PARTITION

TABASONDRA, ET. AL., VS. SPOUSES CONSTANTINO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 196403.
DECEMBER 07, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs filed the complaint against the defendants. In essence, they claimed that the parcels of land
are owned in common by them and the defendants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits
thereof. Hence, they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.
They maintained that they tried to amicably settle the dispute before the Lupon, but to no avail. Thus,
their filing of the suit praying that the subject land be partitioned, that new titles be issued in their
respective names, that the defendants be ordered to render an accounting on the fruits thereon, and that
such fruits also be partitioned.

In their Answer, the defendants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same
should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the shares of
Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters
executed in their favor. Moreover, they alleged that the plaintiffs are the ones who should account for the
profits of the property because it is the latter who enjoy the fruits thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition and accounting should be limited only to the 33,450.66 square meters of the
property registered under TCT No. 10612.

RULING:
The aggregate area of the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352)
sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana each has a share equivalent to 33,450.66 sq. m.
portion thereof. Accordingly, when Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the defendants became co-
owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelio's death, the only area that his heirs, that is, the plaintiffs
and the defendants, are entitled to and which may be made subject of partition is only a thirty-three
thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro
indiviso shares in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter
property with Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In
effect, Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-
third pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of
Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and the petitioners.

Nonetheless, an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the trial court should
find after trial the existence of co-ownership among the parties, it may and should order the partition of
the properties in the same action.

To segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the several co-owners,
the CA should have followed the manner set in Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

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 Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. If actual
partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds
and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party,
and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the
portion of the real estate assigned to him.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to
effect the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-third; the heirs of
Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian
(collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA
uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express
terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the RTC will be to appoint not
more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to
command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as
directed in this decision.

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VICTORIA* T. FAJARDO, VS. BELEN CUA-MALATE, G.R. NO. 213666. MARCH 27, 2019,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Damages against her
siblings. In the Amended Complaint respondent Belen alleged that she and the defendants siblings are
compulsory heirs of their late mother, Ceferina Toregosa Cua. Ceferina died intestate and had left certain
real and personal properties, as well as interest in real properties. Respondent Belen further alleged that
she did not receive her lawful share from Ceferina's estate. She prayed that judgment be issued: 1)
ordering the partition and distribution of Ceferina's entire estate; 2) ordering that she (respondent Belen)
be awarded her lawful share; 3) and ordering the defendants siblings to pay respondent Belen moral
damages, exemplary damages, contingency fee, and litigation expenses.

Defendants Ramon, Adelaida, Emelita, and Elena filed their Answer, alleging that they were willing to
settle the partition case amicably; that respondent Belen was receiving her share from the income of the
properties left by their late mother, Ceferina; that it was respondent Belen who intentionally refused to
show documents pertaining to the supposed properties left by Ceferina; and that respondent Belen is not
entitled to the reliefs she prayed for.

Meanwhile, petitioner Victoria filed an Answer alleging that she is in favor of the partition and
accounting of the properties of Ceferina.

Pre-trial was conducted and terminated on January 25, 2007. Thereafter, respondent Belen was presented
as a witness. But after her direct examination, and before the conduct of the cross-examination, the parties
agreed to refer the case to mediation.

Hence, the RTC issued an Order of Referral dated October 22, 2008, referring the case to mediation
through the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). During the mediation conferences, all the parties
attended and successfully arrived at an agreement on the manner of partition of Ceferina's estate. Because
of the agreement reached upon by the parties, the mediator issued an Order dated November 5, 2009
requiring respondent Belen's counsel to draft a written compromise agreement. The terms of the
agreement reached upon by the parties were thus translated into writing. A meeting was then scheduled
on April 8, 2010 for the signing of the document entitled Compromise Agreement, which reduced into
writing the prior agreement reached by the parties during the mediation conferences.

On said date, petitioner Victoria did not appear, while all her other siblings appeared. It was subsequently
explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was not able to attend the meeting as
she did not have enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Respondent Belen
and the other siblings proceeded to sign the Compromise Agreement and submitted the same before the
RTC for approval.

The RTC rendered a Decision issuing a judgment on compromise. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Victoria
appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA. Petitioner Victoria alleged that the Compromise Agreement
cannot be binding as to her considering that she did not sign it and supposedly did not consent to its
execution.

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Victoria's appeal, holding that "[t]he RTC did not err
when it approved the Compromise Agreement." Petitioner Victoria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties have entered into a valid oral partition.

RULING:
The parties have come to terms as to the partition of Ceferina's estate even prior to the translation of the
agreement into written form on April 8, 2010. There was already a valid and binding oral partition that
was agreed upon by the parties.

