Journal of Military Ethics,

Vol. 6, No. 4, 280
291, 2007

Comrades or Friends? On Friendship

in the Armed Forces
DESIREE VERWEIJ
Section of Military Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, Faculty of Military Sciences,
Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT This article discusses the difference between comradeship, brotherhood, and
friendship in a military context. The difference between these bonds will be made clear with
the help of the story of Achilles and Patroclus, poems of the war poets, and Aristotle’s books on
friendship in the Ethica Nicomachea, amplified with insightful reflections on this classical text by
several present-day philosophers.

KEY WORDS: Comradeship, friendship, friendship as a ‘school of virtue’

Introduction
Comradeship and the bond of ‘brothers’ in arms seems to be a special kind of
friendship; it is an important and necessary bond in the military. But is
comradeship or ‘brotherhood’ really friendship, or is it the shared predica-
ment, the solidarity in the shared destiny, that binds comrades and ‘brothers’
in arms? Can friendship, as discussed by several philosophers, contribute to
these bonds? If these philosophers are right in stating that friendship can be
seen as a ‘school of virtue’, this question has to be answered affirmatively. At
least, it seems that way. But what is the meaning and consequence of this
statement, especially in a military context?
In order to address these questions, I will start with the story of Achilles
and Patroclus, one of the oldest stories of brotherhood in arms, and
subsequently discuss the brotherly love that is illustrated in the poems of
the war poets. This discussion will underline the importance of looking
deeper into the difference between comrades, ‘brothers’, and friends, which
will be done with the help of Aristotle’s books on friendship in the Ethica
Nicomachea, and insightful reflections on this classical text by several present-
day philosophers.

Correspondence Address: D. E. M. Verweij, Philosophy and Ethics, Netherlands Defence Academy Faculty
of Military Sciences, Section Military Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, PO Box 90.002, 4800 PA
Breda, The Netherlands. Tel: 31 765273251. Fax: 31 765273255. E-mail: dem.verweij@nlda.nl

1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/07/040280
12 # 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/15027570701755398
 Friendship in the Armed Forces 281

Achilles and Patroclus

Achilles, one of the most popular heroes in Greek and Roman culture, was
immortal and thus invulnerable except for his heel
no wonder he was
recruited by Nestor and Odysseus in their battle against Troy. Achilles had a
close friend, his older cousin Patroclus, who was less strong than Achilles, but
very dear to him. It was Achilles who, after landing on the Trojan shore, was
able to slay Cycnus, the son of Poseidon, which made the Trojans flee back to
their city (Graves 1960: 296). The city itself, however, could not be taken.
Together with a group of volunteers, Achilles ravaged the Trojan countryside
(Graves 1960: 298). He seems to have killed everyone that was somehow in his
way and took many cities that were allied to Troy.
During one of the Trojan winters, in which no fighting took place since
winter was not considered battle season, Achilles fell in love with Polyxene,
the daughter of the Trojan king Priam and Queen Hecabe. Polyxene’s brother
Hector was asked on what terms Achilles could marry Polyxene. Hector
answered: ‘She shall be his on the day that he betrays the Greek camp to my
father Priam’ (ibid.: 305). We are told that Achilles was willing to accept this
condition, but hesitated when he was informed that, if he failed to betray the
camp, he must swear instead to murder Ajax and the sons of Athenian
Pleisthenes (ibid.). When spring came and the fighting resumed, Zeus decided
to help the Trojans by plaguing the Greeks. Things became even worse for the
Greeks when Agamemnon fell out with Achilles. This happened when the
Gods asked Agamemnon to send Chryseis, a kidnapped girl held captive by
Agamemnon, back to her father. Agamemnon obeyed reluctantly and
recouped his loss by claiming Briseis, another captured girl that was allotted
to Achilles. Achilles was furious and announced that he would take no further
part in the war (ibid.: 306). However, according to Graves, some say that
Achilles kept on fighting in order to show his goodwill towards Priam,
Polyxene’s father (ibid.).
Whatever the case, Achilles withdrew from the fighting. Even when he was
challenged by Hector to man-to-man combat, he stated that he had retired
from combat and Ajax took Achilles’ place. As the story goes, Ajax and
Hector fought without pause until sunset and were then parted by heralds.
They praised each other’s skill and courage, and exchanged presents (ibid.).
It was the death of his beloved friend Patroclus that made Achilles take up
arms again. Patroclus was killed in his fight against the Trojans who had set
Protesilaus’s ship on fire. He was dressed in Achilles’ suit of armour and had
chased the Trojan army back to the city. But Apollo, coming to the rescue of
the Trojans, created the opportunity for Hector to kill Patroclus. ‘Achilles, on
hearing the news, rolled in the dust, and yielded to an ecstasy of grief’ (ibid.:
308). Graves refers to several historical sources, including Homer’s Iliad, to
support his description. Achilles set out to avenge Patroclus. ‘None could
stand against his wrath’ (ibid.). He challenged Hector, and all parties stopped
fighting and drew back to watch Achilles fight Hector and eventually kill him.
He refused his (Hector’s) dying plea that his body might be ransomed for
burial. ‘After possessing himself of the armour, Achilles slit the flesh behind
282 D. E. M. Verweij

