TM 23 568
TM 23 568
TM 23 568
Technical Memorandum
NTIA Memorandum 23-568
Alan Davidson
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
May 2023
DISCLAIMER
Certain commercial equipment, materials, and/or programs are identified in this report to
describe aspects of the ways that Open RAN solutions are being introduced at present or may be
introduced in the future. In no case does such identification imply endorsement, approval,
recommendation, or prediction of success by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, nor does it imply that the equipment, materials, and/or programs identified are
necessarily the best available for achieving an open, modular, interoperable 5G market. The
mention of any commercial equipment, material, or program should not be construed as that they
are in any way superior to or more noteworthy than similar ones not mentioned.
iii
CONTENTS
Figures..............................................................................................................................................v
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................1
2. Background ..................................................................................................................................4
2.1 Single Versus Multi-vendor Solutions ...................................................................................4
2.1.1 Historical Dynamics Between Mobile Operators and Network Suppliers ...................4
2.1.2 A New Model with 5G .................................................................................................5
2.2 O-RAN ALLIANCE Specifications ......................................................................................6
2.3 Plugfests .................................................................................................................................8
2.4 Security ..................................................................................................................................8
2.4.1 Importance of 5G Security ...........................................................................................8
2.4.2 Security Gaps and Exposures .......................................................................................8
2.4.3 O-RAN Potential for Improved Security......................................................................9
6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................20
7. References ..................................................................................................................................21
Acknowledgments..........................................................................................................................24
iv
FIGURES
v
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
CD continuous delivery
CI continuous integration
COTS commercial-off-the-shelf
CT continuous testing
CU Central Unit
DDOS distributed denial of service
DOCSIS Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification
DoD Department of Defense
DU Distributed Unit
E2E end-to-end
EO Executive Order
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDD frequency division duplex
FTP File Transfer Protocol
gNB gNodeB, refers to 5G Next Generation Node B
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IE Information Element
IT information technology
ITS Institute for Telecommunication Sciences
IoT Internet of Things
IOT interoperability test
KPI key performance indicator
L1 layer 1 (physical layer)
L2 layer 2 (data link layer)
L3 layer 3 (network layer)
MAC Medium Access Control
MNO mobile network operator
MSSP Managed Security Service Provider
NOI Notice of Inquiry
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration
O-CU Open RAN central units
O-DU Open RAN distributed units
O-RAN Open Radio Access Network; O-RAN refers to the O-RAN ALLIANCE and the
group’s specifications for open interfaces in the RAN
O-RU Open RAN radio units
vi
OTIC Open Test and Integration Center
OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
PHY physical layer
RAN Radio Access Network
radalt radar altimeter
RIC Radio Intelligent Controller
RLC Radio Link Control
R&E Research and Engineering
RF radio frequency
RRC Radio Resource Control
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
RU Radio Unit
SA standalone
SBOM Software Bill of Materials
SDAP Service Data Adaptation Protocol
SDN software defined network
SUPI Security Permanent Identifier
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDD time division duplex
TS Technical Specification
UE user equipment
μTP Micro Transport Protocol (sometimes also uTP)
UX user experience
VEX Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange
vRAN virtualized radio access networks
vii
5G CHALLENGE PRELIMINARY EVENT: EVALUATING MODULAR,
INTEROPERABLE, MULTI-VENDOR, OPEN RAN SOLUTIONS
Margaret H. Pinson, 1 Mark Poletti,2 Julie Kub,1 Jeremy Glenn,1 Tim Thompson,1 Robert Kupsh,1
Naser Areqat,1 Okmar Dharmadhikari,2 Annie George, 3 T. Lauriston Hardin,1 Cory Johnson,1
Spiros Kapoulas,2 and Sundar Sriram2
Keywords: 5G, interoperability, network testing, SBOM, open interfaces, Open RAN
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, mobile networks typically consist of proprietary software integrated into customized
hardware designed by a single mobile network supplier. Network upgrades or fixes require
systematic deployment and validation to each of the network subsystem functions and, in some
cases, lead to an entire network overhaul. Mobile operators are locked into the development,
release pace, and schedule of the network supplier, which can significantly impact network
1
These authors are with the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Boulder, CO 80305.
2
These authors are with CableLabs, Louisville, CO 80027.
3
This author is with Kyrio, Louisville, CO 80027.
operation, offered services, and deployment plans. This industry dynamic increases costs, slows
innovation, and reduces competition.
