Case 3:23-cr-00063-TSL-LGI Document 73 Filed 03/20/24 Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CRIMINAL NO. 3:23CR62TSL-LGI

CRIMINAL NO. 3:23CR63TSL-LGI

CHRISTIAN LEE DEDMON

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the United States

Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Mississippi and the Civil Rights Division of the

Department of Justice (“the United States”), files this sentencing memorandum to assist the Court

with sentencing Defendant Christian Dedmon in the above-captioned cases at his consolidated

sentencing hearing, which is scheduled for March 20, 2024. The United States respectfully

submits that a sentence at the high end of Defendant Dedmon’s Guidelines range is sufficient, but

not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

because it would appropriately account for (1) the egregiousness of Defendant Dedmon’s conduct;

(2) Defendant Dedmon’s lengthy and disturbing history of misconduct; (3) the seriousness of civil

rights crimes and the damage they cause to society; and (4) the special need for general deterrence

in this context.

I. Factual and Procedural History

a. Criminal No. 3:23-cr-00062-TSL-LGI (Conerly Road)

On January 24, 2023, Defendant Christian Dedmon and his five co-defendants in Criminal

No. 3:23-cr-00062-TSL-LGI (“the Conerly Road incident”), while acting as sworn law
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enforcement officers, unlawfully entered the home of M.J. and E.P. without a warrant, handcuffed

and arrested them without probable cause to believe they had committed a crime, and, over the

course of the next hour, tased them dozens of times, taunted them with racial slurs, threw eggs at

them, waterboarded them, assaulted them with a dildo, and placed guns to their heads. The ordeal

culminated with a mock execution: Co-Defendant Elward surreptitiously ejected a bullet from the

chamber of his gun, and then shoved his gun in M.J.’s mouth and dry-fired it. The gun clicked

but did not discharge. Co-Defendant Elward removed the gun from M.J.’s mouth and

instinctively but subconsciously clicked the magazine back into place. Co-Defendant Elward

then placed the gun back in M.J.’s mouth and pulled the trigger, and the gun discharged. The

bullet blew apart M.J.’s tongue, shattered his jaw, and exited through his neck. As M.J. lay

bleeding on the floor, Defendant Dedmon and his co-defendants devised a false cover story and

took steps to corroborate it, including: removing M.J.’s handcuffs, planting a BB gun next to him,

destroying surveillance video, getting rid of spent shell casings and taser cartridges, submitting

fraudulent drug evidence to the crime lab, filing false reports, charging the victims with crimes

they did not commit, and making false statements to investigators.

In connection with that incident, Defendant Dedmon was charged in an Information with

eleven felony offenses: Conspiracy Against Rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Counts 1 and

13); Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Counts 2, 3, 4, 6,

7, and 10); Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

(Count 5); Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Count 11); and
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Obstruction of Justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (Count 12). ECF 3. The parties

subsequently entered into a plea agreement. ECF 56.

b. Criminal No. 3:23-cr-00063-TSL-LGI (Interstate 20)

On December 4, 2022, Defendant Dedmon and his two co-defendants in Criminal No.

3:23-cr-00063-TSL-LGI (“the I-20 incident”), while acting as sworn law enforcement officers,

violated A.S.’s right to be free from excessive force. Defendant Dedmon learned that A.S. had

allegedly stolen personal property from Dedmon’s neighbor. Dedmon asked other RCSO

deputies to conduct a traffic stop and detain A.S. until Dedmon could arrive. Co-Defendant

Hunter Elward, and Co-Defendant Daniel Opdyke arrived separately after the traffic stop and

continued to detain A.S. while waiting for Dedmon. Dedmon then arrived, at which time he threw

A.S. to the ground and slapped, punched, and kicked him, even though A.S. was not resisting.

Dedmon then took Opdyke’s service weapon and fired it multiple times near A.S. to coerce him

to confess to stealing the property. Dedmon tased A.S. repeatedly, and then pulled out his penis

and rubbed it on A.S.’s face. Co-Defendants Opdyke and Elward failed to intervene to protect

A.S., despite the opportunity to do so.

