“Law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by the one who is in charge of the
community” (St. Thomas Aquinas, STh I-II, 90, 4; CCC 1976). Law is primarily a reasonable plan of action,
“a certain rule and measure of acts whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting” (S.t., 1–2, q.
90, aa. 1, 3; S.c.g., 3, 114).
Eternal Law is the Divine Wisdom of God which oversees the common good and governs everything.
Eternal law is God’s plan to lead all creation towards God’s eternal salvific plan to be holy and blameless
before Him through Jesus Christ (Ephesians 1:4–5)[1]. God, as “Being-itself”, is able to promulgate such a
law as God the Creator’s reason is also perfect wisdom. Everything in nature reflects the Eternal Law in
their own natures (S.T. I-IIae, 91, 2)[2]. Things act according to their nature, so they derive their proper
ends (final cause) according to the law written into their nature.
Divine Law is the historical laws of Scripture given to us through God’s self-revelation. Divine law is divided
into the Old Law and the New Law, which correspond to the Old and New Testaments of the Bible (q91,
a5). The Old Law, revealed by God to Moses, “is the first stage of revealed Law. Its moral prescriptions are
summed up in the Ten Commandments” (CCC 1962). It has an extrinsic focus — motivated by fear — and
promises earthly rewards (such as social peace).[3] It expresses immediate conclusions of the natural
moral law.
The New Law perfects the Old Law. The New Law, through the teachings of Jesus — commands internal
conduct — and reaches us by divine love — promising love and heavenly reward[4]. The New Law “is the
Holy Spirit given through faith in Christ, which heals and is expressed through love.”[5] It gives interior
strength to achieve what it teaches. It is also a written law found in Christ’s teachings (in the Sermon on the
Mount, the Beatitudes, etc.) and in the moral catechesis of the apostles, summed up in the commandment
of love.[6]
Natural Law is “the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 2.). “The highest
norm of human life is the divine law — eternal, objective, and universal — whereby God governs us
according to His wisdom and love. God makes Man a sharer in His law so Man can recognize the
unchanging truth” (DH 3)[7]. The natural law “hinges upon the desire for God and submission to Him, as
well as upon the sense that the other is one’s equal” (CCC 1955).
It is “natural” as it consists of Reason given to us by the “higher reason” of the divine Lawgiver.[8] They are
natural as they are objective principles which originate in human nature (GS 16; DH 14).[9] The natural law
is universal because it encompasses every person, of every epoch (cf. CCC 1956): “it is immutable and
permanent throughout history; the rules that express it remain substantially valid” (CCC 1958).
Every man is bound to live by his rational nature, guided by reason[10]. The natural law expresses the
dignity of the person and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties (CCC 1956, 1978). The
first principle of the natural law is “good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided” (q94, a2, p. 47; CCC
1954). All other precepts of natural law rest upon this.[11] The Church, through its Magisterium, is the
authentic interpreter of the natural law (cf. CCC 2036). Since mankind is subject to sin, grace and
Revelation are necessary for moral truths to be known “by everyone with facility, with certainty and no
error.”[12]
Human Law is the interpretation of natural law in different contexts (ST II.I.95–97). Natural law is a
foundation for moral and civil law. Government laws are dictates of practical reason from the precepts of
Natural Law[13].
Law is not about individual morality. Individual vices should be legislated against when they threaten harm
to others.[14] Rulers of the State should take the general moral precepts of nature and specify them into
State laws, e.g., the repugnance of murder is legislated into punishments[15].
Hierarchy of Law
For Aquinas, human laws are derived from natural law which is a participation in the eternal law.[16]
Therefore, eternal law is at the top, followed by natural law, and then human law. Divine law is the revealed
law of God to man, while natural law is the imprint of eternal law on the hearts of men[17].
Aquinas On Law
Read Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics (Hackett), xiii-xxii and 11-83.
