REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y.

2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Geriel

SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES AND ERLINDA SIBUG vs.

SPOUSES ALFONSO AND LOURDES SUBA
G.R. No. 137792 | August 12, 2003 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Doctrine:

…as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only exemption is when the mortgagee
is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned,
no right of redemption exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their
right, as mortgagor, to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale.

Facts:

On June 13, 1997, the RTC Manila rendered a decision declaring that the deed of sale between
Spouses Rosales and Felicisimo Macaspac is an equitable mortgage. It also ordered Spouses
Rosales to pay Macaspac the sum of P65,000.00 with interest, within 90 days from the finality of
the decision. The decision further provided that the property subject of the equitable mortgage
shall be sold in case of non-compliance.

The decision became final and executory. Spouses Rosales failed to pay the P65,000.00. Thus,
Macaspac filed a motion for execution.

An auction sale of the property was held wherein Spouses Suba were the highest bidders (at
P285,000.00). The RTC subsequently confirmed the sale. The Register of Deeds of Manila issued
a new TCT in the names of Spouses Suba.

Spouses Suba filed a motion for a writ of possession contending that the confirmation of the
sale effectively cut off Spouses Rosales' equity of redemption. Meanwhile Spouses Rosales filed
an M/R of the confirmation of the sale.

The RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, and denied the M/R. It ruled
that Spouses Rosales have no right to redeem the property since the case is for judicial
foreclosure.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, holding that there is no right of redemption
in case of judicial foreclosure.

Issue: Whether or not Spouses Rosales have the right to redeem their property

Ruling: NEGATIVE

The decision of the trial court, which is final and executory, declared the transaction between Spouses
Rosales and Macaspac an equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage is not different from a real estate
mortgage, and the lien created thereby ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance with the
formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate mortgage.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Since the parties' transaction is an equitable mortgage and that the trial court ordered its foreclosure,
execution of judgment is governed by Rule 68

Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only
exemption is when the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or a banking institution. Since the
mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned, no right of redemption exists in favor of Spouses Rosales.
They merely have an equity of redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their right, as mortgagor, to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the
confirmation of the foreclosure sale. However, instead of exercising this equity of redemption, Spouses
Rosales chose to delay the proceedings by filing several manifestations with the trial court. Thus, they only have
themselves to blame for the consequent loss of their property
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

GUILLERMA S. SILVA VS. CONCHITA S. LO

G.R. No. 206667, 23 June 2021, THIRD DIVISION, (HERNANDO, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition: first, the trial court, after determining
that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court
promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach
an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.

In this case, the Court ruled that the RTC Orders of February 9 and August 27, 2010 pertain to the requirement in
Section 2, Rule 69 for the recording of the partition agreed upon by all the parties and the order of the court confirming
the deed of partition in the registry of deeds of the place where the property is situated. However, contrary to the rule laid
down in the said Rule, respondent circumvented the procedure to question the partition of the subject property via a record
on appeal by treating the said Orders as interlocutory orders which could not be the subject of an appeal. Thus, as the
February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders are not interlocutory, respondent filed an incorrect remedy to assail several
final orders of the RTC.

FACTS
On May 20, 1975, Carlos, Jr. died intestate leaving behind a sizeable estate to his compulsory heirs: the
surviving spouse, Concepcion and their children, Ma. Enrica, Carlos III, petitioner Guillerma, Lily, Pamela,
respondent Conchita, and Teodoro. In 1976, the heirs of Carlos Jr. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate which provided that all properties of the decedent shall be owned in common, pro indiviso, by his heirs.
While in 1988, Carlos, Jr.'s heirs executed a Memorandum of Agreement for the physical division of the estate.
However, both agreements were never implemented, and the heirs remained pro indiviso co-owners of the
estate's properties.
Enrica, one of the heirs, filed an action for partition in August 1989 docketed as Civil Case No. Q- 89-
3137 before the RTC impleading all the other heirs, her mother, and siblings as defendants. Eventually, Teodoro
withdrew as defendant and joined suit as plaintiff-in- intervention. Opposing the physical division of the
properties, defendants therein primarily asserted Concepcion’s usufructuary rights over the estate’s real
properties. They further alleged a diminished value and use of the properties should these be physically divided.
Given the unanimity of their defense against the complaint, Conchita and two other heirs residing abroad, Lily
and Pamela, executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of their mother Concepcion and their sister,
Guillerma, respectively.
The RTC issued numerous orders reflecting the negotiations during court hearings for the distribution
and partition of the estate among the heirs. The trial court encouraged the heirs to arrive at a mutually acceptable
partition and distribution of the estate's properties. The heirs agreed on the manner of division of each property,
via raffle conducted by the trial court. The heirs drew lots for an aliquot of each property of the estate, with
Concepcion drawing first. While the heirs who failed to attend the hearing and the scheduled raffle, their
respective counsels or their appointed attorney-in-fact, either Concepcion or Guillerma, in the case of Conchita,
Lily and Pamela, drew the lot on their behalf. For three years, under the supervision of the RTC, the heirs
negotiated the terms of the estate's partition to be embodied in a compromise agreement. After the plaintiffs,
Enrica and Teodoro, signed the final draft of the compromise agreement, the defendants, Concepcion and the
rest of her children, delayed signing thereof.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

On January 11, 2000, the RTC issued an Order of Partition rendering the partition of the intestate
estate of the late Carlos Sandico, Jr. pursuant to the final Compromuse Agreement. By the 26th of the same
month, Conchita executed a Revocation of the SPA. Conchita filed a copy of the Revocation with the RTC but
failed to furnish her agent, Concepcion, a copy thereof. The latest SPA dated June 8, 1999 issued by Conchita
in favor of Concepcion.
Despite the January 11, 2000 Order of Partition of the RTC, various properties of the estate remained
undivided and were not distributed among the heirs. Thus, Enrica filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners
to Make Partition. On September 10, 2003, Atty. Tuason, counsel for the defendants, filed a Manifestation
opposing the appointment of commissioners on the ground that the agricultural land tenants have already
agreed to the subdivision of the agricultural lands.
The RTC granted the Motion to Appoint Commissioners. Yet again, the appointment of
commissioners did not happen as plaintiffs appeared to have acquiesced to the defendants' proposed
subdivision of the agricultural lands, including the herein subject property.
Sometime in 2006, Concepcion, representing herself and the other defendants-heirs, executed a second
agreement with the tenants of the subject property designated as "Kasunduan sa Pagwawakas/Pagtatapos ng
Relasyon bilang May-ari ng Lupa at mga Ortilano/Kasama ng Lupa" (2006 Kasunduan). Thereafter, the
defendants filed a Motion for Approval of New Agreement and New Subdivision Plan of certain agricultural
properties, including the subject property, which motion the plaintiffs no longer opposed.
The RTC granted defendant’s motions: it approved the New Agreement and Subdivision Plan and
ordered the plaintiffs Enrica and Teodoro to sign the document. In 2009, to execute the RTC's Order and
facilitate the issuance of new titles over the subject property, Concepcion filed a Motion to Order Register of
Deeds to Enter New Titles. On November 6, 2009, through a different counsel, Conchita opposed
Concepcion's Motion on the ground that the 2006 Kasunduan is void. The RTC granted Concepcion’s motion
and ordered the Register of deeds of Pampanga to enter new titles in the names of the tenants and the heirs of
Carlos, Jr., ruling that the 2007 Order approving the subdivision of the subject property and its distribution via
raffle had already become final and executory after the affected parties did not file the appropriate remedy.
Conchita filed a petition for Certiorari under Rules 65 before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
RTC’s Orders in February 9 and August 27, 2010.
The CA annulled and set aside the Orders of the RTC. The appellate court invalidated the 2006
Kasunduan because it lacked the signature of all the heirs: Enrica's, Teodoro's and Conchita's who now
repudiates her mother's, Concepcion's, signature on her behalf. It ruled that the 2006 Kasunduan did not
conform with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court on Partition. The motion for
reconsideration by Guillerma was likewise denied by the CA. Hene, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court impugning the grave error in the ruling of the said appellate court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by Conchita is the proper remedy to assail the February 9 and
August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC. (NO)

2. Whether the tenants of the subject property should have been impleaded as indispensable parties to
Conchita's petition for certiorari. (YES)

RULING:
1. NO. The CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari which failed to implead
indispensable parties and is an improper remedy to question the assailed orders of the RTC.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

The (1) April 13, 2007, (2) February 9, 2010, and (3) August 27, 2010 Orders of the RTC are final orders
decreeing partition. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 69 in connection with Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, a final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby
considering that it is a matter declared by the Rules to be appealable.
In our jurisdiction, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition: first,
the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order
for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision
of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed
commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be. In delineating the two phases of a judicial
partition, the Court explained that:

(a) The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether
or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with either a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth
exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order such that the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon.
(b) The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal
with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an
order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
In this case, while the property to be partitioned is the entirety of Carlos, Jr.'s estate, only one of the properties
thereof, the subject property, is the subject matter of the controversy. The CA overlooked the fact that the first
stage of the partition has long been terminated by the RTC. In fact, the status of the parties as the compulsory
heirs of Carlos, Jr. was immediately stipulated among them. As early as January 11, 2000, the trial court had
already issued an Order of Partition of the Estate among the heirs pursuant to a compromise agreement.
Notably, none of the parties appeared to have appealed this final order of partition nor were any of the partition
agreements executed by the parties.
Since Carlos, Jr.'s estate is sizeable, consisting in numerous properties, each property may be the subject of
separate agreements for its partition. The parties may also agree to a project of partition which covers the entire
estate of the decedent. These various partition agreements must all be approved by court order which are
considered final orders decreeing partition appealable by an aggrieved party under the second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 69.
The Court ruled that the RTC Orders of February 9 and August 27, 2010 pertain to the requirement in Section
2, Rule 69 for the recording of the partition agreed upon by all the parties and the order of the court confirming
the deed of partition in the registry of deeds of the place where the property is situated. It is therefore plainly
apparent that respondent sought to obliquely assail a final order of partition of the trial court when she
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

questioned the RTC's subsequent final orders of partition, i.e., the February 9 and August 27, 2010 Orders, in
a petition for certiorari before the CA.

