220618 10% wae ) f ? i | * Published in Ideas in History, the Maratha Polity, jis Nature and Development y the time the East India Company established its nile in India, the administrative and political system established in the country by the Mughals had largely broken down. The centralizing Mughal empire had given place to a series of states held together in a system of balance of power. The Marathas were politically the most powerful and aggressive entity among this group of states. However, by 1761 their bid to replace the Mughal empire by a new, all-India empire had definitely failed. While scholars are by no means agreed on the significance and causes_of the Maratha defeat Panipat, there is hardly any difference of opinion that institutional defects, played_a large part in the ultimate failure oF the Marathas{Generally speaking, these are traced to the abandonment of Shivaji’s sol system, and its gradual re} ment by an essentially feuda Polity presided over by Ses Peshwas! ‘This emphasizes ea necessity of examining the nature of the Maratha movement an ed,, Bisheshwar Prasad, Bombay, 1969, 1941;G. S. Sardesai, 3-4. The number ncient thinkers. State and Pp. 173-93. lahabad, L.See V. V. Joshi, Clash of Three Empires, Allahann< Naw History of the Maratha People, Vol. I, Poona, 1948, Pea Ofministers varied from seven to twenty according Nj ar, Mahabharata recommended eight ministers. °° vemment in Ancient India, Benares, 1949, P- 1"—aoo_——(aOtssseeh 194 “ Essays on Medieval Indian History nh polity, the ideas underlying them and their ; a Mpace | agrarian situation, Unless and until that ; 4 is done, Pon F " Fi Our 4, the standing of the nature of the forces at work in Mediey, Nde, society in general and during the eighteenth century in Bae Mian must remain incomplete. eula, There has been a good deal of discussion AMON histo, whether the Maratha movement was} a Hindu reaction agai s ich rites a in the communal policies of Aurangzeb,” or a movement of nati. ne 3 : ation, — independence against foreign rule,? or simply a regi action against the inexorable process of absorption into the Mughal empire.‘ Since, in the medieval context, all Movements of protest tended to expréss themselves in religious forms, op to draw their sustenance from religious ideologies, the task of analysing their social and economic content is not €asy. It is outside the scope of the present chapter to enter into a detaileq examination of the nature of the Maratha movement, istori- cally, the rise of the Maratha movement was anteri ior to the fi communal policies of Aurangzeb and cannot be explained in rf terms of the so-called religious reaction alone. Even a casual \ examination of the composition of the Maratha ruling class would show that it retained its regional character to the end. Hardly any non-Maratha rose to a position of importance in the Maratha states during the eighteenth century. We may distinguish three broad phases in the development of the Maratha polity: the early phase lasting up to the flight of Raja Ram to Jinji (1689); the Stage of expansion lasting more or less up to the battle of Panipat (1761); and the final phase up to the final defeat of thé Marathas by the British in-1818, and the establishment of British Paramountcy, 2.J.N. Sarkar, Shivaji and His Time, 4th edition, Calcutta, 1948, p. 372: G.'S. Sardesai, Main Curents of Maratha Hiss iti bay, 1949, pp. 57-83, ‘ory, 2nd edition, Bombay; 3. M. G. Ranade, Rise of the Maratha Power and Other Essays, Bombay; 1963, pp. 3-4, 48. ‘The idea of forming a Confederacy of Hindu powers all over India, and subverting Musulman dominion, appear to have seriously been entertained by him,’ Ppears never 4. This view was expressed by Dr R. P. Tripathi e if he has put it down in print. 1, though I am not awaré i | | | ! | o~ o™b The Maratha Polity 195 ministrative ideals and practices of Shivs a : : ppean sources nor the Persi: rope* them. The Maratha sources ji. Neither the Eu- AW accounts throw much light on available to us mostly relate to the late seventeenth or early ghteenth century when a religious halo was alreac y being cast on Shivaji. For xaimple, Sabhasad, writing at Jinji in 1697, declares that Shiv; ji was an incarnation of Mahadeva, and ascribes his tories over Afzal Khan and Shaista Khan to the advice and miraculous power of the Goddess. Bhawani.” Shivaji was well versed in the epics and the Hindu scriptures. In so far as he had a conscious ideology, it was apparently derived from them. However, the scriptures did not provide a sufficient guide for the organization of the state, and Shivaji was compelled in practice to draw upon the existing ideas and institutions both of the Deccanis and the Mughals. The administrative ideas and ideals of Shivaji have thus to be largely deduced from his practice. \Recent research has shown that Shivaji’s system of adminis- tration was based essentially on the system of administration prevalent in the Deccan but it also drew upon the Mughal institutions. Most of the important officials ‘comprising the asthapradhan, such as the peshwa, the majmuadar and the dabir had existed in the Deccan much before Shivaji’s time.® The administrative divisions adopted by Shivaji—the suba or prant, tarfand mauza—were also based on the administrative divisions prevalent in the Deccan.’ Under the Sultans in the Deccan, the 5. Sabhasad Bakkhar, or Shiv Chhatrapatichen Charitra, ed., K.N. Sane (Bombay, 1923), pp. 11, 23, 32, et seq.; S. N. Sen, Shiva Chatrapati (Calcutta, 1920), pp. 11, 27, 42. ‘This deed (the killing of Afzal Khan) was not that of a human being. An incarnation he surely was, and so indeed he could perform this deed’ (Sabhasad Bakkhar, p. 22; Shiva Chhatrapati, p. 25). 6. Sir Wolsey Haig thinks that the body of eight ministers was instituted by Muhammad Shah Bahamani I, with modifications about their numbers and functions being introduced according to the needs and resources of individual kings. See Cambridge History of India, Vol. MI (Cambridge, 1937, p. 377). See also V.T. Gune, The Judicial System of the Marathas (Poona, 1953), pp. 26-7; H. N. Sinha, Development of Indian Polity (Bombay, 1963), pp. 379-80. “There is some propriety in discovering more than a superficial resemblance in numbers, between the Bahamani ministry and Shiv: ministry.” 