error.

t
..r.7.
. ^ tr.
(
'4
•
•1

3 r .;_
2-60
 Chapter III. AIR SUPPORT

GENERAL down and could be depended upon to reoccur with

the half light of dawn. During the night harass­
ENEMY OPPOSITION
ing of isolated surface craft was the paramount
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet object. In most cases these attacks could be pre­
Japanese air opposition to our landings in dicted with the aid of a moonrise table and the
Okinawa was expected from Formosa and the weather report.
Sakishima Gunto on the left flank, and from The enemy approached the area along the island
Kyushu and Amami Gunto on the right flank. chain from the north and from the southwest.
This expectation was fully realized. As was A. tabulation of approaching aircraft groups
further expected, the enemy apparently funneled indicates that a majority of the plane groups
aircraft from South China and the South through approached fromm the southwest. The groups ap­
Formosa and from the whole Empire, North proaching from the north usually appeared to be
China, and Korea, through Kyushu and Amami larger than those approaching from the southwest.
Gunto. Of approximately 560 *raids directed at Groups from both the north and southwest were
our forces at Okinawa, about 150, or 27 percent, observed to close on the objective area simultane­
came from Formosa and the balance came from ously during the middle of the night indicating
Kyushu. a coordinated effort. The "pincer" movement was
Action toward neutralization of enemy air also noticed each morning and evening. In view
power prior to the landings consisted of TF 58 of their operating habits, no great amount of
strikes on Kyushu and Kure on March 18 and 19, coordination may be attributed to their air com­
twenty-first Bomber Command attacks on areas mand at these particular times.
in Honshu and airfields in Kyushu and mining of The attacking groups were observed to ap­
Shimonoseki Strait, and continuing attacks on proach at altitude from 9,000 feet to sea level. The
Formosa by the Fifth Air Force. usual "low on the water" approaches were espe­
Carrier aircraft of TF 58 commenced strikes on cially prevalent during periods of low visibility.
Okinawa on 23 March. CVE aircraft of TG 52.1 Approaches were made at any low altitude that
began strikes on Okinawa on 25 March. The cloud cover, radar characteristics and visibility
landings began on 1 April and were practically would permit. In many cases, the enemy groups
unopposed. Yontan and Kadena, airfields were were observed to approach the area and then dis­
captured almost at once and it therefore became appear except to close adjacent radar. This ob­
possible to begin establishing the Tactical Air servation might indicate proper training in low
Force ashore much earlier than had been planned. evasive tactics but might also indicate a poor ap­
preciation of our radar range and coverage.
ENEMY AIR TACTICS On several occasions, high speed single bogies
were observed making an approach from the north,
From: Commander,Amphibious Group Seven
swinging over the objective area,and then retiring
In general enemy air tactics followed the pat­ to the north on opposite course removed from the
tern previously observed against major landings original track. Although none of these fast bogies
in the Philippines and elsewhere. were intecepted, they were believed to be making
Enemy strategy continued to prescribe the use reconnaissance or weather flights. During two of
of small groups of planes, usually one to three, these flights visibility was good and cloud cover
and not more than six, with independent missions. was negligible. On one occasion 4/10 to %o cloud
Attacks were mounted with the approach of sun­ cover was present, while in another case solid
 -
•. .„.:. ., . ., . ,
a,,, ,... • .
.A
'-'-' . - . ,,,,,:4 I • _.
overcast:-prevail6d. Speed of bogey on all occa­ 157 VF,17 VF(N),4 VF(P),41 VB,26 VT,and
sions varied from 260 to 300 miles per hour at 3 VOS.
altitudes of 18,000 to 25,000 feet. ENEMY LOSSES
The enemy air activity invariably aroused itself
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
as the last TCAP went home and then diminished
with the approach of the early morning TCAP. Enemy planes destroyed.—
On one particular morning the TCAP was late (1) By fast carriers on Empire strikes 920
arriving and the enemyforces remained in the area (2) By fast carriers in other operations 1, 410
with an apparent full knowledge of our predica­ (3) By CVE's 260
(4) By Tactical Air Force 357
ment. A limited amount of day activity was ob­ 32
(5) By planes of Fleet Air Wing 1
served, such as an occasional snooper, weather (6) By ships' AA 409
plane, or small attacking group. Most of the air (7) Destroyed in suicide dives 206
activity occurred during the morning and evening
twilight. Total 3,594

Window was used on several occasions by the Enemy shipping sunk.—

enemy, but full advantage was not taken by fol­ Ships
Small
craft
lowing aircraft to pass through or by the orig­ (1) By fast carriers during Empire
inator to turn and circle in his own deception. strikes 14 1-1
The window was observed with the air search type (2) By fast carriers during other oper­
ations 43 152
radar SC and SK. No particular confusion.was 4 19
(3) By CVE's
apparent in tracking planes during this period. (4) By Fleet Kir Wing 1 76 50
The suspected use of IFF code 3 and 6 by isolated
enemy aircraft complicated the problem of identi­ Total 137 235
fication, and allowed passage through the area
Enemy shipping damaged.—
of,whatlater events indicated to be hostile aircraft. Small
Ships craft

OWN LOSSES ­ (1) By fast carriers during Empire

strikes 139 73

From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet (2) By fast carriers during other oper­
ations 100 597
Complete reports covering our own and enemy (3) By CVE's 10
losses have not yet been received from subordinate (4) By Fleet Air Wing 1 111 33
commanders. The following approximate figures,
Total 350 713
however, are believed to be essentially correct:
Own pilot losses.—(1) Combat, 139 pilots, BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET (TF 57)
50 aircrewmen (2) operational, 41 pilots, 17
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
aircrewmen, 1 combat photographer.
Own plane losses.-880, including 266 d The operations of the British Carrier Force
stroyed aboard damaged carriers. (TF 57) were carried out with commendable
initiative and reflected credit on the British per­
From: Commander, Task Force 58 sonnel concerned and their leadership. Between•
During the period from 18 March through 27 26 March and 25 May, TF 57 carried out 22 days
May 1945, a total of 251 aircraft from the task of strikes against Sakishima Gunto and 2 days
force were lost in combat during flight operations. against Formosa airfields. Complete. neutraliza­
The breakdown by types is as follows: 171 VF, tion of Sakishima Gunto airfields by this means
8 VF(N),6 VF (P),38 VB,and 28 VT. Opera­ was not to be expected, but the efforts of the
tional losses of aircraft during the period covered British carrier force in that direction unquestion­
by this report totalled 248 aircraft exclusive of a ably greatly reduced the magnitude of enemy at­
few aircraft lost on non-strike days for which tacks upon our forces in the Okinawa area by air­
reports are not available. The breakdown of op­ craft from or staging through Sakishima Gunto,
erational aircraft losses by types is as follows: thereby reducing our losses and damage and con­
,
 Agano Class CL, Two Takanami DD's, Yamato, and TERUTSUKI DD in Japanese Task
Force Under Attack Southwest of Kyushu on 7 April 1945.

tributing materially to our success. In these oper- to the destroyer Quilliam. TF 57 was handi­
ations suicide plane hits were made upon the capped by their lack of night fighters, the rela­
cafriers Indefatigable, Formidable, Indomitable, tively small number of planes on board their
and Victoriow. Their armored flight decks re- carriers as compared to United States large car­
duced the damage caused by these hits. Although riers, and by the shorter endurance of their ships
damage was received, all of these carriers re- and certain of their planes (Spitfire and Firefly).
mained operational. Serious damage was done by They gained experience in sustained operations
a bomb hit to the destroyer Ulster and by collision and American carrier task force methods and tac-

YAMATO under Dive Bombing Attack,7 April 1945.

-441t.
TAKANAMI Class DD Damaged and Dead in Water. TAKANAMI &lass DD'Damaged and Dead in Water.
Later Sunk. 7 April 1945. 7 April 1945.
 CHIDORI Class TB Sinking. FTD Sinking.

FTC Breaking Up and Sinking. FTC, Probable Ammunition Ship, Blows Up. Ship
to Left is in Background.

Four Ships of an 8-Ship Convoy Sunk 220 Miles Northwest of Okinawa. 24 March 1945.

tics and are considered ready to undertake oper­ The bulk of this duty was assigned to the four
ations with our fast carrier force. h,enango class CVE's of TU 52.1.3.

From: Commander, Amphibious Forces OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

TF 57, the British Fast Carrier Force, made its From: Commander, Task Force 58
debut in the Pacific Ocean area during this opera­
tion. Staging from Manus, this force consisted During operations from 18 March through 27
of 4 CV's, 2 BB's, 2 CL's, 2 CL(AA) )'s and 11 May 1945 in support of the capture of Okinawa
DD's. TF 57 was assigned by ComFifthFlt to including attacks on southwestern Japan, aircraft
the neutralization of airfields in the Sakashima of TF 58 flew over 43,000 combat sorties. The
Gunto area plus occasional strikes on northern breakdown of these sorties by type of mission is as
Formosa fields. follows:20,204 day sweep,strike support,and mis­
The British fleet generally followed the prac­ cellaneous sorties including fighter patrols over
tice of striking 2 days and retiring to replenish for Amami Gunto; 848 photographic; 1,067 day
2 days. The entire force also returned to Leyte search; 7,141 Okinawa day target CAP; 582 res­
for logistics and upkeep during the period 17 cue and submarine CAP; 21 night search; 471
April to 3 May. During the periods when TF 57 night hecklers and intruders and Okinawa VF(N)
was not striking Sakashima Gunto, units of the target CAP;'or a total of 30,334 sorties away from
CVE task group 52.1 continued the neutralization. the task force. The balance of the sorties were
flown on task group and radar picket line day out, condition watches result in physical exhaus­
CAP,antisubmarine and antisnooper patrols and tion. which cannot easily be combatted. The nat­
task force VF(N) CAP. As evidence of the great ural result is lack of the proper degree of alert­
increase in night operations, it is interesting to ness. The suicide planes which dived on the
note that 492 task forcesVF(N) CAP sorties were Bunker Hill were not reported by any ship in TG
flown, most of them by VF(N)from the day car­ 58.3. It is recommended that fast carrier task
riers due to the fact that Enterprise was operat­ groups be returned to a rear area every 4 weeks for
ing with the force for such a short period of time. a period of not less than 2 weeks and preferably
During the above period aircraft from the task 3 weeks.
force actually dropped or fired at their targets
7,672.4 tons of bombs,525 napalm bombs,178 tor­ PERFORMANCE OF PLANES AND PILOTS
pedoes, 32 tiny tims, and 36,441 five-inch rockets.
From:. Commander, Task Force 58
In addition to the above flight operations fast
battleships from the force on two occasions bom­ The performance of planes operating as much
barded Okinawa and light cruisers and destroyers as.175 hours per month exceeded normal expecta­
from the Force conducted three bombardments of tions, and is a great tribute to the maintenance
Minami Daito. personnel who made possible _continuous opera­
Following the initial attacks on Kyushu TF 58 tions which amounted to 80 days in the case of-TG
operated in the vicinity of Okinawa until 12 May 58.37 without any undue increase in material-fail­
1945, when two task groups proceeded north for a ures. The F4U aircraft has proven to be an en­
2-day strike on Kyushu. This plan of defensive tirely satisfactory- carrier plane. The 'excessive
maneuver was decided upon by commander TF number of structural failures prevalent during
58 in lieu of offensive operations against Kyushu. February and March operations was reduced to
The reason for the defensive type of operations that which could normally be expected. This re-
was because it was felt that the Japanese would suited from improved landing techniques .on. the
run true to form and send continuous air strikes :part of the pilots, which came with experience.
against our forces to the south. Furthermore, it The • F4U is the only fighter available that can
was necessary to furnish daily air support and compete with the Japanese Myrt at high altitudes.
CAP to the amphibious forces at the objective and The F6F is too slow. It is hoped that every effort
to do this it was necessary to remain in the im­ - is being- made to equip all. F4U models with a
mediate vicinity of Okinawa. By employing a properly'Streamlined center-line drop tank. Until
planned defense TF 58 was able to destroy over this is done the gunnery and bombing efficiency of
1,200 airborne enemy aircraft from 23 March to the plane is being adversely affected by the buffet­
27 May 1945 at a relatively small over-all loss to ing caused by other drop tank arrangements.
itself and to Fifth Fleet Forces. Furthermore, the two pylon racks should - be - uti­
lized for bombs. The SB2C aircraft performed
PERFORMANCE satisfactorily but its bomb load capacity is ineffi­
PERFORMANCE OF SHIPS cient,- and its range too limited unless drop tanks
are employed. If this plane is to • continue in op­
From: Commander, Task Force 58 eration it is recommended that consideration be
Continuous operation of our ships for long pe­ (riven to eliminating the combat aircrewman .and
riods at sea at high speeds, day and night, has the rear gun,and toreduce the weight of the plane
been proven to be possible. However it will not as far as possible by removing other equipment in
continue to be practicable unless extended interim the rear cockpit that Will no longer be needed if
periods (3 weeks) for maintenance and upkeep are this is done. The TBM-3 aircraft,continues to
allowed. The performance of personnel on the give excellent performance, both forfake-off with
surface ships,particularly as regards anti-aircraft a full load,climb,and cruising.. The performance
gunnery and lookout efficiency, was adversely af­ of pilots of squadrons and air groups under ex­
fected by extended periods at sea within range of tremely difficult operating Conditions was of the
enemy aircraft. Day in, day out, night in, night usual high caliber.
 47;nk.a ,,, •

PERFORMANCE OF PILOTS TF 54. During this period, two VOS aircraft

daily were maintained in condition 11 for rescue
From: Commander, Carrier Division 5(CTG
purposes from dawn until dusk. On several occa­
58.1)
sions other VOS were diverted from spotting for
During the subject period the average flight time rescue missions of such urgency that the delay in­
of VF pilots in this task group was in excess of volved in launching one of the "rescue" VOS
115 hours which is considered high. One squadron would have jeopardized the chances of success.
averaged 110 hours in 31 days. During the same Commencing on Love-minus-3,the VOS standbys
period the average flight time of VT and VB pilots were supplanted by 6 PBM Dumbos of VH-3,
was 35 hours-which is below normal. This was based on Bering Strait at Kerama Retto. These
brought about largely by the necessity of flying re­ planes then became the primary means for air-sea
inforced CAP's over Okinawa and nearby enemy rescue. In addition to actually rescuing more
held fields to the north and southwest. As long downed aviators than any other type of agency,
as the task group was in easy range of Kyushu it they engaged in numerous extensive searches for
was necessary to maintain a very strong CAP personnel of missing planes, covering wider areas
over both the radar pickets and the group. The than could have been coered
-v by any other avail­
striking power of the Task Group therefore was able facilities. Other PBM's of TG 51.20, both
not used to its full strength. ASP and search planes, also engaged in search-
Although night landings of day groups should rescue missions and made numerous successful
be attempted only in case of necessity, it is be­ rescues. In the waters in and around Okinawa
lieved they can be accomplished successfully under Gunto,however,the great bulk of the rescues were
good weather conditions if strict air and radio performed by DD's, DE's, and smaller vessels.
discipline are enforced as on this occasion. The stationing of screening, sweeping and picket
vessels in the objective area was such that ordi­
AIR-SEA RESCUE narily it was unlikely that any plane could go
From: Commander Amphibious Forces down in the area during daylight hours without
being sighted by at least one ship.
Scope of rescue activities.—Air-sea rescue ac­ Summary of incidents.—This summary includes
tivities during this operation were on a scale larger As "incidents" all cases in which aircraft failed to
than in any previous amphibious operation in the return from missions in the Okinawa Gunto area,
Pacific and extended to areas far beyond the im­ all cases in which aircraft based on Okinawa,
mediate vicinity of the objective. Neutralization- Kerama Retto or le Shima failed to return from
strikes carried on regularly against Sakashima missions, and all cases of aircraft forced down,
Gunto and the Amami-O-Shima group accounted regardless of area, for which assistance was re­
fora substantial proportion of the rescue incidents quested of, or was undertaken by, one or more
covered by units of TF 51, and the operations of units of TF p1. (Crashes or forced landings on
TF 58, and of the search planes of TG 50.5 in land are included only if they were in enemy terri­
the vicinity of Kyushu, resulted in a number tory.) A "successful" incident is one in which
of rescue missions at ranges of over 300 miles from one or more persons were rescued. A "possible"
Okinawa. Other long range missions included a incident is one in which there was an absence of
search on 27 April of the waters northwest of For­ positive evidence that all personnel involved were
mosa for personnel missing from the submarine killed, even though it may have appeared highly
Cod,and a search to a distance of 500 miles south­ unlikely that there were any survivors to be
east of Okinawa for a P-47 pilot missing from a rescued.
ferry flight on 14 May. Number of incidents 138
Facilities for rescue.—Prior to the commence­ Possible incidents 112
ment of PBM Dumbo operations on Love-minus­ Successful incidents 83
3-day (29 March),facilities for rescue consisted of Percent of possible incidents successful 74
small ships in the vicinity of the objective and The following table presents a summary of the
VOS aircraft based on cruisers and battleships of personnel involved in the above incidents, using
t*­
7‘.
 *

-
the same standard in determining 'wlietli'er or not were reconditioned transport planes, devoid of
rescue was "possible." armor, armament or self-sealing fuel tanks, and
Number of personnel involved 249 unsuited for rescue operations under the combat
Killed in crash :14 conditions then prevailing. Fortunately, these
Possible survivors 186 were eventually replaced with PBM-5s, which
Rescued 132 proved well suited to the job. It is recommended
Percent of possible survivors rescued Ti
that in future operations the air-sea rescue squad-
Agencies effecting rescue were as follows: rons assigned be equipped with suitable aircraft.
Agency: Personnel rescued (e) Experience during the operation showed
PBM Dumbos 03 again and again the importance of keeping air-
Ships 44 craft orbiting over downed ayiators _continuously
•PBM search and ASP aircraft 18 until rescue has been effected. This not only ex
VOS aircraft
Land forces cludes the possibility of losing sight of the sur-
1
Made shore unassisted 1 vivor and never, finding him again, but it also
provides the officer controlling the resale with a
Total 132 steady source of information -or.t the progress of
Personnel rescued were from the following the rescue. It is the responsibility of the unit
bases: controlling aircraft in the vicinity to see that this
is done when the tactical situation permits. The
Base: Personnel rescued
TF 58
importance of this technique should be impressed
„. 59
Okinawa Gunto (TG 99.2) and (TG 51.20) 49
on all air support control units and fighter
TG 52.1 directors. -‘
23
TF 57 3 (d) The impor.tance of reporting downed
Iwo Jima (TF 93) 3 planes promptly to the command responsible for
TF 54
rescue is too obvious to need comment. Never-
Total 132
theless, some instances of delay by commands
ashore in making such reports were experienced.
In three instances personnel forced down in enemy
The outstanding instance of this was the incident
territory made their way to shore and either swam
of a plane that went down at 0645,6 May,'which
or rowed out to sea where they were rescued by
was reported to CTF 51 by secret dispatch. It
seaplanes. One person who parachuted behind
was 1300 before the dispatch was received, de­
enemy lines crossed over safely to our own front
coded and delivered to the proper authority. A
lines.
prompt report, in plain language, over a voice . V
(a) The outstanding feature of air-sea rescue circuit might have resulted in a successful rescue.
operations was the brilliant performance of the
(e) In at least,four instances, survivors in life-
PBM Dumbo squadron; 1711-3. The pilots and jackets were lost before rescue could be effected.
crews of this six-plane squadron accounted•for a This indicates that some types of lifejackets cur-
total of 63 aviators rescued during the period cov­ rently used by aviators will not sustain a man in
ered by this report,and it may be anticipated that the water for many hours. It is extremely im­
their total will be considerably higher before the portant that orbiting aircraft should, whenever
Okinawa operation is completed. In the course possible, drop life rafts to survivors who are with-
of these rescues 33 open-sea landings were made. out them. Pilots should be briefed accordingly.
Twenty-one of the rescues were effected within 10
miles of enemy-held islands, and Seven of these SEARCH
were made under fire from enemy shore batteries.
Many examples of outstanding courage and skill From: Commander, Task Force 58
were shown by the pilots and crews of this The fast carrier task force conducted defensh*Te
squadron. search operations to the northwest and northeast
(b) During the.early stages of the operation, of Okinawa to a distance of 325 miles from 23
VH-3 was equipped with six PBM-3Rs. These March until the 8th of April. Subsequently such
 GENERAL

operations were discontinued because the areas (c) Itisimpossible to say how many suicide
were being efficiently covered day and night by boats were knocked out, but pilot reports in­
commander, TG 50.5. dicate that the total was substantial.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces After the early successes of the ground troops,
and the destruction of substantial numbers of
The long range air search was very adequately
boats referred to above, it appeared that no more
handled by aircraft of Fleet Air Wing 1, oper­
was to be feared from suicide boat tactics, and ex-
ating from Kerama Retto directly under com­
CAP sweeps were reduced. However,on the night
mander, Fifth Fleet, beginning on Love-minus-3­ of 3-4 May,a determined suicide boat attack was
day. On only one occasion was a search by CVE
carried out against transport areas both off the
planes ordered. Based on submarine reports of
Hagushi beaches and in Nakagusuku Wan. Ap­
enemy cruisers heading southwest from the em­
proximately 25 suicide boats were destroyed by
pire, six special searches were flown out 250 miles
surface forces, but not before they had succeeded
covering the sector bearing 336° to 048° from
in inflicting serious damage on the Carina,an AK
Okinawa. This was on Love-plus-16-day (17
anchored in Nakagusuku Wan. As a result of this
April). One TBM and one FM plane covered threat, more intensive antiboat measures were
each sector. Results were negative. The first
instituted, as follows:
land based search planes arrived at Yontan Field
on 23 April.. This initial group consisted of six (a) Landing Force Air Support Control
Privateers from VPB-118. Units were briefed frequently on the basis of
recent low-angle oblique photographs of boat
ANTIBOAT OPERATIONS ramp, revetment, cave, and hideout areas.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces (b) Photographs were distributed to Land­
ing Force Air Support Control Units ashore
During the capture of ICerama Retto, over 200 so that quick and accurate reference could be
suicide-type boats were found, together with in­ made in requesting specific antiboat air
formation indicating that there were a great many attacks.
more in the Okinawa region. Accordingly, plans (c) Frequent attacks were made on boat
were made to utilize air power as fully as possible hideout areas. Photographs, and a lessening
in seeking out and destroying boats and possible of boat attacks,indicated favorable results.
boat hideouts. (d) All of this coordinated information
The first step in this direction was to send a and appropriate sets of photographs were dis­
despatch to all supporting carrier forces setting up tributed to Landing Force Air Support Con­
special sectors for antiboat sweeps. A toial of 22 trol Units and Commander,FIFTH Amphib­
sectors were set up. Of these, 17 were in the is­ ious Force, before the departure of com­ corn
land of Okinawa including the Eastern Islands mander,Air Support Control Units,Amphib­
and 5 were on the outlying islands of Acuni Shima, ious Forces, Pacific Fleet,from the area.
Tonachi Shima, Kumef Shima, Theya Retto, and It is recommended that a definite antiboat
Yoron Shima. search and attack plan be outlined in Air Plans
(a) Instructions were given to brief pilots for future operations in areas where suicide boats
on the location of these areas. Areas were and boat-pens are prevalent.
chosen on the basis first, of likelihood that
BRIEFING
they would harbor boats and second,that they
could easily be identified by pilots. From: Commander,- Amphibious Forces
(b) Since CAP control circuits were taxed While on a tour briefing carrier personnel prior
to the utmostin handling regular traffic,pilots to this operation,the originator pieked up a mime­
going off CAP were simply instructed by CIC ographed paper from the deck of a carrier pilots'
on the Eldorado to "make antiboat sweep in ready room on which a pilot had been examined,
sector I, • presumably following .a briefing on lifesaving
 AIR SUPPORT

services available to him. On this particular PHOTOGRAPHY

paper the pilot had failed to give the correct
From: Commander, Task Force 58
answer on about half of the questions that had
beerLasked. It was felt that if pilots were miss­ 'the following special reconnaissance photog­
ing briefings on matters which are so vital to raphy was accomplished chiefly by the photo recco
them,extraordinary efforts should be made to de­ teams.
termine that they and others are actually retain­ (a) Complete trimetregon mapping coverage
ing information provided them. In connection of southern Kyushu (approximately one-fourth
with the above example, we prepared an examina­ of the whole island).
tiontof about 75 questions on vital points concern­ (b) Complete trimetregon mapping coverage
ing our operation and quizzed all officers of our of the northern Nansei Shotos, as far south as
Air Support Control Unit on them, just prior to Yokodate Shima.
arrival in the objective area. It is felt that this (e) Low large scale obliques of southern
was very beneficial to the organization in that a, Kyushu beaches.
high level of understa,nding of all needed informa­ (d) Complete large scale vertical and oblique
tion was assured prior to commencement of the coverage of the entire Kerama,Retto and the land­
operation. It is strongly recommended that this ing areas of Okinawa.
procedure be adopted wherever practicable. Al­ (e) 1/3500 vertical coverage of the Wan and.
though conditions as regards the pilots seemed Shitooke areas on Kikai Shima, and Sokme cov­
good to us in this connection, they were not erage of the beaches in the same areas.
excellent. (f) Complete large scale vertical mapping of
Briefing of carrier personnel for the Okinawa Kikai Shima.
operation was conducted by Commander,Air Sup­ (g) Complete large scale oblique beach cover­
port Control Units, members of his staff, and one age of the entire shoreline of Kikai Shima.
officer from Tenth Army Staff. (h) Complete large scale vertical mapping of
The fast carriers and most of the escort car­ Tokuno Shima.
riers were briefed at Ulithi between 10 and 15 (i) Complete large scale beach oblique cover­
March, and the remainder of the escort carriers age of the entire shoreline of Tokuno Shima.
at Leyte on 19 March. (j) Complete small scale vertical mapping of
Briefing conferences for this operation were Amami O'Shima.
much more limited than for previous operations (le) All the above is in addition to the routine
insofar as the number of personnel briefed was target reconnaissance and damage assessment cov­
concerned. It was necessary for security reasons eraffe which included:
to exclude all who would fly over enemy territory (1) Complete coverage of the Kure Naval
before the time of the actual landing and to in­ Base area showing .the location of shipping
clude only those who would be concerned with the and the damage inflicted on ships and shore
briefing of pilots at later dates.
The land-based squadrons of Tactical Air Force, _ (2) Excellent coverage of many Kyushu,
Tenth Army, were briefed immediately after ar­ Shikoku and Honshu airfields which showed
rival of each element at the objective area. the damage inflicted on facilities ,and planes.
The subjects covered in the briefing conferences (3) Coverage showing composition and
were: damage inflicting on convoys in the Kyushu.
(a) Schedule of events. Nansei_ Shoto area including excellent, be­
(b) Pre-Love-day air support. fore and after, photos of the Yamato and
(c) Scheme of maneuver of landing forces. escorts.
(d) Air support for Love-day and there­
after. From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
(e) Air-support communications. (a) Aerial photography was begun on Love-
(f) Air-sea rescue—Facilities and pro­ 7-day and was used extensively thereafter. Due to
cedure. the size ofthe area and the many enemy-held is­
 k`
lands in the vicinity, an extensive photographic T1 it satifctoy coverage of the corps zone
program was necessary. The employment by the at our disposal was a controlled mosaic with a
enemy of suicide boats, midget submarines and scale of 1:16,000. Supplementary pictures ob­
shore-based torpedo launchers also required the use tained from assigned photo missions proved to
of photographs to locate concealment and launch­ be invaluable and were extremely useful in the
ing sites. This was a major photographic assign­ identification of targets and in the briefing of strike
mentfor CVE planes. Also,an extensive program groups. The work of the pilots on these photo
of photographic coverage of the islands in the. missions was outstanding and received praise
Nansei Shoto_ group was completed. CVE, fast from both corps and commander,- A,ir Support
carrier and shore-based planes were used. Control Units. Missions were flown promptly in
(b) Planes specially equipped for photographic accordance with directions and the quality of the
missions were furnished by the CVE's and the photographs was excellent. All drops of exposed
majority of the exposed negatives were dropped film to the Teton were successful. Eleven photo­
on headquarters ships for processing and interpre­ graphic planes reported on station and a total of
tation. In spite oftheincreased volume of pictures fourteen missions were flown under the control of
required, the carrier planes were able to fill the this ASCU.
requests. On Love+21-day (22 April)four Army.
F-5—A_ type photographic planes arrived at Yon- From: Commander, Amphibious'Group 4
tan and took over the requests of the shore-based Some photo planes were notsent in with VF pro­
troops for pictures. Navy VD squadron planes tection. SAD officers should provide VF cover for
took pictures of the landing on Love-day,and two photo misions, until assured it is unnecessary.
planes from VD-5 arrived on Love+40-day (10
May) to map Okinawa and adjacent areas. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
(c) Considerable difficulty was encountered by
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
P. I. officers with many of the runs made by the
CVE planes. This wascaused by the failure of the Itis suggested that in the planning and training;
pilot or photographer to drop the necessary con­ before each future operation, considerable em­
trol information with his negatives. Such data as phasis be laid on air discipline and procedure,and
flight lines,altitude of plane,type and focal length the fact, that an improvement in them invariably
of camera, and time pictures were taken were improves communications, be strongly brought
omitted in some cases. home to all hands.
Photographic missions during the operation Due to generally excellent communications en­
were,on the whole,well performed. In some cases, joyed by tactical nets, there has been a growing
however,there were indicationsthat photographers tendency for administrative traffic to encroach
had not been briefed adequately. In some cases thereon, with the attendant overloading and lack
this resulted in poor photography and inadequate of discipline. A.specific example of this is the use
information dropped with the negatives or prints. of the LAW net by various SOPA's'during this
In future plans, land-based photo planes should operation. *
be scheduled for arrival at the objective area as Every effort should be made to assist the net offi­
soon as possible after thefirstfighters have arrived. cers in maintaining positive control over their nets.
At Okinawa,it was found necessary to order for­ It is recommended that the specific traffic to be
ward an advance echelon of the .Twenty-eighth handled on each net be clearly set forth, and it be
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. stated that any exceptions must be cleared through
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 the net control officer.
Prior to the operation the photo coverage of the AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL-APPROACH PROCEDURE
objective, available to CTF 55, was not adequate
because all existing photographs had not been From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
received. The most useful photographs were those An approach procedure for emergency landings
ofthelanding beaches and of a small adjacent area. on air fields in enemy territory which it is antici­
 -

pated to use, should be adopted and.disseminated' pba or neutralization of Sakashima Gunto air­
thoroughly prior to the operation. In many cases fields.
radio control cannot be effected. Under air-raid Love—7 to Love-day . 14 CVE
conditions the lack of an approach procedure is 'Love-day to Love+2 18 CVE
hazardous to aircraft. Love+2 to Love+26 17 CVE
Love+26 to Love+47 12 CVE
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 7
One Love— 5 following the landing three uni­ The Wake Island was hit and damaged by enemy
dentified planes were reported by the Army to bombs'on 3 April and retired to the Marianas for
be strafing as close as 60 yards ahead of advanc­ repairs. During the early evening of 4 May the
ing ti'oops. This close support act had not been Sanagamon was hit by an enemy suicide plane and
authorized and many troops were endangered. received considerable damage requiring navy yard
The planes were not a part of our support aircraft availability for repairs.
groups and could not be contacted. On many occa­ From: Commander, Carrier Division 24
sions individual planes, both VF and VT, were
seen loafing around over the landing beaches and Operation of seven CVE'sin the same,formation
transport areas. Attempts to contact these planes is entirely practicable and is recommended on op­
failed. erations similar to the last one during which one
or two CVE's were generally absent,either engaged
COMPOSITION OF CARRIER FORCES in antisubmarine warfare or in replenishment.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces Operation of six CVE's has been thoroughly
tested over long periods during several operations,
Planes from the First Fast Carrier Task Force, Leyte, Mindoro,Lingayen, and the present opera­
Pacific,and from the Support Carrier Group were tion,and is entirely practicable. No confusion re­
used in the Okinawa operation. The former con­ sults in landings, take-offs and rendezvous. The
sisted of CV and CVL types from TF 58 and the
largest number of CVE's which can be efficiently
Support Group was composed of CVE carriers of operated in one group should be so operated in
TO 52.1. order to make best use of escort vessels which are
The fast carriers provided the bulk of the pre- never sufficient in number.
How striking force. For the first time in amphib­
ious operations this force was also available for a AA GUNNERY
prolonged period to furnish planes for support air
groups and targetcombat air patrols. It wasthere­ From: Commander, Task Force 58
fore possible to keep a large number of carrier Of the 555 enemy aircraft destroyed in the vicin­
planes in the area and increase the effectiveness of ity of the ta.sk force, 403 were shot down by day
air support. Approximately the following num­ and night CAP. Of the remaining 152-enemy air­
bers of fast carriers were available to protect and craft, 141 were shot down by AA gunfire and 11
support the naval units and ground troops. made suicide hits.
Love-9 to Love+26 7 CV 6 CVL The score by task groups
Love+26 to Love+41 5 CV 4 CVL
Love+41 to Love+47 4 CV 4 CVL Task group Day Night Suicide hits Total

- Atleast 50 percent of the carriers and their planes 36 7 0 43

58.1
were available daily for Okinawa support except 58.2 8 4 0 12
32 5 5 •42
during the period May 13 to 16 when TF 58 was 58.3
17 5 4 26
58.4
engaged in strikes on Kyushu and fueling there­ 58.8 25 2 2 29

after. 118 23 11 152

Total
The CVE Support Carrier Group was origi­
nally organized in three units. An April 29 Unit
2 was dissolved. Approximately the following Limitations of AA defense.—The high percent­
number of CVE's were available for Okinawa sup­ age of attacking aircraft destroyed does not ac­
 GENERA­
•.
curately represent the degree of effectiveness of From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
AA gunnery. In addition to the suicide hits,
bomb hits and near suicide misses caused various (a) At the beginning of the operation, there
was one over-all.control of air warnings and con-
degrees of damage and the criterion of effective­
ness is best indicated by the fact that over 90 per- trol colors that of CTF 51. However, SOPA
Kerama Retto was very shortly granted the au­
cent of the planes making daylight attacks on
the carrier task groups were shot down inside thority to establish conditions and control colors
the formation screens. for that area and when the occupation of le Shima
commenced, the SOPA in that area was granted
20-mm AA guns.—The minute percentage of hits
the authority for the area north of Zampa Misaki,
obtained with this weapon at effective ranges raises
with the area east of Okinawa and south of Zampa
considerable doubt as to its effectiveness in stop-
coming under the control of the SOPA in that
ping the suicide attack.
section. CTF 51 retained the authority to estab-
Recommendation lish control in the Hagushi area and on Okinawa
That type and task group commanders review south of Zampa Misaki, and he also retained the
the requirements of AA conditions of readiness authority to establish an over-all control of the
with a view to utilizing the periods of darkness entire area if conditions should warrant. No oc­
for resting gun and fire-control crews who usually casion developed necessitating this over-all control.
spend the entire daylight period at Condition 1 (b) The closest cooperation was experienced
or 1 Easy. with the AAA command ashore, and bogey con-
Continuing study by responsible commanders tacts were checked by the Eldorado with the AAA
for a system of AA coordination that will con- command close-in bogey contacts were relayed to
sistently develop a large volume of fire in the the Eldorado by the AAA, these reports often
shortest possible time againstlong and short range being the only source of information available at
air targets. the time. Control YELLOW was granted the
The failure of present radar arrangements to AAA ashore whenever possible and it is felt that
give warning and location of incoming single during this operation a mutual understanding of
plane attacks as evidenced by the alarming num- problems arising under varying conditions was
ber of surprise attacks where first contacts were (mined. •
visually made at ranges of 5000 yards and less. (c) The two controls for AA .fire as promul-
The limitations of the present search radar equip- gated by CinCPac were in effect, with a modifica­
ment are understood by the . enemy and their tion of Control GREEN to permit opening fire
knowledge plus suitable cloud cover for sneak at- on air targets identified as enemy.
tacks is a vulnerable spot in our AA defenses. (d) All warnings and control colors were broad­
The rapid development and procurement of a cast on all available radio nets to ensure that all
shortrange radar capable of giving elevation,bear­ units received the warnings in the shortest prac­
ticable.time.
ing, range and IFF indication on all aircraft
anywhere within a 20-mile radius. ANTISUBMARINE PATROL

From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force From: Commander Amphibious Forces

Antiaircraft fire discipline was in general very Day ASP consisted of six PBM planes from
good. During periods of low visibility, particu- KERAMA RETTO supplied by CTG 51.20 flying
Plan A of appendix (VI),to Annex H to,Op Plan
larly if an air raid was in progress,friendly planes
No. A1-45. One TBM plane was supplied for
on a few occasions were fired on by ships. Again
special search over the transport area. These
it must be stated that it is the responsibility of
planes flew continuous daylight patrol, being re-
the commanding officer to see that all personnel
lieved on station at 1700(I). The night ASP con-
are properly trained in the identification of enemy sisted of six PBM planes supplied by CTG 51.20.
aircraft. Antiaircraft and control conditions as The night sector search was the same as that flown
set by the SOPA must be strictly followed. throughout the day, planes being relieved at 0600
 PPORT
fr:4••
(I). Intensive day and—nil :the's'eaPelieveac central Pacific task forces by long range search
ried out along shipping lanes to the southeast of and reconnaissance; carried out offensive anti-
Okinawa by CTU 50.7.1 (CVE Anzio) and CTTJ shipping sweeps; operated antisubmarine and
50.7.3(CVE Tulagi). Dumbo planes as directed by CTF 51; and pro­
Communication between the control station and. vided emergency seevices for battleship and
ASP aircraft was generally good during the opera­ cruiser type seaplanes as required.
tion. During the night hours some difficulty in
TACTICAL AIR FORCE, TENTH ARMY
reception was experienced. (NotrE.—See Com­
munidation section for amplification.) From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
The sectors flown by the ASP were generally The Tactical Air Force was employed success­
accurate. The outer three s'ectors were out .of fully in Air Support, CAP and all other air mis­
radar range and usually no plot of aircraft flying sions normally required in amphibious operations,.
these sectors could be obtained. During the period. except for ASP and NGF spotting. Availability
from 1 April to 17 May, 1945, all ASP planes re­ of aircraft was as good as is normally found under
turned safely to base from patrol. In event of field conditions.
enemy air attacks, ASP in danger of fire from HAG 31 and MAG 33.—These groups consist­
friendly shipping were vectored to safe positions ing of three VFB squadrons and one VF(N)
until such time as the area was clear. The local squadron each arrived on 7 and 9 April, respec­
air warning net (3115 kcs.) was also used as a tively, and started operations as indicated below:
seadrome control frequency. This provided a, (a) Day CAP on 7 April.
ready means of information on search planes ap­ (b) Night CAP on 14 April.
proaching Okinawa and provided a close liaison. (c) Troop Support on 14 April.
between the seadrome control ship and com­ (d) Distant Support on 16 May. On that
mander, Air Support Control Units,on lost-plane date, and thereafter, day strikes and night
procedure. The day patrols proved very helpful heckler missions were conducted against
in reporting obstructions to navigation encountered Amami and the airfield on Kikai.
during their patrol. VIJITB 232.—This squadron arrived on 22
During this'46-day period PBM planes flew a, April. Plans had called for this squadron to be
total of 540 sorties and participated in 17 investi­ used for ASP;however,it was not equipped with,
gations hunter-killer actions against subma­ nor was it trained in the use of,sono-buoy gear,so
rines. The special search over the transport area was used for the following types of missions:
carried out 7 investigations in coordination with (a) Troop support.
surface search. This plane was helpful in observa­ (b) Flying the air observers.
tion of small islands to the west of Okinawa. (c) Night heckler missions over Southern
Okinawa. The night heckler was controlled
SEAPLANE OPERATIONS
by mean of ground radar and was used pri­
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces marily for its nuisance effect on enemy ar­
Provisions were made for the establishment of tillery.
a seadrome at Kerama Retto, Okinawa as soon as Twenty-eighth Photo Reconnaissance Squad-
practicable following their capture. On 28 March ron.—Four F-5's of that squadron arrived on 22
(Love minus 4) the seaplane base was established April and started operations immediately by per­
with provisions for seven tender-based seaplane forming photo missions requested by this force
squadrons. Air antisubmarine patrol was as­ and the ground troops.
sumed by TG 51.20 as well as long range searches Three Hwndred and Eighteenth Fighter
under direction of commander Fifth Fleet, on 29 Group.—The first squadron of this group arrived
March (Love —3). on 13 May and began providing CAP the follow­
During the 46-day period from 1 April to 17 ing day. The other squadrons arrived at 1- to 2­
May 1945 the seaplane base operated patrol sea­ day intervals thereafter. The group conducted its
planes in accordance with orders of commander first distant support mission on 17 May by striking
Fifth Fleet, as issued by CTG 50.5 to •support Kyushu airfields.
 '(c)' T1Lf(Mstei.nlj sTAnds Attack Grouf))
TRAINING OF AIR GROUPS held rehearsals from 9 March to 16 March in Leyte
Gulf area.
From: Commander, Task Force 58
(d) CTG 51.2 (Demonstration Group) held re­
The most pressing problem in connection with hearsals in the Saipan area from 16 March to 21
the training of air groups is to produce a pilot March 1945.
who can dive-bomb the VF-type aircraft and at­ (e) CTF 52(Amphibious Support Force) held
tain the necessary accuracy. It is not believed rehearsals at Ulithi during the period 11 March
that this can be, done until a dive flap has been to 21 March 1945.
installed on the VFB-type aircraft. At the pres­
(i) Air support control units attached to the
ent time when pilots are shifted to fighter types
above task forces and groups participated in the
they immediately lose much of their interest in rehearsals. Their reports will be included in those
dive-bombing, and become in fact pilots whose of the task forces and groups.
primary concern and desire is to engage in air-to­
air combat. In training VF pilots there can be CTF 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force)
a shift in emphasis from air-to-air gunnery to
air-to-ground gunnery and bombing. Current (a) The commander, Joint Expeclitionary
operations have forcibly brought out the fact that Force,was presentin Leyte Gulf during the period
all bomber pilots must be capable of delivering an of rehearsals conducted by CTF 55 (Southern
effective attack from almost any altitude from 500 Attack Force), aboard the U. S. S. Eldorado
feet above the ground and up. Experience in the (AGC 11).
Tokyo Area, Kyushu, and at Okinawa, particu­ (b) CTG 51.10 (ComASCU) aboard the
larly in air support work,has been that frequently U. S. S. Eldorado did not participate directly in
targets are overcast with ceilings generally vary­ this rehearsal. However, all radio nets were
ing from 1,000 to 5,000 feet. Techniques must be checked in with CTG 55.10(ComASCU Southern
developed which will allow pilots to effectively Attack Force) aboard the U. S. S. Teton (AGC
drop their bombsfrom any altitudes. 14) and the nets were monitored and logged dur­
ing the periods of active air operations.
NEW CARRIERS (c) During the period of the approach to the
From: Commander, Task Force 58 objective, daily drills were held in Joint Oper­
It is considered to be the responsibility of the ations, based on the maps, plans, and procedure
type commander to insure that new carriers join­ adopted for this operation. The personnel had
ing the task force at sea are adequately equipped developed a high degree of efficiency and team­
and trained, particularly as regards gunnery, to work during the Iwo Jima operation, and as the
take their place on the fighting line. Frequently control of direct troop support operations was to
such ships join at sea and there is no opportunity be assumed by the respective Attack Forces, em­
for the task group commander to do anything phasis was placed on liaison with the Tenth Army
about any deficiencies that might exist. It is of Staff embarked, the refinement of operations and
the utmost importance that CV-9 class carriers administrative procedures,and the maintenance of
have their full allowance of 40-mm. mounts and records.
that they know how to use them. From: Commander Amphibious Group 4
REHEARSALS AND TRAINING-ATTACK FORCES On 2 and 3 March, air operations were handi­
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces capped by a lack of aircraft. Only VJ planes
(a) CTF 53 (Northern Attack Force) held re­ from one shorebased squadron were available.
hearsals from 1 March to 8 March 1945 in the Nevertheless, air attacks were simulated both
Guadalcanal area. days, including pre-H-hour Napalm and strafing
(b) CTF 55(Southern Attack Force) held re­ attacks.
hearsals from 14 March to 21 March 1945 in Leyte On 5 and 6 March,aircraftfrom two CVEs were
Gulf. available. Full air schedules were carried out
 ".

SUP.POld
7,1
during the period of traiiiinectacleditiiicIwing
..t (d) 2 Air support sheets, gridded, covering southern half
pre-H-hour rocket and bombing, Napalm, and of Okinawa, scale 1 to 50,000, size 15 by 24 inches.
(e) 1 Area chart, gridded, Okinawa, scale 1 to 250,000,
strafing attacks. On 5 March, 13 called strike size 151/2 by 18% inches.
missions were executed on 6 March, 10. Smoke (f) 1 r'adar reference plotting chart, Okinawa and Amani
screens-were laid and photos coverage was made Gunto area, size 17 by 17 inches.
both days. (g) 1 operations chart, S by 8 inches.
Net offieers and radio operators received inten­ (h) 2 anti-submarine patrol charts (day and 'lite), size
sive training during the rehearsal. Before the 8 by 8 inches.
(i) I carrier search sector chart, size 8 by 8 inches.
exercise was secured on 6 March, 19 Air liaison
(j) 1 transient aircraft approach and departure chart,
parties had gone ashore and established commu­ size 8 by 8 inches.
nication's with CASCU (SAR net).
Intensive drills in communications were held These maps proved to be adequate for the area
for officers and men from the time of departure covered. However, an additional gridded map
Guadalcanal until two days before arrival at tar­ of the northern half of the island would have
get. Love-day conditions were simulated and H- assisted air support operations there.
hour time schedules followed. Radio nets were Target Information Center.—This was the first
guarded en route to target. time that an air support control unit had worked
in coordination with a target information center.
INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING Since CTG 51.1.0 in the Eldorado did not control
direct support missions on Okinawa targets, the
PLANNING, CHARTS AND MAPS Target Information Center did not have a chance
to perform its functions as far. as air support was
From: Commander Amphibious Forces
concerned. The Target Information Center was
The planning and preparation of the original of great help in keeping Air Support Control
drafts of the Air Plan for the Okinawa opera­ Units supplied with targets in the Tenth Army.
tions were accomplished in the Hawaiian area, Zone of action. In future operations, it is ex­
beginning in the early part of November. The pected that the relationship between Air Support
final draft of the Air Support Annex was ap­ Control .Units and Target Information Center
proved and reproduced aboard the U. S. S. El­ will be continued and that the mechanics of select­
dorado while en route to the Iwo Jima landing. ing targets will be developed further.
Because of the size and complexity of this opera­ On numerous occasions, pilots would state that
tion, an unusual amount of liaison with the staffs they did not have certain charts with them such as
of the Tenth Army, Fifth Fleet, First Fast Car­ the 1:250,000 area chart-Okinawa, and especially
rier Force, Amphibious Force, and Support Car­ the 8 by 8 over-all grid-charts of Okinawa.
rier Group Commands was necessary. Usually from coaxing,it was found they did have
Air target maps and charts the latter along with their other8by 8's. On a few
Special air target maps were laid out by Air occasions, pilots did not have these vital charts.
Support Intelligence, drafting and reproduction It is a matter of the greatest importance thaat pilots
being done by the Sixty-fourth Engineering be provided with a complete set of 8 by 8-inch
Topographic Battalion, USAFCPBC. Many charts and one area chart, and that they be famil­
problems were encountered due to the large size of iar therewith before reporting on station.
the island and the fact that the maps had to be The Air Plan has been standardized during the
adapted to cover the preferred and alternate last few operations. It is recommended that all
plans. The special air support maps provided detailed instructions therein be issued in the form
were as follows: of a fleet doctrine, and that future Air Support
(a) 58 air support charts, scale 1 to 25,000, size 8 by 8 Plan schedules be presented graphically,using the
inches.
same basic system utilized to show the naval gun­
(b.) 2Index maps for above air support charts, size 8 by 8
inches.
fire schedule of fires. This would greatly simplifS,
(c) 4 Over-all grid charts of Okinawa, scale approxi­ Air Support Annexes and cut down on its present
mately 1 to 125,000, size S by 8 inches. large size.

3-1

• t •
-97
 FIGHTER DEFENSE OF THE AREA
•

From: Commander,Amphibious Group 7 RUBBER TERRAIN MODELS

The gridded maps available (1:25,000) worked From: Commander,Amphibious Forces
exceedingly well. For strikes against Kume
CASCU did not receive one of the rubber
Shima, and Tonachi Shima, geographical land­
terrain models of the beachhead area which were
marks had to be resorted to for orientation and
prepared for the Okinawa operation. It is
direction since the planes were not carrying tar­ strongly recommended that every CASCU in
get grid maps on these islands. More accurate and volved in future operations be placed on distri­
effective results could have ben attained had the bution lists so that these models will be available
pilots and air observers been carrying target grid for study by all net officers.
maps. For small islands where defenses are apt
to be concentrated, gridded vertical photographs COMMENTS AND'RECOMMENDATIONS
of suitable scale (1:25,000 or larger) would prob­ From: Commander,Amphibious Forces
ably be more suitable in aiding pilots to locate
small camouflaged targets. The additional nu­ Experience indicates some changes are de­
sirable on .future air support charts as follows:
meral designation added to the lettered 200-yard
(a) On large land masses the maps should be
grid square was used to a good advantage on nu­
16 by 16 inches square rather than 8 by 8.
merous occasions in pin-pointing targets.
(h). Colored maps are much more readable
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 12 than black and white and four or five colors
should be used on all'but the most simple maps.
It is recommended: (c) The Radar Reference Plotting Chart is
That operations plans include CASCU on dis­ very desirable for CIC, LAW and ASR. It
tribution lists for all photographs, including should be a standard chart for all future oper­
photographs taken prior to an operation and sup­ ations, covering an area with a radius of approxi­
plementary photographic coverage obtained dur­ mately 130 miles, over-all size to be 18 by 18
ing the operation. Adequate photographs are a inches.
"must" for the proper functioning of an ASCII • (d) All possible areas in which aircraft are to
during the direction and control of air strikes. operate should be covered by gridded charts with
Gridded photographic coverage is highly desir­ a maximum size of 16 by 24 inches.
able and it is believed that, whenever possible, (e) For close air support, maps should have
gridded controlled mosaics of the objective area a minimum scale of 1 to 25,000. In case of deep
should be obtained prior to an operation and support or attacks on areas where it is known
furnished to all interested units including there will be no friendly troops gridded maps
CASCU's. Whenever possible, such controlled with a scale as large as 1 to 100,000 are
mosaics should be to a scale not in excess of satisfactory.
1:16,000. It is also recommended that when time
and size of the objective area permit gridded con­ FIGHTER DEFENSE OF THE AREA
tact prints in chartboard size be prepared and
FIGHTER DEFENSE OF TF 58
furnished all carriers for use by pilots.
That efforts be made to simplify air and gun­ From: Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force
nery target maps, pilot chartboard maps, and A sense of false security must not be permitted
other maps of the objective. It is believed that to prevail because many friendly blips from a
a minimum use should be made of contour lines, group of planes can be seen on the radar screen.
that the scale should be made large enough to per­ It is quite possible for a group of enemy planes
mit intelligible plotting of targets and troop to trail such a group and attempt to take ad­
movements and that target square numerals vantage of their transpondors to press home an
should be more legible. The 1:16,000 scale is be­ attack. It is also possible for blips from friendly
lieved to be adequate for large land areas. aircraft to conceal enemy surface craft.

3-16
 AIR SUPPORT
I I
ki
*Abu

ANEGA
gt> SHIMA
Li
'
11C A KU SHIMA

• • /
/

1 • /
/
/

BIG DAYS
YOKOATE
J A P PLANES OWN A/C
SHIMAco„ DATE SHOT DOWN LOSSES
PATIPOC•
6 APRIL 249 2
AMAMI 0 12 " I 73 6
SHIM
16 " 171 2
TORI 4 MAY 1 02 4
of,
111, FIITROL
•
OKUNO

tif
41
.
•
• •
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OK1NAW
011 —'
0 i•
00 RADAR PICKET GROUP
TO gm tfl. 6 TO 0 DirS- 0 TO 16 W OAP
*Or\
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•

T/SK FORCE 58

DIAGRAM SHOWING TF58 DEFENSE DISPOSITION

TO PREVENT ATTACKS FROM KYUSHU

FROM I APRIL 10 28 MAY

 T.
:tsg4Pit.bit*
llaIHDLI

,4.
Japanese TONY Just Before Crashing Alongside U. S. S. SANGAMON Amid Heavy Fire of AA Guns.
ZEKE Rolls on His Back Just Before Hitting.

A
3-19 1111111111111111111111
, it. •
 having less than 4 ships together and usually 6
or 8 destroyers.
Every effort was made to intercept the attacking
enemy units at a maximum range and with a maxi­
mum number of fighters at variable altitudes. It
was apparent that the enemy made their approach
in medium size groups until just outside intercept
range (50 to 60 miles) after which they dispersed
and initiated their radical approaches. Combat
air patrols were augmented in an attempt to defeat
these dispersal tactics and to shoot down every
plane once interception had been made..
Fighter-director officers were ordered to evalu­
late all contacts most carefully even though show­
ing friendly on the radar screen, bearing in mind
such factors as altitude of the target, bearing of
Hangar Deck Space,Looking Forward.
approach, speed, and general tactical situation.
In an attempt to compensate for this limita­ Every doubtful indication must be evaluated as
tions the following steps were taken: enemy and intercepted.
Establishment of the radar picket line, com­ Returning strike groups were required to ap­
posed of two or three destroyer divisions, -sta­ proach the formation in designated YE sectors,
tioned 30 io 40 miles on the flank or flanks which depending upon the fleet axis, and were instructed
represent the most probable direction of enemy to make their return from the target in groups and
approach. This picket line normally controlled at designated altitudes to allow both the picket
2 to 4 divisions of fighters, had; experienced tine and the Force to identify them as easily as
CIC personnel and well established intra-group possible.
and force communications. They performed the Visual fighter direction was stressed,and in each
following functions: task group visual stations were maintained at all
(1) Interception of enemy aircraft and times during daylight.
initation of early alerts to the force, particu­ Whenever possible a cloud-clear operating area
larly on low flying aircraft. was sought to increase the range of visibility, not
only of the combat air patrol, but of equal import­
(2) Acted as a filter of returning strikes
ance to both gunnery and look-out personnel.
who approached pickets and were identified
Of particular importance during this operation
before continuing on to the task group. YG was the excellent radar information given by the
equipmen't had been installed in at least eight supporting ships in each task group. Battleship-
destroyers to properly facilitate this function. cruiser information was invaluable, and it is rec­
(3) Air-sea rescue and homing of lost ommended that greater use of their CIC teams be
planes. made for intercept work.
During the current operation this radar picket
line destroyed some 86 aircraft by CAP and shot VISUAL FIGHTER DIRECTION
down 27 by AA. As was to be expected, the From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Monterey
enemy hit this line frequently and hard, and (CVL 26)
damaged two destroyers. The value of the picket It is believed that in order to use visual fighter
group cannot be too strongly emphasized. As a direction and to make it at all effective,it must be
buffer, they stopped many enemy suiciders whose conducted from the destroyer screen, where the
ultimate object was undoubtedly a carrier, and visibility is greater and less restricted. In order
their over-all performance of the missions out­ to make visual fighter direction effective in the
lined above was invaluable to the task force. screen there should be at least one division of CAP
Damage to the destroyers was minimized by never assigned for use only by a visual fighter director.

2() ottr t.ott

11)
 IINCL AIR SUPPORT

One destroyer in each division of the screen could

then be assigned "Snapper Duty." The"Snapper
CAP"should be stationed over the task group at
5,000 feet or at the cloud base, whichever is lower.
It should be prepared to receive a vector from any
one of the destrikyers in the division at,any time.

FIGHTER DEFENSE OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

From: Commander, Amphibious Forces

Six AGC's and nineteen fighter-director ships
were originally -scheduled for employment in this
• operation. This was more than double the number
employed in the Iwo Jima operation and due to
the short period between operations and the great
• distances between staging points, considerable
Hangar Deck Space, After Clearing of Debris, Showing.
difficulty was encountered in effecting a balance
Tilted Elevator and Girder Penetrated by Bombs.
between the experienced and inexperienced per­
sonnel on the various teams. However, by means operation in which the fighter-director ships were
of many despatches and considerable air trans­ not assigned duty as Fire Support Units.
portation, with one or two exceptions,experienced The fighter-director vocabulary should be
team leaders were placed on each ship. One group adopted where practicable, and greatly enlarged
fighter director was placed on each AGC with an upon, to decrease length of air-support transmis­
additional night intercept officer on SP-equipped sions, thus making it possible to handle more
AGC's. In addition,one force fighter director and planes on one net.
an assistant were ordered to the force flagship. (a) Summary.—This amphibious operation,the
Pre-Love-day and approach phase largest to date in the Pacific campaign, was
marked, as expected, by the large amount of air
(1) Two DM's with fighter-director teams opposition offered by the enemy. The two surpris­
aboard accompanied the minesweepers on Love-­ ing factors experienced were the lack of any air
8-day and one additional DM with team accom­ attacks in force reaching the transport areas be­
panied subsequent ninesweepers. cause of the excellent performance of radar pickets
(2) Six DD's with fighter director teams aboard and fighter directors, and the intense concentra­
accompanied the bombardment group on Love — tions of enemy attacks on the outlying radar
s 7-day. pickets.
(3) One DD with fighter-director team aboard
(b) Organization.—At the beginning of this
accompanied the Western Island Attack Force.
operation it was believed that the 19 fighter-direc­
(4) The remaining nine DD's with fighter-
tor teams and specially equipped ships would be
director teams escorted the various tractor groups,
more than sufficient for the job to be done. How­
attack groups and demonstration groups to the
ever, it was soon apparent that this would not be
objective.
the case and as many additional teams as could be
Love-day and thereafter procured were ordered forward. Steps have been
(1) With the arrival of the attack forces at the initiated to secure a number of additional teams
objective on the morning of Love-day, all fighter- in order that this load will not have to be carried
director ships reported to commander,Screen,for over extended operations by such a small group of
duty in Screen. officers and men.
(2) These ships were assigned duty in radar When in any way useful, pilots should give
picket stations, and in the Screen, and as escorts angles when reporting position, as this is the only
for various retirement groups. This is the first way their true positions can be visualized.