the tendons of Hector’s heels. He then passed leather thongs through the slits,
secured them to his chariot and sweeping up the horses, dragged the body
towards the ships. Hector’s head, its black locks streaming on either side,
churned up a cloud of dust behind him’ (ibid.: 309).
Achilles then buried Patroclus and, on the funeral pyre, he sacrificed
horses, dogs, and Trojan captives in honour of his friend. But all this did not
help him come to terms with the loss of his beloved brother in arms. ‘Still
consumed by grief, Achilles rose every day at dawn to drag Hector’s body
three times around Patroclus’ tomb’ (ibid.), until the gods finally had enough
and decided to put a stop to a situation that was becoming highly
unacceptable. They arranged for Priam, Hector’s father, and Achilles to
come to an agreement. The ransom that was agreed upon was Hector’s weight
in gold (ibid.).
The story of Achilles and Patroclus is a story about the love of brothers in
arms and about the consequences this love might have. Achilles’ love for
Patroclus makes him inconsolable, and most of all furious, when his beloved
friend is killed. Not being the prototype of a humanitarian hero, Achilles tries
to find consolation in the maltreatment of Hector’s dead body. Even the
Greek gods, by definition not humane in their plotting and scheming, are
appalled by Achilles’ violation of Hector’s dead body.
Are the Greek narrators telling us that the stronger the bond between
‘brothers’, the stronger the hatred for the person who kills one’s ‘brother’?
Does this mean that brotherhood poses a potential problem? Yet, brother-
hood seems of the utmost importance in the context of war. One needs
brothers and comrades in these circumstances, and one needs friends.
Moreover, problematic circumstances create deep friendship. In tragic
experiences, people are confronted with the depths of human existence.
Ricoeur (1995) maintains that sharing our experience of human suffering
creates feelings that are valuable and enriching, feelings to which we have no
access on our own. This becomes clear in the texts of the so-called war poets.

The War Poets

According to Giddings (1988), the First World War inspired many poets; in
fact, some of the best war poetry was written during this period. War poets
such as Owen, Graves, and Sassoon tried to capture their harrowing
experiences in words.
Many poems display comradeship as the commitment to and involvement
with their brothers in arms. They illustrate their brotherly love and their
identification with the pain of the other. It is their shared predicament, the
solidarity in the shared destiny, that seems to bind brothers in arms. The
involvement with and commitment to one’s brother in arms is clearly
expressed in ‘The Dug-Out’ by Sassoon:
The Dug-Out
Why do you lie with your legs ungainly huddled,
And one arm bent across your sullen cold
Exhausted face? It hurts my heart to watch you,
 Friendship in the Armed Forces 283

Deep-shadow’d from the candle’s guttering gold:

And you wonder why I shake you by the shoulder;
Drowsy, you mumble and sigh and shift your head . . .
You are too young to fall asleep for ever;
And when you sleep you remind me of the dead.