7. S.N. Sen, Administrative System of the Marathas (2nd edition, Calcutta, 1925), pp. 44, 252; V. T., Gune, Judicial System, p. 28. However, Sen is noteT traditional elements enjoying local authority, the deshmukhs desais, etc., were not displaced. For the maintenance of th officials and their dependents, igia's were assigned. These wer Often held on revenue-t rowards the beginning of farming term the century, Methwold recor solconda that ‘the gover, | ; ¥ 5 196 “ Essays on Mediedat Indian Hist at € ment is farmed immediately from the King by some eminen, ‘armeth out the lesser ones, anq man, who to other inferiours far? to the country people.” These farmers could be th rdars but were quite often Hindus—asualj “ay Brahmans or bani 10 The revenue farmers apparently enjoyeq considerable administrative powers in the tracts under their charge.!! Though not hereditary in theory, they tended to tecome so, particularly in the outlying areas, where the authority of the Sultan was slack. It has been argued by almost every historian since Ranadee tim@that Shivaji abolished feudalism in his dominions. Sen says that he ‘made it a rule not to assign any jagir to any officers, ' Givil or military’.’” Also, that while for reasons of expediency, Shivaji Teli the deshiniukhs_and deshpaniles in the “enjoyment of their old rights and perquisites, he appointed government agents to collect the land revenue and thus established direct relations with the peasants. Finally, we are told that Shivaji did not disturb the ‘village republics’ which were left in enjoyment they again local officials or jagi ei ices wa EH correct in equating these divisions to the subah, sarkar and pargana of the Mughals. Nor is it easy to see how the adoption of Sanskrit nomenclatures for these by Shivaji was proof of ‘nationalizing principles’ "The subal f Shivaji apparently corresponded to the parganas or mamlats of the Dec!” rulers. 8. Iga‘ had gradually come to mean revenue assignments in whic state had the real rights of property. See Infan Habib, Aggatt p. 257n. The assignee was called mugi@’, and frequently held te Fevenuefarming terms. (See Barani, Tarikh-iFinuz Shahy PP: dee mugfa’ often enjoyed wide administrative powers. Z Goll® §. Methwold, Relations, ed., W. FI. Moreland in Retain g Hakluyt, 2nd series, No. LXVI (London, 1931), P- ll. 10. Relations, pp. 54, 57, 79, 81-2. ‘ 11. See Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar. PP- at (Me 12. Sen, Administrative System, p. 45. See also RAMA cyan sit Power, pp. 70, 78; Sardesai, New History, Vol. 1h P: ; p. 351; Gune, Judicial System, p. 30.The Maratha Polity % 197 of their. former rights and administration,! sertion that Shivaji qi, s 1 did not assig: officers Seems to be based ona eae account. Referring to the mode sabhasad says: i Privileges and formed the basis of i n any jagirs to his Single passage in Sabhasad’s of payment to the chief officials, ne sarnobal, and the majmuadar, 2 The al stall of the ra ee vena the hav, and the men on the GF barais (orders). The lands Cultivated. be ake by means assessment like the fields of the rayais, and the manent ee —<-ejeducted from thei , a € amount of the revenue due wa: neir pay. For the balance they got barats eith on the treasury of the capital or the district. Men serving in th a iy, the army or the forts were not to be given'villages in entirety (dan gasi) as mokasa mahals, They were to be paid by baratsfrom the treasury None but the karkuns had any authority over the countryside, All payments to the cavalry, the army or the fort establishments were to be_made by the. karkuns, The grant of mokasa would have created disorder among the rayat: they would have grown in strength and disobeyed the government collectors; and the growing power of the rayats would have led to rebellion at various places. The mokasaholders and the zamindars, if united, would have become uncontrollable. Therefore no mokasa was to be granted to anyone.!* Diverse interpretations have been put upon the words mokasa and mokasa mahals. Mokasa has been defined as a proprietory right in land, whether rent-free, or at low quit rent or on reyenue- farming terms on condition, of service.” However, the most Satisfactory explanation seems to be to derive it from the Persian word mugdsamat (v.n. of gism) meaning ‘dividing (with 13. Sen, Administrative System, p. 30. 14. Sabhasad, pp. 27-8. ; 15. Wilson, Glossary, pp. 352-3; Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 351; Sen, Administrative System, p. 669; Gune, Judicial System, Vol. XV, pp. 12-13. Wilaoa sas a mokasa is irregularly derived from the Arabic khas and also inchides under mokasa ‘a village held khas by the state...or the share a the goveran eS in a village or the revenue paid by it’. However, the word ! eats been used in this sense by Sabhasad. There seems no JU ite ae thinking that the word mohasa had come into use aos 0 Se ae of the Bahmani kingdom. The actual word used in Tigers is magazat or posts of gazis. Cf. Gune, Judicial System PU Burhan-i-Ma’asir, p. 7-198 + Essays on Medieval Indian History another), admitting (him) to a share’.!® Tt has thus meaning as the Arabic word igtd‘ which appears te Pe Same more generally used during the Sultanat and the pi ber periods.!” It seems that there were three types Of mugag™*ig under the Adil Shahi rulers. First, those in which wag a" @™tey ‘a specified share (fagsim, an annual amount ranging pe eq fions to 600 hions or Rs 800 to Rs 2400) of the land tesa® a village to the royal cavalry-men such as sillahda afrad and lashkari in lieu of their monthly salary ( _ Second, those granted on condition of service, cons or more villages. These were apparently granted on, Tevey farming terms, the exact revenue to be realized not ee specified in the grant, and the grantee being free to adminis them either through the hereditary local officers of the Villa, the deshmukh, through an agent, or deshpande, patil, etc. The thir d type of grants were those granted to high grandees, etc, as 4 royal favour, without their being connected with any office, These often consisted of a large number of villages, or one or more parganas. These were also held on revenue-farming terms, and the grantee was expected to maintain a specified force of cavalry from hundreds to some thousands for the service of the state. The word jagir seems sometimes to have been used for this category of grants, and such jagirdars virtually enjoyed the position of autonomous chiefs.!