PSV - General Guidelines

Education Institute for
Equipment & Process Design
PSV General Guideline



Chapter 1
Definitions and Terms
Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP)

The maximum gauge pressure permissible at the top of a completed vessel in its normal
operating position at the designated coincident temperature specified for that pressure. The
pressure is the least of the values for the internal or external pressure as determined by the
vessel design rules for each element of the vessel using actual nominal thickness, exclusive of
additional metal thickness allowed for corrosion and loadings other than pressure. The MAWP is
the basis for the pressure setting of the pressure-relief devices that protect the vessel. The
MAWP is normally greater than the design pressure but can be equal to the design pressure
when the design rules are used only to calculate the minimum thickness for each element and
calculations are not made to determine the value of the MAWP.
Design pressure
Pressure, together with the design temperature, used to determine the minimum permissible
thickness or physical characteristic of each vessel component as determined by the vessel
design rules. The design pressure is selected by the user to provide a suitable margin above the
most severe pressure expected during normal operation at a coincident temperature. It is the
pressure specified on the purchase order.
This pressure may be used in place of the MAWP in all cases where the MAWP has not been
established. The design pressure is equal to or less than the MAWP. In most of the cases,
however, the pressure relieving device is set at the design pressure and not at the M.A.W.P.
because the latter is only known late in the design, when the detailed mechanical design of the
vessel is completed.
Accumulation
The pressure increases over the MAWP of the vessel, expressed in pressure units or as a
percentage of MAWP or design pressure. Maximum allowable accumulations are established by
applicable codes for emergency operating and fire contingencies.
Blow-down:
for gas 5-7% and for 2-phase and liquid is 20%
Overpressure:
is the pressure increase over the set pressure of the primary relieving device during
discharge. Overpressure is the same as accumulation only when the relieving device is
set to open at the maximum allowable working pressure of the vessel
Backpressure
The pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure-relief device as a result of the
pressure in the discharge system. Backpressure is the sum of the superimposed and
built-up backpressures.
Built-up backpressure
The increase in pressure at the outlet of a pressure-relief device that develops as a
result of flow after the pressure-relief device opens.

Superimposed backpressure
The static pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure-relief device at the time the
device is required to operate. Superimposed backpressure is the result of pressure in
the discharge system coming from other sources and may be constant or variable.
Relieving conditions
Relieving pressure, shown as P1 in the various sizing equations, is the inlet pressure of the
PRD at relieving conditions. The relieving pressure is the total of set pressure plus
overpressure. The examples cited in this section for the determination of relieving pressure refer
to PRVs; however, they are also applicable to non-reclosing PRDs (see Figure 15 and Figure 19
for pressure level relationships for these types of devices). The effects of inlet pressure drop on
specification of relieving pressure for PRV sizing can be neglected if the inlet pressure drops
does not exceed 3 % of set pressure.
Notes
1.In general, restrictions, either a specially designed spool piece or a restriction orifice, should
not be used as a means of limiting the capacity of a pressurization path.
2. When the increased operating condition will not exceed 10 hours at any one time or 100
hours per year, it is permissible to increase the pressure rating at the temperature existing
during the increased operating condition, by a maximum of 33 %.
3. When the increased operating condition will not exceed 50 hours at any one time or 500
hours per year, it is permissible to increase the pressure rating at the temperature existing
during the increased operating condition, by a maximum of 20 %.
Overall PSV Sizing Procedure
1.Determine the scenario, using API-521

2.Calculate the relief load, using API-520 Part1
3.Calculate the orifice area, using API-520 Part1
4.Select proper PSV type by checking backpressure
5.Use API-526 to determine the designation and the inlet and outlet sizing
6.Use API-521 Part2 to detail its construction
Chapter 2
Individual Overpressure Causes and Their Relieving Rates
Fire Scenario
Fire exposure on equipment can result in overpressure due to vapor generation (boiling of liquid
contents or decomposition reaction) and/or fluid expansion. Fire exposure can also cause
overheating of the vessel walls resulting in a reduction in material strength. Either the vapor
thermal-expansion-relief load or the boiling-liquid vaporization-relief load, but not both, should
be used. It is a practice that has been used for many years. There are no known experimental
studies where separate contributions of vapor thermal expansion versus boiling-liquid
vaporization have been determined. When sizing the PRD for fire exposure, the contribution of
vaporizing liquid compared with vapor expansion is generally governing unless, for example, the
wetted surface has external insulation in accordance with 4.4.13.2.7 and the unwetted surfaces
are not insulated.
Effect of Fire on the Wetted Surface of a Vessel

