COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION

SIERRA LEONE LAW SCHOOL

2023/2024

MODULE – TORT LAW assignment

TUTOR –HON. justice MONFRED SESAY

RE: THE DIRECTOR, FIVE STAFF AND FIFTY STUDENTS OF THE LAW SCHOOL DIED IN A
FIELD TRIP BUS ACCIDENT
 OBJECT

My service has been solicited to write a Legal Opinion advising the families of the Deceased
who died in the Sierra Leone Law School Fatal Field Trip Bus Accident .
SUMMARY FACT
On November 4, 2023, the Sierra Leone Law School organized a field trip from New England,
Freetown to Ropate in the Tonkolili District. The Director of the School hired a bus for the trip,
and each student paid Le 500,000 for the fare, food, and drinks. The bus, driven by Mr. Speedo
Wakafast, left the campus at 10:00 am with 50 students and 5 female support staff on board.
While they were onboard, the students were singing and drinking while the driver, despite a
heavy thunderstorm and reduced visibility, Wakafast drove at a speed of 150 kilometers per
hour, significantly above the official speed limit.
As they approached Rogbere bridge, Wakafast lost control of the bus due to his excessive speed
and the bus plunged into the Gbere river. Wakafast managed to escape, but all the students, the
Director, and the support staff perished in the accident. After the funeral, the families of the
deceased sought legal advice.

LEGAL ISSUES
1. Whether the Negligent Over speeding of Wakafast caused the accident.

2. Whether Wakafast can escape liability in Contributory Negligence and the Act of God as
defence to be the cause of the accident .

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Whether the Negligent Over speeding of Wakafast caused the accident. Look at Negligence
and its elements in relation to the scenario.

NEGLIGENCE:
This comes from the Latin word, “Negligentia” which means lack of care. Negligence refers to
the failure to behave with the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised under
the same circumstances. In the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, Lord Atkin
defined negligence as the failure to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my
neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being affected when I am directing my
mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. In the case of Blyth v The Company
of Proprietors of the Birmingham Waterworks (1856), 156 ER 1047; 11 Ex 781, Alderson B set
out the classic definition of negligence:
‘Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.’

To be held liable for negligence, we have several elements to establish.

1. There must be a duty owed to the victim whom the defendant must have in contemplation in
anything he does not to affect him.
2. There must be a breach of that duty.
3. The act of the defendant must be the cause of the harm or injury.
4. The Claimant must suffer an injury or harm.

DUTY OF CARE: This is a legal or moral obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of others
that your actions may affect to have them in contemplation when you do or you do not do such
acts. In the case of Arnaud France v Commissioner of Police (MAG.APP 29 of 1963), Mark J.
defined the duty of care of a driver to mean, the duty to exercise care and diligence on main road
to avoid accident. In the case of Modu Selina Bright & Another v Emile V. Carr & Another (CC
159 of 1959), R. B. Marke J. held that the driver who negligently drove a car and somersaulted
to a dish on the side of the road, causing severe injury to the plaintiff failed to exercise the
reasonable professional duty of care a driver should exercise to avoid accident. In the scenario,
Wakafast being the driver, he owes everyone in that bus a duty of care to drive with care to make
sure that they reach to their destination safe. He needs not know them. But driving alone on that
vehicle creates a duty of care to ensure their safety.