® None of the three categories mentioned above were heredi- tary. But there was, from the beginning, a marked tendency for heredity in the category of grants called jagir which were gene™ ally granted in frontier tracts or outlying areas. For example, there was from the outset no question of transfer as far as the jagirs of Shahji in the Poona and Bangalore tracts were C™ cerned, and in the Qutb Shahi kingdom, as far as the jagirs ° Mir Jumla in the Karnatak were concerned. From the conjunction of the word mahal with appears that what Sabhasad was referring to was 4P]I © fro 3, lashhan MUShahera)s isting of one mokast, parent y 16. Steingass, Persian—English Dictionary, p. 1288. 17. Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, ff. 257-8n. i Shab 18. H. Fukazawa, ‘A Study of the Local Administration of the Ad! 'o¢5, Sultanate (1489-1686)" in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 111(2) Printed in idem, The Medieval Deccan: Peasants, Social Systems OUP, 1991, pp. 32-40, :The Maratha Polity 199 ype of grants referre pe secon OF ra ints referred to above, ice., those i . fi plordships or administrative rights in the se involving ald generally on revenue-farmi racts conc he arming terms. The object and he ants, according to S sis pe of st IS, Tee tng Co Sabhasad, were both economi litical, » that they led ‘ithe and PO . to the oppression of try, and ated the danger of the grant hands gantry # pe’ ne . joining hands ih the local zamindars in opposing the government on Fowevers Sabbasad’s statement that : Sted to anyone can only be taken as an ae = be jdeal rather than a des cription of the actual practice unde shivaji- This is evident from the fact that Sabhasad refers i the grant of mokasa mahals by Shivaji on more than one occ sion, Thus, after the defeat of Afzal Khan, many people were “rey Jarded with grants of villages in mokasa’ and mokasa mahals were also set apart for the Goddess Tulja Bhawani.’ After the return oeShivaji from Agra, Krishnaji Pant, Kashi Rao and Vishaji Pant were rewarded by the grant of one lakh huns as inam, a salary of 10,000 huns, and the grant of mokasa mahals.” After the Karnatak expedition, when an agreement was patched up with Santaji, the son of Shahji by a concubine, he was given the command of 1000 horses in the Karnatak, and granted mokasa mahals2" ayment_ of cash salaries to the soldiers—is it_too, was apparently an ideal. The salaries of ihe soldiers, havaldars, etc., were either to be paid out of the Treasury or by means of barats (orders) on the countryside which were to be paid by the karkuns. But the earlier practice of giving assignments of the villages for a fixed sum of money which was realized by the grantee either through his agent or the local zamindars was apparently not completely abandoned. To quote be given to soldiers who Sabhasad again, ‘saranjam should Worked hard in campaigns.”*” 19, Sabhasad, pp. 21, 23. 20. Sabhasad, p. 55. 21. Sabhasad, p. 91. 22. Sabhasad, p. 27. Saranjam has been define i Ment of revenue from villages or lands for the support of troops oF for Personal military service, usually for the life of the grantee...these #0 teither transferable nor hereditary, and were held at the pleasure © Sovereign,” ; mes nearest tO the eteign.’ See Wilson, Glossary, 465. Saas this sense by Sabhasad. lughal concept of a jagir, and is apparently use das ‘a temporary assign-_ ~ 900 “ Essays on Medieval Indian History ogasa grants under Adil gy ; Shah; rhe three types of m §rant The th E ar in Shi above thus appear mokasaand jagir. Strictly speaking, jagiras und AP ot esponded to neither of these, and Se be “nd es both the words mokasa mahals and saranjam for yp important point to note is that all the three ty ‘sa ar to have developed strong elements of her, ree tage. The author of the Ajnapatra, writin, = iPS tina 4 iy mentione S time in the sh "ers saranjam, by the Mughals co’ ust jagirs. An i grants appe very early si eiyipar ‘f the eighteenth century, strongly disapprores the system of hereditary assignments (oritti) out of land rey, enue, on the ground that it led to a continuous decline of the government’s income, resulted in the oppression of the peas antry, and provided the disloyal descendents of an assignee the wherewithal for rebellion. However, he goes on to say, ‘It is a sin to resume a hereditary preferment (vritti) however small it may ba The preferment of one person should not be transferred to another, nor should it be remus It is difficult to say to what extent such ideas were prevalent’in Shivaji’s time. Perhaps they were inherited from a much earlier period, and repre sented the powerful effect of Hindu tradition. edity a Thus, Shivaji's negotiations with, Aurangzeb during his visit to Agra for a saranjam for himself are referred to more than once (Sabhasad, pp. 45,49) Since Shivaji expected to get an imperial mansab, saranjam is obvious used in the sense ofa tankhwah jagir here. As argued above, in the Decca, Jagr had come to imply a hereditary grant. Thus, Afzal Khan, in his | negotiations with Shivaji, offered him ‘the raj of Talkonkan jahangin (le | his traditional jagir), and as much saranjam as he wanted’ (Sabhasad, P- br Bidens of time saranjam also seems to have become heredita" r laulat, often translated as jagir b i neant in reality a preferment, and could be used for aed wn aosignment— i a sa oF saranjam or for a post or mansab. Sabhasad tells us tht he escape of Shivaji from Agra, Aurangzeb advised Shah Alam © appease Shivaji by giving territory (muluk) in mokasa in the name of bs son, Shah Alam accordingly sent Shivajia message promising him moke'® lat (i.e., mansab) to Sambhaji, and terri BD lakh hunsin Berar and Khandesh, Accordi ribory|(gruduh) |yiel dios ingly, Shah Alam gave jagirwo! 15 lakh huns in Berar, and Rauji its sarsubadar (Sabhasad, pp. cai Bade eae 23. Ramchandra Pant, A; Prakaruna 7. Hees a ed., KN. Sane (Bombay 1929); ae ie niThe Maratha Polity 201 viz., the ani, were assigned was an element spe fact that lands as signed for a religious purpose, nance of the temple of the goddess Tulja Bhaw: aralled mokasa mahals suggests that the lands so also not normally transferred, and that there were ditary grant in them already. aint of here eon regardi ; The posiuion regarding the mode of payment of offi s. javaldars, and men of the armed forces might be summarized as follows: (i) Shivaji desired to assert the authority of the government over the entire territory under his control. The practice of ganting mokasa mahals was objected to since these grants which vere held on revenue-farming terms conferred on the grantees jdministrative authority and the opportunity of harassing the peasantry, and created the danger of their joining hands with » the local zamindars to oppose