To determine vapor generation, it is necessary to recognize only that portion of the vessel that is
wetted by its internal liquid and is equal to or less than 7.6 m (25 ft) above the source of flame.
Wetted surfaces higher than 7.6 m (25 ft) are normally excluded because pool fire flames are
not likely to impinge for long durations above this height.
Effect of Fire on the Unwetted Surface of a Vessel

Unwetted wall vessels are those that have no liquid in contact with the internal vessel walls (e.g.
internal walls are exposed only to a gas, vapor, or supercritical fluid or they are internally
insulated regardless of the contained fluids). These include vessels that contain separate liquid
and vapor phases under normal conditions but become single phase (above the critical) at
relieving conditions. Vessels can be designed to have internal insulation (e.g., refractory) and
such areas may be considered unwetted. A characteristic of a vessel with an unwetted internal
wall is that heat flow from the wall to the contained fluid is low as a result of the heat transfer
resistance of the contained fluid or any internal insulating material. Heat input from a fire to the
bare outside surface of an unwetted or internally insulated vessel can, in time, be sufficient to
heat the vessel wall to a temperature high enough to rupture the vessel.
Heat Absorption Equations for Vessels Containing Liquids

The amount of heat absorbed by a vessel exposed to an open fire is markedly affected by the
type of fuel feeding the fire, the degree to which the vessel is enveloped by the flames (a
function of vessel size and shape), the environment factor, firefighting, and drainage. Equation
(7) is used to evaluate these conditions if there are Prompt firefighting efforts and drainage of
flammable materials away from the vessels:
Where adequate drainage and firefighting equipment do not exist, Equation (8) should be used
Credit for thermal insulation is typically not taken because it usually does not meet the fire-
protection insulation requirements. Thermal insulation not equal to fire proof insulation.
The designer should be certain that any system of insulating materials permits the basic
insulating material to function effectively at temperatures up to 900 °C during a fire for up to 2
hr.
The value of thermal conductivity used in calculating the environmental factor credit for
insulation should be the thermal conductivity of the insulation at the mean temperature between
904°C and the process temperature expected at relieving conditions. (Use of a conservative
mean temperature of 1000°F (540°C) is suggested.)
For insulated vessels, the environment factor is given by:
Horizontal Drum
Up to 25 ft (7.6 m) above grade - Use total wetted vessel surface up to high liquid level.
Greater than 25 ft (7.6 m) above grade - Use the wetted area of the vessel surface to high liquid
level or up to the vessel center line whichever is less.
Vertical Drums
The wetted vessel surface within 25 ft (7.6 m) of grade, based on high liquid level, is used. If the
entire vessel is more than 25 ft (7.6 m) above grade, then only the surface of the bottom head
need be included. For vessels supported on skirts that do not require fireproofing of their inside
surface the surface of the bottom head need not be included in the wetted area regardless of
elevation.
Vertical Vessels
A wetted = 1.089 D 2 + π D h
Use this equation when the liquid surface elevation SE < 7.6 m. If the surface elevation of liquid
level is above 7.6 m, replace h by h - (SE – 7.6)
Fire Case Calculation by Software

Relief load calculation for single component:
Calculate Aw then calculate Q-fire then calculate landa then divide Q-fire to landa.
In order to calculate landa put Vf=0 and relieving pressure = 1.21pset + patm.
Relief load calculation for multi-component:
For multi-component systems, the latent heat of the residual liquid will change as the lighter
components are vaporized and removed from the system. In general, such systems require a
time-dependent analysis to determine the required relief area and the corresponding relief rate.
The following approach is suggested.
Using the composition of the residual liquid inventory in the vessel, perform a bubble point flash
at the accumulated pressure. In doing this flash, the flow rate of the feed stream to the flash can
be set at initial mass on the equipment. m=ρ.V
m: initial liquid mass in the equipment
V: liquid volume in the equipment up to HLL
ρ: liquid mass density at normal operation.
For each flash, sufficient heat is applied to vaporize a nominal 10 wt% of liquid, the remaining
liquid passing to the next flash.
An estimate of the time for each flash should be made.
time=required heat for each flash/calculated heat of fire.
A flash temperature of 400°C is obtained. The total vaporization time riches 2 hours. For
each stage, a latent heat of vaporization should be calculated and data for the flashed vapor
used to compute the value of a factor A’ which is indicative of the pressure relief valve orifice
area required based on that stage of the vaporization of the original fluid.
A =1/Y sqr(ZT/M)
pressure relief valve orifice area parameter (not the orifice area)
λ latent heat of vaporization (kJ/kg)
z vapor compressibility
T vapor temperature (K)

M vapor molecular weigh
Two-phase relief-device sizing is not normally required for the fire case, except for unusually
foamy materials or reactive chemicals.
If no accurate latent heat value is available for these hydrocarbons near the critical point, a
minimum value of 115 kJ/kg (50 Btu/lb) is sometimes acceptable as an approximation
Horizontal Vessels:
Liquid level below centerline
S=D Cos – 1 ((r- h) / r)
Liquid level above centerline