3-21
 .•
From: Commander,FIFTH AmphibiousForce control, and TCAP ,accordingly.
In the future a pool of trained fighter-direction Whenever weather permitted, &visions of TCAP
officers and enlisted personnel should be main­ were established on low altitude barrier patrols
tained in a rear area available as replacement for from reference point to reference point about the
casualties on fighter direction destroyers and for area.
relief of teams during an extended operation. In addition local TCAP was maintained adja­
cent to the transports with "Snapper control" for
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 immediate use. Since high altitude radar coverage
Nisual-fighter direction was utilized at every was excellent, altitude and disposition of TCAP
opiportunity,weather and visibility permitting,for were utilized where possible to augmentlow warn­
the control of TCAP as a defense against low- ing and coverage. A box-like or "mouse trap"
flying enemy aircraft. Radar warning of low-on­ type,of patrol was established on some occasions
the-water aircraft at 12 to 19 miles was the signal in areas considered to be natural passage ways
for the VFDO to take over. Valuable informa­ for approaching low flying aircraft.
tion was performed by the VFDO on several oc­ The greatest period of enemy activity during
casions by control of planes and information on the period covered by this report occurred during
visually sighted enemy planes. the24hours of 29 March. From Love— 7- to Love-
day (0600 (I)) approximately 40 enemy aircraft
The visual position was found to be invaluable
for directing message and photographic drops to were destroyed. More than one-half of these air­
craft were destroyed on 29 March. The enemy ac­
the ship. The drops,coached by visual, were made
tion was negligible on the following day. It is
with dispatch and efficiency, saving much time in
estimated that during the period covered by this
identification and approach of the plane involved.
report the forces in the immediate vicinity of Oki­
Air cover en route to the objective was fur­
nawa and Kerama Retto were the objective of ap­
nished by Escort Carrier Unit 4 which consisted
proximately 100 to 120 enemy aircraft. Nineteen
of the U.S. S. Marcus Island, U. S. S. Anzio and
Red alerts and 34 Blue alerts were set in connec­
U.S. S.Savo Island. Control of all aircraft was
tion with the above.
normally retained by commander, Escort Carrier
Unit 4 (CTU 51.1.2). Provision was made Night fighters, of which 1 to 2 were available
all night,and 4 at dawn and dusk, were invaluable
to permit the fighter direction officer (CTG 51.1),
in countering enemy air activity.
to assume control of CAP in the event'carriers
became separated too far from the two convoys. TARGET COMBAT AIR PATROL
This authority was exercised on Love minus 7
when a CAP of four aircraft was controlled by a From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
visual fighter direction officer over the transports (1) The original plan called for: one division
as a defense against suicide tactics in addition to stationed in the southwest; six divisions in the
the usual daylight cover. The Advance Tractor objective area; and five divisions to the north.
Group George was also furnished a CAP during However, due to the irregular arrival of the
the afternoon of the same day. The tractor group TCAP,irregular both as to number and time of
was visually sighted by enemy aircraft during reporting, this scheme had to be modified to meet
this period. the conditions. The lack of uniformity in main­
Over-all strategic control at the objective area taining the scheduled TCAP during the early days
was exercised by the Force fighter director,TF 52, increased the problem of furnishing adequate pro­
in the U.S. S. Estes. TCAP was allotted to this tection for the several separate units: the main
group by the Force fighter direction officer, TF 52 Attack Force The Demonstration Group the
and,controlled under the direction of fighter direc­ Kerama Retto area; and for the radar pickets.
tor,' TG 51.1. TCAP was composed of 4 to 32 However,this was clarified,and by Love+2 after­
planes at a time, depending on the situation and noon and thereafter the TCAP arrived at regular
planes available. The area south and west of the intervals in numbers expected and approximately
Kerama, Retto was best suited to our position for eight divisions were maintained on -station. On

3-22
 •

..- •

krAZI
SUPPORT

the ni i: 1‘,ectuVd.'1
esch- 7 CAP
-
Requests for speck air cover by small units on
was iiici•ea* sed 63'11 divisions and wa,s maintained special missions are considered' unwise in that by
at that level or greater thereafter. Planes started complying with such requests the over-all strength
operating from Tactical Air Force on the evening of the air defense of the objective is proportion­
of Love+6 and from Love+7 TCAP was fur­ ally weakened. '
nished jointly by file CVs,the CVEs antl TAF on
regular schedules. From:Commander,FIFTH AmphibiousForces
(2) The tactics_ of the enemy in concentrating The problem of dawn CAP was eliminated after
his attacks on the outlying pickets necessitated the establishment of fighters ashore. CAP was
spreading the TCAP—placing a greater part with normally on station by first light. Again trouble
the pickets and f,ewer divisions in the objective was experienced with dusk CAP and the problem
area, with the result that a larger TCAP of from still exists. Here the light and visibility • condi­
56 to 76 aircraft were generally maintained— tions favor the attackers who can easily locate
being increased by scrambles by TAF when neces­ large targets and handicaps the defender who
sary. In addition, a special radar picket CAP of must contend with small fast moving targets. The
two planes each for five ofthe pickets was main­ problem of keeping dusk CAP on station until
tained by TAF. dark presented landing difficulties due to darkness
From Love-day morning through 0900 (Item), and large numbers of planes.
Love+46, the following number of TCAP sorties
were furnished for day TCAP. AIR DEFENSE CONTROL CENTER
Source: Divisions Sorties From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
r.PF 58 1403 5612
TG 52.1 1074 4296 (a) Prior to leaving Pe.arl Harbor from the Iwo
TAF 1360 5440 Jima operation meetings were arranged between
representatives of the ADCC, MAWS to be em­
Totals 3837 1534S ployed at Okinawa, and the force fighter director.
From Love-day night through Love+45-night Asin preparations for past operations,these meet­
the following night fighters were furnished: ings proved very beneficial and most of the ques­
Source: Sorties tions which arose at the objective had been dis­
TF 5S 173 cussed at these meetings.
TAF 474 (b) Prior to the establishment of the ADCC,
Total 647
the individual radar stations reported directly to
The special radar picket CAP reported directly the Eldorado on 2096 kilocycles, and the shore-
to the pickets and no record was kept of the num­ based Fighter Direction Units maintained com­
ber of sorties involved. However,this is estimated munications on this net. These stations became an
to be about 1600. integral part of the air warning and fighter-
The Amphibious Support Force found that it direction organization as soon as established. The
was advantageous to have the fighter component coordination of these units was effected through
of the first morning Support Air Group come on the ADCC ashore.
station early enough to act as part of the dawn (e) In the beginning, considerable difficulty
was encountered in establishing adequate com­
TCAP. It is recommended that this method of
munications with various shore-based units.
augmenting the dawn TCAP be used when in­
sufficient VF are available for all purposes. However,additional equipment was obtained and
In order to organize adequate fighter defense at adequate communications were established and
a large amphibious objective the officer in charge maintained.
of this defense must rely on the maintenance of (d) As in all past operations,the time required
the scheduled TCAP, otherwise many additional to activate the various shore-based radars and to
radio transmissions on crowded circuits are neces­ integrate them into an adequate air warning and
sary to restation the TCAP, and vital areas are fighter-direction organization was much longer
left unprotected for short periods of time. than anticipated. This was emphasized by the

679527-46 11 3-23
eimuni
 •
FIGHTER DEFEN SE ',,C)
A

speed with which Phase II was completed,with the posed fighter-director ships aid their supporting
resultant acquisition of more land-based sites for elements in the radar picket stations.
radar installations. (4) In the early stages Radar Picket Nos. 1,
As in the past three operations all radar reports 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, and 14 were filled, with No. 9
were in polar coordinates from a predetermined being filled later when more warning was thought
reference point (Zampa Misaki Peninsula), and necessary against low flying planes approaching
this system proved adequate for the many uses Kerama Retto from the southwest. With the com­
made of it. There was no grid system of report­ pletion of shore-based radar installations on Hedo
ing used and although the Marine Air Warning Saki and Ie Shima a revised picket arrangement
Squadrons had anticipated using the JAN grid for was formulated with Radar Picket Nos. 5, 7, 9,
internal radar reporting,they considered the polar 15, and a new No. 16 being filled. This latter ar­
system superior and adopted this method for their rangement was the picket plan in effect as of 0900
internal reporting. (I) Love+46-day.
RADAR PICKETS The ships and teams
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet (1) The 19 original fighter-director ships with
special teams and equipment were the mine layers
The effectiveness of radar pickets in protecting Robert H.Smith, Aaron Ward and Shea and the
an amphibious operation against enemy air attack destroyers Bennion, Bryant, Prichett,
was demonstrated. They provided air warning Cassin Young,Mannert L.Abele,Stanly,Bennett,
service, shot down many planes by AA. fire and, Hudson, Bush, Wickes, Luce, 0olhoun, Gregory,
by controlling their own CAP's,contributed to the Brown and Cowell. Of these original 19 the Hal­
destruction of many more. Although the radar ligan was sunk by mines and the Bush, Colh,oun,
picket ships suffered heavy losses from these at­ M. L. Abele, and the Luce were sunk by suicide
tacks, it is believed that the enemy committed a planes. The Bryant, Prickett, Cassin Young,
serious error in concentrating upon them instead Stank,Bennett, Gregory,Shea, and Aaron Ward
of avoiding or ignoring them in favor of the trans­ were seriously damaged by suicides. The Bennion,
ports. Hudson, and Wickes suffered minor damage.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces (2) During the course of the operation the
(1) This report would not be complete without following ships received special equipment, and
words of high praise and admiration for the men. fighter-director teams were transferred to them
in the ships on radar picket duty, for their ade­ from previously damaged destroyers: Laffey,
quate and experienced handling of their CAP,for Daly, Macomb, Wadsworth, Jeffers, Morrison.
their expert and complete raid reporting, for the Lowry, Ammen, Bradford, D. H. Fox, Gainard,
superb quality and quantity of their gunnery,for W. D. Porter, Shubrick, H. W. Hadley. Of
their expert damage control, for the experienced these 14 designated fighter director ships, the
handling of their ships by the commanding officers Morrison was sunk by suicide attacks, the Laffey,
and for the maintenance of the morale in the ships Day, Macomb, Jeffers and H. W. Hadley were
during repeated tours on the picket line. seriously damaged by suicide attacks. The Wads­
-
(2) It is recommended that in planning all fu­ worth* and Lowry suffered minor damage.
ture operations much greater emphasis be placed (3) During the course of the operation the
on securing outlying land areas or islands at the Prichett was repaired and returned for picket
earliest practicable date and installing adequate duty and the Hudson, Brown, and Wickes were
land based radars and fighter director units relieved of picket duty with their teams being
thereon in order that vulnerable shipping will transferred to other destroyers.
have to remain on exposed stations no longer than (4) As of 0900 (I) Love+46-day the following
is absolutely necessary. were the designated fighter-director ships with
(3) The bulk of the defense of the Okinawa special radio equipment installed and fighter-
amphibious operation evolved around the raid re-. director teams aboard:Bennion, Cowell,Pricliett,
porting and fighter direction exercised by the ex­ and R. H.Smith from the original 19 ships, and

sill11111111ft
 AIR SUPPORT
_
Ammen, Bradford, D. H. Fox, Gathar Lowry, erations, the large number of airfields in the
.D.Porter, Shubrick, and Wadsworth,from the Tokyo Area available for use by the enemy and
replacement ships. the lack of positive reaction of the enemy to our
(5) As of 0900 (I) Love+46-day 7 of the orig­ presence within 200 miles Tokyo.
inal 19 teams are still aboard, 4 new teams have It was apparent that the Night Task Group
been supplied and.1 team has been organized from must have one or more day carriers to provide
the Mount McKinley, with one of the original day fighter defense.
teams on duty in the Mount McKinley. In addi­ It is considered axiomatic that defensively each
tion, four officers live been added to the teams to carrier task group should be self-sufficient both
ease the watch requirements. day and night. Presently the day task groups en­
Special radar pipket CAP.—After the raids of joy that sufficiency except in the category of night
the 12th of April, additional means of protecting search planes. The addition of three VI` (N)
the radar pickets were sought and it was decided or three VT (N) to each CV would provide
to furnish as many pickets as possible with a enough radar equipped planes for night search
special two plane picket CAP. As of 14 April, and make each task group fully independent.
TAF was able to maintain this CAP over three • In a continuing campaign, such as the support
stations and very shortly this was increased to of Okinawa,it has worked a hardship on the day
five stations and this number was continued there­ carriers who have had to operate their flight decks
after. These planes reported direct to their as­ day and night. However both target and task
signed Radar Pickets and were employed solely force combat air patrol have been supplied very
as local picket protection supplementing AA fire successfully every night while the Enterprise
by the pickets. No separate record of the kills was in a rear area for battle repairs. Under such
affected by this special CAP is available at operating conditions it would be desirable to pro­
present, but it is known that many planes were vide day carriers with extra handling crews for
splashed by these aircraft and several ships credit night work.
the picket CAP with saving them from serious The operation of a night carrier as a unit of a
damage from suicid6rs. day carrier group has proved practical. The em­
ployment of such a carrier is primarily offensive
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 with each task group providing its own night de­
Radar coverage within the capabilities of the fense and the night carrier planes used for dusk
equipment available at the objective area was and dawn sweeps, night search-attack and in:
good. However, good low altitude coverage is truder-heckler missions. However, as the net is
still to be desired. The numerous pickets and drawn tighter around the enemy's homeland land-
overlapping areas of coverage served to give based planes can, and undoubtedly will, provide
ample warning and clear information on almost all the night heckler missions necessary. This re­
every occasion. Coverage was necessarily poor duces the night operations necessary by the car­
for those units adjacent to land masses or in pro­ rier task force to night search, night combat air
tected anchorages. The land mass of Okinawa patrol over own ships and over amphibious forces.
served as a curtain on some occasions to hide A single night carrier is not a reliable investment.
approaching enemy aircraft but warning in all Battle damage and sometimes a single deck crash
instances was possible. may deprive the task force of her services at a
critical time, thereby throwing the load on the
NIGHT OPERATIONS day task groups.
In the near future the most important function
From: Commander, Task Force 58
of night work will be that of night search, and
Contrary to expectations and plans the night night intruders to a limited extent, and night at­
carrier group was unable to exploit its full offen­ tacks on shipping. The VT (N) are equipped
sive potential during the initial attack on Tokyo. with special search radar equipment that is not
Contributory causes were very bad weather, lost _installed on the day carrier planes for reasons
planes resulting in cancellation of scheduled op­ unknown, although one VT • squadron was so
 FIGHTER DEFENSE OF THE AREA.

equipped and trained on the Enterprise 2 years During the time VF(N) were on station there
ago. were 331 enemy raids, involving a total of 622
The following alternatives are offered for planes. It is estimated that interception of 252
consideration: or 76 percent of these raids was attempted.
(a) The .formation of one or more night task (4) From the night prior to Love-day through
groups which include sufficient day carriers to the night of Love-plus-13-day VF(N) TCAP was
provide day protection to the task group. provided by TF 58. Normally two VI'(N) were
(b) A minimum of one night carrier for each on station during darkness, although at times
task group. there was none. Based in part on incomplete data
(e) Increase the complement of night planes the record of these planes is presented below:
and handling crews on day CVs and have no Sorties 173
night carriers as such. Attempted interceptions (42 percent of sorties) 72
Radar contacts by VF(N) (67 percent of attempts) 48
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces Splashes (17 percent of contacts) 8

In order to increase the number of splashes by In addition these TF 58 VF(N) made 10 splashes
the night fighters it is recommended that at least under semidaylight conditions.
six special night fighter director destroyers be al­ (5) From the night of Love+13-day through
located to each large amphibious operation. Love+46-day,TAF furnished the VF(N) TCAP.
These ships must have SP radar equipment and There were usually four on station and sometimes
must be manned by sufficient trained personnel to as niany as eight. Estimates from incomplete
control both day TCAP and night fighters. It is records are as follows:
felt that only by starting interception at greater Sorties 474
range from the center of the operation will more Attempted interceptions (38 percent of sorties) 180
kills be effected. It is also felt that more efficient Radar contacts by VF(N) (38 percent of attempts)_ 68
Splashes (15 percent of contacts) 10
night fighter aircraft with better radars must be
provided in order to discourage the number of During this period dusk and dawn CAP was
night air attacks. flown by day VI' with the consequence that
(1) There were three AGC's in the objective VF(N) seldom operated under semidaylight
area equipped with SP- radars; the Eldorado, conditions.
Panamint and Teton, and there were,in addition (6) The marked contrast between proportion­
'five GCI stations established ashore and operative ate number of contacts by TF 58 and TAF
by Love+46-day. The Eldorado normally re­ VF(N) apparently reflects a considerable dispar­
tained control of one VF(N)and assigned the oth­ ity in airborne radar performance. For both car­
ers to AGCs and to shore bases. Emphasis was rier and shore based ITF (N), many attempted
placed on giving control to the latter as early as interceptions and contacts had to be broken off to
their operating status permitted. Ordinarily, in­ protect the night fighter as he chased the raid into
itial control was not given to fighter director,DD's ship and shore AA range during Control Yellow.
or DM's,but there were many occasions when con­ The scope of this amphibious operation resulted
trol was shifted to them during an interception. in the establishment of four areas of considerable
Two of the total of eighteen splashes were made shipping concentrations, with consequent increase
by DD's on such occasions. in vulnerability to AA.
(2) Withholding of VF(N) control from the
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
picket fighter-director ships was due to their hav­
ing insufficient personnel to maintain 24-hour con­ For control of nightfighters six areas of respon­
trol of a combat air patrol,and the lack of experi­ sibility and patrol were established:Sector 1,000°­
ence in night fighter controlling by most of the 030°; sector 2,030°-060°; sector 3,060°180°; sec­
intercept officers in these ships. tor 4, 180°-240°; sector 5, 240°-300°; and sector
(3) From Love-day to Love+46-day, there 6, 300° to 360°, all bearings from Zampa Mizaki.
were eight nights during which bad weather kept At times it was necessary to give one controlling
the ITF(N) on the deck all or most of the night. station two_ sectors and two VF(N) to control. It
z .
fr.,
I .t
n.
3-26
L, **,
 AIR SUPPORT
-
is believed that considering all handicaps and lim­ Panamint directed air support of III Amphibious
itations of F6F as night fighters that the results Corps troops from Love-day (1 April) until con­
obtained were excellent. trol was passed to Landing Force Air Support
Control Unit No.1 on 10 April at 1200 (I). This
DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES air support control unit also directed air support
CLOSE:SUPPORT CONTROL of the Seventy-seventh Division during attack on
and occupation of Ie Shima, from 13 April
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces through 19 April.
Control of support aircraft for the Okinawa (d) Air Support Control Unit 51.1.10 in the
operations was distributed between six AGC's, as Mount McKinley directed air support of the Sev­
follows: enty-seventh Division in the attack on and capture
Ship 42'Task Force or Task Group ASCU of islands of the Kerama Retto and Keise Shima,
Eldorado Joint Expeditionary Force 51.10 from Love-6 (26 March) through Love-1 (31
Teton Southern Attack Force 55'.10
March).
Panamint Northern Attack Force 53.10
Mt. McKinley__ Western Islands Attack Group_ 51.1.10
(e) The air support control unit in the Estes
Ancon Demonstration Group 51.2.10 acted in two different capacities:
Estes Amphibious Support Force 52.10 (1) During the period Love— 8 (24 March)
Estes Eastern Fire Support Group__ 51.19.10 through 0600 on Love-Day,this unit was in over­
(a) Air support control unitsin each of the above all control of all air support at Kerama Retto,
AGC's except the Ancon controlled aircraft at one Keise Shima, Okinawa and nearby islands. De­
period or another during the operation. The An­ tailed troop support for the Kerama Retto and
con's Air Support Control Unit was left without a Keise Shima landings during this period were
job to do because of a last-minute change of plans delegated to Air Support Control Unit 51.1.10 in
whereby the Estes, as command ship for the East­ the Mount McKinley. The Estes unit controlled
ern Fire Support Group, assumed control of all all strikes on Okinawa and outlying islands, pro­
aircraft in ;the Demonstration area. tection of minesweepers,CAP,ASP,protection of
The various AGO-based air support control underwear demolition teams, and other over-all
units controlled support aircraft at various periods control functions.
as follows: (2) Air Support Control Unit 51.19.10, the
(a) Air Support Control Unit 51.10 in the El­ Estes unit, controlled air support for demonstra­
dorado was in over-all control of all air operations tion landings and attacks in eastern Okinawa
at the objective area from Love-day (1 April) un­ areas as follows:
til control was turned over to commander, Fifth Demonstration landings-1,2, 19 April..
amphibious Force (0900 oil 17 May). CAP,ASP, Eastern Okinawa area attacks-5, 7, 10
itinerant aircraft, and numerous other types of April.
aircraft were directly controlled by this air sup­
port control unit. Details of direct troop support During this operation there were three fully
in all but Tenth Army zones of action were han­ manned and equipped air support control units
dled by subsidiary air support control units. Ex­ ashore, which were assigned as follows:
Unit Assigned to
cept in the case of ex-CAP strikes'on outlying is­
Landing Force Air Support Con- Tenth Army
lands and in a few cases on targets on Okinawa trol Unit No.3.
that were far removed from the front lines,the air Landing Force Air Support Con- XXIV Corps
support control unit on the Eldorado did not di­ trol Unit No. 2.
rectly control strike missions. Landing Force Air Support Con- III Amphibious Corps
(b) Air Support Control Unit 55.10 in the trol Unit No. 1.

Teton directed air support of XXIV Corps troops (a) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit
from Love-day (1 April) until control was passed No. 3 served as coordinating agency ashore for
to Landing Force Air Support Control Unit No. all air support operations. The services of this
2 on 8 April at 1200 (I). unit were invaluable in performing the following
(c) Air Support Control Unit 53.10 in the functions:
 DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

(1) Coordinating reports and requests of sub­ air direction activities again in the southern zone,
ordinate landing force air support control units. starting on 9 May and continuing through the end
(2) Serving as liaison between commander,Air of the period covered by this report.
Support Control Unit,Joint Expeditionary Force, The Okinawa operation proved to be the largest
and Tactical Air Force,Tenth Army. , and most prolonged amphibious operation in the
(3) Helping with transportation and liaison Pacific. During the period covered by this report,
between commander, Air Support Control Unit, direct air support missions utilized over 5,800 tons
Joint Expeditionary Force,and shore based units. of bombs against the enemy. Air support mis­
(4) Maintenance of an air suppKt control unit sions, sorties, and tonnage from the period 25
representative at Yontan field. March (Love-7) through 16 May (Love-46) were
(5) Writing up dailST reports on the ground as follows:
situation to be flown back to carriers of TF 58 and Missions flown 1,388
TG 52.1. These reports proved of great help in Sorties flown 13,950
Tonnage of bombs dropped 5, 817
briefing carrier pilots who were engaged in air
support operations, since they were much more By far the largest proportion of air support
complete and up to date than regular despatches. operations were controlled by Landing Force
(6) Controlling night TBM hecklers vectored ASCU No. 2 with XXIV Corps. A percentage
by radar over southern Okinawa. breakdown of sorties by ASCU's is as follows:
(b) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit
No.2 directed air support activities in support of Number of
direct support Percent
ASCU
the XXIV Corps starting at 1200 (I) on Love+7 sorties con-
trolled
of total

(8 April) and continuing on through the period

(a) LanFor No.2(XXIV Corps) 5,963 43
covered by this report. 23
(b) TF 5j(Amphibious Support Force)(in Estes)_ 3,121
(c) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit (c) TF 53(Northern Attack Force)(in Panamint)_ 2,121 15
(d) TF 55(Southern Attack Force)(in Teton) 1,355 10
No. 1 directed air support in support of the III (e) LanFor No.1 (III Phib Corps) 879 7
Amphibious Corps in northern Okinawa from (f) TO 51.1 (Western Islands Attack For) (in
Mount McKinley) 311 2
1200(I) on Love+9(16 April),through 22 April,
after which time air support was no longer needed Total 13,950 100

in the northern zone of action. As progress in the

southern part of the island became more difficult, It is interesting to note that a majority of the
it was necessary to place the III Amphibious missions were chosen on the basis of pre-planned
Corps in the line alongside the XXIV Corps in intelligence. Of the total of 1,388 missions flown,
southern area. Acordingly, Landing Force Air only 507, or 37 percent, were the result of air
Support Control Unit No. 1 commenced support . liaison party requests.

Missions directed by principal air support control units 25 March through 17 May

ASCU TF 52
ASCU III ASCU XXIV TO 51.19,
Unit ASCU TF 53 ASCU TF 55 Phib Corps Corps TO 51.1
Total

Period 1 Apr(L-day) 1 Apr(L-day) 10 Apr to 17 8 Apr to 17 25 Mar to 19

to 10 Apr - to 8 Apr May May Apr

Direct support missions 232 154 131 640 231 1,388

VF sorties 1,118 756 289 2,149 I
VB sorties 180 105 1,108 3,632 13,950
VT sorties 823 494 590 2,706
Tons of bombs dropped 607 438 343 2,916 1,513 5,817
Rockets fired - 6,999 4,912 4,271 20,599 36,781
Napalm bombs dropped 335 189 - 31 390 945
Air liaison party requests 68 49 191 479 none 787
Number of air liaison party requests fulfilled 49 34 131 293 none 507

I Figures not available.

4.•

4111.111111ar 3-28 •

r
 -- -72
The arrangement whereby commander,Air Sup­ cations channels and the scientific evaluation of
port Control Units, Joint Expeditionary Force, information which could be received thereby,
monitored all communications channels used by makes it difficult for air support to obtain clear­
other air support control units, in addition to di­ ance to attack.
rectly controlling various types of aircraft, proved In conclusion, it is desired to stress that an air
valuable on Love-day in providing as great deal support control unit, true to its title, is purely an
of early information not otherwise obtainable. agency for controlling, through communications
For future operations,however,it is recommended facilities and personnel, aircraft supplied by other
that monitoring of many of the nets by the ASCU units. It cannot be emphasized too strongly then,
having over-all control cease after the beachhead that to be successful it must have good communi­
is secured. Monitoring of SAD and SAR nets cations and good communications discipline. In
used by other act support control units, for ex­ order to handle larger groups of aircraft,as opera­
ample, is not necessary after that point, and all tions increase in scope, it is a matter of the most
information to be obtained from them can be vital urgency that communic.ations procedures be
passed to commander,Air Support Control Units, streamlined,that reliability of communications be
Joint Expeditionary Force, over the ICAS or improved, that additional communications chan­
ASC channels. nels be provided, and that communications dis­
Artillery, naval gunfire, and air support are so cipline be of.the highest order.
closely tied together in their operations that it is This unit worked only with carrier-based air­
of small value to have one developed in any one craft for close support missions. In close sup­
direction more than the others. For example naval port it is considered that if anything useful or
gunfire and artillery are decentralized among the advantageous can be made out of a situation, car­
participating units. Air support is highly cen­ rier-based pilots will find a way to do it. The
tralized in the hands of the controlling air sup­ following excerpt from a message originated by
port control unit. The foot soldier who is looking this unit regarding the work of a certain carrier
for support,and doesn't care where it comes from, pilot is typical of the warm appreciation we feel
could be served better,it seems, if final direct and for the general excellence displayed by all car­
positive control of all three supporting arms were rier pilots, Who are maintaining their effectiveness
centralized in one locality where they could be shut at sea over periods previously considered impos­
off or started up instantly. sible:"Air coordinator Cupid Six Call 125 Fancy.
It is not believed that this will be possible until conducted Direction of Support Group Fox in out­
artillery and naval gunfire train teams, install standing and intelligent manner deserving of high
radio equipment, and institute procedures com­ praise X though targets were thin as they fre­
parable to those at present in use in air support quently appearto be 125 Fancy went to work with
control units. "Joint operations room" on com­ the enthusiasm and persistence of a bird dog,
mand ships would then take on all the significance quickly located assigned targets, exercised per­
that the name implies. Whereas air support has fect control of his group, conserved his ammuni­
previously been able to supply the least weight tion making every unit count and disregarding the
of explosives comparatively,in the future the sky feeble enemy Able Able Fire superbly led and
will literally be the limit as to how many aircraft directed his group in knocking them cold X This
can be provided to support an operation. Accord­ is the stuff that has put air support on the map X"
ingly, it is altogether fitting that procedures be
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
instituted whereby ASCU's can find out more
scientifically exactly where NGF or artillery can That all pilots be more thoroughly briefed by
be expected to fire from,and what trajectories will CASCU concerning the information desired from
result. Even though NGF and artillery seldom them. Needless transmissions will be saved if the
have enough ammunition on hand to allow them flight leader reports when arriving on station,
to fire more than a very small percentage of the without request, the complement of the flight, its
time available,the inadequacies of the present sys­ mission, its period on station and its loading.
tem, chiefly involving lack of sufficient communi­ Similarly a flightleader should observe and report
rti
 • 3,

DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND F ­eK§44

the results of the attack by his group. Accurate incoming CASCU. The Advanced CASCU who
results of the attack, in so far as it is possible to has been controlling for several days would retain
observe them, are of the greatest importance to these functions until such time as the- incoming
CASCU, Naval Gunfire, Army or Marine head­ CASCU was in all respects ready and desirous of
quarters, and to their units on the ground. Un­ taking over control. The incoming CASCU would
less specifically authorized by CASCU or the air of course bein a position to direct and supervise the
coordinator, pilots must not initiate attacks on functions of the advanced CASCU but would be
targets unknown to CASCU or the air coordina­ relieved of many details and therefore free to de­
tor in identity and location and must not make vote full attention to more pressing matters. The
additional individual passes at a target after com­ principal functions which may well be thus tempo­
pletion of the original attack or jettison ammuni­ rarily retained by advanced CASCU, under the
tion in the objective area. Pilots must comply general supervision of Expeditionary Force
with instructions regarding the boundaries of CASCU,are:
areas to be searched for targets of opportunity. (a) Target combat air patrol,
It is recommended: . (b) Target anti-submarine patrol,
That adjustments in schedules be made, if pos­ (c) Air-sea rescue operations,
sible, to permit effective use of ex-CAP and ex- (d). Courier and transient aircraft,
VOC for support missions by CASCU. Effective (e) Miscellaneous aircraft not a direct part
use can be made only when such planes are relieved of the landing operations.
from regular patrol or spotting duties on schedule The mission of advance commander,air support
and are available to CASCU as a group for at control unit, was (1) the control of all aircraft
least 30 minutes. It is also recommended that all on station in the objective area from L-7 to L-day
VOC planes be rocket-equipped on all flights. for the support of minesweepers,underwater dem­
Relatively few air support missions were re­ olition teams, and preliminary bombardment of
quested by air liaison parties. The majority of the objective, (2) the allocation of aircraft to
requests were received from units of the Ninety-
Western Islands Attack Group Air Support Con­
Sixth Division. During the last 3 days of control trol Unit for support of landings at Kerama Retto
a number of close support missions were success­
and Keise Shima, (3) the control of aircraft in
fully accomplished for this division with the ex­
support of the demonstration landings on the
cellent cooperation and assistance of battalion,
eastern beaches on L- and L+1-days, and (4)
regimental, and divisional air liaison parties.
such other missions as might be directed by com­
From: Commander,AmphibiousSupportForce mander, Air Support Control Units, Amphibious
(CTF 52) To'rces,Pacific Fleet.
-
Fromi'Commanding, General SIXTH Marine
In past operations it has been standard pro­
cedure for CASCU Expeditionary Force to arrive Division
at the objective during the early morning on the The basic difference between air support as car­
day of the main landing and immediately take ried out in the Okinawa operation and that which
over control of all air support from the advanced is desired by this command is that instead of hav­
CASCU who has been in the area for several days. ing the ASC direct the strike group it is advocated
This procedure has been successful in the past and that the ALP's be permitted to contact the air­
should continue to be so in the future. However, plane directly on the SAD net, while directly on
there is believed to be room for improvement. the SAD net, while directing a strike. If the per­
Communication difficulties have been experienced, sonnel on the gtound is not considered sufficiently
and the abrupt shift in control of all CASCU qualified to do so, steps should be taken to place
functions is not conducive to smooth operations. capable officers in these positions. The practica­
Therefore it is recommended that the transfer bility of this latter method has been proved by the
of control of certain CASCU functions which are use of naval gunfire spotting planes on targets of
not an intimate part of the main landing be made opportunity. These planes were directed through
gradually and at a time most convenient to the the naval gunfire net with very good results.

3-30 •10.
•
r
 OBSERVATION AND SPOTTING were reliable. They kept CASCU informed on the
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces ground situation, and fulfilled many other func­
(a) OY type artillery spotting planes were tions. The courage displayed in flying at low
lifted to the area by the CVE's,by a Brodie-gear­ altitudes in front of caves, over gun positions and
equipped LST and by garrison shipping vessels. Up and down gullies looking for the enemy was
Nineteen of the.gb planes were flown to the beach of the highest order.
from the LST's and CVE's without loss on From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
Love+1-day. These planes began operation on The air observer proved to be the best available
the following d6y. By securing an operational medium for information. Questions arising con­
field from the enemy on the initial landing day, cerning possible targets were investigated, and re­
it was made possible to shift this load from the ported upon by the observer with a minimum of
CVE torpedo planes beginning on Love+2. Com­ delay. The Army communications ashore are not
plete operations were taken over ashore on always positive due to constant troop movements.
Love-1-5-day. In contrast to former operations, The air observer was always on hand to supply
no TBM planes engaged in artillery spotting or ready information about enemy or friendly move­
aerial observation were lost. This was no doubt ments.
due to the negligible enemy opposition during the
early stages of the assault. The first OY plane From: Commander, Cruiser Division 5 (CTF
landed at le Shima on Love+18-day (19 April). 54)
(b) Two specially trained VOC naval gunfire The aviator spotter must study carefully photos
spotting squadrons were available for this opera­ and accompanying intelligence, the terrain, strip­
tion. The Wake Island which carried one of these ping of camouflage. Good observation requires
squadrons was bombed and forced to retire on that they get down close at times. Enclosure(A)
LOve+3-day at which time the VOC squadron shows that they do. Enemy AA is nearly always
wastransferredto the MarcusIsland. This squad­ present, and most ships which have been in both
ron departed the area aboard the latter carrier on Iwo and Okinawa have had at least one plane shot
April 29. Spotting was furnished throughout the down. The major part of the firing is by one or
operation by the second VOC group aboard the two shots at a time and different than the easily
Fanshaw Bay. The excellent record established in seen splashes of a water salvo, full concentration
previous operations was carried to greater heights is demanded all the time. Lack of effectiveness and
in the Okinawa assault. Pilots flew tirelessly and waste of effort which can be caused by a substand­
fearlessly low over enemy lines and performed ard air spotter is apparent. Frequently, a ship is
their duties in a manner which earned for them required to furnish a spotting plane for a de­
the traditional "very well done." stroyer or another ship.
(c) Aerial and hydrogra;phic observers were • During the first 2 years of the war there were
flown in TBM planes of the CVE's from the be­ few opportunities for the cruiser and battleship
ginning of the operations until the observers were plane to function at the tasks for which it was
transferred ashore on Love+23-day (24 April). designed. Its fire hazard and weight of installa­
No planes were lost, and operations were con­ tion was definitely against it and its retention
ducted without unusual incident. aboard ship at least questionable. The number
was reduced to two per ship. The advent of am­
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4 phibious operations reversed the trend and from
The observations and information reported by now to the end of the war there is no plane and
airborne observers and air coordinators were'of its aviator which is more important in doing dam­
immeasurable value. When targets could no age to the enemy than the cruiser and battleship
longer be supplied by ground forces in Joint Op­ spotting plane. This is because the majority of
erations, and requests for strikes were not forth­ all fire support is indirect fire. As it can readily
coming from ground forces ashore, the observers be seen that the cruisers and battleships of TF 58
and air coordinators often supplied missions. will soon be employed primarily in fire support;
They were on the job constantly,and their reports these remarks include those ships also.

3-31
 •

There has been much enthusiasm for the VOF— Ship-based aircraft sustained more damage
VOC spotter because he is a trained artillery,spot­ from enemy attacks on board ship than from
ter and the ship is freed of the continuous han­ enemy action while airborne. In addition to
dling and servicing of planes and their fire hazard Nevada already noted,Indianapolis lost the serv­
while firing. But the advantage remains with the ices of her three aircraft due to a suicide hit on
cruiser and battleship aviator spotter, because of Love-minus-1-day (31 March 1945), and New
the opportunity for _constant conference with the York lost one aircraft.
ship's officers and his integration into the gunnery Although plans called for the use of AVD's
organization of the ship. With all their recent for servicing of VO/VCS aircraft, it was not
experience,the present assigned ship's' aviators are found necessary to use them. Gunfire schedules
the equal of the VOF—VOC spotter. There will were so arranged that parent ships could service
always be too many demands for other air needs own aircraft between firing missions. This ability
to permit the number of VOF—VOC needed. The to service own planes had two major advantages:
ship's plane frequently flies during lowered visi­ (1) The opportunity for pilots to get out of
bility because the ship is within sight; whereas the their planes and, if necessary, exchange with
VOF atits distant CVE or land base is held there others, rather than sit in their planes for 9 to
by the weather. 13 hours a day as has occurred on other occasions.
The foregoing indicates the need for a better (2) The opportunity for ship's gunnery per­
recognization of the cruiser-battleship aviator and sonnel to interview their air spot between firing
his plane, both as to the importance of his assign­ missions.
mentand in the requisite of prompt replenishment, CLOSE SUPPORT TARGETS
in order.that the full effectiveness of the surface
gun may be realized in its remaining primary task, From: Commander, Task Force 58
i. e.: fire support (bombardment). It was further requested that target locations be
supplied for each day's support groups such tar­
From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF gets to be attacked unless the group had to be
54) used for close support. Information on new
,VO/VCS aircraft attached to the battleships targets was then furnished each day and picked
and cruisers of TF 54 were operated in a normal up from Okinawa by carrier plane; however,
manner, i. e., spotting and 'air-sea rescue. Cas­ no attempt was made to specify which targets
ualties were lighter than expected, and operations were important. It is recommended that in fu­
were in every sense satisfactory. VOF spotting ture support operations primary and secondary
requirements were kept to a_ minimum, being targets, be designated for each support group.
limited to destroyers and those heavy ships with­ Pilots of support groups will then be thoroughly
out own VO/VCS aircraft available. Ships in briefed the night before on their assigned targets
this category were Birmingham, which was un­ and whenever practicable they should be allowed
able to obtain satisfactory SC-1 aircraft prior to attack such targets. It is further recom­
mended that each CASCU be assigned an expert
to sortie from Ulithi; Wichita, St. Louis, and
on bomb selection and fuzing in order that the
Mobile, ,which had poor SC-1 aircraft availa­
most effective combinations will be used. It is
bility; Nevada which lost the services of her
further recommended that CASCU's make some
planes and pilots as a result of a suicide plane hit attempt to use air support groups as early in
on the morning of Love-minus-5-day (27 March their period on station as possible. It has be­
1945); and Biloxi which had poor Kingfisher come habitual in the Pacific to keep air support
availability throughout. In this connection, it groups circling until the last few minutes of their
should be noted that all ships equipped with the time on station and then to give them a target,
SC-1.type aircraft continually suffered poor avail­ or in some cases, giving them no target and di­
ability. This is a sad commentary on the latest recting them to jettison their bombs in the water.
ship-based seaplane, which it was hoped would It is felt that improved planning and coordi­
replace all other types. nation with the ground forces could result in the
 raw.
=.11
Co2
IllOdd aS

13 April 1945. Okinawa Gunto-Bombs Burst on Gun Emplacement Near Yonabaru. Photo Shows Difficulty of Accurate Damage Assessment in Close
Support Work.
 UN
DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

ments with times of attacks, was drawn up for

each of the following day's strike groups. These
schedules were planned and coordinated with
naval gunfire. The schedule was not inflexible
and a list of alternate targets was available for
Strike Groups and for X—CAP and X—VOF
planes. This prepared schedule of targets worked
excellently and resulted in a smoother and more
orderly operation for the day. After analysis of
intelligence material, including photo interpre­
tation, the following target priority was set up
for air:
Priority 1-Enemy aircraft.
Priority 2-Amphibious tanks and small boats. (The
"amphibious tanks" were later found to
Bombing Dispersal Areas and Facilities at Wan Airfield,
be suicide attack boats fitted with depth
Kikai Sh,ima. 5 April 1945.
charges.)
Priority 3-Island installations:
employment of air support groups during the
(a) Coastal defense guns and field
first half of their time on station, rather than artillery;
the last half. Pilots who have been circling in (b) Antiaircraft guns;
formation over an area for 1/ 2 hours are pri­
1 (c) Floating mines;
marily interested in getting rid of their bombs (d) Communication facilities;
(e) Barracks area.
and getting back to base. The natural result is
poor accuracy. From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine
Division
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
During phase VII air support proved to be of
Effective during the afternoon of Love+4, the
Tenth Army issued a directive that no towns, great value in attacking enemy troop and supply
columns, and in destroying strong points on re­
bridges, radio towers, oil, or food-storage areas
were to be attacked by air except when visual verse slopes after extensive destructive fires had
observation disclosed enemy activity in the vi­ been laid on the forward slopes by artillery.
cinity. This directive further limited the number As phase III progressed a marked increase was
of available targets until Love+6 and Love+7 noted in the number of aircraft available. In con­
when artillery and intense antiaircraft fire was sequence planes were employed in sufficient num­
encountered from positions in or near towns and bers to have a palpable effect on the progress of
storage areas.
From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Com­
mander,Support Force)
At the close of each day's operation, the com­
mander, Air Support Control Unit, the unit op­
erations officer and the unit intelligence officer met
in conference to plan for the next day's air ac­
tivities. Operations for the day were covered
and damage tentatively assessed. Since an ad­
vance Air Support Control Unit must depend
for target selection, primarily on photo interpre­
tation and pilot observation, it was decided to
prepare targetschedulesin advance. Accordingly,
at each conference a schedule of target assign­ Village of Kikai Shi/ma Near Airfield,5 April 1945.
 #•;

AIR SUPPORT
• I, ,
4-1
I! I
the operation. Planes were also'proiilpt in arriv­ casion when a bogey disappeared into the land
ing on station which greatly facilitated Coordina­ mass, ASCU was informed and directed an es­
tion with the other supporting arms. cort for a photographic hop to be especially alert
in that particular area. This plane made contact
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Fanshaw and shot down two VALS.
Bay(CVE 70)
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 4
It is recommended that aircraft launched from
the carrier, loaded with bombs, rockets, and am­ On Love-day at Okinawa support groups were
munition and sent in to the target area,be assigned stationed over the beach area with instructions to
suitable targets and authorized to expend their commence an attack on any guns firing immedi­
load against enemy territory or forces prior to ately upon receipt of the word that gunfire units
return to base. During the early part of the Oki­ had been notified that an air attack was com­
nawa operations our fully loaded planes, after mencing,without waiting for the formal approval
being launched and proceeding to target area fre­ of Plan Negat or Plan Victor. This procedure,
quently were not allowed to conduct an attack approved by commander, Joint Expeditionary
but were ordered to return to base, jettison their Force, was called Plan Precautionary within our
bombs and land aboard with rockets still loaded. own staff. It is felt that should strong opposition
This constituted a considerable waste of pilot have been encountered,Plan Precautionary would
time, plane time, ammunition and morale. It is have proved effective due to the certainty that
recommended that an area be established in enemy could have been engendered in the thoughts of
territory where pilots may,upon obtaining proper the enemy, namely, that for him to open up with
authorization, expend their bombs, rockets and any type of heavy fire during daylight would have
ammunition upon enemy targets of opportunity. been certain to draw instant retaliation from our
This plan was put into effect in the latter phases aircraft stationed above him for that purpose.
of the Okinawa operation and proved highly sat­ Except during the H-hour strikes, and under
isfactory. special circumstances, it appears inadvisable to
carry out; the cessation of scheduled gunfire by
CLOSE SUPPORT COORDINATION invoking Plan Negat and Plan Victor. It is be­
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces lieved that with vigilant air sentries on die artil­
During the first few days of the operation there lery pieces and aboard ships, the attacks by small
was considerable delay in fulfilling requests of support groups do not warrant this confusing
some of the battalions due to the length of time and time-expending procedure. When capable
required to effect coordination with the various air coordinators were on station, it was obvious
echelons of command up to and including corps that they had an excellent picture of where ships
. headquarters. This was caused by the fact that were firing, by observing gun flashes and the fall
many of the troops involved had had no previous of the shot. Their estimation of range and trajec­
experience with air support as practiced under tory in keeping their groups clear would indicate
that with proper briefing, pilots can avoid naval
transport doctrine. It is recommended that
ground troops committed to future operations be gunfire by observation. All are too familiar with
given exercises with air support control units the drawbacks and delays connected with invoking;
prior to embarking. Plans Negat and Victor to warrant further discus­
sions here. It is recommended that Plan Precau­
ARTILLERY AND AIR COORDINATION tionary be adopted for all operations and take its
place alongside Plan Negat and Plan Victor.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
The cooperation of ASCU during the opera­ From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
tion has been extremely satisfactory. Due to Little use was made of Plan Victor or Plan
the close liaison all pertinent information con­ Negat; and all except very large air strikes were
cerning aircraft was immediately available to conducted without resorting to either .plan. The
CIC. This is evident in the fact that on one oc­ primary use of these plans was to-protect low fly­
 •

In some instances, where targets requiring low From: Commander Amphibious Group 12
altitude attacks were discovered, bombs fuzed
It is recommended that all CVE support VF be
-witli8to 11 seconds delay were requested. In most
equipped with rockets and with Napalm, if pos­
instances low altitude bombing attacks were very
sible. It is believed that the effectiveness of Na­
successful, especially against small targets such
palm for such purposes as burning off camouflage
as cave entrances,small gun poitions and concrete
will increase as further improvement is made in
pillboxes.
release and detonating mechanisms and that the
Some misunderstanding occurred when in some
value derived therefrom will be sufficient to war­
instances bombs fuzed for low drops were used on
rant the inclusion of Napalm as a part of standard
targets which were suitable for instantaneously
armament.
fuzed bombs. Special fuzing is always requested
with specific types of targets in mind but fre­ ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR NEUTRALIZING
quently the tactical situation demands that pre­ ENEMY AIRFIELDS
planned targets be discai-ded and that all avail­
able airborne explosive be used to destroy a target From: Commander, Carrier Division 4 (CTG
discovered since the support group was launched. 58)
This operation presented a problem which has
AP BOMBS
become a common one to this force; that of deny­
From: Commander, Task Force 58 ing to the enemy the use of certain airfields over
The limited opportunities for use of this bomb a period of time. The airfields on Tokuno and
have reduced itto the special weapons category and Kikai Shima, constituted a constant threat to our
it is recommended that it be included on the bomb forces on and near Okinawa both as bases from
allowance only when operations call for this type which air attacks might originate and as staging
of bomb. , points for aircraft at rear enemy bases.
NAPALM These airfields were attacked by carrier planes
with general purpose bombs using short delay fuse
From: Commander, Task Force 58
to crater runways. Installations and areas sur­
The effectiveness of Napalm as opposed to the rounding the airfields were strafed, rocketed, and
general purpose bomb is not apparent in the re-. bombed. Napalm fire bombs were dropped on the
sults obtained against the usual targets. Success­ latter.
ful ignition of Napalm varied between Task In spite of daily attacks using the weapons men­
Groups but preliminary reports indicate that well tioned above, these fields remained in part opera­
over 80 percent satisfactory performance was tional and were a constant threat to our forces. It
realized. is felt that the so-called butterfly bomb particu­
larly when used with "spikes" would offer a far
From: Commander,Carrier Division 24 more effective means of accomplishing the neutral­
The performance of Napalm bombs was very ization of these fields. Since the enemy has become
gratifying. The improvement of performance very adept at camouflaging, dispersing and revet-
during this operation over that of previous opera­ Sting aircraft and installations near his airfields it
tions was generally attributed to the addition of a is almost impossible to destroy them without an
second igniter. The Napalm bomb was found par­ unprofitably large expenditure of bombs,ammuni­
ticularly effective against exposed personnel, slit tion, planes and pilots. Even if all were destroyed
trenches,and inflammable structures. An electric- the field could still be used for staging planes. The
type release mechanism would greatly improve the butterfly and spike combination if used in con­
accuracy. Preparation of these bombs would be junction with cratering and long-delay fused
simplified 1,37 furnishing quickly attachable -pre­ bombs would make• air operations virtually im­
fabricated tail fins. The use of 150-gallon Napalm possible with a far smaller expenditure.of ma­
bombs is recommended against small targets due terial rind lives.
to the limited size of the lethal area and limited It is understood that the type of "butterfly"
accuracy of 58-gallon bomb. bomb originally supplied to the fleet was unsafe
• 4,"
for use on carriers. It is also understood were maintained and except for a few instances
bomb of this type which will be safe for carrier the TCAP reached their assigned areas at the
operations is in process of manufacture. Until proper time. It is believed that with the install­
it is in use by carriers this force will not be able ation of AN/ARC-1's in all fighters and fighter
to cope effectively with the problem of neutraliz­ director ships communications will be much more
ing enemy airfields. flexible and satisfactory for future operations.
It is recommended until such a bomb is'supplied There were many instances of blocked circuits
to carriers that shore-based aircraft which can on this net due to faulty microphones or to some­
reach the same objectives be instructed to drop the one unintentionally holding a microphone key open
"butterfly" bombs now available on airfields which for long periods of time. This was particularly
must be neutralized. In addition it is recom­ true of the TAF planes in the beginning, but this
mended long-delay fuses be supplied to all carriers condition improved as the operation progressed.
which may be assigned the mission of neutralizing Circuit discipline on the net was excellent with
enemy airfields. the exception of the first days with the TAF
TORPEDOES ON CVE's
•TCAP when the net was completely blocked by
these planes reporting in individually and at­
From: Commander,Amphibious Forces tempting to join up using this net. However,this
Since we are on the threshold of running out condition was soon clarified and as conditions im­
of hea-Oly.- armored naval targets, it is. proved at the field this difficulty was overcome.
that reconsideration be given to therecomnd quan­ Inter fighter director net (so-called secondary)
tities of torpedoes and AP and SAP bombs car­ 2096 kilocycles.
ried by support carriers. It appears at first This net was the most important net in the air
glance that there will be small need in the future warning set up. All raid reports from the radar
for this type armament from support aircraft.. pickets, the AGC's, the shore-based radars and
other reporting ships were transmitted via this
COMMUNICATIONS net to the Eldorado where these reports were
FIGHTER DIRECTION plotted, coordinated and evaluated and raid in­
formation disseminated. The assignment of all
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
TCAP to the various controlling bases was
For this operation one VHF channel was as­ handled on this net during very busy periods.
signed for primary fighter direction. On this This net was extremely well-controlled by the
channel as many as seven or eight bases controlled Eldorado personnel and acquired a larger audi­
fighters at the same time, with reliefs for 12 to 16 ence than Tokyo Rose, one of the control officers
divisions reporting in and being assigned to their being compared to Walter Winchell. Usual
stations and controlling bases. Obviously no one troubles of CW interference, feed-over and other
frequency could carry this load during raid con­ stations jamming the net were experienced from
ditions, with the result that various SAD fre­ time to time, but in the main reception was
quencies were made available during these satisfactory.
periods. However, due to the many varied types Inter fighter director net (so called primary)
of VHF equipment and crystal frequency set up
.37.6 megacycles.—(1) Traffic on this net was ex­
in the fighters, the AGCs and the fighter director
tremely light for the following reasons:
destroyers, this changeover was very difficult to
accomplish in a smooth and orderly manner as (a) Its use was not allowed underway due
common frequencies had to be determined between to conditions of radio silence. During this
the destroyers and the airborne TCAP. Most of period it could be used to best advantage as
the ships had AN/ARC-1's but the sets were in­ intra-force IFD net.
stalled at the last moment,some parts were found (b) At the objective, due to the use of so
to be missing and adequate power supplies were many frequencies and equipment of this.type
difficult to obtain. However, by forcing the sys­ on AGCs,reception was very poor and1 inter­
tem and the facilities available, communications ference so great that reception was coin­

• •
 iL t
•

COMMUNICATIONS

pletely unreliable and only by constant at­ jamming. The enemy may find it more advan­
tention on the part of the technicians and tageous to - completely block the net than to
extreme patience on the part of the net officer monitor it.
could communications be maintained with Inter fighter director net-37.6 megacycles.—
other units within the limited range of the Should be redesignated as an administrative inter
equipment. fighter director net and every effort should be ex­
(2) The need- for a reliable net for admini­ pended in securing some additional type of equip­
strative traffic between AGCs and the ADCC at ment for this purpose. The use of this equipment,
the objective-area is great and many attempts on AGCs has proven unsatisfactory and unre­
were made to utilize this net. liable during the past three operations.
Local air warning-3115 kilocycles.—This net is AIR SUPPORT COMMUNICATION NETS
the control net for the ASP and the control officer
is stationed in the CIO in the Eldorado with the From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
result that the approximate location of the ASP Commander Air Support Control Unit, Joint
planes was available at all times and they could Expeditionary Force (CTG 51.10), aboard the
be directed away from oncoming raids. The con­ Eldorado, exercised supervisory control of all Air
trol officer was adjacent to the TBS control officer Support functions during the Okinawa operation,
and all raid reports, flash conditions and control and directly controlled fighter direction, anti-sub­
colors sent on TBS were immediately rebroadcast marine patrol, air-sea rescue, and all air defense.
on the LAW. To maintain this control, additional operating po­
Radar reporting net-3195 kilocycles.—This net sitions were established in Joint Operations and
was monitored in CIC in the Eldorado in order CIC,and officers filtered incoming voice traffic to
to speed up reports from the outlying shore-based keep abreast of the air-ground tactical situation
radats and in an effort to determine the radar at all times. This involved activation of 23 radio
coverage of these units, and to check the com­ channels, a total of 7 more than on any previous
munication facilities ashore. This was done so operation. The addition of many radio channels
as to be able to determine when coverage by cer­ throughout the Expeditionary Force, and the
tain of the Radar Picket ships would no longer proximity of enemy transmitting stations, raised
be required and the number of picket ships could many difficulties in cOmbatting various types of
radio interference. All radio circuits were kept in
be reduced.
operation, however, and communications were
Fighter nets.—In order to handle the large
generally good.
number of fighters by numerous controlling bases,
The following radio circuits were established for
a minimum of two VHF frequencies for fighter
air support:
direction must be assigned for a medium sized
(a) Support air direction (very high fre­
amphibious operation. One of these frequencies
quency).—(1)140.58 megacycles,aircraftcommon,
should serve as the common reporting frequendy
was used by all aircraft to report arrival at and
and the other as the main control frequency. Ad­
departure from objective area. Prior to activation
ditional VHF fighter control frequencies are es­
of Yontan airfield this net was used to great ad­
sential for large operations. Adequate install­
vantage in keeping an accurate position report of
ation of AN/ARC-1 must be accomplished in all
all support aircraft. When the airfield became op­
fighter director units and all fighters in order to
erational, however, 140.58 megacycles carried so
provide flexibility in VHF fighter director com­
much traffic in landing and take-off of combatant
munications.
and transport aircraft (tower control) that its use
Inter fighter director net-3096 kilocycles.—
as a reporting net for Support Aircraft was dis­
Should be redesignated as primary and one addi­ continued. Still later,when Kadena and Ie Shima
tional high frequency established as a secondary. airfields were activated, the common frequency
The traffic handled on this net is so important that (140.58 megacycles) was over-loaded to such an
there should be a prearranged secondary available extent that its usefulness was impaired.
in the event of any emergency such as complete (2) Other support air direction VHF frequen­
,
t
 :4 1

tAIR SUPPORT
:A 40

cies wei. 142.0 MeghCyc es,14 .56 megacycles, to reduce the LAW net traffic during development
128.70 megacycles, 46.10 megacycles, and 126.1E3 of submarine contacts.
megacycles. This number of SAD (VHF) fre- (g) Air-sea rescue.—Communications with
quencies was made necessary because the support­ Dumbo aircraft and Dumbo bases were generally
ing air commands, namely, fast carriers, escort satisfactory, although CIV from task Force Com­
carriers, and tactical air force had no common manders' circuit (4420 kilocycles) caused consid­
VHF channels for support Air Direction. Con- erable interference at times.
trol officers were sometimes uncertain as to what (h) Air support command (2620 kilocycles),
frequency support groups would be able to use,and This circuit was of great value in linking together
this difficulty delayed operations at times. all air support control units, escort carriers, and
(b) Support air direction (high frequency), Tactical. Air Force. Communications were ex-
These channels were used in the direction of air- cellent,and furnished a rapid means of dissemina­
craft on special missions. Of necessity use was ting operational traffic. Such a net was essential
limited to directing VT or VB aircraft, but the in coordinating Air Support activities. Trans-
value in having reliable, clear, long-range chan- missions were in plain voice, with code names and
nels for this purpose is very great and should bp shackles used where security required.
retained. (i) Inter commander air ,upport (37.0 mego­
(c) Support air observation.—Communications cycles).—This frequency modulated VHF channel
were excellent on these channels, and much valu- was used between air support control units for
able information passed to air support control administrative and tactical traffic. It relieved the
units, air liaison parties, and various command overload on air support command net, and be­
posts. cause of its VHF characteristics was used for
(d) Support air request.—Communications on transmissions requiring more security than that
these channels were generally good, and radio furnished by the HF circuits. The frequency,
discipline was improved over previous operations. 37.0 megocycles, proved unsatisfactory on many
Numerous instances were found, however, where occasions due to interference from the many other
air liaison parties failed to keep their equipment similar channels used throughout the Expedition-
on proper frequency, resulting in garbled trans- ary Force. 37.6 megocycles and 36.5 megocycles
missions. were the ones feeding into 37.0 megocycles most
(e) Local air warning.—Communications were frequently.
satisfactory on this circuit although CW interfer­ (i) Airfield tower control.—Because com-
ence was very noticeable at times. Installation of mander air support control units, CTG 51.10, ex-
wave traps and use of fine tuning cut out most ercised control of all air warning and air defense,
of this interference. The circuit was overcrowded it was necessary for that unit to take control of all
as, in addition to air warnings and direction of transient aircraft entering or leaving the area.
anti-submarine patrol for objective area, it was This control was exercised on airfield tower con­
used as high frequency seadrome control, escort trol frequencies. 140.58 megocycles was VHF
carrier local anti-submarine patrol, and at times tower control. This channel was greatly over­
as an administrative net for the vessels of the crowded, and 6970 kilocycles, HF tower control,
screen. was utilized wherever possible. Use of the HF net
For this operation the local air warning net con­ proved very satisfactory. Late in the operation
trol officer controlled the net from a position in 116.10 megocycles, VHF, was also designated as
CIC. This enabled him to keep accurate location Airfield Tower Control to relieve the burden on
of anti-submarine patrol aircraft by checking the 140.58 megocycles.
vertical plot board. During air alerts he was in It is recommended for future operations, where
•close touch with the air situation and broadcast several airfields are to be activated in the vicinity,
more pertinent information to net stations than that primary tower control of the fields be placed
on previous operations. on 116.10 megocycles (Army-Navy Common) to
(f) flunter-killer.—The frequency 3355 kilo­ avoid loss of efficiency due to overloading one
cycles was used effectively on numerous occasions Aircraft Common frequency. 140.58 megocycles
could then be used as a common VHF tower con­ ASCU COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS­
trol for itinerant and special aircraft operating in NET PROCEDURE
the area.
From: Commander,Amphibious Forces
Air-ground visual communications were limited
to use of white phosphorous mortar shells to mark One of the chief local difficulties that developed
targets,and colored smoke grenades and fluorescent after the operation commenced full swing was t
panels to mark front-line positions. keep all net officers currently abreast of the situa­
Use of codes and ciphers was limited to the tion. For example, the ASC and ICAS net offi­
Shackle code no others being adapted to rapid cers were receiving and sending many dispatches
voice communications. pertaining to policy, and the SAD, SAR, SAO
A system of code words covering standard and other officers were too busy to be interrupted
armament loadings of aircraft should be devised to give them this information unless it was a mat­
and instituted to cut down the length of trans­ ter of the greatest urgency for them individually.
missions on this subject. Therefore it was decided to adopt the procedure in
use by the ASCU in the Eldorado, and enlarge
ASCU COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS­ upon it,by immediately typing up all messagessent
RADIO EQUIPMENT and received of any significance whatever, orig­
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force inal and seven copies and distributing one each to
The TCZ (10 channel selector transmitter) has CASCU, ACIO, and all net officers. These dis­
proven invaluable as an emergency transmitter on patches not only had local time date groups, but
importantcircuits and for seldom used frequencies. were also given a serial number in numerical order
It is recommended that a TCA (with rectifier to facilitate easy reference. It was found that this
type power supply) be assigned for the sole use of system was sound and effective in keeping all
ASCU. ASCU officers abreast of the situation, and is
accordingly recommended as a standard operating
ASCU COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS­ procedure for all ASCUs.
VOICE PROCEDURE
ASCU COMMUNICATION RECOMMENDATIONS
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
Widespread instructions on use of the handheld From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
RS-38 microphone should be instigated for all Immediately prior to leaving Leyte two new
personnel of all services who have occasion to use AN—ARC-1 radio sets were installed. These were
one because it is not generally known that this used advantageously by CASCU and CIC. A dis­
device was originally designed so that it will not advantage noted in their use wasthe limited power
pick up side noises in noisy aircraft and tanks. supply provided by the batteries. This can be rec­
Unless the "mike" is held against the lips as all tified by installation of a motor generator. All
instructions issued with the equipment require, it radio gear except the AN—ARC-1 was tested with
will not transmit full volume. Two operators in other ships prior to leaving Leyte and necessary
our Joint Operations room were seen trying to talk adjustments in operating equipment were made.
into the back of this type microphone which is In the Joint Operations room, alterations were
indicative of too little indoctrination for prospec­ made to the table thereby changing itsshapefrom a
tive users of the equipment. Few operators are U to an H design. The intelligence officer occu­
holding the"mike" againstthe lips as instructed in pied the "well" thus formed and was able to effect
manuals. As artillery, naval gunfire and air sup­ closer liaison with SAD,SAR,and SAO. Space
port- are closely tied in and air support cannot was also made available for two additional jack
function at times until the others are stopped, it boxes which were installed for use as emergency
is felt that it is not out of place to stress here that operating positions. A greater availability and
no only air support personnel, but also artillery use of VHF channels by this unit was made pos­
and Naval Gunfire personnel, be thoroughly sible by installation of the two AN—ARC-1 trans­
drilled in the proper use of this vital piece of mitters in the voice filter room, the addition of
equipment. jack boxes in the - Joint Operations room, and by
* ,)
: A-7
•
 •

I ; SUPPORT
R

installing additional patch cOriTs. tr*ciajtlieLATHF mentioned in the clear when they should have
transmitter panel to the HF transmitter panel in been shackled. Weather, codes should be used
Radio 1. These installations proved to be very more often, and the reporting of downed planes
valuable in handling problems such as the imme­ should be shackled. It is recommended that a
diate need of an additional VHF channel or the code be set up to cover the directions given to
replacement of one which was temporarily dis- CAP aircraft. For example, when CAP is or­
abled. It is recommended that a similar system be dered to pancake it seems unwise to use plain lan­
installed in other AGC's to afford greater use of guage.
available equipment and utilization of more VHF From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
channels.
The practice of "shackling" ETA's and ETD's
Recommendations over the IFD net of information received mo­
(1) Install a dynamotor in lieu of batteries as . ments earlier in plain language on VHF from
a constant power supply for AN—ARC-1 radio CAP is violating the code. Plain language is pref-
equipment. erable to compromising a useful instrument. The
(2) Install -local (VHF) receivers in the voice 'enemy seems to know when our TCAP is re-
filter room where needed. lieved. ­
(3) Provide each CASCU with all necessary MESSAGE DROPS
s
equipment and supplie before departi ng for for-
ward area, since complete reliance cannot be From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
placed on ship and staff supply sources. Such As an aid in facilitating message dropping it is
equipment and supply should include frequency suggested that the boat assigned to the pick-up
meters and local and remote receivers for each net. make"figure 8"turns on the ship's designated bow
(4) Designate separate "reporting-in-on" fre- in addition to the ship flashing the signal "Easy";
quencies, if possible, when there are to be two or the turns are spotted easily by the pilot and he is
more adjacent attack forces. The present use of not confused in trying to determine ship's head-
one. channel by an excessive number of stations ing, and port and starboard sides.
causes it to be ineffective. The situation could be
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
helped by the selection of an entirely separate fre­
quency for use by control towers. It is also be- Pilots were always told to come in low and slow
lieved that much of the present ineffectiveness of for their drops to ships' boats. However,on one
this net is caused by "peak" loads which could be occasion a pilot came in from about 600 feet alti­
eliminated by having strike groups so staggered tude in a fast glide, though with.flaps down. The
when reporting on station that groups assignecl to result was that one can of negatives broke open
two or more forces would not report in at the and sank. Some of these particular negatives
same time. were vitally needed, and the pilot had flirted with
(5) Install a 22 MC intercommunications box light AA to getthem. Itis considered that a para­
in the voice filter room in order that transmissions chute or drag of some sort should be used on all
between CASCU and other communication cen- message drops.
ters in the ship may be expedited. It is believed Before each approach the pilot was given the
that the Teton is the only ACC which at present ship's heading, and bearing and distance from a
does not have this equipment available to CASCU familiar reference point. Then, by close coordi­
in the voice filter room. nation with flag bridge, the drop was timed cor­
rectly.
MISCELLANEOUS • PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SECURITY
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force From the best we could learn, no leaflets were
Breaches of security were not numerous. How- dropped by aircraft on le Shima. Itis understood
ever, frequencies and distances were sometimes that leaflet dropping was placed under the direct
 MIS
_ ; •
.4 •
supervision of an'6ffiter,especially instructed as period long-rangfihtY1%pjagainst Empire
to where they should be dropped. The natives fields were not profitable. The alternative in this
of le Shima were invariably hostile until it was case was to let the enemy come to us and destroy
explained.to them by Nisei and others that they him in the air. This conception of battle was
would be treated kindly. Even women attacked. proven to be correct during these operations, as in
our ground forces. Many natives caused consid­ past operations.
erable damage. On the mainland of Okinawa it
was reported that these leaflets softened the atti­ AAF MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION
tude of the native population. It is felt that the From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
same good effect could have been achieved amongst
the relatively numerous natives on le Shima. Twenty-first Bomber Command
A total of 40 tons of propaganda bombs to­ (a) L-20 to L— 10. Industrial cities of Hon­
gether with 3 Army propaganda specialist officers shu were struck with maximum effort.
were loaded aboard 13 of the.CVEs. The first (b) L-5 to L-day. Air installations on Kyushu
leaflets were dropped on Love-day and daily there­ were struck heavily.
after for the first week of the operation. Early (c) L-F1 and thereafter. Honshu strikes were
and incomplete reports from the Tenth Army in­ resumed and several Empire harbors were mined.
dicate the results of the propaganda leaflets were Due to heavy enemy air attacks on this Force
good among the civilians. through L+11, the Twenty-First Bomber Com­
mand was requested to strike Kyushu airfields
WEATHER PLANES until such time as additional fighters could be
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Ticonder­ based at the objective. The Twenty-First Bomber
oga(CV 14) Command complied with an average of about 75
sorties per day f­ rom 17 April through 11 May.
Most carrier operations in the uture will be well
within the range of land-based search planes,and Fifth Air Force
it is highly recommended that when this is the (a) L— 16 and L— 15. On each day approxi­
case such planes be sent to the vicinity of the tar­ mately 120 Liberators, 80 medium bombers, and
get a short time before scheduled strikes to trans­ 150 fighters covered movements of fast carriers
mit the latest weather information directly to the by striking air installations on Formosa.
Striking carrier task force. For the strike of 8 (b) L— 14 to L— 7. Approximately 80 Liber­
June. against Kanoya a weather plane was re­ ators, 40 medium bombers, and 50 fighters struck
quested on the morning of the strike,and informa­ air installations on Formosa daily.
tion obtained proved of great value in corroborat­ (c) L—6 and thereafter. Airfields and commu­
ing the forecasts from other sources. nications on Formosa have been hit by an average
of about 28 Liberators,6 medium bombers, and 9
LONG RANGE FIGHTER SWEEPS AGAINST THE
EMPIRE fighters per day.
(d) Antishipping missions have been conducted
From: Commander, Task Force 58 regularly along the China Coast throughout the
On two occasions long range fighter sweeps were operation.
launched against airfields in southern Kyushu.
Fourteenth Air Force
Those sweeps were not effective because of the fact
that the enemy refused to send up planes and very The Fourteenth Air Force and Strategic Air
cleverly dispersed and camouflaged his operational ForcePOA provided neutralization strikes against
aircpaft; at the same time utilizing dummy air­ Hongkong and Nanpo Shoto.
craft that were difficult to distinguish from the DDT SPRAYING
air. The result was that our fighter pilots in the
face of heavy antiaircraft,opposition had a diffi­ From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
cult,time destroying planes on the ground. It was (a) An extelisive program for spraying DDT
the opinion of commander,TF 58 that during this over friendly territory was planned and carried
r'
11111111111111111111111k
12 April 1945. Okinawa Gunto—Supplies Dropped to Marines on Motobu Peninsula.
out. The equipment and chemicals for spraying were ordered to transfer the balance of the supplies
were loaded on three of the CVE's. The first to Yontan Field. This was done by lighterage
spraying was on L 1-day by two TBM planes. from Kerama Retto, being completed by April 24.
The work was continued daily for the first week (c) All air deliveries were successful and no
from the carriers and until all DDT was expended. unusual difficulties were encountered. The pres­
(b) The Tenth Army ordered forward a C-47 ent policy for marking the area where the drop is
plane equipped for spraying on L+7 (8 April). to be made with panels and smoke pots plus allow-
The plane crashed while flying a mission on 11 ing the air liaison party to "coach in" the planes,
April, killing one medical officer and fatally in- when necessary,is adequate. Some of the supplies'
juring seven members of the crew. A replacement were reported wormy or wet.
plane arrived 15 April and continued the spraying
throughout the period covered by this report. BLACK-OUT SUITS

AIR DELIVERY OF SUPPLIES From: Commander, Carrier Division 4

From: Commander, Amphibious Forces During the period covered by this report most
of the pilots of VF-12 and VFB-12 attached to
(a) Due to an unfortunate series of events, the
U. S. S. Randolph used the new black-out suits.
air delivery commitments far exceeded the capac-
Comments of other squadrons on this equipment
ity of the(NE's. The Tenth Army packaged 876
have not been received. All pilots in Air Group
tons of supplies and equipment and furnished 144
12 who have used the black-out suits are most
personnel to handle it. This was much in excess enthusiastic about them. The protection against
of the amount the carriers could lift. An emer-
black-out has enabled several of them to execute
gency agreement was reached whereby 390 tons of
radical maneuvers in combat which would other-
air delivery supplies were taken to the objective
wise have been impossible. In addition to its
area by 13 CVE's. The balance followed in gar-
principal function this equipment was inflated by
rison shipping.
one downed pilot and supplemented the Mae West
(b) The first supplies were dropped on L+2­ in keeping the pilot afloat until he was rescued.
day at 0925 to the Seventh Regimental Combat The only criticism of the black-out suit is one
Team of the First Marine Division. Additional that is already known—the inflammability of the
supplies were dropped on the following day and materialfromm which itis made. Thisreceived con-
intermittently thereafter up to L+17-day. Not firmation from the fire resulting from a landing
all of the supplies were needed before arrange- crash on Randolph. The burns received by the
ments were completed for carrying on this service pilot were in part caused by combustion of his
from the airfield -ashore. The carriers, therefore, black-out suit.