(Sassoon, cited in Giddings 1988: 168)

The involvement with and commitment to the brother in arms is expressed in

the fear that he will die, as many have before him. The poet even tries to wake
his comrade when he is asleep to make sure he is still breathing. The intense
emotions that arise when a brother in arms is fatally wounded are expressed
by Nichols in his poem ‘Casualty’:
Casualty
They are bringing him down,
He looks at me wanly.
The bandages are brown,
Brown with mud, red only-
But how deep a red! In the breast of the shirt,
Deepening red too, as each whistling breath
Is drawn with the suck of a slow-filling squirt
While waxen cheeks waste to the pallor of death.
O my comrade!
My comrade that you could rest
Your tired body on mine, that your head might be laid
Fallen and heavy
upon this my breast,
That I might take your hands in my hands
To chafe! That abandoned your body might sink
Upon mine, which here helplessly, grievously stands;
That your body might drink
Warmth from my body, strength from my veins,
Life from my heart that monstrously beats,
Beats, beats and strains
After you vainly!
The trench curves. They are gone.
The steep rain teems down.
O my companion!
Who were you? How did you come,
Looking so wanly upon me? I know

And O, how immensely long I have known

Those aching eyes, numb face, gradual gloom,
That depth without groan!
Take now my love
this love which alone
I can give you
and shed without pain

That life if I could I would succour,
Even as it were,
This, this, my poor own!

(Nichols, cited in Giddings 1988: 84)

The comrade, the companion with whom the poet shares his predicament of a
hellish war, is mortally wounded. The poet wants to do everything to help
him. He wants to give him ‘warmth’ from his ‘body’, ‘strength’ from his
284 D. E. M. Verweij

‘veins’, and ‘life’ from his ‘heart’. The words ‘my comrade’ and ‘my
companion’
both with exclamation marks
refer to the person the poet
loves deeply because of what they both share: the pain, the despair, the
presence of death.

Comradeship: Brotherhood or Friendship?

Sharing the same predicament, sharing ‘hell’, ‘pain’, ‘death’, and the ‘abyssal
horrors’ of war, as described in the poems above, creates strong bonds. The
bonds of comrades are forged by experiences that cut deep into one’s soul and
leave wounds that never heal completely. Because the comrades were all there,
because they all know what it was like and how it felt, and still feels
sometimes, the comrades love each other. This is also indicated by Shannon
French: ‘Comrades in arms come to feel an intense love for one another [ . . .]
The love a warrior has for his comrades is what gives him the strength to
stand against the dreadful tide of a heavily armed, charging host of enemies’
(2003: 12).
In this context, French quotes William Manchester from Goodbye
Darkness, a book about his experiences in World War II:
I understand, at last, why I jumped hospital that Saturday thirty-five years ago and, in
violation of orders, returned to the front and almost certain death. It was an act of love.
Those men on the line were my family, my home. [ . . .] They had never let me down, and I
couldn’t do it to them. I had to be with them, rather than let them die and me live with
the knowledge that I might have saved them. Men I know do not fight for flag and
country, for the Marine Corps, or glory or any other abstraction. They fight for one
another.’ (ibid.: 12)

This strong bond is also found in research on military fighting units. Kelman
and Hamilton, for instance, argue, with reference to Shils and Janowitz (1948)
and Lang (1968), that soldiers in a combat situation are prepared to take the
heavy risks demanded of them out of loyalty to their comrades in the
immediate fighting unit (1989: 95).
The mutual love of comrades and the dedication towards each other are
necessary for survival, and it is self-evident that this is not only to the
advantage of the warrior in question but also to the advantage of the military
organization as such. Moreover, comradeship seems to be the cement of the
Defence organization. The close bond between comrades benefits both the
organization and the comrades. Facing abyssal horrors is something better
not done on one’s own. In these circumstances one needs comrades.
However, are these comrades ‘brothers’ or friends? Or, to put it differently,
does one need brotherhood or friendship in the armed forces? This question
assumes growing importance against the background of the objections raised
against brotherhood by several philosophers at different periods in time, for
instance, Arendt (1968) and Derrida (1994). According to Arendt, brother-
hood denies plurality. It focuses on a homogenous ‘we’ in which there is no
room for ethnic or religious difference. There is not even room for different
views amongst the ‘brothers’. There is no room for ‘alterity’, as Derrida puts
 Friendship in the Armed Forces 285