However, contrary to the rule laid down in Section 2 of Rule 69, respondent circumvented the procedure to
question the partition of the subject property via a record on appeal by treating the February 9 and August 27,
2010 Orders as interlocutory orders which could not be the subject of an appeal. As the February 9 and August
27, 2010 Orders are not interlocutory, respondent filed an incorrect remedy to assail several final orders of the
RTC.
2. YES, respondent should have impleaded the new title holders, the tenants, as indispensable or
necessary parties to the petition for certiorari before the CA.
The tenants are not strangers or third parties to the subject property. Prior to being transferees of half of the
subject property, they were the agricultural tenants thereof. However, the subject property is private agricultural
compulsorily covered for distribution to qualified beneficiaries such as the tenants under the CARL. Hence,
the heirs entered a voluntary transfer arrangement, offering to sell half of the subject property pursuant to the
CARL. Notably, the parties have known, consented and acquiesced to the voluntary sale of the subject property
as contained in the 1999 Kasunduan executed prior to the 2006 Kasunduan and the respondent's revocation of
the agency relationship with her mother, Concepcion, in 2000.
Concededly, the tenants are not heirs and are thus strangers to the estate of the decedent, the subject matter of
the action for partition. However, in relation to the subject property, as tenants who are qualified beneficiaries
thereof under the CARL and to whom new titles had been issued, they are palpably real parties-in-interest.
While the validity of the partition of the subject property and consequent distribution thereof can still be
determined in CA-G.R. SP No. 116979, a complete relief for those already parties or the complete
determination of the claim could not be had since the tenants were not impleaded. In short, the tenants are not
indispensable parties but, at the least, are necessary parties in the determination of the partition of the subject
property.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dorado, Bianca L.

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA v. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, ELENA

FIGURACION-ANCHETA, HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL,
QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ
G.R. No. 154322, 22 August 2006, SECOND DIVISION, (Corona, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69
provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits)
in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the
decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate.

While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her father's final illness
and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

FACTS
Sps. Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion had six children who are the parties in this case.
Leandro executed a quitclaim in favor of his six children.
Leandro Figuracion, husband of respondent Carolina Figuracion, had two parcels of his land inherited
from his parents. He later on sold a portion of this to Lazaro Adviento. As such, the two parcels were in the
name of Lazaro and Leandro.
The subject property in this case is Lot 707 which belonged to Eulalio Adviento. This lot was inherited
by his daughters in his two marriages, Agripina (first wife) and respondent Carolina (second wife). Agripina
executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner Emilia over ½ eastern portion of the land. Unknown to her, Carolina
sought the adjudication of the entire Lot 707 to her name, and sold the same to Felipa and Hilaria to which the
latter had acquired a new TCT issued to their name as owners.
Emilia and her family went to USA for 10 years, and upon return, built a house made of strong materials
and had been paying tax ever since.
Later on, Emilia filed a complaint for partition and annulment of the self-adjudication made by
Carolina as well as the nullification of sale to Felipa and Hilaria. Respondents countered that the partition
cannot be had unless there is settlement proceedings first.
RTC nullified the self-adjudication of Carolina and declared that the lots to which Lot 707 belonged
are part of Leandro’s estate. However, RTC denied the partition on the ground that there must be settlement
of the estate of Leadro first. CA reversed the nullification of self-adjudication, but affirmed the denial of
partition.,

ISSUE: Is there a need for a settlement of estate before partition can be had?
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

RULING: NO. Nothing in the Rules of Court require such condition before partition. However, in this case,
it falls under the exception where settlement must first be done before partition because there are expenses to
which the estate of the deceased is answerable.

There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and
through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedent’s estate. While
Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits)
in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property
belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar
expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate.

While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro
Figuracion's only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those
related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their father's estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses
cannot be done in an action for partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the
estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may
take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on
the payment of the estate's obligations.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Factor, Mikkah

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate

v. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ
G.R. No. 152195, 31 January 2005, SECOND DIVISION, (Callejo, Sr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property
shall be joined as defendants.

Here, when Atty. Pelaez filed his complaint for partition of the subject parcels of land, his father, Rodolfo, was still alive.
Atty. Pelaez failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, the heirs of Santiago, and the City of Danao which
purchased the property from Pedro and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property. It is precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed.

FACTS
Atty. Pacifico Pelaez (Atty. Pelaez) filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr.
(Pedro), seeking, among others, the recovery of the ownership and possession of 11 parcels of land and the
partition thereof.

The disputed parcels of land were among the 25 parcels of land that Atty. Pelaez’s mother, Dulce
Sepulveda (Dulce), inherited from her grandmother. Santiago Sepulveda (Santiago)—Pedro’s brother and
Dulce’s uncle—was a co-owner of some of the 25 parcels of land. Santiago later died intestate. Meanwhile, one
of the 25 parcels of land was the subject of a sale between Pedro and the City of Danao, in which the purchase
price of the property was allegedly not yet paid.

Dulce died intestate in 1944. Atty. Pelaez filed the subject complaint in 1972. It appeared, however,
that when Atty. Pelaez filed his complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez (Rodolfo), was still alive.

The trial court ruled in favor of Atty. Pelaez and held that the partition of the disputed properties was
in order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Pelaez’s complaint should have been dismissed

RULING
YES. Atty. Pelaez failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint. When
Dulce died intestate in 1944, she was survived by her husband, Rodolfo, and their son, Atty. Pelaez. Under
Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Rodolfo, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment.

Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested
in the property shall be joined as defendants.

Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and
persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will
not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

In the present action, Atty. Pelaez failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his
father, Rodolfo; the heirs of Santiago; and the City of Danao which purchased the property from Pedro
and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property.

Rodolfo is an indispensable party, he being entitled to a share in usufruct equal to the share of Atty.
Pelaez in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo had waived his right to usufruct.

Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be
dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence
of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Macasero, Sharmaine Eliza

BETTY B. LACBAYAN v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.

G.R. No. 165427, 21 March 2011, THIRD DIVISION, (VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership
in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners.

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if
the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

FACTS
Petitioner and respondent maintained a relationship to which petitioner Lacbayan gave birth to their
son despite respondent Samoy being legally married.

During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with 3 more incorporators,
established a manpower services company. In addition, 5 parcels of land were also acquired during said period
and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife.

When their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways, both parties agreed to divide the
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent
Samoy agreed to petitioner’s proposal that 2 of the properties shall be assigned to petitioner, white the
ownership of the remaining 3 properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused, resulting to petitioner filing a
Complaint for Judicial Partition before the RTC in Quezon City.

Petitioner averred that she and respondent worked together as business partners and acquired real
properties amounting to P15,500,000. She likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties
from the income of the company which she and respondent established. Respondent denied petitioner’s claim
and claimed that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from
petitioner. He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude
the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of
the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA
asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the
trial court's decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law
and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an
action for partition. However, the appellate court denied the appeal.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

ISSUE
Whether or not an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership

RULING
NO. In the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, the Supreme Court explained that the determination
as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:

The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co- ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received
by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. . . .
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties
by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage
may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of
the real estate in question. . . .

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso
of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely
and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly,
the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby
declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against
him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees in respondent's favor is DELETED.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Negrete, Charlene Mae

ANGELINA DAYRIT, represented by JULIE E. DAYRIT v. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS et al.

G.R. No. 201631, 7 December 2021, EN BANC, (Hernando, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be
read and understood to provide that first-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as
long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment
cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in
accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and
not the character of the subject land.

FACTS
Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Bolisong, El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental. In 1993, the parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP. Hence, Angelina's titles to
the parcels of land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to Certificate of Land Ownership Awards) were
issued in favor of respondents. Angelina filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB
Misamis Oriental Provincial Office. She also applied for exemption from CARP coverage with the DAR.

While the appeal of the petition for annulment was pending in the DARAB Manila Office, Angelina
claimed that the respondents surreptitiously entered the property and refused to vacate despite repeated
demands. This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for forcible entry against the respondents before
the MCTC.

Respondents acknowledged that Angelina was the previous owner of the parcels of land. However,
they alleged that Angelina lost her ownership over the properties when these were awarded to respondents as
CARP beneficiaries. It follows that Angelina lost her right of possession. Respondents also argued that they
remain owners of the parcels of land despite Angelina's pending petition for annulment of the CLOAs. Hence,
Angelina cannot claim forcible entry as she already lost her right of possession.

The MCTC ruled in favor of Angelina. Evidence showed that Angelina was in prior possession of the
parcels of land. The MCTC held that respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands by
entering the property; they should have filed an appropriate action to enforce their ownership pursuant to the
CLOAs. Aggrieved, respondents appealed the case to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the MCTC Decision in its
entirety.

With respondents still aggrieved, they further elevated the case to the CA. The CA reversed and set
aside the rulings of the MCTC and the RTC and dismissed the complaint. The CA ruled that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the CARP.
In the instant case, petitioner's parcels of land in dispute were included in the CARP. Portions were awarded
to respondents pursuant to the CLOAs that resulted to the issuance of new titles. As beneficiaries, respondents
occupied the parcels of land, which was considered by Angelina as unlawful entry, resulting in the filing of the
instant case to recover possession. The CA therefore found that the issue of possession in this instant case is
linked to an agrarian dispute. Respondents entered the properties by virtue of the CLOAs issued to them. The
MCTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, or at least have heard the parties to
determine if it has jurisdiction. Angelina moved for reconsideration but was subsequently denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible entry.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

RULING
NO. The Court ruled that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the instant action for forcible entry.