S=D {π-Cos – 1 ((h- r) / r)}
A wetted= (2.178D2+ πDL) (S/ πD)
As with vertical vessels, these equations are directly useful when the liquid surface elevation S
E < 7.6 m. If the surface elevation of liquid level is above 7.6 m, replace h by h - (S E – 7.6).
Trayed column
High liquid level in bottom plus liquid holdup from all trays. Level in reboiler is to be included if
the reboiler is an integral part of the column. Total wetted surface up to the height of 7.6m.
Vessel heads protected by support skirts with limited ventilation are not normally included as
wetted surface area. Liquid hold-up on each tray shall be equal to the weir height plus 50mm.
Air-Coolers
It is not necessary to consider the bare area for air-cooled condensers, whether partial or total
condensing, as long as both of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The tubes are sloped so that they are self-draining.
2. There is no control valve or pump connected directly to the condenser
liquid outlet.
Heat Absorption Equations for Vessels Containing Only Gases, Vapors, or Supercritical
Fluids
The discharge areas for PRDs on vessels containing supercritical fluids, gases or vapors
exposed to open fires can be estimated using Equation (9). In certain cases, the normal
operating pressure can be below the thermodynamic critical conditions but the relieving
pressure is supercritical. In such cases, the guidance below can be used to size the relief
device.
In the use of Equation (9), no credit has been taken for insulation:
The derivations of Equations (9), (10), (13), and (14) [53] are based on the physical properties
of air and the perfect gas laws. The derivations assume that the vessel is uninsulated and has
no mass, that the vessel wall temperature does not reach rupture stress temperature, and that
there is no change in fluid temperature. These assumptions should be reviewed to ensure that
they are appropriate for any particular situation. Insulation that meets the external insulation
criteria outlined in 4.4.13.2.7 offers a mitigating benefit when gas-filled vessels are exposed to a
fire by decreasing the rate at which the metal wall temperature rises.
The surface area potentially exposed to a fire should be used when determining the fire-relief
requirements of gas-filled vessels.