The proceedings during the mediation conferences indubitably show that petitioner Victoria and her
siblings actually came to an agreement as to the partition of the estate of Ceferina. Hence, that an oral
partition has been entered into by the parties is a factual finding that must be left undisturbed.

The fact that petitioner Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties'
agreement is of no moment. An oral partition may be valid and binding upon the heirs; there is no law
that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

Under Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "there is nothing in said section from which it can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition.
Accordingly, an oral partition is valid." The Court further added that the partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title
or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.

Therefore, even if the document titled Compromise Agreement was not signed by petitioner Victoria,
there was already an oral partition entered into by the parties that bound all of the siblings. The written
agreement only served to reduce into writing for the convenience of the parties the terms of the agreement
already entered into during the mediation conferences.

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SPOUSES SALITICO, VS. HEIRS OF FELIX, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 240199. APRIL 10, 2019,
CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name under
Original Certificate of Title (subject property).

By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos (Huling Habilin), the subject
property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee. Thereafter, Resurreccion, as
the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa, which
transferred ownership over the parcel of land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took
physical possession of the subject property.

Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate was undertaken before the RTC. Respondent Recaredo was
appointed as the executor of the Huling Habilin. The latter then filed and presented the Huling
Habilin before the Probate Court, which approved it. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of
Allowance.

The petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate the subject property and
surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To protect their interest over the subject property,
the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was however denied
registration by the respondent RD.

In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in their
favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT and the execution of the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale
by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa. They likewise prayed that OCT P-1908 be cancelled
and a new one be issued in their names. Lastly, they also demanded payment of attorney's fees, moral and
exemplary damages, and reimbursement for litigation expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of a valid sale in the instant case necessarily mean that the RD may already
be compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

RULING:
The existence of a valid sale in the instant case does not necessarily mean that the RD may already be
compelled to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

According to Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, with respect to the transfer of properties subject of testate or intestate proceedings, a
new certificate of title in the name of the transferee shall be issued by the Register of Deeds only upon the
submission of a certified copy of the partition and distribution, together with the final judgment or order
of the court approving the same or otherwise making final distribution, supported by evidence of payment
of estate tax or exemption therefrom, as the case may be.

Further, under Section 91 of PD 1529, even without an order of final distribution from the testate/intestate
court and in anticipation of a final distribution of a portion or the whole of the property, the Register of
Deeds may be compelled to issue the corresponding certificate of title to the transferee only when the
executor/administrator of the estate submits a certified copy of an order from the court having jurisdiction

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of the testate or intestate proceedings directing the executor/administrator to transfer the property to the
transferees.

The aforementioned sections of PD 1529 are in perfect conjunction with Rule 90, Section 1 [ of the Rules
of Court, which states that the actual distribution of property subject to testate or intestate
proceedings, i.e., the issuance of a new title in the name of the distributee, shall occur only when the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if
any, chargeable to the estate, have been paid. Only then can the testate or intestate court assign the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled to the same. Under Rule 90, Section 1, the testate or intestate court
may also order the distribution of the property pending the final order of distribution if the distributees
give a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of the aforesaid said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

Hence, under the applicable provisions of PD 1529 and the Rules of Court, it is only upon the issuance by
the testate or intestate court of the final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the
final distribution that the certificate of title covering the subject property may be issued in the name of the
distributees.

In the instant case, there is no showing that, in the pendency of the settlement of the Estate of Amanda,
the Probate Court had issued an order of final distribution or an order in anticipation of a final
distribution, both of which the law deems as requirements before the RD can issue a new certificate of
title in the name of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.

To clarify, this holding does not go against Article 777 of the Civil Code whatsoever. What the aforesaid
Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar preventing an heir from disposing his/her
hereditary share and transferring such share to another person, inasmuch as the right thereto is vested or
transmitted to the heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or testator. The rule, however, does
not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering the
specific property in his/her name.

Hence, reading Article 777 of the Civil Code together with the pertinent provisions of PD 1529 and the
Rules of Court, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person, before
the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering specific property in his/her
name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in anticipation of the final distribution issued
by the testate or intestate court must first be had.

Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion and the petitioners Sps.
Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in
favor of the latter, pending the final settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final
distribution or an order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be
compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in favor of the petitioners
Sps. Salitico.

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ROGELIO LOGROSA, VS. SPOUSES CLEOFE AND CESAR AZARES, ET. AL., G.R.
NO. 217611. MARCH 27, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:
In his verified complaint for partition filed before the RTC, petitioner Logrosa alleged that he, together
with the respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands (subject properties), all situated in the
Municipality of Tagum (now Tagum City), Davao del Norte. The TCTs of the subject properties all
indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together with the respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.