the government. " religious purposes as well”as for distinguished service. ~~ (iii) It appears that many of the officials of Shivaji belonged to petty Iandowning sections (mirasdars), Their, lands weré ‘assessed like the lands of ordinary peasants, and the revenue due from them set off against their salary. Thus the number of oicials who received their salaries wholly in cash was probably not very large... (iv), Soldiers, havaldars and others were. paid both in cash and by saranjam, i.e., the grant of stipulated sums of money out ofthe revenue of a village...) f _(v) The tradition of regardin ally hereditary operated strongly A this nradiiancond countered by the Muslim tradition that i st i king alone. In the reditary rights in land should vest 1n the king tussle ie this point, the weakness of the Maratha monarch. afer Shivaji operated powerfully to his disadvantage. '# ios «towards the zamindars is concerned, > nian as Shivaji's policy tewhat obscure passage, Sabhasad Ma long, rambling and some stakes the } g all rights in land as essen- from the beginning. However, —_ ““Avgam Shahi and Mughal territories cond 8 the Adil Shahi, Niztiis had formerly been subject to quered by Shivaji, ‘the 7 ~ LEA ~~ (ii) However, mokasa mahals continued re granted, for202 & Essays on Medieval Indian History patits, kulkamis and deshmukhs who used 0 do the col work (Ramazisi) and pay what they pleased (9 the Mea, 2. ‘For a village where in mivasdari rights they yo. two thousand (ins or rupees) (they) used t0 pay ty 4M m Inmdred to the government (diwani as a contribution Cnet In consequence, the mirasdars grew wealthy, and strengq 0” themselves by building bastions, castles (vade) and sr m 0 "Ethene inthe village, and enlisting footmen and musketeers, Thee waited on the revenue officer of the government, and gon to fighting if he urged that they could pay more. This class ial become unruly and seized the country. id Shivaji occupied their lands, demolished their , castles and strongholds, and wherever there were stro, posted his own garrison. “Thus no power was left in of the mirasdar.’ ‘aStions, Ng forts, the hands 3. He prohibited ‘all that the mirasdars used to take at their sweet will, as gifts (inam) or by way of revenue farming (ijara), and fixed the dues of the zamindars from the villages in cash and grains as well as the rights and perquisites of the deshmuths and the deshkulkarnis, and the patil (and) the kutkarni.* It does not seem correct to equate the_mirasdar with the bigger zamindars, i.e., the deshmukhs and desais. Baden Powell defines it in the sense of a hereditary tenure, or for ‘members of co- sharing landlord communities’,?° analogous to the pattidari or dhaichara villages of the north.2> Reference to strongholds in 24. ‘Sen adds the words ‘according to the yield of the village’, Sarkar says, “Their dues were fixed after calculating the (exact) revenue of the village.’ However, such an interpretation does not follow from the origi Passage. Cf. Sabhasad, p. 30, _25. Baden Powell, Land System, Vol, IIL, pp. 115, 256-7. Wilson defines mirasdar as ‘the holder of hi ; ereditary lands, or offices in a village... Pe landowner or cultivator’ (p. 342). V.T, Gune, Judicial System, says. T wu eae were constituted by cultivators (mirasdars and “en isans, latas)’ (p, ir Be landowners (en aa 4). Elsewhere, he defines mirasdars as ¢ see p. 153 above. The mirasdars oi thet and had their own ploughs and bul land, ie, Seneric sense, including all those ¥ hereditary rights i ry rights in » all catagories of zamindars, (SC)| the villages suggests the latter, and ree: drastic action which the young against fortified villages.27} lands on a quit-rent b; The Maratha Polity 203 c ‘alls to mind the equally Farid (Sher Shah) took in Bihar 2the mirasdars apparently held their Shivaji curtaile ivi : a ailed privileges of the mirasdars, assessing them in the same i s wayas ordinary peasants, and resuming the lands they had seifed iMegally. "Thus he brought them nearer to the position of ordinary peasants.}* It would follow that Shiv. interfered drastically with the privileges of the ‘village republics’ in some c: vertheless, it would probably be correct to say that the petty “amindars (mirasdars) formed the backbone of Shivaji's support and constituted a powerful ation) in iis armed forces as well as the civil administration. The mle forbidding the building of castles was applied to the bigger zamindars, i.e., the deshmukhs and the desais. Shivaji’s relations with this section were not always cordial.)The more important of the deshmukhs and deshpandes, who had been left in enjoyment of their privileges by the Adil Shahi government, saw no reason to submit tamely to Shivaji. Hence many of them had to be fought by Shivaji. Many preferred to take service with the Adil Shahi or the Mughal government.” Shivaji was thus faced with the problem of creating a new, dependable class of zamindars. oo. It seems that the most important step taken by Shivaji in this diréction was to restrict and define the rights and perquisit of the primary and higher echelons of 2amindars. It is not quite clear if Shivaji ended the system of revenue farming, or letting land to the zamindars on the basis of a quit-rent or tribute ie is generally believed. Rat the government's agents ee took steps to ascertain the actual producd. (This Sa the basis of a new assessment) The steps appeared suf Sure important to Sabhasad to assert that i“ aa Nadel a to the authority of the zamindars, deshmukhs and desais, 27, Abbas Khan Sarwani, Tubfa-i-Akbar Shahi, quoted by Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, p. 166. : : 28, Cf. the action of Alauddin Khalji against the khuts the duab, Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi, PP- a anal 29, For the list of Maratha nobles in Mughal eae The Mughal Nobility, loc. cit, pp- 2% 35 et seq. i a numerous than Ranade, in Rise of Maratha Power ‘P- and balahars of believed.14 — 204 + Essays on Medieval Indian History a no rights to exercise the powers of a political supe lord), or to harass the rayats.