Formal Theorizing

Author(s): Lee Freese

Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 6 (1980), pp. 187-212
Published by: Annual Reviews
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Ann. Rev. Sociol. 1980. 6:187-212
Copyright? 1980 by Annual ReviewsInc. All rightsreserved

FORMAL THEORIZING *10589

Lee Freese
Department Washington
ofSociology, Pullman,
StateUniversity,
Washington
99164

INTRODUCTION
The difference betweencontemporary sociologicaltheoryand thehis-
toryofsocialthought is notalwaysclear.Certainbooksseemto equate
thetwo(Coser& Rosenberg 1969;Timasheff & Theodorson1976;Ros-
sides 1978). Othervolumeson sociologicaltheoryeschewtheconcept
oftheory as theabstract ideasofgreatsociologists infavorofa concept
emphasizing substantive traditions,
paradigms, or schoolsoftheoretical
analysis(Ritzer1975;Turner1978).Theliterature onsociologicaltheory
as a wholedoesnotyetconsidertheory as a bodyofprinciples indepen-
dentofcertaintheoreticians and theoreticaltraditions.
However,a growing concernedwiththe methodology
literature of
theory construction
suggests thatthedevelopment ofsociological
theory
is (or wouldbe) facilitatedbyformally extracting theoretical
principles
fromgeneraldiscourseand formulating themwithinwhataresupposed
to be therequirements ofeffective theories.Contemporary analysesof
theserequirements andofthekindsoftheories madepossiblebyvarious
formalconsiderations claimthatapplicationsof formalmethodsand
techniquesto the construction of substantive theorieswillresultin a
moreeffective consolidation ofsociologicaltheoriesand data.
The concernforconsolidation is not new. It was,forexample,the
guiding concernofParsons'efforts at systematic theorybuildinga gen-
erationago, and it was a focalpointof his presidential addressto the
American SociologicalSocietyin 1949 (Parsons1950).It also hasbeen
a guidingconcernofBlalock'swork,and it was discussedin hisrecent
presidential address(Blalock1979). In the thirty yearsbetweenthese
addresses,thenumberof formaltheoriesconstructed appearsto have

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188 FREESE

Itshouldthusbe possibletoassesswhether
increased. formal are
theories
a meansto theconsolidation ofsociologicalknowledge.
Unfortunately,assessingthisis not a simpletask.The term'formal
theory'has manyconnotations, someofwhichconflict.Moreover, sev-
eraldistinct exist,each containing
literatures ofissue,style,
differences
and purpose.

Literatures
Alternative
Themethodological developedbyorforsociologists
literature is multifa-
cetedand uneven.Amongprimerson scientific methodthereare the
conventional (Lastrucci1967; Reynolds1971; Wallace 1971; Chafetz
1978)and theidiosyncratic (Mullins1971;Hage 1972).Someanalyses
of theoreticalmethodsare general(Willer1967; Baldamus1976) and
some focuson particular topics,such as explanation(Meehan 1968;
Cohen 1972),causalmodels(Gibbs 1972a, 1972b;Blalock& Costner
1972),orreductionism (Blau 1970a;Homans1970;Blain1971;Webster
1973).Therearegeneraldiscussions on thenatureofsociological inquiry
(Greer1969;Lachenmeyer 1973) and specificdiscussions on thelogic
of axiomatictheoryconstruction (Costner& Leik 1964; Bailey1970;
Land 1971).Thereare proposalsforand analysesofspecialmodesof
theory bothimported
construction, fromotherdisciplines (Blalock1964,
1969; Wilber1967) and inventedby the authorsthemselves (Gibbs
1972c;Mullins1974;Dubin1978).Someworkscombine methodological
analysiswithsubstantive theorizing(McKinney1966; Stinchcombe
1968);someprovidemethodological discussions ofsubstantive theories
(Fallding1968;Park1969;Skidmore1975);andmanypassfromtheory
and methodology intothephilosophy of social science(Gibson1960;
Brown1963;Krimerman 1969;Borger& Cioffi1970;Ryan1970;Gell-
ner1973).The foregoing topics,categories, and references are illustra-
tive,notexhaustive.
The substantiveliteratureon formaltheorydevelopedbyor forsoci-
thesamediversity
ologistsreflects as themethodological literature. Nu-
merous theoriesin greater or lesser degrees of mathematical
formalizationcanbe foundin Bergeretal (1966b,1972b)andLeinhardt
(1977). Butsomenonmathematical theoriesareconsidered tobe formal
becausetheyevincea concernfordeductivestructure (Kuhn1974;Col-
lins1975;Blau 1977),whilemanydeductive, mathematical treatments
and processare consideredto be modelsbut not
of social structure
theories(Cohen 1963; Bartos1967; Ofshe& Ofshe1970). Emerson
(1972a, 1972b),whoseexchangetheorywouldbe considered formal by

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 189

mostcontemporary standards, isreluctant tocallitthathimself-oreven

to allowthatexchangeprinciples constitute a theory(Emerson1976)-
presumably becauseof the absenceof mathematical equations;while
Homans(1974), whenhe introduces equations,refers to themas toys.
Formalsociological theories canrangefromsystems containing differen-
tialequations(Fararo1972)tosystematic verbaldiscourse ontheclassics
(Smelser& Warner1976).Whatcountsas formalsociologicaltheory is
verymuchin theeye ofthebeholder.
To thesetwodistinct literatures mustbe addedthaton thephilosophy
ofscience.(A cogentexposition ofthestateofthatfieldcan be found
in Suppe1977.)Philosophers ofscienceareinterested insciencelargely
forwhatit can tellthemaboutphilosophical problems. Nevertheless,
investigations intothephilosophical andlogicalfoundations ofscientific
methodformtheseedinggroundfordiscussions offormal theory inany
science(Suppes 1969). Hence the philosophyof sciencecomplicates
discussions offormaltheoryin sociology.Sociologists, whoare usually
interested in philosophy onlyforwhatit can tellthemaboutscience,
havefreely interpolated thisworkin developing theirownmethodologi-
cal literature(oftento thephilosophers' chagrin).
Evaluating formal sociological theories intermsofthemethodology of
formaltheory construction or thephilosophy ofsciencepresents enor-
mous semanticdifficulties. Take one issue as an example:Glaser&
Strauss(1967) implythatformaltheoriescan or shouldor do develop
inductively; however, theirconceptofformal theory is notthehypotheti-
cal-deductive model,whichtheydenigrate. Leik(1979),whosetheoreti-
cal workis hypothetical-deductive in structure, arguesforinduction as
a methodofformal theory construction; butwhathemeansbyinduction
is creativityinspiredby examining data. However,a philosopher (for
example,Salmon1967)wouldsay thattheformal theories in Bergeret
al (1974) are inductive(even thoughtheyare deductively structured)
becausetheyexpressknowledge claimsamplified beyondtheevidence
thathasbeenbrought tobearon them.Thiswouldnotbe saidaboutthe
formal modelsofSewell& Hauser(1975). The initialattempt byCollins
(1975) toformalize conflicttheory canbe considered inductive inalmost
any senseof the term;and Collins,whosestyleof formalization falls
withinthegeneralframework ofthehypothetical-deductive model,ex-
plicitlyrejectspositivism, theschool of method with which thatmodel
is mostcloselyassociated.Yet none of these authors is self-contradicto-
ry.The problem is thatthelanguage,conceptions, proposals, interpreta-
tions,andresultsofformal theorizing so
are thoroughly babelized.The
hallmark ofthisliterature is its incredible anarchy.

