Scott Participation Breach Trust 1921

Participation in a Breach of Trust
Author(s): Austin Wakeman Scott

Source: Harvard Law Review , Mar., 1921, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Mar., 1921), pp. 454-482
Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1329469
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Harvard Law Review Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Harvard Law Review
This content downloaded from

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
454 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST
A NYONE who participates with a trustee in a breach of trust

may be held liable in a court of equity to the cestui que trust.
If he has received and still holds the trust property or its proceeds,
he may be held as constructive trustee thereof; if he has never
received or no longer holds the trust property or its proceeds, he
may be held liable in equity for damages.
A purchaser of trust property is not liable merely because at
the time of the purchase he knew of the existence of the trust at-
taching to the property. If the sale was not in fact in breach of
trust, the purchaser takes the property free and clear of the trust.
At common law, however, an extraordinary doctrine was widely
accepted, to the effect that a purchaser of trust property is liable
in equity to the cestui que trust for the purchase-price, although the
trustee had made the sale in the proper exercise of a power of sale
and although the purchaser had paid the purchase-money to the
trustee, unless the money so paid was properly applied by the
trustee for the purposes of the trust.' As Professor Ames has
said ,2 " this highly artificial doctrine would seem to be indefensible
on any principle." Why should the purchaser be responsible for
a misapplication of the purchase-money by the trustee in which
the purchaser did not participate and which he had no reason to
anticipate? The courts have whittled away the rule by making
many exceptions to it,3 and in England and in many of the states
it has been abolished by statute.4 The effect of the rule is to ob-
1 LEWIN, TRUSTS, 12 ed., pp. 534 et seq.; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 790-799.
The rule was applicable to mortgagees and pledgees as well as purchasers of trust
property.
2 AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS, 2 ed., 269 n.
3 LEWIN, TRUSTS, 12 ed., pp. 535 et seq.; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 790-799;
I9 Am. St. Rep. 28I.
4 Law of Property Amendment Act, I859 (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35), ? 23; Lord Cran-
worth's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. I45), ? 29 (i86o); Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, i88i (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), ? 36; Trustee Act, I893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), ? 20.
The last named Act provides: "The receipt in writing of any trustee for any money,
securities, or other personal property or effects payable, transferable, or deliverable
to him under any trust or power shall be a sufficient discharge for the same, and shall

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST 455
struct the proper administration of trusts by making it difficult

for trustees to find persons who are willing to incur the risk at-
tending the purchase of trust property. Where the rule prevails
it is almost the universal custom to insert in a trust instrument
containing a power of sale a provision that purchasers shall not be
bound to see to the application of the purchase-money.
Except so far as a purchaser of trust property is bound to see to
the application of the purchase-money, the general rule is well
settled that a third person dealing with a known trustee is not
liable to the cestui que trust, although the trustee in fact com-
mitted a breach of trust, unless the third person knew or ought to
have known that the trustee was committing or intending to com-
mit a breach of trust. He is not chargeable with participation in
a breach of trust merely because he knew or ought to have known
of the existence of the trust; it must appear also that he knew or
ought to have known that the trustee was committing or contem-
plating the commission of a breach of trust.5
It is easy to affix liability upon one who obtains trust property
from a trustee with actual knowledge of the existence of the trust
and of the fact that the trustee is committing a breach of trust.
No principle in the law of trusts is more clearly settled than that
a transferee of trust property who knows that the transfer is in
breach of trust is liable to the cestui que trust.6 It was settled law
as to uses as far back as I465.7 Similarly a purchaser of trust
effectually exonerate the person paying, transferring, or delivering the same fr

seeing to the application or being answerable for any loss or misapplication there
A number of the American statutes are cited in 2 PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ? 790. O
of the most recent statutes is MASS. L. I9I8, c. 68, ? 2. New York Real Property
Law, ? io8, provides: "A person who shall actually and in good faith pay a sum of
money to a trustee, which the trustee as such is authorized to receive, shall not be
responsible for the proper application of the money, according to the trust; and any
right or title derived by him from the trustee in consideration of the payments shall
not be impeached or called in question in consequence of a misapplication by the
trustee of the money paid."
5 "A stranger to the trust receiving money from the trustee which he knows to be
part of the trust estate is not liable as a constructive trustee unless there are facts
brought home to him which shew that to his knowledge the money is being applied
in a manner which is inconsistent with the trust; or (in other words) unless it be made
out that he is party either to a fraud, or to a breach of trust on the part of the trustee."
Re Blundell, 40 Ch. D. 370, 38I (i888), per Stirling, J.
6 See ScoTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, C. VII.
7Y. B. 5 Ed. IV., fol. 7, pl. i6; SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 688. See also Y. B.
iI Ed. IV., fol. 8 (1471), cited 3 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS, 345.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
property is liable if he pays the purchase-price to the trustee with

knowledge that the trustee intends to misapply the money so
paid.8 Similarly, if a chose in action is held by the obligee in trust,
the obligor is liable if, knowing of the trust, he accepts a release in
consideration of the cancellation of a personal indebtedness of the
obligee to him.9 So also the obligor is liable if he pays the obligee-
trustee, with knowledge that the latter intends to misappropriate
the money.10 A fortiori an obligor is precluded from setting off a
personal debt of the obligee to him, if he knows that the obligee's
claim against him is held in trust.11
But suppose that a purchaser of trust property has no actual
knowledge that the vendor is committing or contemplating the
commission of a breach of trust. When and to what extent ought
he make inquiry, ought he investigate, in order to ascertain whether
or not the vendor is acting in breach of trust? Of course, strictly
speaking, there is no "duty" to make any inquiry. But the cir-
cumstances may be such that the purchaser cannot escape liability
if an inquiry or investigation would disclose the vendor's breach
of trust.12
If one takes a conveyance as purchaser or mortgagee from a
person whose name in the document of title is followed by the
word "trustee" or other words indicating a fiduciary character, he
In Georgia it is expressly provided by statute that "All persons aiding and assist-
ing trustees of any character, with a knowledge of their misconduct, in misapplying
assets, are directly accountable to the persons injured." 3 PARK'S ANN. CODE, GA.
(1914), ? 3784.
8 M'Leod v. Drummond, 17 Ves. 152 (i8io) (executor); Tillinghast v. Champlin,
4 R. I. 173, 209 (I856) (partner). See Manhattan Bank v. Walker, 130 U. S. 267, 279
(I889). Cf. Tapley v. Tapley, 115 Ga. 109, 41 S. E. 235 (1902) (subsequent collusion
in misapplication of purchase-price held not to affect validity of sale).
9 SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 646 n. See notes 14, 15, 24 and 66, infra.
10 Taylor v. Harris' Adm'r, I64 Ky. 654, 176 S. W. i68 (1915) (guardian).
11 AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS, 270 n; SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 647 n, 739 n. See
note 65, infra.
12 The English Conveyancing Act, I882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 39), ? 3 provides that a
purchaser shall not be prejudicially affected by notice of any instrument, fact, or
thing unless it is within his own (or his agent's) knowledge, or "would have come to
his knowledge if such inquiries and inspections had been made as ought reasonably to
have been made." In Bailey v. Barnes, [I894] i Ch. 25, 35, it is explained that the
word "ought" does not import a duty or obligation, and that the expression "ought
reasonably" means "ought as a matter of prudence, having regard to what is usually
done by men of business under similar circumstances."

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
is chargeable with notice of the existence of a trust; 13 and if he

actually knows that the transferor is making a conveyance in pay-
ment of or as security for his individual indebtedness, the trans-
feree is liable to the cestui que trust, unless upon a reasonable in-
quiry it would appear that the transferor was not violating his duty
as trustee.14 The result is the same whenever the circumstances are
such as to inform the transferee that the transferor is a fiduciary
and is making the conveyance for his own personal advantage."5
It is of course possible that there was in reality no trust,
or the trust may have been of such a character that the trans-
feror was not acting improperly in making the transfer, or the
beneficiary may have authorized the transfer. But the trans-
action is prima facie wrongful, and the transferee should make
13 By the great weight of authority such words are not treated as mere descriptio
personwx and of no effect. In the leading case of Shaw v. Spencer, ioo Mass. 382, 393
(i868), Foster, J., said: "The fact that it is common to issue certificates of stock in
the name of one as trustee, when no trust actually exists, has no legal bearing on the
decision of the present case. The rules of law are presumed to be known by all men;
and they must govern themselves accordingly. The law holds that the insertion of
the word 'trustee' after the name of a stockholder does indicate and give notice of a
trust. No one is at liberty to disregard such notice and to abstain from inquiry for
the reason that a trust is frequently simulated or pretended when it really does not
exist. The whole force of this offer of evidence is addressed to the question whether
the word 'trustee' alone has any significance and does amount to notice of the
existence of a trust."
14 Scott v. Tyler, 2 Dick. 712, 724 (1788) (executor); Hill v. Simpson, 7 Ves. 152
(I802) (executor); M'Leod v. Drummond, I4 Ves. 353, 358 (I807), I7 Ves. 152, 172
(i8io) (executor); Johnson v. Amberson, 140 Ala. 342, 37 So. 273 (1903) (trustee);
Cohen v. Parish, 105 Ga. 339, 31 S. E. 205 (I898) (trustee); Hill v. Fleming, 128 Ky.
201, 107 S. W. 764 (I908) (public officer); Shaw v. Spencer, ioo Mass. 382 (i868)
(trustee); Smith v. Burgess, 133 Mass. 5II (I882) (trustee); Galloway v. Gleason,
6i Mo. App. 21 (I895) (trustee); Wisconsin Yearly Meeting v. Babler, II5 Wis. 289,
9I N. W. 678 (1902) (treasurer). See LEWIN, TRUSTS, 12 ed., 562; PERRY, TRUSTS,
6 ed., ?? 225, 8I4. See notes 24, 25 and 26, infra.
15 As where the property is pledged by the trustee to secure a present loan which
is apparently a loan to the trustee personally. Bank of Montreal v. Sweeny, 12 App.
Cas. 617 (I887); Keane v. Robarts, 4 Madd. 332, 357 (I8I9) (semble); Duncan v.
Jaudon, I5 Wall. (U. S.) i65 (I872); Henshaw v. State Bank, 239 Ill. 515, 88 N. E.
214 (1909); Clemens v. Heckscher, i85 Pa. 476, 40 Atl. 8o (I898). Cf. Taylor v. Harris'
Adm'r, I64 Ky. 654, 176 S. W. i68 (1915).
"If there are circumstances that would arouse the suspicion of a reasonable man,
inquiry must be made until a reasonable man would be satisfied; and if inquiry be not
made, the person charged cannot take advantage of his own wrong, but is held to have
notice of everything that a proper inquiry would have revealed." LOWELL, TRANS-
PER OF STOCK, ? 67.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
inquiry, and is chargeable with notic

reasonable inquiry would appear.
But suppose that the transferee does not know that the trans-
feror is making a conveyance for his own personal advantage, and
has no more reason to think that the transfer is wrongful than that
it is rightful. Is the transferee bound to make inquiry as to the
authority of the transferor to make the transfer? The courts have
usually answered this question in the affirmative. One who pur-
chases or lends money on the security of property which he knows
to be. trust property should inquire whether the trustee is em-
powered to sell or mortgage it."6 If the trustee's authority is
evidenced by a will or other instrument in writing of which the
transferee knows, he has failed to make a reasonable inquiry if he
has not examined the instrument; and he is liable if the instrument
showvs that the trustee was exceeding his authority in making the
transfer."7 And if the instrument shows that the transfer is au-
thorized only if, for example, one of the beneficiaries gives a
written consent to the transfer, he should ascertain whether such
16 Stroughill v. Anstey, I DeG., M. & G. 635 (i852) (trustee); Sternfels v. Watson,