In contention here is the conflict of jurisdiction between the MCTC and the DARAB. Angelina
maintained that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the instant complaint for forcible entry, while respondents
maintained that the DARAB has jurisdiction as the action is considered as an agrarian dispute stemming from
the enforcement of the CLOAs issued to them.

Section 33 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, provides for the exclusive original
jurisdiction of first-level courts over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In actions for forcible entry,
the party is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth.71 The inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. Plaintiff's proof of prior physical
possession of the usurped property is essential for the action to prosper. On the other hand, Section 50 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), as amended, provides for the quasi-judicial powers of
the DAR. DAR exercises this adjudicatory power through the DARAB.

As can be gleaned from these laws, the MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry, while the DARAB has primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute refers to any
controversy relating to, as related to the instant case, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture and transfer of
ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. The amended
CARL adds that the judge or prosecutor shall automatically refer the case to the DAR if there is an allegation
from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature, and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker or
tenant.

The case of David v. Cordova (David) should not be understood that jurisdiction on ejectment cases
of whatever nature falls on first-level courts; it should be read and understood to provide that first-level courts
have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character as long as the case is not an agrarian
dispute. The public character of the land does not divest the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
However, if the ejectment case is found to be an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of
jurisdiction in accordance with the CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the
dispute (i.e., agrarian or not) and not the character of the subject land.

Then there is the more recent case of Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon (Chailese), which
clarifies the jurisdiction of the DARAB over agrarian disputes:

Hence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is applicable in this controversy, the Court now
proceeds with the examination of such amendment. Based on the said provision, the judge or prosecutor is
obligated to automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR when the following requisites are
present:
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.

Based on the foregoing, David and Chailese can be viewed as guides for the courts in tackling ejectment
and possessory actions allegedly involving agrarian disputes. David instructs that not all ejectment cases are
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

cognizable by the first-level courts - those involving agrarian disputes are not cognizable by the first-level courts.
In this relation, Chailese clarifies the requisites for an agrarian dispute, and highlights the mandate of the
amendatory law of automatic referral of cases involving agrarian disputes to the DAR.

From this, the Court ruled that the MCTC has no jurisdiction on the instant complaint for forcible
entry. This case meets the two requirements for automatic referral, as set out by RA 9700 and as summarized
in Chailese. Thus, the Court found that the case is cognizable by the DAR through the DARAB.

The first requirement is the presence of an allegation from any one or both of the parties that the case
is agrarian in nature. Here, despite the filing of the forcible entry case, respondents have been consistent on
alleging that the controversy is agrarian in nature. In their answer filed before the MCTC, they alleged that the
land in dispute were awarded to them as CARP beneficiaries. The RTC, on appeal, also touched upon matters
of allegations of agrarian dispute in relation with jurisdiction of the courts. The CA also did the same and in
fact dismissed the complaint after finding that the issue of possession was linked to an agrarian dispute brought
by the issuance of CLOAs to respondents. In their comment filed before this Court, respondents maintain that
the case is an agrarian dispute. As stated by RA 9700, mere allegation of the existence of an agrarian dispute is
enough. In this case, this requirement was met when respondents made consistent allegations of the existence
of an agrarian dispute pursuant to the CLOAs issued to them.

As to the second requirement, Chailese adds that proof must be adduced as to the person's status as
farmer, farmworker, or tenant. In this case, it is undisputed that respondents are farmers of the subject lands.
Indeed, the records did not expressly show any agreement of whatever kind that respondents were farmers of
Angelina's lands. However, the CA and the DAR Secretary (in the exemption from CARP case) here recognized
the status of respondents as farmers. This was not disputed by Angelina. Further, their status as farmers was
cemented by the subsequent award of Angelina's lands to them by virtue of CLOAs. This is also shown by the
cases Angelina initiated regarding the annulment of CLOAs, exemption from CARP coverage, and this forcible
entry case. Thus, the second requirement is met.

The Court, therefore, agreed with the CA in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
DAR, through the DARAB, has jurisdiction over the instant case for forcible entry for being an agrarian dispute.
 Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199 | March 22, 2017 | Jardeleza, J.

Doctrine of the Case

An action for unlawful detainer pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession.
It refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained
possession lawfully. This possession only became unlawful due to the expiration of the
right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.

Here, CAMSUR established the jurisdictional facts for an action of unlawful

detainer to prosper. It alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof
of its legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand.
For several years, CAMSUR merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to
continue using its building and conducting business on the property. CAMSUR demanded
that Bodega vacate the property in 2007. These presented a clear case of unlawful
detainer based on mere tolerance.

Facts: Province of Camarines Sur (CAMSUR) was the registered owner of a land in Naga
City. CAMSUR donated around 600 square meters of this land to the Camarines Sur
Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed).
The Deed included an automatic revocation clause.

CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of the law and
complied with the conditions stated in the Deed. However, CASTEA entered into a
Contract of Lease with Bodega Glassware (Bodega). Bodega eventually took actual
possession of the property.

The CAMSUR Office of the Provincial Legal Officer (PLO) wrote Bodega regarding
the building it built on the property. The PLO requested Bodega to show proof ownership
as legal basis for its possession, but Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless,
CAMSUR tolerated Bodega’s possession of the property.

CAMSUR, through Provincial Governor Luis Raymond Villafuerte, revoked its

donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation (Deed of Revocation). It asserted
that CASTEA violated the Deed when it leased the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking
the automatic revocation clause, CAMSUR revoked, annulled, and declared void the
Deed of Donation. Meanwhile, CASTEA never challenged this revocation.

Thereafter, CAMSUR filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega, praying
that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to it its peaceful possession.
It likewise prayed for payment of a monthly rental until Bodega vacates the land.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of Bodega, ordering Bodega to
vacate the property and pay a monthly rental of P15K as a reasonable compensation.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) revered the MTC Decision. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the RTC Decision that CAMSUR could not demand that Bodega vacate the

Digest-maker (Prudencio, Reem D.) 1

property, because this was based on the Lease Contract. Moreover, before the automatic
revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the
property against CASTEA. Lastly, the CA held the action had already prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not the unlawful detainer action against Bodega should prosper. (YES)

Ruling: YES. An action for unlawful detainer pertains to specific circumstances of

dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property initially
obtained possession lawfully. This possession only became unlawful due to the expiration
of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key
jurisdictional facts:
(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) Within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Here, CAMSUR established the jurisdictional facts for an action of unlawful detainer
to prosper. It alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its
legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For
several years, CAMSUR merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue
using its building and conducting business on the property. CAMSUR demanded that
Bodega vacate the property in 2007. These presented a clear case of unlawful detainer
based on mere tolerance.

Furthermore, the Deed of Donation was automatically revoked when CASTEA leased
the property to Bodega; hence, the property automatically reverted to CAMSUR. The
records showed that CASTEA never contested the Deed of Revocation. Hence, CAMSUR
validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause,
this revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of judicial intervention.

In demanding the return of the property, CAMSUR sourced its right of possession on
its ownership under Article 428 of the Civil Code. This right of possession prevailed over
Bodega’s claim that was anchored on the Lease Contract with CASTEA, which was the
same act that caused the donation’s automatic revocation.

Additionally, the petition had not prescribed. Article 764 clearly states that the
prescription of actions for the revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the
donation had an automatic revocation clause. On the contrary, the Civil Code and the
Rules of Court provide that a party seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful

Digest-maker (Prudencio, Reem D.) 2

detainer must file the action for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand vacate
are applicable.

Here, the CAMSUR complied with the prescriptive period as records showed that
CAMSUR served its last demand letter on 11 November 2007. It filed the action for
ejectment 13 March 2008 or around four (4) months from the last demand. Therefore, the
action was clearly within the prescriptive period.

Lastly, Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court grants the rightful possessor in an
unlawful detainer case to recover damages, which refer to “rents” or “the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,” or “fair rental value of the
property,” and attorney's fees and costs.

Here, CAMSUR prayed for the award of P15,000 monthly as damages, which was
half of the monthly rental between CASTEA and Bodega. Such amount of damages was
fair and reasonable given the circumstances.

Digest-maker (Prudencio, Reem D.) 3

REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Pulido, Alwin

HUBERT NUÑEZ v. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC.

G.R. No. 180542, 12 April 2010, 2ND DIVISION, (PEREZ, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over the case, viz.:
a. the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property;
b. they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and
c. the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the
physical possession of the property.

As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of
the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. The one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry
is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.

FACTS

Respondent SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc is the registered owner of a 635.5 sqm property situated at Calle
Solana, Intramuros, Manila. The property was acquired thru a Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by by
the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The respondents were constrained to leave the subject
parcel idle and unguarded for some time due to important business concerns.

An ocular inspection conducted in October 2003, revealed that the property was already occupied by petitioner
Hubert Nuñez and 21 other individuals. Initially faulting one Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its
verbal demands to vacate the subject parcel, respondent filed its 5 December 2003 complaint for forcible entry
before Branch 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.

Additionally impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants of the property, respondent filed an amended
complaint, alleging, among other matters, that thru its representatives and predecessors-in-interest, it had
continuously possessed the subject realty, over which it exercised all attributes of ownership, including payment
of real property taxes and other sundry expenses; that without the benefit of any lease agreement or possessory
right, however, petitioners and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by means of
strategy and stealth; and, that according to reliable sources, the latter had been in occupancy of the same parcel
since 1999. Together with the ejectment of the occupants of the subject premises, respondent prayed for the
grant of its claims for reasonable rentals, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs.

Petitioner averred that the property occupied by him is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla
Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a subsisting lease agreement over the same, and that, in addition to
respondent’s lack of cause of action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case for lack of prior
demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to the barangay authorities for a possible amicable settlement.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Likewise questioning the MeTC’s jurisdiction over the case, the rest of the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
which they adopted as their answer.

