EN BANC

[G.R. No. 97710. September 26, 1991.]

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC , petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES

MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative
who may be appointed vice representative Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C . Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for

petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

SYLLABUS

1. Â POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; DEFINED. — The

accepted meaning of "political question" is that "where the matter involved
is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the
sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of
the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits
where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or
any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
2. Â ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTIONAL; DEFINES "JUDICIAL POWER." — Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines judicial power as both
authority and duty of the courts "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
3. Â ID.; ID.; HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT UNDER THE 1935
CONSTITUTION. — Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall
be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." Section 17
reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision
on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is
now based on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and
second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
4. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT AND NON-PARTISAN. — The use of
the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of
the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,
1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although
two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission
applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives: "The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal
for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members. "The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National
Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained in the legislature." "The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the
House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies
which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise
and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.) To be able to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts. "The Electoral
Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature. "The Electoral
Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
5. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TO REMOVE A MEMBER FROM THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so
zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, be a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the
majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve
the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of
Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole
judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such
interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House
Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power. The expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly
interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive
Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the
House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
6. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND "BREACH OF PARTY
DISCIPLINE" NOT VALID GROUND FOR TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP
THEREIN. — As judges, the members of the House Electoral Tribunal must be
non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence — even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach
of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
7. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBERS THEREIN ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE;
REMOVAL MUST BE FOR A VALID CAUSE. — The resolution of the House of
Representatives expelling Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura
has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

1. Â POLITICAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF "SEPARATION OF POWERS";

EXPLAINED. — A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that
the powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments
is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one
deriving its authority directly from the fundamental law. As Mr. Justice
Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not only coordinate, they
are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each
is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other,
they are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to
say, one department may not control or even interfere with another in the
exercise of its particular functions ." The completeness of their separation
and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the point that those
in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in
authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as
nugatory and not binding in every other department. In other words, one
department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the
constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has
been delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department
alone, to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it
free from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever.
2. Â ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE POWER TO APPOINT OR
DESIGNATE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE
POWER TO REMOVE SAID MEMBER. — The power to appoint or designate a
member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal must, necessarily include the power to remove said
member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where
such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the political
parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected,
no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said,
is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency.
3. Â ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW
ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR ACTION OF LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT TAKEN IN
THE EXERCISE OF POWER COMMITTED EXCLUSIVELY TO IT BY THE
CONSTITUTION; CASE AT BAR. — The judicial department, in my opinion, has
no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively
to it by the Constitution. It is not within the province of this Court to
supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts as to keep them within the
bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, are exclusively
of legislative concern. To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle
of separation of powers. Even assuming that the act of the House of
Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how
Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests before said Tribunal,
this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the House of
Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

POLITICAL LAW; "POLITICAL QUESTION"; BEYOND JUDICIAL

INTERFERENCE. — I believe that the question, can the Court annul an act of
Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question
and a question in which the Court can not intervene. It is true that under the
Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or
discard the principle of separation of powers. Evidently, Congressman
Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers
within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices
should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J : p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of

Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart
the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that
action of the House? LLphil

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in
Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a
legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government,
finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be
considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other
two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest
branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political
confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in
the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which
is that "where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in
their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the
legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial
cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was
either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the
courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.).
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially
when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As we pointed out
in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted
either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry,
for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done
and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the
actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does
not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It
does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive
action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this
case. It is —
"a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in
courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. . . . It is
simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a
case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law." (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987,
Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda 31,700 votes
 Emigdio A. Bondoc 28,400 votes
Difference 3,300 votes
Â
On May 19,1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due
time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of
nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the
remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice Â
Supreme Court Â
 Â
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice Â
Supreme Court Â
 Â
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice Â
Supreme Court Â
 Â
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman Â
1st Dist., Benguet Â
LDP Â
 Â
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman Â
1st Dist., Palawan Â
LDP Â
 Â
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman 2nd Dist., Nueva
Â
Ecija
LDP Â
 Â
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman Â
1st Dist., Davao del Sur Â
LDP Â
 Â
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman Â
4th Dist., Batangas Â
LDP Â
 Â
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
 Congressman Â
2nd Dist., Zamboanga del Sur Â
(formerly GAD, now NP). Â
Â

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and

submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in
July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP
members in the Tribunal insisted on a re appreciation and recount of the
ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months
the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in
increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura
voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest. LLpr

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on

March 4, 1991, to his "Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP
Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he
voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self-respect," and to
honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that
they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot 1
Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which
went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of
Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the
notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc
decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by
letter 2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at
Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91, had already expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political
party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical
and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives,
and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the
House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it "especially
in matters where party membership is a prerequisite." 4
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal,
Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March
13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from
the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March
13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter
reads as follows:
"13 March 1991
"Honorable Justice Ameurfina
 Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives
 Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
"Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

"I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the
decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on
13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election
of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-
explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.

"Thank you.