I39 Fed. (C. C. Ore.) 505 (I905) (T, holding land "as trustee," makes unauthorized
mortgage; subsequent purchaser bound to inquire into authority of T to mortgage);
Tuttle v. First Nat. Bank, i87 Mass. 533, 73 N. E. 560 (I905) (pledge by trustee of
stock); Donnelly v. Alden, 229 Mass. IO9, ii8 N. E. 298 (I9I8) (mortgage of land by
executor improperly carrying on testator's business); Snyder v. Collier, 85 Neb. 552,
I23 N. W. I023 (I909) (trustee of land); Gaston v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 29
N. J. Eq. 98 (i878) (T, holding stock "as trustee," makes unauthorized pledge);
Suarez v. de Montigny, I App. Div. 494, 37 N. Y. Supp. 503 (I896), affirmed I53 N. Y.
678, 48 N. E. II07 (I897) (trustee of mortgage); First National Bank v. National
Broadway Bank, I56 N. Y. 459, 5i N. E. 398 (I898) (trustee of stock); Ludington v.
Mercantile National Bank, I02 App. Div. 25I, 92 N. Y. Supp. 454 (I905) (trustee of
stock); McLeod v. Despain, 49 Ore. 536, go Pac. 492, 92 Pac. io88 (I907) (trustee);
Kenworthy v. Equitable Trust Co., 2i8 Pa. 286, 67 Atl. 469 (I907) (trustee of mort-
gage); Freeman v. Bailey, 50 S. C. 24I, 27 S. E. 686 (I897) (trustee of overdue note).
See note 28, infra.
But see Northwestern, etc. Co. v. Atlantic Co., 174 Cal. 308, i63 Pac. 47 (I9I7)
(holding the word "trustee" not enough to put the purchaser upon inquiry); Salisbury
Mills v. Townsend, IO9 Mass. II5 (i870) (holding that a purchaser of stock need not
ascertain validity of previous assignments).
17 Donnelly v. Alden, 229 Mass. IO9, ii8 N. E. 298 (I9I8); Suarez v. de Montigny,
i App. Div. 494, 37 N. Y. Supp. 503 (I896), affirmed I53 N. Y. 678, 48 N. E. II07
(I897); First National Bank v. National Broadway Bank, I56 N. Y. 459, 5i N. E.
398 (I898); Ludington v. Mercantile National Bank, I02 App. Div. 25I, 92 N. Y. Supp.
454 (I905); Kenworthy v. Equitable Trust Co., 2i8 Pa. 286., 67 Atl. 469 (I907). See
2 PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., p. I3I3 n.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
consent has been given.18 If there is no such instrument of which

the transferee knows, he should make such inquiry as to the au-
thority of the transferor as a reasonable man would make under
the circumstances. If a reasonable inquiry shows that the trans-
feror has apparently authority to make the sale or mortgage, and
there is nothing in the nature of the transaction to indicate a
breach of trust, the transferee is not bound to inquire further. He
need not ascertain whether there are circumstances which may
make the transfer improper, or whether the trustee is exercising a
sound discretion or whether his motives in making the transfer are
proper, nor need he inquire into the intended application of the
proceeds."9
How far are these principles applicable to negotiable instru-
ments? The mere fact that the name of a payee of a negotiable
instrument is followed by the word "trustee'" or other words indi-
cating a fiduciary character, does not render the instrument non-
negotiable.20 But if the purchaser of such an instrument is bound
18 Suarez v. de Montigny, i App. Div. 494, 37 N. Y. Supp. 503 (I896) (affirmed

I53 N. Y. 678, 48 N. E. II07 (I897)).
19 See Grafflin v. Robb, 84 Md. 45I, 35 Atl. 97I (I896); Kirsch v. Tozier, I43 N. Y.
390, 396, 38 N. E. 375 (I894); Spencer v. Weber, I63 N. Y. 493, 57 N. E. 753 (I900);
PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 225, 814; I COOK, CORPORATIONS, 7 ed., ? 326; LOWELL,
TRANSFER OF STOCK, ?? 67-79; I4 CORP. JUR. 785.
Since it is the duty of an executor to reduce the estate to money so far as is neces-
sary to enable him to pay debts and pecuniary legacies, the purchaser may assume
that the executor has power to sell, and need not inquire whether the sale is actually
necessary for the payment of debts or otherwise, where statutes do not require a
court order to authorize a sale. Ewer v. Corbet, 2 P. Wms. I48 (I723); Keane v.
Robarts, 4 Madd. 332, 356 (I8I9); Fletcher v. American Trust & B. Co., iii Ga. 300,
36 S. E. 767 (I900); Prall v. Tilt, 28 N. J. Eq. 479 (I877); Wood's Appeal, 92 Pa. 379
(i88o); WARREN, CASES ON WILLS, 6II-626; PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 225, 809. This
is true also of guardians, where statutes do not require a court order. Fountain v.
Anderson, 33 Ga. 372 (I862); Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) I50 (I823).
On the other hand since a trustee is not in general empowered to sell trust property
unless expressly or by implication authorized by the instrument creating the trust or,
by an order of court, a purchaser should ascertain whether a power of sale is to be
found in the instrument. PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ? 8I4. In some jurisdictions by
statute power to change investments and to make sales is conferred upon trustees in
the absence of any provision by the settlor to the contrary. See MASS. LAWS, I9I8,
c. 68, ? i. See also Trustee Act, I893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), ? I.
20 Walter v. Kirk, I4 Il. 55 (I852) (administrator); Central State Bank v. Spurlin,
iii Iowa I87, 82 N. W. 493 (I900) (trustee); Downer v. Read, I7 Minn. 493 (I87I)
(trustee); Bank v. Looney, 99 Tenn. 278, 42 S. W. I49 (I897) (trustee); Dollar Sav.
& T. Co. v. Crawford, 69 W. Va. I09, 70 S. E. I089 (i9ii) (trustee). See 8 CoRP.
JUR. I74. But see Hazeltine v. Keenan, 54 W. Va. 600, 46 S. E. 609 (I904) (attorney).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
to make an investigation as to the authority of the holder to

negotiate the instrument, and to ascertain whether he has exceeded
his authority, its marketability will be much impaired. It is pro-
vided in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, section 56,
that:
"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect" in

the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is
negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect,
or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith."
Of course an indorsee of negotiable paper payable to a fiduciary is

not a bona fide purchaser if he actually knows that the holder is
acting wrongfully in negotiating it, or if he suspects that the
lender is acting wrongfully and refrains from making an inquiry
in order to avoid obtaining such actual knowledge. But does the
mere fact that the fiduciary character of the holder appears on the
face of the instrument preclude the indorsee from asserting that he
is a holder in due course, if he has failed to make any inquiry as to
the right of the holder to negotiate it? 22
If the name of the holder of a negotiable instrument is followed
by the word "trustee" or other words indicating a fiduciary char-
acter, and it is transferred by him in payment of a private debt,23
it is held that the purchaser is bound to make inquiry as to the
propriety of the holder's conduct. The transaction is prima facie
wrongful. This applies when the holder is designated as a trustee,
executor, administrator, guardian, agent, or the like,24 and -also
21 "The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the

meaning of this act . . . when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such
circumstances as amount to a fraud." N. I. L., ? 55.
22 It is agreed that under the Negotiable Instruments Law, and according to the
weight of authority at common law, a holder is not denied protection merely because
he is negligent. EATON AND GILBERT, COMMERCIAL PAPER, ? 75; 8 COP-P. JUR.
499-507.
23 If a trustee incurs a debt in the administration of a trust, th

ing payment out of the trust fund, as he knows, is not bound to
of the trustee's accounts in order to ascertain whether the truste
indemnity. Re Blundell, 40 Ch. D. 370 (I888).
24 Manhattan Bank v. Walker, 130 U. S. 267 (I888) (agent); McBain v. Seligman,
58 Mich. 294, 25 N. W. 197 (i885) (agent); Payne v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Mo. App.
377 (I891) (trustee); Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 82 N. Y. 29I (I880) (partner)
(semble); Brovan v. Kyle, i6o Wis. 347, I65 N. W. 382 (I9I7) (guardian). But see

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST 46I
when the instrument is payable to a corporation and is indorsed by