See xx-xxi for the part, question, article structure of the Summa and the Objections, Sed Contra,
Respondeo, and Responses-to-Objections structure of the articles.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
Philosophy and Theology in Thomas' Thought
A. For Thomas philosophy is ancilla theologiae (handmaiden of theology). Aquinas was first and foremost a
theologian, though he was quite capable of distinguishing philosophy proper from theology. He held that
(1) philosophy can prove by means of reason unaided by revelation some truths proposed by Christian
faith;
(2) it can clarify truths which cannot be proved;
and (3) it can defend the principles of Christian faith against their detractors.
True philosophy cannot conflict with Christian faith but it can fall short of it--e.g., the existence of God as
efficient cause of the universe can be established by reason alone, the full meaning of "God" can only come
from faith.
Aquinas is not the only, but he is the most important, medieval thinker who tried to incorporate many of
Aristotle's ideas into Christian philosophy. He goes as far towards accepting Aristotle's views as a Christian
of his time could do. But there are some points on which even Thomas would have to depart from Aristotle:
chief among them (i) Aristotle's view that the universe is everlasting and (ii) Aristotle's rejection of individual
immortality.
B. Christian PHILOSOPHY: Philosophy as Thomas understands it depends on this: that there is a natural
world; that its substantial components regularly exercise their own causal powers; that there are intelligent
beings capable of understanding the natural world by their own mental powers.
C. CHRISTIAN philosophy: Christian philosophy for Thomas depends on this: that the world of creatures is
totally based--for its existence, endurance and operation--upon God, who freely creates, conserves and
cooperates with what He has created. *****
An Outline Corresponding (roughly) to Thomas' Exposition
A. Law in general
B. Kinds of law
C. Eternal Law
D. Divine law
E. Natural law
1. in general
2. the precepts
3. apprehending natural law--synderesis
F. How human law is related to natural law
G. Human law
1. Why human law is needed
2. Specificity of human law
3. How framed for the community and classes of persons
4. Whether it represses all vices or prescribes acts of all the virtues.
5. Whether everyone is subject to law
6. Whether there are exceptions to true human laws
7. Whether human law should ever be changed
8. How quickly should human law be changed/the importance of custom
I shall deviate from this outline by reversing E-G, to which most of our time shall be devoted. The reason for
doing this is that human law is more familiar to us, and it is good philosophical inquiry proceeds from what
is most familiar to us.
Law in general
Aquinas describes law as "a certain rule and measure of acts whereby man is induced to act or is
restrained from acting." (q90, a1) Because the rule and measure of human actions is reason, law has an
essential relation to reason; in the first place to divine reason; in the second place to human reason, when it
acts correctly, i.e., in accordance with the purpose or final cause implanted in it by God.
Law is directed by its nature to the good, and especially to the universal or common good. (q90, a3) It is
addressed not primarily to private persons but to the whole people meeting in common or to persons who
have charge of the community as a whole.
Promulgation--i.e., the application of the law to those to whom it is applied and the communication of this
law to them--is essential to the nature of the law. The natural law is promulgated by God: "God has instilled
it into human minds so as to be known by them naturally." Divine and human laws can be promulgated by
word of mouth or, even better, by writing.
Kinds of Law
Aquinas recognizes four main kinds of law: the eternal, the natural, the human, and the divine. The last
three all depend on the first, but in different ways. Were we to arrange them in a hierarchy, eternal would be
at the top, then natural, then human. Divine law is not in conflict with natural law, but it reaches human
beings by a different route, revelation.
Eternal Law
Eternal law is identical to the mind of God as seen by God himself. It can be called law because God
stands to the universe which he creates as a ruler does to a community which he rules. When God's reason
is considered as it is understood by God Himself, i.e. in its unchanging, eternal nature (q91, a1) , it is
eternal law.
Divine Law
Divine law is derived from eternal law as it appears historically to humans, especially through revelation,
i.e., when it appears to human beings as divine commands. Divine law is divided into the Old Law and the
New Law (q91, a5). The Old and New Law roughly corresponding to the Old and New Testaments of the
Bible. When he speaks of the Old Law, Thomas is thinking mainly of the Ten Commandments. When he
speaks of the New Law, the teachings of Jesus.