3-46
 Chapter IV. INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL COMMENTS (a) Air and gunnery target map,scale 1:25,000,

showing target areas and defenses (50 sheets)._
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces (b) Intelligence map, scale 1:36,000, showing
Okinawa Gunto is a prefecture of Japan, a, target squares and defenses as of 3 January 1945
densely populated chain of rugged islands. Iso- (16 sheets).
lated from the world by the Japanese,information (c) Bombardment chart, scale 1:36,000, show-
of military value of this strategic inner defense ing target areas, beaches.and defenses (15 sheets).
line of the Empire was difficult to obtain. How- .(d) Approach chart, scale 1:72,000 (6 sheets).
ever, captured Japanese charts furnished excel- (e) Line map of Hagushi beaches and Ie Shima,
lent hydrographic data. Captured documents, scale 1:10,000 (10 sheets).
interrogation of former residents of the islands, (f) Plotting map,scale 1:100,000 (2 sheets).
and old publications furnished limited basic in- (g) Road map,scale 1:250,000(1 sheet).
telligence. (h) Tentative anchorage charts of Okinawa
The requests for photo coverage, the assembly (6 sheets).
of intelligence data,and the reproduction and dis- (i) H. 0. Chart No. 6132, Okinawa Shima,
tribution of material were all done in close coordi- Southern Part.
nation with the 0-2 section of the Tenth Army, (j) Beach maps and diagrams (6 sheets).
JicPoa,Fifth Fleet,First Carrier Task Force,and (k) Engineering and terrain intelligence team
commander, Air Force,Pacific, and Thirtieth and study, "Beach and Terrain Study of Area Be­
Sixty-Fourth Topographical Engineering Bat- tween Zampa-Misaki and Chatan, Okinawa
talions. Shima"(7 sheets).
The intelligence on the objective was as com- (1) Controlled mosaic of southern half of Old­
plete as could be hoped for and was thoroughly nawa, showing beaches and defenses (13 sheets).
disseminated throughout the Joint Expeditionary (m) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 9CL-45
Force. Information as to the beaches was excel­ of 24 January 1945,Captured Enemy Material and
lent, and although the reef was again a problem Documents, Handling of.
in unloading, it was found to be substantially as For the first time in the Pacific Ocean areas,the
predicted in the studies and offered no serious diffi­ world polyconic grid, with target area designator,
culties, especially since there was practically no was used on all maps and charts. This grid will
surf. The only element of surprise was the tac- be used on all maps and charts in future opera­
tical situation ashore when the enemy chose to tions. This is not a radical departure from the
withdraw from prepared defenses in the area of "Flintlock grid". .
the assault beaches and defend in the more favor- A 1:72,000 scale intelligence map showing major
able terrain in the southern part of the island. enemy installations as 25 March 1945 was repro­
Preliminary -distribution included general de- duced by the Intelligence Section and given the
scriptive material, preliminary information on widest possible distribution at the objective. This
defenses, a detailed study of the beaches and reef, map showed only guns of 3-inch caliber and above
information on Jap suicide-boat tactics, a weather and was reproduced to facilitate choice of primary
study, tide and daylight and dark tables, instruc- targets for naval gunfire support.
tions on handling prisonerg of war, captured ma- Anchorage charts for the staging areas at Sai­
terial and documents, and counter intelligence pan,Ulithi,Eniwetok,and Leyte were reproduced
material. and distributed to all ships.
Thefinal distribution ofthe intelligence material Tentative anchorage charts for five anchorages
to all units included: at the objective were prepared by the hydro­
;12
 GENERAL COMMENTS

graphic officer and reproduced and distributed to bling and using all target information. How-
all ships and port directors for issue to ships later ever, maximum use was not made of the target
sent to the objective. •Two more anchorage charts information developed by fire-support ships, and
were prepared and distributed at the objective. much of the information reported was of dubious
Final anchorage charts were prepared at the ob- value. Some ships had difficulty locating targets
jective after hydrographic reconnaissance by the and were also too prone to label them "knocked
various hydrographic- units. These were printed out" without sufficient evidence.
on the hydrographic vessels and distributed to all In the early phase of the operation, it was de­
ships present and to port directors,Poa and Leyte. termined that specially trained gunfire-support
The problem of obtaining information from and intelligence officers be assigned to bombardment
maintaining liaison with intelligence units ashore ships for future operations. These officers, who
is one that requires attention. Naval forces must are to be thoroughly acquainted with all photo-
be apprised immediately of the capture of docu­ graphs and other intelligence data pertaining to
mails or prisoners providing information of value the operation, are to do necessary briefing and be
for current or future operations. Specifically,the available throughout an operation for repeated
naval forces want information on weather,hydrog- consultation on damage assessment, new targets,
raphy, captured charts, maps (for naval gunfire etc.
support), enemy strength, particularly garrisons Three aerial hydrographic observers were
on enemy-occupied islands, air order of battle and again assigned to CVE's of TF 52. Beginning
tactics, etc. L 7 at Kerama, Retto and continuing daily
As in previous operations, special intelligence through L-day,they flew over the assault beaches
teams were provided by the Joint Intelligence to observe conditions of the surf, height of swells,
Center, Pacific Ocean areas. These teams were length of breakers, etc. Their reports were sent
composed of specialists in all appropriate fields of to all ships.by dispatch from the CVE to which
intelligence and were trained in the handling of they were attached. On L-day they reported their
captured enemy material. These teams were as- findings by voice and their observations were sent
signed to the commander, Expeditionary Troops, over TBS to all ships present. Their reports were
and were charged with the collection,examination, •accurate and valuable.
and forwarding of enemy material of interest to A detailed study of the landing beach and hp-
the Joint Intelligence Center. Also, they were proaches was made by this Intelligence Section
specifically charged with expeditious delivery of from the excellent photographic sorties of 10
material or information of immediate operational October 1944.
value to the forces afloat and ashore. Although Chart 6132: These beach sketches were given
this latter function was handled satisfactorily in- early distribution to all units for use in planning.
sofar as the forces afloat were concerned during More detailed diagrams were later prepared and
this operation, it is felt that a more positive rela­ distributed to all ships.
tionship between intelligence units ashore and Sonne studies made from late and better photo-
afloat should be provided. graphic coverage were not available soon enough
Target information centers were maintained by for general distribution. However, the depth de­
the Tenth Army, and the Third Corps, and the termination corresponded closely with the earlier
Twenty-fourth Corps in close coordination with studies and sketches and made such distribution
the respective naval intelligence and gunnery unnecessary. Soundings and examination of the
officers. All deep-fire support was coordinated by beaches and reefs indicated that actual beach and
the Tenth Army Artillery Officer. All targets reef conditions closely approximated the data on
located by air or ground observers, or by means of the preliminary beach sketches.
photographs, were reported to the center respon- With few exceptions the Hagushi landing.
sible for the sector in which they were located, and beaches used by the assault waves proved to be
then assigned to fire-support ships,artillery, or air reasonably satisfactory for landing troops and
support. supplies. The reef dried or was slightly awash at
This proved the most workable plan for assem- low water as predicted. This was no great ob­
'4
11111111
.1111111
 V

INTELLIGENCE

stacle, since the reef floor waTs'ouind toThi,fairly curve from Zampa,Misaki to Chatan was sounded.
level, and earth and pontoon causeways could be Several uncharted coral heads inside the ten fa­
built to the edge of the reef. thom curve were found and marked. On the com­
On arrival at Kerma Retto with the 'Western pletion of the soundings in this area, an anchor­
Islands Attack Force, two of the units imme­ age chart was prepared, printed and distributed
diately began survey operations in that area as by ComPhibsPac. This completed the assault
outlined in the Hydrographic Survey and Naviga­ hydrographc activities for the first part of
tional Aids Plan, appendix III to Annex (L)— phase I.
SOPA Instructions, ComPhibsPac Op Plan Al­ Hydrographic and topographic details encoun­
45. Additional buoys were laid,currents and tides tered in Nakagusuku Wan agreed closely with
observed,and special examinations of beaches and those shown on the Hydrographic Office charts
anchorages made as requested by SOPA Kerama of this bay. Numerous discrepancies in shoals
Retta. All radar reflector buoys plus numerous and reefs were discovered by the Bowditch, in
additional ones were planted by Cominnic. The Chimu Wan. These discrepancies were reported
positions of all these buoys were determined or for dissemination by Q message from time to time
checked. Third class navigation buoys were laid as discovered.
in the ship lane and at Shimo Sone. Acetylene-
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
burning navigation lights were established on
Aware Said and Kamiyama Shima. The former There was substantially less detailed intelli­
was maintained by the SOPA Keraka Retto, but gence available from higher echelons concerning
maintenance of the latter and all of. the small the beaches and defenses in the Western Islands
lighted buoys in the Keise Shima and Kerama than on Okinawa proper. Accordingly, it was
Retto areas, except those in the anchorage, was necessary for the Intelligence Section to prepare
discontinued about 10 April. The small lighted and produce,through the medium of the Map Re-.
buoys were originally intended as temporary aids production Unit aboard the U. S. S. Mount Mc­
until vessels Operating in these areas had become Kinley, the greater part of the beach sketches,
acquainted with local conditions. The radar re­ diagrams and charts of the assault area which
flector buoys were maintained throughout as aids were used by the Western Islands Attack Group.
for fire-support ships operating in this area. Over 40 individual diagrams, sketches, and half­
While conducting hydrographic operations in the tones were prepared and reproduced.
Kerama Retto these two units printed and dis­ Inasmuch as the plan involved the simultane­
tributed temporary charts showing the new de­ ous assault of six islands, it was of necessity un­
velopments. On their departure to take up new usually complex. Therefore, every effort was
surveys at Okinawa, all unfinished work and made to provide each coxswain, control officer,
records were transferred to the Bowditch. The and boat officer with all possible graphic mate­
Bowditch later assembled all data developed by the rial in the form of diagrams, photographs, and
units into a field chart of Kerama Retto. The descriptive matter which would aid him to accom­
hydrographic and topographic details of the Ker­ plish his particular assignment. The unit intel­
ama Retto and Keise Shima areas were found to ligence officers did an unusually good job of brief­
conform very closely to those shown on the Hydro- ing, whether graphic, written,or oral. This brief­
graphic Office charts of those areas. The only ing is considered to have been contributory to the
major discrepancy found was a 7-foot spot 220° fact that not one casualty was incurred during
160 yards from the center of berth K92. the landings in INT's on the assault beaches, and
The remaining two units arrived off the south­ all beaches were identified without difficulty.
ern Hagushi landing beaches with the Southern The day before the arrival of TG 51.1 in the
Tractor Flotilla. They began hydrographic sur­ assault area, a reconnaissance report concerning
vey operations according to plan on L-day. Navi­ the Western Islands assault beaches was received
gation lights were established and all known off­ by dispatch through commander TF 52 from the
shore dangers were marked. The offshore area underwater demolition teams. This indicated that
between the low water line and the 30-fathom reef conditions would preclude the preferred plan
 GENERAL

for landing in LCVP's on two of the six initial received from joint intelligence by naval and
beaches. An alternate plan had been prepared ground staffs.
against such a contingency. After the receipt of Comparison of predicted installations with
the reconnaissance report, however, a modified those found ashore has not yet been received.
preferred plan was adopted whereby LArrs were There is, however, sufficient evidence at hand to
used for all of the assaults. warrantthe conclusion that major defense installa­
During the operatidn, the Intelligence Section tions,atleast,were predicted through photographs
prepared summary and special intelligence re­ with a high degree of accuracy. So far as is known
ports, originated daily and special situation re­ at this time,no gun battery on the Western Islands
ports, maintained a strategic plot in the flag shel­ or Okinawa Shima was missed by the interpreters.
ter and visual presentation of the various phases All of these installations if not actually destroyed,
of the operation. Close liaison was kept with the had at least been under gunfire or an air strike for
G-2 of the Seventy-seventh Division, and this several days before the landings. In the landing-
efficient and extensive organization provided much beach area,except for a rather formidable concen­
intelligence to this Command. Many ground and tration of artillery positions on the south flank,all
aerial photographs were taken,some of which are gun positions, pill boxes and other defense works
reproduced in the photographic supplement to were destroyed or at least rendered untenable, as
this Action Report. they were not manned when the landing was made.
Late photographs disclosed the south flank con­
From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Amphib­ centration in time to provide heavy air strikes
ious Support Force and CTG 51.19) and bombardmenton Love-1- and Love-day which
Using information from all sources, the photo­ apparently rendered these positions ineffective.
graphic interpretation section compiled a target Up to the time of this report, no particularly
list consisting of priority targets for naval gunfire new types ofenemy defense installations have been
and air. At Ulithi,ships'spott6rs and air spotters discovered except for the suicide boats,concerning
were briefed on these installations but it was again which much information has already been distrib­
apparent,as it was before Iwo,that a short brief­ uted, and the shore-based torpedo-launching de­
ing aboard the flagship can only serve as an intro­ vices on the shore of Yonabaru Wan.
duction to those installations which ships and
planes mustlocate in order to destroy. Much more From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
must be done—in fact, the briefing must be a con­ With the change of command on Love-I-46, all
tinuing process up to the time of opening fire. functions relative to intelligence, initiated and
One solution is to have aboard each heavy bom­ planned by ComPhibsPac prior to his relief, were
bardment ship (013B, CA, and CL) a trained continued. Operational intelligence planning was
officer whose knowledge of individual targets will limited to preparation of material necesary for the
permit him to brief the appropriate gunnery per­ occupation of Kume Shima.
sonnel prior to and during the operation,and who A JicPoa team,consisting of at least the follow­
will serve as a "photographic spotter" during ac­ ing specialists, naval material, aviation material,
tual firing. On the few occasions when this com­ bomb and mine disposal, and language,should be
mand has been able to loan qualified personnel,the embarked in a specially designated small craft of
reaction of the ship and results of firing have beep the LCItype assigned to the task force commander
most gratifying. and equipped for light salvage work including
The photo-interpretation section consisted of diving. Previously this has been handled by
four interpreters, three regularly with the staff JicPoa teams assigned to the landing force how­
and one on loan from FMF Pac. At Ulithi, this ever, the increased number of sunken Japanese
section was augmented by three officers and three ships and crashed aircraft encountered makes this
enlisted men from Tenth Army who accompanied a highly technical full-time job if the naval in­
Colonel Ely, G-2, Tenth Army. The advice and telligence material is to be gathered quickly and
assistance rendered by these officers was invalu­ efficiently.
able, and again demonstrates the benefits to be Further indoctrination of naval personnel with
regard to Japanese language material seems nec­ advance and subsequent intelligence was made
essary,particularly in case of further operationsin available to all forces. There were estimated to
areas with Japanese-speaking civilian popula­ be between 60,000 and 70,000 enemy troops defend­
tions. The following points, brought out in pre­ ing the island, with the greater strength concen­
vious CinCPac and ComPhibsPac orders, need trated in the southern half. Although no coastal
constant repetition: defense guns had been noted in the vicinity of the
(a) That such material often has cmisiderable northern beaches, pillboxes were strategically
tactical importance and that it is impossible for placed along the entire beach area. Yontan air­
individuals without knowledge of Japanese to de­ field and vicinity was estimated to be heavily de­
termine which documents are important and which fended with both heavy and automatic AA guns,
are not. and it was to be expected that the high ground
(b) That looting of civilian property is strictly bordering the airfield to the north and east would
forbidden. conceal many defensive positions not detectable
(c) That enemy documents and material, how­ from a study of aerial photographs. Prior to
ever obtained, are not the property of individuals Love-day (1 April) all the airfields on the island
but of the government,-and that such material can were reported neutralized and air opposition was
only become the property of individuals after it is not expected to impede our advance.
passed by intelligence and certified by command­ Commencing at 0830 Love-day (1 April), as
ing officers. scheduled, troops of the First and Sixth Marine
(d) That retention of such material without Divisions were landed without difficulty. No op­
turning it in for release by intelligence is a pun­ position was encountered and troops of both di­
ishable offense. visions continued to advance inland standing up.
Because of the greater facilities for translation There were no enemy troops in the landing area
maintained by shore-based units,and because most and gunfire was nil. The airfield was found to be
material recovered after the preliminary stages of abandoned and all guns removed from revetments.
an amphibious operation is.primarily of interest Several dummy planes were placed under nets just
to the Army,it is desirable that material acquired off the field and a few operational planes were lo­
ashore by naval personnel be turned in to intelli­ cated intactin the town nearby. No land mines or
gence officers ashore and not brought aboard ship, booby traps were encountered. The caves and
whenever such procedure is possible. burial vaults, which were thought to be defended,
Maintenance of liaison with other commands werefound deserted and there was no evidence that
afloat and ashore is of the greatest importance in they had ever been fortified. By nightfall troops
the prompt translation and dissemination of docu­ had advanced to the originally cheduled Love+3
ments and in the correct handling of prisoners. line. By Love+5-day,III Corps.troops continued
It is desirable to keep informed regarding trans­ to advance to the Love+20 line, meeting only light
lation and interrogation activities of other com­ resistance. Heaviest resistance was met on
mands in the same area and regarding types of Motobu Peninsula where 1,000 to 1,500 Japs-were
material in which such commands are especially located in the hills southeast of Toguchi. Al­
interested. Prisoners should be processed in such though the northern two-thirds of the island was
a way that all commands interested are able to pronounced secured on 22 April,it was still neces­
conduct further specialized interrogation of valu­ sary to maintain patrols in a continuous mopping
able prisoners after preliminary interrogation is up operation.
completed. For these purposes it is desirable that
routing procedures be set up before the beginning ENEMY DEFENSES
of the operation.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
From: Commander Amphibious Group '4
The capture and occupation of the island of Oki­ The enemy made only one attempt against the
nawa,it was considered, would be one of the most Force by surface attack. This ended in the proper
difficult operations undertaken by the Amphibious disposition of the Yamato and most of its escorts
Forces in the Pacific. Plans were made well in by CTF 58 on 7 April 1945.
•
 L.

The most effective enemy weapon was the em­ and further inland. As they were poorly camou­
ployment for the first time of mass suicide plane flaged, detection was relatively easy, and they
attacks with as many as 51 planes attacking a served only to delay the advance of the troops.
single ship. These attacks were anticipated, and The one tactical surprise was the withdrawal
the intelligence regarding them was excellent. in of defense from prepared positions on and imme­
spite of the many raids on enemy airfields, and diately back of the Hagushi beaches to the south­
the high toll taken by the CAP,many planes made ern part of the island where the terrain was more
determined attacks on ships in all areas, but espe­ favorable for defense. As a result the landing
cially on the screens. The brilliant firing of the was very lightly opposed. No mines were encoun­
DD's and LCS's and the fighting spirit of these tered and the troops quickly secured a large beach­
and other ships dealt effectively with this most head and unloading proceeded without difficulty.
formidable threat of the enemy. The main enemy defense was in the southern
For the first time the enemy attacked with a part of the island north of Shun. Here the enemy
weird human-piloted bomb—the Baka bomb. This dug in and used natural caves and the rough ter­
bomb is described in detail in the Weekly JicPoa rain much as was done at Iwo Jima. The use
Bulletin and other technical publications. A num­ of mass artillery and mortar fire, mutually sup­
ber of attacks were made against vessels, but only porting strong points, counterattacks, and infil­
a few were successful. The effectiveness of this tration made the defense a strong one.
new weapon is as yet questionable, but it is a po­
tentially serious threat, and the most effective From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
means of combating this device are being con­ It is interesting to note that the enemy on ie
sidered. Shima employed the same "Jack in the Box" tac­
As anticipated, the enemy was prepared to tics as in southern Okinawa. In both localities
launch hundreds of fast, one-way suicide bbats the enemy did not disclose his presence until we
against the ships of this Force. This danger was had approached within close range or overrun
largely avoided when over 400 such craft were his positions. A most intricate system of under­
destroyed in the early occupation of Kerama Retto. ground connecting passageways had been con­
To date over 300 more have been destroyed on or structed on Iegusugu Yama, with cave mouths
near Okinawa. Special photographic missions well camouflaged to prevent detection from photo­
were flown to find the caves in which these boats graphs. Caves ranged in depths up to 30 feet
were concealed and both naval gunfire and plane and afforded excellent concealmentfor mortar and
strikes have been directed against these targets. machine gun fire. Small parties of the enemy
An effective "fly-catcher" screen was constantly equipped with "satchel charges" consisting of
on patrol. (This is described in detail in the naval wooden boxes containing explosives, attempted to
ordnance and gunnery report.) These precau­ infiltrate our lines at night,fulfilling their mission
tions proved effective and although several ships by detonating their."pack" in a suicidal attempt
wee damaged by suicide boats, none were sunk. to destroy our troops. In several instances women
Although the enemy still has a number of sub­ were employed for these fanatical missions. Most
marines available, their utter ineffectiveness in of the attackers were killed before they were able
this operation was surprising. It was a tribute to accomplish their assigned tasks. Antitank bar­
to the effectiveness of our antisubmarine measures. riers consisted of large boulders of rocks lined
Minefields were extensive, but all operating along the foot of the mountain. Caves along the
areas were swept prior to and after L-day. Thus airfield contained parts for baka bombs, similar
this danger to shipping was eliminated. A great to those found on Okinawa but no complete units
number of•floating mines were found in the area, were-discovered. Several dummy planes and a
and many ships reported the sinking of these by few damaged ones were found near the airfield.
gunfire. Heavy air attacks were anticipated from the
Land mines of all types were relied upon as a numerous airfieldsin southern Kyushu to the north
major defensive weapon only on Ie Shima where and Formosa to the southwest, both lying within
they were thickly laid on the beaches, airfields a 350-mile radius of the target. Enemy air reac­

";: i •

4
 ii ,4*

t
,

TAGENCE
i•

tion, however, did not materialize as quickly as Phib Corps and the capture of Motobu Peninsula
anticipated, and it was not until Love plus 6 that by advance overland rather than by amphibious
very heavy raids were received. landing as had originally been contemplated.
Suicide air attacks were numerous and interro­ Photo coverage of 21 and 22 January 1945 indi­
gation of captured Jap pilots indicated that some cated two strong centers of resistance on le Shima,
of the crews being used were just out of training one in the vicinity of the Southern Beaches and
school and had no previous combat experience. west Coast, the other organized in depth between
Planes used were of -saried types including Val, the airfield and the town of Ie Shima. These were
Zeke, Oscar, Betty, Sally, Judy, Jill, and Dinah, estimated to be two infantry battalions plus air­
and probably training planes as well. field service troops, totalling 2,500 defending the
No Jap surface units were estimated to be in island. No coastal defense guns were observed
the vicinity and none were encountered. Al­ and the airfield appeared to be lightly defended.
though it was expected that suicide boats, swim­ It was expected that the enemy would make a last
mers and midget submarines would prove a ditch stand on and around Iegusugu Yama,a 604­
constant hazard, ships of this command suffered foot pinnacle rising from the eastern section of
no damage from this source. However,numerous the island. Although both vertical and oblique
attacks were attempted by suicide boats as the photo coverage of the mountain did not disclose
operation progressed. Numerous abandoned small any defensive positions, it was believed that guns
boats were found along the north shore of Motobu could easily be concealed in caves and camouflaged
Peninsula but it is doubtful if as many as 700 positions.
suicide boats, mentioned in a document captured Photo coverage of 22 March 1945 showed for the
on Kerama Retto, are based on Okinawa. first time that the enemy had dug trenches and
Approaches to the Hagushi Beach area had been holes on all the airstrips, thus rendering them in-
reported as mined. During mine-sweeping oper­ operational. Guns had been removed from the
ations over 235 mines were located and destroyed vicinity of the field and no sign of activity could
in and near the transport area, prior to Love-day. be seen anywhere on the island. A captured Jap­
Both floating and moored mines were frequently anese document disclosed that the enemy started
reported by various ships after initial sweeping to wreck the field on 20 March 1945. POW's cap­
and these were destroyed by gunfire. tured on Okinawa claimed to have heard that
No underwater obstacles or beach mines were troops had been evacuated from the island on Wil­
found. Antiboat barriers,clearly shown in photo­ liam —4a DD had observed a Jap plane flying low
graphs in the vicinity of Red and Blue Beaches, over the island,receiving obviously inaccurate AA
were removed by UDT prior to landing. fire from the vicinity of the airfield. The plane
The importance of prompt delivery of both neg­ circled over the field, suddenly landed near the
atives and prints of appropriate aerial photo­ north-south runway,and was quickly hidden from
graphs to group commands during the planning sight. During the same night,several bogies were
phase,has long been stressed in amphibious action tracked into the center of the island and then lost
reports. However, it should be pointed out that from the radar screen, indicating that they were
this group did not receive negatives and prints of possibly landing on the field. However, observa­
the very important 28 February coverage until 22 tion planes, flying low over Ie Shima.from Wil­
March, too late to be of any value for further liam— 5- to William-day, failed to note any ac­
distribution. tivity.
• The value to attack forces of sonne depth-deter­ At 0800 -William-day (16 April), troops of the
mination studies could be greatly enhanced if suffi­ Seventy-seventh Division were landed on Ie Shima
cient data were provided to permit plotting, in at the southwest beaches and advanced rapidly
advance, possible landing craft channels from the inland against light opposition,securing approxi­
edge of the reef to the beach. mately 65 percent of the island by nightfall. The
The assault on Ie Shima, tentatively scheduled airfield had been mined and abandoned and no
for Love+30 was advanced to Love+15(William­ troops were found in that vicinity. Increasingly
day) due to the rapid progress of troops of the III heavy resistance was met as the advance ap­
 POW REPORTS AND CAPTURED -15,0011tEN
1
-

proached Ie Shima town and Iegusugu Yama. to use suicide boats in quantity for the defense
Here the enemy was found well intrenched in an of the island was not revealed until the capture
inter-locking cave defensive system, well pro­ of Kerama Retto,after which descriptive material
tected against naval gunfire and air attack. was issued to permit plans for counter action and
Heavy mortar, machine gun and rifle fire was destruction of suicide boat positions by naval gun­
encountered. Organized resistance ceased and fire and other means. Landing conditions on the
assault operations were completed at 1025 on 22 fringing reef actually were much better than de­
April. tailed study of photographs indicated.
Two infantry battalions were estimated to be on
the island however, units identified consisted of POW REPORTS AND CAPTURED
one infantry battalion,a labor battalion organized DOCUMENTS
as infantry, elements of an airfield battalion, and
armed civilians. From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
By 27 April,4,716 enemy dead had been counted, A*preliminary screening was made upon receipt
208 POW's captured,1,586 civilians_ interned, and to discover items of immediate value. These were
several hundred additional snipers and stragglers translated at once, or forwarded, as the situation
were estimated to be still hiding in caves through­ warranted. Example of this type are:
out the island. It should be noted that in spite , (1) Certain enemy top secret documents. Sev­
of excellent photo coverage and reconnaissance eral were recovered and forwarded to Commander,
by low-flying observation planes from 27 March Fifth Fleet immediately, and in one case at least,
to 15 April, only five people had been observed proved of the utmost value.
on the island of Ie Shima during that entire (2) Orders,, tactical and briefing notes for
period. Such successful concealment of almost pilots, instructions for the use of certain codes,
7,000 people is not only indicative of the enemy's etc. Part or full translations of these were made
capabilities in camouflage, but also of the definite and the original documents then sent direct to
limitations of aerial reconnaissance in estimating JicPoa.
enemy strength. Similar tactics were found in (3) Air-navigation charts,hydrographic charts,
southern Okinawa and may be expected in future sketches or airfields or installations, information
operations. regarding staging points for raids,etc. Informa­
Land mines ranging from 50 to 500 pounds in tion of this type was passed on to staff officers con­
size were planted throughout the entire airfield cerned, following which the documents were for­
area, along the roads in the southwestern part of warded to JicPoa. Wide dissemination of this in­
the island, and in back of Green Beach T-2. A formation was made when necessary.
captured document, giving the accurate location A more thorough examination was made,and the
of land mine fields greatly assisted the land forces material, with full information concerning each
in clearing mined areas. However,this work was item, was then forwarded to the JicPoa team
still in progress after the island had been declared ashore for further disposition.
secured. Prisoners dealt with by this command can be
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 divided into three groups: (1) Japanese air per­
sonnel, (2) Army personnel picked up by naval
2. The nature of the defenses of Okinawa,i. e.
the elaborate and well-concealed system of cover, forces,and (3) civilians.
prevented accurate detailed estimates of enemy (a) Those in group 1 were given a preliminary
strength and installations, nor would any amount interrogation to discover what information of im­
of photography and study have revealed the com­ mediate value they possessed and what disposition
plete picture picture of the enemy's plan for should be made of them. Copies of this prelimi­
defense. However,the nature of the terrain and nary interrogation were sent to interested com­
the probability of well prepared cover and sub­ mands.
terranean systems were emphasized repeatedly (b) Those in group 2 were given the routine in­
during planning and briefing. The enemy's plan terrogation required to fill out the JicPoa,"Dope
-,;;; 1 v.
;
t.

;1;:.
•
• •
 -4 t 71
a
-t
Ir:111;

Sheet," a copy of which was forwarded immedi­ They included six aviatiop enlisted personnel, one
ately to the forces ashore. officer and one enlisted man from an MTB,and one
(c) Those in group 3 comprise a special group enlisted man from a submarine. Intelligence
interrogated ashore for special information of im­ gained related to air fields used, condition of the
portance to the Amphibious Forces. fields,routes followed,and number of planes avail­
Instructions for the handling of captured docu­ able in units. Noteworthy was the fact that these
ments, prisoners, and stamping of souvenirs are POW reports gave evidence of the rapidly dwin­
laid down in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter dling potentiality of the Japanese Naval Air
9CL-45 and in Amphibious Forces Circular Letter Force,the disorganization of the aircraft servicing
AI20—Rev.1,Intelligence'Doctrine. facilities in both Kyushu and Formosa, and the
In order to aid in the collection of information youth and inexperience of the pilots. Informa­
of tactical value through the examination and tion was gained from one POW that indicated the
translation of captured documents and the inter­ possibility that the garrison of Ie Shima had been
rogation of prisoners,and to classify and make dis­ withdrawn.
position of other documents and prisoners, Japa­ A good many Japanese documents were recov­
nese-language officers from JicPoa were attached ered by officers of the Intelligence Section or turned
to both the forces ashore and the forces afloat. over to this Command by other ships for process­
Other officers from JicPoa were attached to the ing. One document of particular interest, recov­
forces ashore to aid in propaganda and civil affairs ered from a boat cave,showed the enemy plan for
work. the suicide boat attack against assault shipping
The amount of captured material examined by off Okinawa other documents indicated clearly
this command was large, chiefly from planes of that the boats based in the Retto were to be used
the heavy air attacks which the enemy mounted for the defense of Okinawa proper and that there
against our forces. Approximately 65 percent of were many other boats based on Okinawa and the
all receipts were documents and material recov­ Eastern Islands. Three Japanese Naval Code
ered from enemy pilots and aircraft. The bulk of Books were recovered aboard ships in the area
the remainder of the receipts was material of inter­ which had been crashed by suicide planes. These
est to our naval and ground forces, and civil were handled in accordance with orders from com­
affairs. mander,Fifth Fleet. Japanese diaries,maps,and
In general, captured enemy material was han­ technical diagrams.were also taken. Parts of Jap­
dled in one of two ways: anese aircraft and manufacturer's plates were re­
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force covered. All this material was processed and sig­
nificant information and documents forwarded to
A simple questionnaire form, written in Jap­ higher echelons.
anese and English,should be prepared and issued
to all fleet units to aid in the handling of prisoners PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE AND MAPS
of war by units in the absence of a language officer.
This form should contain certain statements to be From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
checked by a prisoner of war to indicate his status, Most of the photographic coverage prior to L-
rank, service number, and immediate needs. On day was obtained by the Twenty-first Bomber
it would also be a statement to the prisoner of war Command and carrier planes of TF 58. They did
that he is to be well treated, bathed, fed, and an excellent job in spite of the difficulties involved.
clothed. Various orders and directions suitably A definite improvement in the planning of photo
translated could be pointed out as necessary. By coverage was made by initially obtaining ade­
leaving the measure of understanding to the pris­ quate vertical coverage for early preparation of
oner of war's ability to read his own language, no maps. Subsequently the larger scale coverage for
special training indoctrination need be given detailed study of installations was obtained, and
United States personnel using the form. by that time interpreters had a satisfactory map
Nine POW's were captured by naval forces and on which to plot their findings. This order of
turned over to this Command for interrogation. photographic coverage haslong been advocated by

679527-46 13
this Section and other agencies and should be These installations were for the most part knocked
continued. out by pre-invasion bombardment.
The frequent small-scale coverage by long-range The 1:25,000 and 1:36,000 maps prepared by
B29's, although not always suitable for detailed the Thirtieth and Sixty-fourth Engineers had the
study, served as an excellent means of detecting beaches and defense installations overprinted.
changes made in major enemy installations. This The information on installations was obtained
coverage effectively closed the gap between the from the photo interpretation's made by the Com-
coverages obtained at the time of fast carrier PhibsPac Intelligence Section. These interpre­
strikes. It again emphasized the necessity for con­ tations were concurred in by G-2,Tenth Army.
tinuous photo coverage of an area, since earlier A large number of rubber relief maps of the
-photos will reveal installations that later cover­ southern part of Okinawa, were constructed by
age fails to disclose due to effective camouflage. Atlantic Amphibious Training Command and the
Likewise, the movement of installations and Photographic Interpretation Center, Anacostia.
changes in the relative strength of defense posi­ JicPoa also produced a number of plastic models.
tions can be determined only by careful study of Originally the mosaic was not gridded because
successive sorties. of considerable variance with gridded maps.
An accurate depth determination study of sonne However, a thousand yard grid was added at the
photography was made by Interpron 2 by stereo objective, since it was found that this materially
comparagraph methods. The results of this study increased the value of the mosaic. In the future a
were distributed as widely as practicable in the wide distribution of a controlled mosaic should be
form of stereo pairs and a mosaic. This study made, and unless the errors would make this
covered the main landing beaches on Okinawa and utterly impossible,it should be gridded.
confirmed depth estimates previousy made by the It is recommended that photographs of targets
Intelligence Section. under fire be obtained immediately upon comple­
Large-scale vertical and oblique photographs of tion of the firing mission whenever possible. By
all the preferred landing beaches were annotated means of these photographs the intelligence officer
to show water depths, reef obstacles, visible de­ on theship will be able to assessthe damage readily
fenses, and extent of beaches. These were.repro­ and accurately. This has been done in several
duced, bound in book form, and distributed to instances and has proved very effective.
all major commands and to all intelligence officers
with the Force. From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
One photo interpreter was assigned to com­ In addition to the material prepared by
mander, Underwater Demolition Teams, for the ComPhibsPac,ComPhibGrp 4 prepared a perspec­
operation. He *as of considerable assistance in tive map and location map of the objective. De­
making a detailed study of the reef and obstacles fenses were overprinted on the previously prepared
from latest photographs, and he also assisted in beach sketches and the best available obliques were
briefing the teams. printed on the reverse side'along with a tide graph
The photo interpretation problems were made and daylight and dark tables.
more difficult by the tactics of the enemy ashore.
Guns were removed from prepared positions in From: Commander, Amphibious Group 5
the vicinity of the Hagushi landing beaches and Complete photographic and map reproduction
moved south of Machinato to the rugged terrain facilities to handle all demands of the landing
north of Shuri. This area was honeycombed with force should be established ashore as early as possi­
natural caves and offered excellent camouflage for ble and in any event not later than DOG-day plus
all positions. The result was that an almost com­ 15. This is considered necessary not only because
pletely new study had to be made of this area after of the volume of work required by the forces afloat,
L-day. but also because of the fact the reduction of AGC
All major coastal defenses were correctly plotted production facilities due to enemy action might
on the intelligence map prepared prior to L-day. -well influence the success of the campaign on land.

4-10
 ,1-INTELLIGENCE

From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force ritory are recognized, but its extreme importance
In addition,a beach approach study and defense warrants extraordinary 'effort. Spelling of place
map, indicating major installations, were pre­ names on maps and in orders should be uniform.
pared by ComPhibGroup 5for the area in southern From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Amphib­
Okinawa off which the demonstration was con­ ious Support Force and CTG 51.19)
ducted. Lacking oblique shots of the beach area,
it was necessary to prepare the perspective sketch Defense installation maps, other than the
for the approach study from a photograph of the 1:25,000,were of too small scale to be of real value
rubber model, which was taken at "water level". to fire support units,and the location of targets on
A tabulation of all those installations capable of the many different maps issued varied so much as
bearing on forces participating in the Demonstra­ to invite confusion-.--especially to ships which must
tion was forwarded by letter to ComPhibGroup 1. often initiate fire at targets by grid coordinate
only.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 WEATHER
Immediately after an assault, when the ground
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
forces arein process of moving and setting up their
facilities ashore,the photographic and map repro­ Weather maps were prepared from synoptic re­
duction facilities of an AGC are invaluable in pro­ ports broadcast by Guam,Leyte, Chungking, and
viding prints of aerial photographs, enemy in­ Khabarovsk from the summaries of weather en­
stallations and equipment, captured maps and countered by search planes from submarine and
documents,and material for psychological warfare ship weather reports and from local reports of
for distribution in quantity by Army units. Pro­ ships and aircraft in the vicinity of the objective.
vision should be made for such quantity reproduc­ In order to eliminate the delay caused by search
tion by having adequate facilities, personnel, and seaplanes at the objective sending reports via
material to meet such requests. Guam, the seaplane base group on April 5 was
The photographic coverage of Okinawa was of directed to broadcast weather summaries on the
good quality. It was obtained by carrier aircraft task group commanders circuit. This resulted in
and by the Twenty-first Bomber Command and much quicker reception by units at the objective
consisted of eight strikes prior to Love-20 and area. Itis considered that a method similar to this
seven strikes between Love— 20 and Love-day. is essential for adequate warning of approaching
bad weather, especially by forces operating at the
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 extreme boundaries of our normal weather cov­
erage.
Maps prepared for this operation apparently Weather reports from the Asiatic continent were
met all requirements as to scale and coverage. . The generally inconsistent, and an analysis based on
method of distribution of these maps and other them was difficult to make. The analysis trans­
intelligence material by commander, Amphibious mitted from Chungking was the most dependable
Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was very.effective. It source of information, and the upper air reports
is believed that the full requirements of every unit from the same source were generally reliable. This
under this Command were filled. It is suggested indicates that the poor quality of the surface re­
that a similar method of distribution be adopted ports is due primarily to local conditions. The
in future operations and that additional charts of Russian reports, on the other hand, are believed
the target area be included in the material for­ to be faulty due to errors introduced isn coding
warded. and transmission.
Submarine reports were of some value in de­
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
tecting the approach of bad weather, but, in gen­
Contour maps furnished to ground forces have eral, inconsistencies in the pressures and tempera­
not had sufficient accuracy. The difficulties of ob­ tures reported reduced their usefulness very
taining accurate terrain information in enemy ter­ markedly. The delay in receiving reports which
 . !.
.31

amphibious assault force would be of considerably lines of studying past synoptic situations,to deter­
greater value than its normal station; the assign­ mine the type and time sequence of weather condi­
ment would furthermore be of short duration; tions under given situations,is particularly needed
lasting only until base weather facilities had been due to the great difficulties encountered in analyz­
setup. ing weather in this part of the world.
Necessary communication channels should be set
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
up to allow full dissemination of weather informa­
tion. The assignment of a weather ship as recom­ The period marked the transitional stage from
mended above, would make full use of the assign­ winter to summer conditions or from northeast
ment of a local channel devoted exclusively to monsoon to southwest monsoon weather. The sys­
weather on which the weather ship can transmit tematic outbreak of cold polar continental high
observations to aerological officers on the staff of pressure cells into the East China Sea gradually
commanders afloat and ashore.; and on which vari­ broke down with the gradual recession northward
ous forecasters can exchange their estimates of the of the polar front through the Ryukyu Islands.
weather situation and transmit their forecasts. In the early period the Ryukyus invariably had
Such a channel will require additional radiomen anticyclolysis within a migrating polar cell. This
and equipment in most ships. A weather ship. anticyclolysis resulted in frontogenesis, generally
assigned to an attack force should have special of a weak nature on passage, intensifying to our
additional communication personnel and equip­ east. The normal situation was for a weak wave
ment. to form into a moderate cyclone before reaching
the one hundred and fortieth meridian.
From: Commanding General, TENTH Army
FrOni:. Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
Closer coordination of the Navy and Army
meteorological plans is needed to insure more ef­ The radar picket destroyers provided much
fective use of ground force forecasts. An Army valuable weather data;on request over. the inter
weather and oceanographer liaison officer should fighter-director net-secondary. Itis recommended
be placed aboard a ship equipped for obtaining that in future operations a simplified weather re­
aerological data,beginning preferably several days porting code be set up which would give the desired
before D-day. This officer would obtain basic weather information rapidly and as easily as ob­
meteorological data, convert it into that needed tained over.this net.
for land forces,and transmit it. It is recommended that units making routine
An Air Force weather detachment should be at­ weather transmissions, particularly Of aircraft ye-
tached to Army headquarters. Itshould be landed ports,be assigned special broadcast times and fre­
early. The .present system of providing com­ quencies. to facilitate interception of these reports
plete weather services, for ground and air forces by units . operating in • the forward_ area without
from a single weather forecasting central located necessitating .a continuous guard on the circuit or
at an airfield should then prove adequate if estab­ a r wait until the reports are rebroadcast on rear
lished early. As the -front lines move a material area weather schedules.
distance inland, Air Force weather detachment, It is recommended,therefore,that consideration
under Army headquarters, should be landed and be given to the following proposals for future
move inland. amphibious operations:
The weather detachments need radio equipment (a) Until permanent and Complete Army or
and operators to obtain local broadcasts of Navy weather observing and forecasting stations
(1) Search aircraft weather reports. can be set up ashore (this is roughly estimated
(2) Surface weather reports from weather sta­ about 30 . days after the initial assault),- that all
tions on neighboring islands. forecasting for air, ground,• and naval forces be
(3) Ballistic messages to field artillery in the done from one Or more AGC's. It is anticipated
front lines. that on such designated ships, space will be re­
(4) Weather observations from the front lines. quested by the Army for one or more Army
Further weather research, especially along the weather officers who will later become •part of the
F_41 ,
P7C- 71)

e, 4
•
 ••
.47:1

. t
•4

INTELLIGENCE

permanent weather statrollto bettisfabled ashore. whereas most shower patterns Iv' e moving with
His familiarity with the requirement§ of the var­ the wind or very near to it.
ious forces ashore who need weather information,
From: Commander, Destroyer Squadron 61
and the ability to formulate his forecasts under
ideal working conditions aboard an AGC should It is my opinion that had the desire of CTG 58.1,
provide for the best possible forecasts. expressed by voice- to hold course about 110° true
(b) In order that those forces ashore who will shortly after midnight been approved, this group
use these forecasts receive them promptly and reg­ would have escaped the storm.
ularly, primary and alternate 'communication UDT RECONNAISSANCE
channels along with any necessary codes should
be decided upon early and written into the regular From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
operation plans. The underwater demolition teams received all
(o) That necessary radiosonde and radar wind available intelligence data on the objective, and
observing equipment (with specialized personnel) latest photographs were delivered to them at the
be installed on some smaller ship that is sched­ objective. They made a reconnaissance of the
uled to remain at the scene of operations, until a Kerama Retto islands prior to their occupation
permanent station is established ashore. This and reported their findings to the interested
will provide regular soundings of the upper air, commands.
vitally needed not only by the corps artillery but On L—2they reconnoitered the Hagushi beaches
also by all Army and Navy forecasting centers at and were accompanied by representatives of the
the scene of operations and at rear headquarters. various troop commands using these beaches. A
detailed written reportincluding large scale ozalid
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Natoma
prints of beach and reef sketches was prepared.
Bay(CVE 62)
These proved to be very accurate and comprehen­
It is believed that scheduled weather broadcasts sive. On L— 1 these reports, representatives of
are too voluminous for our limited communication the underwater demolition teams and the repre­
facilities to handle speedily, and that storm warn­ sentatives of the various troop commanders were
ings have been delayed in transmission and inac­ taken by destroyer to the various flagships and
curate when received. Such deficiencies make it ships on which the respective troop commanders
almost impossible to judge correctly the path of an were embarked. The written report and sketches
approaching typhoon. It is suggested that sched­ were supplemented by oral reports. This infor­
uled weather broadcasts be divided into geographi­ mation was then passed down to all interested
cal areas and that a reliability index be used for commands.
each storm warning in order that the report can be
immediately assessed. It is also suggested that an . From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
adequately equipped weather plane be included in On Love —3,UDT's conducted successful recon­
the complement of each task unit,thereby enabling naissance of reefs and beaches in the landing area.
the unit commander to make"on-the-spot" weather The charts which they prepared showing water
analyses as may be deemed advisable. depths and conditions of the reef were most help­
ful and supplemented previous estimates and
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Hornet
sketches. Their reports, along with that of an
(CV 12)
aviator who was forced down in the, vicinity of
The radar images of typhoons and other cyclonic Naha and later rescued, indicated tha:t we would
tropical storms should be familiar to all radar op­ and the going tough as had been expected.
erators—they are distinct from other weather
images and once seen can be identified almost at PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
once. A useful criterion in this regard is that
typhoon images in the northern hemisphere will From: Commanding General, TENTH Army
appear to be moving in a direction between 60° and The psychological warfare campaign began
900 to the right of the surface wind directipm with.the_dropping of five million leaflets by car­
• "- Jr

IBERIMMEN
 PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND TRAINING

vided were well conceived and proved adequate. rated by distances up to 35 miles. Visual com­
They included: munications were hampered by low visibility in
(a) Teletype from commander Joint Expedi­ the daytime and by the necessity for darkening
tionary Force, to Guam. This circuit handled a ship at night. VHF radio would not cover the
large volume of traffic for the amphibious forces distances. Delivery of messages to the shore
and in addition was used to clear approximately radio station for transmission required a trip by
10,000 words of press per day. boat to a point off the beach,transfer to a DUKW
(b) The high command ship-to-shore, a manual which had to be obtained from ashore in order to
circuit from commander, Fifth Fleet, on 10,490 cross the surf,followed by a jeep ride of about 10
kilocycles, was used for 80 percent of the fleet miles through heavy traffic on a narrow road. To
commander's traffic on a continuous basis. the time required by this procedure was added the
(c) The 4205 series,previously designated as the delays inherent to heavily overloaded radio cir­
Pacific Ocean area task force commanders series, cuits. As a result, delivering radio traffic via the
was diverted to use by task force commanders as local shore radio station proved to be impracti­
a command overload channel on which they might cable unless excessive delays were accepted. It is
deliver their traffic to Guam. submitted that it is notfeasible to mount and train
When the HiCom FOX was initially set up, a large attack force without rapid and efficient
it was intended that the HiCom FOX series would means of communication,and these were not avail­
also be used sometimes for High Command ship- able in Leyte under existing orders and communi­
to-shore communication with commander, Fifth cation plans. It is recommended that in the fu­
Fleet,calling radio Guam during the silent periods ture the use of rapid communications in assembly
of the broadcast. This was not very successful. and staging areas be made a responsibility of the
Local circuits commander on the spot, with due regard for se­
A task force common on 371 kilocycles was set curity. Communication security must be coordi­
up for local use at the objective. The circuit was nated with over-all security, allowing necessary
inadequate because overloaded; frequently only relaxation in areas subject to enemy reconnais­
traffic of OP precedence could be cleared. sance from the air or ashore.
The present system of authentication on CW It has been noted that sometimes communica­
circuits is not satisfactory. The instructions are tion plans for amphibious operations do not take
confusing. into consideration general directives concerning
The communication security units now func­ circuits to be guarded, promulgated in standard
tioning serve a useful purpose, but it is believed fleet publications, with the result that the total
that they would be more valuable in the combat number of frequencies assigned to some classes of
area rather than the rear area. ships when added to those required to be guarded
by the standard publications mentioned above,ex­
PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND ceeds the material and personnel capacities of the
TRAINING ships. The communication officer or the com­
manding officer of the ship affected must then
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
make a decision as to what frequencies he will
The communication plans for the operation guard and which ones he will leave unguarded.
were based on CentCom 2,and in general were ex­ This should not be necessary. Communication
cellent although there was noted a tendency to
plans should specify exactly whatfrequencies each
depart from realism in some respects. Plans
ship and each command must guard and the num­
should not contain any directives which cannot be
followed to the letter. Restrictions were imposed ber of frequencies assigned should be within their
on the use of radio in the staging areas, which were capacity.
impossible of observance except by a very loose From:Commander,Amphibious Support Force
interpretation bordering on disregard.
This command loaded and trained in Leyte It is impossible to train ships at a base in com­
Gulf, ships and units of the command were sepa­ munications,if radio silence is strictly maintained.
 ICATIONS
• es,
While the desirability of such silence is abpr c so many .different types of vessels were used and
ated,there are times when it should not transcend because of the losses'of portable radio equipment
all other considerations. One of these times is resulting from enemy action at Iwo Jima, a few
the training and rehearsal period for a large and difficult problems arose in connection with pro­
complex force immediately before an important curement of sufficient spares and replacements and
combat operation, when the force is assembled at in shipping them to the different staging areas.
a base being reconnoitered frequently by enemy Radio pools at Guadalcanal, 'Leyte, and Guam
aircraft. were requested to supply Many different types of
equipment. Much of this equipment was not in
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 5 stock in the forward area pools, making it neces­
Training of staff and flagship personnel was sary to arrange shipment by air from Pearl and
continuous, covering all phases of procedure, op­ from the mainland. Upon leaving Iwo Jima the
eration, and maintenance. Voice training was Eldorado replenished radio and radar tender
emphasized, operators being given 2 hours a day spares at Guam before proceeding to Leyte.
of procedure, and net -drills using sound power The radio materiel officer of the Force pro­
phones,plus close supervision on watch. Tactical ceeded ahead of the flagship to Leyte by air and
circuit operators were briefed on tactics to fa­ started to assemble radio equipment necessary to
miliarize them with maneuvers resulting from the complete outfitting transports of two transport
usual tactical signals. squadrons and numerous small craft, which were
staging from the Leyte area. Barge YF 624,
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 which arrived in the Leyte, area soon after the
Theoretically a communication plan should be arrival of the Eldorado,provided amphibious ves­
merely a standard outline of the commander's in­ sels With numerous replacements of electronic
tentions as to the employment of his communica­ equipment.. It was :still necessary, however, to
tions facilities according to a broad basic plan, or order much radio equipment by air to finish out­
his divergences therefrom to meet certain circum­ fitting beach parties and Small craft with SCR
stances or operations differing from a standard equipment. Additional TBS's and a number of
pattern, plus a chart or charts of the frequencies :AN/ARC—Ps were installed in AGC's and in de­
to be employed,for ready reference. stroyers. This was the first time during an am­
A study of amphibious operations communica­ phibious operation that more than one TBS
tion plans, especially of amphibious group plans channel was used, thus requiring several "crash"
discloses no standard pattern except a mimicry of installations. AN/ARE—i's were installed in
USF 70 Able and CentCom 2 format, resulting fighter direction destroyers to give them an addi­
either in a fOrmidable document which cannot be tional VHF channel and •necessary flexibility on
completely digested prior to an operation, or a VHF,and in AGC's to back up TDQ's and RCK's
series of vague references to various communica­ and to act as standby VHF sets. AN/ARC—i's
tion publications and directives which serve to add worked extremely well and later in the operation,
to the confusion or pile up the burden of research when additional fighter direction destroyers were
on each communication officer. needed to replace those damaged by the enemy,
Experience has demonstrated that communi­ still more of them were installed in many de­
cation personnel are not familiar with instruc­ stroyers by technicians from the Eldorado.
tion, operation, and maintenance manuals, bulle­ The problems encountered in the repairing of
tins, orders, policies, etc., so that a communica­ radio equipment during the Operation were not
tion plan must be a source of information as well as exacting as in previous operations,even though
as a directive. many more ships were involved. This was prob­
MATERIEL ably. due in part to the cooler weather, as well as
to increased technical ability of technicians on
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces small craft and to better distribution of spare ­
Radio materiel planning was also started in Parts.
Pearl prior to the Iwo Jima operation. Because Technicians from the Eldorado again accom-
7---
11111111111111111111P
plished an amazing amount of work,repairing and tial. Of total number of raids on Okinawa, 29
installing over 400 pieces of radio equipment for percent were first detected at ranges of less than
other vessels in the transport area. Much 20 miles from guard ships and pickets. Only the
radio equipment was transferred between ships fact that these raids were detected by outlying
during this operation. The Eldorado alone trans­ pickets, 40 to 70 miles from the operational area,
ferred 74 radio transmitting-receiving equipments, permitted early interception and warning in time
not including numerous miscellaneous items such to protect ships in transport areas.
as megaphones, tubes, crystals and Nancy equip­ The Mark III IFF system was used extensively,
ment. It remains evident that headquarters ships both for normal friend or foe interrogation and
must be prepared to act as electronic tenders pend­ for ready identification of ASP and CAP,trans­
ing the arrival of regular electronic repair ships ports and long range strike groups.
at the objective. Radar performance was in general good. The
SCR equipment again shouldered much of the SP and SK were used as a team afloat, the SP1M
load for voice circuits. and AN/TPS-1B as a team ashore. Fighter
The waterproof cabinets fabricated at Pearl direction was controlled from the presentations of
Harbor Navy Yard for vehicular mounted radios the SK and AN/TPS-1B,the former on a 12-inch
SCR-608 proved their worth and kept sets dry remote PPI, the latter on a VG remote as the
even though the cabinets were submerged in cross­ sharp definition of the AN/TBS-1B presents a
ing the reef on some beaches. The jeep-mounted clear picture while the forty degree antenna beam
SCR-608's were very useful in the early phases width of the SK blurs on the long retention scope
of this Operation, in maintaining communication of the VG. The SP presentation could not be used
between major commands. A lightweight col­ successfully on the remote PPI's, as interceptions
lapsible mast with coaxidl cable and matching im­ had to be conducted clear of the AA defenses of
pedance transformers is needed for equipments the shore and transport areas, and it was not pos­
used inland from the beaches, to improve relia­ sible to maintain a picture of two or more targets
bility of transmission and increase the range of at ranges beyond 30 miles.
the equipment in hilly terrain. It is believed that the installation of the SP
The Mark IV mobile communication vans radar on picket ships will prove of great value.
worked well but they should be equipped for re­ The pickets make the original bogey contacts;
mote operation when *required. For instance, it they are clear of the ship and shore AA fire which
is desirable in some cases to have remote positions make close interceptions by AGO and ADCC very
in a bomb-proof shelter so that the radio circuits difficult; and they are in the best tactical position
can be operated during frequent air raids. to control interceptions away from the operational
The portable radio teletype equipment.should area. The long range surface detection ability of
be vehicular mounted as the equipment is too heavy the SP will also permit pickets to maintain a more
for efficient pack handling. efficient low flying plane.guard when the radar
is not being used for fighter direction. Installa­
RADAR tion of the very best in radars and communication
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces equipment on picket ships is considered excellent
The picket system operated efficiently. While insurance against suicide attacks, both against
eight and nine picket stations were filled, raids pickets and against ships in transport areas.,
were detected at an average distance of 72 miles The supply of radar tender spares carried by
from the reference point at Point Bob,which was all AGC's proved invaluable. Minor repairs and
a few miles north of the main transport area and replacements were a daily neCessity,ranging from
close to 'Kadena and Yontan airfields. Only 7 the tuning of a BM interrogator-responsor to the
percent of all raids -approached within 50 miles replacement of a length of wave guide and com­
of Point Bolo undetected; less than 1 percent ap­ plete equipment checks of destroyers being con­
proached within 30 miles undetected. verted to fighter director ships.
An adequate ring of air warning and fighter In addition to the intercepts of enemy shore-
direction sites around an objective area is essen­ based radars, signals from enemy airborne radars
 JAMMING TYPE: WW1!
RADAR: Sk-2
"AU SCOPE liPPI" SCOPE
DATE: 4722-45
TIME: 0200

Clet"=5',

0.4411056S
Mark VI, Model.4, Type 3, and Mark VI, Model Until further information is obtained, it is
1, were intercepted upon several occasions during recommended that the 150-160 megacycle band be
dusk and night air attacks. Theseintercepts were jammed when enemy planes approach within 25
made after first radar contact. Several were made miles during low visibility nights.
by ships retiring at sea and by ships in radar The enemy has noise modulated jamming equip­
picket stations. As it appeared that the enemy ment which is effective in the 200-megacycle region.
might be using radar to locate these units which The advantages of being able to determine the
were some distance removed from Okinawa,ships bearings of radar intercepts are obvious. The in­
in radar picket and screening stations were au­ stallation of UTIF/DF equipment in the fleet
thorized to jam Mark-VI radar signals in the should be given high priority.
145-165 mcs band when detected. Enemy air­
VISUAL
borne radars were jammed with the exception of
two intercepts on 210 mcs which were evaluated From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
as Mark VI,Model 1,airborne radar. These were The volume of visual traffic was greater and re­
not jammed because of the probable detrimental mained at a more constant level than in previous
effect of such action on operation of the great operations. The daily load averaged 184 trans­
number of our own air search radars near the same missions. Twelve-inch searchlights continued to
frequency. be the workhorse of visual communications with
The Japanese used "window" at Okinawa in semaphore playing a minor role, particularly
moderate to large quantities during almost all among the small craft.
dusk and night air. attacks. As in previous op­ The use of identification hoists of three flags for
erations "window" was used tactically to conceal merchant vessels was most helpful in locating
raid splits,to cover course changes,while orbiting, these ships.
to evade nightfighters,and for defense against fire Violations of procedure were common with the
control and searchlight control radars. • small ships who were the most frequent offenders.
-While not serious, these breaches of procedure
RADAR RECOMMENDATIONS
show a definite lack of proper training and un­
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force familiarity with communication instructions.
In future operations utilize all suitable island From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
radar sites for the establishment of early warning Visual methods carried the bulk of traffic in
stations concurrently with or immediately after the staging area because of security requirements,
the initial assault. Provide necessary equipment and were also relied uppn to a great extent at
in the assault shipping. Hagushi. Efforts were made to increase the use
Make additional lightweight radars and trained of semaphore instead of flashing light, and were
personnel available during the assault to provide fairly successful, but flashing light still remains
additional radar coverage at vital points not cov­ the principal visual method in spite of its disad­
ered in the original plans. vantages when sending ships are subject to obser­
Have AEW pickets available for future opera­ vation by the enemy. Flag hoists were used very
tions. little, although this method should be prescribed
Adopt a scramble IFF code as soon as possible. for all routine reports. Special flag signals could
Stress the dangers of operating high power be provided for all routine reports required in am­
radarsin the vicinity of ignitable fumes,especially phibious operations, such as percentage of cargo
ashore at newly established radar sites when gaso­ unloaded, percentage of troops unloaded, number
line is being handled, of casualties of each class on board, number of
From: Commander,Cruiser Division 13 beds available for casualties, etc.