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190 FREESE

Plan of theEssay
Ratherthantryto forcea continuity wherenonereallyexists,I do not
reviewrecentdevelopments informal theory as theybearonthecumula-
tionofknowledge. Themethodological literature is notreadyfora sum-
mingup; theissuesand proposalswithinit are too badlyin need of
Even if thiswerenot so, it wouldbe riskyto reviewor
clarification.
interpretsubstantivedevelopments intermsofthemethodological litera-
turebecausetherelationship betweenthetwois notclear.The method-
ologistsmay have sensitizedsome theoreticians to the need for
formalizationand in somecases providedbroadcontours, butthetieis
tenuous.Also,in a reviewessayofthissortit wouldbe indefensible to
evaluatethesubstantive in theabsenceofconsensuson meth-
literature
odologicalstandards.
Instead,I approachthe subjectindirectly. I discerntwo different
strategiesfortheoryconstruction. I distinguish thembytheobjectives,
structure,content,methods,and resultstheyimplyforformaltheory
constructionand I analyzetheirimplications forthegrowth ofknowl-
edge.I concentrate on methodological issuesand illustrate themwith
substantivedevelopments. I do notrefermuchtoworksinthesociology
of knowledgeor of science.Whilethesedisciplinesshed lighton the
socialcontext ofscientific
knowledge andon whatscientists actuallydo,
theyarenotneededto determine whatmethodology scientists
oughtto
use to achievetheiraims.

THEORETICAL STRATEGIES
A theoretical as Zelditch(1979a) uses the term,is a set of
strategy,
proposals andrevealedbythepracticeoftheory
underlying construction.
Theseproposalsconcernthegoalsofinquiry, thedefinition
oflegitimate
problems andappropriatemethods, and thecriteria
forassessingresults.
Different theoretical
strategies beginwithdifferent
typically premises.
Whenresearchparadigms developfromthem,theirfundamental differ-
ences sometimeslead to irreconcilable disputesovermethodor sub-
stance.However,not everyextantsociologicalparadigmreflectsa
differenttheoretical
strategy(Mulkay1971). Nor shoulditbe assumed
thateverymethodological statement theoreti-
proposesa single,unitary
cal strategyforinquiryor thateverysubstantive theorynecessarilyre-
flectsone.
Manyofthecommentaries, andadvancedproposals
primers, forsocio-
logicaltheoryconstruction,thoughtheyvaryin emphasizing particular
features,supportthefollowing abbreviated,
compositeportraitofformal

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 191

theorizing:Theory construction typicallybegins with empirically

grounded, systematic discourseexpressedin an ordinary language.As
dataare substantially and successfullydevelopeda theoryadvancesby
meansofformalization. Formalsociologicaltheoryattempts to explain
andpredict (andhenceunderstand) thephenomena ofreal,complex, and
usuallycontemporary socialsystems. The problematic features ofthese
phenomena mustbe inductively abstractedand idealizedto enablelaw-
likegeneralizations aboutthemandthen,ifdesirable, effectiveattempts
tocontrolthem.Ideally,formal theorizing shouldresultintheconsolida-
tionof sociologicaltheoriesand data or in the cumulative growthof
sociologicalknowledge.
Twoindependent fortheory
strategies construction aremaskedinthis
(a) A generalizing
portrait: theoretical strategy,in whicha theoryis
constructed withthefollowing features:Itsobjectives areto explainand
togeneralize aboutthelawfulphenomena ofopensystems; itsstructure
is systematicand it containsordinary language;itsmethodis inductive
abstraction;anditspossibleresultis theconsolidation oftheoriesordata.
(b) A puretheoretical inwhicha theory
strategy, is constructed withthe
followingfeatures:Its objectiveis to predictthe behaviorof lawful
phenomena in closedsystems; itsstructure is formal and it containsno
ordinarylanguage; itsmethodis idealization;anditspossibleresultis the
cumulation oftheory someofwhichcouldhaveengineering applications.
A generalizingtheoreticalstrategytacitlyassumes a generalizingview
of theoriesand laws: Laws are construedas nomothetic universalor
of nonlimited
generalizations
statistical spatio-temporalscope,having
highinformation content, and describingsomeregularity thatobserva-
tionsoftheworldshouldconfirm. A theory ofsuchgeneraliza-
consisting
tionscan be thought ofas summarizing information,in an abstract
and
generalform, empirical
thatcan be usedto explainor predictparticular
cases thatfallwithinthescope of thetheory.In sociologicaldiscourse
oneoftenfindstheviewthattheoriesand lawsaresupposedto explain,
predict, in theworldof everyday
or describeregularities experience.
A pure theoreticalstrategytacitlyassumes an instrumentalview of
theoriesand laws: Laws maybe construedas nomothetic statements
expressedin universalor statistical
formand havinghighinformation
content,buttheyarenotmeantto be generalizations abouttheworldof
everyday Theregularities
experience. theydescribeexistina theoretical-
ly possibleworldbutnot in the actualworld.Theoriesand laws that
describe, spacesor idealgasesdescribewhatis
forexample,frictionless
truein a hypothetical
worldwhoseantecedent conditionsare notsatis-
fiedin ourordinary world.Iftheoriesare construed
as describing some
in a closed system,withlaws describing
idealizedstateof affairs the

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192 FREESE

invariances ofthesystem, thentheyare devicesforcalculating changes

inthesystem whenotherthings areequal.Thoughotherthings arenever
equaloutsideoftheclosedtheoretical system,on theinstrumentalview
theories andlawsmayserveas toolsforengineering somechangein an
openempirical systemwhosedepartures fromsometheoretically true
stateofaffairscan be measured(Freese& Sell 1980a;Willer& Hecka-
thorn1980).
Generalizing andpuretheoretical arenotmutually
strategies exclusive
and in practicemostformalsociologicaltheoriesreflect theirmixture.
However,some of thefeaturesof thesealternative maybe
strategies
incompatible orat leastindependent-afactnotapparent whentheyare
interpretedas partofa unitary strategysuchas thecompositedescribed
above.To providea conceptual anchorforsortingissuesandaccomplish-
mentsinformal theorizing,I examinethedistinct ofthesestrate-
features
beginning
gies in juxtaposition, withwhatare usuallytakento be the
objectivesofformaltheorizing.