it. He also objects to brotherhood, especially to its patriarchal structure, in

which there is no place for the ‘sister’ or for anyone who differs from the
‘brothers’. According to both Arendt and Derrida, not accepting room for
difference or denying difference and striving for a homogenous ‘we’ is a
danger to the political value of friendship. (The political value of friendship
refers to the bonds between people in the public sphere; it will be discussed in
the next section.) This statement about the political value of friendship is
interesting, for it illustrates that both philosophers do not criticize strong
bonds as such. What is criticized by Arendt and Derrida is the homogenous,
seclusive ‘we’ that does not accept any breaking through of this ‘we’. Anyone
or anything that does not belong to ‘us’ becomes a danger, a threat, and will
be treated accordingly. Brotherhood in this sense is not typical for the
military, it also occurs in other segments of society (political parties, religious
groups, etc.).
In a military context, the close bonds in a group, brought about by difficult
circumstances (as illustrated in the section above) and thus by the necessity of
mutual trust, can degenerate into intolerance and the violent defence of group
norms. The ways in which strong bonds between ‘brothers’ can become
dysfunctional and thus dangerous are reflected in the practices of some small,
isolated military units. It was present, for instance, in the torture practices of
Canadian Paratroopers in Somalia in 1992
1993 (Winslow 1998) or the
comparable practices of Dutch military units in Indonesia in 1947
1949
(Doorn & Hendrix 1970).
Thus, brotherhood, and also brotherhood between ‘brothers in arms’, can
lead to derailment and the use of excessive force against those who are
perceived to be disturbing the homogeneity and unity of the group. This
implies that brotherhood in the military is a danger to the military as such.
But is brotherhood the same as comradeship? Or, to put it differently, are
comrades better off with friends than with ‘brothers’? In order to answer this
question, a closer look at the concept of friendship is necessary.

Aristotle on Friendship
One of the classical texts on friendship is Book VIII and Book IX of
Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (EN), a text that is still relevant today,
especially with regard to the questions posed above. It is important to note
that what we call friendship is different from the friendship (philia) Aristotle
discusses. Friendship (philia) in the Greek sense is a broad concept. It
includes affection and love, even erotic love, and is thus applicable to all
strong bonds, including the bonds between members of the polis (city state)
(EN 1997: 387). This is also indicated by Nussbaum (1986). She points out
that philia includes the strongest affective relationships that human beings
form, for which the word ‘love’ seems more appropriate (EN 1997: 354). In
the words of Smith Pangle: ‘The Greek word philia can cover all bonds of
affection, from familial ties to political loyalties and humanitarian
sympathies’ (2003: 2).
286 D. E. M. Verweij