an officer of the corporation and tranSferred by him in payment of
his private debt.25 The principle is likewise applicable when an
instrument is drawn by one as fiduciary whether as trustee, execu-
tor, administrator, guardian or the like, or by a public official or
corporate officer, payable to his private creditor, or by the weight
of authority when payable to bearer or to himself personally and
delivered in payment of his private debt.26 The result is the
Fletcher v. Schaumburg, 4I Mo. 502, 506 (I867) ("Shff."); Mayer v. Bank, 86 Mo.
App. io8 (I900) (curator, semble). See I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed.,
?? 27I, 795 a. See note 66, infra.
The opposite result was reached in First Denton Nat. Bank v. Kenney, II6 Md.
24, 8I Atl. 227 (I9II), where the holder's name was followed by the word "attorney."
Cf. Cunningham v. Bank, I3 Ida. I67, 88 Pac. 975 (I907) (attachment). But see
Hazeltine v. Keenan, 54 XV. Va. 6oo, 46 S. E. 609 (I904).
25 Palo Alto, etc. Assn. v. First Nat. Bank, 33 Cal. App. 2I4, I64 Pac. II24 (I9I7);
Norment v. First Nat. Bank, 23 N. Mex. I98, I67 Pac. 73I (I9I7) (semble); Ward v.
City Trust Co., I92 N. Y. 6i, 84 N. E. 585 (I908); Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R.
Co., 72 Hun (N. Y.) 380, 25 N. Y. Supp. 449 (I893); Jenkins v. Planters' & Mechanics'
Bank, 34 Okl. 607, I26 Pac. 757 (I9I2); Pelton v. Spider Lake, etc. Co., I32 Wis. 2I9,
II2 N. W. 29 (I907). See I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed., ? 795 C.
26 Lamson v. Beard, 94 Fed. (C. C. A. 7) 30 (I899) (corporate officer); Redfield v.
Wells, 3I Ida. 4I5, I73 Pac. 640 (19I8) (partner, payable to creditor, discussion of
effect of N. I. L.); Leigh v. American Brake-Beam Co., 205 Ill. I47, 68 N. E. 7I3 (I903)
(corporate officer); Washbon v. Hixon, 87 Kan. 3I0, I24 Pac. 366 (I9I2) (treasurer
of fraternal organization); Hill v. Fleming, I28 Ky. 20I, I07 S. W. 764 (I908) (public
officer); Newburyport v. Fidelity Ins. Co., I97 Mass. 596, 84 N. E. iii (I908) (city
treasurer); Newburyport v. Spear, 204 Mass. I46, 90 N. E. 522 (I910) (city treasurer,
payable to self); Coleman v. Stocke, I59 Mo. App. 43, I39 S. W. 26 (I9II) (corporate
officer, payable to cash); McCullam v. Buckingham Hotel Co., I98 Mo. App. I07,
I99 S. W. 4I7 (19I7) (corporate officer, payable to creditor); McCullam v. Mermod,
etc. Co., 2I8 S. W. (Mo. App.) 345 (I920) (corporate officer, payable to self); Gerard
v. McCormick, I30 N. Y. 26I, 29 N. E. II5 (I891) (agent); Rochester, etc. Ry. Co
v. Paviour, I64 N. Y. 28I, 58 N. E. II4 (I900) (corporate officer); Cohnfeld v. Tanen-
baum, I76 N. Y. I26, 68 N. E. I4I (I903) (guardian); Squire v. Ordemann, I94 N. Y.
394, 87 N. E. 435 (I909) (executor); Lanning v. Trust Co. of America, I37 App. Div.
722, I22 N. Y. Supp. 485 (1910) (corporate officer); Surety Co. v. Nelson, I4I App.
Div. 850, I26 N. Y. Supp. 453 (I9I0) (special guardian); Newman v. Newman, i6o
App. Div. 33I, I45 N. Y. Supp, 325 (1914) (corporate officer, payable to self);
Nat. Bank v. Gillette, 52 Okl. 4I, I52 Pac. I084 (I9I5) (corporate officer, payable to
creditor); Schmitt v. Potter T. & T. Co., 6i Pa. Sup. Ct. 30I (N9O5) (corporate officer);
Sheer v. Hall & Lyon Co., 36 R. I. 47, 88 Atl. 8oi (I9I3) (corporate officer, payable to
creditor); Clement Nat. Bank v. Connolly, 88 Vt. 55, 90 Atl. 794 (1914) (partner).
But see Fillebrown v. Hayward, I90 Mass. 472, 77 N. E. 45 (I906) (corporate
officer, payable to self); Goshen Nat. Bank v. State, I4I N. Y. 379, 36 N. E. 3I6
(I894) (cashier's draft payable to cashier's private creditor). See 8 CORP. JUR. 515,
52I, 522.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
same whenever the circumstances are such as to make it evident

that the transaction is for the personal benefit of the fiduciary.27
It is of course possible that the fiduciary is authorized to make payment to himself

personally out of his principal's funds, as where the principal is indebted to. him for
salary, commissions, dividends, reimbursement for expenses or the like. The fiduciary
may even be authorized by his principal to draw checks payable to his private creditor.
Watts v. Gordon, I27 Tenn. 96, I53 S. W. 483 (I9I2). The courts almost univer-
sally hold, however, as shown by the above cases, that the transaction is prima facie
improper and that the creditor is put upon inquiry.
The creditor is not put upon inquiry where the payee of a corporate note is a di-
rector of the corporation. Orr v. South Amboy, etc. Co., II3 App. Div. I03, 98 N. Y.
Supp. I026 (I906). Cf. Pemiscot County Bank v. Central-State Nat. Bank, I32 Tenn.
I52, I77 S. WV. 74 (I9I5).
The mere fact that the instrument is signed by another officer as well as the fiduciary
does not dispense with the necessity of making inquiry. Newman v. Newman, i6o
App. Div. 33I, I45 N. Y. Supp. 325 (II94), supra. But cf. Re Troy & Cohoes Shirt
Co., I36 Fed. (D. C., N. D., N. Y.) 420 (I1905), affirmed I42 Fed. I038 (I906).
But if one as a fiduciary draws an instrument payable to a third person who in-
dorses to the fiduciary personally, a subsequent purchaser is not bound to make in-
quiry. Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R. Co., I50 N. Y. 59, 44 N. E. 70I (I896).
Cf. National City Bank v. Shelton Electric Co., 96 Wash. 74, I64 Pac. 933 (I9I7).
In Fillebrown v. Hayward, I90 Mass. 472, 77 N. E. 45 (I906), it was held that
where checks of a corporation signed by its treasurer payable to himself individually
were indorsed by him in payment of his private debt, the indorsee was not put upon
inquiry and was a bonafide purchaser, since it was not shown that the indorsee knew that
the indorser was acting fraudulently nor that she deliberately decided to refrain from
making inquiries; she either gave no thought to the matter or "may have inferred
that the money so appropriated was in payment of his [the treasurer's] own salary, or
otherwise was being withdrawn lawfully." This case was explained in Johnson &
Kettell Co. v. Longley Luncheon Co., 207 Mass. 52, 56, 92 N. E. I035 (I910),
ing, J., who said: "The distinction seems to be this: Where the corporation note or
other negotiable instrument is payable to the creditor of the individual, the transaction
which on the face of the note or other instrument is represented to have taken place
is an appropriation of the corporation's money to the payment of the individual's
debts and is bad unless shown to be good. Since the transaction is bad unless shown
to be good and since the purchaser took with notice (given on the face of the note or
other instrument), his rights depend upon the transaction's being or not being in fact
what it purports on the face of the note or instrument to be, and no question of a
purchase in good faith can arise. . . . But on the other hand where the note or other
instrument is payable to the treasurer or to a third person and after being indorsed by
27 See Thornton v. Netherlands, etc. Co., I78 App. Div. 604, i65 N. Y. Supp. 682
(1917), where the treasurer of a corporation paid the defendant steamship company
for a passage ticket by a check of the corporation drawn by himself as treasurer, and
payable to himself. Cf. Mayor v. Sands, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 5I19 (i886). But see Cluett
v. Couture, I40 App. Div. 830, I25 N. Y. Supp. 8I3 (I910), where a manager of the
plaintiff firm, who had authority to indorse checks and deposit them in a bank, in-
dorsed a check and delivered it to the defendant in payment of a hotel bill, receiving
the balance in cash.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
But suppose that the instrument is not used for the purpose of
paying a private debt of the fiduciary. Is the indorsee or payee
under an obligation to ascertain whether the indorser or drawer is
committing a breach of his fiduciary obligation? To impose such
an obligation seriously impairs the marketability of such instru-
ments. It seems to deprive the indorsee or payee of the defense of
purchase for value although he has no actual knowledge of the
defect and does not act in bad faith. By the weight of authority
nevertheless the indorsee or payee is bound to make inquiry as to
the authority of the indorser or drawer to indorse or draw.28 But
in the absence of any circumstance in the transaction indicating a
breach of trust, he is not bound to inquire further into the pro-
priety of the transaction.29
the payee in blank is used by the treasurer in paying his individual debt, the transac-
tion which on the face of the instrument is represented to have taken place is a payment
by the corporation to the treasurer (where the note or other instrument was pay-
able to him), and a payment by the corporation to the third person and another
payment by the third person to the treasurer (where the note or other instrument was
payable to a third person as stated above). In each of these last two cases the trans-
action on its face is good unless it is proved to be bad. In that case, if the corporation
proves that the application of the note or other instrument of the corporation was a
wrongful one, the rights of the creditor depend upon his having acted in good faith."
But see Newman v. Newman, I6o App. Div. 33I, I45 N. Y. Supp. 325 (I9I4), supra.
In Missouri a statute (Laws I9I7, i44) provides: "If any check, draft or order of
any corporation, firm or copartnership shall be given in payment of the debt of any
officer, agent or employee, of said corporation, firm or copartnership, the payee or
other person collecting such check, draft or order shall not be liable to said corpora-
tion, firm or copartnership therefor, unless it shall be shown that such payee or other
person, at the time of collecting same, had actual knowledge that said check, draft
or order was issued without authority of said corporation, firm or copartnership."
28 McMasters v. Dunbar, 2 La. Ann. 577 (I847) (tutor); Nicholson v. Jacobs, 2 La.
Ann. 666 (I847) (syndic); Third National Bank v. Lange, 5I Md. I38 (I878) (trustee);
Ford v. Brown, II4 Tenn. 467, 88 S. W. I036 (I904) (trustee, holding that the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law does not protect subsequent purchasers since the defect ap-
peared on the face of the instrument); Dollar Sav. & T. Co. v. Crawford, 69 WV. Va.
I09, 70 S. E. io89 (I9II) (trustee, semble). See i DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
6 ed., ?? 27I, 795 a, 795 C; PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 225, 8I4.
In some states it is held that the payee of a negotiable instrument cannot be a
holder in due course; but the better view and the weight of authority are otherwise.
Redfield v. Wells, 3I Ida. 4I5, I73 Pac. 640 (ioi8). See BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW, 3 ed., I62, commenting on N. I. L., ? 52.
29 Ashton v. Atlantic Bank, 3 Allen (Mass.) 2I7 (i86i) (trustee); Norman v. Towne,
I30 Mass. 52 (i88o) (trustee); Mason v. Bank of Commerce, i6 Mo. App. 275 (I884)
(trustee); Weeks v. Fox, 3 Thom. & C. (N. Y.) 354 (I874) (agent). See i DANIEL,