Explanationor Prediction
Explanation andprediction aresaidtobe thegoalsofformal theorizing;
butwriters disagreeabout what it means to explain and about
predict,
whatkindsofdatasociological theoriesshould tryto explain andpredict,
and aboutwhether thesetwoactivities necessarilygo handin hand.
Discussionsof thesematters, whichare legion,usuallyconcernthe
hypothetical-deductivemethod.Thismethodhas beencriticized on the
groundthatitignoresotherpatterns ofreasoning essentialtothegrowth
ofscientific
theories.ThusHanson(1958) arguesthatsuccessful theoriz-
ingmayproceedretroductively, meaning(roughly) thattheories maybe
amplified and improved byproposing, forproblematic phenomena, hy-
potheseswhoseplausibility is grounded in theconceptual andlinguistic
patternsbymeansofwhichthephenomena aredefined andobserved.Or
Feyerabend (1975) arguesthatsuccessful theorizing is oftencounterin-
ductive,meaning(roughly) thatthedeliberate introduction oftheories
inconsistentwithalreadyacceptedtheoriesand knownfactsmayocca-
sion significantadvancesthroughattemptsto resolvethe anomalies
therebydiscovered.The hypothetical-deductive methodobscuresthe
"logicofdiscovery"-interest inwhichis rising(Nickles1980)-because
itdoesnotaccountfortheprocessofhypothesis formation andreforma-
tion.Whatitdoesaccountforarethelogicalconnections betweentheory
and data in a contextofverification.
Thebest-known explication ofthehypothetical-deductive methodhas
beenthecovering-law modeldevelopedextensively byHempel(1965),

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 193

Popper(1959), and others.Its essentialidea is thatempirical eventsor

laws are explainedwhendescriptions of themcan be logicallyderived
from somesetoflaws(ortheory). Fortheexplanation ofempirical events
statements ofinitialconditions are requiredto interpret thelawsin the
empirical contextoftheeventsto be explained.In thismodel,explana-
tionandprediction aresymmetrical becausetheirlogicis identical.The
onlydifference betweenexplanationand prediction is pragmatic:An
investigatorpredictsa futureeventbydeducingstatements aboutitfrom
laws and statements of initialconditions;he explainsa past eventby
subsuming statements aboutit underthe same propositions he would
haveused to predictit.
The strength ofthecovering-law modelis thatitallowsformaximum
reduction oferrorin theoretical inference,due to thelogicalnecessity
thatobtainsbetweenexplanans(statements thatexplain)andexplananda
(statements tobe explained).Whentheexplanansarestatistical laws,an
invariablerelativefrequency is deduced.Laws describean invariant or
constantstateofaffairs andarenotsummaries ofprevious observations;
andso theyafford a morestablebasisforexplanation andprediction than
accidentalgeneralizations or simplecorrelations, whichdepend on
uniqueorchanging empiricalconditions. Whensystemic changescanbe
coordinated tolaws,theireffects canbe calculatedwithprecision (Nagel
1961; Brodbeck 1962; Hempel 1965).
The covering-law modelhas been subjectedto numeroustechnical
criticisms(Talley1974): (a) The modelreliesunnecessarily on nomo-
theticlaws and on thesymmetry of explanation and prediction;
some
explanations and predictions can be accomplishedwithoutlaws and
someeventscan be explainedthatcouldnot havebeenpredicted and
conversely (Scriven1959,1962);(b) themodeltacitly assumesanunten-
ableorat leastunfruitful
dichotomy betweena theoreticalandan obser-
vationallanguage(Suppe 1977); (c) the model, togetherwiththe
empiricist philosophythatunderliesit, forbidsthesimultaneous exis-
tenceof mutually inconsistent theorieswithinthesame domain,thus
prohibiting a theoretical
pluralism necessaryto and historically
descrip-
tiveof thegrowthofscience(Feyerabend1965).
None ofthesecriticisms is lethal.The use ofthecovering-law model
forformaltheorizing does notprecludetheuse ofidiographic explana-
tion(ofa kindthatcouldnothavebeenemployedpriorto thefact)for
phenomena notdeemedtorequireortobe suitablefornomothetic expla-
nation.It is no concessionfordefenders of thecovering-lawmodelto
allowthatthemodeldoesnotapplyefficiently to everything
thatcanbe
describedinan observational language.It is someconcessiontoabandon
theobservational-theoretical butthedeductive-lawful
distinction, char-

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194 FREESE

acterofthemodelcan be preserved by requiring thattheoriesemploy

formallanguageand describeideal systems.The use of themodelin
theory-testing does notrequireone to abandoncomparisons withalter-
nativetheories, nordoesitsapplication ina contextofverification imply
thereis no logicof discovery. Thoughthecovering-law modelhad its
origins inlogicalempiricism, a deductive-nomothetic modeldoesnotin
itselfcommitone to an empiricist doctrine.
The emphasisthe covering-law model places on the symmetry of
explanation andprediction obscuresthefactthatthemodelismuchmore
usefulforprediction in closedtheoretical systemsthanforexplanation
inopenandcomplexempirical systems. Thisis so becausethededuction
ofstatements describing empirical eventsoutsideofclosedsystems re-
quiresinordinately manystatements aboutinitialconditions-conditions
aboutwhich,formanysociologicalphenomena, we do not have,and
probably cannotobtain,adequateknowledge.
Thismaybe illustrated by referringto thebodyofformaltheoryon
statusorganizing processeswhichattempted initiallytoexplainandpre-
dictsomesocial-structural effectsofattributes suchas occupational rank,
educationalstatus,race,and sex (Bergeret al 1966a,1972a).Bergeret
al examinedan arrayof diversefindingsthatseemedto suggestan
empirical generalization worthy ofexplanation: thatdiffuse statuschar-
acteristics,externalto sometasksituation and notnecessarily relevant
to it, determine the observablepowerand prestigeorderof a group
duringtaskinteraction. Theirtheoryattempted to explainthisgenerali-
zationbydeducingitfrom generalprinciples thatdescribed thebehavior
ofstatuscharacteristics underrestricted and somewhat idealizedcondi-
tions-forexample,theconditionthata giventaskgroupbe character-
izedbyonlyonestatusinequality. Thusthetheory cannotexplain, inthe
covering-law sense,casesthatdo notsatisfy theseconditions ofscope-
e.g. the cases thatinspiredthe originalgeneralization. Furthermore,
becausethenecessary information wasnotgathered atthetime,itcannot
be determined whether or notthebehaviorin themockjuriesobserved
byStrodtbeck et al (1958) wasorganizedbythestatuscharacteristics of
thegroupmembers (thoughin retrospect it appearsto havebeen).One
lacksinformation on theattitudes ofStrodtbeck etal's subjectsaboutsex
and occupational inequalities;and evenifsuchattitudes had beenmea-
sured,inorderto apply, thetheory to thesedataonewouldhavetorelax
therequirement ofa singlestatuscharacteristic (andotherrequirements
as well).Thusforanyillustrative case thatdoes notsatisfy thescope
conditions ofa theory, or forwhichmeasuresare missing, theobserva-
tionstatement describing thecase willnotbe deductively explainedby
thetheory becausesomestatements ofinitialconditions connecting the