*° The ascertaining of the produce also implied the fix, the perquisites and privileges of the zamindars. But the ass that the-land revenue was to be realized directly through 4 government's agents does not seem to be warranted, Abhae, asserts that the karkuns were asked to realize rent in Brains » the time of each harvest ‘in every village, from each individu rayat’. It may well be that once again Sabhasad is stating Br an ideal position, or a position that applied to khalisa lands on}, It also appears that the word rayat is used both in the sense ¢ the peasantry, and the owners of land, i.e., the village zamindars,” | From the foregoing analysis, it would appear that Shivaji made no drastic changes in the existing social setup in Maharashtra: Even then, Shivaji’s revenue policy would seem to mark_a-considerable advance. The sum total, in terms of its ~ Social effects, would be to reduce the mirasdar to the level of gn ordinary farmer, and a peshkashi zamindar to the position of | TOF (ong ‘tion gf UMP, a khiraji one, i.e., instead of being largely autonomous, he was to-be-subject-to-the-government's revenue rules and regulati and obey its révérue collectors.” It may be doubted whether Shivaji was able to apply the above policy to all the territories comprised in his swarajya. abhasad seems to imply that it applied only to the desh or tableland o conquered from Bijapur, Golconda and the Mughals. In 2 case, it apparently did not apply to the scattered districts oF™ south Maratha country.*> 30. Sabhasad, p. 29. . 31. Sabhasad’s statement that the grant of mokasa mahals led © “ oppression of the rayat, that they would have disobeyed the gover agents, and that the growing power of the rayatwould have led to ree" only makes sense if the word rayat is construed in the genetic 5°" the peasantry at one place, and the specific sense of village 74”"" the other. The word raiyat was apparently used in both these SC" Mughal literature also. See S, Nurul Hasan ‘Revenue Administ, the Jagir of Sehsram by Farid (Sher Shah)’, in Procs. IHC, XXVt pp. 102-7. \ 32. For a division of zamindars into peshkashi and khirajis S°° * Ahmadi, suppl. Chapter VI. 38, For the system of administration in those areas, S¢¢ ¥ jinda ati 64 i +7, Ga\ The Maratha Polity 205 l phe pasically oe character of the Maratha polity under gnivaji W8S reinforced by the fact that except for the coastal trade and handicrafts were little developed in Shivaji a pritories. Trade and income from trade, formed a very small part of his revenues. The Mughal emperors, and their le: ding nobles were fairly conscious of the possible monetary benefits, poth to the state and to themselves individually which trade and the traders could be made to yield.*! While this sometimes led to gross interference, at other times it also led to the protection and fostering of trade. Despite some limited efforts by Shivaji to encourage commerce, and even to build a coastal fleet, on the whole, the Marathas remained oblivious of the benefits to be reaped from peaceful commerce.*® ‘What were the social origins of the leading supporters of Shivaji? Although Sabhasad gives a list of the silahdars, subahdars, commanders of the cavalry and infantry (mavles), chief karkuns and household officers of Shivaji,*® no analysis of their social as yet been made. Ranade says that unlike the leading inguished ie origin has officers of the Peshwas, ‘None of the great men, who di: themselves in Shivaji’s time were able to hand over to their descendants large landed estates.’*” On the other hand, many of the leading supporters of Shivaji were themselves deshmukhs and deshpandes or petty zamindars (mirasdars). The ambition of these and in fact every official was to acquire a hereditary Post or possession (watan), and having acquired it, to enlarge ——- Judicial System, p. 28. The Maratha jgindars of the area retained thei importance till 1818, See K. A. Ballhatchet, Social Policy and Social Change in Westen India, 1817-1830 (London, 1957), p. 1. 34. See S, Chandra, Commercial Activities of the Mughal Emperors Supra, ‘apter XJ. 35. For the rapacity of the Marathas against bankers and moneyed men Ul gatherers, sce Francois Martin, Memvirs, ed, A. Martineau (3 50h ‘ndichemy, 1931-4), Shivaji in Karnataka, iii, 42; Kall, Khan, Vol. 1, PP. 272-5, 788, See also the threat of Pratap Rai, seuahalt of Shivaji, €0 © merchants of Surat in 1672, demanding annual customs of the pert coma har salah, wa mali-sa'ir sawat sanwat wagal) on pain of wen Ele destruction of the town ‘so that not even. trace of habit Sarit Pe leh’. Khatut-+-Shivaji, Ms., Rajasthan University, transcripts P- 6, ere of Shivaji, p. 205. , githasad, pp. 97-9, 108. nade, Rise of Maratha Power, p- 70-- Medieval) MG@an TNStory - \ 206 * E vs on hief difference between tig and augment ee ahat the bulk of the Mughay Sting the Mughal nobility in land, an Ca bility the Mug! reditary rights in lay , and w iM Conga ity at not have here jent on the sovereign. Even they, d “ey far more depend kind of a bureaucracy, the Myc 1, ite te ent of some oe : Al gp he developme! the traditions and a MONS of ¢) obit could not Tt the ewhich continued to prevail in the country asa order et sbility, the officials of Shivaji, while ~ the Mughal Fntegration up to a point, could themselves pig the forces Misineegration in different circumstances Seine a factot isintegré se above or Whole. yl Presa. advancing th places hi and As far as the peasant was concerned, the internal law and order, and t ‘ must certainly haye been was always prepared give his support to anyone who could | It is difficult to form a precise ideas the actual scale of revenue demand.under Shivaji. Sabhasad states that the state demand was two-fifths of the produce in grain.” To this must be added a large number of cesses which were customary and which we meet with in the Peshwa period." It would be safe to nd Possibl e are not in a position 38. From the Mir@ti-Afmadi, Vol. I, p. 279, it appears that in its oii Glau was a cess demanded by the zamindars free the areas wndet “4 domination, See Sen, Administration System, pp. 11-16; Irfan HP® Aearon System, pp. 146-8, 349, ideas advocaree ati Potcy in this was in tine with the traditional HE . Muhammad Tuga 24 followed by the rulers of Delhi since the wee) anes a, For details, see Sen, Administrative System PP: 41. Sen, Administrative System, pp. 82-8,‘ f The Maratha Polity # 207 judge whether it was, as Fryer asserts, double the rate of former ‘days unless we have more prec revenue system both under the Decc /It has been 7 a feudal set-up. Both the Rajputs and the Turkish Sultans sub- scribed to the ideal of an annual r: at the end of the rainy sea ¢ information regarding the “ani states and under Shivaji. aid upon neighbouring states ‘on, With the stabilization of their administration, the Mughals did not stand in as much need of this policy as the Sultans of Delhi earlier, although mulkgiri remained an ideal with the army and the nobility, * Shivaji’s | policy of plu territories thus does not need any €xplanation, However, he gave to this policy-a~ moreLl “systematic and extensive form] Though Shivaji his policy of plunder bypainting to th d to “8 his policy was based~on the traditional ideology which to some extent was subscribed to by his opponents also.