The industry is attempting to change this single vendor paradigm (“vendor lock”) by developing
industry standards to disaggregate proprietary software from the hardware and open proprietary
interfaces between network subsystems and functions to allow for network supplier
interoperability.
CableLabs, the host lab for the 5G Challenge Preliminary Event, is the leading innovation and
R&D lab for the cable industry. CableLabs creates global impact through its member companies
around the world. With a state-of-the-art research facility and collaborative ecosystem with
thousands of vendors, CableLabs delivers impactful network technologies for the entire industry.
CableLabs has experience working with diverse Wi-Fi vendors to achieve interoperability and
harden the Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS). The 5G Challenge builds
on CableLabs’ experience as an independent arbitrator and host of industry interoperability
events.
In the envisioned future 5G market, Open RAN interfaces reflect clear-cut requirements,
enabling true plug-and-play operation. Modular 5G elements let network operators quickly and
easily reconfigure, update, or replace components as needed. External scrutiny of open interfaces
allows vulnerabilities to be identified and patched. This open, modular, interoperable
environment attracts and incentivizes new vendors. A diversified marketplace delivers targeted
innovation and drives down costs. International allies and partners can establish secure, trusted
supply chains. Beneficiaries of this future 5G market include DoD, international allies and
partners, network operators, businesses, and consumers.
The 5G Challenge is a two phase, multi-year prize challenge. This memo describes phase one—
the 5G Challenge Preliminary Event: RAN Interoperability Event in 2022—during which
NTIA/ITS offered a $3,000,000 prize purse to contestants who successfully integrated hardware
and/or software solutions for one or more of these 5G network subsystems: Central Unit (CU),
Distributed Unit (DU), or Radio Unit (RU). The second phase, the 5G Challenge Final Event,
began in 2023.
The 5G Challenge Preliminary Event had three stages. In Stage One, competitors submitted
white paper applications to participate in the competition and were required to have one or more
2
5G Open RAN subsystems that adhere to the 3GPP standards and O-RAN ALLIANCE
specifications. In Stage Two, each contestant’s Open RAN subsystem was evaluated separately
in an emulated environment. In stage three, multiple vendors integrated their Open RAN
subsystems into an end-to-end (E2E) network. Each winning contestant submitted a Software
Bill of Materials (SBOM), and a prize was awarded for the best SBOM.
3
2. BACKGROUND
The single-vendor model suited Tier 1 MNO customers. The single-vendor model simplified
procurement, deployment, E2E integration, and troubleshooting—one source to blame and one
vendor to troubleshoot.
Let’s fast-forward to today. Computer systems in general have experienced cost reductions and
improved security due to advances in virtualization, softwarization, continuous integration /
continuous delivery / continuous testing (CI/CD/CT), Agile software development, and other
modern software development lifecycle practices. Vendor equipment is adopting some of these
advances—particularly virtualized radio access networks (vRAN)—but lags in other areas (e.g.,
CI/CD/CT).
Governments around the globe have made available vast new quantities of spectrum in multiple
frequency bands. This has led to new spectrum owners and new ownership categories (e.g.,
mining, utilities, public safety, and manufacturing), each with novel and distinct use cases and
requirements (e.g., higher throughput, lower latency, higher security, and many endpoint
connections). These scenarios do not align with purchasing from a single, E2E infrastructure
vendor because no single vendor can specialize in everything. This next generation of network
operators requires a more diverse ecosystem of vendors to meet their new use case requirements.
Many of these network operators would like to replace older solutions that poorly serve their
needs. Many of the new operators support a paradigm shift to multi-vendor, disaggregated 5G
solutions—as do some of the Tier 1 MNOs.
Other Tier 1 MNOs are interested in multi-vendor solutions but require confirmation—like
demonstrated interoperability, scaled deployment, vendor longevity assurance, measured energy
savings, load balancing, spectrum efficiency, or new service offerings. Also, most Tier 1 MNOs
must solve the brownfield problem (i.e., how to integrate multi-vendor 5G equipment with pre-
existing, single-vendor networks). There are many “flavors” of 5G, and their brownfield
equipment may not strictly adhere to 3GPP interface specifications (e.g., due to the
implementation of options available within the specification). The 5G Challenge tackles a critical
4
first step towards addressing these concerns for multi-vendor RAN solutions, by requiring
compliance with 3GPP interface standards and O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications and by
demonstrating E2E, multi-vendor integration.