In connection with that incident, Defendant Dedmon was charged in an Information with

three felony offenses: Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242

(Counts 1 and 2); and Use of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1) (Count 3). The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement. ECF 32.

c. Guilty Pleas and Sentencing Date

On August 3, 2023, Defendant Dedmon pleaded guilty to the charged crimes, and the Court

accepted his guilty pleas. The Court set a consolidated sentencing hearing on January 16, 2024,

which was later continued to March 20, 2024.

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II. Sentencing Factors

A. Sentencing Factors

Section 3553(a) of Title 18 identifies sentencing factors for district courts to consider in

imposing sentencing in a criminal case. A court “in determining the particular sentence to be

imposed, shall consider,” among other factors, “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the

history and characteristics of the defendant,” and the purposes of sentencing: specifically, “the

need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for

the law, [] to provide just punishment for the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), “to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). After weighing those factors, the court “shall

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of

sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

B. Application of Sentencing Factors and Sentencing Recommendation

The United States respectfully submits that a sentence at the high end of Defendant

Dedmon’s Guidelines range is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the

purposes of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, because it would appropriately account for (1) the

egregiousness of Defendant Dedmon’s conduct; (2) Defendant Dedmon’s lengthy and disturbing

history of misconduct; (3) the seriousness of civil rights crimes and the damage they cause to

society; and (4) the special need for general deterrence in this context.

First, a high-end Guidelines sentence would appropriately account for the nature and

circumstances of the offenses, and, in particular, the aggravating factors that make Defendant

Dedmon’s conduct especially egregious:

• Premeditation. Defendant Dedmon planned to make unlawful entry into the residence
at 135 Conerly Road and also planned to use, and recruited others in his plan to use,
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excessive force. Defendant Dedmon’s premeditation is evidenced by his off-the-

books text-message communications and directives to Co-Defendants Middleton,
Elward, and Opdyke in which he recruits them for a “mission” at Conerly Road and
later states, “If we don’t see cameras go” and “no bad mugshots.” The group
understood these messages to mean that, once they arrived, they could breach the home
if there were no surveillance cameras, even though they did not have a warrant, and
that they should avoid injuring the parts of the body that are captured by a mugshot.
Dedmon’s knowledge and premeditated plan to use excessive force, especially on
individuals who had done nothing wrong and where the officers lacked any probable
cause to arrest—is an aggravating factor the Court should consider at sentencing. See
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is
the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.”); United States v.
Livoti, 196 F.3d 322, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding the district court properly found
that the defendant-officer’s conduct “fell outside the ‘heartland’ of typical civil rights
cases” and justified a departure in part because the defendant-officer “had himself
created the violent situation which led to Baez’s death because the Baez brothers had
done nothing wrong and [the defendant-officer] lacked probable cause to arrest them.”).

Defendant Dedmon also planned to use unlawful force during the I-20 incident.
Dedmon ordered deputies to make a traffic stop of the victim, A.S., and further ordered
the deputies to hold A.S. at the location of the traffic stop until Dedmon could arrive.
Dedmon so instructed his fellow deputies because he planned to use unlawful force
against A.S. to coerce a confession from him. Dedmon’s premeditated plan to use
excessive force is an aggravating factor the Court should consider in imposing
sentence. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 156.

• Racial animus (Conerly Road). Inside 135 Conerly Road, the defendants, all of whom
are white, violently assaulted M.J. and E.P., both of whom are Black. During the assault,
the defendants called M.J. and E.P. racial slurs, including, “nigger,” “monkey,” and
“boy”; accused them of taking advantage of the white woman who owned the house; and
warned them to stay out of Rankin County and go back to Jackson or to “their side” of
the Pearl River—areas with higher concentrations of Black residents. The defendants’
insidious racial animus is an aggravating factor the Court should consider in imposing
sentence. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) (“Traditionally,
sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence
bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant. …
The defendant’s motive for committing the offense is one important factor.”).