Relying on the survey plan submitted the City Engineer, the MeTC went on to render a Decision ordering the
petitioners to vacate the property

The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC. The case was elevated to the CA by way of petition for
review under Rule 42. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ratiocinating that parenthetically, although the
dispossession took place more than one year from the illegal entry of petitioner and his co-defendants,
knowledge of the same was only acquired by petitioner in 2003 when the ocular inspection was made. While
ordinarily, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of the actual entry on
the land, the same however, does not hold true when entry was made through stealth, in which case,
the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents properly made a case for forcible entry against petitioners (YES)

RULING

Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved, there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition to being conferred by
law, however, a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims asserted therein. In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on
the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.

The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.:
a. the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property;
b. they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and
c. the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of
their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.

As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a
sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under
said conditions. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the
one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

As the registered owner of the subject parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru
its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all
attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular inspection
conducted in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the
property by means of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate had been unheeded by
said interlopers. Considering that the test for determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff3 we find that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.

While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth
of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Because possession can also be acquired
by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like, it has been held
that one need not always have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property to be
considered in possession.

In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of Deed of Assignment executed in its
favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the same to
active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of 27
February 200236 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon37 alongside the sundry expenses
incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the
time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the
land since 1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as her
 Lourdes Dela Cruz. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Melba Tan Te
G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006
Velasco, Jr, J.

Doctrine of the Case

Exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the
first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces
an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3)
requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must
allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were
deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be
filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of
physical possession of the land or building.

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or
implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by
the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received
by the defendant.

Facts: This is a petition for review. The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located
at No. 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz
was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40 years.
Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner’s dwelling. After the
fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective houses;
simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees, including
petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. Petitioner was served a written demand to vacate
said lot but refused to leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings
against any of the lessees.

The disputed lot was sold by the Reyes’s to respondent Melba Tan Respondent bought the lot in question
for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the lot. Petitioner was sent
a written demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate
conciliation proceedings at the barangay level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by
offering financial assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her house. Respondent
rejected the counter offer which she considered unconscionable.

On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila
MeTC, The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in possession and control
of the contested lot; (2) the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the
property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical
possession of the property and continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands
to petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.

Digest-maker (Ramos, Elisha Faye V.) 1

Petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry; (2)
she was a rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20; (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the
property; and (4) the lot was subject of expropriation.

The MeTC of Manila ruled in favor of respondent, and ordered petitioner to vacate the property. Petitioner
Dela Cruz appealed the Decision of the MeTC in the Manila RTC. The RTC rendered its judgment setting
aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan Te’s Complaint on the
ground that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. Disappointed at the turn of events, respondent Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to the CA. The
CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC decision. Petitioner tried
to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted Petitioner Dela Cruz now seeks legal remedy
through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not, the Manila MeTC has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Manila RTC (YES)
2. Whether or not, petitioner can be ejected by the respondent from the premises (YES)

Ruling:

1. YES. The Court held that Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or
tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law.

Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with
the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession
of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for
forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property.
Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the
owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or
building.

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the defendant

Digest-maker (Ramos, Elisha Faye V.) 2

 is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession. The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1)
the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the
possessor’s right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land
or building after expiration or termination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon
lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the
action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the defendant.

To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the
MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the
allegations of the complaint. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and
the court that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant

In this case, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful
detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4)
decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a
contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated;
but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth
without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the continued occupancy of
the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses,
with respect to the lot, were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time
also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending several
demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the action was filed with the
MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was instituted well within the one (1) year period
reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer
and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.

Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te
complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.

2. YES. The Court held that petitioner admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant of
the Reyes’s, predecessors in interest of respondent Tan Te. As such, she recognized the ownership
of the lot by respondent, which includes the right of possession. After the fire raged over the
structures on the subject lot in late 1989 the contracts of lease expired, as a result of which Lino
Reyes demanded that all occupants, including petitioner, vacate the lot but the latter refused to
abandon the premises. During the duration of the lease, petitioner's possession was legal but it
became unlawful after the fire when the lease contracts were deemed terminated and demands
were made for the tenants to return possession of the lot. Petitioner's possession is one by the
Reyeses' tolerance and generosity and later by respondent Tan Te's.

Petitioner raises the ancillary issue that on March 15, 1998, the Manila City Council passed and
approved Ordinance No. 7951. It readily appears that this issue was not presented before the
Court of Appeals despite the fact that the respondent's petition was filed on September 25, 1998,
six months after the ordinance was passed. Thus, this issue is proscribed as are all issues raised
for the first time before the Court are proscribed.

Digest-maker (Ramos, Elisha Faye V.) 3

REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Roldan, Dyana Katrina T.

CORAZON SARMIENTA et.al. v. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. (MAHA)

G.R. No. 182953, 11 October 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Villarama Jr., J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the
property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how
the possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of
the land or building "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."

In the case at bar, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer.
MAHA tolerated petitioner’s stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA.
Petitioners' continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP.
Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right
of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave, petitioners became
deforciants illegally occupying the land.

FACTS
MAHA filed a Forcible Entry/Unlawfil Detainer case against Amara Cigelsalo Association and its
members. The complaint was raffled to the MTCC of Antipolo.

MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area of 9,936
squaremeters in Brgy. Sta. Cruz Antipolo City. Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth,
petitioners entered the premises and constructed their temporary houses and an office building. Petitioners
likewise even filed a civil case to annul MAHA's title on September 2, 1992, but said case was dismissed by the
trial court. After said dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that they
be given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA acceded. The said one-
year period, however, was repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHA's members. Later on,
petitioners came up with a proposal that they become members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire
portions of the property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). MAHA again agreed,
giving them time to comly with the requirements to avail of the CMP but still, petitioners failed to comply.
Hence MAHA sent a formal demand to petitioners to vacate the proper but petitioners did not heed the
demand.

MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action; it held that MAHA failed to establish the
jurisdiction requirement of prior physical possession in its complaint. Also, the trial court held that MAHA's
failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its subsequent
declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to
justify the treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer.

RTC, on appeal, reversed the MTCC decision holding that MAHA was able to allege and prove by
preponderance of evidence that petitioner’s occupation of the property was by mere tolerance.

On petition for review with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

ISSUE
Whether or not the case is one for unlawful detainer (YES)

RULING:

Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody
such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant
whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means
provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of defendant started or continued,
that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building "after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied."

In the present case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case
of unlawful detainer.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's
right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated petitioner’s
stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners'
continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the requirements of
the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate
the property as their right of possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA
required petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land.

Well settled is the rule that a person who occupied the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the TYC
and CA correctly ruled for MAHA.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

N.B.
As to petitioners' argument that MAHA's title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was
improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material possession of
the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate
action.

never considered as a candidate.

REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Ronquillo, Erideen

Juanita Ermitano, etc. v. Lailanie Paglas

G.R. No. 174436, January 2013, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

It is settled that during the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed
property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the period of
redemption has expired without the right being exercised. Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying
incidents. He only becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period.
In this case, however, the redemption period expired on February 23, 2001. Since there is no allegation, much less
evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent
became the owner thereof.
FACTS
On November 5, 1999, herein respondent Lailanie M. Paglas, and petitioner Juanita Ermitaño, through
her representative, Isabelo R. Ermitaño, executed a Contract of lease wherein Juanita Ermitaño leased in favor
of Lailanie Paglas a residential lot and a house.
Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, Paglas received information that sometime in March
1999, Juanita mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie Yap and that the same was foreclosed
with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on
February 22, 2000.
Paglas bought the subject property from Yap for P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was
executed by the parties as evidence of the contract. However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the
property was still subject to Juanita’s right of redemption.
Prior to Paglas’ purchase of the subject property, Juanita filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of the
mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate of sale. Juanita sent a letter demanding
Paglas to pay the rentals which are due and to vacate the leased premises. A second demand letter was sent on
March 25, 2001. Paglas ignored both letters.
Juanita filed with the MTCC a case of unlawful detainer against respondent. The MTCC dismissed the
case. Petitioner filed an appeal with the RTC, which was affirmed by the latter with modifications.. The CA
affirmed the RTC with modifications.
ISSUE
Whether the unlawful detainer case shall prosper (NO)
RULING
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: Who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession
de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner for the declaration of nullity
of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in sustaining the
presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of Yap as well as the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the public officers who subsequently conducted
its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. The MTCC, the RTC and the CA also sustained
the validity of respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap. The Court finds no cogent reason to
depart from these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for purposes of resolving the issue as to who
between petitioner and respondent is entitled to possess the subject property, this presumption stands.
Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in unlawful detainer, one unlawfully
withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.
There is no dispute that at the time that the respondent purchased Yap's rights over the subject
property, the petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor had not yet expired. It is settled that during the
period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the foreclosed property
since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is merely inchoate until after the
period of redemption has expired without the right being exercised. Stated differently, under Act. No. 3135,
the purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate right and not the
absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. He only becomes an absolute owner of the
property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period.
As a consequence of the inchoate character of the purchaser's right during the redemption period, the
purchaser is allowed, at the foreclosure sale, to take possession of the property only upon the filing of a bond,
in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve (12) months, to indemnify the
mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was made in violation of the mortgage or without complying with
the requirements of the law.
It, thus, clearly follows from the foregoing that, during the period of redemption, the mortgagor, being
still the owner of the foreclosed property, remains entitled to the physical possession thereof subject to the
purchaser's right to petition the court to give him possession and to file a bond pursuant to the provisions of
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right
to the possession or beneficial use of the premises.
In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser of the disputed
property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135. In addition,
respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent the respondent's filing of such petition and
bond prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not
have the right to possess the subject property. Petitioner, as mortgagor and owner, was entitled not only to the
possession of the disputed house and lot but also to the rents, earnings and income derived therefrom.
However, the situation became different after the redemption period expires on February 23, 2001.
Since there is no allegation, much less evidence, that petitioner redeemed the subject property within one year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, respondent became the owner thereof. As a consequence,
petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when the period of redemption expired
on February 23, 2001 without petitioner having redeemed the subject property, for upon expiration of such
period petitioner lost his possessory right over the same. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can
enforce is his right to the rentals during the time that he was still entitled to physical possession of the subject
property — that is from May 2000 until February 23, 2001. In this regard, this Court agrees with the findings
of the MTCC that, based on the evidence and the pleadings filed by petitioner, respondent is liable for payment
of rentals beginning May 2000 until February 2001, or for a period of ten (10) months.
‭REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO‬

