[ G.R. No. 243818.

April 26, 2022 ]

RAOUL C. VILLARETE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Procedural due process is met when one is given notice and the opportunity to be heard
and explain their side. It gives a party the chance to seek reconsideration of an action or
ruling unfavorable to them.1 A party is denied the opportunity to avail of the reliefs
available to them if they are not notified of a decision involving them, especially one
where they stand to lose their life, liberty, or property. Such is a violation of their due
process.

II

Petitioner claims that he was never served a notice of Decision No. 2012-138 and
was thus robbed of his right to seek reconsideration on the matter. He claims that
respondent erred when it issued a Notice of Finality of Decision and an Order of
Execution despite him not being apprised of the previous Decision. Consequently, he
asserts that respondent's Order of Execution is likewise void for having been issued in
violation of his constitutional right to due process.59

Petitioner alleges that while respondent avers that Decision No. 2012- 138 was
served twice and received by Bernardo Llona (Llona) and Cajipe, on behalf of petitioner,
both Llona and Cajipe are not his authorized representatives; thus, service on them
cannot be considered service on him.

Petitioner's procedural infirmity allegations hold water.

Respondent, in its Comment,60 states that Llona delivered the Notices and it was
Cajipe who received them on behalf of petitioner. On the contrary, the Certificates of
Service indicate that Llona is the recipient of the Notices on behalf of petitioner, Dr.
Rubio, and the Chief Auditor.

Respondent further points to the Certification61 of the Lung Center's Human

Resource Department which states that Cajipe held a secretarial position in the Office of
the Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services from November 2007 to
2014.62 However, there was no showing that Cajipe was assigned specifically to
petitioner as his personal secretary and, thus, no assurance that service to her person
would translate to service to petitioner.
 Proof of service to one's office secretary is not sufficient service to comply with the
due process requirement. In Cervantes v. City Service Corporation,63 this Court
enunciated the wisdom behind proper service on parties, to wit:

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or

some other paper in a case, to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it
and subject him to its legal effect. The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure
that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the
same so that he can take steps to protect his interests; i.e., enable a party to file an
appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes
final.64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

This is embodied in Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
is applied suppletory here. There, service of court processes, inter alia, is made in the
following manner, to wit:

SECTION 2. Filing and service, defined. - Filing is the act of presenting the pleading
or other paper to the clerk of court.

Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper
concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon
his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one
copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.

Thus, for service of a pleading to be proper, it must be made upon the parties
themselves, or their counsel. Here, given that petitioner was not represented by counsel
when Decision No. 2012-138 was issued, the service of notice of decision must have
been made to him personally or, if this was not possible, to his authorized
representative.

Respondent also claims that its December 6, 2013 Resolution and June 16, 2014
Notice of Finality were served on petitioner. However, there were no documents to
support such allegation. It is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.65

Respondent failed to substantiate its claim that petitioner was indeed served a
notice of Decision No. 2012-138 and its succeeding orders. Thus, this Court is
constrained to conclude that the same were not served on petitioner, thus, violating his
right to due process.

Procedural due process is met when one is given notice and opportunity to be heard
or explain their side. It entails giving a party a chance "to seek reconsideration of an
action or ruling complained of."66 In line with this, the failure to notify a party of a
decision involving them, especially one where they stand to lose their life, liberty, or
property, robs a litigant the chance to avail of the reliefs granted to them by law. Such is
a violation of due process.

Here, petitioner did not receive any notice from respondent after his filing of a
Memorandum of Appeal on April 17, 2006. Notably, the appeal was denied only on
September 13, 2012, more than six years after the filing of the appeal. While petitioner
could have diligently anticipated new developments on his case, a wait of over six years
without any movement would make any litigant weary. That said, it is only natural that
one would rely on the notices and orders sent by the Commission on Audit to keep
apprised of the movement of the case. Here, unfortunately, petitioner did not receive
any notices until the Order of Execution was released in 2015.

