C4: Virtue Ethics

Eighth Edition

Ethics
Theory and Contemporary Issues

Barbara MacKinnon
University of San Francisco, Professor of Philosophy, Emerita

Andrew Fiala
California State University, Fresno, Professor of Philosophy

Australia • Brazil • Mexico • Spain • United Kingdom • United States

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 For Edward, Jennifer, and Kathleen

Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues, © 2015, 2012, 2009 Cengage Learning
Eighth Edition
Barbara MacKinnon WCN: 02-200-203
Andrew Fiala
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 Virtue Ethics 8
Learning Outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:

• Understand how virtue ethics differs from

other approaches to ethics.
• Identify some features of the diverse
cultural approaches to virtue.
• •

© iStockphoto.com/Sebastiaan de Stigter
Describe some key virtues and how they Explain how the idea of the Golden Mean
are manifest in concrete situations. functions in virtue ethics.
• Explain how virtues are connected to an
account of the functions or purposes of
• Provide an overview of Aristotle’s moral
philosophy.

•
human life.
Describe how eudaimonia functions in the
• Defend your own thesis with regard to the
value of virtue ethics.
theory of virtue.

P at Tillman was a successful NFL player. He played safety for the Arizona Cardinals,
earning hundreds of thousands of dollars. After the September 11 attacks in 2001,
Tillman turned down a $3.6 million contract offer and enlisted in the Army. He quali-
fied to become an Army Ranger. His unit served in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where he
was killed, by accident, by members of his own platoon during a firefight. Tillman’s
death prompted a number of controversies. The Army initially informed Tillman’s
family and the public that he had been killed by enemy fire, in an apparent effort to
preserve the image of Tillman as a war hero. (Among other awards, he posthumously
received the Army’s Silver Star for Valor.) A subsequent book about Tillman claimed
that Tillman was not a supporter of the Iraq war and was critical of President George
W. Bush.1 Nonetheless, Tillman remains a model of virtue and courage. Senator John
McCain used Tillman’s story to explain the virtues of citizenship and patriotism in his
book Character Is Destiny.2 What is remarkable about Tillman is his willingness to
sacrifice a lucrative football career for life and death as an Army Ranger. He seemed
to embody virtues—such as courage, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and patriotism—that are
often mourned as deficient or absent in contemporary society. Do you agree with this
assessment? What role do such virtues play in your own moral life?
When thinking about virtue, it is useful to think about the people you admire.
Whether it is a relative, a coworker, a friend, or some celebrity, it is helpful to consider
the traits that make those people good. We usually admire people who are coura-
geous, kind, honest, generous, loyal, diligent, temperate, fair, modest, and hospitable.
Such traits of character are traditionally known as virtues.

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Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 150   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

VIRTUES AND EVERYDAY LIFE include self-sacrifice. At issue here is a definition of

The theories that we have treated so far in this text happiness. Virtue ethics tends to hold that happiness
are concerned with how we determine the right is something different from pleasure. Pat Tillman’s
action to take or policy to establish. The focus on life and death were not particularly pleasant—he
virtue takes a different approach to morality. Rather suffered through Army Ranger training and then
than asking what we ought to do, virtue ethics asks was killed at the age of 27. But perhaps there is
how we ought to be. Virtue ethics is concerned with something more important than pleasure. At any
those traits of character, habits, tendencies, and dis- rate, even if it is difficult and unpleasant to become
positions that make a person good. When some or a hero or a saint, the virtue tradition maintains that
all of the traits mentioned above are unusually well people live better when they possess most or all of
developed in a person, that person may be regarded the virtues. People can also exhibit bad character
as a hero or even as a saint. One version of virtue traits. For example, they can be coward, dishonest,
ethics is focused on thinking about saints and heroes tactless, careless, boorish, stingy, vindictive, dis-
as paradigms or exemplars of human excellence. loyal, lazy, or egotistical. Another word for these bad
In a well-known article on the topic, Susan traits is vice. An ethics focused on virtue encourages
Wolf described a moral saint as, “a person whose us to develop the good traits and get rid of the bad
every action is as good as possible, that is, who is ones, that is, to develop our virtues and eliminate
as morally worthy as can be.” 3 But Wolf goes on our vices.
to argue that moral saints are not especially happy, The ethical issues that are treated in the second
since the demands of saintly perfection might half of this text are generally controversial social
issues: the death penalty, abortion, and terrorism,
for example. Virtue ethics seems more personal. It
involves not so much asking which side of some
social issue one should support as what kind of per-
son one should be. Virtues can help us make good
decisions in tough situations. But they also serve us
on a daily basis. Virtues such as courage, loyalty,
honesty, and fairness show up in our interactions
with relatives, friends, and coworkers. We often
think about virtues when we consider how our
behavior serves as a good (or bad) model for our
children, students, and colleagues.
Virtue ethics can be useful in thinking about the
applied issues discussed in the second half of the
text. Virtues depend, in part, on our roles and help
us fulfill the requirements of our roles: so soldiers
ought to be courageous and strong, while teachers
John Cordes/Icon SMI/ZUMA/Corbis Wire/Corbis

ought to be patient and kind. Virtue ethics encour-

ages us to consider the question of how a soldier’s
virtues might differ from those of a teacher. Some
of the applied topics we will discuss have connec-
tions with questions about the virtues of various
vocations and roles. In thinking about euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide, for example, issues
arise regarding the proper virtues of health care pro-
viders. In thinking about the morality of abortion,
Pat Tilman, during his NFL career. we might think about proper virtues of parents and