• Brutality (Conerly Road). The defendants’ assault on M.J. and E.P. was particularly
brutal. The victims endured multiple forms of torture over a prolonged period. They
were handcuffed, tased repeatedly, hit, kicked, beaten with objects, waterboarded with
various liquids, sexually assaulted with a dildo and threatened with rape, intimidated
with multiple gunshots, and, ultimately, Co-Defendant Elward discharged his gun
inside M.J.’s mouth. Dedmon’s overall participation in the prolonged brutality, as
well as his personal actions during the abuse, are aggravating factors the Court should
consider in imposing sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 626
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(8th Cir. 2010) (stating that it was proper for the district court to consider the “brutal
nature of the attack” in gang-related prison assault); United States v. Carroll, 189 F.
App’x 450, 457 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant-officer’s substantive
reasonableness challenge and noting that, “This was an ugly episode, the violence
gratuitous, calculated, malicious and sustained, and defendant Carroll was one of five
active participants.”).

• Ringleader. Defendant Dedmon personally participated in a majority of the various

methods of abuse during the Conerly Road incident, and he was the primary and most
sadistic abuser. Dedmon repeatedly drive-stunned M.J. and participated in the taser
torture of both victims; he fired his weapon multiple times as a means of terror and
intimidation; he sexually assaulted the victims with a dildo, including by putting the
dildo in the victims’ mouths, near their buttocks, and threatening to anally rape them;
he beat the victims with a piece of wood; he participated in pouring liquid on the victims
and waterboarding them; and he used racial taunts against the victims.

Defendant Dedmon used various means of abuse during the I-20 incident as well, where
he was also the primary and most sadistic abuser. Dedmon physically assaulted the
victim, A.S., by hitting, kicking, and tasing him; he shot a firearm near the victim to
scare him and coerce a confession; and he also committed multiple sexual assaults
against the victim by grabbing and squeezing A.S.’s genitals and then by pulling out
his own penis and rubbing it on A.S.’s face.

• Coerced confessions. In both incidents, Dedmon discharged a firearm near the head
of a restrained victim for the purpose of coercing an unlawful confession. This is an
aggravating factor the Court should consider in imposing sentence. See Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1951) (discussing the reprehensibility of coercing
confessions through brutal acts and stating that, “when officers wring confessions from
the accused by force and violence, they violate some of the most fundamental, basic,
and well-established constitutional rights which every citizen enjoys.”).

• Sexual assaults. As previously noted, Defendant Dedmon sexually assaulted both

M.J. and E.P. with a dildo during the Conerly Road incident. Also as previously noted,
Dedmon sexually assaulted A.S. during the I-20 incident. The use of sexual assault as
a means of inflicting terror and humiliation is particularly horrendous. Dedmon’s
disturbing pattern of sexual assault is an aggravating factor the Court should consider
in imposing sentence. See United States v. Bresnahan, 400 F. Supp. 3d 793, 802 (D.
Minn. 2019) (finding, in prosecution for false statements, that the defendant-probation
officer’s perpetration of “humiliating sexual abuse on multiple women throughout his
career,” his infliction of “unimaginable pain on th[o]se women,” and his lies to cover
up his sexual abuse warranted an upward variance).

• Severity of victims’ injuries and emotional trauma (Conerly Road). M.J. and E.P. both
experienced severe pain from the torture they endured. M.J. suffered permanent
injury. As noted above, the bullet from Co-Defendant Elward’s gun blew apart M.J.’s
tongue, shattered his jaw, and exited through his neck. M.J. required emergency
surgery, his jaw had to be wired shut, and he spent five days in the intensive care unit
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and 21 total days in the hospital as a result of the shooting. To this day, M.J. has not
fully recovered. He still experiences constant pain from being shot. It is painful for
him to eat and drink, and he has persisting problems with his jaw. In addition, the
injury has affected his eyesight and his ability to sing, both of which prevent him from
being the musician he once was.