The RU converts radio signals sent to and from the antenna into a digital signal for transmission
(handling the front end and parts of the physical layer as well as digital beamforming
functionality). RU development requires specialized skills around issues such as antenna design,
radio frequency (RF) filter design, interference, and propagation. For example, the introduction
of 5G systems in the U.S. between 3700 and 3980 MHz has raised concerns about
electromagnetic compatibility with airborne radar altimeter (radalt) receivers operating between
4200 and 4400 MHz [2]. As a result, most presently available RUs include function-specific
hardware.
However, for the RU, 3GPP defines a RAN functional split architecture and leaves it to the
global vendors to differentiate themselves and decide how layer 1 and 2 functionality should be
“split” between the RU and the CU/DU. As shown in Figure 1 [3], vendors have multiple
functional split options. Vendors can therefore create CU/DU and RU split options that apportion
protocol layers differently, in response to specific customer use cases and deployment scenarios
(e.g., delay and throughput requirements and fronthaul bandwidth availability). This “option 2”
split appeals to MNOs because it enables innovation around transmitters and receivers (e.g., to
lower power consumption) with minimal impact on the rest of the network.
To standardize the Open Front Haul interface (between the DU and RU), the O-RAN
ALLIANCE proposes a version of the split 7.2 (called 7.2x) that splits the physical layer (PHY)
into a high-PHY and low-PHY. The O-RAN ALLIANCE’s 7.2x split provides a balance
between functionality, time-to-market, and deployment cost. The 7.2x split option objectives are
explained in detail by Dell Technologies [4]. O-RAN ALLIANCE also specified two variant
splits (7.2a and 7.2b) generically based on where precoding occurs.
5
Figure 1. 5G RAN Functional split between central and distributed units
(see also 3GPP TR 38.801, Figure 11.1.1-1)
Open RAN is based on years of research on open and programmable networks (based on
software-defined networking transformation) [8]. Open RAN deployments are based on
disaggregated, virtualized, and software-based components, connected through open and
standardized interfaces, and interoperable across different vendors [9]. The Open RAN vision
driven by the O-RAN ALLIANCE [10] starts with the disaggregated RAN.
The four foundational principles for O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications include disaggregation;
intelligent, data-driven control with the RAN Intelligent Controllers (RIC); virtualization; and
open interfaces [9]. Disaggregation splits the base station into different functional units per 3GPP
standards for the 5G Next Generation Node B’s (gNBs) [6]. Near–Real-Time and Non–Real-
Time RICs and Closed-Loop Control allow near–real-time and non–real-time data-driven,
closed-loop control over RAN optimization and orchestration [11]. The RICs enable finer grain
control of radio resource management and virtual/physical network functions (e.g., for policy
4
We use “open” here to mean a well-defined, standardized interface with specific information exchange that enables
multi-vendor communication.
6
applications for scheduling, handover, RAN slicing, and load balancing based on network load
and/or resource utilization). O-RAN virtualization extends software defined network (SDN)
concepts [12], decoupling hardware and software components to enable automated deployment
of RAN functionalities on COTS hardware.
Figure 2. O-RAN logical architecture (see also O-RAN Architecture Description 7.0 [13])
The O-RAN ALLIANCE specification, beyond 3GPP, further disaggregates the RAN
functionality by defining three open interface specifications between the three RAN elements.
These open interfaces include:
• Backhaul, also called NG as defined by 3GPP, between the RAN and the Core
Disaggregating the RAN elements (RU, DU, and CU) into interoperable components connected
by open interfaces further allows network operators to use equipment from multiple vendors and
still ensure interoperability. O-RAN decouples hardware and software into three layers: the
COTS hardware, a software abstraction layer, and an application layer where the RAN functions
7
reside. O-RAN ALLIANCE has specified a list of requirements for a cloud platform that
supports the execution of O-RAN network functions. This is referred to as the O-RAN Cloud
Platform, or O-Cloud.