Old Law -- commands conduct externally -- reaches humans through their capacity for fear -- Law promised
earthly rewards (social peace and its benefits)
New Law -- commands internal conduct -- reaches humans by the example of divine love -- promises
heavenly reward
Human Law
Thomas' philosophy, as we should expect knowing how much he is indebted to Aristotle, is pervaded with a
sense of teleology. Nowhere is this clearer and more important than in his discussion of human law. You
might think here that he would define human law as what we sometimes nowadays call positive law, the
laws actually enacted and put in force in our human communities. But in fact human law fits just those so-
called positive laws which are what written and enacted laws should be. So-called laws which fall short of
what they should be are not true laws at all, according to Thomas. (Cf. q95, a2, p. 59)
I shall hold off giving Thomas' own definition of human law, because it relies upon the concept of natural
law to which we will turn to later. We can say now that Thomas thinks of human laws as laws, devised by
human reason (q91, a3, p. 21), adapted to particular geographical, historical and social circumstances.
Law is directed to the common good, and human law is no exception. The promotion of virtue is necessary
for the common good, and human laws are instruments in the promotion of virtue. Aristotle already pointed
out that most people are kept from crime by fear of the law. Thomas accepts this judgment, suggesting (r.
Ad 1, p. 57) that by coercion even men who are evilly disposed may be led in the direction of virtue.
Laws are also important, says Thomas, for other reasons noted by Aristotle.
(1) It is easier to find a few wise persons who can make good laws than to find many who, in the absence
of laws, can judge correctly in each instance.
(2) Lawmakers can deliberate at length before making laws while many particular cases must be judged
quickly, when they arise.
(3) Lawmakers judge in the abstract and are less likely to be swayed by emotions evoked by concrete
circumstances or by the kinds of things that tend to corruption. There is less danger of perversion of law,
which is formulated in general, than there would be perversion of judgment in particular cases where no law
exists to guide judgment. (Q. 95, A. 1, R. Ad 2)
Even though laws are general, they are still adapted to the nature of the community, which is not
everywhere the same, and to the classes of individuals who make up the society. For example, there may
be one set of laws that govern the conduct of trade, another set of laws that govern the control of parents
over their children, another set of laws setting limits on the powers of what passes for a police force.
In other words, there may be different laws for different kinds of citizens, who have different functions in the
community. Still laws are general to two ways. All human laws worthy of the name laws are directed
towards the common good. And even specific laws, say, for merchants, are general in some way: that they
go farther than a single case. (Q. 96, a. 1)
The human law, says Thomas, is not obliged to repress all vices. It is framed for most people, who are far
from perfect in virtue. It is aimed at the more grievous vices from which the majority can abstain, i.e., those
which are to the hurt of others, e.g., murder, theft, and the like. Were the law to attempt to legislate
perfection, it would make people hostile to the law and defeat its purpose. (Q. 96, a. 2)
For the same reason, the law does not prescribe all the acts of the virtues. But it does prescribe some acts
corresponding to each virtue. For example, some acts that a just man would do are prescribed; some acts
that a temperate person would do are prescribed. (A. 3)
Everyone is subject to human law and ought to obey the human law, that is, the true human law, not the
occasional perversion of it which is sometimes presented as law. But the ruler (charged with stating and
enforcing the law) is in a special position. Normally, he is obliged to follow the law which he himself has
stated. But there is nobody over him to judge him in this life. However, he is not exempt, since he will be
held accountable by God. (A.5).
Thomas considers when it may be permissible to violate the letter of the law (in A. 6). He realizes that,
because it is by nature general, the law may require exceptions. In most cases, these should be made only
with the consent of the political authorities, but there are exceptions even to this rule, when the common
good is under unusual peril.
Human laws are subject to change, according to Aquinas, because experience in practical matters may
allow us to improve them. (Q. 97, A. 1) Pp. 76-77 are interesting because, while they echo passages in
Aristotle, they give a hint of that idea of long-term moral .and political progress which would later became
influential during the 17th and 18th c. Enlightenment.
Aristotle understood that there could be progress in the arts and in philosophy, but he saw history as
cyclical, and he anticipated that social catastrophes would cultural and technical progress to be lost, though
they might be recovered in a later cycle. Thomas, by contrast, has an essentially linear notion of history,
which is connected with the Christian idea that there is just one Big Story and each human event has its
unique place in that story.