*4 However, the net the Mughal empire and the state founded by Shivaji. (Lhe rise of the Peshwas to supreme power in the state and the gradual eclipse of the Maratha king and the ashtapradhan did not imply as great a change in the Maratha polity as has been generally assumed. We have seen that the zamindars—the deshmukhs, deshpandes, ¢tc.—continued to be a powerful element in Maratha polity, despite the attempts of Shivaji to curb their power. Under Raja Ram and Shahu, the leading officers of state, the pratinidhi, the pant sachiv, etc., became practically hereditary. As such, they enjoyed certain perquisites and privileges which were called watan.* It seems that the lands they had held before 42. John Fryer, A New Account of East Indies and Persia being Nine Years Travels, 1672-81, Vol. Il, ed., W. Crooke, Hakluyt Society, p. 5; Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, p. 350. jets 43. Khataet Shiva No. I, pp. 1-8 Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 354. 44. Cf Sarkar, Shivaji, pp. 355-6, where precisely the same view is taken. : : «i ; Icolm, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I, 3rd edition (Lom ae ee 540-2; Vol. I, p. 59, has described at length the perquisites and ptvileges of the chief officers in the states of the Bhonsle Raja: the flalkar and the Sindhia. It is likely that these were traditional, , the Ho!208 & Es: vs on Medieval Indian History as mokase or saranjam also became their hereditary po: sion’ and began to be termed jagirs. Inside these jagirs Sses, the territory of the more powerful chiefs, administrative 5" judicial power vested in the grantees."” nd Apart from this, the general pattern of administratio, the swarajya territory was more or less the same as in the ti, 5 ‘ é Pe ; e of Shivaji, The territory was divided into subas, tarf and mayan as before, and various officers—havaldars, hamishdars, mama) latdars, etc.—were appointed to them. Though some of these officers were allowed to remain in the same district for 39 or 40 years, and were sometimes succeeded by their sons, it does ,not seem that these offices had become generally hereditary8 The deshmukhs, desais, patils, etc., most of whom continued in their positions under Mughal rule also, helped in collecting the government’s revenue as before. Thus, the papers of the revenue officers were not accepted unless they were countersigned by the hereditary officers.) The assessment was based upon a careful classification-of land on the basis of productivity and means of irrigation.*® The village patils occupied an important part in the system which in its working changed little till the time of Baji Rao II, when the old rules were thrown to the winds and land was farmed to the highest bidder. During his rule, many of the mamlaidars became revenue farmers, or disappeared from the scene. The assessment under the Peshwas, though M in ‘46. After the annexation of the Peshwa’s territories, jagirdars were divided into three categories. In the first class were those who had existed from the earliest times, such as the Nimbalkars of Phaltan, the Dafles ané the Ghorpades of Mudhol, In the second class were ‘the old aristocrat? of Shivaji and his descéndents’ such as the Pradhans, the Pratinih’- Angria and the Raja of Akkalkot, A third class was that which was by the Peshwas. See Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, Vol. Il (Calcit™ 1918), p. 493. It will be seen that the old zamindars and the officials the ashlapradhan are all classified as jagirdars. This suggests that thet es le of these officials had become hereditary, and as such, indistingvis¥? from the position of the zamindar. and 47. Malcolm, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 538-9; Ballhatchet, Social Polity Social Change, pp. 52-6; Sen, Administrative System, p. 206. has 10 48. Sen, Administrative System, pp. 208, 265. This point edit! investigated more fully. These officials were not regarded as he 9. in the later Maratha principalities. See Malcolm, Memoirs, PP: 49. Sen, Administrative System, pp. 258-9.ie The 1© Maratha Polity 209 = higher than in the tine of Shi : inf ceanse * 1 a pee number of a S. The revenue dem tl rian if jaré © prevalence ser emMand wag a due tO the pr ence of peace, the lot of the econ Peasant was bat er than that of his unfortunate brethren out bet s é fs bil “Mle the suaraiya ae rise of ‘a new nobility’ consisting + The fependents affected ‘the Maratha a y aspect. These chiefs were Reis chiefly in its and were paid by the assignment of make False their own wt of the Maratha claim for chauth and sarde aa e itories COMPTISINg the Mughal e wd sardeshmukhi was reserved for th the individual sardars had to be assigned their responsibility for collecting this also. When the Mughal government formally granted to the Marathas the chawth and sardeshmukhi of the peccan, the arrangements about them had to be regularized and formalized. As is known, a complicated division of these cesseS Was made between the Maratha king and the leading sardars, including the Peshwa. The’ sardeshmukhi was reserved forthe Maratha king and was to be realized by him directly from the peasants. Of the chauth, three-quarters was to be assigned tothe various Chiefs as saranjam for their own expenses and the expenses of their troops. Another 6 per cent, called sahotra, was reserved for the pant sachiv, while 3 per cent (nadgaunda) was at the king’s disposal to be granted to different persons at different times at his pleasure. The remainder, or 16 per cent was reserved for the king.*° Be neted! The following points about this system deserve to De nove 4eThe king’s share of the chauth was to be colicted for im by his leading officers, the peshwa, pratinidhi, tc. The fares king thus became, to some extent, a pensigner of i nae officers. This process was carried further by 5 A ee Officers the responsibility of maintaining differen eee he leading chiefs, though at “ended to be hereditary ee k on the Jocal ambitions ; ary chiefs and thelr externa oops tro0P saranjams d shmukhi from the mpire. A part of the chauth he Maratha governme: nt, but 2. The saranjams granted t the king’s pleasure in theory, the outset. Efforts to place a chec’ pp. 272-811 for the details. 