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   151

lawmakers, as well as doctors. In thinking about the became known as Alexander the Great. In 335 bce,
morality of war, we consider the virtues we associate Aristotle returned to Athens and organized his own
with military service. school, called the Lyceum. There he taught and
There will be overlap among the virtues found in wrote almost until his death thirteen years later, in
different vocations. But different roles require differ- 322 bce.4 Aristotle is known not only for his moral
ent character traits and habits. This reminds us that theory but also for writings in logic, biology, physics,
virtue ethics has a pluralistic aspect. There are many metaphysics, art, and politics. The basic notions of
different virtues that can be emphasized and inte- his moral theory can be found in his Nicomachean
grated in various ways in the life of an individual. Ethics, named for his son Nicomachus.5
Moreover, virtuous people tend to be responsive to As noted in the previous chapter, Aristotle was
the unique demands of various situations; they do one of the earliest writers to ground morality in
the right thing, at the right time, in the right way, nature, and specifically in human nature. His the-
exhibiting a sort of “practical wisdom” that is sensi- ory of ethics and morality also stressed the notion
tive to context. From the standpoint of utilitarianism of virtue. For Aristotle, virtue was an excellence of
or deontology, which wants clearly defined rules and some sort. Our word virtue originally came from the
principles for action, virtue ethics can seem impre- Latin vir and referred to strength or manliness.6 In
cise and vague. But an asset of virtue ethics may be Aristotle’s Greek, the term for virtue was arete, a
its sensitivity to context and its recognition of plu- word that can also be translated as “excellence.”
rality in morals. According to Aristotle, there are two basic types
Although we probably do not use the term of virtue (or excellence): intellectual virtues and
virtuous as frequently today as in times past, we moral virtues. Intellectual virtues are excellences of
still understand the essence of its meaning. A virtu- mind, such as the ability to understand and reason
ous person is a morally good person, and virtues are and judge well. Moral virtues, on the other hand,
good traits. Another word that is useful in under- dispose us to act well. These virtues are learned by
standing virtue is the word excellence. The virtues repetition. For instance, by practicing courage or
are those things that make us excellent; they allow honesty, we become more courageous and honest.
us to manifest our highest potential. There is more Just as repetition in playing a musical instrument
than one thing that makes us excellent. Indeed, vir- makes playing easier, so also repeated acts of hon-
tues are often described in the plural—as a list of esty make it easier to be honest. The person who
qualities that lead to living well. Loyalty is a virtue, has the virtue of honesty finds it easier to be honest
and so is honesty. A moral philosophy that concen- than the person who does not have the virtue. It has
trates on the notion of virtue is called a virtue ethics. become habitual or second nature to him or her. The
For virtue ethics, the moral life is about developing same thing applies to the opposite of virtue, namely,
good character. It is about determining the ideals vice. The person who lies and lies again finds that
for human life and trying to embody these ideals in lying is easier and telling the truth more difficult.
one’s own life. The virtues are ways in which we One can have bad moral habits (vices) as well as
embody these ideals. If we consider honesty to be good ones (virtues). Just like other bad habits, bad
such an ideal, for example, then we ought to try to moral habits are difficult to change or break. And
become honest persons. like other good habits, good moral habits take prac-
tice to develop.
ARISTOTLE
Aristotle was born in 384 bce in Stagira in northern Virtue as a Mean
Greece. His father was a physician for King Philip of Aristotle’s philosophy outlines a variety of particular
Macedonia. Around age seventeen, he went to study virtues including courage, temperance, justice, pride,
at Plato’s Academy in Athens. Aristotle traveled for and magnanimity. However, Aristotle also provides
several years and then for two or three years was a unifying framework for understanding virtue in
the tutor to Alexander, Philip’s young son who later general, as a mean between extremes. This idea

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Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 152   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

is occasionally known as the Golden Mean (and amount of honesty be forthrightness? But not all
should not be confused with the Golden Rule, which virtues may be rightly thought of as means between
we’ve discussed in previous chapters). By saying extremes. For example, if justice is a virtue, then
that virtue is a mean, we are using the word with could there be such a thing as being too just? It is
reference to how it is used in mathematics, where important to note that virtue ethics still maintains
the mean is in the middle, as the average. (The term that some things are simply wrong and not amena-
mean here should also not be confused with the idea ble to explanation in virtue terminology. Murder, for
of using someone as a means, as we discussed in example, is wrong; there is no right time for murder
the chapter on Kant and deontology.) or right amount of murder.
To better understand the idea that virtue is a
mean, take the following example. The virtue of Nature, Human Nature, and the Human Good
courage can be understood as a mean or middle Aristotle was a close observer of nature. In fact, in
between the two extremes of deficiency and excess. his writings he mentions some 500 different kinds
Too little courage is cowardice, and too much is of animals.7 He noticed that seeds of the same sort
foolhardiness. When facing danger or challenges, always grew to the same mature form. He opened
we should have neither too much fear—which makes developing eggs of various species and noticed that
us unable to act—nor too little fear—which makes us these organisms manifested a pattern in their devel-
take reckless or foolish risks. The virtue of courage opment even before birth. Tadpoles, he might have
is having just the right amount of fear, depending said, always follow the same path and become frogs,
on what is appropriate for us as individuals and for not turtles. So also with other living things. Acorns
the circumstances we face. So, too, the other virtues always become oak trees, not elms. He concluded
can be seen as means between extremes. Consider that there was an order in nature. It was as if natu-
the following examples from Aristotle organized in ral beings such as plants and animals had a prin-
the following table, with the virtuous mean listed ciple of order within them that directed them toward
in the middle between two vices. their goal—their mature final form. This view can
Different authors have offered different lists be called a teleological view, from the Greek word
of virtues and corresponding vices. For the Greek for goal, telos, because of its emphasis on a goal
tradition, following Plato, there were four basic or embedded in natural things. It was from this conclu-
cardinal virtues: prudence (or wisdom), justice, sion that Aristotle developed his notion of the good.
temperance, and courage. Questions arise about You might also notice that the idea of a natural goal,
which traits count as virtues and how these virtues purpose, or function showed up in the discussion of
are related to corresponding vices. For example, we natural law (in Chapter 7).
might want to count loyalty and honesty as virtues. According to Aristotle, “the good is that at which
If loyalty is a virtue, then is it also a middle between all things aim.” 8 Good things are things that ful-
two extremes? Can there be such a thing as too lit- fill some purpose or end or goal. Thus, the good of
tle or too much loyalty? What about honesty? Too the shipbuilder is to build ships. The good of the
much honesty might be seen as undisciplined open- lyre player is to play well. The traits that allow for
ness, and too little as deceitfulness. Would the right good shipbuilding or lyre-playing will be somewhat

Deficit (Too Little) Virtue (the Mean) Excess (Too Much)

Fear Foolhardiness Courage Cowardice
Giving Illiberality Liberality Prodigality
Self-Regard Humility Pride Vanity
Pleasures (No Name Given) Temperance Profligacy