Human law can be changed, and occasionally should be changed, but it should not be lightly changed. The
reason is that respect for the law is largely a matter of custom or habit, and inessential change undermines
this custom. The common good is not served by a more finely tuned, theoretically better law, if people have
less respect for law and follow it less faithfully. (A.2)
The Relation of Human and Natural Law
To define human law, a Thomist must refer to natural law. Thomas says that
it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human
reason needs to proceed to certain particular determinations of the laws. These particular determinations,
devised by human reason, are called human laws. (q91, a3, p. 21)
The natural law is law with moral content, more general than human law. Natural law deals with necessary
rather than with variable things. In working out human laws, human practical reason moves from the
general principles implanted in natural law to the contingent commands of human law.
Natural law is more perfect than human laws, because of the variable subject-matter of human laws.
Natural law is less specific than human laws, but human laws are applications of natural law and cannot
deviate from what we might call the spirit of the natural law, as applied to the time and place of the human
law's promulgation. If a human law does deviate in this way, if it is not a proper and rationally defensible
application of the natural law, then it is a perversion of law, which is to say, it is a law in name only (q95, a2,
p. 59).
Natural law holds that in general human life should be preserved and steps should be taken to preserve it.
But laws governing automobile traffic so as, among other things, to preserve human health and life are
applications specific to the era in which automobiles exist. A further specification, codified in human law, is
that in the U.S. one should normally drive on the right and, in Great Britain one should normally drive on the
left. At this level the human law is partly a matter purely of custom. Human law in one place differs from
human law in another, but if they are laws and not perversions of law they all have the same ends, those
contained in the natural law, which is an expression of eternal law.
Natural Law--In General
Natural law is introduced in q91, a2 (p20):
all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, insofar as, namely, from its being imprinted upon them, they
derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational
creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of
providence, by being provident for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the eternal reason,
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end, and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law.
Aquinas conceives of creatures, according to types, as governed by final causes or ends which they
naturally seek. These ends are implanted in them by the Creator. Most creatures actively seek their proper
ends out of instinct. Aalthough human beings too have proper ends, we do not always act as we should.
Our actions are often determined counter to nature and natural law by our appetites. When reason rules in
the human soul, we choose what accords with nature.
Natural Law--The Precepts
Reason in human beings is capable of apprehending certain general principles implanted in human nature.
The first principle of the natural law is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" (q94, a2, p. 47).
All other precepts of natural law rest upon this. What Aquinas seems to mean is that the several precepts of
natural law are specifications of this precept, which is highly abstract). These other precepts include (p. 48):
"Whatever is a means of preserving human life and of warding off its obstacles belongs to natural law"; in
other words, a good justification for a moral or legal rule is that it promotes the preservation of human life.
Behind this is the fact that all living beings possess an inclination for survival [corresponding to the nutritive
faculty of the soul, as Aristotelians apprehend it].
"Sexual intercourse, education of offspring," and the life have a proper place in human life, as in other
animal life [corresponding to the sensitive faculty];
Corresponding our peculiar possession of reason, humans are under an obligation "to avoid ignorance"
(and to seek to know God) and to avoid offending those among whom one has to live. [These pertain
uniquely to the rational faculty.]
Aquinas never gives an exhaustive list of these precepts.
Grasping Natural Law--Synderesis
The grasp of the principles of natural law is achieved by a special capacity called synderesis. This is a
natural intellectual habit, in one sense of habit but not in the central sense.
It is natural because all human beings are born with it.
It is intellectual because it makes possible the grasp of principles.
As something found in the soul which is the foundation for grasping principles, it might be a capacity
(power) or a habit. But mere capacities can go either way, towards good or evil; synderesis is oriented
towards the good. So it's not a mere capacity, but a habit.
Habit (habitus) is a Latin Aristotelian's way of expressing what Aristotle called a hexis (state or disposition).
A habit is a first act of the soul, which can be actualized, in a second act; here the act of conscience.