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 195

theoryto thedatawillbe falseor willbe absent.If,as in thisinstance,

a generalization but not the cases it describesis derivable,thenthe
generalization andnotthecaseshasbeenexplained.Sincethisgenerali-
zationis itselfan abstractand theoreticalformulation thatmuchsimpli-
fieswhatwasobservedin eachcase,itcannotbe demonstrated thatthis
theory explainsmanycasesunlesstherequirement ofstrictderivability
is relaxed.
Thiscircumstance, however, has notimpededthedevelopment ofthe
theory ofstatusorganizing processes.To thecontrary, thetheory was a
foundation fora formal theoryconstruction program in whichattempts
havebeenmadeto extenditsgenerality (Berger& Fisek1974;Bergeret
al 1977)ortofindlimitsforthestatusgeneralization processitdescribes
(Freese& Cohen1973;Freese1974). Someofthesedevelopments em-
ployscopeconditions evenmorerestrictive thantheoriginalformula-
tion,buteach was undertaken becauseof thepredictive successofits
immediatepredecessor.Predictionwas attemptedforthese theories
primarily in a standardized experimental situation designedto measure
influence rates.An attempt to evaluategroupdecision-making by pre-
dictingthebehaviorof derivatives of some mathematical function ob-
tainedfrominfluence rateshas metwithsome success(Sell & Freese
1977).Fewerpredictions havebeenattempted in uncontrolled circum-
stancesbecauseofthestringent scopeconditions ofthetheories andthe
difficultyofassessingmeasurement error.Prediction ofthebehaviorof
mathematical derivativesand explanation of decision-making in juries,
usingthe same theoryappliedon the covering-law model (Zelditch
1969),areeasierto visualizeinprinciple thanto accomplish inpractice.
The proposalthatformaltheoriesshouldsimultaneously explainand
predict,deductively and nomothetically, is insufficientlycircumspect.
Theoriesmustbe testedbythepredictions theygive. Butformal socio-
logicaltheories givetheirmostsuccessful predictions on simulated data
or in artificialcircumstances or in closed or isolatedsystems.Popper
(1957) claimsthesameis truein thephysicalsciences.Henshel(1980)
claimsthenaturalsciencesobtainsomeoftheirmostsuccessful predic-
tionsbydevising unnaturalexperiments. Freese& Sell(1980b)arguethat
theverytestability ofa sociologicaltheorydependson observing some
idealizedsystemthatpre-fits thetheory.To theextentthattheseposi-
tionsaresound,thecovering-law modelis wellsuitedto formal theoriz-
ing-presuming theinstrumental in
viewoftheories, whichprediction is
emphasized. However,whether themodelis suitedto explanations of
complexsociological phenomena thatoperateinuncontrolled systems is
debatable(Ryan1970;Dixon 1973;Lessnoff1974).Theoriesmay have
to be severelyconditionalized to accountforphenomenaobservedin

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196 FREESE

openempiricalsystems-theveryphenomenathat,on thegeneralizing
viewoftheories,
theoriesshouldbe able,and are typically
intended, to
explain(Cohen1980).To theextenttheyareconditionalized, theymay
whattheyaimto explain.The covering-law
distort modelis an idealiza-
best suitedfortheoriesaboutidealizedand
tionand a simplification
simplified
systems.
Formal,or AxiomaticTheory
Systematic,
Apartfromthequestionof explanation theremaybe
or prediction,
discernedin sociologyat leastthreedistinctinterpretations
forhypo-
theory.
thetical-deductive Becauseeach presumes a deductive
structure
fortheory,eachhas beenindiscriminatelycalledsystematic,
axiomatic,
and formal.As willbe seen,whatis here called the systematicinterpreta-
tion is consistentwiththe generalizingview of theories;the axiomatic
interpretation is consistentwith the instrumenentalview; the formal
interpretation is consistentwith both. I distinguishthese (somewhat
inexactly)accordingto whethera theoryis structured
witha formal
calculusand whetheror notit containsordinary
language.
SYSTEMATIC THEORY In thesystematic interpretation ofhypothetical-
deductivetheory, a theorymaybe expressedin a naturalor ordinary
language,without thestructureofa formal calculus.Systematic sociolog-
ical theoriesare sometimesviewedby theircreatorsas subjacentto
mathematical formulations (Homans1974),or as preliminary (Emerson
1972a,1972b),or evenas primitive (Blau 1977) becausetheirprimary
purposeis to summarize and generalizeaboutthesubstanceof a phe-
nomenon forwhichtheimposition offormalities is regardedas theoreti-
callypremature. Thoughoccasionalsymbolic notation maybe employed,
such notationservesas an ad hoc codingprocedureand not as a
formalization. The extentof formalization is limitedto explicitly
identifyingprincipalassumptions, definitions, and apparentderiva-
tions,and to expressing thesein grammatical Englishand exhibiting
them(usually)initalicizedtype.Systematic sociological theoriesaresaid
tobe deductive becausetheyaresupposedto satisfy somelogicofordi-
narylanguage.
Zetterberg's (1963, 1965) discussionsof whathe called axiomatic
theoryprovidedconsiderable impetusforthesystematic interpretation
insociologicaltheory construction.
Sometheory-building efforts,suchas
Burr's(1973) volumeon the sociologyof the family, claima direct
descentfromZetterberg. Others,suchas Kuhn's(1974) effort to build
a unified,
generaltheoryofsocialsystems, do notbutare nevertheless
consistent
withhisprogram. Systematic theories resemble hierarchiesof

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 197

propositions in whichthemorespecific,ordinary propositions maybe

deducedfromthemoregeneral,theoretical propositions accordingto
"the deductionrules of ordinarylanguage"(Zetterberg1965:163).
Theoretical propositions are said to havehigherinformative valuethan
ordinary propositions suchas researchhypotheses orempirical generali-
zations.(Movahedi[1980],however,has shownthatthisproposalof
Zetterberg's is notself-consistent.) The deductionrulesin questionare
almostneverspecified.
One ofthemoreconcertedefforts to developsystematic theoryin a
sociologicalspecialtyhas been thetheoryconstruction program in the
sociology ofthefamily. In progress sincethelate 1960sandspearheaded
bytheBurr(1973) volume,thisprogram(Burret al 1979) attempts to
consolidate generalprinciples offamily behaviorbycodifying empirical
generalizations so that(a) theirsimilarities oflanguageor ofsubstance
canbe identified and (b) generalization to a widerrangeofphenomena
canbe attempted. The explanation ofspecificrelationships or empirical
generalizations is said to be accomplishedby "the use of inductive,
deductive,and transitive logicalprocesses"(1979:20) which,in this
volume,areemployed on 22 "theoretical domains"offamily behavior-
i.e.on a variety oftopicsforwhichconsiderable empiricalresearch exists
(heterosexual permissiveness, mateselection,problemsolving,and the
like).In attempting tosystematize theoreticallythese22 areasofinterest,
thevolumeas a wholepresentsno less (and perhapsmore)than650
propositions. Someconcernfamily behaviorperse, somedo not(Bahr
1979), and some are statements of no relationship betweenvariables
(Trollet al 1979).
The resultof thiseffort is a propositional inventory. The claimthat
someofthesepropositions arederivable fromothers noteasilydemon-
is
strated.The same is trueof Blau's (1977) theoryof inequalityand
heterogeneity, whichcontainsnearly200 statements calledtheorems or
corollaries, fewof whichare logicallyprovable.In general, most sys-
tematic theories insociology havethestatusofpropositional inventories
becauseof the ellipticalappeal theymaketo "the logic" of ordinary
language.Uponexamination itis clearthislogicis at bestsyllogistic. It
apparently doesnotincludethestatement andpredicate calculi,inwhich
thesentential connectives and quantifiers forindividualvariablesare
developed,becausefewsystematic sociologicaltheoriesmakecircum-
spectuse oftheconnectives andquantifiers. (Exceptionsarethetheory
ofevaluation processesbyWebster& Sobieszek[1974]and thetheory
ofdistributive justicebyBergeret al [1972c]).References to transitive
logicalprocessescan perhapsbe interpreted formally in terms of the
hypothetical syllogism orthelawoftransitivity forset inclusion,but each