‭Santiago, Paulinne Stephany‬

‭ABIGAIL L. MENDIOLA‬‭v.‬‭VENERANDO P. SANGALANG‬

‭G.R. No. 205283, 07 June 2017,‬‭THIRD DIVISION‬‭, (Tijam,‬‭J‭.‬)‬

‭DOCTRINE OF THE CASE‬

‭The‬‭procedure‬‭in‬‭proving‬‭the‬‭better‬‭right‬‭of‬‭possession‬‭of‬‭a‬‭party‬‭is‬‭sanctioned‬‭under‬‭Section‬‭16,‬‭Rule‬‭70‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Rules‬
‭of Court. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.‬

‭In‬ ‭Spouses‬ ‭Reyes‬ ‭v.‬ ‭Montemayor,‬ ‭the‬ ‭Court‬ ‭held‬ ‭that‬ ‭a‬ ‭certificate‬ ‭of‬ ‭title‬ ‭merely‬ ‭confirms‬ ‭or‬ ‭records‬ ‭title‬ ‭already‬
e‭ xisting‬‭and‬‭vested.‬‭The‬‭indefeasibility‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Torrens‬‭title‬‭should‬‭not‬‭be‬‭used‬‭as‬‭a‬‭means‬‭to‬‭perpetrate‬‭fraud‬‭against‬‭the‬‭rightful‬
‭owner‬‭of‬‭real‬‭property.‬‭Good‬‭faith‬‭must‬‭concur‬‭with‬‭registration‬‭because,‬‭otherwise,‬‭registration‬‭would‬‭be‬‭an‬‭exercise‬‭in‬‭futility.‬
‭A‬‭Torrens‬‭title‬‭does‬‭not‬‭furnish‬‭a‬‭shield‬‭for‬‭fraud,‬‭notwithstanding‬‭the‬‭long-standing‬‭rule‬‭that‬‭registration‬‭is‬‭a‬‭constructive‬‭notice‬
‭of‬‭title‬‭binding‬‭upon‬‭the‬‭whole‬‭world.‬‭The‬‭legal‬‭principle‬‭is‬‭that‬‭if‬‭the‬‭registration‬‭of‬‭the‬‭land‬‭is‬‭fraudulent,‬‭the‬‭person‬‭in‬‭whose‬
‭name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.‬

‭In‬ ‭the‬ ‭case‬ ‭at‬ ‭bar,‬ ‭it‬ ‭is‬ ‭undisputed‬ ‭that‬ ‭the‬ ‭Deed‬ ‭of‬ ‭Sale,‬ ‭through‬ ‭which‬ ‭ownership‬ ‭over‬ ‭the‬ ‭property‬ ‭had‬ ‭been‬
p‭ urportedly‬‭transferred‬‭to‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬‭Vilma,‬‭was‬‭executed‬‭in‬‭1996.‬‭However,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭perfectly‬‭obvious‬‭that‬‭Honorata‬‭could‬‭not‬
‭have‬ ‭signed‬ ‭the‬ ‭same‬ ‭as‬ ‭she‬ ‭passed‬ ‭away‬ ‭as‬ ‭early‬ ‭as‬ ‭1994.‬ ‭If‬ ‭any,‬‭Honorata's‬‭signature‬‭thereon‬‭could‬‭only‬‭be‬‭a‬‭product‬‭of‬
‭forgery.‬‭This‬‭makes‬‭the‬‭Deed‬‭of‬‭Sale‬‭void‬‭and‬‭as‬‭such,‬‭produces‬‭no‬‭civil‬‭effect;‬‭and‬‭it‬‭does‬‭not‬‭create,‬‭modify,‬‭or‬‭extinguish‬‭a‬
‭juridical‬ ‭relation.‬ ‭Hence,‬ ‭by‬ ‭theory‬ ‭of‬ ‭succession,‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬ ‭Venerando‬ ‭are‬ ‭co-owners‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭subject‬ ‭property‬ ‭and‬‭equally‬
‭entitled‬‭to‬‭possession‬‭thereof,‬‭either‬‭de‬‭facto‬‭or‬‭de‬‭jure.‬‭As‬‭such,‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬‭Vilma‬‭had‬‭no‬‭right‬‭to‬‭exclude‬‭Venerando‬‭from‬
‭enjoying possession thereof through a possessory action.‬

‭FACTS‬
‭Honorata‬ ‭Sangalang‬ ‭(Honorata)‬ ‭was‬ ‭the‬ ‭registered‬‭owner‬‭of‬‭a‬‭parcel‬‭on‬‭which‬‭a‬‭residential‬‭house,‬
‭and‬ ‭a‬ ‭four-door,‬ ‭one-storey‬ ‭commercial‬ ‭building‬ ‭were‬ ‭built.‬ ‭She‬ ‭had‬ ‭two‬ ‭siblings,‬ ‭Sinforosa‬ ‭and‬ ‭Angel.‬
‭Sinforosa‬‭had‬‭three‬‭children,‬‭namely:‬‭Abigail,‬‭Vilma,‬‭and‬‭Azucena,‬‭while‬‭Angel‬‭begot‬‭four‬‭children,‬‭namely:‬
‭Venerando,‬ ‭Ma.‬ ‭Lourdes,‬ ‭Angelino,‬ ‭and‬ ‭Fernando.‬ ‭Sinforosa‬ ‭and‬ ‭Angel‬ ‭predeceased‬ ‭Honorata,‬ ‭who‬ ‭died‬
‭intestate in May 1994.‬
‭When‬ ‭Honorata‬ ‭was‬ ‭still‬ ‭alive,‬ ‭one-half‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭residential‬ ‭house‬‭of‬‭the‬‭subject‬‭property‬‭was‬‭being‬
‭used‬ ‭by‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬ ‭the‬ ‭other‬ ‭half‬ ‭by‬ ‭Vilma's‬ ‭son.‬ ‭On‬‭the‬‭other‬‭hand,‬‭the‬‭commercial‬‭building‬‭was‬‭being‬
‭leased to third persons.‬

‭Sometime‬‭in‬‭2003,‬‭the‬‭children‬‭of‬‭Angel‬‭discovered‬‭that‬‭the‬‭subject‬‭property‬‭was‬‭already‬‭registered‬
i‭n‬ ‭the‬ ‭names‬ ‭of‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬ ‭Vilma‬ ‭by‬ ‭virtue‬ ‭of‬ ‭a‬ ‭Deed‬‭of‬‭Sale‬‭purportedly‬‭executed‬‭by‬‭Honorata‬‭in‬‭their‬
‭favor.‬ ‭After‬ ‭Vilma’s‬ ‭son‬ ‭left‬‭the‬‭residential‬‭house,‬‭Venerando‬‭allegedly,‬‭without‬‭asking‬‭permission‬‭from‬‭the‬
‭Abigail‬ ‭or‬ ‭Vilma‬ ‭and‬ ‭with‬ ‭the‬ ‭use‬‭of‬‭force‬‭and‬‭violence‬‭upon‬‭things,‬‭broke‬‭open‬‭the‬‭door‬‭of‬‭the‬‭unit‬‭and‬
‭detained the same.‬
‭In‬‭April‬‭2005,‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬‭Vilma‬‭demanded‬‭that‬‭Venerando‬‭vacate‬‭the‬‭unit,‬‭but‬‭to‬‭no‬‭avail.‬‭After‬‭the‬
‭failed‬ ‭conciliation‬ ‭before‬ ‭the‬ ‭barangay,‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬ ‭Vilma‬ ‭filed‬ ‭a‬ ‭Complaint‬ ‭for‬ ‭Accion‬ ‭Publiciana‬‭against‬
‭Venerando.‬

‭In‬ ‭his‬ ‭Answer,‬ ‭Venerando‬ ‭claimed‬ ‭that‬ ‭as‬ ‭heirs‬ ‭of‬ ‭Honorata,‬ ‭they‬ ‭all‬ ‭have‬ ‭become‬ ‭co-owners‬ ‭in‬
e‭ qual‬ ‭undivided‬ ‭shares‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭subject‬ ‭property.‬ ‭He‬ ‭further‬ ‭disputed‬ ‭the‬ ‭Deed‬ ‭of‬ ‭Sale‬ ‭since‬ ‭the‬ ‭same‬ ‭was‬
‭executed only in 1996 after the death of Honorata.‬

‭The‬‭Regional‬‭Trial‬‭Court‬‭(RTC)‬‭dismissed‬‭the‬‭Complaint‬‭on‬‭the‬‭grounds‬‭that:‬‭(1)‬‭since‬‭Venerando‬
r‭ aised‬‭the‬‭defense‬‭of‬‭co-ownership,‬‭the‬‭case‬‭was‬‭converted‬‭from‬‭accion‬‭publiciana‬‭to‬‭accion‬‭reivindicatoria;‬
‭and‬‭(2)‬‭the‬‭resolution‬‭of‬‭the‬‭criminal‬‭complaint‬‭for‬‭falsification‬‭lodged‬‭by‬‭Venerando‬‭against‬‭the‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬
‭Vilma‬ ‭constitutes‬ ‭a‬ ‭prejudicial‬ ‭question‬ ‭to‬ ‭the‬ ‭complaint.‬ ‭The‬ ‭Motion‬ ‭for‬ ‭Reconsideration‬ ‭was‬ ‭likewise‬
‭denied.‬