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Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   153

different. But good shipbuilders and good lyre play- good of humans is happiness, blessedness, or pros-
ers will share certain virtues such as intelligence perity. The Greek word for this sort of happiness is
and creativity. Aristotle asks whether there is any- eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is not to be confused
thing that is the good of the human being—not as with pleasure. Indeed, the virtues are often at odds
shipbuilder or lyre player, but simply as human. with pleasure. A coward who is afraid of danger is
To answer this question, we must first think about reluctant to experience pain. And a courageous per-
what it is to be human. According to Aristotle, natu- son may have to forgo pleasure and submit to pain—
ral beings come in kinds or species. From their spe- including the pain of being killed. Aristotle warned
cies flow their essential characteristics and certain that pleasure can distract us from what is good.
key tendencies or capacities. A squirrel, for exam- Thus, Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia aims at a
ple, is a kind of animal that is, first of all, a living kind of happiness that is deeper and longer lasting
being. It develops from a young to a mature form. than mere pleasure. The term eudaimonia gives us
It is a mammal and therefore has other character- a clue about this. The eu- prefix means “good”; and
istics of mammals. It is bushy-tailed, can run along daimonia is related to the Greek word for “spirit” or
telephone wires, and gathers and stores nuts for its “soul.” Thus, Aristotle’s idea is that virtue produces
food. From the characteristics that define a squirrel, the happiness of having a good soul or spirit, which
we also can know what a good squirrel is. A good fulfills essential human functions or purposes.
specimen of a squirrel is one that is effective, suc- Aristotle is thus interested in the question of
cessful, and functions well. It follows the pattern of what our human functions or purposes might be.
development and growth it has by nature. A good Human beings have much in common with lower
squirrel does, in fact, have a bushy tail and good forms of beings. We are living, for example, just as
balance, and knows how to find and store its food. It plants are. Thus, we take in material from outside
would be a bad example of a squirrel if it had no bal- us for nourishment, and we grow from an imma-
ance, couldn’t find its food, or had no fur and was ture to a mature form. We have senses of sight and
sickly. It would have been better for the squirrel if its hearing and so forth, as do the higher animals. We
inherent natural tendencies to grow and develop and are social animals as well, who must live in groups
live as a healthy squirrel had been realized. together with other human beings. Since human
Aristotle thought of human beings as natural beings have various functions or purposes, there are
beings with a specific human nature. Human beings various types of virtue. The virtues of social life, for
have certain specific characteristics and abilities that example, help us fulfill our function as social beings.
we share as humans. Unlike squirrels and acorns, The moral or social virtues would include honesty,
human beings can choose to act in the service of their loyalty, and generosity.
good or act against it. But just what is their good? But is there anything unique to humans, an
Aristotle recognized that a good eye is a healthy eye essentially human function or purpose? Aristotle
that sees well. A good horse is a well-functioning believed that it is our “rational element” that is
horse, one that is healthy and able to run and do peculiar to us. The good for humans, then, should
what horses do. What about human beings? Is consist in their functioning in a way consistent with
there something comparable for the human being as and guided by this rational element. Our rational
human? Is there some good for humans as humans? element has two different functions: one is to know,
Just as we can tell what the good squirrel is from and the other is to guide choice and action. We must
its own characteristics and abilities as a squirrel, the develop our ability to know the world and the truth.
same should be true for the human being. For human We must also choose wisely. In doing this, we will
beings to function well or flourish, they should per- be functioning well specifically as humans. Thus,
fect their human capacities. If they do this, they will in addition to social or moral virtues, there are also
be functioning well as human beings. They will also intellectual virtues, which help us fulfill our func-
be happy, for a being is happy to the extent that it is tion as intelligent animals. These virtues, according
functioning well. Aristotle believed that the ultimate to Aristotle, include practical knowledge, scientific

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 154   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

knowledge, and practical wisdom. It is not surprising

that Aristotle—who was a philosopher and a student
of Plato—thought that the intellectual virtues were
more important than the other virtues, since they
help us fulfill our uniquely human capacities.

CROSS-CULTURAL AND
CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE ETHICS
Versions of virtue ethics can also be found in other
traditions. The Confucian tradition in China is often
described as a virtue tradition. This tradition traces its
roots back to Confucius (551–479 bce), a figure who
plays a role in Chinese philosophy that is similar to
the role played by Socrates in Greek philosophy—as
founding character and touchstone for later authors

© iStockphoto.com/Sebastiaan de Stigter
who want to reflect upon virtue and wisdom. Unlike
Socrates, however, who was something of a rough-
mannered outsider to the elite social scene of Athens,
Confucius was viewed as a model of courtly gentility
and decorum. The Confucian tradition emphasizes
two main virtues, jen (or ren) and li. Jen is often
translated as “humaneness” or “compassion.” Li
is often translated as “propriety,” “manners,” or
“culture.” Confucian ethics aims toward a synthesis Statue of Confucius in Shanghai, China.
of the virtues oriented around compassion and pro-
priety. In the Analects of Confucius, this is explained
in various ways. Consider the following saying or yamas: nonviolence (ahimsa), truthfulness, hon-
attributed to Confucius: esty, chastity, and freedom from greed.10 Hinduism
also includes mental virtues to be perfected in medi-
A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, tation and yogic practice: calmness, self-control,
respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and self-settledness, forbearance, faith, and complete
truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and culti-
concentration, as well as the hunger for spiritual
vate the friendship of the good. When he has time
liberation. 11 Buddhism shares with Hinduism an
and opportunity, after the performance of these
things, he should employ them in polite studies.9 emphasis on both intellectual and moral virtues. The
“noble eight fold path” of Buddhism includes moral
Confucius advises young people to be polite and virtues such as right speech, right action, and right
respectful, earnest and truthful, and to overflow livelihood, as well as intellectual virtues of under-
with love. Similar advice holds for others who are standing and mindfulness. 12 Christian virtue eth-
at different stages of life’s journey. Confucius also ics includes similar moral virtues, as well as what
holds that there are specific virtues for those inhabit- Thomas Aquinas called the “theological virtues.”
ing different roles: for fathers, brothers, sons, and In the Christian tradition, the four cardinal moral
government officials. As is true of most of the other virtues are prudence, justice, temperance, and for-
traditions of the ancient world, the primary focus titude, while the three theological virtues are faith,
here is on male roles women’s roles were defined in hope, and love. It is easy to see that there is over-
subordination to the male. lap among these different traditions in terms of the
Other traditions emphasize different forms of virtues required for a good life, despite some clear
virtue. Hinduism emphasizes five basic moral virtues differences. The common thread that links them as