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198 FREESE

of thesein theirrespective systemsconstitutes onlyone amongmany

possibleinferencerules.It is notclearwhetherthelogicofsystematic
theoriescanbe takentobe strictly Aristoteliansincemanypropositions
in themare notAristotelian in form.Even so, Aristotelianlogicforms
an insignificantpartof modernlogic (Tarski 1965), whichsuggests
reasoning
thatsyllogistic aloneaugurslittleforformaltheorydevelop-
ment.
Froma logicalpointof view thereis littleaboutmostsystematic
sociologicaltheoriesthatcan be provento be deductive. Usually,how-
ever,strictlogicaladequacyis not theprimary purposeof systematic
sociological Theprimary
theories. purposeis usuallytoformulategener-
alizationswithexplanatory applicationto bodiesofdatathathavebeen
developedfora variety ofexisting complexsystems. Systematictheories
oftenaimtoorganize, collate,andexplicategeneralizationsso thatfind-
ingscan be consolidatedandtheirtheoretical significance As
identified.
such,systematic theoriesusuallyreflecta generalizing strat-
theoretical
egy.

FORMAL THEORY In theformalinterpretation of hypothetical-deduc-

tivetheory, a theoryis expressed within the framework ofa logicalor
mathematical calculus.Formal calculi are held to be necessary to expli-
cate the deductive structureand remove the of
vagueness systematic
theories,whoseverbalformulations at bestare firstapproximations to
deductive systems (Blalock1969).Becausesystematic theories areoften
viewedas precursors toformal theories, formalization is oftenviewedas
a post-factum development bywhichtheverbalexpressions ofsystematic
theoriesaretranslated intoa formal language(Diesing1971).Thededuc-
tiveapparatusofa formalcalculusmayrevealimplications ofa theory
thatare camouflaged by itsexpression in ordinary language(Bergeret
al 1962).
The development of formaltheoriesadmitsof twodistinct(butnot
opposing)tactics.One is to supplya logicalformalization fortheverbal
expressions ofa theory;theotheris tosupplya mathematical model.Not
all formalsociologicaltheories, however,are formalizations ofexisting
systematic theories.
Logical formalizations are less commonthan mathematical ones.
Sometimes theyaread hoc; that is,the formation rulesor transformation
rulesofa calculusareimprovised to accommodate theexigencies ofthe
verbalexpressions to be formalized. ThusKunkel& Nagasawa(1973),
attempting to formalizebehavioralprinciplesunderlying exchange
theory,employwhatappears to be a jerry-builtcalculus. It wasintended
to givethemthederivations they wanted as determined from theirex-

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 199

aminationof existingsystematic theoryand evidence.Greene(1974)

claimedtohavefoundaninvalidinterpretation fortheircalculus,thereby
provingtheirsystemto be unsound.The questionoflogicallyunsound
ortheoretically uselessinterpretations ariseswhenever ad hocformation
ortransformation rulesareemployed; indeed,unwanted implications can
usuallybe foundforthem.For themuch-debated signrule,an ad hoc
procedure, Turner& Wilcox(1974) wereunableto finda satisfactory
interpretation withthreelogicalcalculiespeciallyconstructed to enable
distinctformsofsignruleargumentation. No similaranalysishas been
madeoftheDeFleur& Quinney(1966) formalization ofthetheoryof
differential association, butit too wouldbe vulnerable becauseof the
libertiesit takeswithset theory.
Maris' (1970) formalization of Homans' (1950, 1961) propositions
illustratesa commondifficulty in usingstandardsymbolic logicto for-
malizetheordinary-language propositions typicallyfoundin systematic
theories.Becausemanyof Homans'propositions are of theform'the
greater theX, thegreater theY', Marisis forcedtomaketheassumption
ofhighcorrelations betweenX and Y thatDuncan(1963) arguedwas
necessary forsounddeductive sign-rulearguments. Thatplacesthelogi-
cal forceofsucharguments at thewhimofempirical data.Propositions
of the form'the greaterthe X, the greaterthe Y' have an algebraic,
functional interpretation. Becausestandard logicalcalculiaretwo-valued
and are insensitive to algebraicsignsforreal numbers, theyare not
particularly usefulforpropositions expressingan implicit functional ar-
gument.Mathematical equationsdo nothave thesamelimitations.
The identification ofsociologicalworksthatrepresent mathematical
formalizations ofsystematic theories dependsonone'sconceptoftheory.
Land (1970) tookDurkheim's theoryof the divisionof labor,reinter-
pretedit,andthensupplieda systemofdifferential equationsto formal-
ize his reinterpretation. Blau's (1970b) theoryof differentiation in
organizations was similarly formalized (Hummon1971; Land 1975).
Sometimes, however, equationsare usedto interpret verbalexpressions
thatarenotso systematic as these.The namingofVariables in ordinary
language, together withthepositingofsomecovariation betweenthem
(as suggestedfroma literature search),is thoughtto definea causal
modelwhensimultaneous linearequationsare supplied(Blalock1969).
Formalmodelsthenbecomeproxiesforimplicittheories. Linearequa-
tionshave oftenbeen used to modeldata on statusattainment (e.g.
Duncanetal 1972;Hauser& Featherman 1977),andthesemodelshave
beencalled"theory-laden" (Horan1978).At thispointanydistinction
betweenthe use of mathematics formodelingand the mathematical
formalization of theories becomesobscure.