Petitioner Logrosa alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, one Benjamin A.
Gonzales (Gonzales), sold the subject properties collectively to petitioner Logrosa and the other
respondents. The records show that a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties.

Answering, respondents contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared in
the titles of the properties aforementioned, however, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-
owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their
maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties who can compel partition.

RULING:
Petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject properties. There are no one dispute that there are eight
certificates of title, all of which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-
owners of the subject properties. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes
the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.

It is also not disputed by any party that a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by all the
parties, wherein it clearly states without ambiguity that one of the vendees of the subject properties is
petitioner Logrosa. Hence, no one in his right mind would include non-buyers or non-owners in a
notarized deed of absolute sale and in indefeasible certificates of title if he truly believes that he is the
sole owner of the property. Bearing in mind the strong presumption created by public documents such as
a notarized instrument and certificates of title, if respondents Sps. Azares really believed that they are the
sole owners of the subject properties, one would expect that they would, at the very least, execute another
document evidencing their true agreement as a precautionary measure. But no such precautionary
measure was employed by respondents Sps. Azares to protect their supposed right as sole owners of the
subject properties.

Furthermore, it is not disputed that petitioner Logrosa possesses a portion of the subject property with no
opposition by the other parties, aside from respondents Sps. Azares, who disclaimed petitioner Logrosa's
status as co-owner only after more than two decades since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
and only as a mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed by petitioner Logrosa.

With respect to the tax declarations presented by respondents Sps. Azares, jurisprudence holds that tax
declarations and tax receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to
reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.

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A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets forth in his/her
complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The law does not make a
distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or through onerous
consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through
gratuity may compel partition.

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JURISDICTION

ARSENIO TABASONDRA, ET, AL., VS. SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO AND

FACTS:
Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the
registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City. Cornelio died on March
15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998,
respectively. They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No. 106012.
Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and
occupied the property.

The Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellants. In essence, they
claimed that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the Defendants-Appellants but the
latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they asked for partition but the
Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons. They maintained that they tried to amicably settle
the dispute before the Lupon, but to no avail. Thus, their filing of the suit praying that the subject land be
partitioned, that new titles be issued in their respective names, that the Defendants-Appellants be ordered
to render an accounting on the fruits thereon, and that such fruits also be partitioned.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the
same should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the
shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said
sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982. Moreover, they alleged that the Plaintiffs-Appellees
are the ones who should account for the profits of the property because it is the latter who enjoy the fruits
thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions
among the several co-owners.

RULING:
The CA did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions among the several
co-owners. To do so, the CA should have followed the manner set in Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:

Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. If actual
partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds
and adequate description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party,
and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the
portion of the real estate assigned to him. xxxs

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to
effect the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-third; the heirs of
Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian
(collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA
uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express
terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

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 Section 2. Order for partition, and partition by agreement thereunder. - If after the trial
the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition of the real
estate among all the parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such
partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated.(2a)

A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. (n)

Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the RTC will be to appoint not
more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to
command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as
directed in this decision.

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 EULALIA RUSSELL, ET. AL., VS. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ET. AL., G.R.
NO. 119347. MARCH 17, 1999, KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY
AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court. Upon the death of spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents
divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot
as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document
was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33
(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. A Motion for Reconsideration of
said order was filed by petitioners alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one
for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null and
void, hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge issued
another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.

RULING:
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation
and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value

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of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located
elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial
Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).

However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION."

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which
private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim
to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document
above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

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MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, ET. AL., VS. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO, ET. AL., G.R.
NO. 212413. JUNE 06, 2018, REYES, JR., J.

FACTS:
The petitioners are children of the late spouses Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-
square meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Emilia died intestate, leaving
Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs.

Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita
Librando-Agarrado, with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. As it turned out, Ana
Lou was conceived during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born on
September 27, 1978—one month after the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the
latter's death. Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981.

Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died. He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate
children by his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.

Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the subject
property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants. None of the
other heirs were however named in any pleading filed by either the respondents or petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the respondents to allege the assessed
value of the subject property.

RULING:
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. A partition is at once an action (1) for
declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
properties involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is
a co-owner of the subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is determined by law.
Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTC).

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the partition,
is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the complaint.

The rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification of the
jurisdiction of the first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:

1. the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property as
alleged in the complaint; and

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 2. the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the
complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already
attached to the complaint.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
assessed value of the subject property. In fact, the only reference to the same in the complaint are found in
paragraphs six, seven, and eight thereof. None of the assertions indicate the assessed value of the property
to be partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire
jurisdiction. More, none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this
case indicates any such amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the
RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none to exercise.

UE-0200673-2023