2.3 Plugfests
O-RAN ALLIANCE plugfests (currently with over 80 participants worldwide) focus on topics
such as multi-vendor interoperability using O-RAN’s open interfaces, RAN virtualization, and
RICs. During the plugfest, participants showcase such aspects of their products as
interoperability with another vendor’s subsystem, conformity to a standard, or interoperability
with respect to a specific use case or use cases. Plugfest participants know who they will be
working with well in advance. Participants may work jointly for several months prior to the
plugfest and then for another few months during the plugfest [14]. Plugfests typically do not
involve E2E testing.
The 5G Challenge’s goal differs from typical plugfests because the 5G Challenge tests “cold”
vendor groupings (i.e., unknown partners). This supports more of a plug-and-play architecture
versus a pre-prepared use case demonstration created solely for the plugfest. 5 Additionally, the
5G Challenge focuses first on testing individual components with wraparound (or bracket)
testing, then exposed interfaces, and finally E2E testing. At the 5G Challenge, vendors are
assigned to interoperate with other vendors without any prior knowledge of the other vendors’
equipment or of the interoperability test plan. Competitors need to work together to win the
challenge. This builds camaraderie among vendors, as each is motivated to assist the others in
order that all may succeed.
2.4 Security
5
From private communications with Ian Wong, Viavi.
8
core of this advance is the ability to shift from legacy technology to virtual, distributed, cloud-
based networks, which enable a host of critical defense-in-depth and virtualization security
techniques.
One of those advantages is distributed denial of service (DDOS) protection and mitigation on the
edge of networks to prevent larger outages. When attempting to provide high levels of
availability to a wireless customer, service providers are vulnerable to motivated and well-
resourced attackers using DDOS techniques that could quickly spread through large parts of a
network. 5G allows such attacks to be identified and stopped at the network edge without
causing more catastrophic outages [16]. Another important advantage of 5G is the use of
stronger encryption schemes for the Security Permanent Identifier (SUPI) and over-the-air
interface.
Legacy network communication security has long been plagued by a necessary level of trust
between different network components. Some of the original packet-switched networks like the
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) relied on complete trust between
every communication node, and we have been playing catch-up from that paradigm ever since.
More recent network security models utilized a hardened perimeter, but trust was implied within
the internal network. That 5G relies on the “zero trust” networking model is thus an important
security upgrade. In this model, no information received is trusted unless it can first be verified.
Within the security community there is a longstanding debate about the value of “security by
obscurity.” If an attacker is unfamiliar with a system’s configuration or cannot find it, there are
certain security advantages. The opposing viewpoint is that open interfaces enhance the ability of
automated tools and community development to find and fix vulnerabilities.
One major objection to O-RAN is that standardized interfaces and protocols remove a defender’s
ability to use obscurity to their advantage. A provider can no longer leverage the advantages
offered by proprietary, black-box infrastructure configurations. This is a valid concern. However,
from a security perspective, the numerous potential advantages offered by O-RAN (discussed in
Sections 2.2 and 2.4.2) vastly outweigh the potential disadvantages.
The FCC List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act [18]
identifies equipment and services that are deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. In response,
numerous entities have replaced (or seek to replace) their telecommunications equipment and
services. The 5G Challenge is motivated in part by the desire to facilitate improved security from
future telecommunications equipment and services. However, standalone (SA) 5G equipment
9
was in the very early stages of development when the 5G Challenge Preliminary Event was
designed and launched. Therefore, our lab tests focused on interface compliance and basic
operational capability. Separate projects will be needed to assess compliance with O-RAN
ALLIANCE security protocols and to test various aspects of network security.
10
3. SOFTWARE BILL OF MATERIALS
The minimum elements of the SBOM are the essential pieces that support basic SBOM
functionality and will serve as the foundation for an evolving approach to software transparency.
These minimum elements comprise three broad, interrelated areas:
• Data Fields: Documenting baseline information about each component that should be
tracked
• Automation Support: Allowing for scaling across the software ecosystem through
automatic generation and machine-readability
• Practices and Processes: Defining the operations of SBOM requests, generation, and use
Open RAN subsystems distributed with SBOMs allow operators to better protect their network
ecosystems and hold third-party suppliers accountable for the quality and security of their
products. Specifically, the SBOM focuses on identifying vulnerabilities and dependencies;
understanding integration and integrity; verifying sourcing and authenticity; and managing risk
through a more targeted security analysis [22].
3.2 Why We Chose SBOM as the Security Component of the 5G Challenge Preliminary
Event
SBOMs level the playing field between attackers and defenders. The intended audience are
people who can use the data constructively—particularly customers who operate the software.