The injury to M.J. and E.P. is not only physical. Both men have lasting and profound
emotional trauma. M.J. feels broken and struggles with shame, nightmares, and
anxiety. E.P has similarly struggled with lasting emotional trauma. He is terrified of
the public, lives in constant fear of further terrorization, and states the humiliation from
the sexual assault is too great for him to talk about. The victims’ serious physical
injuries and continuing emotional trauma are aggravating factors the Court should
consider in imposing sentence. See United States v. Bailey, 169 F. App’x 815, 826
(5th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s upward departure based in part on the
“severity of the injuries” to the victims); United States v. Dautovic, 763 F.3d 927, 935
(8th Cir. 2014) (noting that the defendant-officer’s “infliction of serious injury” and
“physical restraint” of the victim were “aggravating circumstances” the district court
should have considered at sentencing).

• Leadership role. Defendant Dedmon exercised a leadership role when he helped

organize the unlawful “mission” at 135 Conerly Road by recruiting Co-Defendants
Middleton, Elward, and Opdyke, directing their unlawful entry, and cautioning them
about surveillance and “bad mugshots.” Dedmon exercised a leadership role during
the I-20 incident by directing other RCSO officers to conduct a traffic stop and detain
A.S. until he could arrive. Dedmon then gave orders to the other officers when he
arrived on the scene. Dedmon’s leadership role in both cases is an aggravating factor
the Court should consider in imposing sentence.

• Nature and extent of cover up (Conerly Road). After Co-Defendant Elward shot M.J.
at Conerly Road, the defendants left M.J. bleeding on the floor while they huddled
together on the property’s back porch, where they agreed to tell investigators an
elaborate cover story. To support their cover story, the defendants destroyed evidence,
planted evidence, tampered with witnesses, filed serious false charges against M.J.
supported by false evidence, wrote false reports, and lied to investigators. Dedmon’s
role in the overall cover up, as well as his numerous personal actions in service of the
concocted cover story—including filing a false sworn affidavit that M.J. committed
felony possession of methamphetamine—are aggravating factors the Court should
consider in imposing sentence. Dautovic, 763 F.3d at 935 (noting that the defendant-
officer “tried to conceal his wrongdoing by falsifying a police report and lying under
oath,” which was an aggravating circumstance of the offense); United States v.
Cordero, 609 F. App’x 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming officer’s 120-month sentence
for obstruction of justice, and explaining that upward variance was justified because
“not only did he defy the law he was sworn to protect, but he abused the privileges of
his law enforcement position to subvert and frustrate a federal investigation.”).
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These aggravating factors make Defendant Dedmon’s offenses especially egregious and deserving

of a high-end Guidelines sentence.

Second, a high-end Guidelines sentence would appropriately account for Defendant

Dedmon’s lengthy and disturbing history of misconduct, which is documented in the sealed

supplement filed in support of this memorandum but is not reflected in Defendant Dedmon’s

criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) (“If reliable information indicates that the

defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the

defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an

upward departure may be warranted.”); United States v. Chiasson, 90 F.4th 832, 839 (5th Cir.

2024) (varying upward based on uncharged misconduct that did not result in convictions).

Third, a high-end Guidelines sentence would appropriately account for the seriousness of

civil rights crimes and the damage they cause to society. “The seriousness of section 242 crimes

simply cannot be understated, as they harm far more than individual victims; society as a whole is

harmed when those entrusted to protect the public and enforce the laws turn to lawlessness

themselves.” United States v. Boone, 110 F. Supp. 3d 909, 917 (S.D. Iowa 2015), aff’d 828 F.3d

705 (8th Cir. 2015). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[p]ublic officials convicted of

violating § 242 have done more than engage in serious criminal conduct; they have done so under

color of the law they have sworn to uphold.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Civil

rights crimes erode the public’s trust in fair and evenhanded law enforcement, thereby weakening

the social contract that bonds our society together and leading to social unrest. United States v.