Forms and Aspects of Friendship

With regard to friendship in the polis, Wadell states that ideally the polis is a
community of friends, the locus of civil friendship (1989: 47). In that sense,
moral life is a function of the polis; its aim is a virtuous community, not just a
virtuous person (ibid.: 46). Thus, for Aristotle, friendship is an important part
of moral life, and moral life is not a life in splendid isolation. ‘Friendship
consists in community’ (EN, 1159b32). Friends and friendship are part of a
flourishing life (‘eudaimonia’) (Nussbaum 1986: 366). Or, to put it differently,
one cannot have a good and flourishing life without friendship. This is also
why the discussion of friendship belongs in the Ethica Nicomachea: it is a
form of optimal functioning. As Aristotle states at the beginning of Book
VIII: ‘Friendship is some sort of excellence or virtue, or involves virtue, and it
is, moreover, most indispensable for life’ (EN, 1155a5). ‘Without friends no
one would choose to live, though he possessed all the other goods’ (EN,
1155a5-6).
Aristotle considers friendship necessary for life, and maintains that
friendship makes it possible for us to act and think more appropriately. He
distinguishes three forms of friendship. Friendship can be based on 1)
usefulness, 2) pleasure, and 3) goodness and virtue. In the former two forms
of friendship, based on either usefulness or pleasure, people love each other
not for who they are; the person is loved for the advantage that can be gained
from him/her. ‘The friend is not loved because he is a friend, but because he is
useful, or pleasant’ (EN, 1156a15). Friendships like these easily dissolve,
according to Aristotle, when the partner is no longer useful or pleasant.
The third form of friendship, friendship based on goodness and virtue, also
called friendship of character (Cooper 1980), is the perfect form of friendship.
As Nussbaum points out: ‘The central and best case of love between persons
is that of love based upon character and conception of the good. Here each
partner loves the other for what the other most deeply is in him or herself
(kath’ hauto)’ (1986: 356). In Aristotle’s words: ‘The perfect form of
friendship is that between good men who are alike in excellence or virtue’
(EN, 1156b5). This does not imply, as Wadell maintains, that the friends
themselves are perfectly virtuous (1989: 54). Nor does it imply that friendship
based on pleasure or advantage cannot genuinely contribute to a good life
(Nussbaum 1986: 356). Aristotle himself states that friends in a friendship
based on character are naturally both beneficial and pleasant to each other
(EN, 1156). The difference is that character friendship means that the
friendship as such implies a possibility for growth in virtue and character
(Wadell 1989: 55). This possibility for moral growth is created through
friendship because friendship is an important source of self-awareness and
self-understanding (ibid.: 58). ‘By loving their friend, they love what is good
for themselves’ (EN, 1157b35). Virtue cannot be attained in solitude; we need
other people for that, preferably friends. (I will come back to the relation
between friendship and moral development in the next section.)
In section 4 of Book IX, Aristotle explains that our feelings towards our
friends reflect our feelings towards ourselves. The friendly feelings we have
 Friendship in the Armed Forces 287

towards other people ‘seem to derive from our feelings towards ourselves’
(EN, 1166a2). In their commentary on this section, Hupperts & Poortman
point out the importance of this section. The distinguishing aspects of
friendship are derived from the distinguishing aspects of the relation the good
person has with himself. This means that the love for oneself is considered
positive, and the friend can be seen as a ‘second ego’ (EN 1997: 398). In
Pannier & Verhaege’s commentary on this section, we are informed that
Aristotle means that true love towards oneself has all the distinguishing
aspects that define friendship and can therefore be seen as an example for
relations in general (EN 1999: 282
283).
Aristotle mentions five distinguishing aspects of friendship: 1) wishing the
friend good, or what is considered good, for the sake of the friend and putting
this into practice; 2) wishing for the existence and preservation of the friend,
for his sake; 3) spending one’s time with the friend, living together; 4) making
the same choices as the friend; and 5) sharing joys and sorrows with the
friend. With regard to the second and fifth aspects, Aristotle states explicitly
that this is something mothers also do. He thereby compares the care for and
commitment to a friend with the care for and commitment of a mother to her
child, with which he emphasizes the care for (moral) growth and wellbeing.

Friendship and Moral Development: Personal and Political

Woldring points out that, for the Greeks, friendship was as important to them
as the nuclear family is to many Western countries in our era. Thus, the
‘cornerstone of society’ was not the nuclear family, but friendship (1994: 15).
Friendship contributes to the quality of life. As we have seen, the ‘good life’
for Aristotle and other Greek and Roman thinkers is not just a personal
trajectory. It is something people do together. That is why ethics and politics
are closely related, and thus why the personal and political are closely related.
In this sense, Aristotle states that friendship is indispensable to the political
community (EN 1155a24). This view can also be found in the writings of the
Stoa and is echoed by authors on ‘world citizenship’ (kosmopolitai), for
instance, Cicero and later on Grotius and Kant (Schofield 1999: xiii). With
reference to Arendt, Woldring states that friendship is the proof of true
humanity (1994: 155). It connects the individual with the community.
Friendship thus interweaves the personal and the political, as does moral
development. Moreover, there is a close connection between friendship and
moral development.
In line with Aristotle, Woldring defines true friendship as a reciprocal
moral relationship qualified by love for the other for the sake of the other
(1994: 175). On this basis, friendship can be seen as a ‘school of virtue’.
Through friendship, we learn about solidarity, loyalty, openness, courage,
generosity, etc. (ibid.: 176). But how does this happen?
Friendship is an integral part of moral life (ibid.: xiii), and moral life,
Wadell maintains, is what happens to us in relationship with others (1989:
142), and he adds: ‘We cannot be moral until we learn to appreciate what is
not our self’ (ibid.). Thus, morality begins when my selfishness has been
288 D. E. M. Verweij