BREACH OF DUTY: It occurs when a duty of care exists and was not followed. That is, if a
reasonable person would have acted with more care than the defendant acted, the defendant
likely breached his duty. The standard of care will always be based on reasonable foreseability.
This means that the court will not ask the defendant whether he foresaw a certain outcome or not
but rather will seek to work out what the defendant ought to have foreseen. In the case of Conteh
V Bangura (S.C.) 1968-69, 19, it was decided that the test of liability for breach of duty is
reasonable foreseability of injury or loss in light of prevailing circumstances. But the standard of
what constitutes the breach of duty depends on the facts of each case. In the case of Nettleship v
Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, the House of Lords held that a learner driver, weston, was liable for
failure to exercise due care which caused injury to her instructor, Nettleship, despite her
inexperinece in driving. The rule established here is that the duty of care owed by a learner
driver to the public (including passengers) was to be measured against the same standard that
would be applied to any other driver. This case creates an exception to the reasonable man test in
the case of motorists and a person’s lack of specialist skills or possession of heightened
expertise, you are always expected to execise the due care expected of an expert and not just an
 ordinary by-stander or reasonable person. If you breach that standard of the expect, even if you
acted as a reasonable person but below the standard of an expert, like a learner driver would
reasonably act, you are still liable. In the scenario, Wakafast driving at such high speed despite
the storms and the low view due to the rain, he ought to have drove with the reasonable low
speed that would have ensured their safety but rather, he even increased the speed from 120kmph
to 150kmph. He ought to have exercised the reasonable expertise of a professional driver.
Besides entering into a bridge as high as Gbere bridge without slowing down was a trap he set to
kill his passengers. On normal days even without rain or storms, drivers always slow down when
they enter high bridges of that nature. But he even increased the speed. He needs not to have
foreseen the harm of death but he ought to have seen that the bus would likely jump out of the
bridge on normal days with such high speed.
The standard of proving such breach of duty is on the balance of probability. The plaintiff needs
not explain everything as to how the accident occured as it was decided in the case of Cole v
Crowther (S.C.), 1967-68, 330. In fact in this scenario, Wakafast breach of his duty is prima
facie established by res ipsa loquitur. The evidence speaks for itself clearly.

CAUSATION: This means a direct correlation (cause in fact) between the defendant’s action or
omission and the plaintiff’s injury. In other words, the plaintiff suffered an injury due to the
defendant’s negligent act. If a driver was speeding beyond the legal limits causing an accident,
and hurting the claimant, the property damage on the car and any medical expenses for physical
injuries suffered are “caused” by the defendant’s negligence. The burden to prove the cause of
harm as a result of the breach of duty is on the claimant but if the defendant takes to defence that
the accident was inevitable, then the burden shifts to him to prove the care he exercised to avoid
accident as it was decided in the case of Bandoe v Jacob (W.A.C.A.) 1950-56 406. The court
held in this case that; once a prima facie case of negligence has been established by a plaintiff,
the burden is on a defendant wishing to set up the defence of inevitable accident to prove the
cause of the accident and that the accident was inevitable in consequence of it, or to show all the
possible causes, one or other of which produced the effect, and that with regard to any one of
those possible causes the result could not have been avoided. But the standard to prove that duty
execised to prevent accident must be on the balance of probability as in the case of Greene v
Greene (C.A.) 1968-69 66. In the case of Wakafast, his negligent act of over speeding is closely
the direct cause of the accident and had he not oversped, the accident could have been avoided.
No other cause of act could be related to this accident. Any reasonable expert driver won't take
such speed in normal circumstances let alone crossing a high bridge under a voggy whether
where there is heavy rain storm.

HARM: It refers to the actual damage or injury that the plaintiff suffered due to the defendant’s
negligent actions. This could be physical injury, emotional distress, or financial loss. This was
established in the case of Kamara v. Gatewah and Macauley (S.C.) 1964-66 370, The case involves
a collision between a motor cycle and a motor bus. The plaintiff, who was a passenger on the motor
cycle, suffered physical injuries and the motor cycle was damaged. The plaintiff claimed damages
against the first defendant (the owner of the motor bus) and the second defendant (the driver of the
motor bus) for the alleged negligence of the second defendant. The defense denied negligence and
blamed the accident on the driver of the motor cycle.The court found both of them quilty and
awarded damages to the plaintiff for the following harm he suffered: Personal Injury: The plaintiff
sustained a simple fracture of the left ulna and an abrasion on the right knee, causing severe pain. No
evidence was given about pain or discomfort after the arm was set in plaster, or any permanent
disability. The plaintiff received treatment until October 1964. Pain and Suffering: The court
awarded Le200 for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering. Inconvenience: The plaintiff was awarded
Le40 for inconvenience caused by the accident, including attending hospital and dealing with the
police. Special Damages: Evidence was only given for damage to the motor cycle, damage to
clothing, and loss of earnings. The court determined the value of the motor cycle at the time of the
accident was £80. The total general damages awarded were Le240. In the given scenario, the
claimants suffer a lots of harms. First is the wrongful deaths of spouces, relatives or children or
parents. In sction 101 of the Road Traffic Act 2007, it provides that if a person dies a wrongful death
by a negligent driving of the defendant, he can be fined to pay a sum of Le 2,000. Some suffer
emotional trauma while some suffer financial loss holding to the fact that their parents who use to
provide for them are dead and some lost their wives and husbands. So there is harm of wrongful
death, loss of financial and parental support, emtotional stress. In the case of Jacqueline Smith v
Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Others (2017) EWCA Civil 1916, the
plaintiff, Mrs Smith succeeded in a claim of damages for the wrongful death of her husband
according to section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which was later used to review the Fatal
Accident Act 1976, for claims of damages by cohabiting couple for wrongful death caused by
negligence. Section 1 Para. A of that Fatal Accident Act 1976 provides for family members to
recover damages for the wrongful death of their relatives.