SBOMs are not necessarily made public, though [23] notes that attackers do not need SBOMs
due to their asymmetrical advantages (e.g., mass indiscriminate attacks and tools to identify
software components). SBOMs empower software operators to identify potentially vulnerable
components, plan for end-of-life components, comply with license obligations, evaluate whether
they will be affected by new attacks, and avoid blacklisted components [22]. Without the SBOM,
operators must consult and rely on the supplier for these tasks. SBOMs are well established in
banking and are gaining traction in health care [23], defense, and other industries that depend on
critical infrastructure.
11
The SBOM was chosen as the security component of the 5G Challenge Preliminary Event
because it is a natural fit with the President’s cybersecurity goals outlined in EO 14028 [21] and
the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2020 [25]. At the highest levels, the U.S. Government has
issued policy directives providing frameworks to intelligently advance policy objectives in the
technological sphere. In this case, providing incentives for 5G Challenge competitors to submit
an SBOM fosters the development of industry knowledge and expertise. It’s a small step towards
growing the SBOM ecosystem with the goal of helping industry reach a critical mass, in which
SBOMs become a routine component of every software project.
• Fixed: Represents that these product versions contain a fix for the vulnerability
• Under Investigation: It is not yet known whether these product versions are affected by the
vulnerability. An update will be provided in a later release
Including a VEX along with the SBOM is a useful addition to understanding the security posture
of software projects. Requiring SBOMs in this stage of the challenge helped support various
high-level policy objectives. Adding VEX is a natural next stop for supporting those efforts and
providing useful data to evaluate the submissions and for our test lab, so it has information about
vulnerabilities being introduced to its test environment.
12
3.2.2 Observations and Lessons Learned
For every project, additional requirements create increased costs, friction, time to produce, and
perhaps even a decision not to complete the project. Following the completion of the
5G Challenge Preliminary Event, we assessed whether including the SBOM requirement was a
worthwhile additional requirement. Ultimately, we decided that it was. There was some minor
resistance, but no indication that anyone chose not to participate because of the requirement.
13
4. EMULATED TESTING
The goal of Stage Two Emulated Testing was to (1) determine participant RAN subsystem (i.e.,
O-CU, O-DU and O-RU) compliance with O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications and 3GPP
standards and (2) evaluate its integration and performance capability as a standalone unit.
ITS selected CableLabs as the host lab to operate the 5G test bed, design and manage 5G
Challenge events, provide technical oversight, conduct contestant testing, analyze test data, and
deliver final event reports. The host lab provided 5G RAN emulators into which competing
contestants integrated their RAN subsystems. For emulated testing, the 5G test bed supported 5G
SA Core and 5G RAN system specifications, as defined by 3GPP Release 15. The 5G Challenge
focused on testing only 5G SA configurations.
Test cases assessed contestant RAN subsystem capabilities at an increasing level of complexity
using 3GPP and O-RAN ALLIANCE standards as a reference. RAN subsystems that complied
with more complex test cases provided an indication of their state of development against the
industry standards and their likelihood of a successful multi-vendor integration (in Stage Three
of the competition).
• Level 0, Integration: The objective was to demonstrate successful integration into the test
environment
14
• Level 1, Interface: The objective was to demonstrate successful setup of its distinct
interfaces with the wraparound test emulator (including basic message exchange)
The overall results of Contestant Pass Rate by Test Level for the Stage Two event (of contestants
presented for testing) show that all six contestants passed all Level 0 tests and half of the
contestants (three) passed all Level 1 test cases. Additionally, one-third of the contestants (two)
passed all Level 2 and Level 3 test cases. The 5G Challenge required each contestant to complete
all test cases at each Level before moving to the next Level of test cases.
Because none of the contestant DUs had passed Level 1 after two weeks of testing, we offered
extra lab time (on an equal basis) to all DUs that passed Level 0. Only one DU contestant
accepted the extra time and subsequently passed Level 1. The above statistics reflect four weeks
of testing for one DU and two weeks of testing for all other subsystems.
• The remaining contestants that did not pass all Level 1 tests completed an average of 46% of
the Level 1 tests
• The remaining contestants that did not pass all Level 2 tests completed an average of 17% of
the Level 2 test
• Two contestants’ RAN subsystems completed all four levels of test cases
15
requirements, with the CU the least complex and the DU the most complex. This was reflected in
the time it took to integrate and establish connectivity with the RAN subsystem and the
wraparound testers (i.e., CU being least complex, and DU being most complex).