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200 FREESE

Mathematics havebeenusedinsociologytodevelopboth(a) measure-

mentmodelsfordata and (b) theoretical modelsforprocessesthat
underliedata.Mazur's(1975) measurement modeland Camilleri et al's
(1972) theoretical modelofdecision-making, developedforsimilar data,
providea goodcontrast betweentheseextremes. However,mostmath-
ematicalmodelsin sociology, suchas White's(1970) workon mobility
orthevariousmodelsanalyzedbyLeik& Meeker(1975),fallsomewhere
inbetween.Manymodelsaredevelopedwitha viewtoimproving their
empiricaladequacyrather thanrefining theirtheoreticalscope(Sorenson
1978); typically, theyare not derivablefromformaltheoriesbut are
insteaddesignedto modelselectivefeatures ofa phenomenon thathas
beenpreviously modeledor discursively described.
As theoretical modelsdevelop,becomesystematized, andspawnmea-
surement modelstheymayresultinformal theoriesthatarenotposthoc
mathematical translationsof systematictheories.Gray & Sullivan's
(1978) theoryofdifferentiation in socialpowercontainspostulates and
theorems expressed withequationsthatarenottranslations ofordinary-
languagepropositions. The formaltheoryofsocialchangedevelopedin
Hamblinet al (1973:194-208),thoughaccompaniedbyverbalexplana-
tions,doesnotexpressina mathematical languagetheordinary language
of a systematic theory.The same is trueof Coleman's(1972, 1973)
theoriesof exchangeand of collectivedecision-making. Occasionally,
too,someoneattempts to developa formaltheoryby translating into
ordinary languagecertainconceptsthathave mathematical interpreta-
tions.Thusgametheoryhas been employedin nontechnical termsto
analyzesocialexchange, decision-making, andinterdependence (Meeker
1971;Kelley& Thibaut1978).
In general,the use of a formalcalculusis not equivalentper se to
formaltheorizing; formaltheorizing can proceedwithoutinterpreting
already-extant systematictheories(thoughusuallyitdoesnot);andfor-
maltheories neednotcontainordinary languageexpressed withformali-
ties(thoughusuallytheydo).
Consequently, the formalinterpretation of hypothetical-deductive
theorycan supporteithera generalizing or a puretheoreticalresearch
strategy.Theoriesintending to formalize systematic theories
reflect the
generalizing viewtotheextentthattheyemployordinary languagewith-
ina formal syntax anduseittosimplify, abstractly conceive,
andgeneral-
ize aboutthecomplexphenomena ofexisting socialsystems.Butsome
formal theories makesuchliberaluse ofceterisparibusassumptions that
thesystems theydescribe havenoknownorpresumed counter-
empirical
part.Thustheytendtowardtheinstrumental viewoftheoriesbecause
theydescribewhatappearto be totallyidealizedsystems, usingformal

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 201

languagenot intendedto translateordinaryverbalconcepts.Formal

theoriessuchas theseare quasi-axiomatic.

AXIOMATIC THEORY In the axiomaticinterpretation of hypothetical-

deductive theory, a theory is expressed withformal language constructed
withinthe syntaxof a formalcalculus;ordinarylanguagecannotbe
utilized(Freese& Sell 1980a). The axiomaticinterpretation does not
distinguish ordinary from formal languageon thegroundthattheformer
is spokenineveryday discourse andthelatteris logicalormathematical.
Thoughlogicsand mathematics are formallanguagesthesymbolsofa
naturallanguagesuchas Englishmayformpartofa formal vocabulary,
too,depending onhowtheyaredefined. A languageis formal if,butonly
if,itsvocabulary designates whatKdrner(1966) calls exactclasses.A
classis exactwhenthemembership ornonmembership ofanyindividual
is categorically decidable-i.e.whenthereare no neutralor borderline
casesthatmaybe assignedto theclassas a matter offreechoice.Other-
wisea classis inexact.
Exactnessis a feature offormallanguagesthathas longbeenrecog-
nized.It is,forexample,whatmathematical logiciansmeanbytheterm
'welldefined'whentheyspeakof a set as a welldefinedcollectionof
individuals. A conceptsimilarto thatofan exactclasswasemployed in
Fararo'sMathematical Sociology(1978). However,theconceptwaslong
takenforgranteduntiltheappearanceof StephanKdrner'sExperience
and Theory(1966),a philosophical treatisethathas goneunnoticed by
sociologists.The issuessurrounding theuse ofordinary and formal lan-
guagefortheory construction inthesciencesarenowhere bettercrystal-
lizedthaninthisvolume-itmaybe themostimportant contribution to
thehypothetical-deductive methodsincePopper'sLogikderForschung
(1935)-and Korner's analysisturnson theconceptofan exactclass.His
conclusion:If the subjectmatterof an empiricalinvestigation is not
conceivedin a languageof exactclasses,no axiomatictheorycan de-
scribeit.That,in effect, precludestheuse ofordinary language(a term
Korneravoids)foraxiomatictheoryconstruction.
The predicatesof ordinarylanguagesdesignatewhatKornercalls
resemblance classes.Theseare classesofindividuals whoseclassmem-
bership is determined bytheirdegreeofresemblance to standard mem-
bers(or paradigm cases).Resemblance classesareinexactbecausethey
admitborderline casesthatmustbe assignedarbitrarily to theclass(or
to its complement). Classification by approximation or by theresem-
blanceofindividuals toa standard ofcertainscientific
is a characteristic
taxonomies andis necessary whenever theclassified
individuals arenot
identicalin all respects. The empirical individualsnamedor definedin

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202 FREESE

thevocabularies ofordinary languagesare typically notidenticalhow-

evertheymaybe classified, andall aresubjectto transformation. Notso
withthenonempirical individuals namedor definedin thevocabularies
ofclassicallogicand mathematics: Theyare identicaland permanent,
and theybelongnotto resemblance classesbutto exactclasses.There
areno borderline cases ofrealnumbers, forexample.
The possibility of borderline cases in an empiricalinquiryposes a
fundamental problem fromKorner'spointofview.Suchan inquiry must
be described witha languagethatenablespredication. Butinference with
classicallogicand mathematics musttreatinexactpredicates as ifthey
wereexact,as iftherewereandcouldbe no borderline cases,on painof
violating thelogicallawsof excludedmiddleand of contradiction, on
whichthesecalculiare founded.Beforea statement can be used in
inference itstruth orfalsitymustbe determined, andin principle thisis
notpossiblewhenvagueorinexacttermsareappliedtoborderline cases
(cf Alston1964). In practice,observesKaminsky(1969), borderline
cases are assignedarbitrarily to a class. Whatevererroris involvedin
suchpractice willbe preserved withstandard inference
deductive proce-
dures-errorthatit is theverypointofaxiomatization to eliminate.
In theory, observesKbrner, inexactpredicates mustbe replacedwith
exactpredicates. Thatresultsin theidealizationofan empirical subject
matter. Inexactpredicates cannotbe converted or translatedintoexact
predicates becausea resemblance classofempiricalindividuals cannotbe
transformed intoanexactclasswhosemembers areidentical,permanent,
and perfect. To replaceinexactpredicateswithexactpredicatesis to
constitute (in mostcases) new objectsthatare ideal individuals. To
axiomatizean empirical subjectmatteris to defineand conceiveit in
terms ofclassesofindividuals thathavean idealexistence intheaxiomat-
ic systembutwouldbe empirically unknown. Thus,a hypothetical-de-
ductive theoreticalsystem,in Korner's words, "is ... not directly
connectedwithexperience"(1966:90),and it "replacesthe temporal
world,whichis itssubjectmatter,witha timelessstructure ofrelations"
(1966:91).
Thisviewof hypothetical-deductive theoryis at odds withboththe
systematic on twocrucialpoints.First,the
and formalinterpretations
axiomaticinterpretationimpliesthata hypothetical-deductive theory
cannotrepresent, model,map,or mirror
capture, empirical phenomena
definedand describedin termsof theresemblance classesof ordinary
languages.The replacement of inexact-classconceptswithexact-class
conceptsdoesnotsimplify orabstract
from an empiricalsubjectmatter-
it changesthesubjectmatter.An empirical worldis in effectreplaced
world.An axiomatic
witha theoretical theory describesa closedsystem,