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   155

traditions of virtue ethics is the idea that habits and there any universally valuable traits? Wherever
character traits matter, along with sustained philo- friendship exists, loyalty would seem necessary,
sophical reflection on the reasons that these habits although the form it might take would vary accord-
and character traits matter. ing to time and place. So also would honesty seem
Various contemporary moral philosophers have necessary for human relations wherever they exist.
also stressed the importance of virtue. 13 Philippa We might also start with Aristotle’s own list of vir-
Foot, for example, has developed a contemporary tues, which reflected what were considered the pri-
version of virtue ethics. She believes that the virtues mary civic virtues of his day. But Aristotle’s society
are “in some general way, beneficial. Human beings included slavery and gender hierarchy. One wonders
do not get on well without them.” 14 According to whether it makes sense to speak of virtuous slave-
Foot, virtues provide benefits both to the virtuous masters or whether the submissive traits of women
person and to her community, just as vices harm in patriarchal cultures are really virtuous. Similar
both the self and the community. Think of cour- problems occur as we consider differences among
age, temperance, and wisdom, for example, and ask civilizations. Are the virtues of Confucian culture the
yourself how persons having these virtues might same (or better or worse) than the virtues of Mus-
benefit others as well as themselves. Some virtues lim, Christian, or Hindu cultures?
such as charity, however, seem to benefit mostly Contemporary moral philosopher Alasdair Mac­
others. But this makes sense for social virtues, which Intyre believes that virtues depend at least partly
help us fulfill our function as social beings. There is on the practices of a culture or society. A warlike
an open question, however, about which beneficial society will value heroic virtues, whereas a peace-
character traits are to be thought of as moral virtues ful and prosperous society might think of generos-
and which are not. Wit or powers of concentration ity as a particularly important virtue. 15 However,
benefit us, but we would probably not consider them these must also be virtues specific to human beings
to be moral virtues. as humans, for otherwise one could not speak of
Foot also asks whether virtue is best seen in the “human excellences.” But this is just the problem.
intention that guides an action or in the execution What is it to live a full human life? Can one specify
of an action. Think of generosity. Does the person this apart from what it is to live such a life in a par-
who intends to be generous—but who cannot seem ticular society or as a particular person? The problem
to do what helps others—really possess the virtue here is not only how we know what excellences are
of generosity? Or rather is it the person who actu- human excellences but also whether there are any
ally does help who has the virtue? Foot believes that such traits that are ideal for all persons, despite dif-
virtue is also something we must choose to develop ferences in gender, social roles, and physical and
and work at personifying. Furthermore, following mental capacity.
Aristotle, Foot argues that the virtues are corrective. A further problem with regard to virtue is the
They help us be and do things that are difficult for question of the degree of effort and discipline
us. Courage, for example, helps us overcome natural required to be virtuous. Who manifests the virtue of
fear. Temperance helps us control our desires. Since courage the most—the person who, as Foot puts it,
people differ in their natural inclinations, they also “wants to run away but does not or the one who
differ in what virtues would be most helpful for them does not even want to run away?” 16 We generally
to develop. Foot’s view is just one example of how believe that we ought to be rewarded for our moral
the notion of virtue continues to be discussed by efforts, and thus the person who wants to run away
moral philosophers. but does not seems more praiseworthy. On the other
hand, possession of the virtue of courage is sup-
EVALUATING VIRTUE ETHICS posed to make it easier to be brave. Part of Foot’s
One question that has been raised for virtue ethics own answer to this dilemma involves the distinction
concerns how we determine which traits are virtues, between those fears for which we are in some way
and whether they are so in all circumstances. Are responsible and those that we cannot help. Thus, the

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 156   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

person who feels like running away because she has us from thinking about why a given virtue is good.
contributed by her own choices to being afraid is not Bearing this argument in mind, it is worth consider-
the more virtuous person. In the reading from her ing whether the idea of virtue as a mean between
essay on virtue included in this chapter, Foot also vices really makes sense of the way we ordinarily
addresses the question of whether someone who understand virtues such as courage and vices like
does something morally wrong—say, robs a bank or cowardice. Is this idea genuinely helpful to us in
commits a murder—and does so courageously, dem- identifying the nature of virtue?
onstrates the virtue of courage. In virtue ethics, the primary goal is to be a good
We can also ask whether virtue ethics is really person. Now, a critic of virtue ethics might argue
a distinct type of ethics. Consider two of the other that being good is only a function of being inclined
theories we have discussed: utilitarianism and to do good. However, ethics appears to require not
deontology. The concept of virtue is not foreign to only a habitual inclination toward good deeds but
Mill or Kant. However, for both of them it is second- also actually doing good. Is what matters the deed or
ary. Their moral theories tell us how we ought to the inclination to carry it out? If what really matters
decide what to do. Doing the right thing—and with is the actions and deeds, then virtue is simply one
Kant, for the right reason—is primary. However, aspect of an action-oriented moral philosophy such
if the development of certain habits of action or as consequentialism. However, virtue ethics does
tendencies to act in a certain way will enable us to have a somewhat different emphasis. It is an ethics
do good more easily, then they would surely be rec- whose goal is to determine what is essential to being
ognized by these philosophers as good. Utilitarians a well-functioning or flourishing human person.
would encourage the development of those virtues Virtue ethics stresses an ideal for humans or persons.
that would be conducive to the maximization of As an ethics of ideals or excellences, it is an opti-
happiness. If temperance in eating and drinking mistic and positive type of ethics. One problem that
will help us avoid the suffering that can come from virtue ethics may face is what to say about those of
illness and drunkenness, then this virtue ought us who do not meet the ideal. If we fall short of the
to be encouraged and developed in the young. So virtuous model, does this make us bad or vicious?
also with other virtues. According to a Kantian, we As with all moral theories, many questions concern-
should develop habits and virtues that would make ing virtue remain to engage and puzzle us.
it more likely that we act fairly (according to uni- The first reading in this chapter is the classic
versalizable maxims) and treat people as ends rather selection on virtue from Aristotle’s The Nicoma-
than simply as means. chean Ethics. In this piece, Aristotle explains what
When evaluating the virtue ethics tradition devel- virtue is, how it is related to human functioning,
oped by Aristotle, we should also consider a more and how it is a mean between extremes. In the sec-
specific criticism of it introduced by Kant. Kant ond selection, Philippa Foot—an important ethicist
argues that Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a mean in the analytic tradition—addresses certain central
between two vices—the Golden Mean—is sim- questions about virtue, while also contrasting virtue
ply false. Kant writes that, “it is incorrect to define ethics with other accounts of ethics, including the
any virtue or vice in terms of mere degree,” which Kantian.
“proves the uselessness of the Aristotelian principles
that virtue consists in the middle way between two NOTES
vices.”17 Kant rejects the idea that there is a grada- 1. Jon Krakauer, Where Men Win Glory (New York:
tion of behaviors or dispositions from one extreme Doubleday, 2009).
2. John McCain, Character Is Destiny (New York:
(or vice) to the other with virtue in the middle. Random House, 2007).
Rather, for Kant, some things are praiseworthy and 3. Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of
others are wrong, and do not vary by degrees on a Philosophy 89, no. 8 (August 1982): 419.
4. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: The
continuum. Kant suggests that the Aristotelian idea Classical Mind, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace
of the Golden Mean simply confuses us and distracts & World, 1969), 214–16.