Conscience is related to synderesis as actively thinking what you know (2nd act) is to the knowledge which
you have but which may or may not be active at any given time (1st act). We do not always experience
conscience but every human being has the capacity called synderesis.
Aquinas, however, denies that synderesis is a habit in the fuller sense (q94, a1), i.e., a moral habit. He
quotes Augustine, who says "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary" (p. 45). The moral
virtues, therefore, are habits; the person of courage may not exhibit courage at every moment (because not
every action requires courage)--yet when necessary, she will do the courageous thing.
And unlike most conditions that we call habits, synderesis is not acquired but innate or, as Aquinas puts it,
"natural."
Now, synderesis is not a habit of the sort described by Augustine since it can be overridden by the
appetities, as in infants and wicked persons.
The term synderesis has every appearance of being a Greek term. Yet it is not found in Aristotle or in any
classical Greek author near to him in time. I have never seen it in any text earlier than Aquinas himself,
though I am not sure that he invented it. It would seem to be a sometimes weak intellectual habit whose
subject-matter is ethical.
Synderesis must not be confused with prudence, which is the Thomas' term for what Aristotle calls
phronesis, or practical wisdom. A person with the intellectual virtue of prudence will necessarily possess the
moral virtues and will make good moral choices. Aristotle and Thomas agree on that. But you can have
synderesis, i.e. know the principles of natural law, and yet not act accordingly. Synderesis, which all
humans have, implies neither moral virtue nor prudence.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
SECOND EDITION
PART THREE
LIFE IN CHRIST
SECTION ONE
MAN'S VOCATION LIFE IN THE SPIRIT
CHAPTER ONE
THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
ARTICLE 8
SIN
I. MERCY AND SIN
1846 The Gospel is the revelation in Jesus Christ of God's mercy to sinners.113 The angel announced to
Joseph: "You shall call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins."114 The same is true of
the Eucharist, the sacrament of redemption: "This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for
many for the forgiveness of sins."115
1847 "God created us without us: but he did not will to save us without us."116 To receive his mercy, we
must admit our faults. "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we
confess our sins, he is faithful and just, and will forgive our sins and cleanse us from all
unrighteousness."117
1848 As St. Paul affirms, "Where sin increased, grace abounded all the more."118 But to do its work grace
must uncover sin so as to convert our hearts and bestow on us "righteousness to eternal life through Jesus
Christ our Lord."119 Like a physician who probes the wound before treating it, God, by his Word and by his
Spirit, casts a living light on sin:
Conversion requires convincing of sin; it includes the interior judgment of conscience, and this, being a
proof of the action of the Spirit of truth in man's inmost being, becomes at the same time the start of a new
grant of grace and love: "Receive the Holy Spirit." Thus in this "convincing concerning sin" we discover a
double gift: the gift of the truth of conscience and the gift of the certainty of redemption. The Spirit of truth is
the Consoler.120
II. THE DEFINITION OF SIN
1849 Sin is an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and
neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods. It wounds the nature of man and injures
human solidarity. It has been defined as "an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law."121
1850 Sin is an offense against God: "Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in
your sight."122 Sin sets itself against God's love for us and turns our hearts away from it. Like the first sin, it
is disobedience, a revolt against God through the will to become "like gods,"123 knowing and determining
good and evil. Sin is thus "love of oneself even to contempt of God."124 In this proud self- exaltation, sin is
diametrically opposed to the obedience of Jesus, which achieves our salvation.125
1851 It is precisely in the Passion, when the mercy of Christ is about to vanquish it, that sin most clearly
manifests its violence and its many forms: unbelief, murderous hatred, shunning and mockery by the
leaders and the people, Pilate's cowardice and the cruelty of the soldiers, Judas' betrayal - so bitter to
Jesus, Peter's denial and the disciples' flight. However, at the very hour of darkness, the hour of the prince
of this world,126 the sacrifice of Christ secretly becomes the source from which the forgiveness of our sins
will pour forth inexhaustibly.
III. THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SINS
1852 There are a great many kinds of sins. Scripture provides several lists of them. The Letter to the
Galatians contrasts the works of the flesh with the fruit of the Spirit: "Now the works of the flesh are plain:
fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension,
factions, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like. I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do
such things shall not inherit the Kingdom of God."127
1853 Sins can be distinguished according to their objects, as can every human act; or according to the
virtues they oppose, by excess or defect; or according to the commandments they violate. They can also be
classed according to whether they concern God, neighbor, or oneself; they can be divided into spiritual and
carnal sins, or again as sins in thought, word, deed, or omission. The root of sin is in the heart of man, in
his free will, according to the teaching of the Lord: "For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder,
adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, slander. These are what defile a man."128 But in the heart also
resides charity, the source of the good and pure works, which sin wounds.
IV. THE GRAVITY OF SIN: MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN
1854 Sins are rightly evaluated according to their gravity. The distinction between mortal and venial sin,
already evident in Scripture,129 became part of the tradition of the Church. It is corroborated by human
experience.
1855 Mortal sin destroys charity in the heart of man by a grave violation of God's law; it turns man away
from God, who is his ultimate end and his beatitude, by preferring an inferior good to him.
Venial sin allows charity to subsist, even though it offends and wounds it.
1856 Mortal sin, by attacking the vital principle within us - that is, charity - necessitates a new initiative of
God's mercy and a conversion of heart which is normally accomplished within the setting of the sacrament
of reconciliation:
When the will sets itself upon something that is of its nature incompatible with the charity that orients man
toward his ultimate end, then the sin is mortal by its very object . . . whether it contradicts the love of God,
such as blasphemy or perjury, or the love of neighbor, such as homicide or adultery. . . . But when the
sinner's will is set upon something that of its nature involves a disorder, but is not opposed to the love of
God and neighbor, such as thoughtless chatter or immoderate laughter and the like, such sins are
venial.130
1857 For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: "Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave
matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent."131
1858 Grave matter is specified by the Ten Commandments, corresponding to the answer of Jesus to the
rich young man: "Do not kill, Do not commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not
defraud, Honor your father and your mother."132 The gravity of sins is more or less great: murder is graver
than theft. One must also take into account who is wronged: violence against parents is in itself graver than
violence against a stranger.
1859 Mortal sin requires full knowledge and complete consent. It presupposes knowledge of the sinful
character of the act, of its opposition to God's law. It also implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a
personal choice. Feigned ignorance and hardness of heart133 do not diminish, but rather increase, the
voluntary character of a sin.
1860 Unintentional ignorance can diminish or even remove the imputability of a grave offense. But no one
is deemed to be ignorant of the principles of the moral law, which are written in the conscience of every
man. The promptings of feelings and passions can also diminish the voluntary and free character of the
offense, as can external pressures or pathological disorders. Sin committed through malice, by deliberate
choice of evil, is the gravest.
1861 Mortal sin is a radical possibility of human freedom, as is love itself. It results in the loss of charity and
the privation of sanctifying grace, that is, of the state of grace. If it is not redeemed by repentance and
God's forgiveness, it causes exclusion from Christ's kingdom and the eternal death of hell, for our freedom
has the power to make choices for ever, with no turning back. However, although we can judge that an act
is in itself a grave offense, we must entrust judgment of persons to the justice and mercy of God.
1862 One commits venial sin when, in a less serious matter, he does not observe the standard prescribed
by the moral law, or when he disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without
complete consent.
1863 Venial sin weakens charity; it manifests a disordered affection for created goods; it impedes the soul's
progress in the exercise of the virtues and the practice of the moral good; it merits temporal punishment.
Deliberate and unrepented venial sin disposes us little by little to commit mortal sin. However venial sin
does not break the covenant with God. With God's grace it is humanly reparable. "Venial sin does not
deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God, charity, and consequently eternal
happiness."134
While he is in the flesh, man cannot help but have at least some light sins. But do not despise these sins
which we call "light": if you take them for light when you weigh them, tremble when you count them. A
number of light objects makes a great mass; a number of drops fills a river; a number of grains makes a
heap. What then is our hope? Above all, confession.135
1864 "Therefore I tell you, every sin and blasphemy will be forgiven men, but the blasphemy against the
Spirit will not be forgiven."136 There are no limits to the mercy of God, but anyone who deliberately refuses
to accept his mercy by repenting, rejects the forgiveness of his sins and the salvation offered by the Holy
Spirit.137 Such hardness of heart can lead to final impenitence and eternal loss.