Two weeks seemed to be sufficient time for wraparound emulation testing of a CU. However,
due to the RU and DU integration complexity, allocating the RU four weeks of testing and the
DU six would have improved the process.
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5. NETWORK INTEGRATION
The goal of Stage Three network testing was to establish a data session across a multi-vendor
RAN with an emulated UE and a commercial 5G SA core and then to characterize the
performance of the fully integrated E2E network under non-stressed and stressed conditions.
The 5G Challenge Rules allowed for an alternate configuration, where up to six contestants
could have participated in Stage Three. In this configuration, two contestants would have
provided O-RAN subsystems and the host lab would have provided the third O-RAN subsystem
(e.g., contestant CU, host lab DU, and contestant RU). This would have allowed for three E2E
integration tasks to operate in parallel, with different sets of contestants.
Several problems prevented this option from being implemented. First, only one DU passed
Stage Two testing, creating a DU bottleneck. Second, one contestant submitted a frequency
division duplex (FDD) RU, but the other contestant and host lab O-RAN subsystems were time
division duplex (TDD). This FDD RU could not be evaluated in Stage Three, which created an
RU bottleneck. Third, some E2E paths were eliminated due to fairness or compliance problems
(e.g., the same vendor’s equipment appeared as both a contestant subsystem and a host lab
component). Therefore, Stage Three consisted of a single E2E configuration.
Stage Three contestants had five weeks to establish E2E network integration. Stage Three test
cases were similar to those in Stage Two. The goal was to assess RAN subsystem capability in
increasing levels of complexity using 3GPP standards and O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications
and test cases as a reference. The four levels of test cases included integration, functional,
performance, and stress as described below.
17
• Level 0, Integration: Objective was, via test cases, to validate the ability of the contestants’
RAN subsystems to successfully integrate with the E2E setup that consisted of a UE
emulator, non-emulated 5G SA core, and other contestants’ subsystems (i.e., CU, DU, and
RU)
• Level 1, Functional: Objective was to verify the contestant subsystem’s compliance with
protocol conformance and baseline functionality of O-RAN ALLIANCE and 3GPP
specifications to establish a successful E2E data transmission across a 5G network
• Level 3, Stress: Objective was to verify the contestant subsystem’s performance across
different KPIs, including throughput, latency, and jitter, for cell edge and loading conditions
with multiple UEs
Stage Three network test cases demonstrated successful E2E bi-directional data sessions with
multiple protocols (μTP, TCP, RTP, FTP and ICMP) across a multi-vendor RAN (with limited
prior integration experience) with a commercial 5G core and UE emulator.
The 5G Challenge demonstrated a multi-vendor RAN that both complied with O-RAN standards
and achieved interoperability with a commercial 5G SA core and a UE emulator within five
weeks. This fast-paced integration had not previously been accomplished.
• Close collaboration and openness to revise software between contestant O-RAN subsystem,
test vendor, commercial 5G core vendor, and host lab
18
Of these lessons learned, we would like to stress the importance of collaboration among diverse
vendors. The 5G Challenge design was informed in part by [28], which identifies potential
obstacles to 5G open architecture deployment. Collaborative efforts between contestant vendors,
host lab, and test equipment vendor resolved three of six potential obstacles: (1) complexity of
integration and deployment; (2) complicated maintenance, including fault finding and
remediation, during operation; and (3) lack of end-to-end coordination for optimization and
upgrades. The other potential obstacles reflect uncertainties associated with this relative newness
of 5G open architectures: (4) piecemeal growth; (5) potential for slower development; and (6)
latency and scalability.
The 5G Challenge confirmed the importance of easily accessible 5G testbeds. Our analysis of 51
responses to a public Notice of Inquiry (NOI) [28] indicated that new market participants need to
test interoperability without waiting for a plugfest or partnering with a large company. This need
is specifically for 5G testbeds that enable hands-on engineering research (i.e., connecting actual
devices to explore the impact of both physics and mechanics). University testbeds focus on
science research, which does not fill this industry need. The 5G Challenge contestants valued and
requested more time “in the lab” at CableLabs, which serves this niche as a not-for-profit
company and the only Open Test and Integration Center (OTIC lab) in North America. To
advance the industry, we need more open, transparent labs that are recognized as unbiased,
trusted agents in which to conduct 5G multi-vendor interoperability research.