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   157

5. This was asserted by the neo-Platonist Porphyry 11. Vensus A. George, Paths to the Divine: Ancient and
(ca. 232 ce). However, others believe that the work Indian (Washington, DC: CRVP Press, 2008), 205.
got its name because it was edited by Nicomachus. 12. Peter Harvey, Buddhism: Teachings, History and
See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 147. 1990), 68–69.
6. Milton Gonsalves, Fagothy’s Right and Reason, 9th 13. See, for example, the collection of articles in Christina
ed. (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1989), 201. Hoff Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life
7. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 233. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985).
8. See the selection in Chapter 8 from The 14. Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Oxford
Nicomachean Ethics. University Press, 2002).
9. Confucius, Analects, in The Chinese Classics— 15. Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Virtue in Heroic Societies” and
Volume 1: Confucian Analects, bk. 1, Chapter 6, “The Virtues at Athens,” in After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN:
trans. James Legge (Project Gutenberg), http:// Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 121–45.
www.gutenberg.org/files/4094/4094-h/4094-h 16. Foot, Virtues and Vices, 10.
.htm 17. Kant, “Doctrine of Virtue,” in Metaphysics of Morals, trans.
10. Sunil Sehgal, ed., Encyclopedia of Hinduism Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
(New Delhi: Sarup and Sons, 1999), 2:364. 1996), § 10, 184-85.

R E A D I N G
The Nicomachean Ethics
A R I S TOT L E

Study Questions It often happens that there are a number of such

1. According to Aristotle, what is meant by the “good?” arts or sciences which fall under a single faculty,
2. What is the function of a person? as the art of making bridles, and all such other arts
3. What is virtue and how do we acquire it? as make the instruments of horsemanship, under
4. How is virtue a mean? Explain this by using some of horsemanship, and this again as well as every mili-
Aristotle’s examples. tary action under strategy, and in the same way
5. Why is it so difficult to be virtuous? other arts or sciences under other faculties. But in
all these cases the ends of the architectonic arts or
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD* sciences, whatever they may be, are more desirable
Every art and every scientific inquiry, and similarly than those of the subordinate arts or sciences, as it
every action and purpose, may be said to aim at is for the sake of the former that the latter are them-
some good. Hence the good has been well defined as selves sought after. It makes no difference to the
that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there argument whether the activities themselves are the
is a difference in the ends; for the ends are some- ends of the actions, or something else beyond the
times activities, and sometimes results beyond the activities as in the above mentioned sciences.
mere activities. Also, where there are certain ends If it is true that in the sphere of action there is
beyond the actions, the results are naturally superior an end which we wish for its own sake, and for the
to the activities. sake of which we wish everything else, and that we
As there are various actions, arts, and sciences, it do not desire all things for the sake of something else
follows that the ends are also various. Thus health (for, if that is so, the process will go on ad infinitum,
is the end of medicine, a vessel of shipbuilding, vic- and our desire will be idle and futile) it is clear that
tory of strategy, and wealth of domestic economy. this will be the good or the supreme good. Does it
not follow then that the knowledge of this supreme
From Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. E. C. Welldon good is of great importance for the conduct of life,
(London: Macmillan, 1892), bks. 1 and 2. and that, if we know it, we shall be like archers who
*Headings added by the editor. have a mark at which to aim, we shall have a better
*Some notes omitted; the remaining notes renumbered. chance of attaining what we want? But, if this is the

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 158   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

case, we must endeavour to comprehend, at least peculiar to him that we are looking for. We must
in outline, its nature, and the science or faculty to exclude therefore the life of nutrition and increase.
which it belongs. . . .   There is next what may be called the life of sensa-
tion. But this too, is apparently shared by Man with
HAPPINESS: LIVING AND DOING WELL horses, cattle, and all other animals. There remains
As every knowledge and moral purpose aspires to what I may call the practical life of the rational part
some good, what is in our view the good at which of Man’s being. But the rational part is twofold; it
the political science aims, and what is the high- is rational partly in the sense of being obedient to
est of all practical goods? As to its name there is, I reason, and partly in the sense of possessing reason
may say, a general agreement. The masses and the and intelligence. The practical life too may be con-
cultured classes agree in calling it happiness, and ceived of in two ways,2 viz., either as a moral state,
conceive that “to live well” or “to do well” is the or as a moral activity: but we must understand by it
same thing as “to be happy.” But as to the nature the life of activity, as this seems to be the truer form
of happiness they do not agree, nor do the masses of the conception.
give the same account of it as the philosophers. The The function of Man then is an activity of soul
former define it as something visible and palpable, in accordance with reason, or not independently of
e.g. pleasure, wealth, or honour; different people reason. Again the functions of a person of a certain
give different definitions of it, and often the same kind, and of such a person who is good of his kind
person gives different definitions at different times; e.g. of a harpist and a good harpist, are in our view
for when a person has been ill, it is health, when generically the same, and this view is true of people
he is poor, it is wealth, and, if he is conscious of of all kinds without exception, the superior excel-
his own ignorance, he envies people who use grand lence being only an addition to the function; for it
language above his own comprehension. Some phi- is the function of a harpist to play the harp, and of
losophers1 on the other hand have held that, besides a good harpist to play the harp well. This being so,
these various goods, there is an absolute good which if we define the function of Man as a kind of life,
is the cause of goodness in them all. . . . and this life as an activity of soul, or a course of
action in conformity with reason, if the function of
THE FUNCTION OF A PERSON a good man is such activity or action of a good and
Perhaps, however, it seems a truth which is gener- noble kind, and if everything is successfully per-
ally admitted, that happiness is the supreme good; formed when it is performed in accordance with its
what is wanted is to define its nature a little more proper excellence, it follows that the good of Man
clearly. The best way of arriving at such a definition is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue or, if
will probably be to ascertain the function of Man. there are more virtues than one, in accordance with
For, as with a flute-player, a statuary, or any artisan, the best and most complete virtue. But it is neces-
or in fact anybody who has a definite function and sary to add the words “in a complete life.” For as
action, his goodness, or excellence seems to lie in one swallow or one day does not make a spring, so
his function, so it would seem to be with Man, if one day or a short time does not make a fortunate or
indeed he has a definite function. Can it be said then happy man. . . .
that, while a carpenter and a cobbler have definite
functions and actions, Man, unlike them, is natu- VIRTUE
rally functionless? The reasonable view is that, as Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intel-
the eye, the hand, the foot, and similarly each sev- lectual and partly moral, intellectual virtue is both
eral part of the body has a definite function, so Man originated and fostered mainly by teaching; it there-
may be regarded as having a definite function apart fore demands experience and time. Moral3 virtue
from all these. What then, can this function be? It on the other hand is the outcome of habit. . . . From
is not life; for life is apparently something which this fact it is clear that no moral virtue is implanted
Man shares with the plants; and it is something in us by nature; a law of nature cannot be altered