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
Such being the general rules as to purchasers of trust property,

including those who take a security interest, the question arises
whether these rules are applicable to persons who are not pur-
chasers but who in other capacities deal with trustees in respect to
the trust property.
In England it is held that a person who does not himself receive
any part of the trust property and who in no way profits by a
breach of trust is not liable for participation therein merely because
he has in some way aided in the commission of the breach of trust,
even though he knows or might have known of the breach of
trust. In Re Barney 30 a testator who had been carrying on business
left his property to his widow upon trust for herself and his chil-
dren, but gave no directions as to the carrying on of his business.
The widow decided to carry on the business. The defendants, two
of her friends, who were aware that the carrying on of the business
would be a breach of trust, agreed to assist her by advice and by
supervising her conduct of the business. Among other things it
was agreed that they should initial all checks drawn by her as
trustee, and the bank in which deposits were made by her was
directed to honor such checks only as were so initialed. The de-
fendants never had possession of any of the trust property. It
was held that they were not liable for participation in the breach
of trust. Similarly it has been held 31 that the solicitor of a trustee
who had advised against a delegation of the trust was not liable
for a participation in the misconduct of the trustee in making such
delegation, merely because he had prepared the instruments whereby
the trustee effected the delegation, although the new trustee mis-
appropriated the trust property, since the solicitor had no knowledge
of or reason to suspect a dishonest design of the old or of the new
trustee in the transaction.32 On the other hand, if the defendant
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed., ?? 27I, 795 a, 795 C; EATON AND GILBERT, COM-
MERCIAL PAPER, ? 75; PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ?? 225, 8I4. See note i9, supra. But
see Third National Bank v. Lange, 5I Md. I38 (I878) (trustee); Strong v. Straus, 40
Ohio St. 87 (I883) (guardian); Ford v. Brown, II4 Tenn. 467, 88 S. W. I036 (I904)
(trustee).
30 [I892] 2 Ch. 265.
31 Barnes v. Addy, L. R. g Ch. 244 (I874).
32 See also Mara v. Browne, [i896] I Ch. ioo; and see 28 HALSBURY, LAWS
ENGLAND, "Trusts and Trustees," ?? I93-97. Cf. Bank v. Byrnes, 6i Kan. 459,
59 Pac. I056 (I900).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
had known of the trustee's dishonest design, he would have been

liable.33
In the United States it has been held that where the name of the
holder of shares of stock or other corporate securities as registered
on the books of the corporation, is followed by the word "trustee"
or other words indicating a fiduciary character, and the holder
transfers the securities in breach of trust, the corporation is liable
for participation in the breach of trust if it registers the transfer
without making inquiry as to the extent of the powers of the
trustee, if such inquiry would have disclosed the breach of trust.34
The effect of this doctrine, which has never prevailed in England,35
33 See Lee v. Sankey, L. R. I5 Eq. 204 (I872). Cf. Safe Deposit Co. v. Cahn, I02
Md. 530, 62 Atl. 8I9 (I9o6) (stockbrokers).
In Hoyt v. Dollar Savings Bank, I87 App. Div. 243, I75 N. Y. Supp. 377 (I9I9),
it was held that where a bank lent $I7,000 and a guardian lent $3,000 to the same
person, under an agreement that the whole debt of $20,000 was to be secured by a
bond and mortgage to be held by the bank, and that the bank was to have priority in
the security, the bank was not liable to the ward, although the loan by the guardian
under such an agreement was in breach of trust.
In Isham v. Post, 7I Hun I84, 23 N. Y. Supp. 211, ii68 (I893), it was said that
when a trustee sends a check to a banker signed by the sender as trustee, with in-
structions to lend the proceeds upon securities sufficient to assure its repayment, the
banker need not inquire into the terms of the trust, and is not put on notice that the
trust is of such a character that the investment should be limited to "legal invest-
ments." See also Titcomb v. Richter, 89 Conn. 226, 93 Atl. 526 (I9I) (money de-
posited in name "M, trustee" with broker for speculative purposes; held broker not
chargeable with notice of trust). But if a broker receives trust funds for speculation,
knowing that the trustee is committing a breach of trust, he is liable. English v.
McIntyre, 29 App. Div. 439, 5I N. Y. Supp. 697 (I898).
34 Lowry v. Commercial Bank, Taney (U. S.) 3IO, 335 (I848); Geyser-Marion Gold
Min. Co. v. Stark, io6 Fed. (C. C. A. 8) 558 (I9OI); Stewart v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
53 Md. 564 (i88o); Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206, I9 Atl. 648 (I890); Baltimore
Trust Co. v. George's Creek, etc. Co., II9 Md. 2I, 85 Atl. 949 (I9I2); Loring v. Salis-
bury Mills, I25 Mass. I38, I5I (I878) (see Iasigi v. Chicago, etc. R. R. Co., I29 Mass.
46 (i88o)); Cooper v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 38 App. Div. 22, 57 N. Y. Supp. 925 (I899);
Baker v. Atlantic, etc. R. R. Co., .I73 N. C. 365, 92 S. E. I70 (I9I7) (executor); Bayard
v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 52 Pa. 232 (i866); Peck v. Providence Gas Co., I7
R. I. 275,2i Atl. 543 (I892); Chapman v. City Council, 28 S. C. 373, 6 S. E. I58 (I887);
Caulkins v. Gas-Light Co., 85 Tenn. 683, 4 S. W. 287 (I887). See I COOK, CORPO-
RATIONS, 7 ed., ?? 327, 330, 399; I MACHEN, CORPORATIONS, ?? 985-994; LOWELL,
TRANSFER OF STOCK, ?? I49-I59; CAMPBELL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFER OF
SECURITIES, 28-44; 14 CORP. JUR. 744; 3 MASS. L. QUART. 284. But see Thompson v.
Toland, 48 Cal. 99 (1874) ("trustee" not notice of trust).
3l Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55 (I796); Bank of England v. Parsons, 5 Ves.
665 (i8oo). See Franklin v. Bank of England, 9 B. & C. I56 (I829). Cf. Simpson v.
Molsons' Bank, [I895] A. C. 270, which construes a provision in a Canadian statute

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
is to put upon the corporation responsibility for preventing breaches

of trust. But it seems absurd to compel the transfer agent of a
corporation to determine the different questions which may arise
as to the powers of a trustee. The effect is seriously to obstruct
the administration of trusts and to increase the expenses of ad-
ministration. As Lord Loughborough said in Hartga v. Bank of
England," in speaking of the responsibility that such a rule wou
throw upon the Bank of England in registering transfers of shares
in the public funds:
"The consequence would be exceedingly alarming, if in all cases, where

there is a legacy in trust, the Bank is to take notice of the execution of
the trust. The consequence would be that for every legacy in trust of
stock there must be a bill in Chancery." 37
The rule has recently been changed in Massachusetts by stat-

ute.38 Where the rule prevails it is not uncommon for a trustee to
avoid its application by registering the stock in his own name
incorporating the defendant bank that "The bank shall not be bound to see to the
execution of any trust whether express, implied or constructive to which any of the
shares of the bank may be subject," and holds the bank not liable for registering a
transfer without actual knowledge of a breach of trust.
The Companies (Consolidation) Act, I908 (8 Ed. VII, c. 69) ? 27, provides: "No
notice of any trust, expressed, implied, or constructive, shall be entered on the register,
or be receivable by the registrar, in the case of companies registered in England or
Ireland." See PALMER'S COMPANY LAW, I0 ed., c. XIV.
36 3 Ves. 55, 58 (1796).
37 In Re Perkins, 24 Q. B. D. 613, 6i6 (I890), Lord Coleridge, C. J., said: "It seems
to me extremely important not to throw any doubt on the principle that companies
have nothing whatever to do with the relations between trustees and their cestuis que
trust in respect of the shares of the company. If a trustee is on the company's register
as the holder of shares, the relations which he may have with some other person in
respect of the shares are matters with which the company have nothing whatever to
do; they can look only to the man whose name is upon the register. It seems to me
that, if we were to throw any doubt upon that rule, we should make the carrying on
of their business by joint stock companies extremely difficult, and might involve
those companies in very serious questions, and the ultimate result would be anything
but beneficial to the holders of shares in such companies themselves."
88 MASS. L. I9I8, c. 68, ? 3. This statute provides: "A company or corporation,
public or private, or quasi corporation, or the managers of any trust shall not be bound
to see to the execution of any trust, express, implied, or constructive, to which any of
its shares, bonds, or securities are subject, or to ascertain or inquire whether the trust
authorizes a transfer thereof by the holder, but the provisions of this section shall not
be a protection against liability for knowingly participating in a breach of trust."
See 3 MASS. L. QUART. 70, 284. See also RUSSELL, STATS. Ky. (1909), ? 4I69; DEL.
REV. CODE (191I5), ? 3396; 4 PURDON'S DIG. PA., 13 ed., 4850, ? 7.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
individually, keeping the trust off the register -an undesirable

practice. It is a not uncommon practice to insert in a trust instru-
ment a provision that no corporation shall be affected by notice
that its shares, bonds, or other securities are subject to the trust
or shall be bound to see to the execution of the trust or to ascertain
or inquire whether any transfer thereof is authorized.
What are the liabilities of depositories of trust funds? In the
course of the administration of a trust, it frequently happens that
a certain amount of cash comes into the hands of the trustee. It
is natural and proper that for safekeeping he should deposit the
cash in a bank.39 As a rule, the trust funds should be deposited in
an account separate from that in which the trustee keeps his own
funds, and the form of the deposit should be such as to indicate its
fiduciary character; and according to the weight of authority if the
bank becomes insolvent the trustee is personally liable if the trust
fund was blended with the trustee's individual account;40 and even
if there was no such blending he is liable if the deposit does not on
its face indicate its fiduciary character.4' But there is some authority
the other way.42 At any rate the question of the liability of the de-
pository bank is quite different from that of the 6liability of the
depositor.
If a trustee in the proper performance of his duty makes a de-
posit in a bank in a trust account, the bank does not become a
trustee of the money,43 unless indeed it agrees with the trustee to
SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 784.

40 AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS, 484 n.
41 Chancellor v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, 58 So. 423 (1912) (administrator); Re Ar-
guello, 97 Cal. I96, 31 Pac. 937 (I893) (administrator); McAllister v. Comm., 30 Pa.
536 (I858) (trustee); Booth v. Wilkinson, 78 Wis. 652, 47 N. W. 1128 (i89i) (guardian).
See AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS, 484 n; SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 787 n; Ann. Cas.
I1915 C, 54.
4 United States, etc. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, i8 Cal. App. 437, 123 Pac. 352 (19I2)
(guardian); Goodwin v. American Nat. Bank, 48 Conn. 550 (i88i) (executor); Bi-
schoff v. Yorkville Bank, 2I8 N. Y. io6, 112 N. E. 759 (I9I6) (executor); Sagone v.
Mackey, 225 N. Y. 594, 122 N. E. 621 (I919) (agent). But see N. Y. Surrogate Court
Act, Laws 1920, C. 928, ? 231, making it a misdemeanor for an executor, administrator,
guardian or testamentary trustee to deposit funds of the estate in his own
name.
43 Fletcher v. Sharpe, io8 Ind. 276, 9 N. E. I42 (i886) (administrator); Officer v.
Officer, 120 Ia. 389, 94 N. W. 947 (1903) (executor); Brown v. Sheldon State Bank,
139 Ia. 83, 91, 117 N. W. 289 (I908) (public officer); Phillips v. Bank, 98 Kan. 383,
I58 Pac. 23 (I9I6) (public officer); Paul v. Draper, I58 Mo. 197, 59 S. W. 77 (1909)