The test software played a critical role in the success of the 5G Challenge. The NOI analysis [28]
expressed support for an open-source test suite, but later investigations indicated an insufficient
level of community support. The test suite used by the 5G Challenge was intended to support
development, not compliance testing. This design goal mismatch was exacerbated by our
aggressive schedule. Certain elements of the O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications were newly
released, being revised, or under development when the 5G Challenge launched in April 2022. In
addition to the test suite identifying problems with contestant subsystems, the wraparound
emulation and interoperability testing encountered typical growing pains with the test suite. Such
issues inevitably arise when conducting engineering research that pushes the envelope.
19
6. CONCLUSIONS
The mobile industry is undergoing a transition from a closed, proprietary RAN architecture to an
open, disaggregated RAN architecture. A blueprint of this open RAN architecture is defined in
3GPP standards and O-RAN ALLIANCE specifications, which allows for greater flexibility in
design and network deployment. This presents many advantages to mobile operators by
improving deployment flexibility, network performance, cost reduction, and the ability to
customize service delivery. This also introduces advantages to the overall mobile network
ecosystem by increasing competition, promoting innovation, and driving multi-vendor plug-and-
play capability.
The NTIA/ITS introduced a 5G Challenge event to characterize the state of the open RAN
ecosystem and to drive multi-vendor interoperability. The 5G Challenge was designed to (1)
demonstrate the level of RAN subsystem compliance with industry specifications and (2)
establish E2E bi-directional data sessions with multiple protocols (μTP, TCP, RTP, FTP and
ICMP) across a multi-vendor RAN (with limited prior integration experience of contestants) with
a commercial 5G core and UE emulator in the allocated five-week time frame.
Results of the test event showed that standalone CUs reached the farthest level of integration and
performance, demonstrating the most compliance with industry specifications. Contestant RUs
attained a modest level of completion, while contestant DUs attained only the lowest level of
completion. In addition to design maturity, it was observed that the level of test completion may
correlate to the complexity of RAN subsystem functionality and interface requirements, with the
CU the least complex and the DU the most complex. This suggests that standalone RAN
subsystems are still working towards industry standard compliance.
Results of the test events also demonstrated successful interoperability across a multi-vendor O-
RAN using E2E bi-directional data sessions with multiple protocols with a commercial 5G core
and UE emulator in the allocated five-week time frame. This suggests that the industry
ecosystem is capable of true multi-vendor interoperability with open RAN.
To help drive the industry towards open RAN, key findings for success include: (1) a well-
established baseline set of E2E industry requirements and O-RAN subsystem configurations in
advance of test event; (2) advanced planning for the testing of different spectrum usage
techniques; (3) specialized expert O-RAN developers available during the test event to support
troubleshooting efforts; (4) unbiased host lab with expertise in system integration and advanced
test equipment; (5) sufficient test time for preparation and integration activities; and
(6) commitment to multi-vendor collaboration during troubleshooting and fault remediation.
20
7. REFERENCES
[1] “NG-RAN; Architecture Description,” 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP),
Technical Specification (TS) 38.401, May 2019, version 15.5.0.
https://www.3gpp.org/ftp//Specs/archive/38_series/38.401/38401-f50.zip.
[2] Frank H. Sanders; Kenneth R. Calahan; Geoffrey A. Sanders; Savio Tran, Measurements of
5G New Radio Spectral and Spatial Power Emissions for Radar Altimeter Interference
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, NTIA Technical Report TR-22-562, Oct. 2022.
https://its.ntia.gov/publications/3289.aspx
[4] “Split option 7.2x,” Dell Technologies, VMware, and Mavenir 5G O-RAN Reference
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[5] 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), Specifications & Technologies / Releases.
https://www.3gpp.org/specifications-technologies/releases.
[8] Michele Polese, Leonardo Bonati, Salvatore D’Oro, Stefano Basagni, and Tommaso
Melodia, “Understanding O-RAN: Architecture, Interfaces, Algorithms, Security, and
Research Challenges,” submitted to IEEE, version 2 from Sep. 1, 2022.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01032
[11] Leonardo Bonati, Salvatore D’Oro, Michele Polese, Stefan Basagni, and Tommaso
Melodia, “Intelligence and Learning in O-RAN for Data-driven NextG Cellular Networks,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 59, no. 10, pp. 21–27, Oct. 2021,
doi: 10.1109/MCOM.101.2001120.