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   159

by habituation. Thus a stone naturally tends to fall cowardly or courageous. It is much the same with
downwards, and it cannot be habituated or trained our desires and angry passions. Some people become
to rise upwards, even if we were to habituate it by temperate and gentle, others become licentious and
throwing it upwards ten thousand times; nor again passionate, according as they conduct themselves in
can fire be trained to sink downwards, nor anything one way or another way in particular circumstances.
else that follows one natural law be habituated or In a word moral states are the results of activities
trained to follow another. It is neither by nature then corresponding to the moral states themselves. It is
nor in defiance of nature that virtues are implanted our duty therefore to give a certain character to the
in us. Nature gives us the capacity of receiving activities, as the moral states depend upon the dif-
them, and that capacity is perfected by habit. ferences of the activities. Accordingly the difference
Again, if we take the various natural powers between one training of the habits and another from
which belong to us, we first acquire the proper facul- early days is not a light matter, but is serious or
ties and afterwards display the activities. It is clearly rather all-important.
so with the senses. It was not by seeing frequently
or hearing frequently that we acquired the senses of DEFICIENCY AND EXCESS
seeing or hearing; on the contrary it was because we The first point to be observed then is that in such
possessed the senses that we made use of them, not matters as we are considering deficiency and excess
by making use of them that we obtained them. But are equally fatal. It is so, as we observe, in regard
the virtues we acquire by first exercising them, as is to health and strength; for we must judge of what
the case with all the arts, for it is by doing what we we cannot see by the evidence of what we do see.
ought to do when we have learnt the arts that we Excess or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is fatal
learn the arts themselves; we become e.g. builders to strength. Similarly an excess or deficiency of
by building and harpists by playing the harp. Simi- meat and drink is fatal to health, whereas a suitable
larly it is by doing just acts that we become just, by amount produces, augments and sustains it. It is the
doing temperate acts that we become temperate, by same then with temperance, courage, and the other
doing courageous acts that we become courageous. virtues. A person who avoids and is afraid of every-
The experience of states is a witness to this truth, for thing and faces nothing becomes a coward; a person
it is by training the habits that legislators make the who is not afraid of anything but is ready to face
citizens good. This is the object which all legislators everything becomes foolhardy. Similarly he who
have at heart; if a legislator does not succeed in it, enjoys every pleasure and never abstains from any
he fails of his purpose, and it constitutes the distinc- pleasure is licentious; he who eschews all pleasures
tion between a good polity and a bad one. like a boor is an insensible sort of person. For tem-
Again, the causes and means by which any vir- perance and courage are destroyed by excess and
tue is produced and by which it is destroyed are deficiency but preserved by the mean state.
the same; and it is equally so with any art; for it is Again, not only are the causes and the agen-
by playing the harp that both good and bad harp- cies of production, increase and destruction in the
ists are produced and the case of builders and all moral states the same, but the sphere of their activ-
other artisans is similar, as it is by building well that ity will be proved to be the same also. It is so in
they will be good builders and by building badly other instances which are more conspicuous, e.g. in
that they will be bad builders. If it were not so, there strength; for strength is produced by taking a great
would be no need of anybody to teach them; they deal of food and undergoing a great deal of labour,
would all be born good or bad in their several trades. and it is the strong man who is able to take most
The case of the virtues is the same. It is by acting food and to undergo most labour. The same is the
in such transactions as take place between man case with the virtues. It is by abstinence from plea-
and man that we become either just or unjust. It is sures that we become temperate, and, when we
by acting in the face of danger and by habituating have become temperate, we are best able to abstain
ourselves to fear or courage that we become either from them. So too with courage; it is by habituating

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 160   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