"For the Secretary-General

"(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon

"Officer-in-charge

Operations Department"

(p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing
development" and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
because —
"By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the
decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v.
Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991,
is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78,
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal
impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a
5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have
been defeated.
"The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as
October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-
appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be
deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a
margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in
by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and
Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and
Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E.
Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
"Congressman Camasura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pined case
was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect
of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leadership of
his party.
"Under the above circumstances, an untenable situation has
come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in
the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its integrity and
credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is
clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is
being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not
be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by
factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before
it.
"In this connection, our own experience teaches that the
provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to
provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or
Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of
votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from
the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can
dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
"In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps
sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as
the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate.
In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements
playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
"We suggest that there should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral
Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation
with their respective political parties, to insure their independence
and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
"There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the
Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March
1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case
No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
"But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the
constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the
 completion of the present congressional term.
"Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be
relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
"xxx xxx xxx".
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the
decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
"In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45
this morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary
session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to
cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET
Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without
Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of
five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal
and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
"The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the
Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development
undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly
adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a
letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also
manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.
"The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce
de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar
intention." (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for
relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to
return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that: LibLex

". . . in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the

Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all
members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely
legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that
in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators,
thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no
longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as
impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster
the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every
member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated
except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request
of Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their
membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS
 its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which
performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of
legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the new that the term of
all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term
and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to
REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to
the said Tribunal in the first instance.
"Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I
wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original
vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial
travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave."
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M.
Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., or any other
representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanito G.
Camasura Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying
this Court to:

1. Â Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13,

1991, "to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Â Issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or

whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura from
assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Â Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to

immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Â Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course,
required the respondents to comment 5 on the petition within ten days from
notice and to enjoin the HRET "from reorganizing and allowing participation
in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanito G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the
nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as
member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this
Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the
petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates
and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in
the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion
from the political party; 6 that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-
extensive with his legislative term, 7 for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified; 8 and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP 9
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is
the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives, hence, it is a purely
political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol
alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he
has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. 11
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET, that withdrew and
rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET. 12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar
vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous
because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The
petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his
rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Juanito Camasura as a member of the HRET. 13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued
that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of
the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling
the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice. 14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable
party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is
accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to
acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision
as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the
Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid." 15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner
explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the
respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had
announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the
HRET, several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take
Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal. 16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution
to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to
that question. It provides:
"Sec. 17. Â The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in
the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,
except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the
tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the
political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each
of the first and second largest political aggravations in the Legislature. The
1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 11. Â The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (1935
Constitution of the Philippines.).
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it
was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the
Batasang Pambansa. LLpr

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive
jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives ( Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ,
G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a
nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a
non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said
about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of
the Senate and House of Representatives:
 "The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid
of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining
to contested elections of its members.
"The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the
National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained in the legislature."
"The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were
created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members
of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which
must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise
and control them, without any legislative interference." (Suanes vs.
Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature
nor with the Courts.
"The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ;
while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx.
"The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for
the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may
not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved

undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the
subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:

"MR. MAAMBONG. Â Thank you.

"My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can.

In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the
Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional
creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan
and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the
Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good
distinction?.
"MR. AZCUNA. Â That is an excellent statement.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â Could we, therefore, say that either the
Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a
constitutional body?
"MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â If it is a constitutional body, is it then
subject to constitutional restrictions?
"MR. AZCUNA. Â It would be subject to constitutional
restrictions intended for that body.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â I see. But I want to find out if the ruling
in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to
the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral
tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would
that ruling still be valid?
"MR. AZCUNA. Â Yes, they are not separate departments
because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive
and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â Although they are not separate
departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be
applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the
Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent
from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and,
therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals.
"MR. AZCUNA. Â I think that is correct. They are independent
although they are not a separate branch of government.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto
themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the
election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have
this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
"Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral
tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we have an
independent electoral tribunal?
"MR. AZCUNA. Â To the extent that the electoral tribunals
are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say:
`The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal.' It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the
House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â But both of them, as we have agreed
on, are independent from both bodies?
 "MR. AZCUNA. Â That is correct.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â This is the bottom line of my question.
How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still
have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?
"MR. AZCUNA. Â Politicians can be independent, Madam
President.
"MR. MAAMBONG. Â Madam President, when we discussed a
portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a
comment by Chief Justice Concepcion — Commissioner Concepcion —
that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals,
considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact
that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral
Tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law
and justice with complete detachment from all political
considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we
could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting
there.
"MR. AZCUNA. Â The same reason that the Gentleman, while
chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence,
shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think
we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be
independent." (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986,
Emphasis ours.)
Resolution of the House of
Representatives violates
the independence of the HRET. —
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, be a myth and
its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party
therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP,
because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the
work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool
for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices
of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of
the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not
a valid cause for
termination of membership
in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence — even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote"
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman
Camasura violates his
right to security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House
of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to
security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura
has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure. LLjur

