People v. Perfecto, G.R. No.
L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in
an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code –
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and
can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the
SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However,
the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its
representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over
the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the
SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to
be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus,
the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition
of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856
Absolute and permanent allegiance is not suspended during enemy occupation.
Hence, adherence to said enemy occupant, through giving them aid and comfort,
is an act of treason punishable under Article 114 of the RPC.
FACTS: Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus and argued that a
Filipino who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort, during
their (Japanese) occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason under
Article 114 of the RPC because the sovereignty of the Philippines and the
correlative allegiance of Filipinos at the time were suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegiance of Filipinos suspended during enemy
occupation.
RULING: No, the allegiance of Filipinos is not suspended during enemy
occupation. A citizen or subject owes absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists of fidelity and obedience, to his government or sovereign. This kind of
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
whom a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein
he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives.
This absolute and permanent allegiance of citizens is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. Sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during enemy occupation; what may be suspended is
Page 1 of 13
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, the same being passed temporarily to
the occupant. In effect, the allegiance of the citizens to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, hence, there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance as theorized by Laurel.
MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION
A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982 - 114 SCRA 77
FACTS: On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in
Civil Case 3010 which became final for lack of an appeal. One of the parties in that
case was Macariola. On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge
Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on
November 11, 1963.
Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots involved in the partition, was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon. On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a
portion of the said lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion.
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte with "acts
unbecoming a judge." The complainant alleged that that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010 decided by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said provision.
HELD: The Court finds that there is no merit in the contention of complainant
Bernardita R. Macariola. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale
or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. For the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
When the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October
23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16,
1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become
final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
Therefore, the respondent Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals is hereby reminded
to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
Page 2 of 13
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts: In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the
sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by
R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of
1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the
location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining
our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over
those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points
to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime
space.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of
the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture.
Page 3 of 13
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
RULING: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
TANADA V. ANGARA, G.R. NO. 118295, May 2, 1997
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
“The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a
“controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”
FACTS: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other
lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy
and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets,
especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports,
particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for
the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment
in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution,
since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
Page 4 of 13
because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for
national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO
Agreement.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair
the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial
power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied
rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
HELD:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute.
As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
2.While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights.
As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty
may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Page 5 of 13
Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable
burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the
Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as
shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Villavicencio vs. Lukban,G.R. No. 14639. March 25, 1919
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
The Government of the Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist
in retaining it as a government of laws and not of men. No official, however high, is
above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors.
FACTS: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the
morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,
purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in
houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night,
in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao,
had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton
Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They
prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel
them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their
consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was
no law or order authorizing Lukban’s deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
ISSUE: Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.
HELD: We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no
law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to
change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same
rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of
profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived
of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.
Page 6 of 13
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION
FACTS: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country".
On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty
Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America.
The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of
the said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition.
Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of
(a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2
counts),
(b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts),
(c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts),
(d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and
(E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts).
On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999
requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as
all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
The Secretary denied the request.
On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish
Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the
Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice
Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United
Page 7 of 13
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction.
The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and
its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
IN SUMMARY:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request
from the United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States
pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have
committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request
and that he be given ample time to comment on said request. The petitioners denied
the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
HELD: NO. The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in
the Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with a situation where there is a conflict between a rule of the international
law and the constitution. Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the
provisions so as to give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal
law must be upheld. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of
the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over the
municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with
the constitution.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action
on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The constitutional issue in the
case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondents
due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by
constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we
choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
Thus, Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to
file his comment with supporting evidence.
Page 8 of 13
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ (G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957)
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the
Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The
main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a
judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that:
• It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
• The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
• The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally
accepted principles.
RULING: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this
case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted
principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to
all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
IBP VS ZAMORA
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and
PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a
temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
Page 9 of 13
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility
to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to
provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of
Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Zamora GR No 141284 15 August 2000
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of
the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that
petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the
AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?
Page 10 of 13
Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit
standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on
standing and resolved the issue now.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.
FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting
for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is
living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty
years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner.
Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing
an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been
living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and
that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement
between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge
of "gross and immoral conduct."
HELD: The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are
anchored on a different reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This
approach erects an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and state.
Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the state.
Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the
Court, showing the Court’s tendency to press relentlessly towards a more secular
society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that religion plays an
important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional
government practices which An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy,
and sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other hand, the
strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally
required, for the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise First, the accommodationist interpretation is most
consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second, the accommodationist
position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the
accommodationist interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of
minority religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include
ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the
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various needs and beliefs of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be immediate
and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the
interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right
to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family
on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and
family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion The second
step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to
be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the "Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the
Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and
defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against
her Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be
given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in
opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas
Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United
Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid
Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest
Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign
Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig.
Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin
Drilon, Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco
Tatad, respondents.
Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On
September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the
presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States
panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of
the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for
brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998,
the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification,
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the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the
VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of
sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers,
petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers
to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.
(2) Yes. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21,
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is
immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel
of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle
with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds
within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
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