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 203

freeoferrors-notan openempirical systemriddledwithvariation but

simplified forpurposes oftheoreticaldiscourseandformalization (Freese
& Sell 1980a).Second,theaxiomatic deniesthata descrip-
interpretation
tionofan empirical phenomenon canbe translated from an ordinary into
a formal language. A formal languagecannotreducetheinexactness that
ordinary languageintroduces intoa subjectmatter. Thusit willnotdo
to utilizemathematical modelsand exactmeasurements ifwhatis mea-
suredis inherently inexact.As Alston(1964) observed,quantitative
measurement willexhibitwhatevervaguenessis inherent in theterms
describing theobjectsor properties measured(cf Lachenmeyer 1971).
Axiomatic theory construction,then,is nota matter ofsubstituting quan-
titativetermsforqualitative terms.Instead,qualitiesmustbe conceived
as quantities.
The axiomatic interpretationis clearlyconsistentwiththeinstrumen-
tal viewof theoriesbutcompletely inconsistent
withthegeneralizing
view.Becauseitholdsthatclassicallogicand mathematics do notapply
to ordinary-language propositions,it mustrejecttheempiricist-inducti-
vistconceptthatthegrowth oftheory proceedsfromempirical generali-
zationsto systematic theoriesand thento formalizations of them.It
deniesthatsystematic theoriescan be formalized. It evendeniesthat
generalizations abouttheworldof ordinary experience can be accom-
plishedwithin a hypothetical-deductive system.Consequently, axiomat-
ic theories cannotprovideexplanations ofthatworldbutmust,instead,
describea hypothetical, idealizedsystemofvariables.
Not surprisingly, fewsociologicalexamplesofhypothetical-deductive
theory areconstructed on sucha puristinterpretation. One worthexam-
iningis Mackenzie's(1976) theoryofthekindsofgroupstructures that
emergeand evolvein interpersonal This workis richin
interaction.
exact-class concepts. ButbecauseMackenziedefines substantive ideasin
formalterms,and becausehe idealizeshis subjectmatter, he is forced
intoa nomenclature thatis uncommon tootherworksaddressing similar
subjects.His methodillustrates theradicalchangethatwouldbe forced
onthelanguageandthecontent ofsociologicaltheory weretheaxiomat-
ic interpretation to be widelyadopted.

Inductive
Abstraction
or Idealization
Twodifferentmethods oftheoryconstruction maybe applicableaccord-
ing to whethersociologicaltheoriespursuea generalizingor a pure
strategy.
Systematicsociologicaltheoriesand formalizations
ofthem,if
theyaretoexplainandgeneralize abouttheirsubjectmatter,
mustinduc-
tivelyabstract
fromthatsubjectmatter.Axiomaticsociologicaltheories

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204 FREESE

or formaltheoriesthatare notpost-factum formalizations (sincetheir

purposeis nottoexplainfaithfully thefeatures ofexisting socialsystems)
mustidealizetheirsubjectmatter.
Constructing Weberianideal typesis morea methodof inductive
abstraction thanofidealization. Thisjudgment dependsin parton how
Weberis interpreted, butWeberhimselfwas not alwaysclearon the
subjectofidealtypes(Rogers1969).Empiricalreality forWebermeant
concreterealityin all itsdetails(Burger1976); butsincethecultural-
historical realitiesin whichsocialactiontookplace wouldshowenor-
mousvariation indetails-aninfinity ofvariation thatsociological theo-
ries could not copy-one was requiredto abstractinductively and
exaggerate selectedfeaturesof thesecomplexrealities.The resulting
idealtypeswouldbe onlypartially realized(ifat all) byexisting social
systems; buttheformer would,nonetheless, providestandards against
whichtocompareandmeasurethelatter.Idealtypes, ithasbeenargued,
aremodelsthatdescriberealsocialsystems in hypothetical terms. Their
construction maybe necessary whenever socialscientists wishtogener-
alize aboutexisting socialsystems(Burger1976).Ifso, thensystematic
theoriesare repletewithideal types.
Inductiveabstraction fromexisting socialsystems forthepurposeof
generalization presumes an empirical realitythattheinvestigator must
simplify by theimposition of theoreticalorder.If so, thenideal types
drawnfrom existing socialsystems arenottrueidealizations. Trueideali-
zationresults inthedescription ofa systemthatmaynotexistempirical-
ly.Ideal-typical construction, on theotherhand,resultsin a simplified
modelthatdistorts an existing empiricalsystem.Thereare at leasttwo
methodsbywhichidealization maybe employedin formal theorycon-
struction withoutdistortion.
The use ofceterisparibusassumptions in theoryconstruction results
inidealization-by-conjecture. No existing systemis idealized;instead,a
hypothetical systemis conceived.The assumption thatotherthingsare
equal is nota licenseto pretendthatdifferent thingsareidenticalin an
existingsystem,nor does it mitigatethe failureto accountforhow
significant variablesbehavein an existingsystem.Ceterisparibusas-
sumptions are a wayofasking,"Supposetherewerea systemconsist-
ing of exactlythesevariables;then,theoretically, how would they
behave?"
Formaldemography haslongmadeuse ofceterisparibusassumptions
in whatis knownas stablepopulation theory(Keyfitz & Flieger1971).
Thisbodyoftheory, theoriginsofwhichareattributed to Lotka(Dublin
& Lotka 1925),arguesthatan age distribution in a population willbe
if and
stableovertime fertility mortality schedules are constant. The