The enemy technique in sowing "window" has From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.Indiana
reached an advanced stage but he is not yet taking Nan equipment has proved a successful addition
full tactical advantage of it. to communication equipment. Nan beacons are
-
 te,

COMMUNICATIONS

not satisfactory at present, but require modifica- bined training of con-munication personnel of
tion to give it longer range and quicker reaction major units prior to an operation.
between the key and the light. Communications between the headquarters ships
and the major headquarters ashore were not good
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 initially. Signal personnel and equipment of the
higher commands were not given a high priority
There was considerably more use of Nan equip-
in loading plans. The rapid initial advance of the
ment in this operation than in previous ones. A
troops following the landing made communica-
Nan beacon was installed in the flagship enroute
tions a major problem which was further accen­
to the objective but was not utilized to its full
tuated by the fact that the men and equipment
capacity. Further training in the use of this
were not available at the objective. It is essential
equipment is necessary before its full capabilities
that communication personnel and equipment
can be realized. To date the benefit desired from
have high priority in ship allocations, loading,
this special equipment has not justified the time
and unloading plans.
and expense spent on its development and instal-
Good communications were further hampered
lations.
by the high percentage of inexperienced personnel
VISUAL RECOMMENDATIONS provided in units ashore.
The problem of frequency assignments and con-
From:Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force trol of frequencies for landing operations becomes
(1) Form signal schools in rear areas on key more accute as operations become progressively
ships to concentrate on problems which confront larger. The use of a minimum number of fre­
signalmen every day and require small ships to quencies by individual units becomes imperative
send their signalmen to these schools for 3- or and multiple assignment of many frequencies be­
4-day refresher course during upkeep and over- comes necessary. With the large number of low
haul periods. power and VHF equipments in use in amphibious
(2) Drill signalmen thoroughly and constantly operations, and the distance between elements of
in the use of communication procedure signals a force in a large operation, multiple use may be
from CCBP-2,the present system of task organi- made of a number of frequencies.
zation call signs, and the making up of headings.
PERSONNEL
(3) Require semaphore be used whenever and
wherever practicable, especially in an anchorage From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
area.
The performance of communication personnel
(4) Provide a pool of communication personnel
of the flagship during this operation was outstand­
to be available when and where needed during an
operation and to be returned to the pool when con- ing in every way. Having had so little chance to
ditions warrant. rest up from the rigorous two-section watch at
Iwo Jima, their results creditably surpassed all
LANDING AND BEACH expectations. This may be due in part to the fact
COMMUNICATIONS that the officers and men had had good training in
their duties at Iwo Jima, but most credit goes to
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces the men themselves who by wholehearted coopera-
Amphibious assault communications followed tion and personal initiative achieved excellent re­
standard procedures for the central Pacific area sults. After the first week or so of standing a
and functioned reasonably well. Communications hard two-section watch, efficiency dropped off
between corps troops and their support shipping noticeably, but at no time did communications fail
were adequate. JASCO teams provided beach to 'assist and promote the success of the operation.
ommunications and beaches were in communica- With the debarking of the Tenth Army, making
ion with each other by both wire and radio. room available,additional personnel were brought
This operation again emphasized the need for aboard in an effort to make possible a three-section
r
closer and more detailed planning and ftp.eiconl- r4watc1.4ow statery t.aining of replacements did
i "
A,
4
 " 61

-
not permit a full three-section watch however. thereby kept at a maximum even under existing
It cannot be assumed that the results of this opera- crowded conditions,on certain SCR channels. Net
tion,.where a two-section watch was successfully control stations noted the following practices
maintained for 40 days, can be used as a criterion which were widespread during the first 2 weeks
for planning. The need for more personnel at at the objective, but which improved after con-
the peak periods cannot be overemphasized. The tinued censure:
past successes may b.:overshadowed by a complete (a) Failure to use voice calls or designations;
break-down of communications, due to insufficient use of names of ships and other military units in
personnel, in some future operation. No matter plain language; references to frequencies -without
how willing the horse he cannot be raced forever. shackling or proper designation.
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force (b) Misuse of shackle cipher; compromise by
Oii 17 May 1945 when Com5thPhibFor,then in transmitting the same numbers plain and
Ancon,took command of CTF 31, only a skeleton shackled; compromise by shackling of obvious
Organization of communication personnel at­ dates or other numerals.
tached to Com5thPhibFor was present. How- (c) Transmission of plain language messages
ever, the'whole-hearted cooperation of officers and which should properly have been encrypted, such
men of the staff of ComPhibGrp 5 enabled com- as references to sailings of convoys, presence of
units and damage reports.
munications to function smoothly, efficiently and
without interruption. The manner in which com- (d) Unauthorized transmissions of unknown
stations, including offensive language, broadcast
munications were able to function, even though
of music, and random social conversations.
there -were two changes in flagships, speaks well
Utmost use should be made of VHF,while trahs­
for the standardization'of AGC's as fostered by
ConiPhibsPac. missions on HF and MF should be kept to tile
barest minimu.m. Several instances were observed
The communication plan was well conceived and
where ships were actually within -visual distance
the CW circuits proved satisfactory. The volume
of each other,and yet were using a medium or high
of.traffic handled by the flagship's radio central,
frequency communication.
bridge radio,and JCC was far greater than on any
other operation, and actually beyond the capacity From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
of the communication section personnel as now al- Voice circuits
lowed the flag and AGC. If this volume is to be (a) Whenever possible, the control of the mi-
experienced in future operations,an increase in the crophone must be under officer supervision and
allowance of officers and men is necessary as re- this must be specified in the communication plan.
quested in separate correspondence. (b) Improve procedure by making drill periods
mandatory for extensive training in correct
ERRORS AND DIFFICULTIES procedure.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces Provide for the establishment of a QMO
Breaches of security and faulty procedure on cuit in the communication plan for future opera-
voice radio circuits were rampant during the tions with at least.two other major vessels assigned
early part of the operation. Inexcusable errors guards with the force commander. These ves­
were committed time and again, requ'iring con- sels to be other than AGC's to reduce and vary all
stant and:close supervision of all circuits. The local interference.
Okina,-wa campaign further proved, as demon- From: Commander, Anzphibious Group 12
strated prerviously,that a controlled net is a prime The usual difficulty was experienced in signal-
necessity on many of the more crowded voice ing with merchant ships. Some of the•merchant
channels. CFT 51 took control on L-Day of 34.8, ships were quite good in visualjsignals,but others
31.6, 33.2 megacycles, and 2716 kilocycles and were very poor. The question of communications
maintained this control continuously, while other with merchant ships is far from settled, and is
circuits were similarly controlled by various ap- one which requires attention before future large
propriate cOmmanders. The flow of traffic was scale amphibious operations are begun.' The only
l'1512
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IV.,t ;e• 1)
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,l: ',.: k ;!.:,- '.'_''.. r',i
i')P l
.
•;..' .
iC. t i
,-
r
 0. •

COMMUNICATIONS

solution appears to lie in furnishing merchant rcqurements and reduce the length of dispatches
ships with Navy communication teams,and requir- accordingly, but the instructions on the subject
ing these teams to handle all communication§ for are not clear enough to easily determine when this
the ship. could be done.
Visual communications between the landing Provide a frequency diagram with all communi­
beaches and ships off shore were satisfactory, cation plans. This will provide specific orders to
although there was some difficulty in call signs and ships concerned, and will prove useful in routing
identification. The various beachmasters had to traffic.
improvise their visual calls, as none are provided Allow.the commander in the staging area to pre­
in the call book. It is recommended that author- scribe his own restrictions on the use of radio, ad­
ized visual calls be entered in the call book for hering to good security principles. .
TransRon and TransDiv beachmasters, using the Establish good monitor watches to improve the
colors and numbers of the beaches as the argument quality of communications and guard against
for making up the calls. . breaches of security.
The lack of radio discipline on the various chan- Provide a course of special training for radio
nels is reducing their effectixe capacity . (3. con- technicians attached to amphibious flagships, em­
siderable extent. This Command has, taken posi­ phasizing eliminations of mutual interference and
tive action to insure that the standards of disci- cross talk between radio circuits.
pline on board the flagship set an example to Provide at least one universally held crypto­
others on the circuit. The good effect of this graphic system, preferably a strip cipher, to be
policy became evident- as time went on, and will held by all commands having rapid communica­
be continued in the future. Some of the tion facilities. It is especially necessary that he
are due to ignorance, but there are-still
shortOming joint communication center and army commands
too many obviously deliberate breaches of disci- ashore hold this system.
pline on the part of some of the younger operators. Begin to increase use of radio telegraphy con-
The filth and obscenity heard on circuits such as the currently with a decrease in the use of radio tele-
Fleet Common demand that drastic disciplinary phony in order to reduce present lack of security
action be taken. It is believed that some of the in communications.
junior commanding officers do not realize the se­
riousness of these offenses and look upon them as From: Conzmander, Amphibious Group 4
mere boyish pranks. This command will make The large number of ships participating in this
every possible effort to stamp out this practice in operation created an unprecedented problem in
the future. the assignment of radio channels. It is a credit
Some action should be taken to reduce the length to the well conceived communication plan that the
of dispatches transmitted on the fleet broadcasts. large volume of radio traffic was handled as effi­
.The extensive use of codress is undoubtedly an ciently and as expeditiously as it was. For the
aid to security, but it appears that some modifica- first time in a major operation, several TBS fre­
tion is necessary to cut down the time required for quencies were made available to the various task
transmission. Instances have been observed where forces. Insofar as the incomplete distribution of
a message of several hundred groups contained Baker series crystals permitted, these frequencies
only the information that a certain dispatch was were used, and a noticeable benefit resulted.
approved, or the answer was "Affirmative." It Too many messages which should have been en-
should not be necessary to encrypt and decrypt ciphered were placed on voice circuits as a matter
such phrases as "Radio Guam deliver to CinePac of expediency. Even after the assault phase was
Adv for info." Arrangements should be made well along,it was difficult to effect delivery of en-
and published to the effect that Radio Guam and ciphered traffic due to the overloading of the OW
other large shore stations will deliver ALL dis- circuits available. It is recommended that a mini-
patches passing through the station to certain im- mum frequency CWT circuit be made available on
portant commands for information. In many an exclusive basis to each task force commander
cases the use of plain dress would serve all security for handling intra-force enciphered traffic.
 ERRORS AND DIFFICULTIES •

The VHF radio teletype provided for this op­ variety, throughout the period of this report had
eration was very valuable. an insignificant effect upon the operation of the
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force radar equipment. This situation was not the re­
sult of poor window manufacture (the signals
The voice circuits which proved invaluable in were clear on the SC-2), nor of a Jap reluctance
previous operations did not function as satisfac­ to drop large enough doses (most dropped with
torily as heretofore. This was due to two main the greatest generosity at the slightest provoca­
causes: tion), but rather from a poor tactical use of the
The areas covered by TF 31 were too great for window sowed. In cases of an attempted coor­
effective inter-area use of SCR 608/610 radios. dinated attack, the lead planes sowed large quan­
For reliable communications high frequency chan­ tities of window but the attack group failed to
nels had to be employed, but the communication derive any cover from it by dallying outside the
plan,as originally conceived,did not provide suffi­ window or delaying further run in until the win­
cient flexibility in HF voice channels: This plus dow had dispersed.
necessity for security caused limited use of HF in The difficulties of establishing communications
place of VHF voice traffic, and OW channels with with the shore fire control parties were overcome
encrypted dispatches were used to a greater extent
nicely by the use of two receivers. The TBL
than in the past.
transmitter and the receiver were set up on the
Circuit discipline reached a new low. Unau­
assigned frequency and the RBH in 0I0 used to
thorized transmissions and lack of proper proce­
dure caused delay in traffic delivery. Both com­ hunt. In this manner satisfactory communica­
manders and ships alike were negligent in this re­ tions were established more quickly than could be
spect. Lack of discipline was most noticeable otherwise realized with a single receiver used for
from 0000 (I) to 0600 (I) and included profane tuning and hunting.
language, playing of victrola records, and opera­
tor small talk. From: Commander, Cruiser Division 5
The overgrading of communications both in
From: Commander, Destroyer Division 110
security rating and in precedence is growing. It
The land situation was a different story. is a rare letter or dispatch that is not at least
For the first 2 weeks of the operation it was "Secret" and the long delay in delivery in "Opera­
a rare night if the radar operators didn't report tional Priority" traffic is a clear indication that
being "land-locked" on a certain bearing. After the situation is again getting out of hand.
becoming accustomed to land interference, the
effect on the operators gradually decreased and From: Commander, Battleship Division 9
disappeared entirely after a month's time. Prac­
It is considered that listenijig to or guarding
tice proved to be the remedy.
cireuits which are totally inactive for days (often
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Charles for the whole operation) is not only an unneces­-
J. Badger(DD 657) sary burden on critical personnel and equipment,
The abundance of "window" dropped by enemy but also a contribution to unreliable circuit watch
planes, particularly of a night search or heckler standing.

a-10
 Chapter VI. SHIP TO SHORE

GENERAL good running order and were not engaged in other

duties. The responsibility for seeing that their
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 loads of .the'previous day were removed and that
In accordance with existing plans, policies, and they were thus 'free to work in their new. assign­
directives, the responsibility for unloading cargo mentslay with the Army. The subordinate shore-
from ships into lighters and unloading from party commanders Made known - their lighterage
lighters to the beach and, of course, for assembly, requirements for the following day and these were
storage, and distribution of supplies lay with the consolidated, then allocations of lighterage* craft
Army. The responsibility for supplying and by type and number were made to each ship to be
operating lighterage craft to transport cargo from Unloaded,utilizing part or all the craft available as
ship to shore lay with the Navy. Obviously necessary._ The force beachmaster's representative
neither phase of unloading could function without then returned to the beachmaster's headquarters
the other and since there was no common com­ with this information and - there specific assign­
mand of the organizations engaged in unloading ment of craft by bow numbers was made by type
below the commander,Joint Expediti9nary Force, commanders to fulfill the allocations -previously
the work had to be done by two separate agencies, agreed upon. These a­ ssignments were combined
cooperating with each other. Under such condi­ on a single sheet which was then published to
tions,,unloading is truly a joint task. interested parties. Individual- craft were notified
During the unloading of assault convoys,trans­ of their assignments by type commanders. In
port squadron commanders were made responsible making the allocations and assignments, three
for unloading ships and craft under their com­ basic principles were followed:
mand, and all LSM's, LCT's and pontoon barges (1) To assign craft by types according to
available were allocated to.them. When the as­ - the nature Of the cargoto be carried.
sault convoys unloaded and departed, type com­ (2) Once a given ship had commenced to
manders were designated for the various types of unload, to continue Working that ship until
ferry craft including LSAT's, LCT's and pontoon its .unloading was completed
barges,and LCM's and LCVP's which werelumped (3)- To assign.the same craft to the same
together in boat pools, and all of these craft were ship with which they had been previously
placed under the control of the force beachmaster. working insofar as practicable..
He acted as the representative ashore of the SOPA
in coordinating unloading activities with the There are faults.to. this system. For one thing,
Army. The following modus operandi, mutually its very rigidity, based. as it is on publishing as­
satisfactory to both Army and Navy, was worked signments only once in 2.4 hours and at the same.
out and put into Practice: The shore-party com­ time every day, requires a 247hour. • operations
mander (Corn 1st E. S. B.) held a daily meeting watch for employment of-all the lighterage to its
at his headquarters which was attended by repre­ maximum capacity. On the other hand there is
sentatives of the various subordinate shore-party inherent in it a. firm control which:'permits -defi­
commands and a representative of the force nite knowledge as to the employment of each craft
beachmaster. The last named brought with him at any time. In the Okinawa operation, utiliza­
information as to the number of the various types tion oflighterage,craft.to.their maximum capacity
of lighterage craft which would be available for was not. an important factor because, at no time
operation during the 24 hours commencing at while this command was there,was the shore _party
0800 the following day. The term "available for able to unload cargo at the beach as fast as it could
operation" simply meant that t1Z14;triatt..Avere
- in be transferred from ship to lighters and sent in.
tyl
 •

Lighterage for transportation of cargo from Able were to be shifted from the west coast of
ship to shore was supplied by landing craft in­ Okinawa to Nakagusuku Wan. This plan was
cluding LSM's, LCT's, LCM's, and LCVP's and carried out insofar as the general outline was con­
pontoon barges. After the departure of the as­ cerned but there were a number of departures from
sault convoys these craft, with the exception of the the original plan in the detailed execution.
LSM's, were organized into boat pools Able and To begin with,the boats which were turned over
Baker. The LSM's operated under jtheir type to the boat pool by the departing transports were,
commander as directed by the beachmaster. Ship­ on the 'average, in very poor shape despite th
borne landing craft of naval transports arriving directive in the force commander's i)lan which re-­
in convoys carrying garrison and resupply eche­ quired that they be in "excellent operating condi­
lons were used to supplement the craft of the boat tion." There were extenuating circumstances for
pools. this 'however. The transport squadrons which
The performance of the LCM's and LCVP's of participated in the L-day assaults had passed
the boat pools was not good. There were a num­ through a period of long, hard service prior to
ber ,of reasons for this, including the poor con­ the Okinawa landing. They had had insufficient
dition of the craft when tunied over to the boat, time and facilities for proper maintenance and
pool by the transports, difficult operating condi­ upkeep of their boats and in the case of Transport
• tions with no shelter for the craft of boat pool Squadrons 13 and 14 at least, adequate replace­
Able, inadequate maintenance and repair facili­ ments or spare parts had not been available in the
ties, and careless and inexperienced crews. To this assembly and mounting area. , As a result, the
was added the further handicap of tidal conditions condition of their boats was definitely below par.
in the Bisha, Gawa River which prevented craft On the other hand, it is doubtful whether com­
of boat pool Baker from entering or leaving the manding officers of ships designated to supply
boat pool basin at low tide. Had it not been for boats for the boat pool made a very strenuous
the LCM(6)'s of the LSD's,the shortage of minor effort to see that those supplied were the best avail.
landing craft for logistic support of vessels in the able. if tbey,were,it is difficult to understand holy
anchorage could have proved serious. The whole the landings.Were made on schedule and the assault
problem of boat service in the Hagushi anchorage convoys unloaded. Some of the boats turned in
apart from the ship to shore lighterage will be were in such poor shape that the seams opened and
discussed at length later. they filled and sank, either alongside or on their
LCT's and pontoon barges, as usual, were very way to the -beach, within two or three days after
useful in unloading, although'heiiiller, group was they were,turned over to the boat pool.
used to its maximum capacity. Tlitit is particu­ The first group of boats were turned over to the
larly true of the,,pontoon barges., LSM's, while boat pool:on the evening of April 4 during what
useful, are not recommended as lighterage craft. eventually proved to be the worst weather experi­
Their employment in this capacity is uneconomi­ enced during the whole 70 days this force was at
cal. They are ocean-going transports and should Okinawa. The facilities for securing them at the
be employed as such rather than in transporting LST(M) and LSD were inadequate and a number
cargo from ship to shore. sank alongside while others broke loose and were
The Expeditionary Force commander's plan washed up on the reef. Those that survived the
called for the formation of two boat pools, Able night took a rough pounding from the seas and
and Baker, to be composed of LCTs and pontoon from each other.
barges dropped from LST's and of LCM(3)'s The only shelter available on the west coast south
and LCVP's left behind by departing transports. of Nago Wan was the Bisha Gawa stream, and
Boat pool Able was to be in two parts, one part boat pool Baker was established there temporarily.
at Kerama Retto, and the other in the Hagushi Because of the depth of water over a shoal near
anchorage. Both parts were to remain afloat. the entrance, boats could not leave the stream ex­
Boat pool Baker was to remain intact and to be cept at times above half tide.
established ashore* as soon as a suitable location Tjvsport Squadron 15 which was supposed to
was available. Eventually both parts of boat,pool ftirnisli 15 LCVP's and 20 LCM's for boat pool
„ ,
 IP TO SHORE
4,4
Able never came to the Hagushi anchorage, but had to be supplied for the following categories of
after remaining in the vicinity of Okinawa for ships, which had no boats of their own except pos­
more than a week, returned to Saiptin with the sibly a whale boat or dingy capable of carrying
Second Marine Division still embarked. Trans­ three or four people: Battleships, cruisers, de­
port Squadron 16 was directed to make up this stroyers, AK's, merchant vessels of various types,
deficit of boats in addition to furnishing its own LSM's,LCI's,PC's SC's,etc. All these had to be
quota.. supplied with food and other stores and their per­
About 17 April that proportion of boat pool sonnel transported here and there on official busi­
Able operating off the Hagushi beaches was trans­ ness. In addition, various other commands and
ferred to Nago Wan under cognizance of CTG activities continually requested the permanent
31.21. This was the last connection this command assignment of one or more boats to enable them to
had with boat pool Able. conduct their business with the forces afloat.
As the campaign progressed and the situation When this command left Okinawa, there were 37
in the Hagushi anchorage became somewhat sta­ LCVP's of the boat pool permanently assigned
bilized;two facts became increasingly_evident: and they covered only about one-half of the re­
quests. There never have been and probably never
(a) That the number of boats originally
will be enough small craft around an anchorage
planned for the boat pools was inadequate to
to supply everyone's wishes but for efficient con­
perform all the task§ required of them.
duct of the administration and logistic supply,
(b) That because of the poor condition of
sufficient craft to supply everyone's needs is a
the boats initially supplied, it would be nec­
"must".
essary to replace many of them with boats in
good operating condition taken from trans­ UDT's
ports arriving in the convoys of the garrison From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
and re-supply echelons.
Mission of UD.T's Flotilla was reconnoiter and
At the direction of CTF 51, additional LCM(3)'s prepare the Hagushi beaches for the landing of the
were turned over to boat pool Baker and also two assault divisions.
semi-independent boat units were formed. One Make a diversionary feint reconnaissance and
was a group of boats employed as an anti-small­ demolition on designated beaches in southern
craft patrol along the southern flank of the'an­ Okinawa.
chorage at night,the other a pool of craft equipped Compile and chart information thus obtained
with smoke generators, smoke floats, and smoke and deliver it to the attack forces (at sea) on
pots and operated by this command to augment Love- — -6- and Love--if-l-day,together with Army
the smoke-making facilities of the ships in the an­ and Marine Corps reconnaissance-liaison per­
chorage. Altogether a total of 64 LCM's and 57 sonnel.
LCVP's exclusive of smoke boats and anti-small­ On Love-day deliver guides for the initial waves
craft patrols were turned over by ships to boat of all. assault battalions.
pool Baker at one time or another. Of these 38 Accomplish post-assault demolition to render
LCM's and 47 LCVP's belonging to boat pool beaches more serviceable.
Baker were operational when this command was Provide reconnaissance and demolition Services
relieved. Information is riot available as to the on Ie Shima,the Eastern Islands, and such other
status of boat pool Able at that time. In addition beaches as might be selected.
to the boats of the boat pool,the LCM(6)'s belong­ TG 52.11 (Underwater Demolition Flotilla)
ing to the LSD's were employed in logistic services proceeded to the objective in two sections as fol­
about the anchorage and in unloading and tran­ lows:
sient APA's and AKA's were required to supply
(a) Group Able (with TF 52):
craft for various services.
Gilmer (APD-11)—ComUDFl0t and staff embarked.
The demands for boat services in the Hagushi Bates (APD-47)—UDT No. 12 embarked.
anchorage were far above those anticipated. This Barr (API)-39)—UDT No. 13 embarked.
is not strange when one considers that boat ce7 ill (APD-78)—UDT No. 14 embarked.
 .• •

the operation on Blue Beach was successfully com­

pleted.
At Iwo Jima specific and direct responsibilities
for covering LCI(G)'s was not defined. This
method proved inadequate when facing heavy
enemy fire from shore positions. For the Oki­
nawa operations, LCI(G)'s, DD's and heavier
ships were employed as covering units, with the
LCI(G)'s covering UDT work as closely as pos­
sible,the DD's covering LCI(G)'s and the heavier
ships stationed at such positions as to protect and.
furnish counter-battery fire for the over-all opera­
tion. The number and positions of DD's and
Photograph of Purple 2 Showing Boat Obstacles. LCI(G)'s were dependent upon the conditions.
The present plan of fire support for UDT op-
Knudson (APD-101)—UDT.No. 19 embarked.
Waters (APD-8)—Reserve equipment.
erations is considered the most effective yet de-
vised. Since resistance at Okinawa was prac­
(b) Group Baker (with TG 51.1): tically nil, the scheme was not put to the critical
Loy (APD-56)—UDT No. 4 embarked. test. The following features, however, are of in-
Hopping (APD-51)—UDT No. 7 embarked.
terest.
Kline (APD-120)—UDT No. 11 embarked.
Herndon (APD-121)—UDT No. 16 embarked. (a) The LCI(G)'s were moved into position in
Crosley (APD-87)—UDT No. 17 embarked. a very irregular manner in order to avoid the
Bunch (GF) (APD-79)—UDT No. 21 embarked. suggestion of a landing wave.
Griffin (APD-38)—Reserve equipment. (b) Increased maneuvering room was allowed
Reeves (APD-52)—Reserve equipment. for the destroyers and LCI(G)'s. ­
Group Charlie consisting of UDT's Nos. 8 and 10 (c) Battleships and cruisers were assigned by
was held in reserve at Guam, not embarked. the bombardment and fire support commander as
Rathburne (APD-25) and Crosby (APD-17) a definite part of the UDT operation. Their sole
were loaded at Guam and kept ready for sailing. function was to cover lighter units assigned in di-
Group Charlie was not needed and was released rect support of UDT's.
2 April. The demand for screening ships has necessi-
The reconnaissance of the northern beaches was tated using APD's with embarked UDT's for
conducted in the morning, that of the southern such purpose. Upon completion of the demolition
beaches in the afternoon. Light resistance in the mission,the APD's should not carry large amounts
form of machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire was of explosives while assigned to escort, screening,
encountered on the northern beaches but did not or picket duty as this is extra hazardous. If sur­
interfere with the mission as covering units
quickly silenCed all enemy fire. The reconnais­
sance of the southern beaches was made without
incident.
Simultaneous demolitions on all beaches were
conducted on the morning of Love minus 2 by the
same teams which had done the reconnaissance.
Approximately 2,900 obstacles made from posts
and rails cemented or wedged into the coral were
removed by hand-placed tetrytol charges. Some
difficulty was experienced in exploding the charges
placed on Purple and Blue Beaches. Purple Beach
was blown after repeat fuzing but two attempts
Photograph of Purple 2, Swimmers and Explosives-Laden
to blow Blue Beach failed. On Love minus 1 Rubber Boat in Foreground.
 TO SHORE

support, and to enemy unfamiliarity with UDT

methods.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
Underwater demolition teams assigned to the
northern Hagushi beaches performed excellent
work. Their pre-assault demolition wasthorough;
their reconnaissance reports complete and reliable.
Post assault demolition was conducted on request
expeditiously and with thoroughness.
Pre-assault work—Hagushi landings.—Perhaps
the most important services performed by the
UDTs,second only to the removal of obstacles to
Photograph of Purple 2, Demolition Charge Blowing Out
the assault landing, were the accurate report of
Obstacles.
reef conditions and the measurement of the water
plus explosives are not needed for post-assault depths over the reef coupled with the time these
demolitions, it is desirable to establish a tempo­ measurements were taken. Large-scale tidal
rary dump ashore or transfer same to shore agen­ curves (tide graphs) had been prepared before the
cies as soon as possible. However, if transfer
cannot be made or if there is a delay, jettisoning
all explosives in deep water is authorized. By
experience it has been found that arrangements
for disposition of surplus explosives must be made
prior to operations. This is the responsibility of
commander, Underwater Demolition Flotilla, or
commander,,,Underwater Demolition Squadron.
If the explosives were to be detonated by a bomb,
torpedo, or suicide the APD would be lost and
casualties heavy.
Responsibility of UDT's:
(a) Stops at the high water line.
(b) Ceases as soon as harbor engineers are
available to take over port and beach development.
The most outstanding feature of the UDT
operation was the manner in which beach charts,
reconnaissance data and maps were distributed.
Reconnaissance of preferred beaches was com­
pleted in the late afternoon of 29 March. Beach
reconnaissance reports and maps were delivered to
CTF 51,CTF 53,CTF 55,and troop commands at
sea early morning 31 March. This allowed suffi­
cient time for close study, necessary revision of
plans and briefing of personnel before the landing
was effected. The accuracy of all reports was veri­
fied by observations after the assault. Observers
representing the troops were returned to their com­
mands at the same time the reports and charts
were delivered to them.
The record of low casualties is attributed to Photograph of Post-Assault Demolition, Charge on
excellent personnel, organization, training, fire Purple 1.

UNCLASSIFIE
 operation. After the water depths on each reef trol officers in guiding the first assault waves to
had been measured on 29 March by the DDT's the beaches. Later the teams advised the group
a direct relationship between tidal height and beach party commander on demolition matters on
water depth was established. Thus it was possible all beaches. A small channel west of Red T-1 and
to predict the times thatLCM's could cross the reef a large channel hi Red T-4 were buoyed during
off any beach prior to Love-day. These working the assault phase of the operation.' Soundings
periods were actually prediOted on Love— 1, and were made on both channels.
inasmuch as the tidal predictions turned out to During the period from William+1 to Wil­
be substantially correct, later working intervals liam+4 (17 to 20 April), teams continued to
were planned and used with confidence. improve the beaches as conditions required. Scat-
Post assault work.—After the assault waves had tered coral heads and coral formations were
landed, UDT teams promptly reported to beach- blasted in order to allow large landing craft to
masters for reef demolition work. Requests for land on Red T-1. A small boat passage was blown
demolition were forwarded from transport beach- through a reef in Red T-3. Many smaller jobs
masters to the senior UDT officer and the force were also undertaken and completed. ­
beachmaster for approval. This system was The work of the underwater demolition teams
adopted to insure thattheir services were employed in removing obstacles to clear the way for the as-
where they would do the most good. sault landings, in ascertaining conditions of the
At least three boat channels were widened and reef and beaches, and in carrying out post-assault
otherwise improved, allowing boats to proceed to demolitions for improving unloading points con-
the beach during low water. On Green Beach 2 tributed immeasurably to the success of these
a channel was improved sufficiently to allow operations and is deserving of the highest praise.
Lers to actually beach.
Pre-assault work—le Shima.—In preparation From:,Commanding Officer, UDT No. 18
for the assault landings, Underwater Demolition There were,approximately, 1,100 posts removed
Teams No.4and No.21 carried out daylight recon- by demolition. Tetrytol blocks were removed
naissance on Green T-1, Red T-1, and Red T-2 from chains in haversacks (chains demolition
beaches of lie Shima on William- —3 (13 April). blocks m1-tetrytol in chains), and wound with
No obstacles or mines were found. Only light and soft iron wire and primed with 6-foot primacord
inaccurate enemy fire was received. leads. These blocks were prepared in bunches
Underwater Demolition Team No. 2 sent two and buoyed up with flotation bladders to be towed
platoons to make reconnaissance of Beach 1 on to the beach by swimmers. The tetrytol blocks
Menna, Shima and buoyed the approach lanes to were then wired to'the posts.
this beach. Marine reconnaissance units had Fox-3-day.—There were, approximately, 1,200
landed on Menna Shima that day, and no opposi­ posts removed by demolition on this day. Hagen­
tion was encountered. sen packs (demolition pack M 127 Mod 0) were
On William —2(14 April), Underwater Demo- used for this operation. The packs were buoyed
lition Teams No. 4 and 21 carried out a daylight up by jungle flotation bladders and towed into the
reconnaissance of beaches Red T-3, Red T-1,
beach Vby the swimmers as on the previous day.
Blue T-1, Blue T-2, Blue T-3, and Blue T-4 of
Tile posts encountered this day were generally
Ie Shima. At that time soundings were made and
larger than those encountered on.Fox —
data, gathered for preparation of charts of the
The Hagensen pack is recommended strongly
area.
for demolition operation involving the removal of
On William —1 (15 April), two officers and a posts. It can be placed in a very short time,and it
platoon from Underwater Demolition Team. No.4
does a very efficient job of cutting the object on
assisted the Seventy-seventh Division Artillery in
which it is placed.
the ship to shore movement to Beach 1, Menna
Shima. From: Commanding Officer, UDT No.4
During the assault, on William-day (16 April), Aluminum camouflage paint was used on the
representatives of the UD teams assisted the con- body and head of reconnaissance swimmers and
 'SkORE

appreciabl§ lessened their visibility. Team 4 has and on Keise Shima were placed under command
discarded the somewhat cumbersome camouflage of Commander Western Islands Attack Group.
hood in favor of covering the entire head with
aluminum grease paint. From: UDT Flotilla(CTG 52.11)
LCPR's during pre-assault work maneuvered After the experience of Iwo Jima, it cannot be
individually in zigzag courses and avoided all said that the present scheme of support for the ­
possible resemblance to assault formations. underwater demolition team operation is the solu­
It was noticed that oblique and vertical aerial tion, inasmuch as resistance on the missions per­
photographs,while excellent in most respects,were formed in this operation was practically nil. It
of,little value in locating specific beaches from the is desired to point out, however,that certain steps
sea. It is strongly recommended that silhouettes were taken for this operation. These steps were:
of the submarine reconnaissance type be included (a) The LCI(G)'s were moved into position
in intelligence data supplied. As yet we are un­ in a most irregular manner in order to avoid the
able to estimate the extent of yalue of the sonne suggestion of a landing wave. Their movement
photography with respect to underwater demoli­ was checked by many observers, and in no case
tion work. was this suggestion given.
(b) Sufficient maneuvering room was allowed
From: Commander, Transport Division 39 for the destroyers and LCI(G)'s.
It is recommended that more and earlier use be (c) Capital ships were assigned by the bom­
made of demolition teams for blasting small boat bardment and fire support commander as a defi,
nite part of the UDT operation, and in one in­
slots in reef edges on D 1-day if at all possible
stance fitted in exactly, when their fire silenced
From: Commander, Task Force 52 enemy fire on swimmers.
The Underwater Demolition Flotilla consisted From: Commander, Transport Squadron 12,
of 10 teams organized in 2 groups. Group Able, and Commander,Transport Division 34
comprised of Teams 12, 13, 14, and 19,.assembled
at Ulithi and proceeded to the objective in com­ Underwater demolition team personnel were
pany with Gunfire and Covering Force (TF 54). placed on LCC's and flank LCS(L)'s guiding
Group Baker,comprised of Teams 4, 7, 11, 16, 17, leading Waves to beaches and proved very helpful
and 21, assembled at Leyte for rehearsals, and in guiding leading waves to correct beaches.
proceeded to objective with Western Islands At­ Recommendatiov.—In future operations desig­
tack Group(TG 51.1). nate in advance,insofar as practicable,these UDT
The tasks scheduled for the UDT's were in gen­ Personnel who are going to serve as assistants in
eral as follows: Group Able (1) perform recon­ guiding initial assault waves to beaches. Thus,
naissance and necessary demolitions in Kerama during their pre-D-day reconnaissance, they can
pay special attention to beach landmarks which
Retto on Love-7 and assist in the assault on
Love-6; (2) reconnaissance and demolition on are visible from seaward and be better prepared
to assist in leading their initial assault waves to
Keise Shima on Love-5 and 4;(3) beginning on
proper beaches on D-day.
Love T4 and continuing through Love-1, work
Present policy places UDT operations, after
on the demonstration
_ beaches of southeastern Oki­
assault, under the attack group beachmaster.
nawa; (4), assist in the landing of XXIV Corps
Recommendation.—After the assault landing,
Artillery on Keise Shima op Love-1; Group
UDT operations in improving beach approaches
Baker perform all reconnaissance and demolition should be placed directly under the transport
on the preferred landing beaches in Hagushi area squadron beachmaster,who,by reason of familiar­
commencing on Love-4,and continuing through ity with existing conditions on his beaches and
Love-1 as necessary. With minor changes made the unloading aids he has available,is in a position
after arrival at the objective, these pcans were to know more readily and correctly exactly what
successfully carried out as scheduled. UDT op­ specific demolition or beach improvement will
erations in Keramo Retto on and after Love-6 benefit his over-all beach unloading set-up.
 0

CONTROL, BEACH, AND SHORE PARTIES'

••

- MINESWEEPING tion of a difficult task and the indomitable spirit

shown in carrying on despite loss and hazard.
From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Amphib­
ious Support Force and CTG 51.19) Summary of mines swept by days
The minesweeping preparation for this amphib­ CTF 52(AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT FORCE)

ious operation is probably the largest assault Day Swept Floaters

sweep operation ever executed. In general, the
intelligence reports were /reliable, indicating the L-7 0 5
L-6
probable existence of fields in A9-135, C4—05, and L-5
26 0
45 0
C2. L-4 54 (1)
L-3 4
For the purposes of extensive shore bombard­ L-2
' 0
33 0
ment, the entire coastal peiimeter of southern L-1 15
Okinawa required clearing during the pre-assault Total 177 2 80
phase, in addition to the clearance sweeping for
capture of the Kerama Retto,and the sweeping in CTG 51.19 (EASTERN ISLANDS) 3
preparation for possible early capture of le Shima.
Sweeping in from the 500-fathom curve was.indi­ L+4 5 3
cated. It is estimated that,including resweeping, L-1-5 16 8
L-F6 18 12
over 3,000 square miles were swept and declared L+7 8 0
'safe prior to Love-day. L-F8 3 1

Excluding the known hazard of loss of sweep Total 50 3 24

vessels while engaged in sweeping, only one vessel
was mined when the Halligan(DD .584) proceeded I Numerous.
2 Estimated from compilation of various reports.
into unswept water while on patrol. The 3 All of these were in Nakagusuku Wan.

thoroughness of the task accomplished is demon­

strated by the safety with which the bombardment CONTROL,BEACH,AND SHORE PARTIES
and assault ships in great numbers have since
closed the beaches without loss. • From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
The scale of this operation indicated the value At Okinawa, enemy resistande at the beaches
of the great flexibility of a large number of units, was virtually nonexistent and the troops pro­
in that delaysin one area due to casualty or other gressed inland rapidly, leaving the Ha,gushi
difficulty could be prevented by the diversion of beaches available for general unloading. Casu­
other units to assist. alties to the beach party due to enemy action were
The priceless value of constant information correspondingly low. Likewise, the generally fa­
about progress of sweeping cannot be too highly vorable:weather and hard beaches permitted rapid
stressed when the sweeping program is integrated. unloading and resulted in few cases of wrecked
with fire support, UDT and bombardment mis­ vehicles or landing craft. Although reef areas off
sions. On future operations, the assignment to most of the Hagushi beaches confine their use by
each sweep unit of a small picket boat of SC or PC the various types of craft landing over them to
type to patrol the outer limit of swept local area those stages of the tide which gave most favorable
is recommended, with the responsibility of main­ conditions,water transportation in excess of needs
taining precise plots of swept water and dissem­ was always available. During the.first period of
inating this Information constantly- to the bom­ bad weather experienced, a number of landing
bardment units. craft, barges and boats were damaged or beached.
It is recommended, for future operations, that The majority of all boats,barges and landing craft
unit commanders submit daily situation reports were shortly salvaged and returned to operation.
by 1800,to permit thorough evaluation and altera­ One LST, badly holed on a coral head during
tion in plans,if necessary,well before midnight. retraction and rebeached to prevent sinking,
In conclusion, it is desired to congratulate the broached and in so doing caused an LCT in the
minesweeping flotilla for the successful comple, adjacent slot to broach. The LCT was a total loss
Boat Wave Approaching Beach Under Cover of Naval Gunfte, Okinawa Shima L-Day. H-Hour Minus.
 rr
CONTROL, BEAC PARTIES

-4 4**046www.
.

Wave of LVT's Approaching Beach Under Cover of Support Vessels, Okinawa Shima, L-D ay, H-Hour
Minus.

and was stripped and cannibalized to furnish plat- Despite this, and the fact that many of the
ing for repairs to other craft. The LST was later transport beach parties landed were participating
refloated and towed to Kerama Retto and beached. in their first operation, the beach parties func-
This ship also was later stricken from the Navy tioned well. The need for adequate moorings for
List. During succeeding periods of bad weather boats, barges and landing craft was keenly felt.
damage to landing craft and boats was negligible. Those brought to the objective by the Amphibious
The factor which had the greatest effect upon Forces and the Repair and Salvage group were
unloading operations was the unexpectedly rapid inadequate to meet all requirements. None were
advance of the troops inland from the shore, which provided in early garrison echelons and none were
resulted in a shortage of unloading vehicles on available in forward areas.
shore. The rapid advance of the troops inland.- and the

6-10U 1 ,

taik_
 "• . •,•!'a.

Ce,

•
•

EASY DOES IT . . . These Leathernecks make their way ashore on Okina wa with no resistance from the Japanese Garrison of the island. This lack
of opposition amazed the Marines, who have fought on blood-drenched shores from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima.
 The echelons shown above paralleled the shore-
party echelons. Each beach unit commander
worked with the battalion shore party commander
at the battalion beach; each beach platoon com­
mander worked with the respective regimental
shore party commander; each beach company
commander worked with the respective division
4 shore party commander; and each beach battalion
commander worked with the respective corps shore
party commander.
This type of organization permits close, perma­
nent liaison with the troop-unloading group and,
such parties, if adequately trained and equipped
well in advance of an operation, should provide
more efficient garrison unloading than has hitherto
been achieved. A lack of continuity in operation
Supplies and Men Going Ashore on L+3 at Purple Beaches in the transition stage between assault and post
1 and 2.
assault phases was apparent. To remedy this de­
fect, transfer beach parties, eadh of 2 officers and
consequent long hauls materially reduced the 10 men, are now being organized for attachment
effectiveness of the transportation brought to the to assault beach parties from the transports to
objective in the assault. There was an early and rem'ain ashore during the assault and after the
continuing shortage of trucks on the beaches. The garrison beach battalions take over until beach
changes in the scheme of maneuver induced by the operation is fully satisfactory. Force or group
enemy defensive tactics resulted in the withdrawal beachmasters, their staffs, and TransRon and
of practically all vehicles with the 1st and 6t TransDiv beachmasters, with their attached com­
MarDivs from unloading assignments for an ex-­ munication units, may be left in the objective area
tended period at a time when the accent on unload­ after withdrawal of the assault transports as nec­
ing was at a maximum. As conditions on the essary to insure continuity of operation and con­
beaches and road nets were improved, unloadin tinued adequate communication on all needful
rates dropped materially due to shortage of equip­ channels.
ment. The need for adequate equipment,attached
to the shore party for shore party use only,is again
emphasized.
Beach battaVion
The Okinawa operation marked the "trial b:y
fire" of a new type of garrison unloading organi­
zation, the naval garrison beach battalion, organ­
ized as follows:
BEACH BATTALION

I •
Beach Beach
Comrany Com )any

I I I I
Beach Beach Beach Beach
Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon

I I I I View of Coral Reef at Low Tide Along Orange 2 Beach.

n - I I I I I I----71 Amphibious Trucks Drive Over the Reef to Unload the
Beach Beach Beach Beach Beach Beach Beach Beach
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Landing Craft.

6-12 .4, le too, ria

•

t t

A
 "It is recommended that in future opera­
tions greater emphasis be placed on priority
of shore party heavy equipment.
"It is felt that the number of heavy boom
cranes was inadequate. It is recommended
that provision be made in future operations
that at least three of these cranes be attached,
not organic to a CT shore party.
"Equipment carried on assault shipping is
considered adequate except more 2/ 2 ton
1
trucks could have been used to advantage,and
M-4 cranes would have been a considerable
help."
Numerous dispatches and reports further con­
firmed and amplified the above statements. These
deficiencies have been noted time and again in
Troops Heading for Okinawa Beach on L-Day.
action reports however,the defects are still to be
remedied.
Garrison beach battalions should continue to The third difficulty encountered by the shore
operate under the attack force commander in the party was the familiar one—lack of personnel
same manner as the assault beach parties until the during the most critical unloading period. Once
commander, Naval Operating Base,is established again replacement troops were used to supple­
ashore and prepared to assume his full responsi­ ment an inadequate basic shore-party organiza­
bilities. At this time control of garrison beach tion. As casualties mounted during periods of
battalions should be passed to commander, Naval more intensive fighting, and as demands on the
Operating Base, for operation under the troop shore party increased, replacements were with­
shore party. It is essential that the commander, drawn. When unloading requirements were at
Naval Operating Base, arrive early at the objec­ their peak manpower available to meet them was
tive with adequate personnel,communications and at its lowest ebb. The results became apparent
equipment to function effectively. in the decreased unloading rates as evidenced by
shore party reports. The employment of re­
Operation of the shore party placement personnel for shore parties is basically
A large amount of cargo was unloaded by the wrong.
shore party at Okinawa and their industry was
greatly to be commended. Certain items were
noted, however, which are enumerated below in
order that the experience at Okinawa may be put
to use in planning for forthcoming operations.
As has been pointed out above,unloading opera­
tions were seriously affected by the rapid advance
of the troops and unforeseen changes in the tactical
situation. Vehicles belonging to the respective
troop divisions, and the use of which the shore * vammotoimen,
-41.
party had counted upon, *ere withdrawn from
unloading operations very early to make long
hauls to the front lines, leaving the shore party
without adequate vehicles with which to move
cargo from the beaches.
In addition, there was not sufficient unloading
equipment provided by the shore party: Storming Sea Wall on Okinawa on L-Day.

UNCLASSIFIED imilmwm
 Finally, unloading was not conducted at maxi­ and unloading phases, the commander of a task
mum speed, due to employment of the technique unit comprising all of the landing ships operating
of selective discharge;that is,certain shipping was with a transport squadron should detail an experi­
retained at the objective for long periods to act enced landing ship officer to serve as an advisor
as "floating warehouses," unloading specific items to the transport squadron beachmasters in the
as requested by the forces ashore. This system is selection of suitable beaching points and as an
highly undesirable, both because it delays the assistant in supervising,from the shore,the beach­
turn-around of resupply shipping, and because it ing of such vessels.
needlessly exposes the shipping to the danger of The operation, maintenance, and administration
sinking by air attack. In future operations loss of control vessels requires continued supervision
of shipping, supplies and equipment will be in in like manner to other vessels. It is recommended
inverse ratio to the rate of unloading. that commanders of control vessel groups,with ap­
ReC0722311 endations propriate staffs, be assigned. Such assignments
should continue throughout all phases of an opera­
It is recommended that troop units be instructed
tion, including assembly and preparation.
that all,vessels will be unloaded continuously and
at the fastest Possible rate upon arrival at the Control vessels
objective. Shipping should not be called forward The vessels assigned to commander, Northern
unless it can be unloaded promptly on arrival. Attack Force to control the ship-to-shore move­
Landing ships and craft should not be called in ment consisted of one PCE, five PC(5)'s, four
to the beach until the Shore Party is ready to PC's, and nine SC's, all outfitted with the addi­
unload them. Ships will not be used as floating tional radio equipment and carrying communica­
dumps once general unloading has commenced. tion personnel provided for control vessels. These
Selective unloading should not be permitted after arrived at the assembly area between 11 and 21
the assault phase. February, some coming from the mainland and
Prior to future operations intensive effort should having had conversion work. performed at Pearl
be made to provide adequate shore party equip­ Harbor; others arriving in very poor material con­
ment and personnel to operate the beaches to fullest dition, having just completed an extended operat­
capacity during that period when advances inland ing period in the Philippines.
require the withdrawal of corps and division shore During the rehearsal the control group op­
party personnel and equipment, and before'per­ erated in accordance with standard amphibious
manent garrison freight handling facilities arrive doctrine and performed satisfactorily. Several
at the objective. This is essential both to ensure items,such as adjustment of timing by wave guides,
adequate supplies of material for the troops at the called for attention at this time but the function­
time when they are most needed, and to expedite ing of this group as a whole was well coordinated
the sailing of shipping. It cannot be too strongly in spite of the fact that the vessels had not trained
emphasized that a permanent,trained, adequately together previously and many exercised at control
equipped shore party, whose personnel are not work for the first time at this rehearsal.
subject to call as replacement troops, is the solu­ These craft moved from the Guadalcanal area to
tion to this recurring problem. Okinawa as part of the screens of the ,tractor
groups. Early on the morning of Love-day (1
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4 April), when released from the screens, they pro­
Operation of control,beach,and shore parties ceeded to their control stations where they oper­
It is considered that the services of experienced ated under the following assignments: as troops
landing ship officers should be available to attack staff vessels,one PC(S) each to the III Phib Corps
force commanders during all phases of amphibious and the First and Sixth Marine Divisions; as con­
operations involving the use of landing ships, in­ trol vessels,the PCE central (senior) control ves­
cluding the planning phases. Should such an offi­ sel, two PC(S)'s as TransRon control vessels and
cer already be attached to the staff, special assign­ four PC's as TransDiv control vessels, having two
ment would not be necessary. During the attack SC's each as secondary control vessels; the ninth

101.111111111111111111ft '7r7,
9t-LCW6L9
col*

7.4014
,4

IRO,
*

IHEYA LANDING-Landing Craft Loaded with the Eighth Marine Regimental Combat Team Stand Offshore as an Aerial Bombardment Paves the
Way for a Landing on Iheya, a small Island 25 miles Northwest of the Northern Tip of Okinawa. The Unopposed Thrust was effected June
3, 1945.
 ,

Amtrack Assault Waves Approach Red Beaches at Iheya Shima-Dog Day-3 June 1945.
 lIEX 4C
CONTROL, '

SC serving as the senior beachmaster's floating ideal beach for landing c) LST's and unloading
headquarters. by trucks over the reef at that time.
During the assault the vessels performed the The pontoon causeway set at Red Beach 1 was
duties of their assignments in accordance with pre­ of particular value, especially during the days of
scribed operational procedure. Following the neap tides. At this causeway LST's and all types
landing of the troops certain of the SC's served in of craft could be unloaded around the clock.
the capacity of close inshore traffic control craft A coordinated and efficient LST unloading
while others were given duty as mobile dispatch schedule was effected after responsible LST Group
craft. The ship-to-shore movement was conducted commanders were represented on the beach. Close
as planned and control functions were performed coordination among the division shore-party com­
with smoothness and dispatch. manders, Trans-Group beachmasters, and the
On William-2(14 April),the group of control Tractor Group commanders soon developed an
vessels, consisting of one POE, one PC(S), two efficient unloading schedule.
PC's, and four SC's which had operated with TG The garrison beach parties were called in on
51.1 (Western Islands Attack Group),during the Love+3, which allowed them sufficient time to
capture of Kerama Retto. distribute themselves, set up, and prepare to take
over. This they did on Love+7.
Beach and shore parties
That the beach parties and shore parties at-, Operation of beach and shore parties at Ie Shima
Hagushi performed in a creditable manner is evi­ The plan for this operation called for the land­
denced by the rapidity in unloading of the assault ing of assault troops and their equipment, plus a
shipping. The efficiency which developed by normal amount of artillery, over three beaches on
Love-plus-one-day and the harmony which existed William-day. It was planned that general un­
between beachmasters and shore party command­ loading would commence on William+1 over a
ers were not accidental,but were the result of care­ fourth beach, Red T-4, which from all appear­
ful planning and ironing out of differences by ances seemed to be the most suitable for the pur­
opposite numbers in the Guadalcanal Area. pose, inasmuch as there was a channel leading
During the planning stage every consideration through the reef to a dock inside. Beach and
was given to the best and alternate methods of shore parties were established early on William-
unloading over reefs. Plans even included the use day following the landing and experienced no dif­
of punts and life rafts if conditions warranted. ficulty in supplying the troops with their assigned
Definite plans were made for the employment of artillery. Priority cargo requested was landed
as many as 22 transfer points for the eight beaches expeditiously. Sufficient crane barges were avail­
where reef transfers would probably be required. able, although, as at Okinawa, boats were able to
It was felt that if all unloading had to be by cross the reef at most points at high water and
proceed directly to the beach. However, at low
transfer from boat to amphibious vehicles, this
water, LVT's and DUKW's experienced consider­
would not be another operation where there would
able difficulty in crossing. The reef was brittle,
be insufficient crane barges for the job. The reefs and there were several cases of amphibious vehi­
on the northern beaches, as it turned out, were not cles breaking through the crust-like coral or fail­
so bad as those encountered in other operations. ing to climb over the reef's edge. Red T-1 and
The favorable factor off all these beaches was that T-2 had numerous fissures and coral heads which
the reef was not a barrier type reef, but a gentle discouraged crossing at low water.
slope from the reef edge to the beach. As a re­ On William+1,reserve assault troops landed on
sult, with the exception of Yellow 2, boats were Red T-3 and Red T-4 Beaches. Beach and shore
able to proceed at high water springs over the reef parties were established on schedule, and prepa­
to the beach or to a distance from the beach where rations were made to commence general unload­
they could be unloaded at low water. In addition, ing. A reconnaissance was made of the beach area
Yellow 2,due to its smooth coral surface and dry­ with tTDT personnel to determine suitable LST
ing condition at low water, turned out to be an beaching areas and necessary demolitions. It was
1, .41 • • 's
•
• • •
6-18
 ru

liNCIA JFIED
Cs•
Kerama Retto Area Completely Burned Out by Napalm Bombi
 A !,?7,3
4
14 -14
.k1
.3 4 14.• ci
(4.1ill
CONTROL, BEACH, AND SHORE PARTIES

decided that by blasting the coral immediately LST's, it was found that this method was as effi­
off the beach, beaching slots for five or six LST's cient, and faster under certain conditions than
could be provided. The idea of causeway instal­ unloading over the reef. It was discovered that
lations was shelved. As it later turned out, this LST's discharged by marrying LCT's to ramps
decision was a poor one,for the subsequent demoli­ unloaded about 20 percent more rapidly than those
tion did not provide the LST beaching points unloaded by pontoon barge.
anticipated.
Starting on William+2-day and for 2 days fol­ From: Commander,Amphibious Group 7
lowing,unloading bogged down sadly. There were The landings made at Kerama Retto differed
two reasons for this, neither of which the beach or considerably from the usual "ship to shore" and
shore parties could combat. First, Red T-4 was "shore to shore" movements; first because the op­
far from an ideal beach for general unloading, eration required separate and practically inde­
especially for an operation where the bulk of the pendent landings by six battalions on different
cargo was carried in LST's. In adequate beaching beaches, which were effectively isolated from each
points have already been mentioned. In addition, other; second because of the temporary nature of
the three LST slots opened, on and adjacent to the occupation, no full-scale unloading of equip­
the dock,required extreme caution in approaching. ment and supplies was required or undertaken,
Ships had to make two successive turnsin a narrow except in the case of the garrison battalion on
channel. LCM's were employed to aid in warping:, Zamami, which was landed on the day following
but with the understandable inexperience of cox­ the assault.
swains in this type of work, occasionally did as Practically all battalions engaged in the initial
much harm as good. The results of these lioor assaults on L G-day, were also assigned assault
beaching conditions.were broached LST's,blocked missions on subsequent days, usually by shore-to­
channels, and vexing delays. The problem was shore movement from beach to beach in LVT's.
alleviated somewhat on William±4 with the in­ Where excessive distances were involved or when
stallation of two causeway sets at the eastern edge sea, tidal currents and swell prevented entire pas­
of the channel. Two additional LST's could then sage in LVT's without prospect of considerable
be handled. The second, and more important, losses,such assaults were carried out by reembark­
reason for the slowness in unloading during this ing LVT's in LST's, which were then moved to
early period was that supplies were being landed close-in launching areas off the new beach.
when the beach was in no condition to receive them.
Control of assaults
In a broad sense,the shore party was not organized
and functioning until William+4-day. In no way The Western Islands Control Unit(TU 51.1.11)
was this fact a discredit to the shore party engi­ included one POE,two PC,one PCS,and four SC,
neers of the Seventy-seventh Division, who did all a total of eight control-equipped craft. The as­
that could be expected of them under the circum­ sault Landing Plan required approximately simul­
stances to clear the beach and unload the cargo. taneous landings by six battalion landing teams
The reason was simply that the shore party did not from three transport and LST landing areas upon
have a beach up through William+4-day due to six different and separated beaches. Each of six
the troop tactical position inland. While it is to control craft and control units wastherefore nece's­
the Navy's interest to push the unloading and sarily assigned practically independent responsi
withdraw as quickly as possible, yet there is sup­ bility for leading in and landing one assault bat­
port for the conception that during this stage the talion. The two remaining control craft were as­
Navy is performing a service function, and con­ signed,one to the TransRon control officer for such
cern over any delay should be tempered by troop coordination and central control as could be effec­
requirements. tively exercised,the other for use of the command­
An interesting feature of the operation was the ing general of the Landing Force, in which was
unloading of LST's beyond the reef's edge by pon­ embarked his representative, and the military op­
toon barge and,LCT's. Surf conditions were ideal. erations officer representing the commander,West­
Considering the trouble _encountered in beaching ern Island Attack Group (CTG 51.1). Since no
 r­
••.4.• •0
42. '

TO SHORE

secondary controls, or relief control craft were was received in the launching areas, and LST
available,it was contemplated that,in event of loss commanders exercised the authority granted to
or disabling of any control craft, first, the Trans- launch LVT's from positiofis which required a
Ron control, second, the control craft in which minimum run to the beach without interfering
were embarked the representatives of the CG with preassault fires of support ships and craft.
Landing Force and Assault Group commander, * Because of the configuration of terrain it was
would take over the control duties for the battalion necessary to place lines of departure 1,000 to 1,500
concerned. yards from the beaches. Control vessels were sta­
During training, and in the actual operation, it tioned in the launching areas, where assault for­
was provided that the same control craft should mations were assembled, thereafter leading boat
work with, and control, the landing of the same and LVT groups at scheduled speeds of 6 and 31/2
battalion. So far as possible the same principle knots, respectively, over the necessarily indirect
was adhered to in subsequent shore-to-shore move­ approach routes to the lines of departure, which
ments, and in reembarkation of the battalion con­ they established upon arrival. This use of control
cerned. vessels to lead in from rendezvous area to beach
Because of the large number of practically inde­ was considered advisable for three reasons,
pendent assaults, and the limited experience and namely: (a) That strong currents and wind would
relatively junior rank of the individual control make navigation too difficult for LCVP to place
officers, it became apparent that the fire-support dependence upon them;(b) control vessels at the
craftteams could not well be placed under the com­ selected Lines of Departure prior to the arrival
mand of the individual control officers, nor could of assault waves would place them too close to
unified control of these fire-support craft teams be the beach for safety; and (c) would also block
effectively exercised by the TransRon control offi­ fire support. Establishing and marking the line
cer, or by an officer assigned as group control of departure an appreciable time before the ar­
officer. Accordingly early decision was made to rival of assault waves is not necessary when boat
place responsibility for operation and fires of sup-. groups are furnished navigation leaders,especially
port craft in the officers assigned to command sup­ when the navigation leader is also the primary
port craft teams,requiring each of them to exercise control vessel, and where strict coordination of
necessary coordination with the assault landing to landings on a number of contiguous beaches is not
which his team had been assigned. required.
Coordination of the landings was under con­ In these assaults the responsibility for coordi­
trol of the TransRon commander with over-all nating close fire support with the movement of
coordination of gunfire support craft and sup­ assault waves was placed upon the support team
port air craft retained by the Assault Group com­ commander for each beach, and close support
mander. vessels were not in direct communication with con­
This organization and control was necessarily trol vessels. This was found to be faulty, inas­
complicated,but under the existing conditions was much as three assaults were delayed because of
decided on as the best solution and it worked. friendly fire falling on and inshore of the line
In order to avoid placing LST's closer than
of departure. Either the support team com-
3,000 yards to unassaulted islands on L-6-day, mander must guard the control vessel common
plans provided for launching LVT's at an average
or the control vessel should guard the appropriate
distance of 8,500 yards from the beaches on which
fire-support frequency. The delay involved in
the assaults were to be made. However, prior
to departure from Leyte, the group commander one or two retransmissions of requests to cease or
specifically delegated authority to LST command­ repeat fires is not acceptable in the face of oppo­
ers of assault units to move LST's in closer to sition. The control vessel must be in a position
beaches prior to launching LVT's, provided UDT to advise supporting vessels of the situation di­
reconnaissance on previous days indicated absence rectly and quickly. This is especially important
of enemy defenses and actual opposition encoun­ where there is no intention or possibility of accu­
tered should permit. Actually no enemy gunfire rate over-all coordination, and when, as in this
 • -•

ci
,
CONK ND,--. gTIO-RE R

operation, a number of small units are required to Shore party

conduct semi-independent landings. Under the present doctrine the Army assumes
For the assault landings which were made in all cargo unlOading responsibilities at the various
LVT's from LST's, it was necessary to transfer beaches. The Army also directs the allocation of
transport beach parties to LST's to facilitate their all cargo unloading floating equipment. Without
integration with assault troops for landing. Such any thought of criticism or understatement this
transfers were made before departure from Leyte, situation leaves the naval vessels entirely at the
.and the beach party personnel so transferred re­ disposition of the Army for lighterage and un­
mained embarked in LST's until their respective loading at the beaches. Accredited Navy repre­
missions were completed. Only reduced beach sentatives sit in at joint conferences each day,but
parties were required, or landed, in most cases, they cannot possibly foresee minute-to-minute
and these remained on shore until the troops were problems which develop with each shipand at each
reembarked from that beach, except in the case of beach.
Zamami,where landing of garrison.battalion with In all cases the Army unquestionably does the
equipment and stores from one APA, one LST, best possible under existing conditions, however,
and two LSM's required unloading operations over we repeatedly learn the lesson that there is never
several days. enough lighterage and that delays are incurred in
Because of the separation of thelanding beaches, unloading boats on the beaches, due to lack of
each Beach Party unit functioned almost inde­ cranes, trucks, and other causes. The old system
pendently, with little possibility of coordination of unloading boats by sheer manpower, passing
or control direction by the Transport Division, individual boxes and cases by hand from boats to
Transport Squadron,and Transport Group beach- beaches should forever remain obsolete as it takes
masters. These actually functioned as "trouble too much manpower and rapidly wears men down.
shooters", prepared to exercise direct supervision The old "chain gang"system never was any good.
at any point where the operation appeared to be The only effective system for rapid discharge of
cargo at the beaches is by the ships discharging
lagging,or where difficulties were reported to exist.
cargo in net slings when possible and having
Because of the relative simplicity and limited- na­
cranes atthe beache§hoistthe netslings with cargo
ture of the beach activities, such intervention, or
directly from the boats to trucks, and in then
direct exercise of control, was in no case required. carrying the load to dumps about one (1) or two
For the Keise Shima operation, which involved (2) miles distance inland. We have learned that
landing of two 155-mm. gun battalions, an AW this is the most practical and expeditious way to
platoon,and a Marine Air Warning Unit on L —1 get the boats unloaded and to keep them rapidly
day,no labor troops were provided. This resulted shuttling back and forth from the ships to the
in slow unloading of ammunition and bulk sup­ beach.
plies. The labor force required was necessarily
Beach battalion
obtained from the troops of the artillery units and
the assault infantry battalion. The resulting delay The difficulty which often intervenes is that the
was not serious, however, and unloading was beachmaster does not have sufficient rank to over­
completed on L+1-day. come local interference. For instance: The beach-
master may be an Army or Marine lieutenant. A
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Starlight colonel of an Army or Marine contingent ashore
(AP 175) may come along, as happened in our present case,
and order that the trucks proceed directly from
It still remains that the most involved part of the beach to a place several miles distant for un­
amphibious operations is at the beachheads where loading where there were not sufficient cranes or
cargo unloading problems multiply each minute of men to handle the cargo. This resulted in trucks
the day. The Navy is well organized afloat to being _tied up for inordinate periods and destroyed.
efficiently and expeditiously cope with all prob­ organized efficiency at the beaches and at the as­
lems up to the point of beachheads. sio.ntd dumps. Then too it is found that it fre­
. t;%,