Failure of Automatic Controls Scenario

Inadvertent Valve Opening
The inadvertent opening of any valve from a source of higher pressure, such as high-pressure
steam or process fluids, should be considered. Administrative controls can be used to prevent
inadvertent valve opening, subject to 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. The relief load should be determined
using the maximum operating pressure upstream of the valve and the relieving pressure on
equipment downstream of the valve. If the pressure source is a pipeline or a production well, the
pressure upstream of the valve may reach the maximum shut-in pressure of the source after a
shutdown. The user should determine whether inadvertent valve opening combined with
maximum shut-in pressure in upstream system is a credible relief case. There can be single or
multiple inlet lines fitted with control devices. The scenario to consider is that one inlet valve is in
a fully opened position regardless of the control valve failure position. Opening of this control
valve can be caused by instrument failure or misoperation. If the system has multiple inlets, the
position of any control device in those remaining lines shall be assumed to remain in its normal
operating position. Therefore, the required relieving rate is the difference between the maximum
expected inlet flow and the normal outlet flow, adjusted for relieving conditions and considering
unit turndown, assuming that the other valves in the system are still in operating position at
normal flow (i.e., normally open, normally closed, or throttling.
The following applies when a manual or actuated valve is inadvertently opened, causing
pressure buildup in a vessel. The vessel should have a PRD large enough to pass a rate equal
to the flow through the open valve; credit may be taken for the flow capacity of vessel outlets
that can reasonably be expected to remain open. The manual or actuated valve should be
considered as passing its capacity at a full-open position with the pressure in the vessel at
relieving conditions. Volumetric or heat-content equivalents may be used if the manual or
actuated valve admits a liquid that flashes or a fluid that causes vaporizing of the vessel
contents.
An important consideration is the effect of having a manual bypass on the inlet control valve(s)
at least partially open. If, during operation, the bypass valve is opened to provide additional flow,
then this total flow (control valve wide open and bypass valve normal position) shall be
considered in the relieving scenario. The potential for the bypass valve to be inadvertently
opened (e.g. during normal operations, control valve maintenance, start-up, shutdown, or
special operations) while the control valve is operating (both bypass and control valve wide
open) should also be considered. Administrative controls can be used to prevent inadvertent
opening of the bypass valve. The user is cautioned that some systems can have unacceptable
risk due to failure of administrative controls and resulting consequences due to loss of
containment. In these cases, limiting the overpressure to the normally allowable overpressure
can be more appropriate. Note that the entire system, including all of the auxiliary devices (e.g.
gasketed joints, instrumentation), should be considered for the overpressure during the failure of
administrative controls.
Other situations can arise where problems involved in evaluating relief requirements after the
failure of an inlet control device are more complex and of special concern (e.g. a pressure
vessel operating at a high pressure where liquid bottoms are on level control and discharge into
a lower-pressure system).
Usually, when the liquid is let down from the high-pressure vessel into
the low-pressure system, only the flashing effect is of concern in the event that the low-pressure
system has a closed outlet. However, the designer should also consider that vapors flow into
the low-pressure system if loss of liquid level occurs in the vessel at higher pressure. In this
case, if the volume of the source of incoming vapors is large compared with the volume of the
low-pressure system or if the source of vapor is unlimited, serious overpressure can rapidly
develop. When this occurs, it can be necessary to size relief devices on the low-pressure
system to handle the full vapor flow through the liquid control valve. The loss of liquid level
followed by high-pressure vapor flow is commonly referred to as “vapor breakthrough” or “gas
blowby.
Closed Outlets
The inadvertent closure of a valve on the outlet of pressure equipment while the equipment is
on stream can expose the equipment to a pressure that exceeds the MAWP. Every valve (i.e.
manual, control, or remotely operated) should be considered as being subject to inadvertent
operation. If closure of an outlet valve can result in pressure in excess of that allowed by the
design code, a PRD is required. If the equipment is designed to the maximum source pressure,
then closure of an outlet valve will not result in overpressure, so a PRD is not required for the
closed outlet scenario. Additional Considerations Involving Pumps: The system does not require
relief protection for the closed outlet (i.e. shut-in) scenario if the pump, piping, and other
equipment downstream of a centrifugal pump (which can be exposed to the shut-in pressure of
the pump, e.g. closed block valve in the discharge system) are designed to withstand the
maximum shut-in pressure of the pump or other pressure source such as a start-up or warm-up
line. For positive displacement pumps, pressure-relief protection is usually required to protect
the pump itself and downstream equipment against shut-in conditions.
In the case of a manual valve, administrative controls can be used to prevent the closed
outlet scenario unless the resulting pressure exceeds the maximum allowed by the
pressure design code [usually the corrected hydrotest pressure is exceeded.
Liquid Overfill
Liquid overfills of a vessel results in a closed outlet case. As an alternative to providing an
adequacy sized pressure relief valve, the following alternative options are available for
preventing overpressure:
1) Increase the system design pressure and/or pressure relief valve set pressure within code
allowances.
2) Provide a safety instrument system (HIPS) to isolate the inflow on increasing vessel
inventory.
3) Rely on operator intervention to prevent overfill from occurring. Where liquid overfill is
eliminated on the basis of operator intervention, at least one additional and independent alarm
shall be provided to indicate that the situation has not yet been brought under control. This
alarm may monitor a parameter other than level (e.g.differential pressure)
Sizing Procedure for Gases

Determine if it is in critical flow:
If so, then:

If it is subcritical flow, then use the following equation for conventional or pilot type
k
Hydraulic Expansion
Hydraulic expansion is the increase in liquid volume caused by an increase in temperature (see
Table 2). It can result from several causes, the most common of which are the following.
a) Piping or vessels are blocked in while they are filled with cold liquid and are subsequently
heated by heat tracing, coils, ambient heat gain, or fire.
b) A heat exchanger is blocked in on the cold side with flow in the hot side.
Caution—Block valves have the potential to leak, thereby admitting either cold or hot fluid into a
heat exchanger that is intended to be blocked in, resulting in a potential overpressure.
c) Piping or vessels are blocked in while they are filled with liquid at near-ambient temperatures
and are heated by direct solar radiation.
Where the system under consideration for thermal relief consists of piping only (does not contain
Pressure vessels or heat exchangers), a PRD might not be required to protect piping from thermal
expansion if any of the following:
a) the piping always contains a pocket of noncondensing vapor, such that it can never become
liquid-full; or Caution—Small vapor or gas pockets can disappear upon heating due to
compression and/or solubilization. In contrast, multicomponent mixtures with a wide boiling range
can always have sufficient vapor present to preclude becoming completely liquid-full. The liquid-
volume change upon solar heating, heat tracing, heating to ambient temperature, or heat from
another source should be estimated to determine if the volume of the vapor pocket is sufficient
for liquid expansion.
b) the piping is in continuous use (i.e. not batch or semicontinuous use) and drained after being
blocked in using well supervised procedures or permits; or
c) the fluid temperature is greater than the maximum temperature expected from solar heating
[usually approximately 60 °C to 70 °C (approximately 140 °F to 160 °F)] and there are no other
heat sources such as heat tracing (note that fire is generally not considered when evaluating
pressure-relief requirements for piping);
d) the estimated pressure rise from thermal expansion is within the design limits of the equipment
or piping.
Sizing and Set Pressure