‭1‬
‭REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO‬

‭On‬ ‭Appeal,‬ ‭the‬ ‭Court‬ ‭of‬ ‭Appeals‬ ‭(CA)‬ ‭affirmed‬ ‭the‬ ‭decision‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭RTC.‬ ‭The‬ ‭Motion‬ ‭for‬
‭Consideration was likewise denied.‬

‭Hence, Abigail filed a Petition for Review before the SC.‬

‭ISSUE:‬‭Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the‬‭dismissal of the Complaint‬‭(NO)‬

‭RULING‬
‭NO.‬‭The‬‭Supreme‬‭Court‬‭r uled‬‭the‬‭procedure‬‭in‬‭proving‬‭the‬‭better‬‭right‬‭of‬‭possession‬‭of‬‭a‬‭party‬‭is‬
‭sanctioned‬‭under‬‭Section‬‭16,‬‭Rule‬‭70‬‭of‬‭the‬‭Rules‬‭of‬‭Court.‬‭It‬‭is‬‭settled‬‭that‬‭the‬‭issue‬‭of‬‭ownership‬‭may‬‭be‬
‭resolved only to determine the issue of possession.‬

‭In‬‭Spouses‬‭Reyes‬‭v.‬‭Montemayor,‬‭the‬‭Court‬‭held‬‭that‬‭a‬‭certificate‬‭of‬‭title‬‭merely‬‭confirms‬‭or‬‭records‬
t‭ itle‬ ‭already‬ ‭existing‬ ‭and‬ ‭vested.‬ ‭The‬ ‭indefeasibility‬ ‭of‬ ‭the‬ ‭Torrens‬ ‭title‬ ‭should‬ ‭not‬ ‭be‬ ‭used‬ ‭as‬ ‭a‬ ‭means‬‭to‬
‭perpetrate‬‭fraud‬‭against‬‭the‬‭rightful‬‭owner‬‭of‬‭real‬‭property.‬‭Good‬‭faith‬‭must‬‭concur‬‭with‬‭registration‬‭because,‬
‭otherwise,‬ ‭registration‬ ‭would‬ ‭be‬ ‭an‬ ‭exercise‬ ‭in‬ ‭futility.‬ ‭A‬ ‭Torrens‬ ‭title‬ ‭does‬ ‭not‬ ‭furnish‬ ‭a‬ ‭shield‬‭for‬‭fraud,‬
‭notwithstanding‬ ‭the‬ ‭long-standing‬ ‭r ule‬ ‭that‬ ‭registration‬ ‭is‬ ‭a‬ ‭constructive‬ ‭notice‬ ‭of‬ ‭title‬ ‭binding‬ ‭upon‬ ‭the‬
‭whole‬‭world.‬‭The‬‭legal‬‭principle‬‭is‬‭that‬‭if‬‭the‬‭registration‬‭of‬‭the‬‭land‬‭is‬‭fraudulent,‬‭the‬‭person‬‭in‬‭whose‬‭name‬
‭the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.‬

‭Settled‬ ‭is‬ ‭the‬ ‭r ule‬ ‭that‬ ‭an‬ ‭action‬ ‭to‬ ‭declare‬ ‭the‬ ‭nullity‬ ‭of‬ ‭a‬ ‭void‬ ‭title‬ ‭does‬ ‭not‬ ‭prescribe‬ ‭and‬ ‭is‬
‭susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack.‬

‭In‬‭the‬‭case‬‭at‬‭bar,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭undisputed‬‭that‬‭the‬‭Deed‬‭of‬‭Sale,‬‭through‬‭which‬‭ownership‬‭over‬‭the‬‭property‬
‭ ad‬‭been‬‭purportedly‬‭transferred‬‭to‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬‭Vilma,‬‭was‬‭executed‬‭in‬‭1996.‬‭However,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭perfectly‬‭obvious‬
h
‭that‬ ‭Honorata‬ ‭could‬ ‭not‬ ‭have‬ ‭signed‬ ‭the‬ ‭same‬ ‭as‬ ‭she‬ ‭passed‬ ‭away‬ ‭as‬ ‭early‬ ‭as‬ ‭1994.‬ ‭If‬ ‭any,‬ ‭Honorata's‬
‭signature‬‭thereon‬‭could‬‭only‬‭be‬‭a‬‭product‬‭of‬‭forgery.‬‭This‬‭makes‬‭the‬‭Deed‬‭of‬‭Sale‬‭void‬‭and‬‭as‬‭such,‬‭produces‬
‭no civil effect; and it does not create, modify, or extinguish a juridical relation.‬

‭Furthermore,‬ ‭while‬ ‭it‬ ‭is‬ ‭true‬ ‭that‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬ ‭Vilma‬ ‭have‬ ‭in‬ ‭their‬ ‭favor‬ ‭a‬ ‭Torrens‬ ‭title‬ ‭over‬ ‭the‬
‭ roperty,‬‭it‬‭is‬‭nonetheless‬‭equally‬‭true‬‭that‬‭they‬‭acquired‬‭no‬‭right‬‭under‬‭the‬‭void‬‭Deed‬‭of‬‭Sale.‬‭Indeed,‬‭when‬
p
‭the‬ ‭instrument‬ ‭presented‬ ‭is‬ ‭forged,‬ ‭even‬ ‭if‬ ‭accompanied‬ ‭by‬ ‭the‬ ‭owner's‬ ‭duplicate‬ ‭certificate‬ ‭of‬ ‭title,‬ ‭the‬
‭registered‬‭owner‬‭does‬‭not‬‭thereby‬‭lose‬‭his‬‭title,‬‭and‬‭neither‬‭does‬‭the‬‭assignee‬‭in‬‭the‬‭forged‬‭deed‬‭acquire‬‭any‬
‭right or title to the property.‬

‭Hence,‬ ‭by‬ ‭theory‬ ‭of‬ ‭succession,‬ ‭Abigail‬ ‭and‬‭Venerando‬‭are‬‭co-owners‬‭of‬‭the‬‭subject‬‭property‬‭and‬

e‭ qually‬‭entitled‬‭to‬‭possession‬‭thereof,‬‭either‬‭de‬‭facto‬‭or‬‭de‬‭jure.‬‭As‬‭such,‬‭Abigail‬‭and‬‭Vilma‬‭had‬‭no‬‭right‬‭to‬
‭exclude Venerando from enjoying possession thereof through a possessory action.‬

‭2‬
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Amante, Din Eve James F.

RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA, INC. v. PELAGIA DIMATULAC, GLORIA DIMATULAC,

NORA M. VDA. DE GRACIA AND ANTONIO NUQUI
G.R. No. 142015, 29 April 2003, SECOND DIVISION, (Quisumbing, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

When the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved for the purpose only of determining the issue of possession. Said judgment shall
be conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title of the realty, or affect the ownership thereof. It
shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the real property.

FACTS
In 1965, Prudencia Reyes purchased from the now defunct Rural Progress Administration (RPA), an
800-square meter parcel of land in San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac.

However, the deed of sale in favor of Reyes was later cancelled by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) by reason of her non-occupancy of said property, and made the land available for distribution to the
landless residents of San Rafael.

In 1971, respondents took possession of the property and were allocated portions of 200 square meters each.
They paid the purchase price and awaited their Emancipation Patent titles.

In 1973, despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the government, Reyes sold the property to the
spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon.

On finding, however, that respondents were in possession of the property, Valentin and Razon filed a
complaint for recovery and damages against respondents.

RTC: In favor of the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon.

CA (docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14909): Reversed RTC and cancelled the title of the spouses. The decision
of CA has attained finality.

However, during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, Razon mortgaged the property to petitioner rural
bank to secure a loan. The property was subsequently extra-judicially foreclosed when Razon failed to pay the
loan.

In 1997, petitioner rural bank filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with the MTC.

MTC: Dismissed petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondents. The
possession of respondents was not by mere tolerance but as lawful beneficiaries. It also declared that it had no
jurisdiction over the case as it involved the issue of ownership.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

RTC: Affirmed MTC. Petitioner could not eject respondents from said property as: (1) there was no legal
relationship, e.g. such as a lease agreement or otherwise, between them that has expired or terminated; (2)
respondents' possession was not through the tolerance of petitioner; (3) respondents were in possession of
the lot as lawful/rightful possessors, vis-a-vis their status as occupants-beneficiaries of the DAR.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE
Whether a question of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer divests an inferior court of jurisdiction.
(NO)

RULING: NO.

In ejectment cases the question is limited to which party among the litigants is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises, that is to say, who should have possession de facto. Settled is the rule,
however, that in an ejectment case, the assertion by a defendant of ownership over the disputed property does
not serve to divest an inferior court of its jurisdiction.

When the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved for the purpose only of
determining the issue of possession. Said judgment shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only,
and shall in no wise bind the title of the realty, or affect the ownership thereof. It shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the real property.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Bayot, Ariel Jieno

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner, v. ARMED FORCES OF THE

PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG. GEN.
ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, AND LT. COL. HAROLD
CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents.
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Second Division, LEONEN, J.:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

“Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem undesirable. It is exercised to
ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in court processes, and it should be invoked only to ensure or
promote the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations
of the confidentiality rule, a restrictive interpretation should be applied.”