1111111.11111111111111ii
 SHIP TO SHORE •

quently happens that there are too many giving eration should be under- an admiral in order that
conflicting orders to the beachmaster. The net re­ the respective captains will have proper protec­
sult of these conditions is inevitable confusion and tion and authority at the beaches.
loss of valuable time trying to get things ironed As matters now stand,with everyone doing their
out. This is but one example of many. It may be best, inordinate delays and confusion often occur
agded that our own boat crews unloaded many of at the beaches. Ships thus held in port for longer
our boats when conditions were fouled up on the periods than they should be are unduly exposed to
beach in order to keep things in motion. combat hazards. We are allfighting the same war,
Recommendations but there cannot be division of authority if we
are to succeed in completing our amphibious opera­
As a possible solution to these problems it is tions in the right manner. I am confident that the
recommended that there be a revision of the entire Army and Marines will be glad to cooperate by
system as follows: leaving work parties aboard ships for handling;
(a) That a naval officer with the rank of cap­ cargo in the holds and in coordinating their facil­
tain be placed in charge of each beach as shore ities with the Navy ashore. After all, they are
party commander. fighting men and want to get their equipment in
(b) That Navy beach battalions be organized operation as soon as possible, as.well as to get off
to include trained stevedores properly equipped the beaches.
with cranes and gear to handle all cargo at the It is recommended that the admiral of an am­
respective beaches. The Army to supply the phibious group, such as ComPhibsGroup 12, in
trucks and to maintain their own dumps nearby charge of ship unloading, also have command of
with a proportionate number of cranes to handle the entire beach operation during the assault and
cargo in net slings. Heavy lifts to be handled garrison unloading 'phase. Upon completion of
with wire straps fixed to the crates when first his mission,he can turn over the beach operations
packed and loaded. These heavy lifts to be also to the commander,Naval Base.
loaded direct from boat to truck. Our sole objective should be to get the entire
(c) All lighterage to be equally divided and. cargo unloading operation performed in the best
under the control and disposition of the Navy cap­ and most expeditious manner possible. Let the
tain in charge of each beach who shall be the Navy Navy complete all phases of troop and cargo un­
shore party commander and directly under the loading as one operation. It will forever solve our
ComPhibsGroup in charge of all unloading. By major unloading and beachhead problems.
advance planning and coordination in this respect Note 1: We kept an officer watch on the beach
there can be no conflict of authority and the Navy continuously during the entire period of cargo
can complete their job in a thorough manner. discharge. He had specific instructions to coop­
It is axiomatic that no major operation can be erate and coordinate all ship unloading activities
successful where a division of authority exists,be­ with the beachmaster also to see that we got our
tween various branches of the service. net slings back promptly,etc. This officer assisted
(d) Cargo to be loaded in each hatch aboard the beachmaster in solving any ship cargo prob­
vessels for one Army or Marine contingent inso­ lems as they arose. We had UNITY of action at
far as possible. This will eliminate much paper all times.•
work,as the cargo tickets will indicate which out­ Note 2: We always had sufficient net-slings to
fit the cargo is for, and it will be placed in their carry out our system due to our supervisory force
portion of the dump after being unloaded at the ashore getting them back to the ship promiitly.
beach. This will avoid later segregation and We lost no slings.
delays. Note 3: The beachmaster was always very coop­
(e) Cargo to be loaded aboard the vessel on erative and helpful. Whenever things got fouled
which the Army or marine contingent is traveling up it was always due to lack of understanding or
and it will be their responsibility to coordinate conflicting orders from sources "higher-up." A
their resources in handling it. beach cannot be run by "remote control." Each
(f) The Navy over-all command for ea aclhshpipd be under the immediate direction of
4 •
4
679527-46 16
 AND SHORE PARTIES

a separate shore party commander at a command anchorage to commander, Naval Operating Base,
post on the spot. Okinawa, who then assumed command of both
beach battalions.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12 . Shore party.—Shore parties on the Hagushi
Control party.—Each attack force had its own beaches during the assault were composed of the
control party consisting of control vessels with XXIV Corps shore party and the III Philp Corps
their control communication teams and the force, shore party each under the command of its respec­
squadron, and division control officers embarked. tive corps commander. On L+6, command of
This force employed 19 PCE's, PC's,PCS's, and both shore parties passed from the corps com­
Se's for this purpose. Their assignments and manders to commander, First Engineer Special
duties were as set forth in commander, Amphib­ Brigade, a subordinate of the island commander,
ious Group 12 Attack Order No. A1202-45. They who,acting in the capacity of a commander,com­
dispatched the assault waves in accordance with munication zone, assumed responsibility for all
the pre-arranged schedule and later controlled Army unloading activities over the Hagushi
ship-to-shore tau& during the unloading of the beaches. This organization endured until June 1
assault convoys. When the assault convoys fin, at which time responsibility for unloading
ished unloading and departed, the transport throughout the island passed to commander,joint,
squadron and division control officers were with­ freight handling facility, a subordinate of com­
drawn and the control vessels functioned under mander,Naval Operating Base,who in turn was a
the beachmaster. Gradually as beaches and un­ subordinate of the island command.
loading facilities were consolidated,the number of
control vessels was reduced until, at the time of From: Commander, Amphibious Group 5
the departure of this command, only four were Control over the demonstration waves was exer­
still in use and one of these was employed exclu­ cised from the PCS 1460, demonstration central
sively for transportation of the attack force beach- control vessel, and PC 466 with SC 724 and SC
master. 1326 acting as beach flank markers on Green Able
Beach party.—Beach parties, during the as­ 1 and 2 respectively. SC 1316 and SC 1315 acted
sault phase of the operation, were supplied by the asflank guides under PC 1177,loading wavesfrom
beach parties from the transports of Transport transport area to line of departure. All control
Squadrons 13 and 14. As the assault convoys were personnel had been transferred to respective con­
unloaded and the transports departed,their beach trol vessels at SAIPAN,which was the final stag­
parties were withdrawn and replaced by elements ing point for TG 51.2. All control vessels accom­
of Garrison Beach Battalion No.2 which had pro­ panied the task group from this area to the objec­
ceeded to Okinawa with the assault convoys. The tive in the capacity of screening vessels to the
same procedure was carried out on the northern Tractor Flotilla. At 0500 (Item) on 1 April 1945
Hagushi beaches where the personnel of Garrison all control vessels were released from their screen­
Beach Battalion No.1 replaced the transport beach ing duties and proceeded independently to the line
parties of the Northern Attack Force as the latter of departurefor Green Able beaches,in accordance
were withdrawn. When the assault convoys of with the operation order.
the Northern Attack Force were unloaded, com­ All control vessels were on station at line of
mander, Northern Attack Force, CTF 53, was re­ approach at 0700 (Item) 1 and 2 April 1945. All
lieved of the responsibility for further unloading, control vessels were on station at line of departure
and direct control of unloading operations over at 0730 1 and 2 April 1945. At approximately the
bOth the northern and southern Hagushi beaches same time waves were being formed and later led
was assumed by CTF 55. TF 55 beachmaster had to line of departure by PC 1177,SC 1315 and SC
already established headquarters ashore and both 1316. King-hour was confirmed as 0830 at 0705
Beach Battalion No. 1 and Beach Battalion No. 2 on 1 April 1945 and at 0715 on 2 April. At 0810
reported to him for duty. This organization re­ (Item), King-20, the numeral 1 flag was hoisted
mained in effect until June 3, when control of un­ by PCS 1460, this action being paralleled by all
loading operations passed from SOPA, Hagushi vessels on line of departure. At 0815 the numeral

timammi
 SHIP TO. SHORE

1 flag was executed by all control vessels and the and vehicles could be landed in any type landing
first wave left the line of departure. All flag craft during the entire occupation period. Exits
hoists were paralleled by voice thus assuring coor­ in existence at the time of the landing provided
dination of all vessels and also offering a time check the necessary routes to inland dumps. There was
for all other units of the task group. At King 0830 some enemy fire on and offshore of the beach, but
(Item) the numeral 4 flag .was executed, paral­ no casualties to beach or shore parties, or to men
leled by "Execute King" by voice. The first wave in landing craft, were reported.
returned across the line at 0845 (Item). Shore party.—The shore party consisted of the
Third Platoon, Company A, One Hundred and
From: Commander, Transport Division 39
Second Engineer Battalion, detailed to initially
It was quite apparent that there was a lack of clear the beach of mines and obstacles Company
proper supervision on the beach to properly con­ C, Thirty-fourth Engineer Battalion, to organize
trol the beaching and coordinate the unloading of the beach and establish inland dumps and the
LST's. Constant calls were made on transport battalion ammunition and pioneer platoon to as­
and division beachmasters for assistance. No par­ sist in the establishing of dumps. The shore party
ticular section of the beach was assigned solely for was ample and able to maintain a clear beach dur­
LST's, which was evidenced by the fact that they ing the unloading and the reembarkation stages.
came in at will and to any open section of the reef.
The space they utilized on Purple 2 Beach left From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine
only 250 yards of workable beach for this division. Division
Recommendation.—On a reef where suitable Shore party
LST beaching areas are widely separated, it is Details are contained in the report of the shore
believed that if a separate transport beach party party commander. The standard operating pro­
were assigned to two adjoining beaches, solely for cedure of this division wasfollowed with outstand­
LST operation under supervision of squadron LST ing results, resulting in commendations from
beachmaster, that valuable assistance and more higher authority. The success of the shore party
expeditious unloading would result. operation can be attributed to the following:
From: Commander, Task Force 52 (Amphib­ (a) A simple operating procedure was adopted
ious Support Force and CTG 51.19) several months before the operation.
(b) Comprehensive instruction for all shore
Capture of Tsugen Jima
party personnel was held,by the shore party com­
Operation of control party.—Lieutenant Bills, mander about 2 months'prior to embarkation.
designated as commander, Control Unit (TU (c) The shore party commander had control of
51.19.4), with PCS 1421, SC 1066, and PCS 1402, the employment of all shore party personnel for
handled the task of controlling the landing of BLT about 1 month prior to embarkation.
105/3, Twenty-seventh Infantry Division, on
(d) A full-scale division rehearsal was utilized
beach Red Baker 3 from APA 119 (Highlands),
to land, and unload over separate regimental
very efficiently. PCS 1421 as the left flank guide beaches, supplies amounting to about 2 U/F and
and SC 1066 as the rightflank guide led the assault
2 days' ration and petroleum products.
waves in to the beach and then took over the land­
(e) Two thousand five hundred replacements
ing craft control stations near the line of depar­
were available as labor to augment the shore party
ture. PCS 1402 was placed in reserve and made
structure.
available to the troop regimental commander em­
(f) An able, energetic officer, familiar with en­
barked in Estes. No supplies or vehicles, other
gineering and pioneering problems, was put in
than initial, were to be landed except on call.
command of the shore party. .
This decision reduced the ship-to:shore control to
a minimum. Comment
Beach party.—Beach Red Baker 3, located on Two replacement drafts were assigned for use
the southwest shore was the selected landing beach as shore party labor and for later release to replace
and proved to be ideal for the purpose. Supplies battle casualties. These drafts proved invaluable,
 7!
4,(4
-
•

r4
CONTROL, BEACH, AND SHORE PARTIE
•
both as shore party labor and as on-the-spot until it was .practically on top of the ship. .Its
replacements. approach into the moon made it invisible to the
ship and at the same time silhouetted the ship as
Recommendations an excellent target for the attacking plane.
That the present system of supplying two re­ It is believed that when night retirement is
placement drafts for each operation be continued. planned, orders for retirement, given sufficiently
That these drafts total approximately 125 officers before time for making smoke, would facilitate
and 2,500 enlisted. clearing transport area safely. On one occasion
it was necessary to veer out 300 feet of stern an­
From: Commander, LST Group 40 chor cable and turn over engines ahead to prevent
It would seem that a few hours reconnaissance an APA from colliding with this ship. The APA
by a beach or hydrographic party, at which time was maneuvering through the smoke, presumably
the most desirable slots could have been marked, to clear transport area for night retirement.
would have saved many hours of'unloading time
during a period when time was the essence. Then From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LST 609
too, the resulting damage from hit or miss beach­ Small landing craft, especially LCVP's and
ing contributes a factor which cannot be ignored. LCM's used in unloading the transports, continue
to block the approaches to LST beaches in large
From: Commanding'Officer, U. S. S. LST 693 number. While waiting to be called in to the
The greatest difficulty as far as the operations beach, they gather in nests of six to eight boats
of LST's was concerned was to beach LST's for to a nest and lie to between the line of departure
unloading. The beaches physically were not good and the beach. They generally pay no attention
but the chief difficulty was that there seemed to to whistle signals and it is always necessary to
be no clear well defined chain of command to order maneuver the LST to avoid running them down,
LST's ashore. thus often making it impossible for the LST to
make a proper beaching in the slot designated.
From: Commanding .Officer, U. S. S. LST 554 This maneuvering in the last 500 yards before
This _command believes, in view of damage sus­ hitting the beach often makes it impossible to
tained by coral head or pinnacle, that a thorough make proper use of the stern anchor, as the LST
reconnaissance of the approach to designated must be kept on a steady heading during the ap­
beaching slot be made by an officerin a small boat, proach and after the stern anchor is let go.
before ship is beached on coral beaches that have
considerable tidal range. In this instance orders From: Commander, Transport Squadron 12
to beach were received, beaching was made beside and Commander, Transport Division
another LST,already beached, an officer placed at 34 (Temp.) U.S. S. Cambria, Flagship
the bow in gun tub No. 41 to observe the bottom, All causeways to be emplaced and used on
and the ship beached on one engine, at one-third transport squadron beaches should come directly
speed. This would seem on the surface to be suffi— under the control of the commander of the trans­
cient warfunt for beaching without apprehension port squadron from the beginning of the opera­
of danger. It is believed, however,that the above tion, thereby assuring speedy launching, installa­
recommended reconnaissance might have spotted tion, and early full capacity use. This also would
the otherwise unseen coral head. give the transport squadron beachmaster who is
In view of the experience of this command with going to install and maintain the causeway an
the suicide plane in the moonlight,it is the opinion opportunity to see that proper gear is loaded
that night retirement is not advisable for LST's aboard the carrier LST's to maintain the cause­
when the moon is full, providing they can be an­ ways in rough weather. The CB officer in charge
chored in transport area and provided the protec­ of causeways allotted to a transport squadron
tion of smoke coverage during the.RED alerts. should be embarked in transport squadron flag-
As indicated in AA action report attached, the slip prior to training exercises to permit exten­
enemy plane, though heard, could not be seen sive and intelligent planning.
„
,rt

1\4,­
Beach parties immediate approach thereto, located on station
Garrison beach parties were not landed in time before the deployment of the transports and trac­
to become thoroughly familiar with unloading tor units, which serve not only as a convenient
set-up and relieve assault beach parties when it check upon the approach of the initial assault
was necessary to withdraw these assault units. units but would be of a very considerable value to
it was necessary for TransRon 12 staff beach and later units, upon which they might orient them­
control organization to take over from assault selves in a circumstance as reported.
units until Love plus 7, when garrison personnel When this ship received orders to beach south
had become familiar enough with the set-up to of Hagushi shortly after noon the day of the as­
take over. sault there was no LST beachmaster party func7
The garrison beach party and their gear should tioning on shore. A landing was made at the loca­
be loaded in the assault shipping in a manner that tion stipulated by orders of the unit commander
will enable them to land personnel and communi­ and the Transport Group control officer. Due to
cation gear not later than D-plus-2,day. All gar­ the irregularity of the reef edge at that point there
rison beachmasters should report to their opposites was no natural platform to receive the bow ramp
in the assault beach party units and start working and it was impossible, consequently to debark
under the direction of the assault beachmasters. vehicles. There was no Army or Navy representa­
The balance of the garrison beach party personnel tive whomsoever ashore to select a suitable site
and gear such as hospital, galley, signal towers, for unloading. It became necessary for the com­
camp gear, machine shop, etc., can be brought manding officer to dispatch a.beach reconnaissance
ashore later and set up. party composed of one Army and one naval officer
Beach parties as presently constituted do not in a small boat to find a spot on the reef where
have sufficient personnel to handle smoke genera­ unloading might be effected. Accomplishment of
tors on the beaches. this mission and the second required landing of
If smoke is to be made on beaches and diligently the ship consumed a good two hours that might
attended to, a special detail should be assigned have well gone toward unloading vital assault
from Chemical Warfare Service to place and equipment. It is especially important that proper
•operate the generators. sites be selected by naval authority ashore for the
landings of the first LST's sent in to beach.
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LST 558 A situation of congestion arises when transports
Markers to indicate outer limits or approaches to and landing ships are ordered to close the beach
transport areas to expedite unloading. Off the Hagushi beach­
head these vessels were anchored in such numbers
In making the final approach to the target of and in such close proximity to one an'other that
this assault the reporting ship experienced diffi­ navigation among them, as was required of LST's
culty in locating the designated LST Area in ordered to beach, was accomplished at extreme
which it was to anchor and launch amphibious hazard.
vehicles. The battle smoke which hung over the The tremendous concentration of small landing
area obliterated any landmarks that could have craft, pontoon barges, etc., lying to inside the
been used for navigational purposes. The ship established line of departure, made it exceedingly
was in a unit which made its approach to the ob­ difficult for landing ships to get squared away for
jective subsequent to the arrival of several other a proper approach to the shore. In some instances
units of LST's. The control vessels on the line of "islands" of unemployed LCM's and LCVP's;,as
departure could not be seen nor could the bow many as 12 secured together, either adrift or at
numbers of the LST's already on station in the anchor—and pontoon barges illogically moored
area be discerned. Consequently. there was no created obstacles impossible to circumvent, thus
means on hand by which a check upon the ship's preventing landing ships from shaping a course to
position could be made. their intended beaching slot.
Two dan buoys with identifying flags at the Not only does this condition impede and jeop­
outer corners of the area or a guide vessel at the ardize the process of beaching landing ships but
 !'"IS

a
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
•;;',
17>

vessels in the same catagories, to anchor in areas

well removed from the lines of departure and
transport unloading areas off the beaches.
From: Commanding Officer, LST Flotilla 6
Over-all unloading is speeded up if a ship once
placed on the beach is fully unloaded and not re­
moved to make way for a ship of higher priority
while some of the load still remains on board. The
particular reef where unloading took place had
an unloading cycle of from 16 to 24 hours, during
which about two hours could be used for driving
vehicles off over the reef. Ships had to be beached
at high tide and left there until low water and
Ordnance Supply Dump Near Orange 2 Beach. could not be retracted until the tide came in again.
This meant that a ship with 1 vehicle left,occupied
the utter jam of vessels and craft makes it remark­
a slot on the beach for as long a period as a ship
able for an enemy suicide plane to miss some mark with 90 vehicles on board.
in the case of an attack.
LST's are so important in assault operations
The following recommendations are made to
that amphibious commanders planning assaults
alleviate this situation. should have the services of an experienced LST
Permit no small craft to anchor or lay to, un­ officer as a consultant all through the planning
employed, off the beachhead during the hours of stage.
daylight and at night,for that matter, if landing The fire-discipline problem in landing ships and
ships are being brought in to the beach. The land­ craft remains unsolved and must be continually
ing craft control unit should provide a fast patrol
craft that would be constantly on duty,and with a
commissioned officer embarked,to see that this pro­
vision be enforced and also to clear the way for
landing ships making a run into the beach of small
craft that may be legitimately, but obtrusively,
underway in the area.
Set aside a region about 500 yards in extent to
a seaward of the line of departure, as determined
and maintained by the control craft anchored on
station, that will be kept clear of any other an­
chored vessels except the necessary bowser barges
and hospital LST's. This restricted avenue should
allow landing ships maneuvering room to execute
a fair approach to the beach designated for their
landing.
Establish transport unloading area outside this
required distance of 500 yards seaward of the line
of departure. Permit only those ships actually
engaged in transferring cargo to landing craft or
launching amphibious vehicles to occupy this area.
Assign ships to anchorages so that there be a
minimum of 300 yards distance between them.
Require empty LST's and those simply waiting Ammunition and Troops Moving Forward Between Shuni
orders to unload, likewise transports and cargo -
and Naha.

411=11111111111
 SITORE

stable firing platform and together with the gyro

stabilizer provides much more accurate fire while
afloat than the LVT(A) can deliver. With its
low silhouette and turret armor,plus the buoyancy
of the pontoons, it is far less vulnerable to anti-
boat fire than the LVT(A). Upon reaching the
beach it can be immediately put to use as a tank,
while the LVT(A) becomes only a support fire
weapon. Salt water, from leakage and spray, is
deleterious to the tank. Its entry cannot be en­
tirely prevented by waterproofing,and causes seri­
ous damage to wiring,clutch and throttle linkage,
and to the suspension system. Flotation should
be for a minimum period. In this operation the
devices were launched too far out and remained
afloat too long. Two tanks were lost while
equipped with the T6. In one tank the motor
Causeway at Orange 2 Beach. Both coral rock and steel
stopped and could not be started. Bilge pumps
pontoons compose the causeway. Trucks are being un­
loaded from an LST. The 11' seawall may be seen in
were operated on batteries until the batteries were
the distance. exhausted. The tank floated for six hours after
that, but finally swamped and sank. The tank
worked on by commanding officers. Discipline in was equipped with a dozer blade, adding extra
this operation appeared somewhat better than ob­ weight and probably hastening the sinking.
served in Lingayen but was still far from satisfac­ Nearby naval units were appealed to for aid,either
tory. by towing or supplying power for the bilge pumps,
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT but it was refused. The other tank was lost pri­
marily because a track broke and was lost while
From: Commanding General, Headquarters, afloat, without the knowledge of the driver. When
ill Amphibious Corps the tank hit the reef it pivoted and the driver,
Twenty-one flotation devices, T6, were em­ thinking the T6 was struck on a coral head and
ployed to land tanks for this operation. The First
Marine Division mounted 6 and the Sixth Marine •
Division 15 of these devices. The landing of tanks
so mounted was little more than an interesting
experiment, since the lack of opposition denied
the opportunity to reach any decision in the com­
bat value of the device. Aside from this aspect
of the situation, some observations can be made.
They require a great amount of valuable shipping
space. They should be employed only under one
of two conditions:(1) That there is no other way
of landing them, and (2) if it is desired to land
them in the first wave in lieu of LVT(A)'s. Use
of the LCM is a superior method of landing the
tanks if beach conditions permit. It does not per­
mit as effective use of the tank gun as the T6 does.
If it is apparent that the beach will be strongly
defended and a heavy gun in an armored vehicle is
needed then the T6 should replace the LVT(A). Unloading dock-Katchin Hanto. Nakagusuku Wan in
A. tank equipped with the T6 furnishes a very the background.
 • • `'," a* • a •;
causing the pivoting, blew the pontoons off. He to the reef problems, it is believed that attack
attempted to drive forward but pivoted again transports, who expect to complete unloading on
into a pot hole and completely submerged. D+2 or D+3, cannot be dependent upon it for
the unloading of bulk cargo. There are too many
From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine
delays normally connected with their construction
Division
besides the probability of enemy fire on the reef,
The Sixth Marine Division had the unique op­ which would add to the delay. Rather, it is felt
portunity to examine three methods of landing that at least three barge cranes,per transport divi­
tanks in the same operation. One company was sion, should be in operation on D-day, and it is
landed from an LSD in LCM(6)'s; one company believed that these would be adequate to complete
mounting T6 tank flotation devices was landed unloading of APA's on D+2, provided sufficient
from LST's; a third company was landed directly LVT's and trucks are operating.
on the beach by LSM's. All schemes functioned
effectively, with the LSM combination the least From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Starlight
desirable because of the necessity for fording deep (AP175)
water from the LSM grounding point. By using the cargo net-crane-truck system afore
The T6 device -worked extremely. well. Tank outlined we established a record of discharging
swam easily to the edge of the reef, moved with­ nine hundred eighty-five (985) tons of miscellane­
out difficulty across a very rough reef floor, dis­ ous cargo in a little over one working day .of
carded their pontoons without incident, and all twenty-four hours. We used the ship's boats con­
but one of the company's tanks were in operation sisting of four LCM's and seven LCVP's for all
by H-plus-29 minutes. The one tank which failed cargo except one load in each of two LCT's. We
to get ashore did so because of motor breakdown. were frequently interrupted by air attacks, gen­
The company transported in LCM(6)'s landed eral quarters, and prolonged "black-outs." Low
at high tide without incident. tides also held up boats at beach approaches.
From: Commander; Transport Squadron 12
MISCELLANEOUS
and Commander,Transport Division 34
Control of launching, selection of site, and in­ From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Edge­
stallation of causeways was originally under con­ combe(AP 164)
trol of CTF 53's beachma,ster. Actually, beach- The entire operation of unloading was delayed
masters from the staff of ComTransRon 12 finally for lack of equipment, and because of the lack of
supervised the installation and maintenance in an Army shore party not being assigned on L-day.
position during subsequent rough weather. The From queries made,it was ascertained,that all the
causeway wa's started on Love+2-day, and it was shore party equipment was loaded on LST 609,
not until Love+3 that its maximum efficiency which was not unloaded until L4-day. This
could be reached.
equipment should be given priority so general
From: Commander, Transport Division 39 unloading can be expedited.
The U-shaped pontoon causeway, placed so as From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Alshain
to bridge the edge of the reef, was an ideal solu­ (AKA 55)
tion to the problem of landing bulk cargo. It
served as a perfect bridge to the edge of the reef LVT waves were late in tun on beach apparently
as trucks were able to shuttle continuously direct due to adverse current. More time should be al­
to the cranes by means of roads constructed to the lotted these craft as they are very slow at best
two ends of the U. speed.
As the beaches were clear of enemy fire almost Earlier erection of cranes on barges where they
from the time of the initial landing,it is felt that are necessary. Delay was caused in unloading
the causeway should have been placed on L-F1. because much of transferring had to be done by
While the pontoon causeway is the best answer manual labor.
 51--up TO SHORE

LST's and LSM's interferred at purple beach Control of LVT's and DUKW's was facilitated
by beaching in small boat area. They should stay by the presence of a dispatcher at each dump en-­
out of small boat area. trance and a liaison officer at the'shore party com­
Cargo-designating boards are recommended mand post. All problems arising in the use of
instead of cargo-designating flags. amphibious vehicles were handled directly through
The Army beach party organization was en­ these channels'. No serious difficulties were en­
tirely inadequate. AKA's do not have the per­ countered and excellent control was maintained at
sonnel on board to send in unloading details. Yet all times.
this ship sent in a total of 36 men and one officer All beaches worked 24 hours a day for the first
to assist in this work. This necessitated cutting 5 days. In most cases labor was worked for 14
down of gun crews and hatch crews. It should hours out of 24. All equipment operators were
definitely be discouraged. It is recommended that on duty 20 hours a day for the first 5 days. All
adequate Army personnel be allotted for this duty. dump officers were on duty 20 hours a day until
A nucleus beach party of one officer and six men all ships of the division were unloaded. Commenc­
is recommended. ing on 8 April, unloading was retarded by the
• The ship was allotted an Army unloading pla­ weather and 8 hour shifts were instituted for all
toon of 99 men. This proved entirely inadequate personnel. This was aided by the return of ship's
for the amount of cargo carried and it was neces­ platoons and boat riders to the labor pools at the
sary for ComTransDiv 38 to send Navy working dumps. More officers trained in shore party pro­
details from APA's to assist. This again is an cedure could have been used during the initial days
ARMY JOB and the Army should provide sufficient to relieve the strain on dump officers. More labor
hands for the work involved. For AKA's, 200 could have been used during the first 5 days of
men are recommended,100 of whom should be car­ unloading to decrease the fatigue of beach labor..
ried in an APA and transferred to the.AKA_ after
arrival in the assault area. From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Lamar
(APA 47)
Again there was much indiscriminate firing of
machine guns by crews of small boats. Boat crews Control of landing craft
must be made to realize the danger. The traffic control set-up was simple. All Lamar
This ship was allotted sufficient lighterage in boats reported to the PC 469 which held the boats
the form of LSM's and LCT's for the first time around it until Lieutenant Fletcher in the Harris,
in the experience of this commanding officer. The LCC-2, called for them. He then directed the
results obtained in unloading 2,100 tons in the time boats to the pontoon crane on the reef where either
involved is proof that the work can be done if the Harris, Pierce, or Lamar boat group com­
lighterage is available. mander directed their landing.
LSM's and LCT's should be provided with
heavier mooring lines. Their lines part in mod­ From: Commander, Transport Division 42
erate swells at a rate which seriously delays un­ (Commander,Task Unit 55.2.3)
loading operations. The ship provides 8-inch Bombardment forces had prepared the beach
lines in addition but they soon wear out from over and foreshore in the area of Brown Beaches 3 and
use. 4,and the assault waves met little opposition dur­
ing their landing. Unfavorable beach conditions,
From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine
however, necessitated the transfer of support and
Division
reserve troops from boats to LVT's,to land on the'
A transient center covering 200 yards by 500 reef.
yards was established about800 yards inland from
Beach Blue 2. All personnel separated from their From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Lycoming
units or in transit to the forward area were (APA 155)
bivouacked in this area. Sanitary and massing One pontoon barge with a crane was available
facilities were established. at Purple 1 Beach. Small craft (LCVP's and
 LI *14ED
-,„ 4

LCM's) were compelled to wait for hours before ' •

(3) That steadying lines from LST's No. 2
unloading could be accomplished. The lack of chocks should be led to amidships bitts on LCT.
amphibious vehicles was responsible for the delay (4) That a stern to mooring with LST ramp on
in unloading these small craft. LOT(6)'s stern is practicable in wind if.an LCVP
Communications as a whole were good. Little is used to hold the LCT's bow up into.the wind.
difficulty was encountered in contacting various That the operation is impracticable in any but the
parties throughout the initial phase of the oper­ lightest sea or swell but that given these condi­
ation. tions any vehicle normally carried by the LST can
It is believed that some better arrangement be unloaded by this method.
should be made in regards to smoke generators on From: Commander, LST Flotilla 6
the beach. It is suggested that the shore party
In this operation the Control Plan was prepared.
commander of each beach be responsible for main­
as a separate annex. It is felt that even better co­
tenance ind upkeep of this equipment. Lack of
ordination can be obtained if the Control Plan
transportation for naval personnel on the beach
is included as a part of the Landing Ship Flotilla
makes the problem of maintenance a difficult one.
commander's landing attack order.
As a whole the operation progressed very satis­
When the line of departure was established and
factorily from this beachmaster's point of view.
control and the beach party began to function
The shore parties were most cooperative in trying
in unloading all possible authority having to do
to alleviate difficulties in beach party work and
with calling in cargo, allocation of amtracks, etc.,
made available all resources they had and were was turned over to control for direct action with
able to spare. •
the discharging ships. Commander, Landing
It is recommended that more rapid facilities be Ship Flotilla (who in this case performed the same
provided for transferring cargo from ship's boats functions of a Transron commander in a larger
just off the reef. Thirteen boats from this ship landing), was always info addressee on all mes­
remained loaded from the afternoon of L+2-day sages concerning unloading and held himself in
until noon of L+3 when they were finally recalled readiness to render decisions whenever it became
to the ship and unloaded into an LSM alongside. necessary. This method of procedure proved very
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LST 784 effective for rapid unloading.
It is recommended: From:. Commanding General, FIRST Marine
(1) That the LST should anchor bow to stern. Division
(2) That for mooring with LCT ramp on LST , Barge propulsion units should be tested for
ramp, the LCT should approach from the wind­ Operating efficiency en route to the target area.
ward side of the LST's ramp, dropping stern an­ Beach lighting equipment should be provided
chor to windward on the approach. in beach dumps to facilitate night unloading.

6-32
 Chapter VII. LOGISTICS

SUPPLY • period atsea be followed by 10 to 12 days at anchor

as the optimum at this time.
SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT SEA The procurement at sea of "urgently needed"
From: Commander,Fast Carrier Task Force materials is of the highest importance. Many
items, which because of their critical nature are
This task group operated at sea for 79 continu­
not regularly available or available only in limited
ous days. This was made possible by the excellent
quantities in the forward area,and other items,for
replenishment services rendered by ,Task Group
which the rate of expenditure has been especially
50.8, by the rugged construction of our ships and
unpredictable and severe, are so essential to the
machinery,and by the sweat and ingenuity of the
operation of the ships that their lack can affect
thousands of men in the task group who fought
seriously the military efficiency of the entire task
and labored to keep the ships afloat and in
group. These items are for the most part aviation
operation.
material, ordnance material, electronic material,
These extended operations at sea have proven
and certain ships spare parts.
beyond a doubt that our fleet has marvelous ability
The task group's "urgent" requirements were
to keep the seas close to hostile shores. The de­
transmitted to CTG 50.8 who out of a multitude of
velopment of our sea-going Replenishment Task items requested (ranging from airplane engines
Group permits our fleet to operate for protracted to nuts and bolts) fulfilled from his own ships on
periods at distances over 1,000 miles from our the spot approximately one-third of the requests
nearest base. and attempted procurement of the remainder at
However, this extended period at sea took its his ports of replenishment. Many ships in the
toll from both ships and men. Our machinery was replenishment group, especially the CVE's, will­
not designed for such long continuous combat ingly gave up their own stocks to help the task
steaming. As a result, there has been an accumu­ group.
lation of repairs that require a long period in port Recommended.—That wherever possible the
to effect. For the destroyers this approximates an CVE's allowance of aviation material be increased.
overhaul. The general efficiency of the crews de­ Stocking of radio and vacuum tubes by one of
teriorated under the many days,of action and con­ the supply ships proved most valuable, and it is
stant tension caused by the ever-threatening considered that this practice should be continued
Kamikaze attacks which sometimes struck with if at all practicable.
little or no warning. The Naval Supply Depot, Guam, is to be con­
It is estimated that after the 79 days at sea, 30 gratulated on its efficient follow-up system and on
days should be allowed to bring ships and men keeping the fleet informed as to what procurement
back to the fighting trim necessary for another action has been taken.
sustained operation. Recommended.—That a Fleet Service Unit be
This long period of replenishment, overhaul, established at Guam to handle all the "urgent"
and recreation reduces the fighting efficiency of carrier task group needs and to expedite delivery.'
the crews,so that a period of training is necessary There were not sufficient F4U drop tanks avail­
about half way through this time. This,of course, able to meet the task-group needs.
interrupts machinery overhaul and replenishment,
but must be accepted for the over-all fighting effi­ From: Commander,Service Squadron 6(CTG.
ciency of the task group. 5.0.8)
Recommended.—That for the maintenance of As the plans for the capture and occupation of
material and personnel fighting efficiency a 30-day Okinawa and associated objectives required con­
 WEEKLY FUEL ISSUES

a 0) (Ii CO CTI P
00 Ca 01 ...­
(14
a a a a
a a a a C) 0
0 a a a a

Scale in
Barrels
7—
1,000,000 .....

500,000

0
Week Ending - March 20 '27 April 3 10 17 24 May 1 8 15 22
WEEKLY AVGAS ISSUES

v .ta v v
00 CO CTI a IN3 0) 00 ....., 00
P
00 0 .4 CY) IN) 01 00
CO ...4 IV al
. v -P CT, Cil CA) 0
r. "1 v
'a .0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Scale in
Gallons
3,000,000

2,000,000 — — 111.11.
.411111,

1,000,000 111.1.1.

Week Ending - March 20 27 April 3 10 17 24 May 1 8 15 22

 lir (2,-,
4/

0
1
4,Ir
1

,, tlibt
tinuous and extended 615-eratithls'at- ‘',s66) iN covered by this operation report was provided
vicinity of the objective,for all groups of tlie-nsi-­ principally to the Fast Carrier Task Forces, but
Carrier Task Fore, preparations were made to substantial deliveries were made also to other com­
furnish as complete logistic replenishment at sea ponents of the Fifth Fleet. This logistic support
as practicable to all units involved. Experience delivered to the Fifth Fleet was in sufficient quan­
obtained in the Mariannas campaign had indi­ tity to materially extend the period that that fleet
cated the absolute necessity of supplying services could remain at sea, fully operative, maintaining
of all types and descriptions to prevent serious an intense schedule of destructive strikes both at
lowering of the effectiveness of the groups after the objective and in the Japanese homeland.
they had been operating for a period.of three weeks The Okinawa operation represents the first at­
or more. tempt to provide complete support for the fleet at
The supply of fuel oil and petroleum products sea on a broad scale during a protracted period.
at sea is now accepted as commonplace. However, Much valuable experience resulted from this suc­
after a force has been operating away from the cessful flow of fuel, ammunition,replacement air­
base and striking hard for a period of 3 weeks or craft and personnel, provisions, stores, hospital­
more,the replenishment of ammunition,important ization, mail service and other supplies. In effect,
spare parts; and provisions for the smaller ships, it amounted to transplanting a major fleet oper­
becomes increasingly necessary. Due to the pau­ ating base, with the only exceptions of major re­
city ofsuitable logistic ship types,many important pair and recreation facilities,to one day's steaming
requirements could not be completely supplied, distance -of the objective.
but experience in the Okinawa operation has con­ Delivery of fuel oil to the Fast Carrier Forces
clusively proven that full logistic support of a and other elements of the Fifth Fleet reached well
fleet at sea is entirely practicable, provided opera­ over 8,700,000 barrels; aviation gasoline 21,470,000
tions are being conducted in an area where rea­ gallons; ammunition over 15,500 tons; and re­
sonably satisfactory weather and sea conditions
placement aircraftin excess of 850. The supply of
will be experienced.
fuel oil and aviation gasoline at sea is common­
Logistic support now being supplied by the
place,though the quantities involved in this oper­
Logistic Support Group atsea included fuel,
oil, ammunition,fresh,frozen and drylubricaton pro­ ation were well in excess of those involved in any
visions; aircraft and aircrew replacements, avia­ previous operation. The supply of 15,500 tons of
tion supplies, ship's store, clothing, general stores ammunition is not commonplace and is indicative
.(GSK), electronic materials, medical supplies, of a new and expanded phase of logistic'support
hospitalization through the services of an attached. at sea.
All; towing and limited salvage facilities, deliv­ The ability to deliver fuelin such quantities nat­
ery and dispatch of mail and freight,and exchange urally leads to the requirement for deliyery of
of movies. proportionate quantities of other supplies neces­
It is realized that the AK specially loaded, and sary to maintain ship operations. Of all other
later, when its supplies were exhausted, the AF logistics, the supply of ammunition is admittedly
which relieved on station, could not furnish com­ the most difficult and hazardous. With such a
plete support to all forces being serviced. Nor was high degree of success as was achieved in ammuni­
other support, except fuel, up to total require­ tion transfers, the practicability of full logistic
ments. The fact remains, however, that logistic . support atsea becomesreadily apparent.
support was in sufficient strength to materially
extend the period that ships of TF 58 could remain From: Commander, Destroyer Division 94
at sea fully operative. Complete support .can be This operation has definitely proved that corn-
given if future operations demand it, providing bat ships of all types can keep the sea for long
the proper and sufficient support ship`ping is made periods. It is believed that the ability .to do so
available. will be greatly improved when the supply situa­
Logistic support at sea during the period tion is improved.
 / 41
, "
1.
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Bryant jective was handled 'by'having one or more fleet
(DD 665) oilers from the Logistic Support Group arrive at
Fueling in heavy swells from a tanker at anchor the objective every 3 days, fuel screening vessels
was successfully accomplished by an ingenious underway between Okinawa and Kerama Retto
method suggested by the commander, Destroyer for two days as directed by commander,Transport
Division 112, and not believed previously em­ Screen, and replenish station tankers and other
ployed. This vessel anchored about 50 to 75 yards ships at Kerama Retto the third day. Also four
abreast the tanker and eased down on anchor chain black oil station tankers were maintained at Ker­
to a position about 50 to 75 feet from the tanker. ama Retto for fueling fire-support ships, trans­
Bow lines were put over to the tanker. Fueling ports, and other types as directed by SOPA Ker­
method used was same as when fueling at sea. ama Retto. Individual tankers were sent by him
Engines were used occasionally to separate sterns to le Shima and Nakagusku Wan to refuel ships at
of destroyer and tanker, although this was not those areas which could not be spared to make the
necessary as sterns were never in danger of collid­ long trip to Kerama Retto.
ing. Depth of water was 25 fathoms. This vessel For future operations all of the tanker and barge
was among few to complete fueling on this day facilities available for the support of both fleet
and is believed to have been the only one to sue­ and land-based forces at the objective should be
cessfully complete fueling without structural dam­ assigned to commander, Joint Expeditionary
age due to excessive rolling. Force. Prior to the operation representatives of
commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, com­
From: Commander, Battleship Division 9 manding general,Expeditionary Troops,the pros­
It is believed that this type ship can remain at pective island commander,and the Service Agency
.sea in the combat area for a period of at least 4 designated for support of the operation should
months if the necessary replenishments are avail­ confer concerning:
able during fueling. (a) The estimated consumption of fuels and
lubes, both ashore and afloat, at the various dates
FUEL OIL during the operation.
(b) Estimated available tank storage capacity
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
at various dates.
The supply of black oil to ships of the assault (c) Distribution of fuel cargoes of logistic
forces was ample and was smoothly handled, ships available for the operation.
through the combined efforts of commander,Serv­ A representative of the designated, service
ice Squadron 10, and commander, Logistic Sup­ agency should move to the objective in the flagship
port Group. Estimates of fuel to be required at of commander,Joint Expeditionary Force,to ad­
the. various. Staging areas were furnished com­ vise him of emergency sources of resupply in rear
mander, Service Force, Pacific, in January and areas and to familiarize himself with the logistic
commander,Logistic Support Group, was advised situation in preparation for eventual assumption
in March of estimated weekly fuel requirements at of responsibility for logistic resupply at the objec­
the objective. -As a result sufficient,black oil was tive. The island commander and commanding
available at all times. general, Expeditionary Troops, should keep the
In order to meet the demands.of the large num­ commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, advised
ber of DM and DMS types scheduled to arrive at daily of:
the objective Love—7-day, arrangements were (a) The current consumption of fuels ashore.
made to. have two tankers of the Logistic Support (b) The current fuel storage and pumping ca­
Group with escorts accompany the Mine Group pacity ashore.
partway to the objective and top off units on L— 10 (c) Anticipated requirements for at least 3
and L—9 days underway. This proved highly weeks ahead.
satisfactory and is a recommended solution of this With this information and the knowledge of the
problem for future operations. logistic requirements of fleet forces the com­
- The fueling of black-oil burning ships at the ob­ mander,Joint Expeditionary Force,may call for­
 :771,
ward sufficient tankers, consolidate their cargoes least one, preferably two AOG's to each area for
and arrange for the timely supply of fuel to the fueling small craft.
beach, and may sail the tankersexpeditiously
LUBE OILS
wljen empty. When operations permit,the repre­
sentative of the designated.service agency should From: Commander,Amphibious Forces
assume the responsibility for supplying fuel to In the Okinawa operation as in previoug,opera­
both fleet and land-based forces, and operational tions difficulty Was experienced in maintaining an
control of all tankers should revert to the service adequate supply Of the symbols of lube oil required
agency at that time. by ships and craft engaged in the amphibious
From: Commander, Fifth Fleet assault. Demands were heavy, due both to the.
length of the operation and to the fact that insuffi­
. Vest control of supply of bulk petroleum prod­
ucts at the objective for forces ashore and afloat cient lube oil had been available at staging areas
in commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, until to enable all amphibious craft to comply with the
this control can be passed to the commander,Serv­ directive contained in the operation plan requiring
ice Force,Pacific Fleet,representative accompany­ them to start for the objective with lube oil tanks
ing him. filled. The normal resupply source,arriving tank­
Allocate at least two fleet AO's to diesel service. ers of the Logistic Support Group,could not carry
Increase number of AOG's assigned to diesel in a fleet-issue load sufficient amounts of the de­
service at the objective. Commander,Amphibious sired lithe oils to maintain a reserve at the objec­
Forces, Pacific Fleet, should be asked for recom­ tive. Also, due to inability to obtain Sufficient
mendations concerning numbers and allocations of AvLubes while fueling at sea, the -CVE's which
these ships. rearmed at Kerama Retto consumed some of the
Increase number of OAO and Liberty tankers supply destined for the seaplane base.
assigned to duty at the objective. One 0A0,one The,shortage was effectively overcome when
black Liberty, one white Liberty, and two diesel commander, Service Squadron 10, shipped large
AOG's are considered a minimum requirement for quantities of drummer lube oil to the objective
each attack force. deck-loaded on garrison shipping. For future
operations, however, the following procedure is
DIESEL OIL suggested:
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces Prior to the operation, estimates of the amount
Like the supply of black oil,the supply of diesel of various symbols of lube oils to be required at
fuel to the amphibious forces at the objective was staging areas and at the objective should be made
ample,due to the assignment of four large station by the commander Joint Expeditionary Force to
tankers and three AOGs to the control of the com­ commander,Service Squadron 10,who should then
mander,Joint Expeditionary Force. arrange for early shipment. of adequate amounts*
Availability of these facilities provided enough to the objective.
sides so that 5,000 barrels of diesel fuel were dis­ Black oil station* tankers assigned for the oper­
pensed daily to the small craft present,on a "first­ ation should carry maximum of drummed lub
come-first-served" basis without the necessity for oil—symbol 2190 and ,2190T. Diesel station tank­
complicated scheduling. Also it removed the ersshould carry maximum loads of bulk lube oil—
former disadvantage of diverting LST'sfrom their symbol 9370,and drummed lube oil—symbol 9250.
primary task of expeditious unloading to fuel Fleet oilers sent to the objective should carry max­
small craft. imum loads of the above-mentioned lube oils, by
The operation reemphasized the desirability of consolidation of cargoes at sea if necessary. . Also
assigning to the assault forces as many AOG's as bulk lube oil—symbol 9370—should be sent to the
can be made available. In future large-scale oper­ objective at regular intervals in fleet oilers by the
ations requiring the maintenance of several sep­ commander,Logistic Support Group, who should
arated unloading areas, sufficient small AOG's advise commander, Joint Expeditionary Force of
should be provided to permit assignment of at its ETA.
 Based on the estimates of subparagraph above, hausted. To eke out the supply of fog oil during
commander,Service Squadron 10, should'arrange the most critical period, diesel oil was mixed with
resupply of drummed lube oils of the above sym­ it. One load of 3,376 drums of mixed lubricating.
bols, plus AvLube—symbol 1120—to arrive at the oils consigned as fog oil arrived on the Pamina
objective in later echelons, and commander,Joint and was also used in the smoke generators.
Expeditionary Force, should be given, shipping
data concerning it so that he can arrange for its From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
removal and storage. The supply of fog oil during the Okinawa oper-
Tanker units of the Logistic Support Group ation was entirely inadequate, in spite of prior
should be adequately supplied with lube oil—sym­ arrangements made by _ComPhibsPae..
bol 2190,2190T,and 1120—when scheduled to fuel
CVE units. All CVE's should take lube oil and From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans-
AvGas each time they fuel,no- matter how little is port Group Baker)
required, in order that their cumulative demands At one time,there was an urgent request for fog
do not exceed the tankers' ability to supply. oil,yettwo boats,which weresent in,were returned
From: Commander,Fifth Fleet to the control vessel, because the unloading point
did not have slings for hoisting individual drums,
Increase facilities for delivery of symbols 1120
whereas had the cargo been in net loads,it would
and 9370 bulk and drum _supplies.
readily have been accepted for unloading.
Instruct all aircraft carriers to replenish supply
of symbol 1120 at least partially at each fueling to From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.LST 681
preclude extraordinary demands which cannot be
The ideal load for an LST designated as fog
met by fleet oilers.
ship would be:
FOG OIL (a) Five thousand drums of fog oil in tank
deck, loaded bung up three drums high, layer of
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 12
dunnage between, with excess drums on side, on
Because of the frequency and duration of air- top of other drums.
raid alerts, the expenditures of fog oil in making (b) Five hundred drums of mogas loaded top-
smoke far exceeded all estimates and the problem side.
of supply and distribution soon became acute. (c) Smoke pots, floats, and generators as re-
From the time the initial supply was exhausted quired, loaded topside.
until L+48 when the steamship Cloth Victory The LST would probably only be able to carry
with 34,000 drums of fog oil and two LST's loaded 85,000 gallons of fuel and 50,000 gallons of water
with smoke pots, smoke floats, and mogas arrived, (an adequate supply) in order not to exceed maxi-
The supply of smoke materials was a hand-to- mum ocean-going draft.
mouth affair. Fog oil was collected from depart- Where possible,it would be advisable to borrow
ing vessels whether it was in drums or in bulk. In crane from another LST (which transfer could be
the latter case, collection was difficult because the accomplished by LST going alongside) so thatfog
oil had to be pumped, sometimes by hand, from oil could be unloaded from both port and star-
the storage tank into drums in landing craft along- board sides.
side. As a result of the efforts of CTF 51,the en- Where possible, a small working party of 50
tire western Pacific wasscoured for supplies of fog hands should be assigned to assist ship's company
oil and other smoke materials and they arrived at unloading (particularly at general quarters when
Okinawa in quantity, but the expenditure kept repair parties must unload). These could be troops
pace with the supply and until the arrival of the whose services ashore have a low priority.
Clovis Victory and the two LST's previously men- That daylight hours be reserved for supplying
tioned, there was a constant threat that a pro- small quantities to LCI's, LCS's, LOM's and
longed period of attacks on several successive LCVP's, while large transfers of 200 to 1,000
nights would leave the smoke supplies virtually ex- drums to LSM's or LCT's be accomplished from
 dark until dawn if tactical situation permits use Due to the limited time (3 days) which the fleet
of shielded lights at night. oilers were permitted by higher authority to re­
In emergency,fog oil could also be transferred main at the objective, insufficient time was avail­
to LCM or LCVP by lowering LST ramp and able in which to fuel screening ships and station
unloading ramp to ramp. tankers and still transfer AvGas to the seaplane
Emergency use of LCM to transfer to LCI and tenders and fire supportships. As a result,tankers
other craft not able to come alongside during rush occasionally left the area still carrying AvGas
hours. LCM could go alongside and drums could needed by the forces at the objective.
be brought aboard by small davit used for boat. To eliminate this difficulty, two facilities wer
Also used to transfer smoke materials to AKA, needed, and should be provided for future opera­
APA and other ships using all small boats in tions: a station ship for storing AvGas at the
unloading. objective for later issue to fleet forces, and several
GASOLINE small barges or bowser boats for supplying AvGas
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces to fire supportships atthesame time asthey refuel,
reprovision or rearm. Such craft should be sailed
Motor gas
or carried to the objective to arrive not later than
Another item for which the demand proved un­ D+10-day.
expectedly heavy was 80-octane motor gasoline, AMMUNITION
used in fog generators (in a ratio of 1 gallon to
12 gallons of fog oil),in personnel boats at sea­ From: Commander, Task Force 54(Comman­
plane bases and in deck machinery or small craft. der,Cruiser Division 13)
The only available source in this and past opera­ The basic loading of ammunition was inaccord­
tions has been the drummed and bulk supply ance with commander, TF 51 Operation Plan
brought forward for the land-based forces. Like A1-45. For heavy ships this provided approxi­
AvGas, the amount required in future by fleet mately one-third armor-piercing with service
forces should be carefully estimated in advance charges and two-thirds high capacity with reduced
of the operation. The supply of motor gas should charges. Specifically, AP was loaded 40 rounds
be carried both in drums and in bulk, the drums per 12-inch, 14-inch, and 16-inch gun, 60 rounds
accompanying shipments of drummed fog oil and per 8-inch gun, and 100 rounds per 6-inch gun,
the bulk carried in one or More station tankers with remainder of maximum capacity loaded with
(AUG type) for issue at the objective. In addi­ HC. The only notable departure from the basic
tion plans should provide for a continuous re­ loading plan was in the matter of 1,200 F. S.
supply of bulk and drummed MoGas for fleet charges for the 5"/38 guns. The number of these
forces. As with AvGas,bowser boats would be of charges available in the area was less than 25 per
value for handy dispensing to small craft. cent of the number required by the plan. How­
Aviation gasoline ever,reports received indicated that only alout 20
percent of the charges loaded were actually fired.
• While the amount of AvGas arriving at the
That is, less than 5 percent of the prescribed load
objective in fleet oilers was adequate to handle
was used. Definite recommendation regarding
the demands by the sedplane base and fire-support
these reduced charges will be reserved pending;
ships, complications in its distribution became
evident in the operation. The consumption of further experience with them.. They are unpopu­
AvGas was much higher than had been expected, lar in many, perhaps most, ships.
-due to the following circumstances: (a) Greater From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
seaplane operations were conducted than had been Assign not less than 150 stevedoring personnel
originally contemplated; (b) the cruisers and bat­ to group commander who is charged with respon­
tleships used an unusually heavy amount, necessi­ sibility of reammunitioning of fire support ships.
tating the refueling of some ships as often as every Make a study of ammunition deliveries at sea to
5 days; and (c) upon occasion CVE's took AvGas Fast Carrier Force with a view to determination
while rearming at Kerama Retto as well as in their of most desirable loading of ammunition ships as­
operating areas. signed this duty.
 SUPPLY

Continue investigation and action to prevent items of ammunition, thereby requiring the com­
14-inch and 16-inch powder explosions. batant ships to go alongside two or more AE's to
Continue emphasis on supply of ammunition complete their requirements.
details, viz., primers,fuses,arming wires,etc. Recommended.—That only AE's with stocks of
all commonly used items be retained in the forward
From: Commanding General, Headquarters,
replenishment areas.
III Amphibious Corps
Difficulty was experienced in unloading the re­ From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
quired quantities of artillery and mortar ammuni­ Ammunition LST's proved to be a very satisfac­
tion. It has been the experience-of this corps that tory means of providing replacement ammunition
a great surplus of unwanted small arms ammuni­ of all types for fire-support ships at the objective.
tion must be discharged from ammunition ships As compared to ammunition loaded LST's,the use
in order to land the required artillery and mortar of assault APA's,AKA's,and LST's to carry rela­
ammunition,under the method ofloading ammuni­ tively small quantities of replacement ammunition
tion ships used during the Okinawa and previous was less satisfactory and interfered with the as­
operations. This system requires more ammuni­ sault loading of these ships. It is therefore rec­
tion ships at the target than is necessary in order ommended that naval replacement ammunition be
to get enough artillery ammunition. This sub­ carried to the objective during the assault phase
jects ships to hazards of suicide planes more than in ammunition loaded LST's.
is necessary and tends to develop large dump in­ In one instance the supplying of ammunition
ventories of small arms ammunition in the early from an LST was held up for 3 hours while the
stages of the operation. These excessive dump fire-support ship brought up empties from below.
inventories constitute an added hazard from enemy For future operations it is strongly recommended
"action and usually involve the further problem that such ships or craft be specifically designated
of later moving the large quantities of these sup­ and that ships have empties on deck ready for
plies to more favorable dump sites as more suit­ rapid discharge on arrival at logistics supply
able land areas are uncovered. This is wasteful point.
of labor and equipment, and slows the process of Since the carrier replenishment program was
delivering the required artillery and mortar am­ not incorporated into the original plans, the ar­
munition to the front line troops. rival of the carriers (two per day starting L— 1),
Recommendation: and the supplying of four LCM's and one LCT per
That 70 percent of the artillery and mortar am­ carrier for transfer of ammunition to them, seri­
munition in resupply shipping be loaded on ships ously interfered with the preloading of LCT's and
containing artillery and mortar ammunition ex­ LCM's (started on L-4) until the arrival of addi­
clusively. tional craft after the assault phase on L+2. The
lack of adequate labor to transfer ammunition
From: Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force from the holds of LST's and AKE's was another
There was a shortage of certain fuses and depth source of delay in replenishment of ships and in
charges but in general the service was very good. the removal of empties from craft. The practice
Some of the AE's were slow in transferring am­ early established of securing working parties from
munition at their first replenishment but they soon fire-support ships and CVE's as they entered the
caught on. The transfer of ammunition to carriers anchorage helped to offset these delays. It is
was at the rate of approximately 30 tons per hour, strongly recommended that for similar future op­
which under good conditions can be increased to erations,a labor pool be established on the basis of
35 tons per hour. 75 men per BB, and 50 per CA and CL for the
Recommended.—Thatthe personnel complement number of ships services in an average day. These
of the AE's be increased to permit faster "break­ men should be available to LST's and AKE's for
out" service. working holds and to the boat pool for unloading
On several occasions the individual AE's were empties at a common point. This labor force can
found low or completely lacking on a number of be conveniently transported to the objective in the
ammunition LSTs, utilizing berthing space nor­ was taken to Okinawa. This reserve consisted of
mally assigned to troops on board this type ship. manila mooring lines, wire rope, welding rods,
plates,shapes,angles,oxygen and acetylene,fend=
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.LST 799
ers, and piling for camels. This 'material was
The plan of loading LSrs with a selective load brought to the objective as top load or deck cargo
of ammunition did not appear too successful. on certain transport types and transferred to an
While this ship was able to unload the type of am­ LST which had discharged its combat load. The
munition required,the process was extremely slow, reserve proved extremely valuable, especially in
and practical proof was established that Victory temporary repairs to early battle damage. Until
type ships With a selective load could be unloaded the arrival of GSK supply ships (AKS's) this
about seven times as fast. During high tide when reserve stock was kept replenished to a limited
it became necessary to use LVT's instead of trucks, extent by transfersfrom departing transporttypes.
the unloading process was slowed tremendously. For future operations it is recommended that
GENERAL STORES
one LST for each transport squadron employed
be loaded with a reserve of such items as are men­
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet tioned in the paragraph above and retained at the
Continue delivery of GSK supplies to Fast objective as long as need for these special items
Carrier Force at sea. exists. The standard load of. an AKS, which
Schedule GSK ships to proceed to objective to should be scheduled to arrive at the objective be­
provide services to amphibious forces. First ship­ ginning about D+5,does not contain these special
ment should arrive not later than D-1-10. items in sufficient quantities to meet requirements
in the early days of an assault. Even though an
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
AKS were especially preloaded,the inadvisability
GSK stores were supplied by LST(M) 677 and of bringing such ships to the objective with assault
LST(M) 678, by stripping vessels departing for shipping and the wider distribution of supply by
rear areas and during the latter part of the opera­ employing a number of smaller types makes the
tion, by GSK tore ships. APA's and AKA's use of LST's much preferable.
departing were required to leave behind boat
spares, plywood, wire rope, line, anchors, sheet PROVISIONS AND FOOD
metal,metal bar and angle iron stores, and lumber From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
such as were not required for the return voyage.
All this material was placed on LST 795 which Fresh,frozen, and dry provisions were supplied
also carried CTF 51 emergency issue items and from provision ships and reefers reporting to Com-
hydrographic gear. A total of 46,606 pieces of SerRon 10. Allocation of quantities was made on
spare parts and equipment were handled by that the basis of the number of personnel to bp fed
ship. A GSK ship which arrived at L+33 sup­ and distribution effected by having ships to be pro­
plied many needed items but it was still found nec­ visioned anchored near provision ships in the logis­
essary to keep LST 795 in operation as a special tic anchorage. The supply,though not as great as
issue ship until ComSerRon 10,Rep.(B),assumed could have been desired, was adequate.
responsibility for logistic supply in the Okinawa Until the first ship loaded with dry provisions
area on 18 May 1945. At,that time the supplies arrived on L 28 and the first reefer ship on L-1-37,
on board LST 795 and operational control of the provisions at the objective were supplied by LST
ship were turned over to him. An exception to (M) 677 and LST(M) 678 and by transfers from
ComSerRon 10,Rep.(B)'s responsibility was that vessels departing for rear areas. The latter were
for smoke supplies which remained under cog­ required to turn over all food supplies in excess
nizance of CTF 51. of that required for three weeks from the esti­
mated time of their departure. LST(M)677 and
From: Commander, Amphibious Foi-ces LST(M)678,in addition to their initial supply of
Based upon experience at Iwo Jima, a reserve stores, were refilled as practicable through these
supply of special items of equipment and material transfers and from provisions ships and used as