Accordingly, petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when he was not
given the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration on Decision No. 2012-138 and
when his Motion to Lift Order of Execution was denied outright. In denying petitioner's
motion in the September 8, 2015 Letter, Commission Secretary and Director IV Nilda B.
Plaras reasoned:

Notably, none of the persons named liable in the ND filed a motion for
reconsideration of COA Decision No. 2012-138. Thus, said COA Decision has become
final and executory after the lapsed (sic) of thirty (30) days from receipt of the copy of
the decision on September 18, 2012, pursuant to Sections 9 and 10, Rule X of the 2009
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission, as modified under COA Resolution No.
2011-006 dated August 17, 2011.

Consequently, the NFD was issued on June 16, 2014 for COA Decision No. 2012-
138 and CP en banc Resolution. The said NFD was forwarded to the Audit Team
Leader of LCP for service to the LCP Executive Director and to the persons liable in the
ND. As shown in the return copy of the NFD, copy attached, somebody received the
NFD opposite your name on September 11, 2014.

In this regard, we can no longer entertain your Motion to lift the COA Order of
Execution to implement COA Decision No. 2012-138 dated September 12, 2012 and
Resolution dated December 6, 2013 which already attained finality.67

Surely, that the Notice of the Decision was received by "somebody" cannot be
deemed effective service on the person. Moreover, the December 6, 2013 Resolution
which denied the Lung Center's Motion for Reconsideration and the June 16, 2014
Notice of Finality of Decision was likewise not served on petitioner.

Accordingly, petitioner was not given the opportunity to assail respondent's findings
until his receipt of the Order of Execution. Consequently, the June 16, 2014 Notice of
Finality of Decision was issued in contravention of petitioner's right to due process.

To reiterate, in administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a part is

duly notified of the allegations made against them and is given an opportunity to explain
their side. Moreover, due process dictates that the defense presented was considered
by the tribunal in the crafting of its decision, which is made known to the parties.68

It is worthy to note that the Revised Rules of the Commission on Audit allows the
litigant three opportunities to state their case and seek for reconsideration of an
unfavorable decision. An aggrieved party may appeal the Auditor's decision to the
Director,69 and the Director's decision may be elevated to the Commission
Proper.70 Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Commission
Proper.71 If the same is denied, the litigant may go to this Court through a petition
for certiorari as a last resort.72

Here, petitioner was only able to avail of an appeal from the decision of the
Commission on Audit Director, but was no longer given a chance to file a Motion for
Reconsideration afterwards. He was not afforded a chance to avail of all the channels
provided to him by law and, thus, was not able to sufficiently plead against the finding of
his liability.

Respondent contends that petitioner could not have been deprived due process
when it was able to file a Motion to Lift the Order of Execution on July 28, 201573 and a
Motion for Reconsideration on the previous Motion's denial.74 However by the time the
two motions were filed, respondent was already intent on the finality and immutability of
the Decisions; thus, it was resistant to any explanation and merely denied both outright.
The case of Fontanilla v. Commission on Audit75 is instructive:

While we have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures
the defect in procedural due process because the process of reconsideration is itself an
opportunity to be heard, this ruling does not embody an absolute rule that applies in all
circumstances. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the due
process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation
of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits
remained.

In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or
raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body
(like the COA) where he or she stands charged, then a due process problem exists.
This problem worsens and the denial of his most basic right continues if, in the first
place, he is found liable without having been charged and this finding is confirmed in the
appeal or reconsideration process without allowing him to rebut or explain his side on
the finding against him.

Time and again, we have ruled that the essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard. In administrative proceedings, one is heard when he is accorded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain his case or is given the chance to have the ruling
complained of reconsidered.1a⍵⍴h!1
 Contrary to the COA's posturing, it did not pass upon the merit of Dr. Fontanilla's
claim that he was denied due process. Instead of asking Dr. Fontanilla to explain his
side (by allowing him to submit his memorandum or calling for an oral argument as
provided under Rule X, Section 3 of the COA Rules of Procedure), the COA
concluded right away that the motion for intervention, exclusion, and reconsideration
had effectively cured the alleged denial of due process. The COA failed or simply
refused to realize that Dr. Fontanilla filed the motion precisely for the purpose of
participating in the proceedings to explain his side.76 (Emphasis in the original)

Here, petitioner was found solidarily liable with the Lung Center for the total amount
of ₱9,033,562.00. While the Lung Center was able to file a Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner was not able to defend himself and refute his liability due to the failure of
respondent to notify him of Decision No. 2012-138. Moreover, he was not apprised of
respondent's succeeding notices and orders, making it impossible for him to argue his
case.