Whether Wakafast can escape liability in Contributory Negligence and the Act of God as
defence to be the cause of the accident.

ACT OF GOD: Vis Major or Act of God is defined as a direct, sudden, insanely violent, natural, and
irresistible act of nature, one which could not by any amount of care would have been foreseen, or if
it has been foreseen, could not be avoided by any amount of care by any individual. It must be
unforseen or even if forseen, it must be impossible to prevent the damage by any reasonable care one
may have taken. In the case of Nichols v Marslan Court of Appeal(1876) 2 Ex D 1There was an
ornamental pool on the defendant’s land. The pool contained various safeguards to prevent flooding,
allowing excess water to drain away naturally. However, a freak rainfall overwhelmed these
safeguards. This caused the water in the pool to flood out onto the claimant’s land, damaging it. The
claimant sued the defendant in negligence. The legal issue was whether it was the defendant
responsible for the damage caused by the flooding. The Court of Appeal held in favour of the
defendant. The defendant was not liable for the damage caused by the flooding because it was not
reasonably foreseeable. This was held so because it was an act of God not negligence.

This makes a fundamental exception to the defence of act of God. Negligence Defeats the Defence
of the Act of God under Law of torts. In the case of Slater v. Worthington's Cash Store Ltd. [1941] 1
K.B. 48 a property owner was held liable for failing to remove snow from his roof, so that a minor
avalanche injured a passer-by on the pavement. He argued that the snow was the act of God but the
court said it was reasonably forseable that it would caused damage and he ought have removed it but
he failed to do that which caused injury to another person. So the negligent omission of the owner
caused the injury and not the act of God. If Wakafast is to rely on the defence of Act Of God, then he
must prove that it was the thunder storm that solely plunged the bus across the bridge. That must
have been the case if he was driving at the normal legal speed limit of 80kmph while a heavy
thunder would just wipe the vehicle. But the facts provided here showed that the accident was
avoidable only had he not oversped but rather drove with due care. But he failed to exercise that care
which makes his negligence to defeat his defence of Act of God.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: This is a defence by a defendant if the person who was hurt did
anything themselves that contributed to the accident or injury, then the defendant is not responsible
for the injury. In the case of Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286, the plaintiff refused to wear seatbelts
because he was afraid of being trapped in a car during accident and they had an accident which was
caused by the defendant's negligent driving. The defendant was found liable for the negligent
driving but as for the cause of damage, the court held that it was avoidable had he worn seatbelts and
therefore, he was liable for contributory negligence. However, the defendant was not completely
freed from liability but 20% was reduced from damages he was to pay. In the cae of Kessebeh v
Coker (S. C.) 1967 (Civil Case No. 108/66), In order to establish the defence of contributory
negligence the defendant must prove, first, that the plaintiff failed to take ordinary care for himself,
i.e., such care as a reasonable man would take for his own safety and, secondly, that his failure to
take care was a contributory cause of the harm he suffered. Even if he was contributorily negligent
but if the negligence on his part is not proved as the cause of the harm he suffered, then the
defendant will solely take responsibility of the damages.