7-0
if
 ••

boats from the boat pool, repaired and re-condi­ From: Commander, Task Unit 51.22.9—Com­
tioned them as practicable and issued them to the mander, LCT and -Pontoon •Bai-ge
ships in exchange for theirs or,if necessary, with­ Group—Okinawa
out exchange.
Establishment of the boat pool revealed defi­
• It is recommended that an adequate supply of ciencies in the training, coordination, unification,
small craft, LCVP's and LCP(L)'s, be provided and organization of the units comprising it. The
for boat service within the anchorage. Judging assembling of unrelated units and equipment at
from the experience of this command, it would the target rather than at a training center or stag­
seem that the best way to _arrive at an accurate ing area made it difficult for the boat pool com­
estimate of the number required is to provide for mander to function untilit was possible to properly
every possible contingency,then multiply the total arrange his various units.
by two. Certainly during most of its stay at
Okinawa this command could have employed use­ From: Commander, Destroyer Division 94
fully double the LCVP's available from the boat It is recommended as a suggested solution to this
pool. bottleneck that a boat'pool be established whose
From:Commander,FIFTH AmphibiousForces delivery schedules would be integrated with the
issue schedules of different types of supplies. Such
Comment.—This operation saw a tremendous coordination of operating schedules would insure
increase in the employment of boats for smoke and that transportation would automatically be avail-
anti-suicide patrols. Since these needs could not able upon issue, thus cutting down waiting time
be anticipated in the amount required, boats and and allowing more time for recreation.
crews in an amount roughly double the original
boat pool were left at the target. From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
The shortages resulting from this increase were Provide 100 percent reserve boat crews,in LST
becoming apparent after the first 45 days. mother ships which are to serve as headquarters
It is recommended that a reserve of spare parts for boat pools.,
and camp and repair components be held in the Additional needs for boat-pool boats in order to
forward area to meet the needs brought about provide logistic services to all ships present were
by unexpected increases. numerous and consequently it was found necessary
From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Wichita to run LCVP's on a 24-hour basis which gave no
(CA 45) time for service and repair. In addition A_PA's
present were required to allocate boats to augment
Logistic difficulties of large ships are accentu­ the pool. It is recommended that in future oper­
ated by a practically total lack of boats. The two
ations a more complete analysis of boat require­
motor whaleboats of this ship are of little use for
ments be made prior to assignment of boats to pool.
this purpose and in the operating area cannot be
Provide increased stocks of boat spares and re:
used because their davits interfere with gunfire
placement parts for boats of assault shipping in
and must be laid down on deck.
loading and rehearsal area and for replenishment
On replenishment at Kerama Retto frequently
immediately before departure for objective.
ammunition and other logistics details were de­
Provide adequate spare parts in ARL's and
layed or not taken care of because boats could not
LSD's before their departure for objective.
be obtained.
It is believed that the assignment of an LCI From: Commander Amphibious Forces
gunboat to each ship is worth consideration. The Boat pools have been established in previous
LCIshould be subsisted,fueled and repaired by the operations on the basis of anticipated unloading
ship and insofar as practicable should accompany requirements plus boats needed for routine port
the ship. Such an assignment would be invaluable, service. In this operation it was found necessary
not only in the objective area but at advanced to greatly increase the number of boats to provide
bases where ships- have many difficulties—material for military in addition to logistic needs. Boats
and personnel—due to inadequate boating facili­ were used for smoke protection over merchant ves­
ties. sels and combatant ships which were not equipped
with generators, for close-in flank protection of landing of class I supplies directly abreast of the
transport areas against'suicide craft, for ammu­ advancing units as landing points are uncovered.
nition handling,for net and anchorage area patrols It would tend to avoid unnecessarily large dump
to protect against sneak attack, and as tenders for inventories af class II,III,andIV supplies in the
the various service craft not equipped with boats. early stages of an operation, which constitute an
For these purposes it was necessary to more than added hazard and usually involve the further
double the number of LCVP's and LCP(R)or (L) problem of later moving the large quantities of
types and to inaterially increase the LCM's re­ these supplies to more favorable dump areas as
tained at the objective. In future operations all more suitable land areas are uncovered. This is
these services will be required for an extended wasteful of labor and equipment.
period after the assault forces have been with­ It is believed that on large operations the fact
drawn. It will therefore be necessary to provide that several ships would be required for resupply
for greatly increased garrison boat pools, the per­ of class I items would in itself provide sufficient
sonnelfor which must arrive with assault shipping. dispersal of class I supplies afloat. Also, small
AK'sand LST's could be advantageously employed
From: Commander, Destroyer Division 94 for class I supply.
A still more serious problem in port is that of The 30-day quantity of classIsupplies in assault
transporting the supplies from the tender to the shipping was in excess of immediate requirements
ship after they have been drawn. The two whale­ since resupply ships commenced unloading On
boats available to a destroyer are entirely inade­ Love+10. The excess of this class of supply lim­
quate for use as stores delivery boats even when ited the amount of essential equipment that could
they are available. The use of the tenders otherwise have been embarked.
is satisfactory when they are available. However, It is recomimended that 20 days class I supplies
it is sometimes necessary to waste a full day wait­ be embarked in assault shipping where resupply
ing for a boat. ships are scheduled to arrive by Dog+10.
MISCELLANEOUS From: Conznzander, Amphibious Forces
From: Commanding General, Headquarters, Logistics has become a major problem of assault
III Amphibious Corps, operations. In order that logistic resupply can be
On large operations it has been found that class properly coordinated with operations at the ob­
II,III,and IV items loaded in resupply ships are jective a representative of the service agency re­
in too large proportions to the quantities of class sponsible for. resupply (normally commander,
I supplies required during the combat iphase. If Service Squadron 10) should be detailed prior to
class I supplies were loaded in separate resupply the operation to work with the commander,Joint
ships, the following advantages would be gained: Expeditionary Force. Estimates of g// require­
It would permit. landing of essential rations ments both at staging points and at the objective
without bringing a large number of resupply ships should be made these estimates should include
into the target area in order to unload small quan­ items such as spare parts, motor gas,various lubes
tities of rations from each, as is necessary under and greases,compressed gases and other items not
the presentsystem. The mounting ship lossesfrom heretofore considered important. The representa­
"suicide" planes and dive bombers make it increas7 tive of the service organization should arrange
ingly desirable that no unnecessary ships be taken with his organization for a regular, adequate re­
into the target area. supply schedule for these items. He should move
It would permit class II,III,and IV supplies to to the objective with the commander, Joint Expe­
be landed as needed from ships loaded with only ditionary Force, both to familiarize himself *with
those classes. Normally these ships would not be the logistic situation and to actually asist in'th
called to the target until after ration and ammuni­ control of the logistic ships, consolidation of car-­
tion ships are unloaded. goes, call-up of supplies, etc. Then when the sit­
In island warfare, or on occasion when an ad­ uation permits, responsibility for logistics at the
vance is made along a coast,it would facilitate the objective area will pass smoothly and efficiently
 to the representtive of the service organization. From: Commander General, SIXTH Marine
While itis not considered necessary that hospital Division
ships,station tankers, provision ships,ammunition
The primary difficulties encountered during this
ships and fleet oilers hold the entire operation plan
preparatory period resulted from unavoidable
of the Joint Expeditionary Force, yet certain in-
reasons incident to the distance of the division
formation contained therein is essential. It is sug­
from its supply agencies. The problem which
gested that certain sections of the operation plan,
i. e.,Task Organization,SOPA Instructions,Com­ caused the greatest concern was the uncertainty as
to dates of arrival of many items of equipment
munication Plan, Logistic Plan, Medical Plan,
Anchorage Charts and Reference Points, be com- and supplies. This concern became acute as the
bined in a special Operation Plan for Logistic date of embarkation neared. As an example,seven.
Ships and distributed to all logistic ships sched­ 105-mm. howitzers were due to arrive 7 February
uled for arrival at the objective. 1945,from the depot quartermaster,Depot of Sup­
plies, San Francisco. They did not arrive on
To meetthe demandsfor provisions,clothing and
small stores, ships store stock, medical supplies schedule and arrangements finally had to be made
and GSK, vessels were called forward by com- at a late date to draw these howitzers from Army
mander,Joint Expeditionary Force,from the pool sources. The relations of Marine Supply Service,
maintained at Ulithi by commander, Service Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, to the several comba
Squadron 10. and service commands in the area were cumber­
The procedure with respect to distribution of some and caused many delays. The Fourth Serv-
provisions at the objective was to first replenish ice and Supply Battalion, located at Guadalcanal,
the APB's (formerly LST(M)'s), then to make which was the supply agency of this division, was
issues to vessels not serviced by the APB's, with a transfer rather than a stocking agency. The
screen types receiving highest priority. The primary source of supply for the division was the
APB'sfurnished fuel,water, provisions, and a lim- Fourth Base Depot located in the Russell Islands.
ited amount of ships store items to SC,PC,PCS, The immediate superior of the Fourth Base Depot
PCE,YM,YMS,LCI,LOT,and AN types. Just in all supply matters was the Second Field Service
prior to the arrival of a provision ship LST and Command,lo*cated at Guadalcanal. Supply prob-
LSM types were also iprovisioned from APB's to lems, many requiring written correspondence and
reduce the number of retail issues from provision decisions by high authority, were not simplified by
ships and speed their departure from the objective. the addition of another senior echelon, the South
The availability of these various forms of supply Pacific Echelon,Fleet Marine Force,Pacific. The
was only fair. recent change in the concept of operation of the
LST and LSM types also received consider­ corps, by which administration of divisions is
able provisions from transport types which were theoretically divorced from the corps, has not
directed to transfer all but three weeks' supply benefited the division. Supply and administration
prior to departure from the objective. LSM types cannot, in practice, be separated from command.
particularly benefited from this policy asthey were Continuity of administration of corps and its divi­
often alongside transport types to assist in dis-. sions throughout the rehabilitation and planning
charge ofcargo and consequently had ample oppor- phases is essential. Every effort was made by all
tunity to obtain provisions from that source, such echelons of command to furnish the required sup-
transfers being authorized on a "not to delay" plies and equipment, and this division embarked
basis. The APB's, of which there were three at with no major shortages which effected the combat
the objective, were used as"roving" logistic ships, efficiency of the division.
being sailed to northern and to eastern Okinawa,
From: Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force
when small craft were in need of logistics. With­
out the APB's the problem of servicing hundreds Fleet Personnel Replacement
of small craft at the objective would have been During replenishment rendezvous at sea with
difficult and any effort to provision them would units of Service Squadron 6, oilers brought out
have been a compromise at best. drafts-ofgeneralservice ratingsfrom Ulithi asfleet
 replacements. These men were made available by continuous operation of these craftin pombat areas
commander, Service Squadron 6 (CTG 50.8) for when required without undue hardship. This
assignment by commander,TG 58.3, and were as­ type craft is particularly suited for logistic serv­
signed by him to the ships of various types under ices and an additional officer will increase its
hiscommand. Principal employmentwasreplace­ effectiveness.
ment of battle casualties occurring throughout this
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
extended operation, and secondarily to fill vacan­
- cies and shortages generally. A small residue of Fuel and water were supplied from AO's and
men not assigned during the cruise were trans­ water tankers anchored off the Hagushi beaches,
ferred on arrival in port for allocation to fleet from ships while unloading into lighterage craft,
units by commander, Service Squadron 10's fleet from LST(M)'s and from LST's prior to their
personnel distribution unit. The greatest need departure. No serious shortage of either devel­
was for nonrated men, whereas rated personnel oped. Lubricating oil was scarce until the arrival
were frequently a drug on the market.. of an LST loaded with 9,250 gallons of lubricating,
oil consigned as fog oil. The lubricating oil was
Replacement Planes and Pilots. not suitable for use in the smoke generators and
A very marked improvement was noted in the was used for its normal purpose,thereby alleviat­
quality of both planes and pilots. With very few ing the existing shortage.
exceptions all planes received were new and in It seems superfluous to make the statement that
good operating . condition. Also the TBM-3E ammunition and fuel are essentials in any military
with the Ash gear and Mk-8 shackle is a great operation, however, it was necessary to convince
improvement over the TBM-3. many LST captains to take ammunition or fuel
In all cases the replacement pilots have fitted in or.both. This, however, was only a minor diffi­
with the squadrons in a very satisfactory manner. culty experienced, but considerable time was used
The only point which might require careful atten­ in "selling" inflammables and explosives to reluc­
tion.is the assignment of relatively senior aviators tant captains. The LST Flotilla was not repre­
with little or no aviation experience as leaders of sented during the planning or loading period.
VF combat teams. It is often difficult to fit them
in as division leaders when there are many juniors From: Commander,FIFTH Fleet
who have much more experience. Assign not less than two ships to duty of trans­
porting of personnel, mail, and registered publi­
From: Commander,Amphibious Group 7 cations from forward area bases to objective area
Personnel replacements to provide services to amphibious forces.
During the Okinawa operation no replacements Assign not less than two ships to the Logistic
were available to fill vacancies in complements of Support Group to deliver mail, personnel, and
ships which had sustained losses in personnel registered publications to Fast Carrier Force at
killed, wounded, and missing. In the case of de­ sea:
stroyer types, particularly, several ships which Continue delivery of first class mail to ships at
were restored materially to condition for duty by sea via fleet oilers.
emergency repairs ,at the objective were seriously Continue present system of deliveries by trans­
handicapped by ,personnel shortages. Such re­ port CVE's fleet oilers, and Aferoury-type ships.
placements normally should not come from sur­ Increase .number of transport CVE's assigned
vivors of lost ships, because many of these require Logistic Support Group to at least eight.
rehabilitation in rear areas before being continued Continue present system of commander, Air
in combat service. It is recommended that,a fleet Force,Pacific Fleet representation at forward area
pool be established at or near objective to make bases.
personnel available to meet such emergencies. From: Commanding general, FIRST Marine
LOT's—Increased complements Division
It is recommended that complements of LcT's Air supply drop was the determining factor in
be increased by one officer in order to Vs;tit advance southward after the
'*
4')
679527-46 17 aL.,
 rp.* • •
Shuni breakthrough. Had it not been for Air provisions approach the point where they will be
Supply the troops would have been unable to re­ unable to do further re-supplying.
ceive any type of supplies for, due to the heavy Ammo re-supply for fire support ships carried
rains,the roads became impassable and it was im­ in PA's and KA's presented a large problem, due
possible to supply them even by tracked vehicles. to inadequate facilities to receive the ammo for
A total of 561 TBM loads of supplies were dropped. re-issue. It is not believed that LST's are suitable
totaling nearly 400,000 pounds of all types of sup­ for ammo handling, due to lack of cargo booms.
plies. During the initial phases of supply drops A possible solution is to include one or more ammo
the weather was in several instances hazardous for ships of the small coastal cargo type in each trans­
flying, however,the pilots did an excellent job of port group, the ammo ships carrying a partial
bringing the supplies to the front-line units even ammo load, with the remaining space used for
though in several cases it was necessary to drop high priority assault cargo. These vessels would
by instruments and radar. The pilots of VMTB then be available at the target to receive ammo
232 did excellent work during this period. from transports, and discharge to fire-support
ships.
From: Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force
On the whole, considering the length of the op­ From: Commander,Amphibious Group 5
eration and the uncertainty as to the future move­ Stocks of radio materiel determined to be neces­
ments of the task group, it is considered that the sary by previous experience in staging amphibious
delivery of air mail and first class mail was gen­ groups be established at each staging area.
erally satisfactory. However it is believed that A stock of scarf rings and mounts should be
had mail of other classes been delivered,the boost established at staging area for installation on
to morale would have outweighed greatly any replacement boats,as necessary.
adverse considerations. Stocks of the following items of general stores
Recommended.—That provision be made for de­ which have a particularly heavy consumption rate
livery at sea of mail of all classes, especiallydur­ in amphibious operation be built up at each ad­
ing protracted operations. vanced staging area for each TransRon to be
staged, Namely: cordage, lifebelts, nets finders,
From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans­ and pilings.
port Group Baker)
The logistic support given by Service Squadrons From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.Enterprise
10 and 12 was well organized and complete in all (CV6)
respects. As it is the established and governing policy in
The logistic support of small ships and craft by this ship to keep"buttoned up"in condition,"Able
transport types at the target continued to be on a throughout the ship",in combat area,it is impera­
catch-as-catch-can basis. It is recommended that tive that battle rations be made available and uti­
each small ship and craft be assigned to a specific lized by all hands, for at least one or two meals
ship in the operation plan,for logistic support at each day while operating in such forward areas.
the target. It is also recommended, that specific In continued and further efforts to better battle
transport types with large reefer spaces be desig­ ration subsistence, a supply of the new Army"K"
nated in advance.to carry replenishment provi­ ration was obtained through ComSeron Ten. This
sions for the mother ships remaining at the target. ration has been found excellent for the purpose
Small craft requisitioning supplies should bear used as it has three distinctly different meals for
in mind the fact that there is but a limited amount variety and balanced diet, it is also well packed
offresh provisions aboard transport types. Requi­ and waterproof which insures the ration being in
sitions calling for excessive amounts of freshpro­ good condition when opened for use, it is packed
visions will,either (a) not be filled or,(b)if filled; for individual consumption,as a unit,and is boxed
deprive some other craft of its proportional share. in a number (36 units) which is convenient for
Transport types should immediately report to issue to battle ration groups aboard. The Army
Squadron Commanders as soon as their supply of "K" ration is the best that has been obtained for

"74'4
 .
t tf,
-

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battle ration use to date and it is strongly recom­ ingly, it is recommended that destroyers be given
mended thatsuch ration be made available through an opportunity to top off completely in both pro­
regular naval sources of provision supply at ad­ visions and ammunition just prior to leaving port.
vanced bases to vessels operating'under combat Such a procedure would tend to diminish greatly
conditions. the amount of supplies to be taken on board dur­
ing the operation;
From: Commander, Destroyer.Division 94
LOADING
The difficulty of making our needs known suffi­
ciently in advance to allow other ships to break ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING
out those supplies which they do have in time to From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
make delivery. Too often our operating schedule The planning and execution of the assault load­
requires that we cast off while badly needed sup­ ing phase of the Okinawa Gunto Operation, phase
plies are being broken out or are on deck waiting and phase II, were characterized by: (1) the
to be transferred over from the larger ship. Under loading of 182,821 personnel and 746,850 measure-.
the present system of last minute assignments, ment tons of cargo into 433 assault transports and
needs can be anticipated, but nothing can be done landing ships by 8 subordinate embarkation au­
until it is too late. thorities at 11 different ports extending 6,000 miles
How it should be done: from Seattle to Leyte, some totally lacking in
It is felt that a systematic procedure for sub­ facilities for piersideloading;(2) the partialload­
mitting m' idoperation requisitions or requests in ings of vessels and troop units at different loading
advance to ships having adequate stock on hand points; (3) the necessity of placing responsibility
or the group commander would solve most of the for loading some ships on commands who would
problems encountered and save considerable time not have responsibility for unloading;(4) the late
and energy for all hands. This could be done by arrival at embarkation point and substitutions of
sending requisitions to the fueling area in advance equipment and supplies of the XXIV Corps; (5)
and by using the "tender" system of assigning the overlapping of the planning and execution of
DD's to a particular ship or ships for supply pur­ loadings for theIwo Jima and the Okinawa Gunto
poses during a specified period. operations; and(6)the departure of ComPhibsPac
In port.—It is believed that considerable time and staff from the Hawaiian Area on 26 January
can be saved by sending requisitions to the rear 1945 and subsequent difficulties of communication
area several days in advance of the ships' return with CinCP0A, ComGen10 and subordinate am­
to port. At the present time there is some delay phibious commanders during the ensuing operation
because of the necessity for assigning to tenders, for the capture of Iwo Jima.
scheduling issuing dates, and in the case of mate­ CinCP0A Logistics Plan for Okinawa Gunto
rial not available on the assigned tender, getting specified supplies to accompany assault and ac­
clearances to check on other sources of supply. If companying garrison units to the objective as
requisitions are submitted in advance, all of this follows:
information can be included in the notice of (1) Thirty days'"10-in-1," type "C" and type
assignment. "K" rations, 2 days'type "D" rations,"B" ration
It is further suggested that complete provision­ bread cpmponents and ingredients,.25 days' PX
ing and supplying'of destroyers be accomplished supplies or equivalent, 5 days' water as 2 gallons
twice while in port: Immediately after arrival per man per day.
and just before departure. At present the approx­ (2) Thirty days' class-II essential items.
imate 2 weeks' stay in port puts a serious dent in (3) 30 days'fuel and lubricants,less aviation.
the6 or7weeks'supply taken on upon arrival. By (4) Aviation petroleum requirements for the
the sametoken,any practicefiring during the avai­ operation of planes expected up to and including
ability period seriously depletes the stock of am­ L+30.
munition taken on board, so that it is quite pos­ (5) Thirty days'medical,aviation, boat repair,
sible for the ship to start out on an operation and motor maintenance,and essential construction
when it is already in need of supplies. Accord­ and fortification materials.
 (6) Five CinCP0A. units of fire for ground contained estimated requirements for 30 days.
weapons, and aviation ammunition as prescribed Almost all of these ships had been unloaded prior
initially by ComGen 10. to L+45.
It was provided that ComGen 10 would issue The Joint Expeditionary Force for the Okinawa
instructions for determination of troops, equip­ operation was composed of approximately 1,400
ment and supplies to be loaded in assault echelons, ships and landing craft of all types. This fact,
that allocation of shipping,instructions and sched­ coupled with the long distances involved, created
ules for loading assault echelons would be issued a logistics problem of greater magnitude than any
by ComPhibsPac, and that personnel and cargo, heretofore encduntered in the Pacific theater. The
other than assault and accompanying garrison
various units of the force were assembled and
units and cargo,would be allocated shipping space
in accordance with schedules issued by CinCP0A. staged at the following points: Ulithi, Guadal­
Joint Shipping Control was made responsible for canal,Espiritu Santo,Noumea,Saipan,and Leyte.
the loading of ships in the Hawaiian area lifting All ships were instructed to load initially to
these supporting elements and it was provided the following endurances, storage spaces to be
that responsibility for loading of garrison eche­ "stretched" as much as possible to meet these en­
lons in other areas would be-in accordance with durances:
existing local instructions. It was directed that (a) Ammunition—to authorized capacity;
the first two echelons of garrison be loaded in (b) Clothing-120 days plus full allow­
acordance with ComPhibsPac Standard Instruc­ ances of special winter clothing;
tions for semicombat loading of garrison units. (e) Dry provisions-120 days for ships
For the unloading phase of the operation, com­ company; 60 days for embarked troops;
mander,Joint Expeditionary Force, was made re­ (d) Fresh provisions—to maximum ca­
sponsible for the delivery of all supplies to the pacity;
beach. It was made the responsibility of the com­
(e) Fuels and lubricants—to authorized ca­
.manding general, Expeditionary Troops, to pro­
pacity;
vide working parties which would discharge cargo
(f) General stores-120 days;
delivered at the beach,keep the beaches clear and
(g) Ship's store stock-120 days;
move cargo to dispersal dumps, and to provide
(h) Medical stores-120 days.
necessary working parties on board ship to assist
in the discharge of vessels, either at pier or at After logistics requirements for the forces in­
anchor. volved had been estimated (about 90 days"before
Provision for initial resupply was made as target date) conferences were held with the supply
follows: officer, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, with the sup-­
(1) Five LST's were loaded with artillery am­ ply officer in command,Naval Supply Depot,Espi­
munition to provide initial resupply. Four Vic­ ritu Santo,and with the maintenance officer, Serv­
tory ships were loaded for selective discharge with ice Squadron, South Pacific. Estimated needs
balanced quantities of all types using CinCP0A were submitted to these representatives who
unit of fire tables as guide. These constituted the checked such estimates against stock on hand at
first echelon of ammunition resupply and con­ respective mounting points and immediately sub­
tained estimated requirements for the first period. mitted requests for deficiencies. The result was
Succeeding echelons of 4 Victory ships.each were that supplies, especially in the south Pacific area,
on call and a total of 14 Victory ships unloaded were ample for needs. The wisdom of early per­
70,180 tons by L+45. sonal conferences between logistic representatives
(2) Twenty-seven Victory ships were loaded of Services concerned cannot be overemphasized.
for selective discharge with balanced loads of Such procedure proved its worth in the Iwo Jima
all other types of supplies, less class-III—A_ operation and again in the Okinawa operation.
drummed products and class-IV—A. These con­ There being no supply installations ashore at
stituted the first echelon of general resupply and Leyte during the embarkation of the forces in that
area for the Okinawa operation, it was necessary 7, acting as SOPA Kerama Retto. This base was
to plan issues from supply ships direct to the originally set up as a temporary expedient with
forces involved. While the result was not perfect, further movement anticipated to eastern Okinawa
it served the purpose fairly satisfactorily. Dis­ at an early date. However, to handle the heavy
tances of 40 or 50 miles between rehearsal beaches battle damage, several large repair ships• were
and logistics areas were a handicap and inade­ located in this area,and the protection afforded by
quacy of VHF communications caused a difficult the land-locked anchorages was utilized to full
situation. Much credit for the logistic success at­ advantage. A large number of oilers, ammuni­
tained is due to advance planning of Service Force, tion, provision and water ships also maintained
Pacific Fleet, who sent an officer to San Francisco station in that area to furnish logistic support for
for the express purpose of insuring that the ships ships of the force.
lifting special supplies and equipment required by PhibsPac combat loading teams reported to
Amphibious Force vessels obtained the necessary ComPhibGrp 12. at Leyte and to ComPhibGrp 4
items, and to supervise loading in such manner as at Guadalcanal. After loading of transports and
to permit maximum selectivity in issue directfrom landing ships of Northern Attack Force at Guadal­
the ship. Necessary fuel, water, provisions, GSK, canal-RussellIslands area was completed,Loading
clothing and small stores and ship store facilities Team 2 was ordered,to report to ComTransRon 16
were provided by Service Force, Pacific Fleet. at Espiritu to assist in loading the Expeditionary
Service Force,Seventh Fleet,assisted to the extent Force Floating Reserve.
of facilities it could spare from its own needs. The employment of loading teams was predi­
Commander,Amphibious Group 4,in command cated upon the assistance they could furnish to
of forces mounting in the south Pacific, coordi­ designated loading authorities at each loading
nated details of logistics in that area with com­ point in making the necessary adjustments in allo­
mander, Service Squadron, South Pacific. Com­ cation of shipping space for units, arranging for
mander, Amphibious Group 12, and commander, loading berths for transports and landing .ships,
Amphibious Group 7, in command of forces issuing loading schedules, providing necessary
mounting at Leyte,coordinated details of logistics lighterage from available landing craft,approving
in that area with commander,Service Force, Sev­ loading plans and actively coordinating and super­
enth Fleet, and commander, Service Squadron 10, vising the activities of all naval units under their
Representative Leyte. Commander, Amphibious cognizance, furnishing continuity of purpose and
Group 5,coordinated logistics at Saipan. action throughout the loading phase. To assist in
Forces embarking in the south Pacific staged these functions,it was contemplated that the com­
through Ulithi, where vessels were topped off on bat loading teams, which are trained in embarka­
water, fuel, and provisions. Arrangements for tion procedure and familiar with the policies of
this staging were made by commander, Amphib­ this command, would be made available to Am­
ious Group 4 direct with commander, Service phibious Group commanders during the planning
Squadron 10,stationed at Ulithi. Based upon es­ and loading phases of amphibious operations.
timates furnished commander, Service Force,Pa­ Each team is composed of one Army or Marine
cific Fleet,in early conferences, adequate facilities field officer, one naval officer (lieutenant or lieu­
were awaiting the task force upon its arrival at tenant (j. g.))and Army,Navy,'and Marine rat­
Ulithi. ings for clerical and drafting duties.
Forces embarking at Leyte proceeded direct to Reports indicate that Loading Team 2 was em­
the target, no staging being requiied. ployed as contemplated in assisting Commanding
General III Phib Corps in the Guadalcanal-
At the objective Russell Islands area but that its services were not
General.—Kerama Retto with its sheltered an­ utilized to the fullest extent during the loading
chorages, proved most valuable as a logistic base. of the Twenty-seventh Division at Espiritu. The
Fuel,ammunition,and provision replacement were loading by this division is not considered to have
coordinated by commander, Amphibious Group been of a high order.
 Due to the delegation of authority by ComPhib- TransRons 13,14,and 17 used by Tenth Army and
Grp 12 in the Leyte loading to subordinate com­ island command headquarters and attached troops
mands, Loading Team 1 was used primarily to for loading at Oahu. Loading orders issued by
assistthe XXIV Corpsin its assembly of cargo and ComPhibGrp 12 placed responsibility for loading
shore-side organization for loading, and while re­ of all corps ships directly upon the Commander,
ports have indicated that valuable work was per­ Tractor Group Fox and for all division ships on
formed by this group, its activities exceeded in TransRon commanders. Transports and landing
scope the intended functions and a corollary di­ ships of Northern Attack Force designated to lift
minution of its ability to perform its primary mis­ III Amphibious Corps.headquarters and attached
sion followed. It is believed that close centralized units were not organized as a separate provisional
control of loading in each area is necessary for unit fOr purposes of loading, movement, and un­
orderly and efficient embarkation. loading,and transports from TransRons 12 and 18
All loadings of transport-type vessels except loaded with Tenth Army and island command ele­
one was accomplished in fhe stream. Fuller, at ments at Oahu reported to parent organizations
Espiritu Salto,loaded alongside pier. All LST's upon joining. The III Amphibious Corps has re­
and LSM's were beached for loading. Good sandy quested that the plan used by Southern Attack
beaches were available, and it was possible to load Force, insofar as it creates a separate Corps Em­
at any tide. barkation Group,be followed in the future in em­
Demonstration Group composed of TransRon 15, barking that organization.
less Montauk and Lauderdale, plus Pinkney with LST's and LSM's of Northern and Southern
10 LST's and 11 LSM's of Demonstration Tractor Defense Groups loaded Aviation Engineer Bat­
Flotilla loaded Second Marine Division and at­ talions, AAA Battalions, elements of two _Marine
tached units at Saipan from 3 March to 13 March. Air Groups, Signal Service Units, Air Warning
Expeditionary Force Floating Reserve, Trans- Battalion, Flame-Thrower Battalion, Naval Con­
Ron 16 plus 10 LSM's,loaded Twenty-seventh In­ struction Battalions, and artillery ammunition
fantry Division (reinforced) and attached units resupply. Numerous small units were also em­
at Noumea in late March. barked in the 12 Tenth Army-allocated transports
Southern Defense Group consisting of 25 LST's loaded at Oahu. In the course of loading these
and 14 LSM's and Northern Defense Group con­ miscellaneous unitsthe following facts were noted:
sisting of21LST'sloaded defense units and ground The chain of command to higher authority for
resupply ammunition at Oahu, Roi, Saipan, San such units was frequently vague or not under­
Francisco, Seattle, Guam, Espiritu, Guadalcanal, stood by the commanders thereof. Responsibility
and Russell Islands. The total personnel and for procurement of equipment and supplies,
cargo embarked in each group are shown in table 1. screening out of unnecessary equipment and sup­
For details of the various loadings outlined plies, the coordination of activities of individual
above, attention is invited to action reports of the units loading at different places, and insuring
PhibGrp commanders. compliance with directives of higher authority
It will be noted by comparison of Northern and was not exercised for all by specially designated
Southern Attack Forces,thatfor purposes of load­ local commands subordinate to the commanding
ing, movement from loading port to targets and general, Expeditionary Troops, with the result
unloading, each was organized differently. For that naval embarkation authorities were uncertain
loading purposes each of the two TransRons of as to the appropriate troop commands with which
Southern Attack Force was reorganized from three to deal..
into four transport divisions,the temporary fourth Such units, not being elements of larger inte­
transport division of TransRon 13 being composed grated organizations, had greater need of con­
ofshipsfrom thisTransRon and TransRons14and stant and close supervision and aid during load­
17lifting XXIV Corps headquarters and attached ing than do units of comparable size constituted
troops, and the temporary fourth transport divi­ as regular tactical units.
sion of TransRon 14including all those ships from Such units are required by Administrative order

11411111111111116
to carry with them amounts of rations, clothing rier Unit 5, and the Southern Tractor Flotilla;
and equipment,petroleumproducts,special equip­ all of the Southern Attack Force and Transport
ment and ammunition corresponding to amounts Group Able, Support Carrier Unit 4, and the
carried by divisions. In the case of small or­ Western Islands Tractor Flotilla of the Western
ganizations, varying amounts of heterogeneous Island Attack Force assembled, loaded and de­
cargo of all classes presented for loading resulted parted from Leyte. Most of the ships comprising
in an uneconomical use of shipping space and ere­ these groups came to Leyte directly from partici­
ated problems of segregation and stowage of dif­ pating in the landings at Lingayen Gulf or at
ferent types of cargo. Iwo Jima. Before that, many.,of them had part
in the Leyte campaign, the capture of the Mari­
From: Commander, AMphibious Group 12 annas and the seizure of Pelelieu and Anguar in
The report on logistics falls naturally into two the Palau group. They had been engaged in active
parts: First, logistic supply of ships and craft combat operations almost continuously for a long
of TF 55 at Leyte during the period of assembly period and as a result their stock of supplies and
and preparation. Second,logistic supply of ships spare parts was very low. They were badly in
and craft based at the llagushi anchorage during need of normal upkeep and maintenance work and
the operation. Commander, Amphibious Group some needed extensive repairs before they could
12 was responsible for both of these. As the rep­ be ready for further combat operations. Replace­
resentative CinCPac and senior officer of the Am­ ments and ships coming from the Iwo Jima opera­
phibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, present, he exer­ tion arrived in Leyte behind schedule thereby fur­
cised supervision of logistics for all Pacific Fleet ther complicating the problem.
vessels in Leyte as well as being directly responsi­ At a conference with ComSerRon 10, shortly
ble for TF 55 which he commanded. Later as after his arrival at Leyte, it was determined that
CTF 55 (commander,Southern Attack Force and sufficient provisions, GSK stores, black oil, diesel
CTG 51.22) SOPA llagushi anchorage, he was oil, lubricating oil, water and ammunition either
responsible for logistics of all ships based on that were available or could be obtained. This having
anchorage. been decided, a plan was prepared to supply all
Nearly all of the ships of the Southern Attack ships by groups. Those groups included in the
Force and the Western Islands Attack Group as­ Western Islands Attack Force were supplied first
sembled and loaded for the assault at Leyte. The because of their earlier departure for the objective.
logistic preparation of these ships for the opera­ Commander,Amphibious Group 7in command of
tion was done entirely by forces afloat because base the Western Islands Attack Force was allotted.a
facilities in that area had not yet been developed specific period for logistics for his force and then
sufficiently to be of value. a detailed plan of distribution was worked out by
Initial plans designated commander, Service him and the Service Squadron commander. Plans
Force, Seventh Fleet, as the responsible service called for all ships of both forces to be provisioned
agency and commander, Amphibious Group 12 as before the training and rehearsal period and to be
the officer responsible for supervision of logistics topped off between the conclusion of that period
for ships of the Joint Expeditionary Force pres­ and their departure from Leyte. As was to be ex­
ent. When it became apparent that commander, pected, many adjustments had to be made in the
Service Force,Seventh Fleet,could not supply the time schedule. Embarkation of the landing force
needs of the Joint Expeditionary Force ships, and logistic supply of the forces were conducted
ComSerRon 10 wasordered to proceed from Manus concurrently so that some ships were embarking
to Leyte in U. S. S. Argonne with tenders and personnel and equipment while others were load­
floating docks to act as the service command for ing fuel,water,provisions,ammunition,and stores.
CinCP0A ships in the Leyte area. ComSerFor, The distance from the embarkation points to the
Seventh Fleet, agreed to provide additional serv­ logistic anchorage,15 to 30 miles,further added to
ices as requested by ComSerRon 10,as practicable. the problem of coordinating the two activities.
Transport Groups Dog and Easy,Support Car­ Schedules were disrupted by inclement weather
 ••

and the late arrivq1 of some of the ships. Despite which required that transports be fueled and pro­
all difficulties, however, all ships were supplied visioned at some time during the loading period.
and even such maintenance and repairs as neces­ The superior beach and surf conditions north of
sary to enable them to perform their tasks in the Dulag where TransRon 14 was loading undoubt­
operation. edly contributed in some measure to the apparent
Loading of assault convoys commenced on 27 ease of their operation as compared to the diffi­
February and was substantially finished by March culty experienced by TransRon 13,but the scheme
14, the commencement of the training period. of loading also was an important factor. By load­
Commander, Amphibious Group 12 was respon­ ing only one transport division at a time, Trans-
sible for the loading of all Joint Expeditionary Ron 14 was enabled to use only the best beaching
Forces in the Leyte area. These included the sites, to concentrate all LCT's and LSM's avail­
,Western Islands Attack Group carrying the Sev­ able on loading afew ships,and to provide a period
enty-seventh Infantry Division and the Southern for logistic supply, maintenance, and upkeep for
Attack Force carrying the XXIV Corps less the the two divisions not engaged in loading.
Seventy-seventh Infantry Division. This com­ The Southern Defense Group which formed part
mand allocated lighterage to the Western Islands of TF 55 was composed of 25 LST's and 14 LSM's
Attack Group for loading giving that group pri­ carrying equipment for the support of the XXTV
ority over the Southern Attack Force because of Corps, the Tenth Army, and the island com­
its earlier departure from Leyte. mander. Of this group,8 LST's were loaded on
No difficulty was experienced in planning the the west coast of the United States, 5 at Roi, and
loading other than the usual necessity for changes 12 at Saipan. All LSM's were loaded at Pearl
in ship assignments; and loading commenced on Harbor. Loading plans for these craft were not
time. Several substitutions were necessary after supplied to this command and when the ships ar­
loading had begun. rived in the assault area on L+1-day,information
All loading was conducted from open beaches. was not available as to what units were on what
TransRon 14 embarking the Ninty-sixth Division ships. Investigation revealed that not only had
in the vicinity of Dulag, TransRon 13 embarking loading plans not been furnished to this command,
the Seventh Division in the vicinity of Bito River but none had been made and the task group com­
and a temporary transport division specially or­ mander himself was notfully informed as to what
ganized for that purpose, embarking Twenty- was embarked on the various ships under his com­
fourth Corps headquarters and attached troops mand.
from Rizal. During the loading period, sea and
From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans­
surf conditions were bad. The latter being so port Group Baker)
high that it was seldom practicable to beach any
craft smaller than LCT's with safety, and LCT's Very little cooperation was given this squadron
and even LSM's had to be held on the beach by by the units of the Tenth Army and the Third
tractors to keep them from broaching. Because Amphibious Corps embarked in assigned ships.
of this, the ship-borne landing craft could not be This is probably due to the fact that the bulk of
used for more than a small fraction of the loading the squadron Was loading at Banika and Pavuvu
and the bulk of it had to be handled with LCT's in the RussellIslands while loading was also going
and LSM's, the latter being the same ones which on in Pearl Harbor and Guadalcanal. The dis­
had to embark their own loads later and sail as tance between the Russells and Guadalcanal is not
part of the assault forces. great, but communication between the islands is
The difference in the loading of TransRon 13 limited. To date, a consolidated unit personnel
and TransRon 14 is worthy of note. The former and tonnage table has not been received by this
attempted to load all three RCT's simultaneously, squadronfrom any unit other than the First Marine
the latter loaded one RCT at a time. The second Division. However, it is believed that 73,584
plan appeared to work much better than the first square feet, 903,173 cubic feet, or 6,184 short tons
and was better adapted to the existing situation plus 3,105 troops were carried in these ships.
From: Commander,LST Flotilla 6(CTG 53.3 at Guam. Two LST's had LCT's mounted and
and CTU 53.3.2) three others carried pontoon barges. The LST's
During the loading phase, especially loading in carrying the Third Amphibious Corps equipment
the rear areas,those in charge should consult with sailed with the Southern Defense Group on 26
people who operate LST's in assault to prevent March.
clumsy loads as LCT's on deck and barges on side. The preparation for loading was handled in an
In far western waters subject to typhoons, 81/2 excellent manner and close liaison existed between
knots is the absolute maximum SOA that should this group, the Second Marine Division and port
be counted upon for LST's. During the trip from authorities. Representatives of this staff pro­
•Ulithi to the objective this command spent the ceeded to Saipan in advance of Ancon to ar­
entire time worrying about his ability to get his range for loading and established early liaison,
force to the target at the time specified because The facilities for loading at Saipan were excellent,
winds of gale force were encountered the entire ample dock areas for staging cargo and enough
trip. For 4 days the ships were making revolu­ docks were available for loading six transports
tions for 10 knots and getting 8.3 over the ground. simultaneously. In addition.facilities are avail-.
This is too close to the top of the speed curve for able for loading seven LST's. The.troops port
comfort in these finely timed operations. command made cargo handling gear available and
On a beach controlled by transport beachmaster a minimum handling of cargo was required. Port
and Landing Force shore parties LST unloading facilities are such that once loading begins it can
is never prosecuted smoothly until a fairly high be continuous and simultaneous until -completed.
ranking liaison officer is placed ashore. From: Comnzanding General, SIXTH Marine
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 5 Division •
The loading of the ships of this group was con­ In December 1944, a Transport Quartermaster
ducted at Saipan without difficulty except for the School, lasting 51/2 days, was conducted by the
late arrival of 9 of the 11 LSM's. Commanding Division Transport Quartermaster Section. Each
regiment assigned to the school:,one field Officer
general, Second Marine Division, was responsible
(regimental transport quartermaster) and two en­
for the preparation of loading plans and prepara­
listed men each battalion (including, separate;
tion of equipment for the Second Marine Divi­ battalions),one field officer or senior captain (troop
sion, and for loading of troops and cargo of the transport quartermaster), one junior officer (ship
Third Amphibious Corps in 3 APA's,1 APH and loading officer) and enlisted men as desired. The
11 LST's. Commander,Amphibious Group 5 was course covered the following subjects: Amphibious
designated as the embarkation authority and Force Organization,Naval Customs andTerminol­
SOPA at Saipan. Vessels of Transron 15 were ogy, Administration and Command Organization
scheduled to arrive at Saipan from Iwo Jima on of United States Naval Vessels, Tables of Allow­
1 March and plans were made to commence load­ ances, Preparation Of Embarkation Forms, Char
ing them on 3 March followed by the LST's on acteristics of Landing Craft, Ship-to.-shore Move­
8 March. However, Transron 15 was delayed in ment,and Sixth Marine Division Transport Quar­
arriving until 3 March and then had to proceed termaster Standing Operating Procedure. During
to Guam to discharge casualties. Consequently the last 3 days each transport quartermaster team
the loading schedule was revised and loading did worked a.transportloading problem using the prin­
not commence until 6 March. It proceeded there­ ciples of combat-unit loading executing forms,and
after on schedule without undue incident. No planning stowage by means of vehicle templates.
difficulty was experienced in loading LST's, ten After completion these problems were corrected
were loaded with Second Marine Division equip­ by the transport quartermaster section and re­
ment at Saipan and 11 with Third Amphibious turned for further study and guidance in loading
Corp equipment, 3 of the latter at Tinian, and 3 out during embarkation phases.

679527-46 18
From: Commanding General, First Marine tually loaded at each point for' toth assault and
Division first-echelon garrison ships were as follows:
Close coordination between the naval and marine XAK
APA AKA XAP
AP AK APR LSD LSV
staffs is necessary to work out the loading details,
boat allocation plan, boat assignment tables, de-. San Francisco-Roi 1 1
barkation and approval schedules, landing dia- Seattle
Oahu 10 10 3
gram, etc. Such coordination was found very Saipan-Tinian-Guam 15 6 2 2 1
difficult to obtain during the planning phase for Guadalcanal-Espiritu-Russell. 45 14 2 3 3 1
Leyte 41 17 1 2 1 3 1
the Okinawa Operation, since the naval staff re­
mained ashore only 3 days, after which time they Total 111 47 6 8 2 6 5

returned to their ships. The ships then were con­

Mea­
tinually under way from one place to another in Per-
LST LSM Total sonnel sure- Short
ment tons
the Russell Islands; it was impossible for marine tons
staff officers to maintain liaison with the naval
San Francisco-Roi 5 7 1,500 17,188 8,052
staff. A great deal of confusion, delay, and mis- Seattle 6 6 1,611 12,856 4,216
understanding resulted. Oahu 2 14 39 12,837 69,423 26,762
Saipan-Tinian-Guam 24 11 61 31,771 119,673 47,446
Guadalcanal-Espiritu-Russell.. 66 25 159 74,970 285,279 108,435
ALLOCATION OF SHIPPING Leyte 81 39 186 71,163 320,148 117,884

From: Commander, Amphibious Forces Total 184 89 458 193,852 824,567 312,795

A series of circumstances, including material The number of personnel, amount of cargo in

failures, groundings, partial loadings at different short tons and measurement tons, and the prin­
ports, nonavailability of units for loading, and • cipal units embarked in each assault transport and
changes in numbers of personnel and amounts of landing ship are shown in table 2. In addition to
cargo for individual units resulted in minor the cargo listed, those ships which loaded naval
changes of original plans. The number of ships by resupply ammunition are indicated in table 2;this
types, the number of personnel, and the amounts naval ammunition is not included in the figures
of cargo in short tons and measurement tons ac- showing the amounts ofcargo loaded and unloaded.

PART V. SPECIAL REPORT

SECTION I. LOGISTICS
(B) TROOP LOGISTICS
LSM's—Okinawa
WESTERN ISLANDS GROUP

Personnel Measurement tons Short tons

,
LSM Principal Unit Date Unloaded
En- Vehi­ Vehi­
Officers listed Total Cargo
o Total cles Cargo Total
Men cles

•
24 Co A706th Tk Bn , 1 56 57 371 2 373 201 1 202
79 AWS-8 Operation A 3 58 61 398 42 540 80 64 144
85 420th FA Grp 4 50 54 613 221 834 181 139 320 ,
88 Btry D 93d AAA Gp 2 41 43 549 94 643 123 58 181 ,
96 AWS 8 TEAM B 6 46 52 393 100 493 93 51 144
181L Co A 706th Tk Bn 1 49 50 374 77 351 203 1 204
Unloaded Love-6
15 420th FA Grp 3 50 53 590 91 681 156 86 242
to Love-day.
83 do . 3 50 53 590 91 681 156 86 242
86 do 4 50 54 618 216 834 181 139 320
87 Btry C 93d AAA Gun Bn 2 42 44 574 144 718 125 48 173
134 Co A 706th Tk Bn 2 41 43 361 1 362 197 1 198

Total 31 533 564 5,431 1,079 6,510 1,696 674 2,370

 OGISTICS

IMPsi—Okinawa—Continued
DEMONSTRATION GROUP

Personnel Measurement tons Short tons

LSM Principal Unit Date Unloaded

En­ Vehi­ Vehi­
Officers listed Total Cargo Total cles Cargo Total
Men cles

116 Co B 2d Tk Bn 2 52 54 211 6 217 164 6 170

117 do 2 52 54 211 217 164 6 170
118 do 2 52 54 258 6 264 181 6 187
119 do 2 52 54 255 4 259 149 6 155
.177 • do 2 52 54 211 6 217 164 6 170
212 do 2 52 54 211 6 217 164 6 170
Returned Saipan
248 do 2 52 54 216 5 221 148 6 154
loaded.
249 do 2 52 54 211 6 217 164 6 170
281 do 2 52 54 254 5 259 196 7 203
282 do 2 52 54 256 1 257 164 6 170
331 do 2 52 54 255 5 260 151 6 157

Total 22 572 594 2,549 56 2,605 1,809 67 1,876

SOUTHERN DEFENSE GROUP

56 713th Tk Bn Co B 2 6 8 371 133 504 254 94 348

61 Bty A 749th FA Bn 2 41 43 570 118 688 171 104 275
62 713th Tk Bn Co A 3 40 43 435 89 524 273 55 328
81 Bty C 749th FA Bn 2 41 43 570 118 688 171 104 275
82 713th Tk Bn Co A 2 40 42 371 151 522 254 95 349
167 Bty B 749th FA Bn 2 41 43 570 118 688 171 104 275
172 712th Tk Bn Co A 3 40 43 346 156 502 231 104 335
173 713th Tk Bn Co C 2 40 42 347 125 472 250 84 334 Unloaded by Love
187 Air Warning Bn 4 43 47 424 83 507 93 39 132 +10.
208 713th Tk Bn Co A 3 40 43 389 118 507 266 73 339
221 713th Tk Bn Co B 2 41 43 346 136 482 231 88 319
244 713th Tk Bn Co C 2 41 43 346 145 491 231 85 316
275 713th Tk Bn Co B 3 40 43 411 98 509 270 63 333
279 II&S Co 713th Tk Bn 8 35 43 380 66 446 163 40 203

Total 40 529 569 5,876 1,654 7,530 3,029 1,132 4,161

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE FLOATING RESERVE

71 193d Tk Bn 2 43 45 426 22 448 218 22 240

72 do 2 41 43 430 17 447 224 16 240
73 do 2 39 41 349 39 388 206 35 241
76 do 2 39 41 375 29 404 211 33 244
77 do 2 40 42 440 67 507 215 24 239
78 do 2 40 42 416 26 442 214 25 239 Unloaded by Love
80 do• 2 43 45 475 50 525 229 11 240 +21.
174 do 1 40 41 433 29 462 216 22 238
222 do.• 2 46 48 435 63 498 222 18 240
75 do 2 39 41 364 30 394 207 28 235

Total 19 410 429 4,143 372 4,515 2,162 234 2,396

NORTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA

246 6th irk Bn 2 40 42 452 24 476 178 14 192 L-I-3.

175 1st Armd Amph Bn Co A 2 42 44 458 90 548 126 86 212 L+3.
277 do 2 49 51 458 90 548 126 86 212 L+3.
228 6th Tk Bn 2 42 44 449 19 468 190 13 203 L+3!
270 1st Armd Amph Bn 1 43 44 458 90 548 126 86 212 L+3.
271 do 2 48 50 458 90 548 126 86 212 L-1-3.
274 1st Amph Bn 2 48 50 458 90 548 126 86 212 L+3.
84 3d Armd Amph Bn 3 72 75 702 702 234 234 L+3.
162 1st Tk Bn 3 62 65 702 702 234 234 L+3.
 LSM's-Okinawa,-Continued
NORTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA-Continued

Personnel Measurement tons Short tons

LSM Principal Unit Date Unloaded
En- Vehi- Vehi-
Officers listed Total cles Cargo Total cles Cargo Total
Men

166 Wpns Co 1st Mar 3 77 80 954 954 318 318 L+3.

220 3d Armd Trac Bn 3 65 68 672 672 213 213 L+3.
265 Co C 1st Pioneers 1 27 28 558 558 186 186 L+3.
278 6th Tk Bn 3 51 54 432 23 455 214 14 228 L+3.
326 do 2 58 60 394 23 417 210 15 225 L+3.
325 do 2 58 60 395 22 417 209 15 224 L+3.

Total 33 782 815 8,000 561 8,561 2,816 501 3,317

SOUTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA

9 711th Tk Bn 2 31 33 545 1 546 155 1 156 L+4.

10 do 2 47 49 347 1 348 203 1 204 L+4.
11 do 2 27 29 532 1 533 148 1 149 L+4.
13 do 2 46 48 379 1 380 214 1 215 L+4.
14 do 3 48 51 368 1 369 214 ,1 215 L+4.
25 Hq Co 711th Tk Bn 2 54 56 367 1 368 188 1 189 L+4.
26 Btry B 31st,FA Bn 2 51 53 522 36 558 148 50 198 L+4.
711th Tk Bn _ 3 36 39 417 9 426 156 10 166 L+4.
57
135 do 1 20 21 538 1 539 149 1 150 L+4.
136 do 1 25 26 540 1 541 149 1 150 L+4.
215 do 3 44 47 347 1 348 203 1 204 L+4.
233 do 1 45 46 618 1 619 152 1 153 L+4.
322 1140th Group 1 36 37 649 4 653 232 2 234 L+4.
12 Hq Co 763d Tk Bn 2 52 54 535 2 537 208 1 209 L+4.
28 96th Inf Div 1 22 23 518 518 139 139 L+3.
29_ _ _ _..____ 173d Engr Combat Bn 1 22 23 518 518 139 139 L+4.
320 321A Engr Bn 5 60 65 644 170 814 154 49 203 L+4.
321 do 5 56 61 693 175 868 151 49 200 L+4.
2 Btry B 145th FA Bn 4 58 62 433 172 605 130 104 234 L+4.
30 287th FA Obsn Bn 4 56 60 425 78 503 91 97 188 L+4.
32 198th FA Bn 3 57 60 560 96 656 121 52 173 L+4.
33 Co B 225th FA Bn 4 56 60 479 3 482 152 85 237 L+4.
137 XXIV Corps 2 44 46 450 50 500 175 25 200 L+3.
144 do 2 44 46 450 50 500 175 25 200 L+4.
210 do 2 44 46 450 50 500 175 25 200 L+4.
234 101st Sig Bn 2 54 56 485 1 486 96 1 97 L+4.
235 XXIV Corps 2 44 46 450 50 500 175 25 200 L+4.
312 968th Engr Maint Bn 2 44 46 535 135 95 95 L+4.

Total 66 1,223 1,289 13,794 956 14,750 4,487 610 5,097

LST's-Okinawa
NORTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA

Personnel Short tons

LST Barge,tugs Principal unit Unloaded

or causeway
Offi- En­ Total Ve- Ve­
Total hicles Total
cers listed
men• hicles

625(F) "C" Co 2d Bn 5th Mar 22 395 417 1,095 1,038 2,133 365 346 711 L+7.
759 1179 Causeway. Det 2-5 12 422 434 951 879 1,830 317 293 610 L+7.
651 1049 do "A" Co 2d Bn 5th Mar 10 355 365 963 579 1,542 321 193 514 L+6.
834 1415 II&S Co 2d Bn 5th Mar 22 513 535 150 1,707 1,857 50 569 619 L+8.
582 4 barges 1st Amph Tr Bn 23 432 455 1,149 291 1,440 383 97 480 L+3.
950(11)_ _ 1150_ 2d Bn 5th Mar 13 339 352 837 837 279 279 L+3.
687 4 barges Det 1-5(B (Jo&Bn 11q) 17 416 433 1,143 879 2,022 381 293 674 L+4.
227 II&S 1st Bn 5th Mar 16 337 353 1,125 909 2,034 375 303 678 L+4.
71 875 Causeway B-1-7 16 364 380 876 975 1,851 292 325 617
268 H&S Co 7th Mar_ 19 299 318 03A 888 1,923 ,345 641 14+7.
 LST's-Okinawa-Continued
NORTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA-Continued

Personnel Measurement Short tons

tons
LST LCT Barge,tugs
or causeway Principal unit • Unloaded
En­ _._
0111- listed Ve- Ve­
cers men Total hides Cargo Total hicles Cargo Total

633 1180 8th Amph Trac'Bn 12 374 386 930 396 1,326 310 132 442 L+8.
728 1244 Causeway 1-11&S Co 7th Mar 19 299 318 1035 88.8 1,923 345 296 641 L+6.
762 750 do H&S Co 2d Bn 7th Mar 13 392 405 969 981 1,950 323 327 650 L+6.
772 792 8th Amph '.1.`rac Bn 18 353 371 1,017 201 1,218 339 67 406 L+4.
939(F)......... 748__. ___ Causeway___ 1-II&S Co 3d Armd Amph Bn 23 401 424 954 633 1,587 318 211 529 L+8.
94.9(11)__ 873 4 barges "0" Co 26 Bn 7th Mar 18 417 435 960 960 320 320 L+5.
151(F) 1st Bn 4th Mar 12 252 264 1,283 '380 1,663 277 317 594 L+4.
769 1265 Causeway CT 3d Bn 4th Mar ' 13 252 265 1,253 465 1,718 240 341 581 L+5.
794 1392 do Det A-1-4 9 257 266 1,012 490 1,502 223 422 645 L+7.
333 1397 do BLT-3-4 ' 12 ' 255 267 1,000 4,578 5,578 224 304 528 L+4.
145do 3d Bn 4th Mar_ . 12 255 267 1,146 310 1,456 250 342 592 L+4.
147 • 1184_ do BLT C-1-4 13 251 264 997 271 1,268 202 178 380 L+6.
712 4 barges 1st Amid Bn 16 216 232 1,572 155 1,727 211 333 541 L+4.
L25 do 6th Tk Bn 7 134 141 1,777 856 2,633 447 196 643 L+3.
752 do 6th Tk Bn 6 126 132 1,566 809 2,375 393 194 587 L+4.
L013 do 3d Bn 22d Mar 7 195 202 1,195 133 1,328 377 109 486 L+7.
791 828 Causeway 4th Amph Trk Bn 7 214 221 979 152 1,131 293 141 434 L+7.
)51(H)
- 1050 2 barges Dot 26th & 336 Repl Draft 5 106 111 957 86 1,043 289 55 344 L+3.
)52(I1)___ 1183 • BLT-1 & H&S & Attach Units 7 207 214 979 88 1,067 293 61 354 L+3.
127 4 barges 4th Amph Trac Bn 7 193 200 1,211 213 1,424 354 70 424 L+4.
L83 do Det BLT-2-22 12 180 192 1,347 93 1,440 374 80 454 L+4.
181 do 1st Amph Bn 12 180 192 1,584 157 1,741 410 125 535 L+4.
128(F) III Phib Corps 12 180 , 192 1,368 1,284 2,652 342 321 663 L+4.
SO ' 4 barges 3d Amph Trac Bn 7 193 ,
200 1,368 1,28-8 2,652 342 321 663 L+3.
)86 .- "H"Btry 3-11 10 269 279 1,212 628 1,840 303 157 460 -L+4.
164 1st MD Arty 11 213 224 1,212 628 1,840 303 157 460 L+3.
81 4 barges 145th NCB Bn 11 213 224 2.250 556 2,806 568 399 967 L+4.
172 145th NCB Bn 11 214 225 2,190 296 2,486 553 197 750 L+4.
39 1st Engr Bn 13 160• 173 420 260 680 173 299 472 L+4.
015(F) 4 barges 58th NCB 12 192 204 467 316 783 335 177 512 L+4.
168 2d Bn 15th Mar 15 250 265 1,622 270 1,892 298 309 607 L+3.
04 4th Bn 15th Mar 14 254 268 2,056 316 2,372 301 309 610 L+4.
i76 3d Bn 15th Mar 14 250 264 1,720 291 2,011 304 300 604 L+4.
'08 1st Bn 15th Mar 14 245 259 1,767 315 2,082 289 309 598 L+4.
126 4 barges 58th NCB Bn 12 192 204 460 253 713 307 137 444 L+7.
.
030 do H&S 6th Engr Bn 14 211 225 1,204 543 1,837 249 298 547 L+5.
!67 . Navy Logistics (fog oil) 1,450 1,450 800 800 L+14.

Total 600 12,417 13,017 54,453 29,170 83,623 14,587 11,506 26,093
,

NORTHERN DEFENSE GROUP

747 H&S Co.1st Engr Bn 13 160 173 209 411 620 409 338 747 L+6.
767 749_ 3rd 155-mm How.Bn 9 217 226 901 308 1209 241 360 601 L+4;
923 8th 155-mm Gun Bn 9 246 255 1464 386 1850 374 317 691 L+6.
17871stNCB 7 127 134 1614 332 ' 1946 426 209 635 L+7.
1000..____ 418 8th 155-mm Gun Bn 9 246 255 1,008 338 1,346 303 294 597 L+7. .
1001 44 7th 155-mm Gun Bn 10 243 253 959 381 1,340 292 325 617 L-1-4.
908 7th 155-mm. Gun Bn 9 212 221 1,507 418 1,925 400 343 743 L+4.
892 1382 Causeway_ III Corps Signal Bn 15 191 206 1,012 188 1,200 205 127 332 L+8.
729 1268 do Resupply Ammo(BOA1) 934 934 1,036 1,036 L+15.
5101403 do Resupply Ammo(BOA2) 862 862 985 085 L+15.
319___ __ 1373 Resupply Ammo (I30A3) 1,174 1,174 1,271 1,271 L+15.
20 III Corps Sig Bn 1 9 10 240 1,076 1,316 44 727 771 L+8. .
273 Corps Troops Embarkation Grp______ ____ 5 5 145 1,102 1,247 34 797 831 L-I-7.
221 MAG 31 23 219 242 981 3,019 2,000 130 283 413 L+7.
316 6th Engr Bn 2 26 28 748 609 1,357 159 405 564 L+6.
521 446 MAG 33 ---------------------------1,044 1,044 1,157 1,157 L+8.
598 900 VMF 312, MAG 33 30 169 199 1,271 465 1,736 233 _ 203 436 L+8.
599 876 VMF 322, MAG 33 30 169 199 981 516 1,497 202 222 424 (I) .
LST 599 hit by suicide plane and burned,
 LOADING

LST's-Okinawa-Continued
NORTHERN DEFENSE GROUP-Continued '

Measurement Short tons

Personnel tons
Barge,tugs Principal unit - Unloaded
LST LOT or causeway En­
OM­ listed Total Cargo Total bides Cargo Total
cers men hicles

774 1417 VMF,323 M..kG 33 28 169 197 945 548 1,493 198 240 438 L+8.
671 3d 155-mm How Bn 9 218 227 1182 314 1,496 289 361 650 L+7.
698 71st NCB 7 128 135 1,535 316 1,851 393 185 578 L+7.
-­-
Total 211 2,754 2,965 16,702 12,741 29,443 4,332 10,183 14,517

WESTERN ISLAND ASSAULT TRACTOR GROUP

484 4 barges Co"A"715 Amph Trk Bn 15 327 342 1,336 223 1,559 378 176 554
793 1275 Causeway_ do 20 339 359 884 192 1,076 308 147 455
796 1270 Co"A"708 Amph Trk Bn 7 163 170 1,309 227 1,536 333 196 529
. 1,
946(F) 746 (5)_ Co"A"715 Amph Trk Bn 14 315 329 902 230 298 162 460
616 416 Co"B"715 Amph Trk Bn 31 395 426 922 1,117 2,039 298 120 418
770 1266 do 22 450 472 932 200 1,132 299 184 483
771 1276 4 tugs do 20 367 387 938 194 1,132 299 142 441
780 1153 HQ 708 Amph Tk Bn 12 181 193 1,331 227 1,558 333 87 420
130 4 barges 305 FA Bn 22 372 394 1,806 229 2,035 360 281 641 Unloaded during
617 304 FA Bn 18 348 366 1,904 232 2,136 323 333 656 14+1 to L+25.
647 1277 708 Amph Tk Bn 8 151 159 1,309 308 1,617, 334 271 605
829 1406 4 tugs 773 Amph Trac Bn 23 409 432 984 248 1,232 234 157 391
885 1407 do 6 114 120 1,028 134 1,162 237 166 403
888., 1414 do 20 408 428 1,037 195 1,232 246 144 390
479 4 barges do 26 415 441 1,311 289 1,600 289 180 469
649 1409 do 21 350 371 1,221 237 1,458 238 120 358
674 417 708 Amph Tk Bn 7 162 169 1,202 226 1,428 342 74 416
801 1413 Causeway 773 Amph Trac Bn 23 346 369 1,060 216 1,276 261 151 412

Total 315 5,612 5,927 21,416 4,924 26,340 5,410 3,091 8,501

WESTERN ISLAND RESERVE GROUP

45 HQ 93 AAA Gun Bn 11 130 141 1,593 618 2,211 353 373 726
670 420 FA Grp ' 17 325 342 1,338 318 I,656 303 249 552
686 HQ 420 FA Grp 21 397 418 1,503 540 2,043 380 378 758
797 1394 Causeway HQ & Co"C"706 Tank Bn 15 200 215 1,223 13 1,236 673 8 681
811 1267 do Co"B"706 Tank Bn 15 203 218 8,899 11 8,910 671 7 678 Unloaded during
813 1405do 1118 Engr(C) Grp 8 82 90 1,143 76 1,219 404 40 444 L-1-1 to L-1-25.
814 1408 do do 7 81 88 865 84 949 437 49 486
917 902 FA Bn 19 372 391 1,523 274 1,797 292 314 606
990 BLT 2-305 15 165 180 1,986 1,986 491 491
776(B) XXIV Corps Arty 18 12 30 257 433 690 217 116 333

. Total 146 1,967 2,113 20,330 2,367 22,697 4,221 1,534 5,755

DEMONSTRATION TRACTOR GROUP

446 1366 F-2-2 10 281 291 976 119 1,095 269 105 374
724 K-3-2 10 370 380 1,340 145 1,485 301 113 414
804 1418 E-2-2 9 316 325 1,003 123 1,126 283 108 391
809 G-2-2 10 320 330 1,342 244 1,586 317 116 433
812 130th NCB 9 272 281 1,613 230 1,843 432 204 636 Returned to Sai-
831 L-3-2 9 321 330 1,327 235 1,562 327 116 443 pan.
838 130th NCB 11 264 275 1,591 240 1,831 - 427 204 631
884 1-3-2 9 304 313 1,251 194 1,445 296 111 407
1032 4-10 14 310 324 1,652 385 2,037 232 400 632
725 1-10 15 309 324 1,673 347 2,020 231 344 575

Total 106 3,067 3,173 13,768 2,262 16,030 3,115 1,821 4,936

:71
 LS7"s-Okinawa-Continued
SOUTHERN TRACTOR FLOTILLA

Measurement
Personnel tons Short tons
LST LCT Barge,tugs Principal unit Unloaded
or causeway Offi- En- Ve- Ve­
cers listed Total hides Cargo Total hicks Cargo Total
men

241 1364 718th Amph Track.Bn 14 343 357 1,038 186 1,224 287 104 391 L+7.
354 1335 do 12 182 194 1,117 317 1,434 298 265 563 L+4.
587(F)_ 793 do 15 302 317 1,089 356 1,,445 316 245 561 L+4.
606 do 23 383 406 1,431 250 1,681 406 167 573 L+4.
660 do 13 315 328 1,649 112 1,761 418 235 653 L+4.
795 1391 do 14 320 334 1,084 395 1,479 297 265 562 L+4.
930(II) do 9 333 342 1,437 48 1,485 384 17 401 L+0.
1024 Hq 718th Amph Track Bn 14 351 365 1,428 491 1,919 386 268 654 L+4.
399 1326 4 barges 536th Amph Track Bn 15 245 260 1,065 840 1,905 213 203 416 L+12
481 1350 do 12 317 329 1,058 355 1,413 298 252 550 L+7.
555 do 12 346 358 1,553 - 73 1,636 389 68 466 L+4.
643 1241 do 11 297 308 1,015 321 1,336 .315 278 593 L+4.
713(F) _ 9 341 350 1,442 353 1,795 405 247 652 L+8.
736 do 19 321 340 1,337 288 1,625 378 228 606 L+9.
909 lig 536th Amph Track Bn 12 263 275 1,372 395 1,767 352 250 602 L+4.
931(H) 536th Amph Track Bn 24 358 382 1,350 50 1,400 335 20 355 L+4.
70 1328 728th Amph Track 13n. • 16 311 327 935 414 1,349 239 294 533 L+6.
553 Hq & Co 780th Amph Track Bn 17 219 236 1,842 268 2,110 501 175 676 L+4.
570 CoA 7S0th Amph Track Bn___ ____ _ 7 157 164 1,698 205 1,903 415 210 625 L+4.
619 Hq 728th Amph Track Bn 18 305 323 1,688 218 1,-936 430 284 714 L+4.
782(F)_ 4 barges 728th Amph Track Bn 13 358 371 1,041 249 1,290 297 226 523 L+4.
790 do 14 396 410 1,078 327 1,405 299 202 501 L+9.
929(H) 2 barges do 23 550 573 1,081 299 1,380 302 278 580 L+4.
940 do 24 445 469 . 1,028 367 1,395 298 340 638 L+12.
571 ., 780th Amph Track Bn 6 .183 189 1,926 77 2,003 427 43 470 L+8.
608. do_ 7 195 .202 1,612 272 1,884 459 151 610 L+8.
624 788th Amph Track Bn 15 296 311 1,546 241 1,787 435 205 640 L+6.
726. 689 • do 16 378 394 1,077 227 1,304 346 226 572 L+13.
789 (F)..... 901 do 16 378 394 1,077 227 1,304 346 226 572 L+13.
808 1243 do 13 337 350 1,119 287 1,406 341 246 587 L+8.
991 Hq 788th Amph Track Bn 22 410 432 1,065 314 1,379 330 346 676 L+12.
1033(H) 788th Amph Track Bn 22 440 .462 1,068 313 .1,381 336 216 552 L+4.
557 48 FABN 13 153 166 1,565 527 2,092 327 603 930 L+4.
558 FA BN 57 17 147 164 1,670 536 2,206 344 558 902 L+4.
615 49 FA BN 15 149 164 1,688 955 2,243 357 579 936 L+4.
662 1140 Engr(C) Grp 3 98 101 3,050 163 3,213 778 95 873 L+4.
734 4-81st Amph Track Co 8 307 315 2,431 71 2,502 610 44 654 L+4.
918 BLT 184 2 3 191 194 784 750 1,534 150 578 728 L+4.
1006(F) 1140 Engr(C)Bn -3 98 101 3,050 163 3,213 778 95 873 L+4.
609 15 ..386 401 404 354 758 164 349 513 L+9.
658 485 AAA_ AW Bn 10 386 401 404 354 758 164 349 513 L+4.
669 Co. A 763 Tank Bn 15 285 300 2, 107 113 2,220 856 24 880 L+4.
675 361 FA Bn 16 252 268 1,500 410 1,910 356 458 814 L+4.
733 362 FA Bn 18 289 307 1,497 368 1,865 349 546 895 L+4.
756(F)__ _ 4 barges Hq 170 Engr(C) Bn 14 125 139 1,914 214 2,128 494 198 692 L+6.
1014 921st FA Bn 19 262 281 0,464 431 1,895 328 494 822 L+4.
449 1333 EN 287 FA Obsn Bn 17 235 252 728 295 1,023 187 285 472 L+4.
552 Hq 145 FA 13n_ 21 236 257 2,384 433 2,817 319 409 728 L+4.
554 198 FA Bn 29 273 302 1,514 342 1,856 436 342 778 L+4.
556 101 Sig Bn 8 225 233 914 67 981 194 35 229 L+4.
559 Hq 225 FA Bn 24 276 300 1,565 395 1,960 448 376 824 L+4..
693 Hq 101 Sig Bn 8 225 233 1,403 ...125 1,528 285 72 357 L+3.
760 RCT 32 1 27 28 1,196 268 1,464 303 178 481 L-1- 4.