Since every application is for a relieving liquid, the required relieving rate is small; specifying an
oversized device is, therefore, reasonable. A nominal diameter (DN) 20 × DN 25 (NPS 3/4 × NPS
1) relief valve is commonly used.
If there is reason to believe that this size is not adequate, the procedure in 4.4.12.3 can be applied.
The thermal-relief pressure setting should never be above the maximum pressure permitted by
the weakest component in the system being protected. However, the PRD should be set high
enough to open only under hydraulic expansion conditions. If thermal-relief valves discharge into
a closed system, the effects of backpressure should be considered.
Two general applications for which thermal-relieving devices larger than a DN 20 × DN 25 (NPS
3/4 × NPS 1) valve can be required are long pipelines of large diameter in uninsulated,
aboveground installations and large vessels or heat exchangers operating liquid-full. Long
pipelines can be blocked in at or below ambient temperature; the effect of solar radiation raises
the temperature at a calculable rate. If the total heat transfer rate and thermal expansion
coefficient for the fluid are known, a required relieving rate can be calculated. See Parry [135] for
additional information on thermal relief
In order to calculate the orifice area use the following equation:

Notes:
When a PRV is sized for viscous liquid service, it should first be sized as if it were for a
non-viscous type application (i.e. Kv = 1.0) so that a preliminary required discharge area, AR,
can be obtained from Equation (32) or Equation (33). The user is cautioned that the equations
presented here may not be applicable for non-Newtonian applications (see 5.10). From the list
of API 526 standard orifice sizes or the manufacturer’s listing, the next orifice size, A selected,
larger than AR should be chosen to calculate the Reynolds number, Re, from either of the
following relationships
After the Reynolds number, Re, is determined, the factor Kv is obtained and applied in Equation
(32)or Equation (33) to correct the preliminary required discharge area, AR. If the corrected area
exceeds the chosen standard orifice area, A selected, the Reynolds number should be
recalculated using the next larger standard orifice size and the value of Kv updated accordingly.

Selecting PSV Type based on Backpressure

Regardless of whether the valve is vented directly to atmosphere or the discharge is piped to a
collection system, the backpressure may affect the operation of the PRV. Effects due to
backpressure may include variations in opening pressure, reduction in flow capacity, instability,
or a combination of all three. backpressure can be constant if the valve outlet is connected to a
process vessel or system that is held at a constant pressure. In most cases, however, the
superimposed backpressure will be variable as a result of changing conditions existing in the
discharge system.
Effects of Superimposed Backpressure on Pressure-relief Valve Opening




A pilot-operated PRV consists of the main valve, which normally encloses a floating unbalanced
piston assembly, and an external pilot (see Figure 10 through Figure 14). The piston is designed
to have a larger area on the top than on the bottom. Up to the set pressure, the top and bottom
areas are exposed to the same inlet operating pressure. Because of the larger area on the top
of the piston, the net force holds the piston tightly against the main valve nozzle. As the
operating pressure increases, the net seating force increases and tends to make the valve
tighter. This feature allows most pilot-operated valves to be used where the maximum expected
operating pressure is higher than the percentage shown in Figure 15. At the set pressure, the
pilot vents the pressure from the top of the piston; the resulting net force is now upward causing
the piston to lift, and process flow is established through the main valve. After the overpressure
incident, the pilot will close the vent from the top of the piston, thereby re-establishing pressure,
and the net force will cause the piston to reseat. The pilots may be either a flowing or
nonflowing type. The flowing type allows process fluid to continuously flow through the pilot
when the main valve is open; the nonflowing type does not. The nonflowing pilot type is
generally recommended for most services to reduce the possibility of hydrate formation (icing)
or solids in the lading fluid affecting the pilot’s performance.

The modulating pilot, as shown in Figure 17, opens the main valve only enough to satisfy the
required relieving capacity and can be used in gas, liquid, or two-phase flow applications. A
modulating pilot-operated valve, in contrast to a pop-action valve, limits the amount of relieving
fluid to only the amount required to prevent the pressure from exceeding the allowable
accumulation. Since a modulating pilot only releases the required relieving rate, the calculation
of built-up backpressure may be based on the required relieving rate instead of the rated
capacity of the valve corrected for the actual overpressure. The modulating pilot valve also can
reduce interaction with other pressure control equipment in the system during an upset
condition, reduce unwanted atmospheric emissions, and reduce the noise level associated with
discharge to the atmosphere.
PRV Instability
PRV Cycling
PRV Flutter
PRV Chatter
Chattering is where the PRV opens and closes at a very high frequency (on the order of the
natural frequency of the valve’s spring/mass system). Spring-loaded PRVs are spring/mass
devices and consequently are susceptible to dynamic interaction with the system. The primary
concern is loss of containment (loosening of flange bolts or failure of piping components due to
fatigue) caused by pressure pulsation or impact loading from rapid hammering of the valve disk
onto the valve seat. Chattering may lead to significantly reduced PRV flow capacity. As a
secondary effect, the chattering can cause valve seat damage and mechanical failure of valve
internals (galling and bellows failure). Spring-loaded PRVs and pop action pilot valves can
experience chatter. Modulating pilot-operated or remote sensing pop-action pilot PRVs are less
likely to chatter). The damaging forces on piping associated with fluid pressure and velocity
changes associated with chatter are much more severe in liquid service as compared to vapor
service due to the higher densities associated with liquids. This is supported by analysis that
shows that the pressure change as a result of fluid acceleration is typically small in inlet piping
applications in vapor service.
Potential Causes of PRV Instability