called into question. In Wadell’s view, friendship is such a fitting model for
moral life, because in friendship the encounter with another human being
frees us from self-absorption (ibid.: 147). ‘Never to acknowledge that
something other than our self is real is a kind of moral suicide’ (ibid.).
Recognition of the other, appreciation of the other, is of crucial importance.
‘In this respect friendship is a paradigm for moral growth and wholeness’
(ibid.: 152). Thus, we need other people or, to put it differently, our
relationship with other human beings, especially friends, is an absolute
prerequisite for moral development.
Genuine moral experience, according to Wadell, is learning to appreciate
what is not ourselves, and he adds that this is the reason why friendship is
such a fitting model for moral life (ibid.: 144
145). Friendship teaches us that
the other person is different, yet we depend on him/her. Confrontation with
the other person creates a decentring of our self. It challenges us, but
eventually helps us to develop our virtues. For morality is not something
apart from us, ‘it is the most personal thing about us. It is an attempt to
understand what we should do with the precious lifetime we have been given’
(ibid.: 10). Because relationships are constitutive of the self, friendship is
important, especially in a moral sense. Again, in Wadell’s words: ‘Friendship
repositions us by drawing us out of ourselves, by pulling us beyond the
confines of our narrow world’ (ibid.: 145
146). This makes our world bigger.
We experience the hopes, fears, and possibilities of the other. By learning
about the other, we learn about ourselves.
Friends help us to understand ourselves and help us learn to reflect on
ourselves. In this sense, Aristotle states that a friend is another self (EN
1166a31-32). This focus on the self, however, is not the ultimate goal, and that
is why friendship is a ‘school of virtue’. In Smith Pangle’s words: ‘Friendship
is derivative from, because it is somehow a reflection of, each man’s concern
with himself, and an extension of that concern to others’ (2003: 152).
The best life according to Aristotle is a shared life; it is found in living
together, and for Aristotle living together implies above all talking together,
sharing each other’s thoughts and not just, like cattle, sharing the same
feeding ground (EN 1170b13-15). ‘The truest, most characteristic activity of
friendship is conversation’ (Smith Pangle 2003: 191). This is also underlined
by Nussbaum, who points out that the benefit of friendship that clearly
could not be derived without the closeness of ‘living together’ is the
‘increase in self-knowledge and self-perception that comes from seeing and
intuitively responding to a person about whom you care’ (Nussbaum 1986:
364).
Through the loving attention of the friend who cares for us, we are sculpted
into a self, Wadell maintains (1989: 160), and he adds that in this nurturing
and caring relationship we are respected and accepted for who we are for our
self and our dignity (ibid.: 164). Friendship is thus indispensable in all phases
of our life. Aristotle points out that friendship provides the guidance that
young men need, the assistance that weak and elderly men need, and the
clarity of insight that even the best men need in order to act and to think as
well as possible (EN 1155a11-16). ‘Our lives seem fuller and richer and more
 Friendship in the Armed Forces 289

extensive and significant when we care about and live with
and so in a sense,
live through
our friends’ (Smith Pangle 2003: 153).