Rodella, No. CR 14-2783 JB, 2015 WL 711941, at *50 (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2015) (“A law

enforcement officer’s violation of the law is not comparable to an ordinary criminal’s violation.

Civil rights crimes go to the core of our system and endanger the entire structure of our government
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and are a threat to the republic.”). If civil rights crimes are not taken seriously and punished

appropriately, disproportionally affected groups are left with the impression that their rights do not

matter and that law enforcement officers will continue to violate them with impunity.

Fourth, a high-end Guidelines sentence would appropriately reflect that the need for

“general deterrence is especially compelling in the context of officials abusing their power.”

United States v. Hooper, 566 F. App’x 771, 773 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished). That is because

“violent abuse” by law enforcement officers “may easily go undetected and unpunished,” so in the

rare instance that it is ferreted out, the interest in general deterrence requires that a strong message

be sent to would-be violators. United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1158–59 (11th Cir.

2013) (emphasizing that “[t]he ability to unearth these crimes by law enforcement officers . . . is

particularly difficult, and, as we see it, the extraordinarily lenient sentences in this case sap the

goal of general deterrence.”); see also Hooper, 566 F. App’x at 773 (reversing district court’s

downward variance in part because it failed to factor in “the need for [the defendant’s] sentence to

adequately deter other police officers from using excessive force.”); United States v. Ronda, 455

F.3d 1273, 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he sentences imposed should serve to deter against future

criminal activity by these defendants as well as by others similarly situated who may be tempted

to violate the law and their oath of office to protect themselves or their fellow officers from

possible state or federal criminal investigations.”); United States v. Pendergrass, 648 F. App’x 29,

36 (2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (affirming district court’s judgment that “a substantial sentence

was warranted for deterrence purposes, given that ‘civil rights cases like this one are difficult to

investigate and to prosecute’ and it is important ‘to let it be known that such criminal indifference

and cruelty will not be tolerated.’”). As one court put it, “[e]ven if [the defendant-officer] will

likely never violate another person’s constitutional rights, a serious sentence sends a message to
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all law enforcement officers to not abuse their positions.” Rodella, 2015 WL 711941, at *51. A

high-end Guidelines sentence in this case would send a strong message to rogue officers that if

they abuse their authority and obstruct justice to cover it up, they will not receive special treatment

or get away with a slap on the wrist.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully submits that a sentence at the high

end of Defendant Dedmon’s Guidelines range provides adequate and appropriate punishment in

this case, is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, and accounts for all relevant 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors.

Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March 2024.

KRISTEN M. CLARKE TODD W. GEE

Assistant Attorney General United States Attorney
Civil Rights Division Southern District of Mississippi

BY: s/Christopher J. Perras BY: s/Erin O. Chalk

Christopher J. Perras (MASS # 682002) Erin O. Chalk (MSB # 101721)
Special Litigation Counsel Criminal Chief
Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division United States Attorney’s Office
DOJ 4CON, 150 M Street, NE 501 East Court Street
Washington, DC 20002 Jackson, Mississippi 39201

BY: s/Daniel Grunert BY: s/Glenda Haynes

Daniel Grunert (D.C. Bar # 1721133) Glenda Haynes (MSB#2132)
Trial Attorney Assistant United States Attorney
Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division United States Attorney’s Office
DOJ 4CON, 150 M Street, NE 501 East Court Street
Washington, DC 20002 Jackson, Mississippi 39201
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Erin O. Chalk, Assistant U. S. Attorney, do hereby certify that I have filed the foregoing
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM with the Clerk of the Court, using the electronic filing
system, ECF, which sent notification to the following participants: Michael Verdier Cory, Jr.,
attorney for Defendant Christian Dedmon, and to Jamie V. Harrell, United States Probation
Officer.

Respectfully submitted this 4th day of March 2024.

S/ Erin O. Chalk______________________
ERIN O. CHALK
Assistant U. S. Attorney