ourselves to despise and face alarms that we become It must be laid down then that every virtue or
courageous, and, when we have become coura- excellence has the effect of producing a good con-
geous, we shall be best able to face them. dition of that of which it is a virtue or excellence,
and of enabling it to perform its function well. Thus
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE the excellence of the eye makes the eye good and
We have next to consider the nature of virtue. its function good, as it is by the excellence of the
Now, as the qualities of the soul are three, viz. eye that we see well. Similarly, the excellence of the
emotions, faculties and moral states, it follows that horse makes a horse excellent and good at racing, at
virtue must be one of the three. By the emotions carrying its rider and at facing the enemy.
I mean desire, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, love, If then this is universally true, the virtue or excel-
hatred, regret, emulation, pity, in a word whatever is lence of man will be such a moral state as makes a
attended by pleasure or pain. I call those faculties in man good and able to perform his proper function
respect of which we are said to be capable of experi- well. We have already explained how this will be the
encing these emotions, e.g. capable of getting angry case, but another way of making it clear will be to
or being pained or feeling pity. And I call those moral study the nature or character of this virtue.
states in respect of which we are well or ill-disposed
towards the emotions, ill-disposed e.g. towards the VIRTUE AS A MEAN
passion of anger, if our anger be too violent or too Now in everything, whether it be continuous or dis-
feeble, and well-disposed, if it be duly moderated, crete, it is possible to take a greater, a smaller, or an
and similarly towards the other emotions. equal amount, and this either absolutely or in rela-
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emo- tion to ourselves, the equal being a mean between
tions; for we are not called good or evil in respect of excess and deficiency. By the mean in respect of the
our emotions but in respect of our virtues or vices. thing itself, or the absolute mean, I understand that
Again, we are not praised or blamed in respect of our which is equally distinct from both extremes; and
emotions; a person is not praised for being afraid or this is one and the same thing for everybody. By the
being angry, nor blamed for being angry in an abso- mean considered relatively to ourselves I understand
lute sense, but only for being angry in a certain way; that which is neither too much nor too little; but
but we are praised or blamed in respect of our virtues this is not one thing, nor is it the same for every-
or vices. Again, whereas we are angry or afraid with- body. Thus if 10 be too much and 2 too little we
out deliberate purpose, the virtues are in some sense take 6 as a mean in respect of the thing itself; for
deliberate purposes, or do not exist in the absence of 6 is as much greater than 2 as it is less than 10,
deliberate purpose. It may be added that while we and this is a mean in arithmetical proportion. But
are said to be moved in respect of our emotions, in the mean considered relatively to ourselves must not
respect of our virtues or vices we are not said to be be ascertained in this way. It does not follow that if
moved but to have a certain disposition. 10 pounds of meat be too much and 2 be too little
These reasons also prove that the virtues are not for a man to eat, a trainer will order him 6 pounds,
faculties. For we are not called either good or bad, as this may itself be too much or too little for the
nor are we praised or blamed, as having an abstract person who is to take it; it will be too little e.g. for
capacity for emotion. Also while Nature gives us our Milo, 4 but too much for a beginner in gymnastics.
faculties, it is not Nature that makes us good or bad, It will be the same with running and wrestling; the
but this is a point which we have already discussed. right amount will vary with the individual. This
If then the virtues are neither emotions nor faculties, being so, everybody who understands his business
it remains that they must be moral states. avoids alike excess and deficiency; he seeks and
The nature of virtue has been now generically chooses the mean, not the absolute mean, but the
described. But it is not enough to state merely that mean considered relatively to ourselves.
virtue is a moral state, we must also describe the Every science then performs its function well,
character of that moral state. if it regards the mean and refers the works which

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   161

it produces to the mean. This is the reason why it Accordingly, virtue, if regarded in its essence
is usually said of successful works that it is impos- or theoretical conception, is a mean state, but, if
sible to take anything from them or to add anything regarded from the point of view of the highest good,
to them, which implies that excess or deficiency is or of excellence, it is an extreme.
fatal to excellence but that the mean state ensures But it is not every action or every emotion that
it. Good . . . artists too, as we say, have an eye to the admits of a mean state. There are some whose very
mean in their works. But virtue, like Nature her- name implies wickedness, as e.g. malice, shameless-
self, is more accurate and better than any art; virtue ness, and envy, among emotions, or adultery, theft,
therefore will aim at the mean;—I speak of moral and murder, among actions. All these, and others
virtue, as it is moral virtue which is concerned with like them, are censured as being intrinsically wicked,
emotions and actions, and it is these which admit of not merely the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is
excess and deficiency and the mean. Thus it is pos- never possible then to be right in respect of them;
sible to go too far, or not to go far enough, in respect they are always sinful.
of fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and Right or wrong in such actions as adultery does
pain generally, and the excess and the deficiency are not depend on our committing them with the right
alike wrong; but to experience these emotions at the person, at the right time or in the right manner; on
right times and on the right occasions and towards the contrary it is sinful to do anything of the kind at
the right persons and for the right causes and in all. It would be equally wrong then to suppose that
the right manner is the mean or the supreme good, there can be a mean state or an excess or deficiency
which is characteristic of virtue. Similarly there may in unjust, cowardly, or licentious conduct; for, if it
be excess, deficiency, or the mean, in regard to were so, there would be a mean state of an excess
actions. But virtue is concerned with emotions and or of a deficiency, an excess of an excess and a defi-
actions, and here excess is an error and deficiency ciency of a deficiency. But as in temperance and
a fault, whereas the mean is successful and laud- courage there can be no excess or deficiency because
able, and success and merit are both characteristics the mean is, in a sense, an extreme, so too in these
of virtue. cases there cannot be a mean or an excess or defi-
It appears then that virtue is a mean state, so ciency, but, however the acts may be done, they are
far at least as it aims at the mean. Again, there are wrong. For it is a general rule that an excess or defi-
many different ways of going wrong; for evil is in its ciency does not admit of a mean state, nor a mean
nature infinite, to use the Pythagorean5 figure, but state of an excess or deficiency.
good is finite. But there is only one possible way of But it is not enough to lay down this as a gen-
going right. Accordingly the former is easy and the eral rule; it is necessary to apply it to particular cases,
latter difficult; it is easy to miss the mark but difficult as in reasonings upon actions, general statements,
to hit it. This again is a reason why excess and defi- although they are broader . . . , are less exact than
ciency are characteristics of vice and the mean state particular statements. For all action refers to particu-
a characteristic of virtue. lars, and it is essential that our theories should har-
“For good is simple, evil manifold.”6 monize with the particular cases to which they apply.
Virtue then is a state of deliberate moral purpose
consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the SOME VIRTUES
mean being determined . . . by reason, or as a prudent We must take particular virtues then from the cata-
man would determine it. logue7 of virtues.
It is a mean state firstly as lying between two In regard to feelings of fear and confidence, cour-
vices, the vice of excess on the one hand, and age is a mean state. On the side of excess, he whose
the vice of deficiency on the other, and secondly fearlessness is excessive has no name, as often
because, whereas the vices either fall short of or go happens, but he whose confidence is excessive is
beyond what is proper in the emotions and actions, foolhardy, while he whose timidity is excessive and
virtue not only discovers but embraces that mean. whose confidence is deficient is a coward.