Total 759 1,500 15,759 74,578 16,099 90,677 19,514 13,447 32,961

SOUTHERN DEFENSE GROUP

334 Causeway_ 1901st Avn Engr Bn 11 251 262 1,281 882 2,163 427 294 721 L+5.
343 MAG'31 18 232 250 2,146 531 2,677 399 581 980 L+7.
447 1901st Avn Engr Bn 11 251 262 1,281 882 2, 163 427 294 721 L+5
781 MAO 31 24 225 249 215 2,712 2,927 77 1,031 1,108 L+7.
798(HF) 802nd Avn Engr Bn___ 11 268 279 1,640 504 2,144 364 360 724 L+7.
%I-47N
rig
$ ;

,
 ••

LST's-Okinawa,--Continued
SOUTHERN DEFENSE GROUP-Continued

Measurement
Personnel tons Short tons

LST LCT Barge,tugs Principal unit Unloaded

or causeway Offi­ En­ Ve­ Ve­
cers listed Total hicles Cargo Total hicles Cargo Total
men

799 1410 Resupply Ammo(BOA4) 762 762 1,128 1,128 L+9.

815 Causeway 802nd Avn Engr Bn 11 268 279 1,640 504 2,144 364 360 724 L+7.
817 do Co A 802nd Avn Engr Bn 17 250 267 1,689 390 2,079 328 277 605 L+7.
830 1411 Resupply Ammo(BOA5) 760 760 1,133 1, 133 L+9.
887 Causeway_ 1901st Avn Engr Bn 11 251 262 1,281 882 2, 163 427 294 721 L+5.
890 1379 3181st Sig Su Bn,F P.0. 23 194 217 1,088 652 1,740 162 306 468 L+7.
166 Rations 1,750 1,750 750 750 L4-13.
244(GF)__ 683 3181st Sig Sv Bn 16 144 160 1,170 479 1,649 174 283 457 L+7.
450 Rations 1,750 1,750 750 750 L4-15
641 1st Prov AA Arty Grp 14 165 179 1,566 173 1,739 336 102 438 L+7.
684 2d AAA Bn_ 17 316 333 1,342 340 1,682 368 263 631 L4 7.
723 do 17 317 334 1,516 352 1,868 361 260 621 L4-7.
758 4 barges Co A 1398th Engrs 11 250 261 1,791 66 1,857 425 85 510 L4-8.
785 do Co B 1398th Engrs 12 261 273 2,476 119 2,595 466 68 534 L+8.
787 Causeway 16th AAA Bn 13 324 337 1,582 425 2,007 445 331 776 L4-13.
788 4 barges Co C 1398th Engrs 9 259 268 1,348 69 1,417 540 30 570
792 HQ & Hqs Co 1176th Engr Bn 6 209 215 1,636 214 1,850 323 139 462
803 16th AAA Bn 13 324 337 4,710 1,147 5,857 1,293 875 2, 168 L+7.
862 2d AAA Bn 19 315 334 1,405 352 1,757 331 229 560 L4-7.
943 16th AAA Bn 18 321 339 1,594 354 1,948 429 268 697 L4-7.

Total 302 5,395 5,697 34,397 17,051 51,448 8,466 10,491 18,957

The Osage (LSV3), was employed in the same Western Islands Tractor Flotilla- composed of 28
manner making a total of 12 transports used by • LST's and 11 LSM's loaded the Seventy-seventh
Tenth Army and island command and loaded at Infantry Division, reinforced, and attached units
Oahu by AdComPhibsTac. Ofthese 12,2Lauder­ at Leyte from 25 February to 15 March off Tarra­
dale and Osage, moved to the target with first gona Beach employing organic TransDiv and RCT
echelon garrison ships from Hawaii. In addition beach and shore parties and ships platoons. The
to the twelve transports,the-following LSM's and. five finger piers at Rizal were not of sufficiently
LST's were loaded at Oahu with the units indi­ substantial construction to permit mooring LST's
cated for transportation to and staging at Leyte. thereto with the prevailing swell and current, ne­
Unit From :To
Number of
LSM's
cessitating beaching LST's and LSM's as near
474 Amph Trk Co______ Oahu Leyte 2 shore as possible and loading vehicles through the
AAA AW Bn do do 2 water,105-mm.artillery by means of Dukw's,and.
93 AAA Gun Bn do• do 3
155-mm.artillery over pontoon causeways. Trans­
Total do do 7 ports were loaded by ships boats supplemented by
Number of 6 to 11 LCT's assigned by ComPhibGrp 12 and by
do
LST's
1
8 LSM's from those assigned Western Islands
93 AAA Gun Bn do
708 Amph Tnk Bn do 140 5 Tractor Flotilla.
715 Amph Trk Bn do -- 140_i 6 The Southern Attack Force loaded personnel
773 Amph Trk Bn do 1 do 6 and cargo of the XXIV Corps, Seventh Infantry
do do 4
481 Trk Bn Divisions, reinforced, and Ninety-sixth Infantry
Total do do 29 Division,reinforced,at Leyte between 25 February
'Reloaded into same LST's of Western Islands Tractor and 15 March as follows:
Flotilla at Leyte. (1) TransRon 13, Jess Menard, Allendale, Ap­
Western Islands Attack Force, Trans Ron 17 piing, Aurelia, plus Epping Forest, and Tractor
less Kenton,Aehernar and Butte plus Rixey, with Group Dog comprised of 16 LST's and 13 LSM's
loaded the SeVeift diitry Division,Reinforced, The average cargo in tons per ship was:
APA's 715. 97
oft Tarragona.
AKA's 1, 488. 2
(2) TransRon 14, less Merrii,veather, Audrarin, LSD's 564. 3
Laurens, and Corms, plus Gunston Hall and Lin­ LSV's 453. 2
denwald, and Tractor Group Easy comprised .of LST's—LSM's 541. 28
16 LST's and 5 LSM's loaded Ninety-sixth Infan­
From:. Commander Amphibious Group 4
try Division, reinforced, off Dulag.
'(3) Two ships of TransRon 13 (Appling, Au­ Bases on cargo and troop estimates submitted,
relia), three ships of TransRon '14 (Audrain, allocation of shipping was as follows:
Laurens, Corvus), one ship of TransRon 17 Third Amphibious Corps
(Butte) and the Ozark (LSV 2) loaded XXIV Sixth Marine Division:13 APA,2 AKA,1 LSD,24 LST,
Corps Headquarters and attached troops off Rizal. 10 LSM.
Northern Attack,Force Composed of TransRon First Marine Division: 12 APA,3 AKA,2 LSD,24 LST,
12 less Sheliak plus Casa Grande and Catskill and LSM.
TransRon 18 less Cephus,Arcturus, and Procyon, Corps Troops (Including MAGI 33):6 APA,5 AKA (in­
cluding 2 from TransRon 15), 2 LSV, 15 LST.
plus White Marsh, Oak Hill,and Monitor,includ­
.ing 46 LST's and 15 LSM's of Northern Tractor Tenth Army
Flotilla loaded personnel. and cargo of III Am­ Headquarters, Tenth Army: 4 AKA (loaded at Pearl
phibious.Corps, First Marine Division,.Sixth Ma­ Harbor), 3 LST (loaded artillery ammunition South
rine Division, and attached units at . Guadalcanal- Pacific).
RussellIslandsfrom 17February to 5 March. The From: Commander, Amphibious Group 5
number of ships by types loaded at each loading
Fifteen LSM's were assigned to this group of
point in this area.was as follows:
which eleven were to be used and loaded with the
APA AKA LST LSM LSD LSV Total Second Tank Battalion and the remainder re­
verted to ComFwdArea. Two LSM's arrived
Russell Islands 13 3 24 5 2 47 early and were loaded immediately. The re­
49
Tassafaronga, Guadalcanal.
Doma Cove, Guadalcanal___
12
2
2
3
24
6
10
11
mainder of the LSM's were scheduled to arrive on
Tetere, Guadalcanal 3 2 3 8 18 March enroute from Pearl but did not arrive
Koli Point, Guadalcanal 1 1 until 24 March. At 0700 24 March nine LSM's
Kukum,Guadalcanal 3 3
Kukum and Russell 2 2 arrived in Saipan, only two of which were
Espiritu Santo 1 4 5
empty and ready for loading, the remainder were
Total_ 31 10 66 15 3 126 loaded with pontoon barge sections Consigned to
Okinawa. Unloading of three LSM's commenced
immediately and two were unloaded by 1800 24
Of the above-listed LST's: 26 LST's loaded
naval ammunition at Tulagi;17LST's side-loaded March. At 2000 24 March four additional LSM's
barges/causeways at Russells. arrived from Guam,empty and ready for loading,
Following is the cargo average for all type ships so these four were immediately loaded,the last one
loaded: completing at 0500 25 March and the Tractor
Group sailed for the objective 1/2 hours later at
1
Tons,
Tons, Total
0630. All of the unloading facilities of the port
Type bulk
vehicles • cargo
tons were required tO unload the LSM's and only by
the greatest effort and closest cooperation by the
31 APA 6,505.9 15,689.4 22,195.3 island commander, port director, Second Marine
14 AKA 6,492.7 14,342.4 20,835.1
2 LSV 475.7 430.7 906.4 Comseron 10 C, and the crews of the
3 LSD 1,679.5 13.5 1,693.0 vessels concerned were the LSM's loaded in time
66 LST
15 LSM 1
23,030.7 20,813.1 43,813.8 to meet the scheduled departure time. No infor­
mation is available as to why the LSM's did not
Total 38,184.5 51,289.1 1 89,473.6
report on their scheduled date or why loaded
1 222,857 measurement tons.
LSM's were sent to this group for loading.
 • 4
-?
- •
loaded at the fastest possible rate and amounts in tionary Force, for issue to fleet units to prevent
excess of the immediate needs of the assault troops its cargo being returned to a rear area. In addi­
placed in shore dumps in prder that ships may tion, it is difficult for the island commander, lo­
be retired out of range of enemy suicide plane and cated a considerable distance from the harbor,
boat attacks at the earliest tiine, and in order that and before garrison force harbor facilities have
the beachesmay be prepared to receive defense and been established, to control the operation and re­
garrison cargo. Cargo ships must not be utilized plenishment of the barges and tankers assigned._
as floating storehouses. him and present in the harbor.
Comprehensive plans are necessary to insure Itis recommended thatthe commanding general,
adequate shore party personnel and equipment to Expeditionary Troops, be directed to form em­
work the beaches during that period after the barkation groupsincorporating all units under one
assault divisions and corps have moved inland and central command at each loading point as outlined
have withdrawn their organic transportation and above.
equipment and returned division and corps shore Itis recommended thatthe commanding general,
party personnel to regular duties and before the Expeditionary Troops, direct the distribution of
garrison freight handling facilities- are in full class I, II, III and V supplies accompanying the
operation. By reason of the uncertainties of com­ units of such embarkation groups in accordance
bat requirements, replacement personnel cannot with paragraph above.
be depended upon for use as shore party personnel It is recommended that dispatch report be made
for any extended period of time. by embarkation authorities of the number of per­
Instructions for the call up of garrison shipping sonnel, measurement tons of general cargo and
subsequent to first echelon and of maintenance number of vehicles for each troop unit loaded in
shipping by the commanding general,Expedition­ vessels which will be unloaded at the objective
ary Troops, should be explicit and the procedure under the direction of different naval commands,
therefor disseminated to all interested commands. with the principal debarkation authorities as ac­
The prescribed procedure should provide for a tion addressees and the subordinate task organi­
deadline time for requests before arrival of ships zation commanders concerned and the commander,
may be expected based on distances and speeds of Joint Expeditionary Force, information address­
convoys and provide that such requests specify ees of such dispatches.
the unloading points at the objective for each It is recommended that troop units be instructed
vessel. that all vessels will be unloaded continuously and
The supply of bulk aviation gas, motor gas, at the fastest rate possible upon arrival at the ob­
diespl oil, and aviation lubes to the forces ashore jective and not considered as floating dumps once
was not entirely satisfactory in this operation. In general unloading has commenced. Selective un­
accordance with basic plans, certain tankers and loading should not be permitted.
barges were assigned to the operational control It is recommended that in future operations
after arrival of the commanding general, Expedi­ further consideration be given to providing for
tionary Troops, who at intervals requested- the adequate shore party equipment and personnel to
commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, to call operate the beaches to fullest capacity during that
specific ones forward as the need for their cargos period when advances inland require the with­
arose. Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, drawal of corps and division shore party personnel
also had assigned to him certain tankers for sup­ and equipment and before permanent garrison
plying fleet forces. Because of unfamiliarity with freight handling facilities "arrive at.the objective.
the limited speeds of various tankers and with It is suggested that a pool of shore party personnel
the escort and convoy requirements of Okinawa, and equipment be maintained on call ashore in the
bound convoys, the forces ashore on occasion re­ forward area, in addition to regularly echeloned
quested the call up of tankers to arrive on dates personnel and equipment.
that could not be met. On one occasion a tanker That the Authorities providing YOGL's and
which was loaded with avgas and diesel fuel was other such craftinsure thatsuch craft are supplied
turned over to the commander, Joint Expedi­ with moorings prior to departure foi,.the objective.

7-31
 For future operations, ihe would have been facilitated by the construction
supply of bulk fuels to the land-based forces is of tank storage at more diversified points.
proposed: As our operations move into areas where large-
All of the tanker and barge facilities available scale air attacks are a daily occurrence and heavy
for the support of both fleet and land-based forces weather is an ever present menace, it is essential
should.be assigned to commander, Joint Expedi­ that adequate bulk storage facilities ashore be
tionary Force. Prior to the operation representa­ completed at an early date, if extensive land and
tives of commander, Joint'Expeditionary Force, air operations are to be maintained. It is highly
commanding general, Expeditionary Troops, the undesirable to keep a large number of ships at
prospective island commander, and commander, anchor at the objective as floating bulk storage,
Service Squadron 10, should confer concerning: since their sinking by air attack or withdrawal
(1) The estimated consumption of fuels and lubes due to heavy weather would leave the shore air­
both ashore and afloat at various dates during the fields and equipment idle in a short time.
operation; (2) estimated available tank storage Recommend that necessary transport squadron
capacity and pumping capacity at various dates; and transport division officers arrive at division
and (3) distribution of fuel cargoes of logistic headquarters atleast4 weeks prior to the embarka­
ships available for the operation. tion date and remain until details of loading and
A representative of commander,Service Squad­ of essential equipment and supplies;
ron 10,should move to the objective in the flagship
of commander,Joint Expeditionary Force, to ad­ From: Commander,Transport Squadron 16.
vise him of emergency sources of resupply in rear That each ship provide itself with two (2)
areas and to familiarize himself with the logistic 5' x 10' camels made from 12 inch by 12 inch
situation in preparation for eventual assumption lumber for use when LSM's,LSVs,or LCT's come
of responsibility for logistic resupply at the objec­ alongside for loading. They will also permit
tive. The island commander and commanding cruisers or destroyers to come alongside transports
general, Expeditionary Troops, should keep the or AKA's to take on ammunition without fear of
commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, advised excessive structural damage.
daily of: (1) The current consumption of fuels That LSM's and LCT's be equipped with con­
ashore;(2) the current fuel storage and pumping veyor rollers as follows
capacity ashore; aiid (3) anticipated requirements LSIII LOT

for at least 3 weeks ahead. With this information Number of sections 20 12

Length of sections (feet) 10 10
and the knowledge of the logistic requirements of
fleet forces the commander, Joint Expeditionary That each AKA be equipped with two fork
Force, may call forward sufficient tankers and lift (battery operated) trucks. These are in­
barges to meet demands of fleet and land-based valuable for the loading or unloading of pallets
forces,control at the objective the operation of all and large boxes or crates containing organiza­
tankers, consolidation of their cargoes and supply tional gear. In addition they can be used in
of fuel to the beach, and may sail the tankers ex­ LSM's when required for handling heavy pallets
peditiously when empty. When operations per­ or heavy boxes carrying organizational gear dur­
mit, the representative of commander, Service ing unloading.
Squadron 10,should assume the responsibility for UNLOADING
supplying fuel to both fleet and land-based forces,
GENERAL -NARRATIVE •
and operational control of all tankers should re­
vert to commander, Service Squadron 10, at that From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
time. ComPhibsPac Op Plan 1-45 provided that CTF
In the Okinawa operation,as in past operations, 55 (COmPhib Grp 12) would have overall re­
the amount of bulk tank storage ashore for avgas, sponsibility for unloading over Hagushi .Beaches
motor gas and diesel fuel was inadequate to main­ and it Was directed that the unloading plan be
tain a suitable operating reserve. Moreover, it is prepared and published by that command. Sub­
felt that supply of bulk fuel to the forces ashore seqUent to the capture of Ie Shima and'reconnais­

7-35
 -1,
tc
.ty, •
sance of Nago Wan,Nakagusuku Wan and Chtmu fon. two ammunition
Wan, and as the unloading of ships progressed ships were sunk by enemy action at Kerama Retto
from assault unloading to the unloading of main­ on the day of arrival. During the period Love-
tenance and garrison cargo,'reorganizations were day to 1200 hoursL+10,532,291 measurementtons
effected and duties and responsibilities reassigned of cargo were unloaded over Hagushi beaches
as indicated below. under conditions as follows:
Several factors, some due to contingencies not Transports and landing ships of Northern and
fully provided for in planning and others due to Southern Attack Forces arrived off Hagushi
conditions and developments at the objective, ma­ beaches during the night of 31 March-1 April.
terially affected unloading of assault, garrison, After H-hour at 0830 (Item) on 1 April, troops
and maintenance cargos. These main factors were along the entire front on Okinawa Shima pro­
as follows: ceeded rapidly inland and by 1800 the beachhead
(1) Three different large scale assault land­ line averaged 4,500 yards inland. By dark,50,000
ings with phase II complete prior to completion troops had been landed over Hagushi beaches, in­
of phase I; cluding both reserve RCT's of the XXIV Corps
(2) Negligible opposition on the Hagushi and the Twenty-ninth Marines, reinforced, ini­
beaches and rapid advances inland by the III Phib tially in Army reserve.
and XXIV Corps with the resultant rapid length­ It was reported that Keise. Shima had been se­
ening of supply lines and the necessity for the cured at1015(Item)31 March and by 1600(Item)
use of division and corps organic transportation to 1 April the Four Hundred and Twentieth Field
transport ammunition, water and rations from Artillery Battalion had unloaded all of its ve­
beach dumps to inland areas; hicles and 52 percent of its other cargo, the Sev­
(3) Early uncovering of air fields, and the un­ enth AAA Battalion was 100 percent unloaded
loading of aviation engineers and ground echelons and fighter-direction unit of AWS 8 was com­
of fighter groups concurrently with assault cargo pletely unloaded.
over undeveloped beaches; By 4 April g0 pontoon barges and the follow­
(4) Continuing requirements for the simultane­ ing causeways were in operation:
ous unloading over the same beaches of equipment (a) At Beach Red 1, 1,400-foot L-shaped pier
and supplies, especially ammunition, to support a with unloading area 45 by 175 feet;
large scale land operation and to permit the early (b) AtBeach Purple 1,T-shaped pier with 300­
and rapid development of garrison facilities; foot single lane approach and a 30 by 175 foot
(5) Relatively long distances from staging section perpendicular to the approach;
points to the objective for garrison shipping with (c) At Beaches Orange 1 and Orange 2, U-
the attendant problems of escorts and necessity shaped piers, each with 500-foot single lane ap­
for call-ups at• least six days prior to desired proaches and 60 by 175-foot unloading areas.
arrival; On the same date eight barge transfer points
(6) Continuing attacks by suicide planes and were in operation at the northern beaches and a
suicide boats throughout the entire period covered finger pier at T. A. 8698 in southern Nago Wan.
by this report with the ever present danger of loss was being used; however, due to the delay in up­
of essential equipment and supplies; loading of their LCM's and LCVP's at the beach
(7) The requirements for aviation gas, motor 30 transports which had completed unloading
gas,diesel fuel and aviation lubricants accelerated could not be sailed to the rear.
beyond the rate of progress in constructing tank During the night of 4 April and continuing
farms for these products. throughout 5 April the wind increased to 28 knots
From 1 April until 11 April when 13 ships of with a 6- to 10-.foot surf retarding unloading and
First Echelon Garrison,five maintenance and two causing LST's, LSM's, and LCT's to broach on
ammunition ships arrived for discharge over the reef with varying degrees of damage. Night
Hagushi beaches,unloading over these beadles was.. unloading was ordered postponed until the storm
confined to assault shipping. Of the two mainte­ abated. By this time it was evident that all ships
nance and three ammunition ships which arrived Could be discharged to water transport faster than

7-36
 4

If
ik„
41111
, %

11.

U. S. Marines leap from stern ramp of Amtrack as one of initial ass ault waves reaches the Northern landing beaches. Okinawa Shima,
L-Day, H-Hour.
 AV*
•••,,,, • ..44L4A\14$10,4A44.4=
.
006A, s' •

CYLI•A'Fi •

CX)

'

CONTRAST-Contrasting with the fire given them on the Iwo Jima beachhead which fell on their supplies for several days, the U. S. Marines, in the
Okinawa invasion, here, stack their gear on the beach in a leisurely manner.
 ,

• #1.
;
1.01044,

50'3'
P.45:411611111

r-A MONS

4::=S

Beach Blue 2. Note LVT in background stopped by wall. Okinawa Shima, L Plus 1.
 UN

:44,110t' uNj.
d .11if

DUKW's,LVT's and MIT Hauling Supplies to Beach from LS111 and LCT's. Okinawa Shima L Plus 1.

the cargo could be unloaded over the beaches and During the period L 10 to L 20, 147,878 meas­
it was also apparent that in addition to unfavor­ urement tons of cargo were unloaded over Hagushi
able weather conditions, the shortage of vehicles beaches. The Seventy-seventh Division, rein­
on the beaches due to lengthened supply lines from forced, landed on Ie Shima and beaches at Nago
beach dumps to the corps and divisions, together Wan were put into use. Cargo unloaded in these
with the attempt to superimpose the unloading of two points from L 10 to L 20 were: Nago Wan.
low priority defense and garrison units over un­ 20,206 measurement tons, Ie Shima 30,894 meas­
loading of assault elements was resulting in par­ urement tons.
tially unloaded ships being detained in the area The weather moderated on 12 April and con­
for several days. tinued favorable for unloading until 19 April
 *

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44

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Avk, NES

zzt

ale"444 cl)

4
V

kg) v-4
‘
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7-4
Pontoon Causeways.Purple 2 and Orange 1 Beaches, Okinawa Shima,6 May 1945.

7-42
•
 •
when theivind increased to 18 to 20 knots and by provide an intermediate transfer dump to hold
20 April unloading was confined to essential ma­ supplies and equipment for future movement by
terials by a 5- to 6-foot surf on.exposed beaches. other than shore party vehicles;
On 21 April,CTG 51.21 issued Op Plan A407-45 (e) For island commander to modify ammuni­
providing for the organization of unloading ac­ tion dispersion requirements and recommend to
tivities injhe Nago Wan-Ie Shima area in a man­ commanding general, Tenth Army, modification
ner similar to the organization provided for by of class III dispersal dumps
CTG 51.22 at Hagushi. • On 26 April CTG 51.21 reported that five LST's
Efforts during the period L20 to L30 were di­ or five LSM's could beach at the same time and
rected towards increasing the rate of unloading five cargo ships be unloaded simultaneously at
over Hagushi beaches to provide adequate ammu­ Nago Wan; III Phib Corps reported the shore
nition and, other supplies for the XXIV Corps, partys there was comprised of 491 marines,'3 offi­
to support increased numbers of land Eased air­ cers, and 120 men of the Eleventh Spec. NCB,the
craft and other installations, developing the le Sixth DUKW Company,17 LVT's,and 3 JASCO
Shima,beaches for the unloading of garrison per­ teams. Two pontoon causeway sets had been
sonnel and supplies and maintenance shipping, launched. On 28 April, plans for the future em­
the development of eastern Okinawa beaches, and ployment of III Phib Corps having been changed,
during the first of this period, improving the and in order to consolidate and equalize shore
Nago Wan beaches to facilitate the loading or un­ party facilities at Nago Wan and Hagushi beaches,
loading across them of troops and supplies. As commanding general, Tenth Army, directed that
weather conditions during the period were gen­ the Seventh Field Depot and First Marine Divi­
erally favorable for unloading except for the sion shore party be transferred to operational con­
night of 23 April, it was considered that the un­ trol of island commander not later than 10 May,
loading progress over Hagushi beaches was not that causeway installations at Nago Wan be given
proceeding at the optimum rate. Tonnage un­ lower priority, causeway installations in the
loaded from 1200 21 April to 1200 1 May over the Chimu Wan-Ishikawa areas be postponed indefi­
different beaches was as follows (in measurement nitely, and that operations of the Nago Wan
tons): Hagushi, 132,013; Nago Wan, 10,627; Ie beaches be taken over by island commander.
Shima, 39,058; eastern Okinawa, 37,263. During At le Shima CTG 51.21 reported on 23 April
this period, the following events occurred :• that road exits from beaches were improved, avia­
On 25 April, CTG 51.22 having conferred with tion engineers unloaded, and the loading of the
island commander, Okinawa, and having made a, Seventy-seventh Division,' and unloading of
personal inspection of the beaches, presented sev­ GroPac 12 progressing satisfactorily. By April
eral recommendations to improve the rate of un­ 25 2 pontoon causeways were installed on the west
loading over Hagushi beaches. Recommendations side of Ie Harbor. By 27 April all Seventy-sev­
as follows were approved by commander general, enth Division assault finits had been reembarked
Tenth Army: for transfer to Okinawa, Shima, and by 29 April
(a) To employ more cranes,transportation and the one port company and 14 trucks originally
labor in unloading • beached landing ships and operating the beaches were supplemented by two
craft; additional QM truck companies. On that date
(b) To employ more LVT's and crane barges .night unloading atIe Shima and Nago Wan except
at the transfer line; during RED alerts was directed and 51.21 reported
(c) To transfer operation of Nago Wan beaches that simultaneous discharge of five cargo ships
from III Phib Corps to island commander with could be accomplished.
Marine shore party under island commander op­ From 30 March (L—1-day) until 1 May
erational control. Commanding general, Tenth (L-f-30), 15 transport and merchant cargo types,
Army, also approved, modified as follows, other four LST's and one LSM had been damaged, and
recommendations; e. g., three XAK's and one LST sunk by enemy action.
(d) Where haul to shore dump •was excessiveii ess tiAlttliatttheAujnber of cargo ships in
64 V:

r
 DNICWOrINfl

Red 1 pier again in service after storm. 13 April 1945.

the Okinawa Area be limited to the number triat­ ionstfiEdiir CTG 51.15 with landing craft require­
could be unloaded expeditiously and efforts for the ments being met from local sources;
the 10-day period, L+30 to L+40, were directed (d) le Shima,unloading operations to continue
principally towards increasing the amounts of under GroPac 12 with boat pool to be assigned to
cargo handled over Hagushi beaches. However, CTU 99.3.4 and operated by GroPac 12 when re­
the fact that 6 days must elapse. between the leased by CTG 51.21;
call-up of garrison and maintenance ships and (e) Nago Wan and Motobu Peninsula ports,
their arrival, together with the fact that all continue operations under Engr Spec Brig until
classes of supplies, especially ammunition,the un­ 1 June when control would pass to CTU 99.3.1
loading of which averaged 2,068 measurementtons and operation of boat pool to pass to GroPac 12
per day, were being consumed in large amounts when released by CTG 51.21.
by both corps which were by that time attacking During this period cargo unloaded showed a
the enemy positions on southern Okinawa, cre­ slight increase for Hagushi and Ie Shima beaches,
ated the necessity to request that shipping be but a decrease in amount discharged at the eastern
brought forward in excess of.the number of ves­ Okinawa beaches (measurement tons): Hagushi,
sels that could commence discharging immediately 147,495; Ie Shima, 39,058; eastern Okinawa, 15,­
upon arrival and be worked continuously. 867. No cargo was discharged at Nago Wan dur­
By 9 May personnel of the Twenty-ninth and ing this period.
Thirty-second Marine replacement drafts were From L40 to L45 71,777 measurement tons of
withdrawn from the northern Hagushi beaches cargo were unloaded at Hagushi, 17,145 measure­
and a shortage of shore party personnel ensued. ment tons at Ie Shima, and 21,129 measurement
While no shortage of aviation gasoline existed tons at eastern Okinawa. These figures showed
in the area, the availability of fleet tankers as a a small increase over the average for the previous
source of supply for land based aircraft had not 10-day period at Hagushi and Ie Shima and a very
been adequately emphasized in the logistics plan substantial improvement at eastern Okinawa.
and efforts were made during this period to clarify On 14 May commanding general, Tenth Army,
and improve the situation. directed that island commander review the dis­
It was found after some adjustments had been tribution of personnel and equipment and that
made that YOGL's could be refilled off Hagushi every effort be extended to utilize all vehicles for
beaches by A0G's coining alongside and a con­ unloading and to reduce maintenance and repair
siderable saving of time was effected by discon­ periods.
tinuing the practice of towing YOGL's to the At 0900 (I) 17 May, Com5thPhibFor assumed
tankers for resupply. The first YOGL's to arrive command of naval activities in the Okinawa area
had not been equipped with mooring buoys; those as CTF 51.
arriving later were to be so equipped at the request During the period 1 April to 16 May,a total of
of CTF 51. 1,256,286 measurement tons of assault, mainte­
On 8 May commanding general, Tenth Army, nance, and garrison cargo was discharged over
advised CTF 51 of its proposed plan for transi­ Hagushi, Ie Shima, Nago Wan and eastern Oki­
tion from assault to garrison cargo handling nawa beaches. The capture of Kerama, Retto and
facilities. This plan provided that: Keise Shima was completed prior to the arrival
(a) In eastern Okinawa, CTU 99.3.4 (NOB) of CTF 51 at the objective on 1 April and is not
continue as already established including operat­ included in the figure. The amounts of cargo by
ing boat pool; types unloaded at each place during the periods
(b) Hagushi beaches, remain under control of referred to in the prepeding paragraphs are as
Engr Spec Brig until 1 June when control would follows: (NoTE.—The figures given include all
pass to CTU 99.3.4 and operation of the boat pool cargo unloaded under the direction of ComPhibs-
for these beaches to pass from CTG 51.22 to CTU Pac at the objective and represent tonnage un­
9.9.3.4 on that date; loaded from garrison and maintenance shipping
(c) Kerama, Retto, continue unloading opera­ in addition to that lifted by assault TransRons.)

5, 4
 UNLOADING
L.1:4
Meas-
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
Garri- Main- Ground
,,,,„,,,,,, urement
Asault
son tenanee a-Li'
nition ''. tons, General unloading oftransports was commenced
total
_ at 1030 (Item) on Love+1. Unloading during
HAGUSHI 1'
the afternoon and night of Love-day,as previously
arranged, made resupply cargo and supplies im­
L-day L+10 , 532,291 532,291
L+10 to L+20 75,746 42,705 13,827 15,600 147,878
mediately available to troops on call. .
L+20 to L-1-30 23,738 41,058 49,071 18,146 132,013 The discharge of cargo was steadily accelerated
L-1-30 to L+40 103,476 23,336 20,686 147,498
L+40 to L+45 40,166 15,863 15,748 71,777 as more beach facilities were made available.
Good weather prevailed for the first three days
Total 631,775 227,405 102,097 70,180 1,031,457
with only spasmodic air alerts. During this time
NAGO WAN
19 transports completed unloading and were re­
L+10 to L+20 12,207 7,999 20,206 turned to rear areas.
L-1-20 to L+30 3,022 7,615 10,637
Unfavorable weather and mass air attacks inter­
Total 15,229 15,614 30,843 rupted the unloading for 2 days. This delay gave
SE SHIMA
an opportunity to perfect the supply to the rapidly
advancing troops and helped to relieve congestion
[4-1-10 to L-1-20 30,894 , ,_ 30,894
L-F20 to L+30 32,630 32,630
on the beaches. On Love+4, six more ships were
L-1-30 to L-F40 27,953 11,100 39,058 completed and sailed.
ii-1-40 to L-F45 17,145 17,145
Transport group commanders, however, were
Total 30,894 77,733 11,100 119,727 retained at Hagushi to control further unloading,
EASTERN OKINAWA which continued in a most efficient manner.
L-1-20 to L+30__ 37,263 37,263
Transports that had been loaded at other staging
L-1-30 to L+40 15,867 15,867 areas,for garrison echelons, arrived and reported
L-1-40 to L-1-45 12,629 8,500 21,129
for discharge over the northern beaches. The ra­
Total 65,759 8,500 74,259 pidity with which they were unloaded gave evi­
Grand total_ 662,669 386,126 128,161 70,180 1,256,286 dence of the close control which was exercised
throughout the entire operation.
The following table shows by comparison the Commander,Southern Attack Force, Rear Ad­
amounts of cargo by assault and First Echelon miral Hall, assumed control of unloading for all
Garrison types which have been unloaded under' Hagushi beaches on 10 April. Commander,
direction of the Amphibious Forces in Central Pa­ Northern Attack Force,Rear Admiral Reifsnider,
cific operations from the Gilberts operation assumed command of unloading activities support­
through the Okinawa operation. The number of ing the advance of the III Amphibious Corps,in­
ships ,and the cargo tonnage listed under "Leyte" cluding the unloading of re-supply ships and cargo
represents that loaded for the Palau-Anguar-Yap ships of the First Garrison Echelon,for the area
operation which was diverted to the Leyte oper­ north of Zampa Misaki.
ation but which was unloaded under direction of By Love+ 10, all assault ships loaded in the
Com3dPhibFor.
south Pacific area had been completely discharged
Measure-
and returned to rear areas.
Operation Total Short
ships Personnel ment
tons
tons Ie Shima-Nago Wan area-Period covered, 11-30 Apr
- Nago Wan 11-16 Apr:
Gilberts 63 35,214 148,782 58,376 XAK 2
Marshalls 122 85,201 293,792 146,949
XAP
Marianas_ 210 141,519 437,753 201,256
Leyte 110 57,411 214,552 89,596 AP
Palau 109 55,887 199,963 92,920 APH 1
Iwo Jima . __ 174 86,516 280,447 119,078 LST's 3
Okinawa Gunto 458 193,852 824,567 312,795
Troops 1,548.
Total 1,246 655,600 2,399,856 1 1,020,970 Short tons 7,756
Measurement tons 15,593

Val111111110 7-46
 le Shima 16-27 Apr Assault landing and reembarka- Total tonnage handled during period 11-30 Apr at Ie
tion): Shima-Nago Wan area:
Landed from: Short tons 46,090
APA's 11 Measurement tons 114,949
AKA's 1 Total number of troops involved 21,020
APH 1
LST's 26 From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
LSM's 5
Troops 15,148 Some statistics on unloading in the Hagushi an-
Short tons 11,740 ehorages are given hereafter. The figures, show
Measurement tons 30,894 ing time spent by different types of lighterage
Reembarked in:
LST's
craft under various conditions, are averages
22
LSM's 6
derived from extensive detailed records kept from
.APA's 1 about 1 May until the end of the period reported
Troops 10,002 on:
Short tons
S 7,826 Statistics on unloading from 1 April through 31 May 1945
Measurement tons
- 20,592 Number of ships unloaded:
Nago Wan 16-30 Apr:
APA-AP-XAP 100
APA . 1 AKA-AK 43
AKA 1 XAK 77
XAK's 9
LST 202
Troops 177 LSM 53
Short tons 7,561 LSD
Measurement tons 3
15,240 LSV
Ic Shima _20-30 Apr (Garrison shipping) 3
APA 1 Total 481
AP 1 Tonnage unloaded by periods:
AK 1 L to L+10 • 25,678
XAP 1 14+11 to 11-1-20 21,648
XAK 1 L+21 io L+30 15, 243
LST's 11 L+31 to L+40 . 16,052
Troops 4,153 L+41 to L+50 12, 557
Short tons 11,217 L+51 to L+60 10, 743
Measurement tons 3,630 Total tonnage unloaded:
Total shipping discharged Ie Shima-Nago Wan area, Measurement tons 1, 265,865
11-30 Apr: Weight tons 421,466
APA's 13 Time at the objective:
AKA's 6 Assault: AP- AK­
APA AKA XAP . XAK
APH's 2 Average time in area 7 11 0 0
AP's 2 Average unloading time__ 5 9 0 0
AK's 1 Garrison and re-supply:
XAK - 5 Average time in area 6 11 7 13
•XAP 9 Average unloading time _ 4 7 3 9
LST's 14 Number of ships unloading simultaneously:
LSM's 5" Transport type 23
Troops 21,026 LST 7
Short tons 38,274 Number landing craft assigned as lighterage (daily
Measurement tons 94,357 average):
Total personnel and cargo reembarked (assault troops): LSM 15
APA 1 LCT - ?.1
LST's 22 Barges 52
LSM's LCM 31
6 .
Troops DUKW's _ 214
10,092
LSM LeT Barges
Short tons 7,826 Average time elapsed from time
Measurement tons 20,592 alongside until unloaded (hours)___ 13 2
Average time elapsed from time of
1 Estimated figures compiled from administrative orders issued - reporting to control vessel until
by commanding general, Seventy-seventh Division.
time of beaching 35 4 134

• 7-47
670527-40--19
 UNLOADING

LSM LCT Barges has-experienced in many large-scale landings. It

Average time elapsed from time of took a heavy load'off the operations section of the
beaching until time completed un-
19 1
74 /
312 Attack Force commander's staff.
loading
Average time on beach /
1912 8 5 The prospective port director, Okinawa, to-
gether with the officers and men of his organization
Prior to L-1-.24,this command merely nominated
were ordered to this command for temporary duty.
vessels for inclusion in outgoing convoys. After
Six of the officers and three of the men traveled
that date, outgoing convoys were organized, in­ to the objective aboard the flagship of the Attack
structed and sailed by the port director represent- Force commander. The remainder, 18 officers and
ing this command. All in all, the services per­ 52 enlisted personnel in all, traveled on board
formed by the port director section were extremely LCI 813. Commencing with the arrival of the
valuable. Without the assistance of this group of first echelon convoy after the assault, the port
trained and experienced officers,it would have been director section of this staff under the immediate
very difficult to adininister the Hagushi anchorage direction of the Attack Force commander, per-
efficiently. formed the following duties:
At least two things are essential to the efficient (a) Established navigational aids ashore.
operation of a port-director's _office. They are: (b) Met incoming convoys and delivered to
First, adequate communications,second, mobility. them anchorage charts and information such as
The first of these were supplied by the communi- SOPA instructions, etc.
cation organization of commander, Amphibious (c) Assigned berths.
Group 12 and the AGC on which this command (d) Provided pilots.
was embarked. The second was supplied by hav­ (e) Controlled the movement of ships within
ing LCI813,in which the port-director's organiza­ the anchorage.
tion had traveled to Okinawa,continue under his (f) Maintained up-to-date anchorage charts
control and by supplying small craftfor the use of showing all berth assignments.
his organization. LCI 812 had also been assigned (g) Published a daily summary of ships pres­
to the port director by ComPhibsPac but when it ent, arrivals and departures,for all anchorages' in
arrived at the objective it wasfound that the pros- the Okinawa and Kerama Retto's.
pective commander, Naval Operating Base, with (10 Assisted in making unloading plans by
his staff, was embarked on board and he obtained supplying information as to personnel and cargo
permission from CTF 51 to remain _there. This carried on arriving vessels.
deprived the port director of approximately one­ (i) Observed ships engaged in unloading and
half of his facilities at the outset,but he performed made daily progress report thereon to SOPA.
his tasks in a very satisfactory manner despite (g) Operated a transportation office aboard the
this handicap. station ship, Crescent City.
The port director section continued to function (k) Provided liaison officers to investigate and
under this command aslong as commander,South- adjust disagreements between merchant vessels
ern Attack Force, was SOPA. When commander, and various elements of the naval organization.
Naval Forces Ryukyus, CTG 99.1, relieved com­
mander, Southern Attack Force, as SOPA, the CAUSEWAYS, PONTOONS, AND SPECIAL
port director section passed to his control,but with EQUIPMENT
the tacit understanding that it would soon be fur­
ther passed to control of command, Naval Oper- From:. Commander, Amphibious Forces
ating Base. This was in accordance with original Considerable credit for the smooth employment
plans. Further details of the organization and of pontoon structures is given to the conferences
operation of the port director section may be found held during the,planning stage of the operation.
in his action report. Using latest intelligence material, representatives
The employment of the port director group in of the Army shore party, Navy beachma.ster, pon­
this operation provided the most efficient control toon operating battalions and ComPhibsPac de­
of shipping off assault beaches that this command cid -e and how barges'and causeways would
­
"
•
effig/INIIR 7-48
 41744!,1

11111111111.10

' be employed. Locations for causeway piers were ' ost

P en route to the target due to a storm;therefore
worked out at these conferences and the causeway 251/2 sets or 51 2 by 30 strings were actually carried
piers were installed on the assault beaches exactly to and launched at the target. Also, five barges
as._planned. No time was wasted during the assault were lost,four due to the storm en route, and one
in looking for sites or getting all parties to agree dropped at Ulithi after a collision had damaged
on locations; all this Was decided beforehand. the side carry brackets and there was no time
Slinilar meetings of responsible authorities are available to make repairs. This left 93 barges
recommended for all future operations. which were carried to and launched at the target.
This report describes the activities of the .naval March 27, the day of assault on the islands of
construction battalions (pontoon) during. the Kerama Retto, a causeway set was launched to be
prepartion • for the assault . and the. . assault on operated as a ferry unit for transfer of men and
Okinawa and the adjacent • island's Of Kerama equipment from ships to the shore of Zamami
Retto,'Keise Shim,and Ie Shima. The report is Shim. The ferry unit made one successful trip
concluded as of -16 May,at which date the assault but on the second trip grounded on offshore coral
battalions had been relieved by CB's of the garri­ heads. An additional causeway set was then
son forces. launched and by the following day a 3-string pier
- Fifty-six of the 3 x 12 barges had the modified was in use unloading the vehicles,tanks,equipment
ramp bow, two strings wide, constructed by use and men for the assault and garrison. The fourth
of T-7-8 and T-711 pontoons and the two-section string of the two sets was made into a small boat
'hinged ramp. The balance of the barges had landing on the same island. Two 3 by 12 barges
standard bow sections. All barges had one oUt­ were launched at Kerama iRetto. These were
board propulsion unit(M LC- T). Warping tugs found to be of limited use and one was sent to
had two outboard propulsion Units, and four of Okinawa on 7 April. The other barge became of
the eight,instead of having the standard A frame useful service as a repair *platform for use when
anchor hoist assembly, had a trough builtinto the working on the outside of hulls of damaged ships.
center bow pontoon cell to act as an anchor hawse On March 31,three causeway sets were launched
pipe... All barge- propulsion units were braced in at Kamiyama Shima in the Keise Shima group.
accordance with the plan developed at the amphib­ These were used to construct two causeway piers
ious forces pontoon assembly yard, Pearl Harbor, and over these was unloaded the 155-mm. gunS
to prevent damage to the engine -mounts when. for the support of the Okinawa operations. One.
barges were launched ,from the sidecarry position. of these sets was later towed to Okinawa leaving
To provide experienced counsel eight officers two sets for use in supplying and later reembark­
from the Three Hundred and Second NCB (Pon­ ing the men and equipment of the artillery bat­
toon) were assigned to the staffs of'Amphibious teries.
Group and Transport Squadron commanders. On 1 April the U. S. S. Kenton arrived at Ke­
These officers were to advise .the commanders with rama Retto with the winches,propulsion units,and
regard to pontoon activities and to act as liaison gear for the eight warping tugs. The warping tug
between the various CB groups and the force civil barges were launched from the LST's, winches,
engineer. This procedure proved very successful propulsion units and gear loaded upon them,
and Will be continued in the future. the units were assembled and on 4 April the warp­
Special gear included radios '(SCR 610) for ing tugs sailed under their own power to the
communications and running lights for the barges. Hagushi beaches on Okinawa where they were
Flak vests Were provided for the crews. immediately put to work on pier construction and
One Of the LST's carrying a *Ire causeway salvage operations.
set,. -LST 768, was diverted to garrison shipping On 10 May a request was received from the com­
between Saipan and Iwo .Jima. 'LST 793, Which manding officer of the seaplane base at Keram
had a Spare causeway set aboard to be dropped Retto for two 6 by 12 barges for repair platforms
and stored at Leyte was directed.to take the cause­ for -PBM's. Repair platform space was urgently
way set to the target.in place of the • one aboard needed due to battle damage on one of the AV's.
LST 768. Three 2 by 30 causeway- strings were The barges would expedite repairs to the seaplanes
 UNLOADING

carrying on vital Dumbo and patrol work. Four weather prevented all pontoon barge and other
extra 3 x 12 barges which arrived at Okinawa on small craft'operations. This occurred on 4 April
26 April were fabricated into the desired two 6 by and 10 April. Ample warning was given and pre­
12 barges,two outboard propulsion units were in­ ca'utionary measures were taken to secure barges
stalled on each,and delivery was made to Kerama so they would not go adrift and little damage
Retto on 16-May. resulted. A few instances were reported of barges
Two damaged barges whose outboard propul­ going ashore and receiving minor damage but
sion units had been dismounted were delivered to most of the barges were subsequently repaired and
SOPA, Kerama Retto, on 11 May for breaking placed back in service.
down into 1 by 2 cell mooring buoys. During an air raid on 5 April two barges, each
The remaining barges and causeways, with the loaded with approximately 200 gasoline drums
exception of two causeway sets saved for the land­ were hit and set afire. Both had all gasoline con­
ing at Ie Shima, were launched off the Hagushi sumed but one was operating the next day. The
beaches of Okinawa. Launchings started on the other, however, was badly damaged and the pro­
day of assault,1 April,and continued as LST's ar­ pulsion unit ruined this barge was scrapped.
rived at the target until by 8 April launchings In general barge operations were considered
were completed, with 19/ 2 causeway sets and 92
1 eminently successful. The limiting factor to their
barges available for use. In addition,seven cause­ usefullness was the ability of shore parties to un­
way sets which were loaded at Pearl Harbor for load them at the beach so they could return for
transportation to and storage at Guam, were or­ another load. During the first month of opera­
dered brought forward and were used at Ie Shima tions at Okinawa the lighter barges hauled 25,000
tons of miscellaneous cargo ashore. Prompt un­
(2),Nago Wan (4),and Bisha Gaw' a (1). These
loading of barges would have doubled this figure.
causeway sets arrived about L+20. '

Crane transfer barges transferred 40,000 tons

The assignment of barges varied from day to
which is about one-third of what would have been
day but the following as of 11 April is considered
realized if continual operation had been possible.
typical during, the early stages of the operation.
On an average about15% of barges were in need
Crane transfer, barges 25
of motor or pontoon repairs. The Seventieth NCB
Bowser barges 6
53 repair crew was moved ashore at an early date and
Lighters
Casualty evacuation 8 had good success patching pontoon cells by letting
barges dry out on the reef and then going to work
Total 192 on them. While the repair crew was aboard the
The number of crane transfer barges steadily de­ ARL it was practically impossible to get barge
creased as the Army found use ashore for its repairs made because of the large number of higher
cranes. The barges assigned to be tied alongside priority craft around the ARL demanding atten­
LST(H)'s for casualty transfer platforms were tion. Some badly damaged causeway cells were
often assigiied. for use as lighters when casualties stuffed with empty gasoline drums to provide flo­
were ,low. By 8 May the number of crane transfer tation.
barges was eight, four of which had been trans­ The pontoon causeway operations were also very
ferred to Ie Shima. Only three barges were still successful. By 4 April a T pier having a 300-foot
assigned for casualty evacuation. single lane approach and a 30 by 175-foot head
Prior to the development of wharf and pier was in use on Purple 1 Beach,a U pier having two
facilities, and, thereafter to a, lessened degree, 500-foot approaches and a 60 by 175-foot wharf
section was in use on Orange 1 a similar U pier
the crane transfer barges were extremely useful.
These barges, anchored near the edge of the reef, was in use at Orange 2. On the same date a large
transferred cargo from small boats to LVT's and L-shaped pier was in use at Red 1 Beach. This
DUKW's which delivered the cargo ashore. Each had a 1,400-foot single lane approach and a 45 by
crane barge would transfer 400 tons per 20-hour 175-foot head. Turnouts on the stein for passing
day when amphibious vehicles were available. • were added later. All piers would accommodate
There were occasions during which the rough LST's and were kept very busy. With the excep­

7-50
•

• ,
 7-51
LOGISTICS

iltiCLASSIF
LINCIAS

Note 2 eran,es and numerous small boats. 4 April 1945.

 K.)
DmiavoriNa

1.:4

rt',7"4".V.•.Wfiqa

li-:"`.':.:IeZiAl
1,:y,..iik

i:=
t
Heavy seas pound causeways. Orange 1, 5 April 1945.
 El
Lion of the Red 1 pier a ottiths e our -lighters, and two casualty transfer barges
-broached to prevents storm damage during the for use with LST(H)'s. The assault took place
night of 4-5 April. It was possible to hold Red 1 on 16 April. Barges and warping tugs proceeded
pier in place by using warping tugs in addition to to Ie Shima under their own power from Okinawa
the 3,000-pound anchors already provided for and proved to be extremely valuable. During the
mooring purposes. Immediately following the early hours of the assault, the LST's grounded at
.storm the broached sections were assembled into considerable distancefrom the shore. The pontoon
six single lane causeways on Orange and Purple barges were immediately put to work and trans­
Beaches. During the balance ofthe period covered ferred 29 badly needed tanks to the beach where
by this report these six causeways have remained they were ibeady for use in the assault. Barges
very busily engaged in unloading cargo from transferred many loads of vehicles from similarly
LST's and LSM's to the beach. grounded LST's. The crane barges were moored
• On 24 April the shore party requested that Red alongside the beach and used as marginal wharfs.
1 pier be moved to Green 1. It was considered by LCM's and lighter barges tied along the outboard
the shore party that the new location would result side and cargo was transferred to trucks and
in the pier being of much greater use. The trans­ DUKW's by the crane. The two casualty transfer
fer of the pier started on 26 April and by 29 April barges worked with the two LST(H)'s. Because
a large U pier having a head composed of seven of the calm water one barge was able to marry
2 by 30 causeway strings side by side and connect­ the bow ramp of one of the LST(H)'s the second
ing strings from each of the head to the beach,four barge was secured alongside the other LST(H)
lengths on the south and three on the north, was and stretchers were lifted from it to the deck by
in operation. crane.
On 28 April the pontoon marginal wharf at The two causeway, sets were launched on 20
Yellow 3Beach in the Bisha Gawa was completed. April. These were placed at Red T-4 beach. Two
This 525-foot long wharf, 28 feet wide for two- additional causeway sets were launched at Ie
thirds of the length, was constructed so as to allow Shima on 25 April. Three strings were fabricated
entrance and exit at either end. In rough weather into one 6 by 30 wharf installed on the east end
it provided the only protected landing for boats on of the beaches. The other string Was installed
the Hagushi beaches. A 3by 12barge was utilized on the west end of the beach and used as a small
for a hinge between the seaward end and the earth boat pier. The warping tugs were used in pulling
fill approach. Later two more strings were added causeways into position. After that they had little
making the head 42 feet wide instead of 28 feet. use and were returned to Okinawa.
The beach and reef condition proved very favor­ One barge was inadvertently towed by an LST
able for the use of causeway structures. Those to Nago Wan on 11 April. It was the only barge
installed were all capable of taking LST's at all there and since the shore party could give it im­
stages of the tide and were continually in use. mediate attention when it arrived with a load, it
During the period up to 27 April a total of 61,000 rolled up an impressive record for cargo, mainly
dead-weight tons of cargo and vehicles and 51,000 ammunition,hauled ashore for use of the Marines
troops were disembarked over the pontoon cause­ invading the northern section of Okinawa. Be­
ways constructed on the Hagushi beaches. cause of its obvious usefulness, Barge 59 was al­
The warping tugs were extremely valuable fol­ lowed to remain at Nago Wan.
lowing periods of rough weather. There was great Starting 25 April, CB's from the One Hundred
demand for them to pull barges and small craft and Twenty-eighth NCB, installed four sets of
off the reef and they also worked out well at mov­ causeways at Nago Wan. These were foriried into
ing causeway sections during pier construction. a double headed pier with 28-foot wide approach
They also made excellent mooring buoys for which would accommodate two LST's. Approxi­
barges.during the storms. mately 700 tons of cargo had passed over the pier
Two causeway sets, ten barges, and three warp­ during its first week of operation. These cause­
ing tugs were used during the le Shima assault. ways were launched from LST's which came for­
The barges consisted of four crane transfer barges, ward with garrison shipping.
r

••
 '

sareensmismoNto Or Nosin mienta*

************1 * OP** * st

fry,viu ow."woo
ailf,

'

Pontoon Pier Installations at Ie Shima. Note moving of Causeway to new location. 6 May 1945.

All equipment brought forward on the assault floats, one went into the Bisha Gawa wharf con-
was turned over to garrison forces upon relief of struction and two 3 by 12's had been combined to
the assault CB's by the Eighty-first NCB. Of the make one 4 by 12. All causeway strings were
93 barges br9ught forward 88 were turned over. still in repair and use except two which had been
Two had been dismantled to provide 1 by 2 buoy dismantled. The Army obtained a considerable

7-54
 ,4
GIStiCS
w
1 , 1 '
number of good'AstaterAilk Via of'these. Of the ashore with their individual boats, regardless of
12 cranes,8 were still aboard transfer barges,Boat the orderly assignment to unloading points, which
Pool Baker had 3 and the First Pioneer Battalion it is the function of the control vessel to carry out.
(USMC) had one. All warping tugs remained. Coxswains simply would not follow orders to form
in good condition. Two of these are being re­ and remain in cargo circles, but jockeyed for posi­
served for the Fifth Amphibious Force and have tions of advantage from which to come alongside
the Seventieth NCB crews aboard. the control vessel. Many even attempted to ignore
The provision of flak vests for the CB crews is the control vessel and bypass it, proceeding di­
unnecessary. Most wounds, about 35 in number, rectly to whatever beach they had a preference for.
were from our own AA which came with little It is believed that an additional number of sec­
warning. Men could not be expected to wear or ondary control boats, similar to the 95-5 and the
carry the heavy vest with them to provide for any 198-26, could have been employed to great ad­
eventuality. vantage.
The provision of an experienced CB officer on. Much unwanted cargo was sentin by transports,
Amphibious Group and TransRon staffs is con- in their evident haste to clear their holds. Tons
Sidered an excellent bit of insurance. The smooth­ of material for barbed-wire entanglements, boat­
ness of operations at Okinawa is attributed in part load upon boatload of perhaps 50 percent or less
to the presence of the officers of the Three Hun­ cargo, and 50 percent or more dunnage arrived
dred and Second-NCB who served in this capacity with priority tickets when the beach was calling
and similar assignments are recommended for all particularly for 155 ammunition,for instance.
future operations. On L+5 days only one crane barge was working
The 1,400-foot L-head pier constructed at Red 1 at transferring,cargo from loaded boats to LVT's
Beach is believed to be the largest pontoon pier and DUKW's on Yellow beaches. This, in spite
constructed under assault conditions during any of the fact that scores of boats were waiting to be
operation in the Pacific Ocean area. unloaded over the reef. Earlier there had been
When barges are side carried to an objective all four of these barges working on our beaches. On
should be of a 3 by 12 size. The increase in ca­ this day two remained, one of which was not in
pacity offsets any argument in favor of the 3 by 7 working order.
size. On L+5 days and also on L+6 days,to expedite
The placing of clearly visible number plates on unloading over the reef, we had boat crews trans­
barges, especially when there are large numbers fer their cargo by hand to LATrs and DUKW's.
of barges to keep track of, is essential. To effi­ This was possible only on lighter stuff, however.
ciently assign barges for an operation, it must be During the unloading phase,boatload after boat­
possible to identify them. . load of 55-gallon drums of fuel and water, not in
The motor bracing scheme devised by the am­ cargo nets, were observed. At the same time,
phibious forces pontoon assembly yard, Pearl transport commanding officers were complaining
Harbor, proved very successful. Only one motor that it was taking too long to unload their boats at
was damaged in launching, and in that case the the reef. Had they boated these 55-gallon drums
LST captain couldn't list his ship because it was in cargo nets, the crane barges at the reef could
beached. have unloaded same in one-tenth the time it did
Running lights for the barges proved very nec­ take.
essary. Considerable night time operation was re­ There should have been closer cooperation be­
quired and there was also the possibility of being tween the beachmasters and the control vessels in
mistaken for an enemy suicide unit. the matter of beaching instructions for LST's,
LSM's, and LCT's. Time after time, vessels of
UNLOADING DIFFICULTIES
this type would report to the division control ves­
From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans­ sel for beaching instructions. If the beachmaster
port Group Baker) happened to be aboard, we were able to furnish in­
There seemed to exist on the part of most cox­ structions. If he was not aboard, we then had
swains an almost fierce determination to be first no instructions for them except to stand by until

679527-40 20
 UNLOADING

we could contact the beachmaster. Generally, this arrangement accommodated LVT's, or was
contacting him required a great deal of time, desired for some other good reason, but certainly
whether visually or by SCR 610. it did not assist the boats.
Despite the efforts mfide, prior to our operation, The narrow channel,to the upstream portion of
to secure adequate information concerning corps Yellow Beach 3, was like a drawstring about traf­
troops and cargo,we were unable to properly han- fic entering or leaving the otherwise commodious
dle this phase of the operation,due to lack of infor- widening of the stream east of the beach. Within
mation. One boat carrying corps garrison bags the limits of the length of the beach and depth of
and rations was observed flying a priority flag for water, it appears that Beach 3 was as productive
no apparent reason, while there were urgent calls as could possibly have been.
for 155-mm ammunition which was only carried Predetermined and specified boatloads of "hot
in corps loaded transports. In future operations, cargo", with boats numbered, and with everyone
even more strenuous efforts must be made to secure concerned familiar with the exact nature of such
more complete information concerning corps or cargo, proved out in practice. If such plans were
other higher echelon unloading priorities. Possi- more carefully worked out in conjunction with
bly,setting aside a separate portion of the beaches loading plans,there would be practically no neces­
after the assault phase of an operation might sity of having emergency calls for supplies or
clarify such corps unloading problems. equipment. Labeling boats with priority flags is
Considerable difficulty was experienced in the basically unsound, because the relative priority is
handling of LST's and LSM's, due primarily to unknown.
the factthat the beaches were notsuitable for rapid There was inadequate planning in the loading
unloading of these ships. The problem was fur- and establishment of priority unloading of LST's
ther complicated by the impossibility of determin- and LSM's. This caused the greatest part of the
ing the relative priorities of corps and First confusion that existed.
Marine Division unloadings. The squadron There should be a unified control of such craft,
beachmaster took firm hold of this situation and, in addition to the control vessel, with commands
with the splendid cooperation of Captain Laidlaw emanating from one source completely familiar
and Captain Clark of the Tractor Groups,
with their capabilities. This would provide the
a great deal,but no one in the naval acomplishedorgan­
beachmaster with technical and control assistance,
ization could determine the relative military im­
and eliminate the confusion of one group violating
portance of the various LST's and LSM's, which
priorities ovei another.
had to be unloaded with limited unloading facili-
Boat coxswains and boat officers need more in-
ties. It is recommended that ,for future opera­
doctrination upon the necessity of obeying orders
tions,such relative priorities be established insofar
from the control vessels,and observing proper pro-
as possible, and that an alternate unloading plan
cedure seaward of the control vessels during un­
be established ahead, when such difficulties can be
loading. They must obey the orders of the con
foreseen.
trol vessels and of officers working in boats sea-
Equipment at reef transfer line was probably ward of the control yes.sel, who are there to main-
adequate, provided that it was at all times avail­ tain proper circles of loaded boats, and to feed to
able, but such was not the case. Several evenings, the control vessel requested cargo.
the cranes were secured by the beach authorities, Many coxswains would attempt to bypass the
while boats were still pouring into the transfer control vessel completely in their apparent mad
area. This gave rise to congestion off the reef quest to "get to the beach at all costs."
overnight, contrary to the idea of dispersion. Many loading boats were left behind during the
Often the cranes were late in opening for business nightretirements by transports. Again,hundreds
in the morning,and at least three of them,during of them had to spend the nightin the water,during
the latter days, were in such a position in relation the two nights when the water was too rough in the
to the reef,that boats were unnecessarily damaged transport area for transports to take aboard their
approaching or retracting from them. Possibly boats.

