Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79564 November 24, 1989

AURORA B. CAMACHO, petitioner,

Rodolfo B. Melliza for petitioner.

Angelino M. Banzon on his behalf as private respondent-intervenor.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for review presents procedural questions involving the remedial vehicle of intervention
as provided for in Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.

The facts are clear and undisputed. Petitioner Aurora Camacho, together with the Municipality
of Balanga, Bataan, filed Civil Case No. 424 on November 18, 1969 for forcible entry in the
municipal court of the same town against one Silvestre Tuazon. Petitioner was then
represented by private respondent Angelino M. Banzon as counsel of record.

In their complaint, it was alleged that the defendant was an agricultural lessee of Lot No. 261,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10.185 of the Register of Deeds of Bataan, who
surrendered his landholding by virtue of an agreement entitled "Agreement With Voluntary
Surrender" dated August 22, 1968. Defendant allegedly re-entered the lot in question by
force, strategy and stealth, thereby obstructing the construction of a provisional road to the
market site of the town as well as depriving the plaintiffs of possession thereof. 1

After trial on the merits, the inferior court rendered a decision, dated March 1, 1971, in favor of
the plaintiffs ordering the defendant to vacate the premises. The case was elevated by the
2

defendant to the then Court of First Instance of Bataan where it was assigned to Branch I
presided by Judge Abraham P. Vera, Docketed as Civil Case No. 3512, the case was tried de
novo (starting the case from the beginning w/o reference to any legal conclusion or
assumption) because no stenographic notes were taken of the proceedings in the inferior
court.

While the trial de novo was ongoing, private respondent was dismissed as counsel by
petitioner. This led to the filing of a complaint in intervention by private respondent on December
17, 1973 against both the petitioner, who was a plaintiff therein, and defendant Tuazon. Private
respondent's complaint in intervention was predicated on an alleged contract of attorney's
fees wherein petitioner was supposed to have bound herself to pay private respondent five
3

thousand (5,000) square meters of the lot in litigation for his legal services rendered in negotiating
for the transfer of the town's market site to petitioner's property. Additionally, private respondent
claimed one thousand (1,000) square meters of the lot which petitioner allegedly orally bound
herself to pay him as attorney's fees in handling her seven (7) other cases. It is averred that
4

his discharge from the case was without justifiable cause and with clear intent of avoiding
payment of the attorney's fees agreed upon. Private respondent further asserted that he
5

purchased from petitioner eighty (80) square meters and from third parties eight hundred (800)
square meters of the lot in question. Thus, private respondent, as intervenor, joined petitioner in
praying for the ejectment of the defendant but, at the same time, asked the trial court to order
petitioner to deliver to him the aforestated portions of Lot No. 261, plus rentals, additional attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation. 6

Nearly four (14) years after the complaint in intervention was filed, or on August 14, 1977, petitioner,
as plaintiff, and the defendant Silvestre Tuazon signed a compromise agreement which became the
basis of a judgment on compromise, dated August 31, 1977, in Civil Case No. 3512. Thereafter,
7

petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint in intervention in said case on the ground that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction to hear and try the same as the principal case for forcible entry was
already terminated. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated March 16, 1979. 8

Another motion to dismiss the same complaint for intervention was filed by petitioner on September
3, 1983 reiterating the same ground relied upon in the previous motion but with the additional ground
that the complaint was filed late for having been filed when the case was already on appeal. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration of the said order of denial, on
August 24, 1986 and October 14, 1986, respectively. 9

A petition for certiorari was filed in this Court on November 4, 1986 questioning the denial of said
motion to dismiss. On November 18, 1986, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court in its decision, dated February 26, 1987, dismissed the petition holding that the
motion for intervention was seasonably filed. It further held that the judgment on compromise
rendered by the trial court would not result in the dismissal of the complaint since the disposition
thereof was not yet complete as was evident from the denomination of the August 31, 1977 decision
of the trial court as a "Partial Decision." Petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on March
19, ,987 was denied in a resolution dated August 14, 1987 where it was further observed that "under
Section 26, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court,
intervene in the case to protect his rights."
10

The aforesaid disposition of respondent appellate court is assailed by petitioner, hence this petition.

Petitioner Camacho questions the timeliness of the complaint in intervention contending that
the filing thereof in the appealed case before the then court of first instance was improper
since the same may be permitted only "before or during a trial," as provided by Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner concedes that the case is being tried de novo but
maintains that intervention is not proper because the trial court is trying said case in the
exercise of its appellate, not its original, jurisdiction. 11

Under the procedure now in force, the regional trial court, in cases appealed from the inferior courts,
decides the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and briefs as may have been filed or required. Trial de novo is no longer
12

required. However, under the former procedure in Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, a
perfected appeal from the inferior court to the then court of first instance shall operate to vacate the
judgment of said inferior courts. The action when duly docketed in the court of first instance shall
stand for trial de novo upon its merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that court, as
though the same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced.
The said former rule nevertheless applies only to cases decided before August 4, 1969, when
Republic Act No. 6031 took effect, or in those cases where the proceedings in the inferior
court were not recorded. Under said law, when the proceedings in the inferior court had been
recorded, there would be no trial de novo on appeal in the former court of first instance as
said appellate court will merely review the evidence and records transmitted by the inferior
court, with the parties having the right, on motion to that effect, to file their briefs or
memoranda. As already stated, however, it follows as a logical consequence that a case
13

shall stand for trial de novo where the proceedings in the inferior court were not recorded.
The present case falls under the last mentioned situation since no stenographic notes were
taken during the trial in the municipal court.