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
keep the money separate and distinct from the other funds of
the bank. A general deposit, though it be a deposit of trust
funds placed to the credit of the depositor "as trustee," creates
the relationship of debtor and creditor between the depository
bank and the depositor. The trustee becomes a creditor of
the bank, and holds his claim against the bank in trust for the
beneficiary.
If the trustee in fact has no authority to make the deposit in the
bank and if the bank actually knows of the absence of authority,
then indeed the bank is chargeable with participation in the breach
of trust, and may be held as constructive trustee of the money.44
But has a bank any duty to inquire as to the trustee's authority to
make the deposit? The depositor may of course be acting im-
properly in making the deposit; on the other hand it is possible
that he is acting properly. It would impose too severe a burden on
the bank if it were bound to investigate the conduct of the depositor
and to determine whether his conduct is proper or not. It might
indeed make inquiry of the depositor, but such an inquiry would
naturally be regarded by a depositor as officious and insulting, and
in most cases if the depositor were in fact acting wrongfully, his
answers would be false and of no avail in preventing a breach of
trust.45 And as a practical business matter it is impossible for
(guardian); City of Sturgis v. Meade Co. Bank, 38 S. D. 3I7, i6i N. W. 327 (I9I7)
(public officer). See PERRY, TRUSTS, 6 ed., ? 122; 7 CORP. JUR. 633; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
888; i6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 9I8; L. R. A. I917 A, 683; 8 Ann. Cas. ii6; 3 R. C. L.
644.
44 Board of Com'rs v. Strawn, I57 Fed. (C. C. A. 6) 49 (1907) (public officer);
State v. Bruce, I7 Ida. I, I02 Pac. 83I (I1909) (public officer); Tesene v. Iowa State
Bank, I73 N. W. (Iowa) 9I8 (I9I9) (guardian); City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb.
822, go N. W. 905 (1902) (public officer); WVatts v. Board of Com'rs, 2I Okl. 23I,
Pac. 77I (i908) (public officer). Cf. Franklin Sav. Bank v. International Trust Co.,
215 Mass. 231, 102 N. E. 363 (1913) (check illegally indorsed by public officer for
circulation). See also Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. International Trust Co., 217 Mass.
370, IO4 N. E. 845 (1914). Cf. Ross v. London, etc. Bank, [I9I9] i K. B. 678. See
3 R. C. L. 555.
If at the time of the deposit the bank had no notice that the depositor was acting
wrongfully in making the deposit, but receives notice before the deposit is withdrawn,
it is liable if it allows a withdrawal. Frazier v. The Erie Bank, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.)
i8 (agent) (I844); Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N. C. 152, 96 S. E. 977 (I9I8)
(agent or trustee).
45 Where an inquiry is required, an inquiry of the trustee may be sufficient (Grafflin
v. Robb, 84 Md. 45I, 35 Atl. 971 (i896); Mercantile National Bank v. Parsons, 54
Minn. 56, 55 N. WV. 825 (i893)); or under some circumstances it may not be sufficient

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
banks to make any real investigation of the circumstances before

deposits are received. In a case decided by the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire, it was said:
"To charge banks with the duty of supervising the administration of

trusts, when in the due course of business they receive checks and drafts
payable to and properly indorsed by trustees in their trust capacity,
would place an unreasonable burden upon the banks and seriously
interfere with commercial transactions." 46
Accordingly by the weight of authority a bank is not liable for

participation in a breach of trust merely because it receives funds
which it knows to be fiduciary funds and credits them to the
private account of the depositor, in accordance with his direc-
tions.47 Thus if a trustee or other fiduciary indorses a check pay-
able to him as trustee and deposits the same to the credit of his
individual account, the bank is under no duty to make inquiry as
to the propriety of the depositor's conduct.48 So too if a trustee
Chicago Title & T. Co. v. Brugger, I96 Ill. 96, 63 N. E. 637 (I902). See LOWELL,
TRANSFER OF STOCK, ? 72.
In Wilson v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., I20 N. Y. I45, 24 N. E. 384 (I890), it was
held that if an inquiry by a purchaser would have shown apparent authority in the
transferor, the purchaser is protected although he made no inquiry and the transferor
in fact was committing a breach of trust. Cf. Buckley v. Hansfield, 72 Misc. 2I8,
I3I N. Y. Supp. I05 (i9ii); Hanover Nat. Bank v. American Dock Co., 75 Hun 55,
26 N. Y. Supp. I055 (I894); Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 62I, I49
N. Y. Supp. 49 (I9I4); Ward v. City Trust Co., I92 N. Y. 6I, 84 N. E. 585 (I908). In
Jones v. Williams, 24 Beav. 47 (I857), however, it was held that where the purchaser
is put on inquiry but makes no inquiry, he is not protected although a false answer to
his inquiry by the transferor might have been made and if made would have dispensed
with further inquiry. See Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 2II Mass. 409, 42I, 97 N. E.
9i6 (I9I2).
46 Brookhouse v. Union Publishing Co., 73 N. H. 368, 370, 373, 62 Atl
per Chase, J.
47 In general a bank may be liable when it disobeys instructions either in receiving de-
posits, as where a check sent for trust account is credited to depositor's private account
(Blanton v. First Nat. Bank, I36 Ark. 44I, 206 S. W. 745 (I9I8); Duckett v. Mechanics'
Bank, 86 Md. 400, 38 Atl. 983 (I897); but see Coleman v. Bucks, etc. Bank, [I897]
2 Ch. 243); or in honoring checks. American Nat. Bank v. Fidelity & D. Co., I29 Ga.
I26, 58 S. E. 867 (I907) (check of receiver paid without order of court); U. S. Fidelity
& G. Co. v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 8o Ore. 36I, I57 Pac. I55 (I9I6) (individual check paid
out of deposit as guardian). See British America Elevator Co. v. Bank of British
North America, [I919] A. C. 658; Cushman v. Ill. Starch Co., 79 Ill. 28I (I875);
man v. Beacon Trust Co., I70 Mass. 452, 49 N. E. 748 (I898). See L. R. A. I9I5 C,
522.
48 Coleman v. Bucks, etc. Bank, [I897] 2 Ch. 243 (trustee); Shields v. B

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
470 HARVARD LA W REVIEW
draws a check upon an account in another bank standing in his

name as trustee, and deposits the same to his individual credit
with the defendant bank, the latter bank is not bound to inquire
as to the propriety of the trustee's conduct.49
If a bank should not be liable for receiving deposits when it has
no knowledge of the misconduct of the depositor in making the
deposits, a fortiori it should not be liable for allowing withdrawals
if it has no knowledge of the misconduct of the depositor in mak-
ing the withdrawals.50 For although a bank is not bound to accept
deposits, it is under an obligation to honor its depositor's checks,
land, [I9OI] I I. R. 222 (executor); Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian Bank, 254 Fed.
(C. C. A. 9) 39I (I9I8), certiorari denied, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 (I9I9) (corporate officer);
United States, etc. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, i8 Cal. App. 437, I23 Pac. 352 (I9I2)
(guardian); Miami County Bank v. State, 6I Ind. App. 360, II2 N. E. 40 (I9I6)
(administrator, semble); Duckett v. Mechanics' Bank, 86 Md. 400, 38 Atl. 983 (I897)
(trustee); Batchelder v. Central Nat. Bank, i88 Mass. 25, 73 N. E. I024 (I905)
(trustee); Brookhouse v. Union Publishing Co., 73 N. H. 368, 62 Atl. 2I9 (I905)
(guardian); Gate City B. & L. Ass. v. Bank, I26 Mo. 82, 28 S. W. 633 (I894) (corporate
officer); Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 2I8 N. Y. io6, II2 N. E. 759 (I9I6) (executor);
Mills v. Nassau Bank, 52 Misc. 243, I02 N. Y. Supp. III9 (I906) (agent); Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. v. Bank, I94 Pa. 334, 44 Atl. I064 (I909) (administrator); Life Ins.
Co. v. Amer. Nat. Bank, 6 VA. L. REG., (N. S.) io6 (I9I9) (corporate officer); Mott Iron
Works v. Bank, 78 Wash. 294, I39 Pac. 36 (I9I4) (agent); United States Fidelity & G.
Co. v. Bank, 77 W. Va. 665, 88 S. E. IO9 (I9I6) (administrator). Cf. Nehawka Bank
v. Ingersoll, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 6I7, 89 N. W. 6i8 (I902) (agent).
But see contra, Bank v. McPherson, I02 Miss. 852, 59 So. 934 (I9I2) (public
officer); United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Bank, I27 Tenn. 720, I57 S. W. 4I4 (I913)
(guardian).
In a recent New York case where a number of checks payable to the order of a cor-
poration were indorsed by its president, who had authority to indorse checks, and
were deposited by him in his individual account in a bank, and subsequently he with-
drew the proceeds and misappropriated them, the bank was held liable. Wagner
Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 228 N. Y. 37, I26 N. E. 347 (I920). See
Niagara Woolen Co. v. Pacific Bank, I4I App. Div. 265, I26 N. Y. Supp. 980 (I9IO).
See 37 BANK L. J. 277, 505.
49 Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9I6 (I9I2) (administrator);
Allen v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 224 Mass. 239, II2 N. E. 650 (I9I6) (administra-
tor); Kendall v. Fidelity Trust Co., 230 Mass. 238, II9 N. E. 86i (I9I8) (treasurer of
business trust); Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., I98 N. Y.
422, 92 N. E. I2 (I9IO) (corporate officer).
It is immaterial whether the check is payable to the depository bank or to the de-
positor. Kendall v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra.
50 If the bank has actual notice that the trustee is improperly making a with-
drawal it is liable. Lowndes v. City Nat. Bank, 82 Conn. 8, 72 Atl. I50 (I909); Miami
County Bank v. State, 6I Ind. App. 360, II2 N. E. 40 (I9I6); Atwood-Stone Co. v.
Bank, 38 S. D. 377, i6i N. W. 539 (19I7); I2 Ann. Cas. 669; Ann. Cas. I914 B
7 CORP. JUR. 645.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST 47I
and if it refuses without justification to honor his check it renders

itself liable to the depositor. The fact that the depositor is a
trustee and may possibly be acting wrongfully is not a sufficient
justification for a refusal to honor his check. It would be unfair
to the bank to put it in a position where it would be compelled to
ascertain at its peril whether the depositor is committing a breach
of trust. In Gray v. Johnston,5" in holding that the defendant
bank was not liable for honoring a check drawn upon it by an
executrix and payable to and deposited in the same bank to the
credit of a firm of which the executrix was a member, Lord Cairns
said: -
"On the one hand, it would be a most serious matter if bankers were
to be allowed, on light and trifling grounds - on grounds of mere sus-
picion or curiosity - torefuse to honour a cheque drawn by their cus-
tomer, even although that customer might happen to be an administrator
or an executor. On the other hand, it would be equally of serious
moment if bankers were to be allowed to shelter themselves under that
title, and to say that they were at liberty to become parties or privies to
a breach of trust committed with regard to trust property, and, looking
to their position as bankers merely, to insist that they were entitled to
pay away money which constituted a part of trust property at a time
when they knew it was going to be misapplied, and for the purpose of
its being so misapplied. I think, fortunately, your Lordships will find
that the law on that point is clearly laid down, and may be derived
without any hesitation from the authorities which have been cited in
the argument at your Lordships' bar, and I apprehend that you will
agree with me when I say that the result of those authorities is clearly
this: in order to hold a banker justified in refusing to pay a demand of
his customer, the customer being an executor, and drawing a cheque as
an executor, there must, in the first place, be some misapplication, some
breach of trust, intended by the executor, and there must in the second
place, as was said by Sir John Leach, in the well known case of Keane v.-
Robarts (4 Madd. 357), be proof that the bankers are privy to the intent
to make this misapplication of the trust funds. And to that I -think I
may safely add, that if it be shewn that any personal benefit to the bank-
ers themselves is designed or stipulated for, that circumstance, above
all others, will most readily establish the fact that the bankers are in
privity with the breach of trust which is about to be committed."
61 L. R. 3 H. L. i, ii (i868).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
Accordingly a drawee bank is not liable m

