Updated January 16, 2024
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Since 2005, the United States has imposed sanctions on Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Venezuelan individuals and entities that have engaged in Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
criminal, antidemocratic, and/or corrupt actions. The Trump determination (most recently in May 2023) that Venezuela
Administration expanded U.S. sanctions beyond is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism
individually targeted sanctions to include broader financial efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
sanctions, sectoral sanctions, and sanctions on the Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The United States has
government of Nicolás Maduro. Those sanctions failed to prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to
dislodge Maduro and contributed to an economic crisis in Venezuela. U.S. Department of Commerce export controls
the country that has prompted 7.7 million Venezuelans to related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including
flee. The Biden Administration has sought to leverage expanded restrictions since mid-2020 on sales to military
sanctions relief to incentivize Maduro to allow presidential end users. In 2008, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
elections in 2024 to be as free and fair as possible, but the 13224, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two
Venezuelan government has thus far continued to bar individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as
opposition primary winner Maria Corina Machado from Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset
running. blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Recent Developments
On October 18, 2023, the Biden Administration issued Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
licenses easing energy sanctions on Venezuela through Treasury has imposed asset blocking sanctions on 11
April 2024 after Maduro and the opposition signed the individuals and 25 companies with connections to
Barbados Accord, which included a roadmap toward Venezuela by designating them as Specially Designated
holding competitive elections. U.S. officials warned that the Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
licenses could be revoked if the Maduro government did Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as
not create a process to allow all barred candidates to run amended; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
and release wrongfully detained Americans and Venezuelan
political prisoners. Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In late November 2023, the Maduro government announced In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
that candidates barred from office could appeal to the enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
supreme court. Machado appealed; the court’s decision is Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
pending. In December, the Maduro government released 20 Among its provisions, the law required the President to
political prisoners, 10 imprisoned Americans, and Leonard impose sanctions on those the President identified as
Francis, an American fugitive indicted in a naval bribery responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human
scandal. In addition to sanctions relief, the United States rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended
released Alex Saab, a U.S.-sanctioned ally of Maduro these sanctions authorizations through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
indicted on U.S. money laundering charges.
President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-
The 118th Congress is closely monitoring the degree to 278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July
which the Maduro government complies with the Barbados 2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
Accord linked to U.S. sanctions relief and could seek to blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
modify U.S. sanctions policy. Unless otherwise noted, policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
information in this product is drawn from the Treasury serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
The product does not discuss foreign aid restrictions. public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
Visa Restrictions activities, as well as current or former government officials.
Since FY2018, the State Department has imposed visa Even though the sanctions authorities in P.L. 116-94
restrictions related to corruption or human rights abuses expired in December 2023, the President still has the
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State, authority to impose them under E.O. 13692.
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
acts on 15 Venezuelans. The State Department also has Treasury has imposed SDN sanctions on more than 110
privately revoked the visas of Venezuelans, including those Venezuelans and at least eight entities pursuant to E.O.
of current Venezuelan officials and their families. 13692. Those individuals include President Maduro, his
wife, and his son; Vice President Delcy Rodríguez; Defense
Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez; supreme court judges;
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
and governors. The Biden Administration has not Biden Administration: Licenses
designated any new individuals or entities to date. Since 2019, OFAC has issued and amended licenses to
allow certain transactions. The Biden Administration has
Additional Financial Sanctions issued licenses to encourage the Maduro government to
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on negotiate a path to free and fair elections. In May 2022,
Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights OFAC allowed Chevron, the only major U.S. energy
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017, company still in Venezuela, to discuss future operations
President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited with PdVSA. In November 2022, after negotiations
access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan restarted, OFAC issued a license allowing Chevron to
government, including state energy company Petróleos de resume production, import, and export of petroleum
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), with certain exceptions intended products at its existing joint ventures in Venezuela. On
to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. October 18, 2023, Treasury
interests. In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O.
13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan • issued a six-month general license temporarily
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token. authorizing transactions involving the oil and gas sector
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which in Venezuela;
prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan
debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral. • issued another general license authorizing transactions
with Minerven, in part to reduce illicit gold trading; and
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850. • removed bans on the secondary trading of certain
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and Venezuelan bonds and PdVSA debt and equity.
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated Resuming oil trade with Venezuela and allowing
sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt Venezuelan gas to be developed and exported to European
transactions with the Maduro government. allies could advance U.S. energy and security interests.
These licenses also may bolster Venezuela’s economy and
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury reduce emigration, another U.S. policy goal. It remains to
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the be seen whether the Biden Administration will extend these
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury licenses beyond April 2024, however, as few observers
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The predict that Maduro officials will allow even a minimally
E.O froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA competitive election to occur.
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons
(companies or individuals) from engaging in transactions Congressional Considerations
with the company. Treasury also sanctioned Venezuela’s Congress has maintained broad support for a negotiated
Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state- solution to the crisis in Venezuela leading to free and fair
owned gold company, Minerven. Treasury has imposed elections. In 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 22 individuals, 91 included the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy
entities, and 47 vessels, none of which were designated Assistance, and Development (VERDAD) Act (S. 1025).
under the Biden Administration. The law extended targeted sanctions regarding corruption
and undemocratic actions through 2023. Legislation to
Sanctions on the Maduro Government reauthorize sanctions authorities in the VERDAD Act has
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884, been introduced but not considered (H.R. 6831/S. 3363).
freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United Other introduced legislation would create new sanctionable
States and within the control of U.S. persons. The order offenses (H.R. 5670), impose visa restrictions on
prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with individuals who support Venezuela (S. 1129), and codify
the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O. selected executive orders and create U.S. foreign aid
13884 also authorized financial sanctions and visa restrictions on countries that militarily support Venezuela
restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro (S. 995).
government. There are five individuals and one entity
designated under this executive order, none of which were Some in Congress have supported sanctions relief, arguing
designated by the Biden Administration. that broad sanctions have not achieved their aims and have
hurt the Venezuelan people. In contrast, other Members of
To allow assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC Congress have opposed sanctions relief and have
issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of
delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine; Venezuelan oil (S. 3053). They have urged the Biden
remittances; international organizations; and Administration to revoke the licenses granted in October
communications services. A 2021 Government 2023, arguing the Maduro-aligned supreme court is unlikely
Accountability Office report found that, despite those to allow Machado’s candidacy. See CRS In Focus IF10230,
licenses, overcompliance with U.S. sanctions had limited Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy.
some humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
IF10715
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 44 · UPDATED