50. See Sen, Administrative System, 5. Bid, pp. 275-7. aI Indian History ays on Medic’ 210 * Ess that their chief agents -ovision we seers by the provision that thelr Ct on these officers by t vere ineffective from the pe./d vinted by the Peshwa were 16 © be Binge appe «plicity of local 7 Pr pe von created a inultiplicity OF local agen, % 3. The syste 4 : lis practical impli ations ith ad to deal. 1 ant had to Khafi Khan.” He says yp A vgeribed by yet *ments ly deseriard upon the raiyats, the Boverns the ee oand he jagirdars, and in every mahal two sets Of Marga ae sytcd—ONe called the kamaishdarsfor cola a agents were APPT Te gumashia of the sardeshmugy, 8 the chauthy the Orr ent. On the roll of the Collection (barq rhe sarrishta-dar of the sardeshmukhi Were fi, om that they also realized separately f customary imposts. ’ Secondly, inclusive of abwabscalled fanji, shigdari, ziafat, etc., the Marathas mS / to receive merely the total revenue recorded in the government roll’, ‘Besides this, the Marathas appointed their own collectors of palidari in each district. ‘They exacted two or three times More than (the most) tyrannical faujdars, Thus, in each district, three regular collectors of Raja Shahy were stationed with parties of horsemen and footmen: at the office (kachahari) where the land revenue and the sai were collected, at the guard houses (thanas) for customs, and a the posts for rakdari.** Apart from this, in some areas where the villages had been laid waste by the Marathas, and which had again been brought under cultivation under special agreement, such as the mahal} about Nandurbar, in Khandesh, Berar and other places, the Marathas disregarded the agreement and made different ar rangements. “They recognized three shares: one was for the Jagirdar, one they took themselves and the third they left to the raiyats’ + whom the p been graphil on realizing the 10 tt the signatures © placed. Apart fr hale From the above analysis it might be concluded that the s* called feudal system was established chiefly in the ares outside Swarajya, and that its net result was to pave the way for the ultimate emergence of a series of Maratha states in those peas Vol., IL, pp. 781-90. Sen, Military System of the Mar 33. did P *7 #8 Rot right in ascribing these remarks to Bhim 54. Ibid.ae The Maratha Polity * 211 In other words, from this time onwards, the Maratha Cas ent should be scen not as a unified movement, but as the mov ry movement of a series of feudatory chiefs who only ed with each other for some common purposes, and for the carving out of independe principalities of their own out of jie dec: ying Mughal empire. Secondly, the growth of Maratha ' wer outside the swarajyaarea brought no relief to the peasants i those areas. In some parts of the Deccan, the Marathas raised the land revenue to two-thirds.°° In other areas, there was no diminution in the previous demand, but from the multiplicity of the agents the peasant had to deal with, and their propensity to levy additional cesses for their benefit, his burdens might rather be greater than before. As against this, the peasant could now pursue his vocation in comparative peace. The expansion of Maratha power into Malwa and Gujarat, and subsequently into northern India brought forward hardly any new features or ideas. In Malwa and Gujarat, the claim for chauth and sardeshmukhi was rapidly commuted into a demand for the cession of land, and was followed soon after by the outright transfer of these provinces to the Marathas. The Maratha policy in these areas may, therefore, be considered as forming a part of the third or final stage of development. In Rajasthan, the Marathas did not~demand chauth and sardeshmukhi but imposed khandani or mamlat (tribute) on the rajas.” The only area they brought under their direct ad- ministration was Ajmer which was considered strategically important. As long as the tribute was paid, the Marathas did not interfere in the internal administration of the Rajput states. Maratha policy towards the Rajput states thus closely parallels the Mughal policyé However, there were some important differences in its actual working.)The tribute imposed by the Marathas upon the Rajput states, exclusive of the campaign funds exacted by them for helping rival princes, was far heavier than the Mughal tribute. The Mughals had generally demanded. paral coope 55. Ranade, Rise of Maratha Power, p. 6. 56. It seems no excuse that the Marathas had helped to restore cultivation in these areas—apparently by ceasing to plunder! Cf, Sen, Military System, p. 48. 57. Selections from the Peshwa Daftar, Vol. IX, pp. 280-2. The imposts were also called mamlat, see Sen, Military System, p. 39.212 % Essays on Medieval Indian History only the supply of an armed contingent, Even this dem, carried with it the possibility a 2M Merial mans, s hig assignment of additional jagirs inside OF Outside Rai" the There was no such prospect of gainful Service Unde, Marathas. Default in the payment of the tribute implieg . threat of the claims of a rival prince being backeq ; the Marathas, whereas payment exhausted the treasury ang Ie the growing exploitation of the peasantry. This was the ch, reason why the Marathas, unlike the Mughals, were unable win the loyal support of any of the Rajput princes even i limited time. We now come to the third or final stage of the developme of the Maratha polity. Hardly any work has as yet been done on the development of the Maratha polity under the Bhonsle, the Holkar and the Sindhia. However, from Malcolm's accoun, it would seem that the pattern of Maratha administration in these areas followed, to a considerable extent, the pattern of administration in the old swarajya territories.2> The following would seem to be the main features) he & 1. The Marathas did not displace the zamindars and the hereditary chiefs in the areas ruled by them, or disturb the old pattern of land revenue administration there. The chiefs were allowed to remain practically autonomous, subject to the payment of tribute or quit-rent. However, they were not allowed the great powers and privileges they had enjoyed under the Mughals. 2. Marathas were not appointed ‘zamindar or canoongo of a Province, or to any hereditary district or village office north of the Narmada’, They, however, controlled the chief offices and supplied the armed following, and were granted saranjams for their support. These were for life only and were not hereditary: It is not clear if the Saranjams were transferable°? 