These elements of the above Sierra Leonean case if related to the scenario here, it automatically
destroys the Wakafast's defence for contributory Negligence. First, Wakafastshould prove that the
students, the support staff and the director failed to take ordinary care provided either by law or
custom that other passengers use to take that led to their death. The facts of this case did not provide
such instance in the case and for the singing and drinking, it is common in most field trips and bus
patrols in Sierra Leone that passengers will sing and merry in bus. That has not in anyway led to the
loss of concentration of the driver or the students did not shout at him to overspeed neither the
Director. The facts provide that he over sped first from 80kmph to 120kmph and later, while he
approached the bridge, even increased the speed to 150kmph. That act alone was sufficient enough
to plunge the bus over the bridge. This has nothing to do with the facts in Froom v Bucher where
Lord Denning said if a man fails to look after his own safety, he is contributorily negligent where the
victim denied seatbelts that would have prevented his injury. In other words, he accepted risk of not
doing what should make him safe and that makes him contributory to his own injury. This would
have been the case if the passengers had been the ones who told Wakafast to overspeed so that they
can arrive earlier. That means, they had accepted the risk that they would be safe but the fact does
not provide for that. If Wakafast was not overspeeding but the passengers were shouting loud and
dancing in the Bus to a point he would loss control, and it is proved that the act of the passsengers
solely caused the harm, then that would be contributory negligence. But the overspeeding proved to
be the imminent cause of the accident which if it was avoided, could have prevented the accident.
 ADVICE

Having analyzed the issues and the principles to this present case above, it is clear that the
families of the deceased have a triable case against Wakafasta. But first, I want to center the
advice on the instruction of the claimants who have solicited my service to advise them on the
possible legal actions to pursue and the remedies available to them in law for the wrongful death
of their family members. These claimants include the wife and children of the Director of Law
School, the Parents of the fifty Students and the husbands and relatives of the female support
staff who died in the accident.

The first advice to the claimants is to consider an out of court settlement by mediation. In the
case of Betuco (U) Ltd & Anor v Barclays Bank of Uganda Ltd & 3 Ors (Civil Appeal No. 1 of
2017) [2018] UGSC 39 (4 October 2018), there was an agreement between the claimants and
the defendant to settle their case out of court which was accepted by the court and referred back
to the lower court Judge to witness the mediation out of court. Out of court Settlement has so
many adavantages and disadvantages to the deceased families:

Out-of-court settlements in this case has several advantages. They are efficient, less time-
consuming, and less financially demanding than trials. They provide financial support to cover
the victim’s final expenses and compensate for lost financial support, which can be particularly
beneficial for dependents. Settlements offer a guaranteed compensation amount, providing
certainty that trials do not. They are private and confidential, unlike public trials, and are less
emotionally draining and adversarial. Lastly, in settlements, both parties have control over the
agreement terms, unlike in trials where the decision is made by the judge or jury.

However, Out-of-court settlements in wrongful death as in this case due to fatal car accidents can
have potential disadvantages. These include potentially lower compensation than what might be
awarded in a trial, no requirement for the defendant to admit guilt, and limited legal recourse
once a settlement is signed. Additionally, settlements may include confidentiality agreements that
restrict discussion of the case, and they lack the public accountability that a trial can bring to
wrongful actions.

The second advice is going to court. If the claimants, having considered the out of court
settlements in its adavantages and disadvantages believe they should go to court to get justice
and better remedies for their loss.

Negligence: In this case, Mr. Wakafast’s decision to drive at excessive speeds in poor weather conditions
could be seen as a breach of his duty of care towards the passengers. And from the above deliberations on the
elements of negligence and the rules that follow, it is possible that they may succeed in an action against Mr
Wakafast.
This action of negligence of Mr Wakafast has not been in anyway interruppted by an act of God or by
contributory negligence from the passengers in the bus as to be the cause of accident which leads to death. The
risk taken by Wakafasta is too high and negligent to a point that it is a prima facie evidence that any defence he
adduces can hardly stand and if he adduce any, he needs to prove it on the balance of probalities.

Potential Damages: For the harm suffered by the family members, if they succeed in establishing
the cause of the accident to be the negligent overspeeding of Wakafast, they may be awarded
damages for wrongful death. The families of the deceased may be entitled also to damages for
loss of companionship, pain and suffering, lost wages, and funeral expenses.
In conclusion, I want to assure the family memebrs that they have a triable issue in negligence
against Wakafast. The evidence is clear and any defence he might bring up would be very
difficult to negate his act of Negligence. However, the onus is on the family members to decide
whether to use out of court settlements or to go to court.