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 162   part ONE ❯❯ ETHICAL THEORY

In respect of pleasures and pains, although not an unambitious person. The reason for our doing
indeed of all pleasures and pains, and to a less extent so will be stated in due course, but let us now dis-
in respect of pains than of pleasures, the mean state cuss the other virtues in accordance with the method
is temperance . . . , the excess is licentiousness. We which we have followed hitherto.
never find people who are deficient in regard to Anger, like other emotions, has its excess, its
pleasures; accordingly such people again have not deficiency, and its mean state. It may be said that
received a name, but we may call them insensible. they have no names, but as we call one who observes
As regards the giving and taking of money, the the mean gentle, we will call the mean state gentle-
mean state is liberality, the excess and deficiency ness. Among the extremes, if a person errs on the
are prodigality and illiberality. Here the excess and side of excess, he may be called passionate and his
deficiency take opposite forms; for while the prodigal vice passionateness, if on that of deficiency, he may
man is excessive in spending and deficient in taking, be called impassive and his deficiency impassivity.
the illiberal man is excessive in taking and deficient There are also three other mean states with a
in spending. certain resemblance to each other, and yet with a
(For the present we are giving only a rough and difference. For while they are all concerned with
summary account of the virtues, and that is suffi- intercourse in speech and action, they are different
cient for our purpose; we will hereafter determine in that one of them is concerned with truth in such
their character more exactly.8) intercourse, and the others with pleasantness, one
In respect of money there are other dispositions with pleasantness in amusement and the other with
as well. There is the mean state which is magnifi- pleasantness in the various circumstances of life. We
cence; for the magnificent man, as having to do must therefore discuss these states in order to make
with large sums of money, differs from the liberal it clear that in all cases it is the mean state which
man who has to do only with small sums; and the is an object of praise, and the extremes are neither
excess corresponding to it is bad taste or vulgarity, right nor laudable but censurable. It is true that
the deficiency is meanness. These are different from these mean and extreme states are generally name-
the excess and deficiency of liberality; what the dif- less, but we must do our best here as elsewhere to
ference is will be explained hereafter. give them a name, so that our argument may be
In respect of honour and dishonour the mean clear and easy to follow. . . .
state is highmindedness, the excess is what is called
vanity, the deficiency littlemindedness. Correspond- WHY IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO BE VIRTUOUS
ing to liberality, which, as we said, differs from mag- That is the reason why it is so hard to be virtuous;
nificence as having to do not with great but with for it is always hard work to find the mean in any-
small sums of money, there is a moral state which thing, e.g. it is not everybody, but only a man of
has to do with petty honour and is related to high- science, who can find the mean or centre9 of a cir-
mindedness which has to do with great honour; for cle. So too anybody can get angry—that is an easy
it is possible to aspire to honour in the right way, or matter—and anybody can give or spend money,
in a way which is excessive or insufficient, and if a but to give it to the right persons, to give the right
person’s aspirations are excessive, he is called ambi- amount of it and to give it at the right time and for
tious, if they are deficient, he is called unambitious, the right cause and in the right way, this is not what
while if they are between the two, he has no name. anybody can do, nor is it easy. That is the reason
The dispositions too are nameless, except that the why it is rare and laudable and noble to do well.
disposition of the ambitious person is called ambi- Accordingly one who aims at the mean must begin
tion. The consequence is that the extremes lay claim by departing from that extreme which is the more
to the mean or intermediate place. We ourselves contrary to the mean; he must act in the spirit of
speak of one who observes the mean sometimes as Calypso’s10 advice,
ambitious, and at other times as unambitious; we
sometimes praise an ambitious, and at other times “Far from this smoke and swell keep thou thy bark,”

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 Chapter 8 ❮❮ Virtue Ethics   163

for of the two extremes one is more sinful than the action of this kind, to put it summarily, that we shall
other. As it is difficult then to hit the mean exactly, best succeed in hitting the mean.
we must take the second best course,11 as the say-
ing is, and choose the lesser of two evils, and this NOTES
we shall best do in the way that we have described, 1. Aristotle is thinking of the Platonic “ideas.”
2. In other words life may be taken to mean either the mere
i.e. by steering clear of the evil which is further
possession of certain faculties or their active exercise.
from the mean. We must also observe the things to 3. The student of Aristotle must familiarize himself with the
which we are ourselves particularly prone, as differ- conception of intellectual as well as of moral virtues,
although it is not the rule in modern philosophy to speak of
ent natures have different inclinations, and we may
the “virtues” of the intellect.
ascertain what these are by a consideration of our 4. The famous Crotoniate wrestler.
feelings of pleasure and pain. And then we must 5. The Pythagoreans, starting from the mystical significance of
number, took the opposite principles of “the finite” . . . and
drag ourselves in the direction opposite to them; for
“the infinite” . . . to represent good and evil.
it is by removing ourselves as far as possible from 6. A line—perhaps Pythagorean—of unknown authorship.
what is wrong that we shall arrive at the mean, as 7. It would seem that a catalogue of virtues . . . must have been
recognized in the Aristotelian school. Cp. Eud. Eth. ii. Chap-
we do when we pull a crooked stick straight.
ter 3.
But in all cases we must especially be on our 8. I have placed this sentence in a parenthesis, as it interrupts
guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure, the argument respecting the right use of money.
9. Aristotle does not seem to be aware that the centre . . . of a
as we are not impartial judges of pleasure. Hence
circle is not really comparable to the mean . . . between the
our attitude towards pleasure must be like that of the vices.
elders of the people in the Iliad towards Helen, and 10. Odyssey, xii. 219, 200; but it is Odysseus who speaks there,
and the advice has been given him not by Calypso but by
we must never be afraid of applying the words they
Circe (ibid. 101–110).
use; for if we dismiss pleasure as they dismissed 11. The Greek proverb means properly “we must take to the
Helen, we shall be less likely to go wrong. It is by oars, if sailing is impossible.”

R E A D I N G
Virtues and Vices
P H I L I P PA F O OT

Study Questions 9. How does this relate to Kant’s contention that some
1. What does Foot mean by saying that one cannot acts are in accordance with virtue yet have no posi-
get on well without the virtues? tive moral worth?
2. What is meant by saying that virtue is a perfection of 10. What does Foot say about whether virtue can be
the will rather than of body or mind? displayed in bad actions? How does she use the
3. What is the problem in attempting to decide example of poison to explain her view?
whether virtue is a matter of intention rather than
performance, or attitudes rather than actions? I
4. What two things belong to the nature of wisdom, . . . [I]t seems that virtues are, in some general way,
according to Foot, and how does she describe each? beneficial. Human beings do not get on well with-
5. What difference does she cite between virtue and out them. Nobody can get on well if he lacks cour-
skill or art?
age, and does not have some measure of temperance
6. What does Foot mean by saying that the virtues are
and wisdom, while communities where justice and
corrective, and what examples of this does she give?
7. How are justice and charity different in this regard,
according to Foot? Philippa Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” in Virtues and Vices, (Oxford:
8. How do individual circumstances and obstacles to Oxford University Press, 2002), 2–18. Copyright © Philippa Foot
virtue play a role in deciding whether doing some- 2002. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.
thing right but difficult is more or less virtuous? *Some notes omitted; the remaining notes renumbered.

Copyright 201 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s).
Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.