1.Excessive PRV Inlet Pressure Loss
2. Excessive Built-up Backpressure
3. Acoustic Interaction
4. Retrograde Condensation
5. Improper Valve Selection
6. Oversized PRVs
PRD Location
If other factors permit, the PRD should normally be placed close to the protected equipment or
system of equipment so that the pressure in the protected equipment stays within code
allowable limits and to avoid PRV instability. The PRD should not be located where there are
pressure fluctuations large enough to result in relief valve simmering/activation or rupture disk
fatigue. On installations that have pressure fluctuations that peak close to the set pressure of
the PRV or burst pressure of a rupture disk, the PRD should be located farther from the source
and in a more stable pressure region.
— locations close to control valves, other valves, and other appurtenances;
— locations close to orifice plates and flow nozzles;
— locations close to other fittings, such as short radius elbows;
— locations close to the discharge of positive displacement pumps or compressors.
The potential effect of pressure fluctuations on the relief device may be reduced by the following
— locating the PRD 10 or more pipe diameters from any areas as described above;
— providing a well-rounded, smooth branch connection where the relief device inlet piping joins
the main piping run.
— providing a larger branch connection (relative to the size of the PRV inlet).
The PRD inlet and outlet piping should be free-draining (no pockets) away from the PRD.
The nominal size of the inlet piping and fittings shall be the same as or larger than the nominal
size of the pressure-relief valve inlet connection.
Horizontal lines are generally regarded as self-draining. However, avoid the installation of a
PRV at the end of a long horizontal inlet pipe through which there is normally no flow. Solids,
such as rust or scale, may accumulate, or liquid may be trapped, creating interference with the
valve’s operation or requiring more frequent valve maintenance.
Auto-refrigeration during discharge can cool the outlet of the PRD and the discharge piping to
the point that brittle fracture can occur. Piping design, including material selection, shall
consider the expected discharge temperature.
Note that the rated capacity corrected for the actual overpressure can vary depending on the
overpressure scenario common relief header piping in closed discharge systems can be sized
using the protected system’s required relieving capacity.
For a modulating pilot-operated PRV, the discharge piping can be sized using the required
relieving capacity of the system that the valve is protecting.
Whenever the atmospheric vent, discharge piping, or common relief header piping is sized
using the system’s required relieving capacity instead of the rated capacity of the valve
corrected for the actual overpressure, the backpressure should be re-checked whenever
changes are made to the process that affect the required relieving capacity of the system the
valve is protecting. The discharge piping from thermal relief valves designed solely to protect
against liquid hydraulic expansion due to ambient heating (including solar radiation) typically
does not need to be sized to meet the built-up backpressure limits provided in API 520, Part I
and as discussed in 6.3.1. The reason for this is that the capacity of these PRVs is typically
larger by an order of magnitude (>10 times) than the required relief rate and the flow in the
discharge line never reaches a steady state flow at the capacity. Superimposed backpressure
that exceeds the inlet pressure of a pilot-operated PRV can cause the main valve to open,
allowing reverse flow through the main valve.
PRV Inlet Pressure Drop Limitations

1.Confirm the inlet pressure losses do not significantly affect the capacity of the PRV.
2.Confirm the PRV is set to open at or below the maximum allowable working pressure for all
equipment being protected.
3.Limit the pressure to the maximum allowable accumulation for all equipment being protected
4.Provide reasonable assurance that the inlet pressure losses are unlikely to result in
destructive instability of the PRV.
PRV Inlet Pressure Loss Criteria

The total nonrecoverable pressure loss between the protected equipment and the pressure-
relief valve should not exceed 3 % of the PRV set pressure, except as noted below:
— thermal relief valves
— remotely sensed pilot-operated relief valves
— an engineering analysis is performed for the specific installation.
Note that keeping the pressure loss below 3 % becomes progressively more difficult at low
pressures and/or as the orifice size of a PRV increases. In certain applications, it is difficult to
meet the 3 % criterion for the largest API 526 [2] orifice size for a given inlet flange diameter
(e.g., 2J3, 4P6, 6R8, etc.). There are some non-API 526 valves that also exhibit this behavior.
When a pressure-relief valve is installed on a normally flowing process line, the 3 % limit should
be applied to the sum of the loss in the normally nonflowing PRV inlet pipe and the incremental
pressure loss in the process line caused by the flow through the PRV.