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members

of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because,
as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed
before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced
by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence
to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that
those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political
implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman
Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from
the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted
on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail
the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from,
and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to
the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The
purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and
so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for
Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the
House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the
Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the
protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the
House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor
indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the
Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect
his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must
perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the
highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J.
Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and
valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the
Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in
his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of
the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which
created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr.
Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as
a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation
of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A.
Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in
the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of
electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the
interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED,
effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
 SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of
Representatives, assuming that said act were politically motivated, but well
within the constitutional parameters of its authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on
the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of
Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its nomination to the House
Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order
Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the
majority's posture which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental
doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for this
reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers
of government are distributed among three (3) great departments:
legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is separate
from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its
authority directly from the fundamental law. 1 As Mr. Justice Moreland
summarized, "the three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-
equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is
unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other, they
are nevertheless in many senses independent of each other. That is to say,
one department may not control or even interfere with another in the
exercise of its particular functions." ' 2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does
not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in one department
can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done
pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in
every other department. 3 In other words, one department must not
encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the constitutional
competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to
the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from
any encroachment or interference of whomsoever. 4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the
judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial review and prudent
refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political questions. 5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House
of Representatives withdrew and rescinded the nomination of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it
seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr.
informing the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of
Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for
allegedly having invited other LDP members to join the said political party.
As a result of this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral
Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of Representatives
and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a ploy to thwart the promulgation of
a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner Bondoc) against
Marciano M, Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP), and which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner
contends that not only does the action of the House of Representatives
violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also
violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral
tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the
House of Representatives has the sole authority to nominate and select from
among its members who are to sit in the House Electoral Tribunal, upon
recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole
power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio
in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion of a House
member from a political party. A Tribunal member's term of office in said
electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his
legislative term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political affiliation may be
completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal changes
party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the
House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of the tribunal are
Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of
the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party
list system. 6 The House of Representatives has the power to nominate the
members of the House Electoral Tribunal (representing the House) provided,
of course, that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended
to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing the House of
Representatives) after the majority party in the House has expelled him from
its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of
the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to remove said
member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where
such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the political
parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected,
no matter how politically motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said,
is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency. 7 The
question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is,
does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done
and not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has
done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act
done within the constitutional authority to the legislature? I believe not, in
the same way that, for instance, the House cannot question the act of the
Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as
members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as — who will be
designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they
should vote — surely are matters that not merely concern political action as
far as members of the House are concerned, but are the very essence of
political action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of
justice to such political controversies would have courts sit in judgment over
the manifold disputes engendered by political maneuvers and skirmishes.
This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run could
undermine and destroy their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even
the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in
the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution . 8 It is
not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee
legislative acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and
common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively of legislative
concern. 9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of
separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot
find among the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the scope of that
'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be understood that the three (3)
'Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a
Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without
any mutual dependence. What could be better evidence of complete
dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department'
as to its authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another?
Such a doctrine makes supreme the 'Department' that has the last word ." 10
(Emphasis supplied).
 The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division
of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its own ideology and to
the constitutional commandments. This may be because the society is still
unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily
accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decision
making function and special interest groups have stepped in to fill the
vacuum. In either case, the Court can neither validate a clearly
unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as guardian to
claims offered, nor invalidate a functioning system with an order which
would be ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige
which is the Court's primary source of power." 11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as
a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically motivated,
precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one
of the electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient
reason to invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is done
within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what other act of the
House (or Senate) is there that is not politically motivated? After all, that
branch of government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically
all of its acts are and will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion,
bring it within the Court's power to strike down the legislative act in
question, it is the people of this nation — not this court — who should
ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot
arrogate unto itself the power to institute what it perceives to be political
reforms, for in the last analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a
political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary for
any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will
result. It is the responsibility of the people and none other, to remain ever
vigilant about their government to the end that they can continue to live
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to the
Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic
government itself.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SARMIENTO, J ., dissenting:

Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am

unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the question, as Justice
Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its
House Electoral Tribunal? — is a political question and a question in which
the Court can not intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes
the power to strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but the
Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a
result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is
above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the
"dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.
Â
Footnotes

1. Â Annex B, p. 29, Rollo.

2. Â Annex D, p. 34, Rollo.

3. Â Resolution No. 03-91, p. 35, Rollo.

4. Â Annex D-2, p. 36, Rollo.

5. Â The comments of the respondents were later treated as their answers to

the petition to which the Court gave due course.

6. Â p. 53, Rollo.

7. Â p. 93, Rollo.

8. Â p. 94, Rollo.

9. Â p. 111, Rollo.

10. Â p. 99, Rollo.

11. Â p. 127, Rollo.

12. Â p. 130, Rollo.

13. Â p. 142, Rollo.

14. Â p. 150, Rollo.

15. Â p. 152, Rollo.

16. Â p. 157, Rollo.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

1. Â People vs. Vera, 65 Phil 56.

2. Â Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 338, 349.

3. Â Kilbourn vs. Thomson, 103 US 168, 25 L. ed. 177; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil.
612.

4. Â Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada, et al. vs. Mariano Jesus Cuenco, et al.,
G.R. No. L-10520, 28 February 1957.

5. Â Neptali Gonzales, Philippine Political Law, 1966 ed., p. 102.

6. Â Section 17, Article n, 1987 Constitution.

7. Â Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 182.
8. Â Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.

9. Â People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535.

10. Â delivered on occasion of the Oliver Wendell Homes Lecture of 1958 and
published in LEARNED HAND, The Bill of Rights 4 (1958).

11. Â Philip a Strum, "The Supreme Court and Political Questions" a study in
judicial evasion, 1974 ed., p. 103.