Undoubtedly, the December 6, 2013 Resolution, September 13, 2012 Decision No.
2012-138, and the June 16, 2014 Notice of Finality of Decision were made in
contravention of petitioner's fundamental right to due process. For failing to give
petitioner an opportunity to seek reconsideration, the aforementioned are void with
regard its finding on petitioner's liability.

Consequently, the Writ of Prohibition is issued enjoining respondent from

implementing its Order of Execution No. 2015-032.

ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the

September 13, 2012 Decision of the Commission on Audit Commission Proper is set
aside/annulled insofar as it held Dr. Raoul C. Villarete jointly and solidarity liable.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission on Audit who is ORDERED to

allow Dr. Raoul C. Villarete to file a Motion for Reconsideration and resolve the question
of his liability.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario,

Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Perlas-Bernabe•, on official leave.

Lazaro-Javier••, on official business

• On official leave.

•• On official business.

1 Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 721 Phil. 34, 39 (2013)
[Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

2 Rollo, pp. 3-16.

3 Id. at 136-137. The September 8, 2015 Letter was signed by Commission

Secretariat Nilda B. Plaras.

4 Id. at 45-49. The March 15, 2018 Resolution in Decision No.2018-268 was
signed by Commission on Audit Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo and
Commissioner Jose A. Fabia of the Commission on Audit Quezon City.

5 Id. at 19-33. Dated May 29, 2015.

6 Id. at 39-44.

7 Id. at 52-57.

8 Id. at 159.

9 Id. at 5.

10 Id. at 59-62.

11 Id. at 52-57.

12 Id. at 5.

13 Id. at 63-65.

14 Id. at 99.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 6.

17 Id. at 79-91. The October 10, 2005 Decision in No. 2005-067 was penned by
Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang of the Commission on Audit, Quezon City.

18 Id. at 103, Government Procurement Reform Act.

19 Id.
20 Id. at 104.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 103.

23 Id. at 217-234.

24 Id. at 92-94.

25 Id. at 105.

26 Id. at 106.

27 Id. at 98-112. The Decision in No. 2012-138 was signed by Commission on

Audit Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan and attested Commissioners
Juanita G. Espino, Jr. and Heidi L. Mendoza of the Commission on Audit,
Quezon City.

28 Id. at 112.

29 Id. at 161.

30 Id. at 113-122.

31 Id. at 6.

32 Id. at 18.

33 Id. at 123-124.

34 Id. at 124.

35 Id. at 125-127.

36 Id. at 19-31.

37 Id. at 21.

38 Id. at 137.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 45-49.

41 Id. at 46-48.
42 Id. at 3-16.

43 Id. at 158-176.

44 Id. at 131-132.

45 Id. at 9.

46 Id. at 123-124.

47 Id. at 125-127.

48 Id. at 13.

49 Id. at 158-175.

50 Id. at 163.

51 Id. at 165.

52 Id. at 167.

53 Id. at 171.

54 RULES OF COURT, Rule 64, sec. 1.

55 Miralles v. Commission on Audit, 818 Phil. 380, 389-390(2017) [Per J.

Bersamin,EnBanc].

56 The Special Audit Team, COA v. Court of Appeals, 709 Phil. 167, 181 (2013)
[Per J. Sereno, En Banc].

57 Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 698 Phil. 1 (2012)
[Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

58 Id. at 14-16.

59 Rollo, pp. 3-16.

60 Id. at 158-176.

61 Id. at 214.

62 Id.

63 784 Phil. 694 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

64 Id. at 698.

65 Office of the Ombudsman v. Espina, 807 Phil. 529, 545 (2017). [Per Curiam,
First Division].

66 Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation, 721 Phil. 34 (2013)

[ Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

67 Rollo, p. 137.

68 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Commission on Audit, 818 Phil. 429, 452

(2017) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

69 Rule V, Section I of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Audit.

70 Rule VII, Section I of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Audit.

71 Rule X, Section 10 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Audit.

72 Rule XII, Section I of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Audit.

73 Rollo, p. 169.

74 Id. at 170.

75 787 Phil. 713 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

76 Id. at 725-726.