7-56
 ri tin ncr
„.1 LT1
,
e.Pm 1216 and Orange beaches arriving from Trans­
LST's have been directed time and again to
alf6w these boats to nest 6,1ongside,and to feed and port Area Dog lined up behind our lines of depar­
house the crews for the night. ture or crossed our boat lanes. This situation
A few LST's off our beaches,mostly the hospital should be avoided in future planning.
LS-T's, were functioning in this regard. Difficulties experienced:
More of them, however, were refusing to allow (a) Twenty-two pontoon barges were launched;
the,landing boats to nest alongside, with the result only eight would operate under own power. One
that scores of landing craft reported to the control sunk with cargo.
vessel all nightlong for a suggestion of what to do. (b) LCT's proved invaluable although launch­
We submit,that by and large,LST's were remiss ing was extremely slow and crews of these craft
in their duty in this regard. seemed at a loss as to what to do and where to go.
At about 2130, on Love+3-night, two Marine This was straightened out in later stages.
officers boarded the control vessel from a barge, (e) It is strongly recommended that more than
which had pulled alongside. They reported that one unit not be landed over one beach at the same
they wanted an LCM to pull them to the beach, as time (i. e., corps over First Marine Division
their barge was listing badly from taking in water, beaches). Even if beach space is limited a small
and they feared it would turn over. While they section of beach should be reserved for units of
were speaking to me,the barge flipped over,dump­ the higher echelons. That will enable higher ech­
ing the personnel thereon,together with their pay elons a place to land at any time without interfer­
records and gear, into the water, as well as two ing with assault cargo and troops.
bulldozers and one 155-mm. rifle. This squadron was completely unloaded on 10
The personnel were immediately rescued by April 1945.
turningfloodlights on them and picking them up in
LCVP's. Only one man was slightly injured. From: Commander, Task Unit 51.22.9—Com­
Their pay records and most of their personal ef­ mander, LCT and Pontoon Barge
fects were lost, as were the two bulldozers, the Group—Okinawa
1-55-mm. rifle, and at last report, the barge had The operation of lighterage continued substan­
not yet been salvaged. tially the same as in the preceding month,with all
The incident was immediately reported. lighter craft always able to carry more cargo than.
At11— 10 we received a radio message from the could be handled by the shore party. During this
Barnett boat group commander, advising that all period the shipping consisted preponderately of
call waves were being held in the rendezvous area merchant vessels with resultant lessening in co­
per instructions. We immediately ordered him to operation from the ships unloading. Much loss
dispatch the call waves. of time resulted because neither these ships nor the
The first call wave to arrive at the line of depar­ stevedore hatch gangs assigned to them had any
ture was at 114,55 instead of II 20. concern about lighterage time. Barges, LCT's,
' Call waves were slow in arriving at the line of and LCM's were ordered to stand off for hours and
departure and the waves of artillery in DUKW's even when called alongside,long delays in loading
were extremely late. This was largely due to the them was usual.
fact that the First Marine Division would not re­ Each report brings out the fact that the Trans-
hearse these waves during rehearsal period. In lions having control of the initial'assault phase of
the future all assault waves and call waves should the unloading, had no interest in the transition
be rehearsed if only for our own benefit. If the period and that there was a lapse in or lack of
need for artillery had been more acute this delay coordination on their departure. Once the last of
would have been extremely serious. the lighterage loaded with cargo from the Trans-
Love-Day for our control vessels was compli­ Rons had cleared the ships,their control and beach
cated by the fact that contiguous beaches to our party personnel were withdrawn. Little or DO
south were Purple and Orange but flew exactly effort was made to direct the beaching or unload­
the same colored control flags as we did on Blue ing of this cargo. Subsequent echelons of control
and Yellow beaches. Large numbers of boats for and garrison beach parties were unfamiliar with

7-57
 ,fir

staff should take part in planning conferences be­ duty carry sufficient gasoline to operate -their
tween commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, pumps for at least 5 hours. At one time during,
and other commanders and should accompany this operation it was necessary to transfer a bar­
commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, to the rel of gasoline to one LCS engaged in fighting
objective. the fire. A delay of this sort might have proven
disastrous.
From: Commander, Transport Squadron 13 (c) That LCS's be provided with larger
(CTG 55.1) fenders. Some damage was done to the LCS's
Based upon experience in the last three amphibi­ themselves while alongside the LST, and several
ous operations it is the opinion of this command hoses were cut when the ships rubbed together,
that control of all units from transports down to even though the sea was relatively calm.
pontoon barges and causeways should rest with (d) That deck loads on LST's be placed so as
the transport squadroh commander. This control not to interfere with proper opening of deck
should extend from the planning period through­ hatches.
out the assault phase to the unloading on the (e) A larger supply of aero foam be carried
beach. The vesting in this command of the coor­ by LCS's.
dination of LST's and IBM's_proved the effective­
ness of this method. Exceptfor over-all planning From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
and coordination no higher echelon of command is In the light of the experience gained during the
necessary in such functions as control, beachmas­ 10 weeks' stay of this command at Okinawa, it
ter, LCT's, pontoon barges and causeways, and would be possible to make many recommenda­
salvage. tions regarding the administration of a large an­
chorage and the conduct of that phase of amphibi­
From: Commander, Amphibious Group FIVE' ous operatiOns following the assault. Most of
A small, well organized party is best for this these,however,would be merely repetitions of com­
:type of operation. ments made by other commanders under similar
When decks are extremely hot, hoses should be circumstances in previous operations and such
led along lifelines or otherwise raised above the repetition would serve no useful purpose. The
deck. At least two hoses charred and burst, even recommendations which follow are considered
though they were in almost constant motion and vital, if not to the actual success of an operation,
had water running through them. at least to a smoothly conducted,efficient:perform­
Rescue breathing apparatus should be used in ance.
the open air for fighting a fire when there are One of the greatest difficulties encountered in the
noticeable fumes present. The smoke from burn-­ administration of the Hagushi anchorage was the
ing white phosphorus hand grenades was particu­ lack of a central source of supply of provisions and
larly bothersome on this occasion. GSK stores during the first 4 weeks of the opera­
Ammunition exploded by heat has a tendency tion following the assault. The method of resup­
to scatter other charges in the same container, ply of LST(M)'s and other ships acting as dis­
which lessens the danger of a serious explosion. tributing agencies, by stripping incoming trans­
The large open interior of the LST's tank deck ports, while feasible, was highly unsatisfactory
permitted sufficient room for expansion so that and should not be relied upon except as an emer­
structural damage from exploding ammunition gency measure. The large number of relatively
was almost negligible. small vessels with limited provision and stores
capacity employed in an amphibious operation
Recommendations makes it mandatory that sources of resupply be
(a) That extra lengths of suction hose for provided at an early date if these vessels are to
handy billys be carried when destroyer fire and remain at the objective. It is recommended there­
rescue parties board a ship with more free board fore, that in future plans, arrangements be made
than that to which they are accustomed. for the arrival of provision and GSK store ships
(b) Ships assigned fire fighting and salvage at the anchorage within approximately one week
 ,
Tics'

after the assault an_ - ervals'thereafter ment troops for labor,in fact it is a disadvantage.
As will keep one ship 9f each type available in the They lack the organization, training, equipment,
anchorage at all times. and physical conditioning of regular labor bat­
, Itis recognized thatthe provision of an adequate talions and for the task of unloading are usually
shore party is the responsibility of the Army. inferior to an equal number of such troops. It is
Nevertheless this particular part of an amphibious far better to bring needed labor personnel to the
operation is so vitally important that an expedi­ objective in the assault convoys or. immediately
fionary force commander should assure himself thereafter and to transport the replacements in the
beyond all possible doubtthat the unloading facili­ first or later echelon convoys whenever they are
ties are adequate. At Okinawa the bottleneck in required than vice versa. Since adequate labor
unloading was at the beaches. A fringing reef, personnel must be brought in eventually, trans­
poor roads, and at the last, mud caused by heavy porting replacements in the assault convoys and
rains added to the difficulty of the task, but the using them temporarily with the -shore party re­
basic trouble was a shortage of men, trucks, sults in no over-all economy of either personnel
DUKW's,and cranes. Cargo could be, and was, or shipping. Instead it saddles the shore party
unloaded from ships into lighterage craft and with inferior personnel at a most important stage
transported to the beach far faster than it could be in the operation and requires breaking in a new
unloaded there. This shortage was due to two group of personnel who would have been thor­
factors:First,inclusion in the shore parties of per­ oughly familiar with the situation had they been
sonnel and equipment belonging basically to com­ brought in initially.
bat elements of the corps,but attached to the shore Not all of the shore party need be carried in the
party for the assault, and the subsequent with­ assault convoy. Only those elements which are re­
drawal of these units as the combat moved inland •quired during the assault need be lifted. The re­
away from the beach area; second, mistakes mainder of the shore party, however, should
in plans which failed to provide for increas­ arrive in early echeldn convoys so thatthe capacity
ing the shore-party facilities commensurately of the shore party may be constantly equal to or
and concurrently with the increased demands for greater than the planned rate of unloading. Fur­
unloading. thermore the principle of responsibility of the
It is strongly recommended that in any future shore-party commander directly to the Army cow.­
operations in which the landing force will have to mander should be clearly recognized and set forth.
be supported for an extended period by men and As the actual fighting progresses inland, the di­
material landed over beaches a carefully trained, vision and corpscommanders look to Army dumps
properly equipped shore party be provided,ample as their source of supply and they are no longer
in strength,to perform its task. This shore party interested in beach operations. The supply prob­
should be completely independent of and separate lem,except during the early phases of the assault,
from the divisions and corps making the initial is fundamentally an Army one and the responsi­
assault and should be responsible directly to the bility for it cannot be delegated to a subordinate
senior officer of the Army in the Expeditionary command.
Force. In a very large scale operation this would
normally be the Army commander. This matter From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
cannot be left to chance. A weak or incompetent It is recommended that in the future repair
shore party may conceivably jeopardize the suc­ crews be located ashore rather than on an ARL.
cess of the entire operation. The ARL is always surrounded with higher prior-.
The practice of employing replacement troops ity craft clamoring for repair and CB's are work­
as labor personnel for shore parties is considered ing for someone else rather than on bar9ges. A
to be unsound unless there is a definite agreement mobile truck repair unit which can go to the barges
beforehand that they will not be detached from and repair them when dried out on the reef would
their duty with the shore party until they are be a better arrangement.
relieved by other labor troops. With such an It is recommended that the modified ramp bow
agreement there is no advantage in using replace- be installed on all barges. This barge can do any­
 . .,
y
thing the standard bow barge can do. In addition advances inland require the with raVval of corps
it is easier to marry to an LST or LSM ramp and and division shore party personnel and equipment,
can put vehicles ashore with no difficulty. Barges and before permanent garrison freight handling
with the modified ramp bow were observed run­ facilities arrive at the objective. It is suggested
ning through heavy seas and were apparently as that a reserve pool of shore party personnel and
maneuverable and sea-worthy as those with stand­ equipment be maintained on call ashore in the for­
ard bows. There was no surge of water up the ward area,in addition to regularly echeloned per­
ramp and onto the cargo as some might anticipate. sonnel and equipment.
The operation of NL pontoon equipment at Oki:
From: Commander, Transport Squadron 12
nawa and vicinity was one of the most successful
and Commander, Transport Division
uses of such equipment in the Pacific campaign.
34(U.S. S. Cambria,Flagship)
As it worked out there were more barges than nec­
essary but this would not have been true if shore Recommend that in future operations where the
unloading facilities had been able to handle the terrain of the objective is such that the front lines
cargo. Causeway installations were eminently are moving along ft beach front, as was the case on
successful. northern Okinawa,one or two LSM's or LST's be
An improved system of beach marking is neces­ loaded originally with rations,water,special types
sary. The system employed in the past has led to of ammunition and fuel plus two DUKW's if an
use of unusual colors such as gold, amber, purple LSM is used;.or four DUKW's if an LST is used.
and black in designating beaches. This is imprac­ These LSM's or LST's would then be held in re­
ticable,since lights and flags for control vessels in serve loaded and ready for instant dispatch to dis­
such variegated colors are not available. tant beaches to land these essential combat supplies
When beaches are selected for the preferred and in the event over-land transportation is unable to
alternate landing plans, force operating areas keep up with rapidly moving front lines. By
should be delineated and named (automobile body having two or four DUKW's aboard, these LSM's
types) and the group of beaches representing a or LST's would be self-sufficient for unloading on
corps field of action should be given an over-all any type of beach and would require no beach or
name; (automobiles, such as Ford, Buick, and shore party. The DUKW's could deliver the sup­
Hudson,are suggested as a satisfactory example). plies to the desired location ashore by shuttle
method. These already loaded LSM's or LS-1"s
Each group of beaches should then be subdivided
would insure that the weather could not prevent
and designated with the four standard colors
the loading of such urgently needed supplies at the
shown in chapter IX of the Transport Doctrine,
instant that the supplies were needed at a distant
always using yellow, blue, red, and green from
beach. If no need for them developed during the
right to left in that sequence. Each color beach
landing,they could then be unloaded over the regu­
should be further subdivided into only two
lar beaches.
beaches; that is, Red 1 and Red 2, also from right
to left, in order that control flags may be easily From: Commander, Task Unit 51.22.9—Com­
differentiated. mander, LCT and Pontoon Barge
It is recommended that troop units be instructed Group—Okinawa
that all vessels will be unloaded continuously and It is recommended that:
at the fastest possible rate upon arrival at .the Action by higher authority is necessary to evalu­
objective, and will not be considered as floating ate the shore parties'failure and to provide correc­
dumps, once general unloading has commenced. tive measuresfor future operations.
Selective unloading should not be permitted after Provision be made requiring TransRons to prop­
the assault phase is completed. erly discharge their responsibilities in the unload­
It is recommended that in future operations in­ ing of the assault convoy lighterage until all cargo
tensive effort be made to provide adequate shore from their ships has been unloaded on the beach.
party equipment and personnel to operate the Upon their departure,all lighterage craftshould be
beaches to fullest capacity during that period when readily available to subsequentechelons rather than

7-62
 . ­
Mt fully loaded with cargo, the disposition of , stalled on all LST's as they come in for overhauls.
.-,which is not known by the personnel relieving the It is considered quite practicable to arrange the
TransRon organizations. rigging so that this equipment could be operated
from the existing snaking winch. It is further
From: Commander, Transport Squadron 13
submitted that the stability of LST's is such that,
(CTG 55.1)
added weight need not be considered and that the
It is recommended that greater emphasis be Bureau of Ships could very easily prepare a design
€placed on rapid unloading of transports rather so that booms and king posts would not interfere
than selective unloading. This opinion is based materially with the load capacity of the main deck.
primarily on consideration of the vulnerability of
transports in the target area. The great advance From: Commander, LST Group 38
in landing procedures, equipment available for There should be an LST beachmaster included
rapid unloading, size of naval forces involved, in the assault beach party to athise on beaching,
nature of larger targets, and prevalence of suicide and supersive unloading of LST's.
attacks, adds to this opinion. The cargo is cer­
tainly safer on the beach. Many of the disad­ From:• Commander, U. S. S. LST Group 62
vantages of rapid unloading can be corrected by (Commander, LST Tractor Unit 14)
better planned combat loads. CTU 55.3.11
Beaches should be marked at the most favorable
From: Commander, Transport Division 39
slots when found. This would save much damage
The approach, unloading, and withdrawal of to ships, and also prevent their being caught by
AP,A's in one day is considered advisable due to pinnacles when they attempt to retract. Also, it
the increased margin of safety provided by early will contribute to faster unloading. This is par­
withdrawal and operation at the target area with­ ticularly necessary on a coral beach.
out necessity of repeated retirement which in it­
self constitutes a hazard particularly if smoke is From: Coiiimander, Amphibious Group 7
used extensively as was the case at Okinawa. This It is strongly recommended that at earliest prac­
can only be accomplished by arbitrarily limited ticable (late preceding an operation. naval beach
combat loading. Ships partially combat loaded parties be organized as beach battalions to per­
and partly convoy loaded complicates the ship to form all naval beach functions for those beaches
shore movement due to the necessity for the Army planned to handle simultaneous unloading of a
units to assemble personnel and equipment from transport squadron, and that naval beach parties
two or three, or even more ships at the point of be billeted and trained with the Army shore party
attack, organize them into waves and place it with which they are to work. Insofar as practica­
properly in the ship to shore movement. This ble set up this organization for loading.
exchange of troops between ships in the transport Naval beach parties landed on assault should
area in the majority of instances would not be normally remain established and functioning on
necessary if original loading plans received careful shore as long as the beach is required for assault
planning, particularly by Army troop quarter­ unloading operations.
masters concerned. It is recommended that each ammunition carry­
ing LST be provided with 50 additional men to
From: Commanding Officer, LST Flotilla 6
provide essential manpower,supervised by an offi­
In recent operations with LST's it has become cer experienced in handling ammunition.
more and more necessary to obtain rapid unloading
without benefit of beaching. To get maximum From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans­
unloading rate it is necessary to unload over the ­ port Group Baker)
side as well as through the bow doors. At present The so-called hot cargo set-up worked extremely
the only equipment for over,the side unloading is a well and undoubtedly saved all of us 98 percent of
rather cheap and inefficient crawler crane. It is the 'usual "screaming" for cargo of various types.
recommended that king posts and booms be in- Near the end of Love-day, when the shore was
 ii 4r
'.14t
.u 11
'
REPAIRS, SALV'AGE, 1VIAiENANCE -
unable to indicate any special cargo required the REPAIRS, SALVAGE, MAINTENANCE
next morning,I decided to request a repeat order • GENERAL NARRATIVE
of hot cargo, after discussing the matter with
Major Shafer,the logistics representative of First, From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
Marine Division aboard the squadron control ves­
sel. This arrived promptly the next morning and OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
except for calls for 155-mm.ammunition (none of LANDING BOATS
which was carried in First Marine Division loaded The Okinawa operation did not reveal any new
ships) and special calls for vehicles (due to in­ methods of operation of LCVP and LCM. Un­
ability to load vehicles in unloaded LSM's as like the situation at Iwo. Jima, the weather and
planned), we had no real calls for special cargo. surf were moderate most of the time at Okinawa;
It is recommended that a similar set-up be estab­ as a result a much smaller number of landing boats
lished for future operations, even though the mili­ were wrecked on or near the Okinawa beaches
tary organization involved may not intend to fol­ than at Iwo Jima, where the small boat salvage
low such procedure. problem was a serious one. While some difficul­
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 ties were encountered due to the presence of reefs
off several of the beaches,salvage was prompt and
It is recommended that the use of large identi­ efficient and consequently a small number of boats
fication numerals,as prescribed for ships and craft were lost.
of the Amphibious Forces, be extended to include With increase in the size of boat pools the need
naval auxiliaries and commercial vessels employed for early establishment of adequate boat mainte­
in combat areas for logistics. The ability to dis­ nance ashore is accentuated. Boat repair facili­
tinguish and identify all ships and craft at a large ties afloat are overtaxed from the beginning.
logistics base (such as Kerama Retto) at maxi­
LSD's,which are the only type of amphibious yes­
mum distance will greatly reduce or avoid delays,
sel capable of maintaining any considerable num­
caused by the time required to exchange signals,
ber,of boats in operating condition, must likewise
or for small craft to close a ship sufficiently to
dock and repair LSM's, LCT's and the various
identify it by less clearly visible markings.
LCI types. They are also called upon for barge
Self-propelled pontoon barges as carriers in repair and, in emergency, for repairs to patrol
sheltered areas such as Kerama Retto can be used craft within their capacity. There are not suffi­
to good advantage. Fifteen or twenty pontoon cient repair facilities afloat to care for all de­
barges could have been employed as carriers (am­ mands. ARL's are not efficient boat repair units.
munition, etc.) releasing LCrs and LCM's for To effect repairs on the beaches it is necessary
ship-to-shore runs in areas where beachings were to lift boats from the water. Lifting equipment
necessary. must therefore be provided with the first repair
Camels should be made standard equipment on units placed ashore. These repair units should be
all tankers and extra camels should be provided. landed and operating before the withdrawal of the
in assault shipping, when practicable, for exten­ attack transports.
sive use at objective. During this operation, the material condition of
When operations anticipate extensive use of the transporttypes was excellent. Very few break­
defense smoke, one LST should be completely downs occurred which could be attributed to either
equipped with large supply of smoke materials, faulty installation or personnel failures.
including MoGas for operation' of Besler gener­ No ship whose turn-around period at the objec­
ators. This LST should also be provided with tive was of short duration was handicapped or de­
personnel qualified in Besler repairs and with ade­ layed due to operational casualties. Some types
quate spares. MoGas (Navy) and additional fog which remained at the objective, such as LSD,
oil, pots and floats should be provided in quantity APD, and LSV, required availability periods to
in shipping such as tankers arriving at objective accomplish routine upkeep, such as boiler and
in early echelons. evaporator cleaning by ships'force. These avail-

7-64
abilities were granted as the tactical situation per-, Forward maintenance bases and repair vessels
mitted. Many repairs to ships were accomplished by the
Exceptfor 2days,the weather conditions along­ various bases and repair ships at which the assault
side the transports at Okinawa, were excellent, echelons were staged. An excellent job was done
and enabled their rapid unloading with practically by all hands, as was proven by the manner in
no damage to ships involved. During the bad which the ships carried out their assigned duties
weather,unloading was kept to a minimum (since with very few operational casualties.
the surf was such that little unloading could be As in the past, the major difficulty encountered
done across the beach),thereby preventing struc­ by landing craft at the staging areas was the great
tural damage such as the ships incurred at Iwo lack of spares. The failure to have an adequate
Jima. supply at forward areas, which caused an inade­
EightLSD's were in the assault transrons. Two quate supply at the objective,reulted in inefficient
were returned to rear area upon completion of un­ operation of many craft. Within two weeks after
loading. Six remained at the objective to act as arrival at the objective, approximately 15 percent
tenders for the boat pools and docking of landing of all LOT and LSM types were operating at re­
craft types. The maintenance of LOT,LSM,and duced speeds because of the lack of spares to repair
LOT types would have been impossible over the the diesel engines. In the future it is recom­
long period required without the invaluable dock­ mended that extreme efforts be made to equip all
ing facilities of these LSD's. During this oper­ landing craft with the complete allowance desig­
ation, the Gunston Hall and Casa Grande were nated for their class.
used to dock PC types this proved feasible in the The salvage and towing facilities included in
quiet waters of the coves of Kerama Retto. It was TG 51.6 did an excellent job, the largest job of
possible to set these ships on blocks sufficiently its kind ever undertaken in the Pacific. Included
high to enable repairs being made to the sound in this group were three ARS's, five ATF's, and
domes of sonar installations. two ATR's. The numbers of these types were
wholly inadequate and at times during heavy en­
During the heavy weather of 4 and 5 April sev­
emy air activity,twice as many of each could have
erallanding craft were heavily damaged and many been utilized to the fullest extent. The ARS types
sustained less serious damage. The LSM 12 was of ship is of exceptional value and for any future
broached and later declared a total loss. The LST operation of comparable size, a minimum of six
675 and 756 were broached, but later both vessels ARS's should be included in the salvage group.
were refloated. All other craft that incurred dam­ The repair facilities included in the original
age while beaching or by collision during this Task Force were hopelessly taxed after the first
period of adverse weather remained operational. day of the assault. The battle damage incurred
Weather at the target during the remainder of was great and it immediately became evident that
the period 23 March to 17 May was excellent, and a large amount of assistance would be required.
was not a factor in the operational casualties ex­ Upon requests for additional repair and docking
perienced by landing craft. facilities to commander in chief,Pacific, and com­
All craft returned to the rear area were in­ mander Service Squadron 10, the repair facilities
spected by representative of AdComPhibsPac- gradually increased so that by 17 May they in­
SubordCom. Repairs to less seriously damaged cluded two ARD's,two ARB's, one AD,one AG,
one AR,plus the original ships of TG 51.6, which
craft were undertaken in the Marianas and Ulithi
were three ARL's and one ARB. Subsequent to
area, and those more seriously damaged were or­
17 May additional facilities were ordered to Oki­
dered to Pearl for overhaul and accomplishment nawa fulfilling requests for added two ARD's,one
of authorized alterations. AD, and spare parts lighter. This combination
Considering the large number of landing craft of repair facilities accomplished a tremendous
and other small craft employed in this operation, amount of work,but the large backlog of damaged
the operational casualties were surprisingly low in ships which accumulated prior to the organization
number. of the unit, had, up to the time of this writing,
 REPAIR , SALVAdi
:
t:41 vidiness for fur­
made it impossible for it to expeditiously return— ­ late screening othmati
damaged ships to rear area. In the policy of re­ ther operations to be conducted at Manus. • Of
pair of ships at the objective, highest priority was these 60 LST's, 41 were selected and further or­
given in the order of least damage and earliest dered from Manus to Guadalcanal. These ship
return to duty. were in urgent need of many vital parts and re­
Six LSD's were used extensively for repair of pairs. Docking,general overhaul and essential re­
landing craft,LSM,and LCI. For the first time, pairs were promptly and smoothly effected, how­
in the quiet waters of a Kerama Retto cove,it was ever, and they were ready to leave at the time
possible to dock other than flat-bottomed craft. In scheduled.
vieiv of the docking and repair ability of this type Major items of work included repairs to hulls,
of ships,recommendations are being written under propellers, shafts and bearings, and the engineer­
separate correspondence for a change in comple­ ing plants as a whole were overhauled as thor­
ment, allowance list of spares to be carried on oughly as time permitted. Ramps and ramp
board and alterations to the ship to accommodate doors, one of which required replacement, were
the increased personnel and spares. A docking placed in operating condition, as were elevators.
procedure is also being formulated in order to Electronic equipment was overhauled and new sets
standardize and disseminate the knowledge gained issued and installed where required.
by all the ships of this type. Two reefers were installed on each of two hos­
When crews were needed at Kerama Retto to pital LSTs, for the purpose of maintaining sup­
assist with the repairs to battle-damaged ships, all plies of whole blood off the beaches. These were
CB's who could be spared were sent there. By 25 later found to be invaluable in the care of
April,four officers and 97 of the One Hundred and casualties.
Twenty-eighth NCB men were so employed. The In order to lift pontoon barges from the Solo­
use of these trained men,their welding equipment, mons to Okinawa it was necessary to fit 14 LST's
and tools made a considerable contribution toward with side brackets and other essential deck gear.
getting the fighting ships back into action in a This work was accomplished at the Russells, and
hurry. The entire repair crew of 25 men of the barges loaded, expeditiously and satisfactorily by
One Hundred and Twenty-eighth NCB which had pontoon assembly depot No.2.
been embarked on ARL 9, were among this group Finally, all ships were provided with a full al­
of men. lowance of spare parts,including a comprehensive
Two officers of the Seventieth NCB,Lieutenant list for their boats, for emergency use during the
Dorfman and Lieutenant (jg) Von Frellick were operation. ''­
assigned to temporary additional duty with the Normal maintenance was carried out on the
salvage group. LSM's, LCI's, and various small craft assigned,
Services too numerous to itemize werc performed including reOacement of propeller pitch control
by these men. For example men were loaned to the gears and bearings and transmission drive gear
Lindenwald for repair crews, mess facilities were pinion bearings. Repairs were made to anchor
built for the beach party, and cranes were loaned winches where required and several lost anchors
to the small-boat pool. were replaced. Finally the vessels were docked for
necessary work on hulls, shafting, propellers, and
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4 external fittings.
This force Was remarkably free of major or Considerable damage was received by units of
emergency maintenance problems during the stag­ this force while unloading at the Hagushi beaches,
ing and phase I of the Okinawa operation. While as a result oftwo storms and friendly antiaircraft
many repairs were of urgent nature,they were ac­ fire. A number of small craft,landing craft, pon­
complished without delay and at no time did the toon barges,and causeways which had no sheltered
operational, matOriel or maintenance features in­ anchorage,dri fted from moorings onto the reef or
terrupt planned events. into other vessels during the storms of 4-5 and
The Philippines area was assigned for the use 10-11 April, when northeasterly winds reached a
of the Northern Attack Force, with an interme­ maximum velocity of 30 knots. A total of 22land­

7-66
ing boats were sunk,Kllidamaged beyond repair as a condition taxed the capacity of ComSerRon 10,
result of bad weather and other operational risks. repair facilities to the utmost. Two repair ships
Included were 10 sLCVP's and 2 LCM's sunk. were anchored in the transport loading area to
Damaged beyond repair, eight LCVP's and two provide services for them and for landing craft
LCM's were turned over to the boat pool for while three others in the logistic anchorage were
salvage. In the frequent Jap air raids over the assigned to the repair of small craft,destroyers and
transport area, several instances of our own anti­ destroyer escorts. The floating dry docks were
aircraft fire hitting friendly ships were reported,. used continuously and vessels were kept in dock
with minor to serious topside damage to. hulls, the absolute minimum time. Because of the time
booms, rigging, and boats. factors it was necessary in some cases to change
Certain spares, such as ordnance parts, sweep propellers on LSTs, LSM's and LCI's without
gear items, spares for electric generators, cargo docking them. The condition of ships and craft
winches,and similar equipment,were not available reporting from Iwo Jima could not be ascertained
in the mounting area,making it necessary to manu­ prior to their arrival; consequently assignments
facture them or procure them from various points were delayed until they had reported and been ex­
in the forward areas. amined and it was determined whether they could
Special emphasis should be placed on ships, in­ be got ready for another operation. Inevitably at
cluding merchant vessels, having all winches and the last minute some substitutions had to be made
cargo gear fully serviceable prior to proceeding to from Pacific Fleet LS'T's and LSM's recently re­
an objective. Replacement gear and spare parts, turned from operations with the Seventh Fleet.
cargo booms, should be made available
in the combat areas as early as practicable. From: Commander, Task Group 53.2 (Trans­
port Group Baker)
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
Various minor difficulties developed, most se­
Repair and salvage activities were handled _by rious of which was securing of special craft such as
CTG 51.6. The damage to landing craft resulting salvage craft, without the knowledge of control
from beaching them on the coral reef made a heavy and beach officers, who had need of these craft
load for the-repair facilities and required the em­ after they had been secured.
ployment of every means available. Docking fa­
cilities, especially, were at a premium and LSD's From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
which were the only such facilities available in the ComServRon 10,Rep.B,had a repair base well
Hagushi anchorage were employed to the utmost established at Kerama Retto by 17 May and was
for this purpose. LSM's,LCI's,Lers and land­ performing all major repair work there for the
ing boats were docked by the LSD's and on one Okinawa area. In addition to the repair ships
occasion a PCE was successfully docked by the under his operational control he was granted the
Gunston• Hull. Of necessity LSM's and LCT's use of CTF 31 repair ships that were in Kerama
were docked together. Pontoon barges were also Retto (Egeria,ARL8; Oceanus,ARB 2;and Casa
docked during the early part of the.operation but Grande,LSD 13).
the shortage of docking facilities plus the fact that
DAMAGE TO SHIPS
it was found they could be dried out on the reef
and repaired at low tide caused the abandonment From: Commander,FIFTH Fleet
of this. Repairs were hampered by a shortage of RECORD OF DAMAGE TO FIFTH FLEET
material, particularly metal plate suitable for SHIPS
patching and as previously mentioned outgoing
From 14 March through 27 May 1945
ships were stripped of their supplies, prior to de­
parture, to remedy this shortage. ANALYSIS BY CAUSE

.Many LST's, LSM's,PC's, and LCI's reported Total number of different ships sunk or damaged__ 262
to this force in a poor state of repair from previous Total number of instances of damage, including sink­
operations. To put them in satisfactory operating .ings 992

7-67
 REPAIRS, SALVAGE, MAINTENANCE

weapons was made,may properly be considered an

Sunk Major Minor Total
importantfactor in reducing navallosses and dam­
Suicide hit or near miss 19 116 65 200 age to ships of the main assault forces.
Bomb hit or near miss 9 11 20 The use of Kerama Retto as a smooth water an­
Baka bomb 1 3 4
Aerial torpedo 3 1 4 chorage for emergency repair of major battle dam­
Strafing ' 3 3 age had an important bearing upon the ability to
Suicide boat_ 4 2 6
Mine 4 1 5 restore crippled ships to further usefulness. Con­
MTB 1 1 sidering the large number of damaged destroyers
Ramming submarine 1 1
Booby trap 1 1 in the Okinawa operation which could hardly have
Shore batteries 1 2 3 6 been given emergency repairs in the open sea,it is
Grounding and beaching 9 4 13
Weather •1 1 2 not too much to believe that several of these which
Collision (includes rescue work) 7 5 12
12
would normally have been lost, will return to fight
Own AA 3 9
Ammunition explosion 2 2 other battles.
Total 26 159 107 292
RECOMMENDATIONS

From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force

From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7
For this operation, four LCI(L)'s were as­
During period covered by this report, the fol­
s'igned to the service and salvage group. These
lowing types were repaired or under repair at
vessels were fitted with welding machines. With
Kerama Retto, including operational defects as
this small amount of equipment they were able to
well as battle damage:
do a great deal of work in patching topsides of all
BB's 1 types of vessels, towing and rendering other
CA's 1
services.
CL's 1
DD's 46 It is recommended that for future operations
DM's 8" LCI(L)'s be fitted for this duty. Thefittings and
DMS's 6 supplies should include the following:
DE's 14
(a) A supply of plate and shapes to do light
APH's 1
APA's 1
structural repairs.
CM's 1 (b) Additional generators to supply electric
AM's 1 power to dead ships and to operate deck ma­
AN's 1 chinery.
AVD's 2
APD's 3
(c) Pumps to be used for pumping out ships
AO's 1 and for fighting fires.
TX's 2 (d) Welding machines with panels and leads.
LCI's 23 (e) Stern rearranged for towing.
LCS's 10
1
(f) Increased living accommodations for re­
LCT's
LSM's 17 pair personnel.
LST's 10 (g) Kingposts, booms and hatches similar to
PC's 9 an LCI(X).
PCE's 1
(It) Protection of sides with grid fenders.
PCS's 4
PGM's 2
16
From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S.LSC(L)34
SC's
7 For a short period following the initial landing
MT's 1 support this and other vessels were assigned to
Total 191 ships and craft of all types. salvage duty. It is again reiterated that this type
The fact that more than 350 suicide craft were vessel is not equipped for even the lightest salvage
seized and destroyed in Kerama Retto, before any operation incident to major landing. It is be­
effective use of these potentially dangerous lieved that during this operation the LCS(L)-
 (3)'s have proved their fullest value and their Since shipboard spares for these types were
proper assignments., found seriously depleted,provisions must be made
During extended operations of this type defi­ to have an adequate stock of spare parts at ad­
nite arrangements should be made to permit pe­ vanced bases and assembly ports and in repair
-- riodic target practice for gun crews. Spares for ships scheduled for early arrival at objective.
main and generator engines and auxiliaries are
From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
definitely a problem and effort should be made to
•2- insure availability of adequate spares. All spares Increase the number of ARS, ARB, and ARL
on board are used and then what ordinarily would proceeding to the objective in company with the
be a minor becomes a major casualty by inability amphibious forCes.
to replace. Alert a limited number of ARD's, AR's, and
AD's and allied repair facilities for movement to
From: Commander,Task Force 52 the objective area on short notice.
Materialization of the plan for establishing re­ Continue the assignment of fleet tugs to the Lo­
arming, fueling, repair and salvage facilities, a gistic Support Group.
seaplane base,and the prompt arrival of a hospital
From: Commander, LCS (L) Group 7 (CTU
ship at Kerama Retto at an early stage in the
32.19.1)
Okinawa prelanding operations, was in accord­
ance with the most sanguine expectations. For Again logistics and repairs proved to be a prob­
this accomplishment, and for the smooth and lem for small ships. It is urgently recommended
rapid functioning of these facilities, it is consid­ that certain provision and repair ships be assigned
ered that much credit is due commander,Amphib­ to take care of LCI types alone. Such an arrange­
ious Group 7, commanding general Seventy- ment would eliminate competition between smaller
seventh Division, and all group and unit com­ vessels and battleships, cruisers, and destroyers
manders operating under the command of these for priority. With this competition, small ships
officers, as well as to the UDT's and their support­ invariably come last. The present arrangement
ing elements. Insofar as possible, it is recom­ lengthens the logistics period and relatively re­
mended that these features be duplicated in de­ duces the time spent on combat duty by the smaller
tail in future campaigns. vessels.

From: Commander, Amphibious Group 7 From: Commanding Officer, LSIII Flotilla 8

(CTU 31.1.14)
Operational deficiencies occurred during the op­
eration in the LCI and small patrol types directly Because of their maneuverability and present
attributed to inadequate maintenance periods and fire-fighting equipment, LSM's have proved to be
facilities provided in preparation for this opera­ very good fire-fighting ships. It is suggested that
tion. several, merely by the addition of more equipment
In order that LCI types and patrol craft may (on the tank deck) can be converted into perma­
be placed in satisfactory material condition for the nent fire fighting and salvage vessels,always of in­
extended operating periods required during an as­ estimable advantage to any small task group as
sault operation, it is recommended that adminis­ damage control vessels, especially while faced
trative organizations be established at earliest with the present threat of suicide planes.
practicable date and that maintenance and along­ During calm seas,LSM's have proved adaptable
_ side tender schedules be put into effect. These pe­ to recovering survivors of damaged or sinking ves­
riods should be mandatory, and operating sched­ sels from the water merely by opening their bow
ules adjusted as necessary to provide them. Per­ doors and lowering the ramp. Survivors can
manency of division, group, and flotilla organiza­ thereby be taken aboard with minimum effort on
tions to permit direct control and supervision by their part and ship's company.
responsible unit commanders is considered essen­ It is believed that the ideal loads for LSM's are
tial. combat loads, or rolling stock.
 -
MEDICAL sonnel concerned': Ar a period of
nearly 3 months during which Lillie forces afloat
OWN CASUALTIES
were subjected to almost daily air attacks and
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces night heckling. The brunt wasborne by the small
ships of the screen and picket stations, particu­
Killed Wound- Missing
Unit in ed in in NBC Total larly the destroyers fitted.as fighter-director ships
action action action
and the LCS(L)'s, which because of a scarcity of
Headquarters 10th Army 0 0 0 2 2
vessels of their type were required to alternate
Headquarters Special Troops, frequently on picket station duty.
w/atch Unit 0 0 0 11 11
Headquarters 10th Army AAA 1 _ 7 52 0 129 188
. All ships and personnel responded to this test in
XXIV Corps 8 25 2 182 217 excellent fashion, but nevertheless, frequent indi­
7th Infantry Division 466 2,086 6 1,427 3,985
27th Infantry Division 593 2,367 57 1,098 4,115
cations of the strain under which the personnel
77th Infantry Division 827 3,493 39 1,846 6,205 was operating became apparent. In future opera­
96th Infantry Division 902 3,757 61 1,359 6,079
III Phib Corps 20 75 0 253 348
tions where similar enemy activity over an ex­
1st Marine Division 588 3,553 31 1,540 5,712 tended period may be anticipated, the answer ap­
6th Marine Division 524 2,220 42 2,076 4,862
TAF 18 66 18 133 235
pears to lie in sufficient vessels available for the
AGF 331 11 . 70 0 31 112 ultra-hazardous duties, so that a suitable rotation
3d Signal Battalion 0 0 0 4 4
Medical Services 0 0 0 '8 8 may be made.
Total 3,964 17,764 256 10,099 32,083 From: Commander, Cruiser Division 13(CTF
54)
1 53d AAA Brigade incorporated with 10th Army AAA w/atch units.
Personnel casualties were far higher than in any
From: Commander,FIFTH Fleet previous operation of this war. This was to be
expected as we have come to close grips with the
The operation was conducted by the most for­
enemy.
midable and largest task organization ever massed
Many of the ships engaged have been in the com­
in the Pacific and became the largest and longest
bat areas for over 6 weeks. The inauguration of
operation so far undertaken by the Fifth Fleet.
a system of rotation so that ships might be retired
The naval personnel represented by the massing
for a time to a rest area,is considered sound.
of over 1,600 ships exceeded 350,000.
The forces on Okinawa on the 27th of May From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Natoma
totalled: Army, 117,697; Navy, 21,793; Marine, Bay(CVE 62)
58,894; total of 198,384.
This operation was the longest in which. this
The ratio of Marine killed to wounded was 1 to
ship has engaged to date and the problem of fa­
5; Army,1 to 4.25; Navy,1 to 1.
tigue of personnel became, accordingly, more
The casualties occurring in the forces ashore
acute. After about 1 month of the operation had
were light during the early landing and assault
passed, fatigue of the crew became very marked.
phase of the operation. They mounted slowly but
This was evidenced by a tendency toward care­
steadily as organized enemy resistance continued
lessness and disregard of safety precautions
into the second and third months.
which, under noi-mal conditions, would be fol­
The fleet was under constant pressure from lowed almost automatically. Several minor ac­
enemy air attacks,including almost daily episodes cidents occurred which could well have been
with Kamikaze special attack groups. It will be attributed to personnel fatigue. The ship was or­
noted that the naval losses were severe; killed and dered to a rear area for engine repairs after about
missing exceeding the number wounded for prob­ a month's operation. During the 3 weeks spent
ably the first time in naval history. en route to and at the repair base the "fatigue
condition" rapidly improved and practically dis­
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force
appeared. The fatigue again became evident just
The Okinawa campaign created a new problem prior to the end of the operation and after the
as regards the morale and well-being of the per­ ship had spent about6 weeks off Okinawa.

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 ENEMY CASUALTIES sc*TeenLdue two.previous reports of air attacks
From: Commander,Amphibious Forces on hospital ships during night retirement.
On the 28th the Pinkney (NoTE.—This is an
Prisoners of war:
Military Prisoners of war 524
APH) was hit amidships by a suicide plane and
Labor troops 329 reported 22 killed in action,11 wounded in action,
and 19 missing in action. As a result of this inci­
Total 853 dent the sick bay area and facilities for casualty
Civilian internees 138,540 treatment were burned. • The senior medical officer
Enemy dead: •
Reported
died the next day of wounds received at this time.
48,015
Estiemated 5,536 During the early stages of this operation naval
casualties exceeded landing force casualties, and
Total 53,551 it became apparent that hospital facilities were ur­
[NoTE.—All figures were extracted from Tenth Army gently needed at.the objective during the night to
G-1 and G-2 reports, from 1 April to 16 May, inclusive.] care for wounded personnel from ships bombed or
Enemy casualties estimated by Commanding struck by suicide planes. Hospital ships were on
General,Tenth Army: night retirement during this period. On arrival
Enemy casualties estimated by Commanding General,
of the Crescent City and Gosper they were desig­
Tenth Army: nated as casualty ships with one stationed at
Killed in action 59,055 Kerama Retto and the other off Hagushi beaches.
Prisoners of war (military) 411 The problem of caring for survivors and injured
Prisoners of war (laborers) 610 became too heavy for these ships so an additional
Civilians interned 148,426 two APA's were anchored near each evacuation
EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES
ship to handle unwounded survivors, allowing the
Crescent City and Gosper to care for wounded.
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces The LST(H)'s functioned well as evacuation
Eight LST's were provided and equipped as control ships and also as casualty transports from
beach evacuation control vessels for this operation various distant beaches to transport area. Both
as described in ComPhibsPac secret letter, serial Army and Marines provided generous assistance
001121, dated 17 December 1944. Four were as­ with medical personnel on these ships. Although
signed to ships of the Northern Attack Force casualties were not heavy,we were better prepitred
mounting the Third Phib Corps,and four with the to render the best evacuation service yet provided
Southern Attack Force mounting the Twenty- in an amphibious operation in this theatre. Five
fourth Army Corps. Rehearsals for the former LST(H)'s were released on 25 April (Love+24)
were held at Ulithi and rehearsals for the latter and returned to the rear areas.
at Leyte.
From: Commander, Amphibious Group 4
The plan of utilization of the six hospital ships,
two APH's,and two APA's converted as casualty The LST(H)'s as evacuation control ships pro­
evacuation ships, was to keep two at the objective vide vital control and emergency care for casualties
all times to receive the most severe type cases; the during the assault phase. The group of medical
others to be evacuated to APA's. Due to the light personnel attached is inadequate to perform activi­
casualties at first nearly all casualties were evacu­ ties required. A minimum of 8 medical officers
ated by hospital ships during the first 30 days. and 27 hospital corpsmen, 6 of whom should be
Three incidents of attack by enemy planes on operating room technicians, are necessary. It is
hospital ships occurred during the operation. At recommended that one medical officer (a surgeon),
approximately 2000 28 April,the Comfort was hit and three hospital corpsmen be permanently as­
amidships by a suicide plane when 50 miles from signed to each LST(H); seven medical officers, of
the objective. Twenty-nine were killed, thirty- whom five are surgeons, and the additional corps­
three wounded,and one missing as a result of this men to be assigned temporarily for each operation.
incident. Prior to this incident the hospital ships One neurosurgeon with two trained corpsmen
had been retained at the objective under the smoke assigned tempoisarily for an operation to each
transport squadron flagship would meet an urgent LST(H)'s 949 and 950,thereby greatly increasing
need, in certain cases requiring special diagnosis the effectiveness of the latter's medical facilities
and treatment. Ships which had experience in previous opera­
One LST(H) should be equipped with reefers tions were particularly adept in casualty han­
to act as a whole blood bank for each transport dling. They were the older and larger APA's,
squadron during the assault phases. such is the Barnett (APA 5), J. T. Dickman
Each LST(H) should be provided with a port­ (APA 13), Chas. Carroll (APA 28) and Thos.
able X-ray. Jefferson(APA 30). Their physical characteris­
tics were more suitable, and an attempt was made
From: Commanding General, Headquarters, to supply them with the best available medical
III Amphibious Corps personnel.
When torrential rain made the existing roads Newer ships of the converted C-3 type,such as
impassable for ambulance transportation of pa­ the Burleigh(APA 95) and the Dade(APA 99),
tients, the First Marine Division inaugurated air are structurally unsuitable for handling large
evacuation by (OY) planes. These planes eas­ numbers of serious cases.
ily, quickly, and safely transported all types of Transports of the PA 117-235 class, which had
patients from hastily constructed air strips behind undergone the alterations proposed by ComPhibs-
the front lines to the hospitals in the rear. This TraPac and BuMed,and authorized by BuShips,
method proved so valuable-that it was augmented were well equipped for casualty handling.
by planes from other units. This method of In addition to the excellent medical. services
transportation not only boosted morale but saved rendered by the LST(H)'s 949 and•950, special
many lives. mention should be made of the care given by these
ships to small boat crews,whose duties made night
Recommendation work necessary after the transports had retired.
That provision for short distance air evacua­ It was most welcome support to the overtaxed fa­
tion of casualties be made in future operations. cilities of the LSD's.
That 12 to 16 (OY) planes with personnel and
repair facilities, or some comparable aircraft, be From: Commander, Amphibious Group 12
made available to corps for use as air ambulances. Casualties were evacuated from Okinawa by
It is suggested that a study be made to determine both sea and air. Information is not available as
the practicability of employing helicopters for to the number who went by each means but it is
casualty evacuation direct from front line medi­ estimated that the ratio of those evacuated by sea
cal companies to corps medical battalion or evacua­ to those evacuated by air was about 2 to 1. Evac­
tion hospitals. If helicopters are found practical uation by air was not a responsibility of this com­
they could be employed where terrain difficulties mand and will not be mentioned further in this
might render the construction of small(OY)land­ report.
ing strips difficult or inadvisable. Plans for casualty evacuation•provided for the
employment of LST(H)'s as examination and dis­
From: Commander, Task Group 52.3 (Trans­ tribution points. Pontoon barges(3 by 7) moored
port Group Baker) alongside the LST(H)'s were used as working
Preparations for handling platforms to avoid the necessity for transferring
patients aboard the LST's unless treatment was
All ships of TransRon 18 were thoroughly required. Normally casualties were delivered to
schooled in handling casualties in the manner pre­ the LST's by either DUKW's or LCVP's. At the
scribed by the Transport Doctrine. LST's they were examined, treated if necessary,
An opthaimologist and a psychiatrist were and further transferred to an APA or hospital
aboard the squadron flagship. In addition, Com- ship designated atthat point. This command kept
ThirdPhibCorps made available the services of the LST's advised of the number of vacant beds
nine additional specialists from the corps hospital available on various ships assigned for casualty
personnel. Eight of these were assigned to the evacuation. Four LST(H)'s were employed in

7-72
 the assault on the Hagushi beaches two under, The use of PCE(R)'s in rescue work should be
command of CTF 53 off the northern beaches and continued and an increased number be available
two under commtnid of CTF 55 off the southern for adequate reliefs.
beaches. After the assault phase two of these were The maintenance of Navy casualty receiving
withdrawn,one each from the northern and south­ ships and survivor ships at target area should be
ern beaches. One of the two withdrawn was as­ continued and the survivor ship should be manned
signed to the operation for the capture of Ie by a staff experienced in handling personnel
Shima,the other was kept in a standby status as problems.
a spare and to transport the wounded personnel The use of the casualty ship for the berthing of
from Kerama Retto and/or Nago Wan to the Ha­ transients should be discontinued and be delegated
gushi anchorage for further transfer to hospital to the survivor ship.
ships and APA's. As beaches were further consol­
idated, the LST(H) off the northern beaches was From: Commander,FIFTH Fleet
withdrawn and all shore-to-ship evacuation was Seven hospital ships were utilized to transport
handled through LST(H) 929 off the southern wounded from the target to rear area hospitals:
beaches. This vessel and the medical personnel Number of casualties evacuated by hospital ships_ 11,731
attached thereto did an outstanding job. Number of casualties evacuated by surface vessels
About L+50 roads in southern Okinawa became other than hospital ships (APA, APH, BB)____ 1,405
Number of casualties evacuated by air (NATS,
impassable for vehicles due to,heavy rains and it ATC) 11,771
was extremely difficult to transport casualtiesfrom
the front lines to the Hagushi beaches. In order Total 24,907
to ease this situation LST(H)'s were sent closer to Number of hospital beds available in Marianas:
the front lines. LST(H) 929 was sent to Naka­
Guam 11,850
ffusuku Wan where she anchored in the southern Saipan 10,500
part of the Wan and operated under the control of Tinian 2,500
CTG 51.19. LST(H) 952 was shifted from her
anchorage immediately off the Hagushi beaches to Total 24,850
a point just north of Naha and patients were trans­ Number of casualties evacuated to Pearl Harbor
ferred from ship to LST by DUICW's. They were and the continental United States:
received and treated on board the LST and prior Surface transportation 9,599
to darkness each day the LST returned to the Air transportation 6,570
Hagushi anchorage and transferred its accumu­
lated patients, resuming station at daylight the Total 9,162
next day. This was necessary because it was im­ From: Conzmanding General, FIRST Marine
practical to protectLST(H)'s adequately from air Division
attack at night if outside the anchorage. LCM's
Each combat team was assigned litter bearers
were provided to transfer patients before the
for each rifle company to evacuate casualties from
• LST(H) returned to the anchorage if there was
the front lines to aid stations. These litter bearers
danger of her being overloaded.
were trained in first aid and the evacuation of
From: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force casualties.
Since LST(H)'s may be called upon to do more SANITATION
operative and definitive work and to retain casual­ From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine
ties for longer periods,it is recommended that they Division
be supplied by naval medical depots with addi­ Three sanitary squads were trained to operate
tional supplies and equipment to function as hos­ with each combat team to spray DDT on all bodies
pital evacuation ships. and assist in mosquito and fly control. On previ­
LST(H)'s medical personnel should be aug­ ous operations these squads had proven invaluable.
mented 30 days prior to an operation by 4 more Their work was to be later supplemented by the
medical officers and 13 hospital corpsmen. malaria control unit. Prefabricated seats were

7-73 11111111111111m
 -bit* • v.•
A •.
•.
prepared and issued to all units for use on em 4- 4epqkv.4.i.. ..#estWitiO:n:.:pf snails which in­
50 gallon drums as latrines. Each drum wag-fo iii,bletleL'a!:iiifeirefieeiitt4d:gamples
7 of water all
be buried to about three-fourths of its height and over the island,the epidemiological unit has failed
the seats close fitting to avoid entrance and egress to find any types of snails bearing cercaria or flukes
of flies. It was believed that these fixtures would of any type or leeches. Malaria vectors have been
keep all the usual gastro-intestinal diseases at a found, and it is most interesting to note that fil­
minimum. These drums also were to have 5 gal­ ariasis has been found in the blood of between 20
lons-of DDT in oil added to them before use. to 35 percent of all natives—Men,women,and chil­
All units were fully instructed in the value of dren—who have been examined. Therefore, it
sanitation while in combat. would seem that filariasis.was reasonably preva­
Each infantry battalion had 40 hospital corps­ lent in this area.... Because of this fact, mosquito
men assigned, permitting the use of 2 corpsmen to control has been stepped up, and carefully super­
each platoon. vised. Leprosy is • not uncommon,. there being a
All medical personnel were brought up to au­ large leper colony on an island adjacent to Oki­
thorized strength. nawa. Medical intelligency preliminary to the in­
vasion stressed the presence of two varieties of
From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine poisonous snakes, and stated that they were very
Division prevalent on this island.. On the contrary, there _
The malaria and epidemiological unit func­ have been but two cases of snake bites reported in
tioned in an outstanding manner. The entire the entire division, both of which made an un­
Sixth Marine Division area wasinfested with fleas. eventful recovery. Natives on interrogation say
There were many malaria bearing mosquitoes pres­ that snake bite is not common. Apparently these
ent,stagnant water,open heads,decaying food,all snakes live in holes in the ground and under rocks,
of which presented a difficult problem. The con­ and are seldom seen unless disturbed by blasting or
trol program consisted of spraying the entire area excavating. Two of the Habu variety have been
and the dwellings and quarters with DDT, both killed, but both were small and the fangs were
from the air and by the use of details equipped with rudimentary. . A substantial amount of Japanese
pack sprayers. DDT powder in the possession of antivenom has been ,captured and the local Jap,­
each officer and man was used lavishly on clothing anese physicians have been cooperative in telling
and bedding. Impregnation of clothing was done our medical officers the technique of its adminis­
under the supervision of medical officers in the tration. In the two cases in which itwas used,
staging area,using dimethylphthalate. Rice pad­ it was apparently • effective. SaMples :of this
dies were drained,all mess halls were screened, all serum have been :sent_ to the Bureau of Medicine
open heads used by the natives were covered, and and Surgery.:for study and analysis.
atabrine discipline was carefully supervised.
The Medical Department had landed prepared From: Commander,- Amphibious Forces
to experience some trouble from scrub typhus. In­ Spraying of.beachhead with.DDT from carrier
terrogation of several Japanese physicians who based planes was a done early in the operation.
had lived on the island all their lives elicited the , After Love+10 land based bombers continued
information that this disease was unheard of. the operation.
This information was taken with reservation, but NO communicable or infectious diseases occurred
in the approximately 40 days of the occupation of in epidemic proportions among the Landing Force
the central and northern parts of the island,it is a or forces afloat during the period of this report.
matter of record that there have been no cases of All cases of malaria were recurrent in type. No
scrub typhus encountered, and that the informa­ Schistosomiasis or unusual diseases were reported.
tion of the Japanese was undoubtedly correct.
With this knowledge, a Tenth Army order has From: Commander, FIFTH Fleet
rescinded further impregnation of clothing. Pre­ Okinawa presents many medical problems of
liminary medical intelligence also placed emphasis military importance and interest,for here may be
against bathing in all streams because of flukes. found practically every disease known to Japan.

• . 744 ;I
I
 The natives harbor insect-borne diseases—ma- ,will be properly prepared to carry out their
Iania, dengue, and filariasis. duties.

MISCELLANEOUS From: Commanding General, III Amphibious

Corps
From: Commander, Amphibious Forces
The Okinawa operation resulted in a substan­
The plan to provide whole blood on a basis of tial number of naval personnel being killed aboard
one box per transport at the staging area was un­ ship. Considerable difficulty was experienced in
successful at Leyte due to weather conditions pro­ fully identifying such personnel and their organi­
hibiting delivery by air. However, a small zation upon receipt of the bodies at the beach.
amount of blood was obtained from the Army in The responsibility for burial of such personnel
this area, which proved more than adequate for also was not definitely fixed. The disposition of
the number of casualties received. Groups stag­ bodies from ships in the area should be the re­
ing from Ulithi and Saipan were adequately sup­ sp9nsibility of the island command and should
plied with whole blood prior to departure. Large not be added to the usually over-extended activi­
quantities of blood were brought in on hospital ties of combat units.
ships on Love—5 and Love+1.
Recommendation
Recommendations
In order to remedy such misunderstandings in
(a) Establishing a pool of medical personnel future operations,a naval officer and,at least three
at the target to provide adequate replacement for enlisted naval personnel (including one pharma­
personnel lost in action to augment evacuation and cist's mate) should be attached to island command
screening ships is vital. as a naval graves registration section to handle
(b) Establishing a receiving ship to handle sur­ the reception of all deceased personnel received
vivors at the objective where combat conditions from ships in the area, the interment of such
warrant is a necessity. This ship should be pro­ bodies in the island command cemetery, where
vided with a staff experienced in handling person­ practicable, and the proper preparation of neces­
nel problems. sary administrative reports.
(c) Flake ice machines .for Operation at the That no attempt be made to land G-6 hospitals
objective should be fully equipped for operation in and "C" camp teams with the assault units but
the field. that more G-10 dispensaries be landed in lieu
(d) A reserve supply of blankets, paper or oth­ thereof and that such dispensaries be augmented
erwise, should be available at the objective for in personnel, equipment and medical supplies.
proper care of troops, survivors, and wounded.
From: Commanding General, FIRST Marine
Prom: Commander,FIFTH Amphibious Force Division
A pool of medical personnel at target area, It is believed that hospital corpsmen should re­
should be established to provide adequate replace­ ceive more training in basic first aid and related
ments for personnel lost in action and for the aug­ subjects during their period of training at the field
mentation of ships.needing additional help. medical schools. Experience has shown that most
If radar picket stations are to be maintained in men are well versed in military tactics and lack
future operations, an increased number of these sufficient training in basic subjects required of the
vessels should be available so that frequent duty hospital corpsman.
changes can be made. The period of time on This operation has proven the need for an ade­
picket duty should be shorter than it was in this quate pool of trained hospital corps replacements.
operation, thereby decreasing the length of anx­ This division suffered 478 casualties' among the
iety and mental tension. hospital corps personnel, of which 49 were killed
All hospital ships and APA's involved in an in action, 226 wounded in action, 17 injured, and
operation should be issued the medical plan so 186 sick. Dispatches were sent asking.for replace­
that reports in conformity with that plan can be ments to be sent via air. On the 5th of June, 10
submitted without delay and so that these ships were received and a like number on June 7 and 8
 MEDICAL
CI,
were also received. On the 16th and 17th of June, frigerated),
frigerated),battle dressings,drugs,and other field
after the acute need was over, 67 replacements items were available as needled. As a result,there
were received. This method did not prove satis­ was no failure of medical supply at any time. It
factory as none of the lower rated men had been might be noted at this point that the automatic
into any combat area and had hardly any idea of exchange of a "litter for a litter and a blanket for
what to expect. It is believed that the only solu­ a blanket" was a highly sensitive problem, partic­
tion to this situ4tion is to order a minimum of 100 ularly when evacuation from shore to ship oc­
extra hospital corpsmen to each Marine division curred by means of LCM's,DUKW's,and amphib­
at least 2 months prior to mounting out for an op­ ian tractors with personnel not attached to the
eration. If this were done, the men could be medical units organic to the division. Unless a
trained under and with experienced personnel and careful check was made, the inevitable result of
they would gradually lose the feeling of insecurity this phase of evacuation was the accumulation of
usually encountered in inexperienced personnel. litters and blankets aboard LST(I-I)s and hos­
After these men have been trained with the line pital ships.
regiments they could be transferred to the medi­ At Nago the division assigned the Sixth Medical
cal battalion and be immediately available as com­ Battalion the area formerly occupied by a Jap.­
bat replacements. After the operation they could anese. doctor who maintained a private hospital.
be retained to relieve the personnel due for rota­ The electricians of the Sixth Medical Battalion
tion. very skillfully converted the captured Japanese
From: Commanding General, SIXTH Marine equipment, which included infra-red and ultra­
Division violetlights and operating room lights and heating
A medical dump was maintained well forward, units to good use. The performance.of the hospi­
at which point blankets, plasma, whole blood (re­ tal corpsmen of this division was commendable.

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