[12] Raj Jain and Subharthi Paul, “Network virtualization and software defined networking for
cloud computing: a survey,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 51, no. 11, pp. 24–31,
Nov. 2013, doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2013.6658648.
21
[13] O-RAN ALLIANCE, “O-RAN.WG1.O-RAN-Architecture-Description-v07.00,” Technical
Specification, Oct. 2022. https://orandownloadsweb.azurewebsites.net/specifications
[15] Ashutosh Dutta and Eman Hammad, “5G security challenges and opportunities: a system
approach,” 2020 IEEE 3rd 5G World Forum (5GWF), 2020, pp. 109–114,
doi:10.1109/5GWF49715.2020.9221122.
[16] Chih-Ting Shen et al., “Security Threat Analysis and Treatment Strategy for ORAN,” 2022
24th International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), 2022,
pp. 417–422, doi: 10.23919/ICACT53585.2022.9728862.
[17] Open RAN Policy Coalition, “Open RAN Security in 5G,” Apr. 2021.
https://www.openranpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Open-RAN-Security-in-5G-
4.29.21.pdf
[18] Federal Communications Commission, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, “List
of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated
Sept. 20, 2022. https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.
[19] Xinxing Ding, Feng Zhao, Lijuan Yan and Xiaodong Shao, “The Method of Building
SBOM Based on Enterprise Big Data,” 2019 3rd International Conference on Electronic
Information Technology and Computer Engineering (EITCE), 2019, pp. 1224–1228,
doi: 10.1109/EITCE47263.2019.9094817.
[21] Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 14028: Improving the Nation's
Cybersecurity, May 12, 2021, Code of Federal Regulation, 86 FR 26633.
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nations-cybersecurity
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SBOM Myths vs. Facts, Nov. 2021. https://www.ntia.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
sbom_myths_vs_facts_nov2021_0.pdf
[24] Seth Carmody et al., “Building resilient medical technology supply chains with a software
bill of materials,” Nature Partner Journal (npj) Digit. Med., vol. 4, no. 34, 2021.
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[25] Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2020, Public Law 116-129, 116th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2020),
134. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-116publ129.
[26] L. Jean Camp and Vafa Andalibi, “SBoM Vulnerability Assessment & Corresponding
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[27] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency,
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23
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the Department of Defense representatives Dolores Shaffer and
T. K. Woodward for their technical contributions. The authors would also like to thank the many
5G experts from industry, academia, government, and standards-developing organizations who
took the time talk with us about 5G technology.
24
NTIA FORM 29 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(4-80) NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
15. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or
literature survey, mention it here.)
Today’s mobile wireless networks comprise many proprietary solutions with custom, closed-source software and
hardware. Changes to these proprietary elements require complex and meticulous verification of the entire network. This
dynamic increases costs, slows innovation, reduces competition, and makes security issues difficult to detect and fix. Our
vision is to accelerate adoption of 5G open interfaces, interoperable components, and multi-vendor solutions by fostering a
large, vibrant, and growing vendor community dedicated to advancing 5G interoperability towards true plug-and-play
operation. This memo describes the “5G Challenge Preliminary Event: RAN Subsystem Interoperability” conducted by
the U.S. in 2022. Contestants submitted Open RAN radio units (O-RU), distributed units (O-DU), and central units (O-
CU). We evaluated each subsystem individually in an emulated environment. Our tight testing timeline consisted of one
week of preparation and two weeks of emulated wraparound testing. We then integrated subsystems from multiple
vendors to create an end-to-end network. In true plug-and-play fashion, contestants approached network integration with
no prior experience interoperating with their fellow contestants’ subsystems. The 5G Challenge provided a rigorous five-
week schedule for end-to-end integration and testing. Contestants worked through diverse issues, from software options to
discrepant hardware. This successful event demonstrated end-to-end data communication sessions using multiple
protocols across a multi-vendor, interoperable, Open RAN architecture.
16. Key Words (Alphabetical order, separated by semicolons)
17. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 18. Security Class. (This report) 20. Number of pages
UNLIMITED. Unclassified 34
19. Security Class. (This page) 21. Price:
FOR OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION.
Unclassified N/A
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