Isolation Valve Requirements
Isolation (stop) valves are allowed upstream and/or downstream of the pressure-relieving device
for the purpose of inspection, testing, and repair of the pressure-relieving device or discharge
header isolation. For outlet isolation valves, to help minimize the built-up backpressure, the flow
area in the outlet isolation valve should be equal to or greater than the outlet area of the PRV.
Typically, the inlet isolation valves for spare relief devices are closed and the outlet isolation
valves are open. The outlet isolation valve for spare relief devices can be closed during
operation if exposure to the fluid is a concern; however, the pressure temperature rating of the
PRD outlet, the outlet isolation valve, and intervening piping should be suitable for the
conditions upstream of the relief device in case of leakage. Protection of the PRD from
discharge system fluids without closing the outlet isolation valve can also be achieved either by
providing a purge or by installing a discharge rupture disk.


Rupture Disk
Rupture disk devices are non-reclosing PRDs used to protect vessels, piping, and
Other pressure-containing components from excessive pressure and/or vacuum. Rupture disks
are used in single and multiple relief device installations. They are also used as redundant
PRDs. With no moving parts, rupture disks are simple, reliable, and faster acting than other
PRDs. Rupture disks react quickly enough to relieve some types of pressure spikes. Because of
their light weight, rupture disks can be made from high alloy and corrosion resistant materials
that are not practical in PRVs.
Rupture disks can be specified for systems with vapor (gas) or liquid pressure-relief
requirements. Also, rupture disk designs are available for highly viscous fluids. The use of
rupture disk devices in liquid service should be carefully evaluated to ensure that the design of
the disk is suitable for liquid service. The user should consult the manufacturer for information
regarding liquid service applications.
Rupture disk devices often have different opening characteristics as a function of the fluid state
against the disk at the time of bursting. To account for the resulting differences in the resistance
to flow, certified Kr values are stated in terms of Krg (gas), Krl (liquid), or Krgl (gas or liquid). In
application, use the following guidelines.
1.When the fluid initiating rupture (in contact with rupture disk) is compressible, rupture disks
rated with Krg or Krgl should be used.
2.When the fluid initiating rupture (in contact with rupture disk) is incompressible, rupture disks
rated with Krl or Krgl should be used.
The rupture disk is also a temperature-sensitive device. Burst pressures can vary significantly
with the temperature of the rupture disk device. This temperature may be different from the
normal fluid operating temperature. As the temperature at the disk increases, the burst pressure
usually decreases. Since the effect of temperature depends on the rupture disk design and
material, the manufacturer should be consulted for specific applications. For these reasons, the
rupture disk shall be specified at the pressure and temperature the disk is expected to burst.
Application of Rupture Disks
Rupture disks can be used in any application requiring overpressure protection where a non-
reclosing device is suitable. This includes single, multiple, and fire applications as specified in
UG-134 of the ASME Code.
Rupture Disk Device at the Inlet of a Pressure-relief Valve
Rupture disks are used upstream of PRVs to seal the system to meet emissions standards, to
provide corrosion protection for the valve, and to reduce valve maintenance.
When a rupture disk device is installed at the inlet of a PRV, the devices are considered to be
close coupled, and the specified burst pressure and set pressure should be the same nominal
value.
When installed in liquid service, it is especially important for the disk and valve to be close
coupled to reduce shock loading on the valve The space between the rupture disk and the PRV
shall have a free vent, pressure gauge, trycock, or suitable telltale indicator as required in UG-
127 of the ASME Code. Users are warned that a rupture disk will not burst in tolerance if
backpressure builds up in a nonvented space between the disk and the PRV, which will occur
should leakage develop in the rupture disk due to corrosion or other cause (
Rupture Disk Device at the Outlet of a Pressure-relief Valve
A rupture disk device may be installed on the outlet of a PRV to protect the valve from
atmospheric or downstream fluids. Consideration should be given to the valve design so
that it will open at its proper pressure setting regardless of any backpressure that may
accumulate between the valve and rupture disk.