FACTS:
- Jennifer Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year-old US Marine Private
Joseph Scott Pemberton.
- Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo and was detained there.
- Respondents state that Petitioner Harry Roque, with his clients (the family of the slain Jennifer
Laude), forced their way inside Pemberton’s detention facility and gained entry despite being
instructed by Military Personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were closed.
- As narrated by Respondents, Petitioner caused disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter
fence, to see Pemberton.
- Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been subject of various
national television, radio, internet, and print media publications.
- Because of these events, Respondents released a press statement that they were considering filing
disbarment proceedings against Petitioner. Subsequently, Respondents filed a disbarment
complaint against Petitioner before the IBP.
- On the same day, a conference was called at Camp Aguinaldo, and it was publicly announced that a
disbarment complaint had been filed against Petitioner. A press statement was also distributed,
which reads: “Press Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint against Atty. Harry Roque”
- Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted from, by media.
- Petitioner asserts that Respondents' acts are violated the Rule that proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. Petitioner claims this put his reputation to question.
- Respondents argue that they should not be cited for contempt. The subject of the disbarment case
pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone. The statements were official statements
made in the performance of a public function to address a public concern. The circumstances, which
led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public
and duly reported by the media. The filing of the disbarment case was not meant to malign
petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that transpired at Camp
Aguinaldo.
- Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of public interest, which is a defense in contempt
proceedings such as this.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

- With the Laude Murder case being of public concern, Petitioner has attained the status of a public
figure, susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case.
- In any case, Respondents instituted the disbarment complaint against Petitioner in good faith. They
are laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality rule.

ISSUE: Whether Respondents should be cited for contempt (NO)

RULING:
No. Citing Respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise of the Court's
contempt power. Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem
undesirable. It is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in court
processes, and it should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper administration of justice.
Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality
rule, a restrictive interpretation should be applied.

Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, Respondents' supposed public
threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, Respondents' public statement that they
had filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to
keep private and confidential.

Respondents' threats were made when there was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press
Statement, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt.
The Press Statement just declared that Respondent AFP filed a disbarment complaint against Petitioner, that
Petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession, and
that Petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Press
Statement's coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had
been filed, and no particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed. The
statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to address a
matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of
security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for responding
publicly to such public actions. Where freedom of speech and press is involved, a restrictive interpretation
must be applied as to what constitutes contempt.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Castillo, Mark

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO

G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014

DOCTRINE

Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the power of contempt unless the
statements pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.

FACTS

In 2005, Marantan and police officers shot dead Cu-Unjieng's son and two others (Ortigas
incident). Marantan was charged with murder, later downgraded by the Ombudsman to
homicide. In 2011, Cu-Unjieng filed a petition asking SC to upgrade the charges back to murder.
The case remained pending.

In 2013, Marantan was involved in the Atimonan encounter where 13 men died.
Cu-Unjieng and her counsel Diokno then held a televised press conference criticizing how SC
and courts have failed to punish Marantan for the Ortigas killings, saying Marantan murdered
their loved ones. They hoped the President would intervene.

Marantan filed this indirect contempt petition arguing the respondents influenced the
merits by declaring he murdered victims, and impaired SC's authority through criticisms.

ISSUE
Whether Diokno and Cu-Unjieng are guilty of indirect contempt for their statements in
the press conference. (NO)

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The power of contempt aims to protect courts'
duty to impartially administer justice, but utterances must pose a serious, imminent threat before
contempt sanctions apply to restrict free speech.

Here, Diokno and Cu-Unjieng merely rehashed their belief that the Ortigas victims were
murdered, consistent with their 2011 petition arguments to upgrade charges to murder. Calling
for presidential intervention lacks malice against SC's integrity and independence.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

The comments, on their face, do not show clear intent to obstruct justice nor seriously or
proximately endanger the case decisions. Though disagreeable to Marantan, they are
constitutionally protected opinions. Hence, contempt power should not be exercised as
statements pose no imminent threat to impede justice.
 Prosecutor Baculi v. Judge Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012
VELASCO, J.

Doctrine of the Case

Administrative complaints cannot substitute for judicial remedies against contempt

decisions. Utterances must show serious threat to administration of justice to warrant
contempt sanctions.

Facts: Baculi filed two separate contempt cases against Judge Belen. The first stemmed
from pleadings Baculi filed in a qualified theft case. Judge Belen initiated direct and
indirect contempt proceedings in 2006, convicting Baculi in both. Baculi questioned the
proceedings and convictions through manifestations and motions, and not appeals.

The second case arose from pleadings Baculi submitted in another case. Judge Belen
again initiated direct and indirect contempt cases in 2006 with identical convictions as the
first case. Baculi filed motions assailing the rulings but did not appeal.

Baculi filed the present administrative cases, claiming the convictions showed Judge
Belen's malice and prejudgment. Judge Belen argued the decisions were already final.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen committed grave abuse of authority or ignorance of
the law in citing Baculi in contempt?. (NO)

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and held that Judge Belen cannot
be held administratively liable for the contempt convictions absent fraud, ill motives or
gross ignorance.

For direct contempt, the Rules states:

Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.––The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may
not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.
The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.

In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order
of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal
cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is
filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by
and perform the judgment or final order.

Digest-Maker: Cheng, Kennelyn

1
The remedies provided for in the above-mentioned Rules are clear enough. The
complainant could have filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the
Decisions in the indirect contempt cases. For the direct contempt citations, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was available to him. He failed to avail himself of both remedies.
He chose instead to question the proceedings and the judgments in the form of motions
and manifestations, and administrative complaints. Due to the failure of the complainant
here to avail himself of these remedies, Judge Belen correctly ruled that the assailed
judgments have become final and executory. They cannot anymore be reviewed by this
Court.

Baculi did not present proof that Judge Belen initiated the contempt proceedings out of
hatred. Judges are presumed to act in lawful exercise of jurisdiction absent evidence
otherwise.

The initiation of proceedings was prompted by Baculi's own pleadings. Baculi was given
an opportunity to present defense but opted not to answer the charges. Thus, Judge
Belen observed proper contempt procedure.

Digest-Maker: Cheng, Kennelyn

2
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Daytia, Dane

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES

EDUARDO and HENEDINA ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JO VITO· C.
SORIANO, ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO B. DENSING,
JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, and ATTY. ERWIN S. OLIV
G.R. No. 216124, 19 July 2017, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
In this case, RCBC accuses respondents of committing indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. The SC held that respondents are guilty of committing indirect contempt.

FACTS
RCBC sought to execute the RTC-Makati's Order dated 5 January 1989, which directed respondent Federico A.
Serra (Serra) to sell to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-232 on
which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is located (subject property).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the subject property to respondent Spouses
Eduardo M. Andueza and Henedina V. Andueza (Spouses Andueza).
In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's motion for execution for lack of basis. The
RTC-Makati found that it had been almost 18 years after the 5 January 1989 Order had become final and executory that
RCBC filed the motion for execution. Neither did RCBC file an action to revive judgment within ten years from the date
the Order became final.
On 11 October 2012, RCBC filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the RTC-Makati's Orders
docketed as G.R. No. 203241. RCBC prayed for the issuance of a TRO to prevent any attempt to remove it from the
subject property, since Serra and Atty. Gina Besa-Serra had already caused the service of a notice to vacate and demand
for the payment of accrued back rentals, dated 6 September 2012, on RCBC. The Court issued a TRO. The TRO became
permanent in in G.R. No. 203241.
Meanwhile, Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

Pursuant to the Decision in G.R. No. 203241, RCBC filed on 27 February 2014 a new motion for execution
before the RTC-Makati. Andueza, a non-party to the case, filed an opposition to the motion for execution with affirmative
reliefs. In an order issued by the RTC-Makati, the motion for execution was granted and since Andueza did not file a
motion for reconsideration nor did he file an appeal before the Court of Appeals, Order of 14 May 2014 became final.

On 23 June 2014, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of execution.

Based on his Report,13 Sheriff Roberto V. Harina (Sheriff Harina) of the RTC-Makati attempted to serve on
Serra a copy of the Notice to Comply and a copy of the Writ of Execution. However, Serra was not in his office so Sheriff
Harina left with Serra's caretaker copies of the Notice to Comply and the Writ of Execution, who returned such copies by
leaving them at the information table of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate City.
Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, respondents Atty. Leomar R. Lanuza (Atty.
Lanuza), Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, and Jovito C. Soriano (Soriano), Sheriff
of the RTC-Masbate, scheduled the public auction of the subject property on 26 June 2014 at 2:00 in the aftemoon.

On 14 June 2014, RCBC filed a petition for injunction before the RTC-Masbate. Judge Ables as Executive Judge
of the RTC Masbate, issued a 72-hour TRO on 25 June 2014.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

In the meantime, RCBC filed before the RTC-Makati a motion to divest Serra of his title, invoking Section 10(a),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On 25 September 2014, a Certificate of Sale was issued by Soriano, noted by Atty. Lanuza and approved by Judge
Ables. The certificate of sale showed that the subject property was sold to Andueza.
In an Order dated 26 September 2014, the RTC-Makati granted RCBC's motion to divest Serra of his title.
In his Comment dated 7 October 2014, Serra asserted that due to the public auction sale on 24 September 2014,
where the subject property was sold to Andueza for being the highest bidder, he could no longer sell the subject property
to RCBC.
In a motion dated 10 December 2014, Spouses Andueza pleaded that the RTC-Makati vacate its 26 September
2014 Order. Spouses Andueza claimed that the RTC-Makati erred in cancelling the real estate mortgage without the trial
court conducting any full-blown hearing.1âwphi1 They also alleged that they were not parties in Civil Case No. 10054;
thus, they are not bound by whatever decision or order the trial court issued in the case. RCBC opposed the motion.

On 27 January 2015, Andueza, through his counsels respondents Atty. Paris G. Real (Atty. Real) and Atty.
Prudencio B. Densing, Jr. (Atty. Densing) filed before the RTC-Masbate an ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of
possession, which was granted by Judge Ables in an Order dated 28 January 2015.27
On 29 January 2015, respondent Atty. Edwin L. Rana (Atty. Rana), Clerk of Court of RTC-Masbate, Branch 47
and Assistant Provincial Sheriff of RTC-Masbate, issued a writ of possession, directing the provincial sheriff to place
Andueza in possession of the subject property, and to eject all persons claiming rights under Serra.

