Manoharlal v State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 418
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.-This appeal raises for consideration the
constitutionality of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940 which reads as follows
" 7. (1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act, every shop or commercial establishment shall remain
closed on a close day.
(2) The choice of a close day shall rest with the occupier of a shop or commercial establishment and shall
be intimated to the prescribed authority within two months of the date on which this Act comes into
force."
Brief Facts:
The appellant Manohar Lal has a shop at Ferozepore Cantt. in which business is carried on under
the name and style of Imperial Book Depot'. Section 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940
(hereinafter called the Act), enacts: [Please see the provision mentioned above]
The appellant had chosen Friday as "the close day", i.e., the day of the week on which his shop
would remain closed. The Inspector of Shops and Commercial Establishments, Ferozepore Circle,
visited the appellant's shop on Friday, the 29th of January, 1954, and found the shop open and the
appellant's son selling articles.
Obviously, if Section 7(1) were valid, the appellant was guilty of a contravention of its terms and he
was accordingly prosecuted in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Ferozepore, for an
offence under Section 16 of the Act which ran:
"Subject to the other provisions of this Act, whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this
Act ................................................ shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty-five
rupees for the first offence and one hundred rupees for every subsequent offence ".
Decision of District Magistrate and High Court:
The additional District Magistrate sentenced the appellant to a fine of Rs. 100 and simple
imprisonment in default of payment of the fine (since the appellant had been convicted once
before).
The appellant applied to the High Court of Punjab to revise this order, but the Revision was
dismissed. The learned Judges, however, granted a certificate of fitness which has enabled the
appellant to file the appeal to this Court.
Arguments of Appellant:
That Section 7(1) violated the appellant's right to carry on his trade or business guaranteed by Art.
19(1)(g) and that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within Art. 19(6) because it was not in
the interest of the general public.
Read this contention of the petitioner wherein long title of the Act is relied upon to point out that
provisions of Act not applicable to him as he does not employ shop assistants. However, court declined
to accept this contention.
Learned Counsel drew our attention to the long title of the Act reading "An Act to limit the hours of
work of Shop Assistants and Commercial Employees and to make certain regulations concerning
their holidays, wages and terms of service" and pointed out that the insistence on the appellant to
close his shop, in which there were no " employees ", was really outside the purview of the
legislation and could not be said to subserve the purposes for which the Act was enacted. In short,
the submission of the learned Counsel was that the provision for the compulsory closure of his shop
for one day in the week served no interests of the general public and that it was unduly and
unnecessarily restrictive of his freedom to carry on a lawful trade or business, otherwise in
accordance with law, as he thought best and in a manner or mode most convenient or profitable.
Decision of Supreme Court:
We are clearly of the opinion that the submissions of the learned Counsel should be repelled. The
long title of the Act extracted earlier and on which learned Counsel placed considerable reliance
as a guide for the determination of the scope of the Act and the policy underlying the legislation,
no doubt, indicates the main purposes of the enactment but cannot, obviously, control the
express operative provisions of the Act, such as for example the terms of s. 7(1).
Nor is the learned counsel right in his argument that the terms of Section 7(1) are irrelevant to
secure the purposes or to subserve the underlying policy of the Act.
The ratio of the legislation is social interest in the health of the worker who forms an essential part
of the community and in whose welfare, therefore, the community is vitally interested. It is in the
light of this purpose that the provisions of the Act have to be scrutinized.
Thus, Section 3 which lays down the restrictions subject to which alone "young persons ", defined
as those under the age of 14, could be employed in any shop or commercial establishment, is
obviously with a view to ensuring the health of the rising generation of citizens. Section 4 is
concerned with imposing restrictions regarding the hours of work which might be extracted from
workers other than " young persons ".
The Act is concerned-and properly concerned-with the welfare of the worker and seeks to prevent
injury to it, not merely from the action of the employer but from his own. In other words, the
worker is prevented from attempting to earn more wages by working longer hours than is good for
him.
If such a condition is necessary or proper in the case of a worker, there does not seem to be
anything unreasonable in applying the same or similar principles to the employer who works on
his own business.
The learned Judges of the High Court have rested their decision on this part of the case on the
reasoning that the terms of the impugned section might be justified on the ground that it is
designed in the interest of the owner of the shop or establishment himself and that his health and
welfare is a matter of interest not only to himself but to the general public.
The legislation is in effect the exercise of social control over the manner in which business should
be carried on-regulated in the interests of the health and welfare not merely of those employed in
it but of all those engaged in it.
A restriction imposed with a view to secure this purpose would, in our opinion, be clearly saved by
Art. 19(6).
We have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling the attack on the constitutionality of s. 7(1) of the Act. The
appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