Conclusion
The story of Achilles and Patroclus, one of the oldest stories of the love
between brothers in arms, with which this article started, left us with the
question as to whether brotherhood poses a potential problem. Strong bonds
are of the utmost importance in the context of war, as was illustrated by the
war poets. Sharing the same predicament, sharing hell and pain and death,
creates strong bonds. The mutual love of comrades and their dedication
towards each other are necessary for survival. Thus, comradeship is to the
advantage of the comrades themselves and also to the advantage of the
Defence organization as a whole. However, it becomes clear that comradeship
in the sense of ‘brotherhood’ can pose serious problems with regard to the
humanitarian aspect of military operations. The bond of brotherhood can
result in a seclusive ‘we’ that lashes out at everyone who threatens to destroy
this ‘we-centredness’.
This insight resulted in the subsequent question as to whether fostering
bonds of friendship is better than fostering brotherhood. With the help of
Aristotle’s discussion on friendship, and reflections by other philosophers,
this question could be given an affirmative answer.
In this sense, we might conclude that both Achilles and Patroclus would
have been better off if they had been friends in the Aristotelian sense. It is
interesting to note that Aristotle refers to Achilles in his Ethica Nicomachea.
In their commentary on Aristotle’s discussion of the ‘good’ men who give up
their life in order to gain ‘great nobility for themselves’ (EN 1169a18-28),
Pannier and Verhaeghe state that Aristotle refers to Achilles here, who,
standing before the gates of Troy, had to make the choice between dying and
obtaining immortal glory, or returning to his country and living a long life
but without glory (EN 1999: 290). With regard to the same text and, more
specifically, with regard to Achilles’ love for Patroclus, Smith Pangle points
out that Achilles shows that the heroic soul cannot bear to relinquish the
greatest glory to another. Achilles’ yearning for nobility and glory results in
disregard for the welfare of the other, destroying in the end not only the
friendship but also the friend (2003: 173). Acknowledging the fact that
Aristotle’s critique on the ‘heroic outlook’ is formulated delicately (ibid.: 174
and 235n10), Smith Pangle states: ‘Noble souls more thoughtful than Achilles
will find better resolutions to the conflicts that arise between friends’ (ibid.:
173). So, Achilles and Patroclus would indeed have been better off if they had
been friends in the Aristotelian sense. For friendship in the Aristotelian sense
includes not only usefulness and pleasure, but also an indispensable moral
dimension.
We have seen that friendship is an integral part of moral life. It is both
enjoyable and morally formative. Aristotle points out that when comrades are
only useful or pleasant, they are not true friends, because an important aspect
is missing. What is missing is suggested by Nussbaum when she states: ‘Life
290 D. E. M. Verweij

without philia is radically lacking in essential human values’ (1986: 367).

I would like to add that friendship creates a ‘repository for the humane’1 This
is especially important in a military context. Friendship gives comradeship an
extra dimension. It is not just about being there and sharing pain, fear, and
despair, but friendship adds a moral dimension to this relationship. In this
sense, friendship enriches comradeship: it contributes to a flourishing life, and
in doing so it helps the friend to refrain from behaviour that will disrupt his/
her humanity and thus his/her human flourishing.
Friends in the Aristotelian sense are scarce. That is probably why, in many
texts on friendship, the quote ‘O, my friends there are no friends’ can be
found. Smith Pangle points out that these words, also quoted by Nietzsche,
and that both Montaigne and Derrida attribute to Aristotle, are a corruption
of the original Greek text, and involve the misinterpretation of two Greek
letters (2003: 240n24). What Aristotle in fact says is that those who have
many friends have no true friends (ibid.: 193). Friendship does not come in
great numbers; it can only be found in the relationship with a few true friends.
As Aristotle indicates, being a good friend and having a good friend
presumes striving after a flourishing life together with the ones you live with
and thus care for. It is in and through this relationship that both partners
develop self-awareness, self-control, inner harmony, self-love, and the many
other virtues described in the sections above. In this sense, friendship seems to
be the virtue ‘par excellence’, an indispensable virtue, especially in the
military. Warriors need comrades, but most of all they need friends.

Notes
1
The words refer to the title of the book by Melis (1995) on human dignity.

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Biography
Desiree Verweij is Professor of military ethics at the Netherlands Defence
Academy, Faculty of Military Sciences.