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 205

assumption thatfertilityand mortality schedulesareconstant is known

to be empirically unsound,but by fixingvaluesforthesevariablesit
becomespossibleto calculatetheintrinsic rateat whicha population
willtheoretically increase(Keyfitz1968). If twoempirical populations
havethesameage distribution butdifferent ratesofpopulation growth
or vice versa,thedifferences betweenthemmaybe attributed to their
differentfertilityor mortality schedules.This bodyof theoryenables
one to calculatehypothetical values,make limiting assumptions, and
conjectureabout theoretical outcomesfor hypothetical populations;
thesecalculations, assumptions, and outcomescan thenbe appliedto
revealthe dynamicsof fertility and mortality of existingpopulations
(Coale 1972).
A secondconceptofidealization worksas follows:Conceivean artifi-
cial system-i.e.one containing certainvariablesthatdo notoperatein
existingsystems-andcreateexperimental conditions whoseeffects can
be described withlawsalsoinoperative inactualsystems (Henshel1980).
The aimofsuchidealization is thediscovery ofknowledge thatenables
thedesignofsynthetic products thatcan be introduced effectively into
existingsystems (Freese& Sell 1980b).Although tinkeringwithexisting
socialsystemsand conducting experiments are notforeign to sociolo-
gists,idealization-by-experiment is a raremethodofsociologicaltheory
construction. It epitomizes theinstrumental viewof theoriesand does
notsquarewiththeview,almostuniversally acceptedin sociology, that
thepurposeoftheory construction is toexplaintheapparent phenomena
ofexisting systems.
Successful theories aboutphenomena inductivelyabstracted fromex-
istingsystems shouldenablethedevelopment ofexplanations andillus-
trationsinthosesystems. Successful aboutphenomena
theories idealized
in hypothetical systemsshould,in thelongrun,enablethe
or artificial
implementation of innovative or synthetic meansto accommodate the
needs of existingsystems.Inductiveabstraction and idealizationare
distinctmethodsof theoryconstruction thatservedifferent ends.The
resultsthesemethodsimplyforthesystematic growth ofknowledge-
theconsolidation oftheoriesanddataorthecumulation oftheory itself-
likewisediffer.

or Cumulation
Consolidation
We need not reviewherethelong-standing concernforthe apparent
disconnectednessofsociologicaltheoriesand empirical A few
research.
facetsofthismatterareworthnoting, however, in connection
withthe
controversythatbeganwithMerton'searlydialoguewithParsonsover

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206 FREESE

thecumulative potentialofmiddle-range as opposedto grandtheories

(Merton1948;Parsons1948,1950).
Thisissueis stillembeddedin thesociologicalconsciousness, though
now it has thecharacter of old winein newbottles.The newbottles,
called paradigms in the over-cited workof Kuhn (1962, 1970),have
fallenintodisfavor in philosophical analysis(Suppe 1977:647-649).In
sociologicalanalysis,however, it is fromparadigms per-
or "theoretical
spectives"thatParsons'visionofa comprehensive theoreticaltradition
is nowpursued. Forexample,Adams& Freedman(1976) foreseethata
comprehensive theoryof social relationships is possibleif developed
froman equityperspective; or Collins(1975) holdsthatprinciples of
stratification
and organizations formtheexplanatory coreofsociology
andso providebasesforcomprehensive theory, butonlyifsuchtheory
is developedfroma conflict perspective; or Homanscontendsthat"in
thelongrunthereis onlyone theorywe wantto develop-a theoryof
humanbehavior-indeed, a theoryof the behaviorof organisms... in
general"(1976:240-41),developedfroman operant-learning perspec-
tive.Grandtheory, forthosewhoadvocateit,is possible-ifonechooses
theright"perspective" or paradigm(or disciplinary matrix).
The proposalfora comprehensive, unifiedsystemoftheoryforsoci-
ologyhasusuallyequatedthesystematic growth ofscientific
knowledge
withtheconsolidation oftheory andempirical research.Merton'sclassic
essayson therelationoftheoryto research, togetherwithhisintroduc-
tionto Social Theory and SocialStructure (1957),suppliedtheconven-
tionalview:The problemwas to consolidatesociologicalknowledge so
thattheoriesanddatabecameintegrated andspecialtheories converged.
Withfewexceptions (J.R. Lilly,P. W. Bechtel,unpublished) contempo-
rarydiscussions also focuson a lack ofcontinuity in
and comparability
theories
sociological andempirical research(Cohenetal 1972) andwish
fora consolidatedbodyof knowledgein whichtheoryand data are
systematicallyintegrated (Nowak 1975).
However,a different conceptcan be proffered, whichdistinguishesa
consolidatedbody of knowledgefroma body of cumulativetheory
(Freese1980).In thisview,tocumulateis nottointegrate andconverge
existingtheoriesanddatabutinsteadto formulate theoretical
problems
andproposesolutions insuccessivestagesso thattheresults ofeachstage
dependon priorresults.A program
logically oftheoreticalresearchthat
is cumulativein thissense,ifgraphically depicted,wouldresemblethe
modelof a cumulative statisticalfrequency (an ogive).If
distribution
advancesintheory aredesignedtofitsucha model,theymight notresult
intheconvergence ofdisparate theoriesor in theconsolidation oftheo-
riesand data thatare disconnected.

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 FORMAL THEORIZING 207

The consolidation of knowledgeas conceivedby Mertonand the

cumulation oftheory as describedabovearenotincompatible objectives,
buttheyare differentially suitedto alternative researchstrategies.
The
ideal of consolidatingtheoriesand data is necessaryto a theoretical
strategyinwhichtheories areconstructed primarilyto explainthecom-
plexpatterns ofdatathatcanbe extracted fromopenempirical systems.
The idealofcumulating theoryis necessaryto a theoretical strategyin
whichtheories areconstructed primarily topredictthosepatterns ofdata
thatarefixedbyarbitrary closurestheoreticallyimposedonhypothetical
or artificial
systems.Consolidating theoriesand data is a moresalient
concernwitha generalizing theoreticalstrategybecausetherearemore
patternsofdatatobe consolidated thanwitha puretheoretical strategy.
However, thecumulation oftheory itselfmaybe limited witha generaliz-
ingstrategy to theextentthatordinary languageis employed(Freese&
Sell 1980b).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Formaltheorizing has yieldednot muchconsolidatedknowledge and
even less cumulative theory.In part,thisis due to the explosionof
alternative theoreticalperspectivesin sociology(McNall 1979).This,in
turn,forcestheoreticians to defendcontinually thefoundations oftheir
methods, becausethesefoundations arerarelyconcededbyothers(Zel-
ditch1979b).The upshotis moreworkon methodsand less workon
theories. In part,too,theconsolidative and cumulative yieldofformal
theorizing is lowbecauseitsstylesvarywidelyandbecauseitsmethod-
ologicalproposalsareoftenvague,ambiguous, orincon-
oversimplified,
sistent.
Althoughit mayhave increasedin the recentpast,the amountof
formal theoreticalresearch insociologyis stillsmallcompared tothatof
empirical research.Organizedprograms of formaltheorizing are rare.
One suchprogram insociology-expectation-states theoryandresearch
(Bergeret al 1974, 1977)-can claim modestsuccessat cumulative
theory development and considerable successat consolidating a variety
ofempirical findings (see Bergeret al 1980,elsewhere in thisvolume).
Bothconsolidation and cumulationare morevisiblein concentrated
research programs (Wagner1978).Productive empiricalresearch efforts
(e.g. statusattainment research)succeed partlybecause theypursue
problems within clearlydelineatedprograms ofresearch. Successfulfor-
maltheorizing willprobably dependon suchprograms too.

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208 FREESE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebtedto Dick Burke,ThomasJ. Fararo,KathyJ. Kuipers,J.

RobertLilly,David Myers,EugeneRosa,and Neil Smelserforcriticiz-
ingan earlierdraftofthispaper.
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