V. THE PROLIFERATION OF SIN
1865 Sin creates a proclivity to sin; it engenders vice by repetition of the same acts. This results in perverse
inclinations which cloud conscience and corrupt the concrete judgment of good and evil. Thus sin tends to
reproduce itself and reinforce itself, but it cannot destroy the moral sense at its root.
1866 Vices can be classified according to the virtues they oppose, or also be linked to the capital sins
which Christian experience has distinguished, following St. John Cassian and St. Gregory the Great. They
are called "capital" because they engender other sins, other vices.138 They are pride, avarice, envy, wrath,
lust, gluttony, and sloth or acedia.
1867 The catechetical tradition also recalls that there are "sins that cry to heaven": the blood of Abel,139
the sin of the Sodomites,140 the cry of the people oppressed in Egypt,141 the cry of the foreigner, the
widow, and the orphan,142 injustice to the wage earner.143
1868 Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we
cooperate in them:
- by participating directly and voluntarily in them;
- by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them;
- by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so;
- by protecting evil-doers.
1869 Thus sin makes men accomplices of one another and causes concupiscence, violence, and injustice
to reign among them. Sins give rise to social situations and institutions that are contrary to the divine
goodness. "Structures of sin" are the expression and effect of personal sins. They lead their victims to do
evil in their turn. In an analogous sense, they constitute a "social sin."144
IN BRIEF
1870 "God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all" (Rom 11:32).
1871 Sin is an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law (St. Augustine, Faust 22:PL 42,
418). It is an offense against God. It rises up against God in a disobedience contrary to the obedience of
Christ.
1872 Sin is an act contrary to reason. It wounds man's nature and injures human solidarity.
1873 The root of all sins lies in man's heart. The kinds and the gravity of sins are determined principally by
their objects.
1874 To choose deliberately - that is, both knowing it and willing it - something gravely contrary to the divine
law and to the ultimate end of man is to commit a mortal sin. This destroys in us the charity without which
eternal beatitude is impossible. Unrepented, it brings eternal death.
1875 Venial sin constitutes a moral disorder that is reparable by charity, which it allows to subsist in us.
1876 The repetition of sins - even venial ones - engenders vices, among which are the capital sins.
113 Cf. Lk 15.
114 Mt 1:21.
115 Mt 26:28.
116 St. Augustine, Sermo 169,11,13:PL 38,923.
117 1 Jn 8-9.
118 Rom 5:20.
119 Rom 5:21.
120 John Paul II, DeV 31 § 2.
121 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum 22:PL 42,418; St. Thomas Aquinas, STh I-II,71,6.
122 Ps 51:4.
123 Gen 3:5.
124 St. Augustine, De civ. Dei 14,28:PL 41,436.
125 Cf. Phil 2:6-9.
126 Cf. Jn 14:30.
127 Gal 5:19-21; cf. Rom 1:28-32; 1 Cor 6:9-10; Eph 5:3-5; Col 3:5-9; 1 Tim 1:9-10; 2 Tim 3:2-5.
128 Mt 15:19-20.
129 Cf. 1 Jn 5:16-17.
130 St. Thomas Aquinas, STh I-II,88,2, corp. art.
131 RP 17 § 12.
132 Mk 10:19.
133 Cf. Mk 3:5-6; Lk 16:19-31.
134 John Paul II, RP 17 § 9.
135 St. Augustine, In ep. Jo. 1,6:PL 35,1982.
136 Mt 12:31; cf. Mk 3:29; Lk 12:10.
137 Cf. John Paul II, DeV 46.
138 Cf. St. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, 31,45:PL 76,621A.
139 Cf. Gen 4:10.
140 Cf. Gen 18:20; 19:13.
141 Cf. Ex 3:7-10.
142 Cf. Ex 20:20-22.
143 Cf. Deut 24:14-15; Jas 5:4.
144 John Paul II, RP 16.