check drawn by a depositor as fiduciary and payable to a third
person.52 Nor is it liable where it honors such a check payable to
the depositor personally, either by paying cash over the counter
to the depositor, or by paying a subsequent holder, or by paying
another bank through which the check is collected for the depositor
or for a subsequent holder,53 or by crediting the depositor's indi-
vidual account in the drawee bank.54 And a bank is not liable
52 Evans v. Evans & Co., 82 Iowa 492, 48 N. WV. 929 (I89I) (partner); Young v.
Trust Co., I34 La. 879, 64 So. 8o6 (N9W4) (liquidator of corporation); Eyrich v. Capital
State Bank, 67 Miss. 6o, 6 So. 6I5 (I889) (partner); Federal Heating Co. v. Buffalo,
I82 App. Div. I28, I70 N. Y. Supp. 5I5 (I9I8) (trustee); Interstate Nat. Bank v.
Claxton, 97 Tex. 569, 8o S. WV. 604 (I904) (trustee). See BRADY, BANK CHECKS, I67;
I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING, 5 ed., ? 3I7; 3 R. C. L. 549; 7 CORP. JUR. 644; DEC.
DIG., BANKS AND BANKING, ? I30; 32 BANK. L. J. 397. See Mo. REV. STAT., I909,
? II929. See Newburyport v. First Nat. Bank, 2I6 Mass. 304, I03 N. E. 782 (N9W
("The defendant bank had no pecuniary interest in the payment of the note, and for
that reason was not on the same footing as a purchaser of it in the matter of making
inquiry ").
53 Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 204 Fed. (C. C. A. 2) 546 (N9O3
(corporate officer); Newburyport v. Spear, 204 Mass. I46, 90 N. E. 522 (I9I0) (public
officer); State v. Chicago, etc. Co., 2I5 S. W. (Mo.) 20 (I9I9) (receiver, semble); Hood
v. Kensington Nat. Bank, 230 Pa. 5o8, 79 Atl. 7I4 (I9II) (guardian).
In Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., I98 N. Y. 422, 92 N. E.
I2 (I9io), the treasurer of a corporation, who was authorized to draw checks on its
behalf, drew checks to his own order upon an account of the corporation with the A
bank and deposited them to the credit of his private account with the B bank, and after
the B bank had collected them, he drew out the proceeds which he used for his own
purposes. The court held that the B bank was not liable to the corporation, on the
ground that though- the B bank was put upon inquiry, it was not bound to look be-
yond the A bank, because the A bank was the agent of the corporation to determine
whether the checks were properly payable. The implication that the A bank was
liable was criticized in Havana Central R. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 204 Fed.
(C. C. A. 2) 546 (N9O3), in which the same transaction was involved and the cor
tion sued the A bank. The federal court held that the A bank was not the agent of
the corporation, but simply its debtor, and that it was not put upon inquiry by the
mere fact that the check was payable to the corporate officer who drew it, and conse-
quently was not liable. It is submitted that the decision of the federal court is sound,
and that neither bank was chargeable with notice of the treasurer's misconduct. See
L. R. A. I9I5 B, 7I5.
54 Gray v. Johnston, L. R. 3 H. L. I (i868) (executrix, check credited to firm of
which she was member); Goodwin v. American Nat. Bank, 48 Conn. 550 (i88i) (ex-
ecutor); Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9I6 (I9I2) (administrator);
Allen v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 224 Mass. 239, II2 N. E. 650 (I9I6) (administrator);
Wickenheiser v. Colonial Bank, i68 App. Div. 329, I53 N. Y. Supp. I035 (I9
affirmed 224 N. Y. 65I, I2I N. E. 8gg (igi8) (executor); Taylor v. Astor Nat. Bank,
I05 Misc. 386, I74 N. Y. Supp. 279 (igi8) (trustee); Corn Exch. Bank v. Manhattan

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
when after allowing a depositor to deposit fiduciary funds in his

individual account, it subsequently honors his personal checks
drawn on that account.55 The bank is not bound in any of these
cases to inquire into the use the fiduciary depositor is making or
intends to make of the proceeds of the checks.
Certain risks of course a bank must run even though it acts in
good faith and is not in any way negligent. If a bank honors a
forged check or a check with a forged indorsement, it is liable to
the depositor.56 It has not discharged its indebtedness to the
depositor, for it has paid a person not authorized by him to receive
payment. Similarly a bank is liable when it pays one who falsely
represents himself to be the payee of a check,57 or when the amount
of the check has been raised,58 unless indeed the depositor by his
Sav. Inst., I05 Misc. 6I5, I73 N. Y. Supp. 799 (I919), affirmed i88 App. Div. 922,
176 N. Y. Supp. 894 (I9I9) (trustee); Town of Eastchester v. Mt. Vernon T. Co., I73
App. Div. 482, I39 N. Y. Supp. 289 (I9I6) (public officer); Interstate Nat. Bank v.
Claxton, 97 Tex. 569, 8o S. WV. 604 (I904) (agent); Clench v. Consolidated Bank, 31
U. C. C. P. I69 (i88o) (assignee). BuQt see contra, American Bonding Co. v. Bank, 97
Md. 598, 55 Atl. 395 (I903) (public officer, interest credited to private account).
55 See notes 48 and 49, supra.
The Georgia Banking Act, Art. I9, ? 42 (GA. LAWS, I919, 209) provides: "When-
ever any agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, either express or implied,
or other fiduciary whether bona fide or mala fide, shall deposit any money in any bank
to his credit as an individual, or as such agent, trustee, or other fiduciary, whether the
name of the person or corporation for whom he is acting or purporting to act be given
or not, such bank shall be authorized to pay the amount of such deposit or any part
thereof, upon the check of such agent, administrator, executor, guardian, trustee, or
other fiduciary, signed with the name in which such deposit was entered, without being
accountable in any way to the principal, cestui que trust, or other person or corporation
who may be entitled to or interested in the amount so deposited.
"Nothing herein contained shall prevent the person or corporation claiming the
beneficial interest in or to any deposit in any bank from resorting to the courts to
subject such deposit, provided such action is brought and served before such deposit
is paid out, and to any action brought for this purpose both the bank and the
depositor shall be necessary parties defendant." See Mo. REv. STAT., 1909, ? II929;
STATUTES OF CANADA, 3 & 4 Geo. V, c. 9, ? 96 (I9I3).
There are statutes in many states providing that when a deposit is made by one
person in trust for another, and no other notice of its existence and terms is given to
the bank, the bank may pay the latter on the death of the former. New York Banking
Law, ?? I48, I98, 249; BRADY, BANK DEPOSITS, App. B. Similarly, there are statutes
governing joint deposits, ibid.; and deposits made by minors or married women.
56 Szwento Juozupo Let Draugystes v. Manh. Sav. Inst., 178 App. Div. 57, I64
N. Y. Supp. 498 (I9I7); 7 CoRP. JUR. 683, 686.
57 7 CORP. JUR. 677.
58 7 CORP. JUR. 684.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
negligence made possible the alteration.59 So also a bank is liable

when it holds on deposit funds of a corporation and honors a check
drawn upon it in the name of the corporation by an officer who was
not empowered to draw checks,60 or when it honors a check payable
to a corporation and indorsed by an officer who had no power to
indorse on behalf of the corporation.61 So also a bank is liable
when it honors a check drawn upon his principal's account by an
agent acting outside the scope of his employment,62 or a check
payable to the principal and indorsed by an agent not empowered
to indorse.63 A distinction must be made between want of power
and abuse of authority. If the corporate officer or the agent was
empowered to draw or indorse checks on behalf of the corporation
or principal, the bank will not be liable although the officer or
agent was abusing his authority in drawing or indorsing checks,
unless it knew or ought to have known of the abuse of authority.
Similarly in the case of trusts if there are several trustees and the
bank honors a check drawn or indorsed by only a part of the trus-
tees it will be liable, since one trustee has no power to bind his
co-trustees,64 although it will not be liable if all the trustees sign
or indorse a check unless it knows or ought to know that they are
in fact acting wrongfully.
If the bank is a creditor of the depositor individually, as in the
case where he is liable on a note held by the bank or where he has
overdrawn his individual account with the bank, it cannot set off
59 7 CORP. JUR. 684.
60 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed., ? i6i6; 7 CORP. JUR. 676. See
Havana Cent. R. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 204 Fed. (C. C. A. 2) 546, 550 (I9I3).
61 Buena Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank, 39 Cal. App. 7IO, i8o Pac. I2 (I9I9); Walker
v. State Trust Co., 40 App. Div. 55, 57 N. Y. Supp. 525 (I899); Moch Co. v. Security
Bank, I76 App. Div. 842, I63 N. Y. Supp. 277 (I9I7), affirmed 225 N. Y. 723, I22
N. E. 879 (I9I9).
62 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Nichols & Co., 223 Ill. 4I, 79 N. E. 38 (I906). See
Sims v. United States Trust Co., I03 N. Y. 472, 9 N. E. 605 (i886); I MORSE, BANKS
AND BANKING, 5 ed., ? 314. But if the account is in the name of the depositor as agent,
the bank may safely honor checks drawn by him as agent. Pennsylvania T. & T. Co.
v. Meyer, 20I Pa. 299, 50 Atl. 998 (I902). Cf. Holden v. Bank, 77 N. H. 535 (deposit
by executor who had not qualified). See Tassel v. Cooper, g C. B. 509 (i850).
63 Schaap v. State Bank, I37 Ark. 25I, 208 S. WV. 309 (I9I8); Hope, etc. Co. v.
Bank, ioi Kan. 726, i68 Pac. 870 (I9I7); Robinson v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 86 N. Y.
404 (i88i).
64 Barroll v. Forman, 88 Md. i88, 40 Atl. 883 (I898). Cf. Lee v. Sankey, L. R. i5
Eq. 204 (I872) (payment by solicitor to one of two trustees). See 2 DANIEL, NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed., ? i6I5; 7 CORP. JUR. 677.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
a deposit standing in his name as trustee or otherwise in such form

as to indicate the fiduciary character of the deposit.65 In the
United States it is held that it is not proper for the bank to accept
in payment of an individual indebtedness of the depositor a check
payable to the depositor as fiduciary and indorsed by him, or a
check drawn by him upon his account as fiduciary in the same
bank or in another bank.66 It is held that the bank has notice
under such circumstances that the payment is presumptively
wrongful. The same result has been reached where a deposit of
fiduciary funds is made in the fiduciary's personal account, and
the depositor subsequently pays a personal debt to the bank by a
check drawn on that account; for it is held that although the bank
is not chargeable with notice that the deposit is in breach of trust,
it is chargeable with notice that a trust attaches to the personal
account to the extent of the fiduciary funds therein deposited; and
the bank is liable to the extent that such funds are withdrawn in
paying the depositor's debt to the bank.67 The effect of these
65 Ex parte Kingston, L. R. 6 Ch. 632 (I87I) (public officer); National Bank v.