Considering that the motion for intervention was filed during trial de novo in the then court of
first instance, we are convinced that private respondent intervened in due time. There is
sufficient authority to hold that the term "trial" referred to in Section 2 of Rule 12 includes the
trial de novo conducted by the trial Court. The basis of this view lies in the very nature of such
14

specific procedural rule since the then court of first instance will try the case without regard to the
proof presented in the municipal court or the conclusions arrived at by said court. As we have stated
on this particular aspect, "(t)he Court of First Instance will not affirm, reverse or modify the rulings or
the judgment appealed from, for the simple reason that there is no ruling or judgment to affirm,
reverse or modify because all the proceedings had in the justice of the peace or municipal court,
including the judgment, do not in contemplation of law exist, having been vacated." 15

The other issue submitted to this Court for consideration is the effect of the judgment on
compromise on the complaint in intervention. Petitioner submits that the trial court lost its
jurisdiction to hear and try the complaint in intervention, an ancillary case, after the principal
case of forcible entry was terminated by the approval of the court of the compromise
agreement. 16

Worthy of note, in this connection, is that the attorney's fees of a counsel may be claimed in
the very action in which the services in question have been rendered. As an incident of the
main action, the fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the
subject of recovery is at the disposition of the Court. 17

The foregoing rule applies where the counsel was dismissed without cause pending the litigation,
although the amount of recovery may be different depending on the circumstances. As observed by
respondent appellate court, the rules even provide that if the contract between the client and his
counsel has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause,
he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract and
may in the discretion of the court intervene to protect his rights.18

Complete reliance on this particular rule per se cannot, however, be made. The records show
that the intervenor claims properties supposedly due to him not only because of the legal
services rendered in the same case where it is being claimed but also in some other cases or
undertakings, as well as consequent to certain conveyances made in his favor. We must,
therefore, also view and take into account these other claims of the intervenor in the determination of
the effect of the judgment on compromise.

There is no question that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. Hence,
it was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal
of said ancillary action. The main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding
whereon the intervention may be based. In the case at bar, however, there was no such final or
19

complete dismissal but rather an approval of a compromise agreement which was embodied in what
was specifically designated as a "Partial Decision" affecting only the interests of herein petitioner
and the defendant in said case but not those of her co-plaintiff municipality arid the intervenor. The
clear intent of the court below in making the partial decision is to make a reservation to determine
the rights of the intervenor and, presumably, the plaintiff municipality. There may be nothing much
left to be done with respect to the main case but as far as the proceedings in the trial court are
concerned, the controversy therein has not been fully settled and the disposition of the case is
definitely incomplete.

It bears mention that the complaint in intervention was filed against the plaintiffs and the defendant in
said ease. The settlement forged by petitioner and the defendant therein would not necessarily settle
the lights of the intervenor and may even be prejudicial to the latter considering that his interest as
alleged in the complaint in intervention, if substantiated, will entitle him to portions of the property in
question.

Also, considerations of equity weigh heavily in favor of private respondent. To require private
respondent to refile another case for the settlement of his claims will necessarily result in
greater prejudice and delay, aside from the inevitable consequence that it will entail
multiplicity of suits. It should also be borne in mind that this complaint in intervention has
been pending for almost sixteen (16) years now, during which period private respondent has
already rested his case after presentation of evidence and petitioner is in the process of
presenting her own evidence. Predictably, the rights of the intervenor can no longer be as
20

adequately protected in another future proceeding which will require presentation anew of the same
evidence adduced in the hearings of the case below, some of which evidence may no longer be
available or extant by then. Undeniably, such cumbersome and duplicitous procedure would run
counter to the desirable legal norm required for the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.

Petitioner should also be faulted for not opportunely assailing the denial of her motion to
dismiss the intervention. After her motion was denied on March 16, 1979, she waited until
September 31, 1983 to again question the propriety of the proceedings on the complaint in
intervention. All throughout these intervening four (4) years, she did not avail herself of the
remedies provided by law. Such actuation of petitioner, bordering on, if not altogether
constitutive of, estoppel by laches ineluctably leads us to hold that her petition
for certiorari seeking to annul the purported improper grant of the motion for intervention
was not filed within the reasonable period of time required in the rules. In fine, the confluence
of the aforementioned considerations dictate that the adjudicative process on the questioned
intervention can validly proceed to its proper conclusion.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent appellate
court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.

Paras, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, 38.

2 Ibid., 44-46.

3 Ibid., 54.

4 Ibid., 49.

5 Ibid., 76.

6 Ibid., 52.

7 Ibid., 57-59.

8 Ibid., 60-62.

9 Ibid., 20, 63-65.

10 Ibid., 5-10, 12-13. The decision and resolution were penned by Justice Gloria C.
Paras, with the concurrence of Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T.
Limcaoco.

11 Ibid., 25.

12 Sec. 22, B.P. Blg. 129; Par. 21 (d). Interim Rules and Guidelines.

13 Sec. 45, R.A. No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031.

14 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed., Vol. I, 409.

15 Royal Shirt Factory, Inc. vs. Co Bon Tic 94 Phil. 994 (1954) and cases therein
cited.

16 Rollo, 21.

17 Otto Gmur Inc. vs. Revilla et al., 55 Phil. 627 (1931); Lichauco vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 63 SCRA 123 (1975); Quirante et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989.

18 Sec. 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

19 Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, et al., 148 SCRA 83 (1987).

20 Rollo, 9, 88.