On the same day, Atty. Rana issued a Notice to Vacate, directed against Serra and RCBC, and all persons claiming
any right under Serra. The Notice to Vacate was served on RCBC on 30 January 2015
On 4 February 2015, RCBC filed the present petition for indirect contempt with prayer for a TRO to enjoin
respondents from enforcing the Notice to Vacate and the Writ of Possession issued by RTC-Masbate, and to enjoin the
respondent Register of Deeds from annotating on OCT No. 0-232 the Notice to Vacate and Writ of Possession. RCBC
pleaded that respondents be declared guilty of indirect contempt for disregarding the Court's decisions in G.R. Nos.
103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, as well as the permanent restraining order in G.R. No. 203241.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents are liable for indirect contempt.

RULING
YES. Serra and Spouses Andueza are guilty of indirect contempt. Contempt of court has been defined as a
willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to,
the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its
restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.

There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive
contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of
resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
In this case, RCBC accuses respondents of committing indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and
(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt: xx xx
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including. the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court
of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto; xx xx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision and restraining order in that
case. The TRO was issued on 3 December 2012 while the decision was promulgated on 10 July 2013. By virtue of the
TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property.
Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza, and Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in
effect allowed the removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede the administration of
justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the premises of the subject property, in contravention of the
clear directive in the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and
accordingly fined ₱30,000.

Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [RCBC] because the subject
property was already foreclosed and sold in public auction in favor of Spouses Eduardo and Dina Andueza x x x. In other
words, Serra alleges that a supervening event - the foreclosure sale in favor of Spouses Andueza - occurred precluding the
execution of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 203241.
The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred which would effectively prevent the execution of
the decision in G.R. No. 203241. While the foreclosure sale proceeded on 24 September 2014, after the finality of the
decision in G.R. No. 203241, the real estate mortgage in favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September 2011
while G.R. No. 203241 was pending. Serra could not possibly be unaware that a foreclosure sale would likely transpire
since he was the mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation. Clearly, Serra performed acts intended to defeat and
circumvent the conclusive effects of the final decision in G.R. No. 203241.

Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have notice of the pendency of such action.
On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued by this Court annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No.
2013000087. Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of the Court's TRO in G.R. No. 203241 prior to their
filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property on 13 August 2013. Further, the decision in G.R.
No. 203241 was promulgated prior to the Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses Andueza
cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest over the subject property when they filed the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure.
In other words, the Spouses Andueza's act of instituting the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, which would
ultimately result in removing RCBC from the subject property, obviously tended to impede the administration of justice
and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Accordingly, the Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt and fined ₱30,000.
The other respondents, namely the counsels of the Spouses Andueza, merely acted to protect the interests of
their clients over the subject property while the public respondents simply acted pursuant to their ministerial duties and
responsibilities in foreclosure proceedings. These acts do not constitute indirect contempt of court absent any clear and
convincing evidence that they willfully disobeyed the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241 or committed any
act which tended to impede the administration of justice.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Geriel

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB INC AND PABLO B. ROMAN JR. vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No 182738 | February 24, 2014 | Peralta, J:

Doctrine:

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is instructive:

. . . Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio
by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

Facts:

In June 2002 Manuel Sanchez , a stockholder of Capitol Hills, filed a petition for nullification of the
annual meeting of stockholders in May 2002, and the special meeting of stockholder in April 2002
before the RTC Quezon City.

Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The motion was granted in
September 2002. In October 2002, Sanchez filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him to inspect
and photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents
subject of the September 10, 2002 Order. The same was granted.

Capitol Hills and Roman Jr. assailed the orders granting the motions of Sanchez via petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA denied the petition for certiorari. On appeal with the SC, the appeals was also denied.
(In February 2005)

Sanchez sought to enforce the order granting the production and inspection of documents several times
(to no avail): the first supposed inspection was not held, the second supposed inspection was not also held as
petitioners moved for deferment; third, the corporate secretary was out of town and Roman Jr was not willing
to comply. These instances were reported to the court where they were duly noted.

Due to a motion for clarification, and the subsequent inhibition of judges to who the case was raffled, and to
an agreement to hold pre-trial conference until actual conduct and inspection of records, the inspection was
held only in January 2007.

In the January 2007 inspection, the only document produced was the stock and transfer book. They alleged
that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the
stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders' meetings, and that they needed
more time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the
Corporation.

This prompted Sanchez to file a manifestation and motion praying that an order be issued in actions with
Section 3 paragraphs a to d of Rule 29 (other consequence of refusal to produce for inspection).

The RTC then issued a resolution which gave the parties one last chance to comply with the oder of
September 2002. Failure to comply will result in citing in contempt of court.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Petitioners questioned the resolution via Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) with the CA. The CA rule that there
was no grave abuse of discretion as the resolution was issued pursuant to the interim ruled, and that the RTC
only warned

Issue: Whether or not the threatened citation for contempt is a grave abuse of discretion

Ruling: NEGATIVE.

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court's mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under
the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the
consequence of possible nonobservance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for
inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal
to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings
pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

NOTE: The topic “How contempt proceedings commenced” were only discussed in passing.

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is
instructive:

. . . Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

MOTU PROPRIO: In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt.

1. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt.
2. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
3. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's
answer.
4. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.

VERIFIED PETITION: As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through
a verified petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

SPOUSES JOSE AND CORAZON RODRIGUEZ vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), ET.AL.
G.R. No. 183324 & 206667, 19 June 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (CAGUIOA, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

SEC. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to
contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory
effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The
Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as
may be filed therefor.

In this case, the Spouses Nicolas alleged that there is a case for indirect contempt against the Spouses Rodriguez and
Manlulu as the latter supposedly disobeyed and resisted the lawful order of a quasi-judicial body, i.e., the HLURB., and
provides in its prayer that the Court conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine if there was indirect contempt committed.
However, there is no basis to support the former’s allegation that the Court has jurisdiction over a case for indirect
contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is
pending appeal before the Court. Neither can it be entertained by the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts. Thus,
the petition for Indirect Contempt is dismissed.

FACTS
On October 2004, the Spouses Balbino and Spouses Nicolas filed a Verified Complaint against Spouses
Rodriguez before the Regional Field Office III of the HLURB. Pursuant to an Order by the HLURB, a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction/Cease and Desist Order was issued by the said board against the Spouses Rodriguez.
Another complaint was thereafter filed by Spouses Santiago, Rogano and Spouses Gamboa before the HLURB-
RFO III which the latter issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the Spouses Rodriguez.
Eventually, the two cases were them consolidated by the Court. The said Complaints deal with the
Ruben San Gabriel Subdivision (subject subdivision), which is located at Barangay Wakas, Bocaue, Bulacan.
The subject subdivision consists of two (2) blocks with a total of twenty (20) residential lots and one (1) road
lot (subject road lot) which served as an access of the inner lots to the MacArthur Highway. In 1978, Ruben
San Gabriel (San Gabriel), the owner of the subdivision, sold nine (9) lots to one Renato Mendoza (Mendoza).
Sometime in 1995, the Spouses Rodriguez acquired these nine (9) lots from Mendoza. When San Gabriel and
Mendoza executed an assignment of right transferring their right to the Spouses Rodriguez, interest in the
subdivision road lot was assigned and transferred in favor of the Spouses Rodriguez. The separate titles of the
lots, including that of the subject road lot, were cancelled and a new TCT covering an area of 4,865 square
meters was issued in the name of the Spouses Rodriguez.
The HLURB-RFO III rendered its decision finding merit to the Complaint and ordering the Spouses
Rodriguez to cease and desist from further including the road lot in the consolidation of their title. It held that
there is no consolidation of the road lot with the other properties of the Spouses Rodriguez.
The Spouses Rodriguez filed a reconsideration with the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The latter
overturned the earlier ruling of the HLURB-RFO III on the basis that the closure of a road lot in a subdivision
is not absolutely prohibited. When the same is done with or pursuant to an Alteration Plan approved by this
Board as required under Section 22 of PD 957, the same is allowable. Without filing an appeal with the Office
of the President, Spouses Rodriguez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for the failure of the Spouses Rodriguez
to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
Consequently, on November 2013, Spouses Nicolas filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against
Spouses Rodriguez and Manlulu alleging that the Spouses Rodriguez, despite the injunction issued by the
HLURB, maliciously and feloniously dumped filling materials which block the road lot leading to the inner lots
of the subdivision. In April 20164, the Court consolidated the two cases.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Spouses Rodriguez’ Rule 65 petition outright. (NO)
2. Whether or not the Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by Spouses Nicolas was meritous. (NO)

RULING:

1. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Spouses Rodriguez’ Rule 65 Petition.
As held time and time again by the Court, for a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove
that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate grievance. An available recourse affording
prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has
lost. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In this case, the Spouses Rodriguez did not dispute that they failed to appeal the assailed Resolutions of the
HLURB Board before the Office of the President prior to filing its Rule 65 Petition before the CA. Neither did
they provide any information to justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP, as provided in the
Rules of Procedure of the HLURB.
Consequently, the contention of the Spouses Rodriguez that HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the
subject lot cannot be given weight considering that the Spouses Rodriguez themselves filed a Motion and
Manifestation before the HLURB praying that they be allowed to construct and introduce developments with
respect to the subject road lot.
2. NO. The Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by Spouses Nicolas should be dismissed.

Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in stating that, with respect to contumacious
acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the HLURB, it is the regional trial court of the place where
the contemptuous acts have been committed, and not the Court, that acquires jurisdiction over the indirect
contempt case.

In this case, the Spouses Nicolas alleged that there is a case for indirect contempt against the Spouses Rodriguez
and Manlulu as the latter supposedly disobeyed and resisted the lawful order of a quasi-judicial body, i.e., the
HLURB. Its prayer asks the Court to conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine if there was indirect contempt
committed. However, there is no basis to support the former’s allegation that the Court has jurisdiction over a
case for indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the
said quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the Court. Neither can it be entertained by the Supreme Court
as it is not a trier of facts. Thus, the petition for Indirect Contempt is dismissed.