Insurance Co., I04 U. S. 54 (i88i) (agent); Keeney v. Bank of Italy, 33 Cal. App.
5I5, I65 Pac. 735 (I9I7) (trustee); First Nat. Bank v. Banking Co., io8 Me. 79, 79
Atl. 4 (I9II) (agent); Edwards v. MacArtney, I83 N. Y. Supp. 851 (I920) (trustee).
See I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING, 5 ed., ? 326; 7 CORP. JUR. 658, 66o; DEC. DIG.,
BANKS AND BANKING, ? 134(7). See note ii, supra.
66 Union Stock Yards Bank v. Gillespie, I37 U. S. 4II (I890) (factor); United States
Fidelity & G. Co. v. Union Bank, 228 Fed. (C. C. A. 6) 448 (I913) (public officer);
Washbon v. Bank, 87 Kan. 698, 125 Pac. 17 (I912) (treasurer of fraternal organiza-
tion); Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9I6 (I9I2) (administrator);
State Bank of St. Johns v. McCabe, 135 Mich. 479, 98 N. W. 20 (I904) (trustee);
Hale v. Windsor Sav. Bank, 90 Vt. 487, 98 Atl. 993 (I9I6) (executor); Ward v. City
Trust Co., 192 N. Y. 6i, 84 N. E. 585 (I908) (corporate officer); Bischoff v. Yorkville
Bank, 2I8 N. Y. I*6, II2 N. E. 759 (I9I6) (executor); Fidelity & D. Co. v. Rankin,
33 Okl. 7, I24 Pac. 7I (I9I2) (public officer); Brovan v. Kyle, i66 Wis. 347, i65 N. W.
382 (I9I7) (guardian). See I MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING, 5 ed., ? 3I7; DEC. DIG.,
BANKS AND BANKING, ? I30.
As to the validity of loans on the security of savings bank trust deposits, in view of
the decision in Re Totten, I79 N. Y. II2, 7I N. E. 748 (I904), see Corn Exch. Bank v.
Manhattan Sav. Inst., I05 Misc. 6I5, I73 N. Y. Supp. 799 (I9I9); 37 BANK. L. J.
753.
67 United States Fidelity & G. Co.'v. Union Bank, 228 Fed. (C. C. A. 6) 448 (I9I3)
(public officer); First Nat. Bank v. Greene, II4 S. W. (Ky.) 322 (I908) (guardian);
Allen v. Puritan Trust Co., 2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9I6 (I9I2) (administrator);
Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 2I8 N. Y. I06, II2 N. E. 759 (I9I6) (executor). But see
United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Bank, 77 WV. Va. 665, 670, 88 S. E. I09 (I9I8)
("For aught a bank would know a check though payable to its depositor in some

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
decisions is to put upon the bank the burden of ascertaining how

far the account is made up of fiduciary funds deposited therein
and not subsequently witlhdrawn. In England however the courts
have taken a somewhat different view in these cases. Even though
a depositor in a bank who has overdrawn his private account
deposits in that account a check drawn by him as fiduciary the
bank is not necessarily liable; the bank, if it has no actual knowledge
that the depositor is committing a breach of trust, is liable only if
a personal benefit to the bank "is designed or stipulated for," as
Lord Cairns said in Gray v. Johnston. The benefit to the bank is
merely a circumstance tending to prove that the bank knew of or
was "privy to" the breach of trust, that is to say, was guilty of
bad faith. When therefore an overdraft is amply secured and the
bank is not pressing for payment, it is not held to participate in
the breach of trust, merely because it receives payment by a check
drawn or indorsed by the depositor as fiduciary.68
In certain cases, particularly in New York, the courts have gone
very far in holding a depository bank chargeable with constructive
notice of the depositor's misconduct.
In Wagner Trading Company v. Battery Park National Bank,69
representative or fiduciary character, the money would belong absolutely to him, and
represent money already paid out by him in discharge of his fiduciary liability").
Cf. Bank of New South Wales v. Goulburn, etc. Co., [I902] A. C. 543 (corporate
officer).
68 See Gray v. Johnston, L. R. 3 H. L. i (i868) (executor); London Joint Stock
Bank v. Simmons, [I892] A. C. 20I (stockbroker); Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank, [I893]
A. C. 282 (stockbroker); Bank of New South Wales v. Goulburn, etc. Co., [I902] A. C.
543 (corporate officer); Backhouse v. Charlton, 8 Ch. D. 444 (I878) (partner); Marten
v. Rocke, Eyton & Co., 53 L. T. (N. S.) 946 (I885) (auctioneer); Greenwood Teale v.
Brown & Co., ii T. L. R. 56 (I894) (solicitor); Coleman v. Bucks & Oxon Union
Bank, [I897] 2 Ch. 243 (trustee); Shields v. Bank of Ireland, [I9OI] i I. R. 222
(executor).
The bank was held liable on the ground that it was privy to the breach of trust in
British America Elevator Co. v. Bank, [I9I9] A. C. 658 (agent); Pannell v. Hurley,
2 Coi. C. C. 24I (I845) (trustee); Bodenham v. Hoskyns, 2 DeG. M. & G. 903 (agent);
Ex parte Adair, 24 L. T. (N. s.) I98 (I87I) (public officer); Foxton v. Manchester, etc.
Banking Co., 44 L. T. (N. S.) 406 (i88i) (trustee); Re Wall, i T. L. R. 522 (i885)
(trustee).
69 228 N. Y. 37, I26 N. E. 347 (I920). See Niagara Woolen Co. v. Pacific Bank,
I4I App. Div. 265, I26 N. Y. Supp. 980 (I9IO). See note 48, smpra. Cf. Havana
Central R. R. Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., I98 N. Y. 422, 92 N. E. I2 (I9IO),
note 53, supra. It is uncertain to what classes of fiduciaries the holding of the prin-
cipal case extends. The opposite result was reached in the case of executors. See
Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, hereinafter discussed. But query under the statute

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
it appeared that a number of checks payable to the order of a

corporation were indorsed by its president, who had authority to
indorse checks on its behalf, and were deposited by him in his
individual account in the defendant bank. Subsequently he with-
drew and misappropriated the proceeds of the checks. The bank
was held liable, because " the nature of this transaction was such
as to warn defendant that the checks were being diverted from
usual business channels."
In Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank,70 one Poggenburg, an executo
deposited money of the estate in the Bowery Bank in New York
in the name of "Estate of Josephine F. Schneider by H. F. W.
Poggenburg, executor." He, as an individual, had at that time
a deposit account with the defendant Yorkville Bank. From time
to time he drew checks upon the Bowery Bank signed by him as
executor and payable to the defendant bank, and sent these checks
to the defendant bank, the proceeds to be placed to the credit of
his individual account with that bank. Additional sums from
sources other than the estate were deposited by Poggenburg with
the defendant bank from time to time. An individual note of
Poggenburg held by the defendant bank was paid by him by a
check upon his individual account with that bank in which the
amount standing to his credit at that time was less than the pro-
ceeds of the checks drawn upon his account as executor in the
Bowery Bank. Other individual notes of Poggenburg held by the
defendant bank maturing from time to time were paid by him
from his individual account with that bank. Eventually Poggen-
burg withdrew all the funds deposited to his credit with the de-
fendant bank (except a small balance) and used the proceeds for
his private purposes. The defendant at no time made any inquiry
as to the source of the deposits or the purpose of the withdrawals.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant bank was liable to the
estate for the proceeds of all the checks drawn by Poggenburg as
executor and deposited with the defendant bank and subsequently
withdrawn by him. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision
of the Supreme Court, but one of the Justices, dissenting, declared
making it a misdemeanor for executors to make deposits of funds of the estate in his
own name. See note 42, supra. Query also as to trustees. See 37 BANK. L. J. 505.
70 2I8 N. Y. io6, II2 N. E. 759 (I9I6). See Pratt v. Commercial Trust Co., I05
Misc. 324, I74 N. Y. Supp. 88 (I9I8), affirmed I88 App. Div. 88i, I75 N. Y. Supp.
9I8 (,9I9).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
that the recovery should be limited to the amount paid to the

defendant bank on the notes.71 The Court of Appeals took a third
and intermediate view, holding that the defendant bank was liable
for the amount of the notes, and also for all amounts withdrawn
from the defendant bank by Poggenburg after the time of the pay-
ment of the first note, but not for the amounts withdrawn before
the payment of that note. The court said:
" In the present case Poggenburg paid to the defendant, as his creditor,
on June 3, I908, the sum of $765 from his account with the defendant.
The finding of the trial court, supported by the evidence, is that the
account at that time was constituted wholly from the trust funds. At
that time and through the transaction the defendant knew that Poggen-
burg had appropriated $765 of those funds for his private benefit. The
presumption that he would not thus violate his duty and lawful right -
that he would apply the moneys to their proper purposes under the will
then ceased to exist. There was absolute proof in the possession of the
defendant to the contrary. The defendant had no longer the right to
assume that in paying the checks of Poggenburg it was paying the
executor's moneys to the executor and not to Poggenburg, the individual,
or that Poggenburg would use the moneys lawfully. It had knowledge
of such facts as would reasonably cause it to think and believe that
Poggenburg was using the moneys of the executor for his individual
advantage and purposes. Those facts indicated that the payment to it
was not an isolated incident; they indicated, rather, that it was within
a method or system. Having such knowledge, it was under the duty to
make reasonable inquiry and endeavor to prevent a diversion. Having
such knowledge, it was charged by the law to take the reasonable steps
or action essential to keep it from paying to Poggenburg as his own the
moneys which were not his and were the executor's, and was bound by
the information which it could have obtained if an inquiry on its part
had been pushed until the truth had been ascertained. It did nothing
of that sort, and by supinely paying, under the facts here, as found, the
subsequent checks of Poggenburg, it became privy to the misapplica-
tion. It must now pay the plaintiffs the moneys of the estate which it
had and received on and after June 3, i908."
The holding that the defendant bank was not liable for the
amounts withdrawn by Poggenburg before payment of the first
note, is, as has been shown,72 in accord with the great weight of
71 I70 App. Div. 679, I56 N. Y. Supp. 563 (I9I5).