Types of Rupture Disks
There are three major rupture disk types
1. Forward-acting, tension-loaded
2. Reverse-acting, compression-loaded;
3. Graphite, shear-loaded.
Forward-acting Solid Metal Rupture Disks

A forward-acting rupture disk is a formed (domed), solid metal disk designed to burst at a rated
pressure applied to the concave side (see Figure 21). This rupture disk typically has an angular
seat design and provides a satisfactory service life when operating pressures are up to 70 % of
the marked burst pressure of the disk (70 % operating ratio). Consult the manufacturer for the
actual recommended operating ratio for the specific disk under consideration. If vacuum or
backpressure conditions are present, the disk can be furnished with a support to prevent
reverse flexing. These disks have a random opening pattern and are considered fragmenting
designs that are not suitable for installation upstream of a PRV.
Forward-acting Scored Rupture Disks

The scored forward-acting rupture disk is a formed (domed) disk designed to burst along scored
lines at a rated pressure applied to the concave side (see Figure 22). Some designs provide
satisfactory service life when operating pressures are up to 85 % to 90 % of the marked burst
pressure of the disk (85 % to 90 % operating ratio). Most designs withstand vacuum conditions
without a vacuum support. If backpressure conditions are present, the disk can be furnished
with a support to prevent reverse flexing. Because the score lines control the opening pattern,
this type of disk can be manufactured to be nonfragmenting and is acceptable for installation
upstream of a PRV. The scored,forward-acting rupture disk is manufactured from thicker
material than nonscored designs with the same burst pressure, and it provides additional
resistance to mechanical damage.
Forward-acting Scored Rupture Disks

A forward-acting composite rupture disk is a flat or domed multipiece construction disk (see
Figure 23). The domed composite rupture disk is designed to burst at a rated pressure applied
to the concave side. The flat composite rupture disk may be designed to burst at a rated
pressure in either or both directions. Some designs are nonfragmenting and acceptable for use
upstream of a PRV. A flat composite rupture disk is available for the protection of low-pressure
vessels or the isolation of equipment such as exhaust headers or the outlet side of a PRV. This
disk usually comes complete with gaskets and is designed to be installed between companion
flanges rather than within a specific rupture disk holder. Flat composite rupture disks generally
provide satisfactory service life when operating pressures are 50 % or less of the marked burst
pressure (50 % operating ratio). The slits and tabs in the top section provide a predetermined
opening pattern for the rupture disk. If vacuum or backpressure conditions are present,
composite disks can be furnished with a support to prevent reverse flexing (see Figure 23). A
domed, composite rupture disk generally provides satisfactory service life when the operating
pressure is 80 % or less of the marked burst pressure (80 % operating ratio).
A flat composite rupture disk is available for the protection of low-pressure vessels or the
isolation of equipment such as exhaust headers or the outlet side of a PRV. This disk usually
comes complete with gaskets and is designed to be installed between companion flanges rather
than within a specific rupture disk holder. Flat composite rupture disks generally provide
satisfactory service life when operating pressures are 50 % or less of the marked burst pressure
(50 % operating ratio).
Reverse-acting Rupture Disks
A reverse-acting rupture disk typically is a formed (domed) solid metal disk designed to
reverseand burst at a rated pressure applied on the convex side. Reverse-acting rupture disks
are designed to open by such methods as shear knife blades, tooth rings, or scored lines
Reverse-acting rupture disks may be manufactured as nonfragmenting and are suitable for
installation upstream of PRVs. These disks provide satisfactory service life when operating
pressures are 90 % or less of marked burst pressure (90 % operating ratio). Some types of
reverse-buckling disks are designed to be exposed to pressures up to 95 % of the marked burst

pressure. Consult the manufacturer for the actual recommended operating ratio for the specific .
disk under consideration. Because a reverse acting rupture disk is operated with pressure
applied on the convex side, thicker disk materials may be used, thereby lessening the effects of
corrosion, eliminating the need for vacuum support, and providing longer service life under
pressure/vacuum cycling conditions and pressure fluctuations
Graphite Rupture Disks

Graphite rupture disks are typically machined from a bar of fine graphite that has been
impregnated with a sealing compound to seal the porosity of the graphite matrix (see Figure 26).
The disk operates on a pressure differential across the center diaphragm or web portion of the
disk. Graphite rupture disks provide a satisfactory service life when operating pressures are up
to 80 % of the marked burst pressure (80 % operating ratio) and can be used in both liquid and
vapor service.
If vacuum or backpressure conditions are present, the disk can be furnished with a support to
prevent reverse flexing. These disks have a random opening pattern and are considered
fragmenting designs that are not suitable for installation upstream of a PRV. A metallic ring
called armoring is often added to the outside diameter of the disk to help support uneven piping
loads and minimize the potential for cracking of the outer graphite ring and blowout of process
fluid.
Rupture Disk Selection
the user is cautioned to make sure that the upper limit of the manufacturing design range does
not exceed the MAWP of the equipment being protected.



Selection Procedure
Sizing Procedure




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