3. The Mughal Jagirdars were i fe Completely displaced. The holders of various types of charitable eae (ine madad- maash, etc.) were allowed to enjoy their grants, but they were 58, Malcolm, Memoirs, Vol, 1 rs, Vol. I, pp. 531 ff, 53g. ick 42. 59. Malcolm, Memoirs, Vol. 1, p. 8 Il, gr Sr eiciad System pA Land System, Vol. Il, pp. 465-73, 7 SS) et seq; Baden P—_* a The Maratha Polity % 213 reduced in many cases, and required to pay various charges, though,.on @ lower scale from what was normal.°” 4, Manlatdars, hamvishdars, etc., were appointed to collect the land revenic from the areas not under the great chiefs. Considerable reliance was placed upon the village headmen (patil etc.). The revenue was either fixed on the individual easant, and collected through the patil, or asses sum on the pargana (mauzawar) which was then distributed over the villages in consultation with the patil. ‘Where the patil was not strong enough to secure payment with requisite punctuality, or where from any course they thought it would pay better, the Marathas either reduced him to a normal position or gave over the village to a revenue farmer (malguzar) who agreed to pay in the whole sum assessed.’ A malguzar might thus be put over several villages.®! British writers of the nineteenth century have laid consider- able emphasis on the reliance of the Marathas upon village headmen, equating this with some kind of a ryotwan system." Thus, Baden Powell says that ‘the Marathas did not encourage great middle-men, the zamindarand the tulugdar of the Gangetic plain or Bengal; they knew how much revenue such people absorb and intercept.’®* However, it is doubtful if there was any fundamental difference in the working of the Maratha revenue system in central India and the Deccan from what it was in north India under the Mughals. The British failed to understand the true position of the zamindar both in north India and the Deccan. In the former das a lump 60. The quit-rent collected by the Marathas from holders of in‘amlands, was called jodi in Madras and Bombay. See Baden Powell, Land System, Vol. II, p. 155. 61. Baden Powell, Land System, Vol, 11, pp. 464-5, 62. Ranade, Rise of Maratha Power, pp. 12-13 also believed that the ‘mirasi. tenures of Maharashtra were ryotwari, and that ‘the village communities in north and north-western India were similarly distinguished from the village organization in Maharashtra by those communities retaining joint responsibility and ownership, which have given place to individual ownership in Maharashtra.’ It is doubtful if this point can be sustained. See Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 118-28. 63, Baden Powell, Land System, Vol. I, p. 460.—__ -- 214 “ Essays on Medieval Indian History d him as an absolute owner of land , . ANd s. ant cultivator. In the latter er, they ice xisted, for the notwap; syste Say they pictured M1 the interests of the pea justification, Where none © justification, none existed, for the | aris ‘A somewhat surprising feature which has been lita a by modern historians, of the Maratha polity in its Final tice is the role of the commercial classes in governmeh ase administration. This feature has been commented Upon at st length by Malcolm. “The lands of the Maharatha Princes usually rented’ he says, ‘and as many of the renters are eit bankers, or men supported by that class, they have acquired 4 er maintain an influence both in the councils of the State, anq rn local administration of the provinces, that give them re power, which they direct to the cause of accumulation, Malcolm goes on to describe how the bankers not only helg the peasant in their clutches by advancing money to him, but how their influence over the local officials and princes enableq them to transport goods across the country and insure them against loss, at no great charge even in times of apparem anarchy.® The role of bankers such as the family of Jagat Seth, in the revenue administration of Bengal, is too well-known to need any mention here. Whatever may have been the nature of the Maratha movement at the outset, it appears that in some of the states that came into existence as a result of it, the forces of feudalism were kept in check, and the commercial classes accorded a more favourable opportunity than before for the, accumulation of capital and for exercising political influence) The process of “feudal disintegration’ during the eighteenthentury should not, therefore, be taken to imply the complete disruption of authority, or the end of the possibility of any Progressive development in the successor states that were created, The internal character of each state is, however, a matter for detailed investigation” A-study of the Maratha polity thus shows that the Maratha | ) movement, which started as a regional reaction against the centralizing Mughal empire, resulted in the reproduction i) 64, Malcolm, Memoir, Vol. Il, p. 38. j i 65. Ibid., pp. 91-7. 66. This has been done, to some extent, b : al has be f : , by André Wink, in Land @! Sovereignty in India: Agrarian Society and Politics pee ee nce Maratha Svarajya, CUP, 1986. ighteent The Maratha Polity + 215 jonal centres of many of the essential features of the eccani-Mughal system of administration adopted by Shivaji Despite such an outer appearance, the Maratha movement did not represent a reassertion of traditional Hindu ideas in the politi al field: the political ideal of Shivaji was not Rama put Akbar.’ The~persistent trend and tradition in favour of the curbing of feudal elements, the establishment of a strong monarchy, and the simultaneous growth of the political impor- tance of commercial elements in some of these states suggest that the process of feudal disintegration in India in the eigh- teenth century was a much more complex process than has been generally imagined. The real triumph of the feudal elements had to await, oddly enough, the establishment of British rule in India. 67. See the letter to Aurangzeb from Shivaji, drafted by Shivaji’s secretary, Nil Prabhu, in which Shivaji compares the policy and achieve- ments of Akbar and Aurangzeb. He calls Akbar ‘the architect of the fabric of empire’, lauds his policy of sulh-kul, and says, ‘Through the auspicious effect of his sublime disposition, wherever he (Akbar) bent the glance of his august wish, Victory and Success advanced to welcome him on the way’, etc, Khatiit-i-Shivaji, No. 17, pp. 15-18, translated by Sarkar in Shivaji, Pp. 306-9.