72 See note 49, supra.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
authority. The holding that the defendant bank was liable for
the amounts paid to it in discharging Poggenburg's individual
indebtedness to it on the notes, is, as has been shown,78 in accord
with the authorities, although of questionable soundness. But the
decision so far as it held the defendant bank liable for the amounts
withdrawn by Poggenburg after the payment of the first note and
not used in paying other notes held by the defendant, goes much
further than any prior decisions. In a similar case in Massachu-
setts, Allen v. Puritan Trust Company,74 it was held that the bank's
liability was limited to the amount of the checks used in discharg-
ing the depositor's individual indebtedness to the bank.75 It is
submitted that the jMassachusetts decision is preferable to the
New York decision. To hold that a bank as a creditor must not
accept payment from its debtor out of funds which it knows were
received by the debtor as a fiduciary without inquiring whether
such funds had ceased to be fiduciary funds may be proper. But
to hold that a bank as depository is chargeable with notice of all
facts which such inquiry would elicit, and is liable for all subse-
quent misappropriations by the fiduciary, would seem to extend
the doctrine of constructive notice too far and impose a burden-
some responsibility upon the bank.76
In Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Queens County Trust Com-
pany,77 the New York Court of Appeals again went far in holding
a depository bank chargeable with constructive notice. In that
case one Peebles, a trustee in bankruptcy of one Bailey, opened an
account in the defendant bank in the name of "Robert J. Peebles,
Trustee," and deposited therein funds of the estate. He made
withdrawals from time to time by checks, some of which were
countersigned by the clerk of the Federal District Court and con-
73 See note 67, supra.

74 2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9i6 (I9I2). See L. R. A. I9I5 C, 5I8.
75 It is to be noticed that although the checks were for a greater sum than the
amount of the overdrafts, the bank was held liable for the full amount of the checks
used in paying the overdrafts, and not merely for the amount of the overdrafts.
76 "And farther than that, I take leave to doubt very much whether the mere
fact that some breach of trust . . . had in time past been committed by their customer
would, alone, have entitled the bankers, or justified them, in refusing to honour the
cheque of their customer, unless it could be shewn that they knew, as regards that
particular cheque, that it also was to go in the same line of misapplication." Gray v.
Johnston, L. R. 3 H. L. I, I2, I3 (i868), per Cairns, L. C.
77 226 N. Y. 225, I23 N. E. 864 (19I9).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
tained in the margin the words "In re Wm. Trist Bailey"; others
were not so countersigned or marked. Most of the latter checks
were deposited to the individual credit of Peebles with the de-
fendant, and the proceeds were subsequently drawn out and used
by Peebles for his own purposes. A general order in bankruptcy
of the United States Supreme Court provides that no moneys of a
bankrupt estate shall be drawn from a depository unless by check
countersigned by a judge or referee or clerk of the court; and that
a copy of the general order shall be furnished to the depository,
and also the name of any referee or clerk authorized to countersign
such check. No copy of the order or name of any referee or clerk
authorized to countersign checks was furnished to the defendant,
and it had no actual notice that the depositor was a trustee in
bankruptcy. The court reached the conclusion, "with hesitation
however," that the defendant was liable. The court was of the
opinion that the bank was chargeable with notice of the bank-
ruptcy of Bailey, for the adjudication was a judgment in rem; that
it was chargeable with notice of the Bankruptcy Act and of the
general order; that it was chargeable with notice that the deposit
was of funds of the bankrupt estate, since some of the checks were
countersigned by a clerk of the court and contained the words
"In re Wm. Trist Bailey." 78 "A simple inquiry, by the bank of
the trustee, for the reason of the countersignature, would have
revealed the existence of the general order and of its provisions."
The decision, it is submitted, carries the doctrine of constructive
notice to an unreasonable extent.
It is easy to sit down at leisure after the event and to see how a
cautious and inquiring banker might have discovered the deposi-
tor's misconduct. It would not require the acumen of a Sherlock
Holmes to follow the clues which may have been afforded. But
should bankers be turned into detectives in order to prevent de-
positors from acting in violation of their obligations to third per-
sons? It must be remembered also that frequently all the clues
78 If the bank had had actual knowledge of these things of course it would b
liable. American Nat. Bank v. Fidelity & D. Co., I29 Ga. I26, 58 S. E. 867 (1907).
It is agreed that a depository bank is not chargeable with notice of facts appearin
in memoranda written on checks. State Nat. Bank v. Dodge, I24 U. S. 333 (i888
State Nat. Bank v. Reilly, I24 Ill. 464, I4 N. E. 657 (i888); Duckett v. Nat. Mechanics
Bank, 86 Md. 400, 38 Atl. 983 (I897); Eyrich v. Capital State Bank, 67 Miss. 6
6 So. 6I5 (I889).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST 48 I
are not known to any one employee of the bank, and that the facts
known to any one employee are not sufficient to arouse suspicion.
It must be remembered that the processes of receiving deposits
and paying checks are processes in which many employees of the
bank take each his separate part.79 If no one of the employees has
knowledge of any breach of trust the bank should not be held
liable merely because it appears that at some stage by piecing to-
gether all the facts known to different employees a breach of trust
would become more or less apparent. The bank is in no way to
blame for receiving deposits or allowing withdrawals merely be-
cause all the facts known to several employees would, if known to
one employee, have aroused a suspicion of misconduct by the
depositor. The bank it is submitted should not be liable unless
some officer or employee had actual knowledge of the depositor's
misconduct or knowledge of facts so clearly indicating such mis-
conduct as to show that the bank was guilty of bad faith.
A trustee or other fiduciary is placed in a situation where there
may be a great temptation to pursue his own interest and lose
sight of the interest of those for whom he acts. The rules as to the
liability of fiduciaries may well be made strict. But a very different
question arises as to the liability of third persons dealing with fidu-
ciaries. If third persons knowingly participate with a fiduciary in
a breach of his obligations it is proper to hold them liable. It is
quite a different matter however to compel them to supervise the
conduct of the fiduciary and to hold them liable for failure to do
so. A rule imposing such liability upon them makes it dangerous
to deal with a fiduciary and seriously interferes with the proper
performance by the fiduciary of his duties. It is right to require
that one who knowingly purchases trust property from a trustee
or other fiduciary whose conduct is prima facie wrongful should
make a reasonable inquiry, and to hold that he cannot escape lia-
bility unless such inquiry would satisfy a reasonable man that the
vendor was not committing a breach of trust. If the vendor's con-
duct is not such as to excite suspicion, still it is held that the pur-
chaser should make inquiry as to the power of the trustee to sell;
and it has been so held, with questionable wisdom perhaps, in the
case of negotiable instruments. But the rule that purchasers of
79 See the Master's Report, pp. I5-20, in the record in Allen v. Puritan Trust Co.,
2II Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 9I6 (I9I2).

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00
trust property are bound to see to the application of the purchase-

money imposed too heavy a burden on purchasers and resulted in
such an intolerable obstruction to the administration of trusts
that statutes have in many jurisdictions abolished the rule. The
rule that a corporation whose securities are held in trust is bound
to investigate whether a transfer of the securities is in breach of
trust, imposes a heavy burden on corporations and results in a
serious obstruction to the administration of trusts. Similarly to
the extent that depositories of trust funds are held bound to in-
quire into the trustee's conduct, a heavy burden is imposed upon
them and the administration of trusts is seriously obstructed.
Corporations whose securities are held in trust, and depositories of
trust funds, should not be held liable for participation in a breach
of trust in the absence of actual knowledge of the breach of trust
or conduct amounting to bad faith. This is the view expressed in
the English cases, although departures from it have occasionally
occurred. In Barnes v. Addy,80 Sir W. M. James, L. J., said:
"I have long thought, and more than once expressed my opinion from
this seat, that this Court has in some cases gone to the very verge of
justice in making good to cestuis que trust the consequences of the breaches
of trust of their trustees at the expense of persons perfectly honest, but
who have been, in some more or less degree, injudicious. I do not think
it is for the good of cestuis que trust, or the good of the world, that those
cases should be extended."
Are not these observations of peculiar force in the United States,

where courts of equity have gone further than in England in
making good to cestuis que trust the consequences of the breaches
of trust of their trustees, at the expense of third persons, who are
honest and not always even injudicious?
Austin Wakeman Scott.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.
80 L. R. g Ch. 244, 25I, 255, 256 (I874). See note 3I, supra.

24.35.161.171 on Sun, 03 Dec 2023 04:00:42 +00:00

Scott Participation Breach Trust 1921

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Scott Participation Breach Trust 1921

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Scott Participation Breach Trust 1921

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Participation in a Breach of Trust

Author(s): Austin Wakeman Scott

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1329469

This content downloaded from

PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUST

A NYONE who participates with a trustee in a breach of trust

This content downloaded from

struct the proper administration of trusts by making it difficult

effectually exonerate the person paying, transferring, or delivering the same fr

This content downloaded from

property is liable if he pays the purchase-price to the trustee with

This content downloaded from

is chargeable with notice of the existence of a trust; 13 and if he

This content downloaded from

inquiry, and is chargeable with notic

16 Stroughill v. Anstey, I DeG., M. & G. 635 (i852) (trustee); Sternfels v. Watson,

This content downloaded from

consent has been given.18 If there is no such instrument of which

18 Suarez v. de Montigny, i App. Div. 494, 37 N. Y. Supp. 503 (I896) (affirmed

This content downloaded from

to make an investigation as to the authority of the holder to

"To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect" in

Of course an indorsee of negotiable paper payable to a fiduciary is

21 "The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the

23 If a trustee incurs a debt in the administration of a trust, th

This content downloaded from

when the instrument is payable to a corporation and is indorsed by

This content downloaded from

same whenever the circumstances are such as to make it evident

It is of course possible that the fiduciary is authorized to make payment to himself

This content downloaded from

This content downloaded from

Such being the general rules as to purchasers of trust property,

This content downloaded from

had known of the trustee's dishonest design, he would have been

This content downloaded from

is to put upon the corporation responsibility for preventing breaches

"The consequence would be exceedingly alarming, if in all cases, where

The rule has recently been changed in Massachusetts by stat-

This content downloaded from

individually, keeping the trust off the register -an undesirable

SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS, 784.

This content downloaded from

This content downloaded from

banks to make any real investigation of the circumstances before

"To charge banks with the duty of supervising the administration of

Accordingly by the weight of authority a bank is not liable for

48 Coleman v. Bucks, etc. Bank, [I897] 2 Ch. 243 (trustee); Shields v. B

This content downloaded from

draws a check upon an account in another bank standing in his

This content downloaded from

and if it refuses without justification to honor his check it renders

This content downloaded from

Accordingly a drawee bank is not liable m

This content downloaded from

when after allowing a depositor to deposit fiduciary funds in his

This content downloaded from

negligence made possible the alteration.59 So also a bank is liable

This content downloaded from