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THIRD DIVISION

RODRIGO GALANDE, G .R. No. 255989

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CAGUIOA, J, Chairperson,

INTING,
GAERLAN,
DIMAAMPAO, and
SINGH,JJ.

FLO RD ELIZA ESPIRITU-

SARENAS and JIMMY 0. Promulgated:
ESPIRITU,
Respondents.
M~rch 1, 2023
x \'A.\~~
---------------------------- -w
- - - - -.... --------- - ---- x

DECISION

INTING, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing

the Decision 2 dated September 24, 2020 and the Resolution 3 dated
February 17, 2021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
159540. The CA reversed the Decision4 dated January 7, 2019 and the
Order5 dated February 7, 2019 ofBranch 38, Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Rollo, pp. 12- 31.

ld. at 33-68. Pe nn ed by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos and concun-ed in by A5sociate
Just ices Elihu A . Ybanez and Walter S. Ong.
Id. at 70- 76.
4
Id . at 99-104. Penned by Presiding Judge Leo Cec ili o D. Bautista.
id . at 105.
Decision 2 G .R. No. 255989

San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, in Civil Case No. 2018-799-SJC which
affirmed the Decision 6 dated September 25, 2018 of Branch 2, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, in Civil Case
No. (17) 4051 that granted petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer. 7

The Antecedents

Subject of the present controversy is a 4,606-square-meter parcel of

land located at Brgy. Pinili, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21865 8 (subject property), and
registered in the name of spouses Jose Salamanca and Lydia Ordanez
Salamanca (Spouses Salamanca). 9

On July 25, 2017, Rodrigo Galande (petitioner) filed a Complaint 10

for unlawful detainer against Flordeliza Espiritu-Sarenas (Flordeliza) and
Jimmy 0. Espiritu (Jimmy; collectively, respondents) with the MTCC.
Petitioner alleged therein that he has been in actual and continuous
possession of the subject prope1iy as tenant of Spouses Salamanca for
more than 40 years. 11 After Spouses Salamanca returned from the United
States of America, pet~tioner purchased the subject property from them on
an installment basis for a consideration oLP950,000.00. 12

In May 2015, while petitioner was still paying the installments on

the purchase price for the subject property, he allowed respondents to till
one-half of the subject property on the condition that the latter will vacate
it upon demand. 13

When petitioner demanded respondents to vacate the portion which

the latter were tilling, they refused to vacate the premises alleging that
they were fa1ming on the subject property based on the notice of adverse
claim of their late mother Gertrudes Ducusin (Gertrudes), as annotated on
TCT No. 21865 in 1966, claiming ownership over the one-half portion. 14

Id. at 93- 98. Penned by Presiding Judge Roberto Ricardo 0. Kanapi .

Id. at 97- 98.
Id. at 150- 153.
9
Id . at 34 .
10
Id . at 144-149.
11
ld.at145.
12
Id. at 99.
13
Id. at 146, 178.
14
Id. at 99-1 00.
Decision G.R. No. 255989

The Spouses Salamanca, ho-wever, refused to recognize Gertrudes'

notice of adverse claim; they den:ed having given respondents permission
to occupy portion of the subject property . 15

The paiiies failed to settle at the barangay conciliation

proceedings. 16 Thereafter, despite repeated verbal and written demands, 17
respondents refused to vacate the premises. Hence, petitioner instituted
the present complaint. 18

In their Answer, 19 respondents alleged that they are the heirs of

Gertrudes: Flordeliza is her daughter, while Jimmy is her grandson. In
view of the Adverse Claim 20 annotated on TCT No. 21865, respondents
averred that petitioner should have known that Gertrudes purchased one-
half of the subject property from Spouses Salamanca in 1966. 2 1 Moreover,
they asserted that from 1966 until her death on April 5, 2008, Gertrudes
had been in actual occupancy and enjoyment of the one-half portion of the
subject property as the buyer. It was for this reason that petitioner allowed
them to maintain their occupancy as owners by way of succession without
any condition of tolerance. They also averred that the annotation of the
adverse claim in 1966 was duly entered and could not be made subordinate
to the subsequent transactions supposedly entered into by petitioner. 22
Likewise, they questioned the validity and binding effect of the payments
on the purchase price received by Irene 0. Timbol because she did not
have a special power of attorney authorizing her to sell the subject
property or to receive payments from petitioner. Lastly, they asserted that
petitioner knew of their physical, legal, and incontrove1iible ownership
over the one-half portion that they were occupying and tilling in the
concept of owners as they were also paying the real estate taxes due on
the property.23

15
Id. at I 77- 178.
16
See Certificate to File Action, id . at 161.
17
See Letter dated May 23 , 2017 , id . at 162- 164.
18
Id. at 146- 147.
19
ld . at 166- 169.
20
Id. at 151.
21
Id. at 166.
2
" id. at 166- 167.
0
·' id. at 167- 168.
Decision 4 G.R. No . 255989

The Ruling of the MTCC

On September 25, 2018, the l\1TCC rendered a Decision24 in favor

of petitioner, disposing as follows :

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds for the plaintiffl]

and hereby orders the defendants [to]:

a. Vacate the property subject of TCT No. 21865 and remove all
improvements introduced therein; and
b. Pay reasonable rent in an amount not less than Php 2,000.00
per month from date of demand until the time the defendants
actually vacate the subject property;

SO ORDERED. 25

The MTCC found that all the elements of a case for unlawful
detainer were established by petitioner by a preponderance of evidence. 26

Undaunted, respondents appealed to the RTC.

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 7, 2019, the RTC upheld the findings and conclusions

of the MTCC and rendered its Decision, 27 the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the APPEAL is

DISMISSED and the DECISION of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
is AFFIRMED. The Court further ORDERS the defendants-appellants
to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 28

Respondents elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for

Review 29 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. They contended in the main
that the RTC erred in affirming the J\,1TCC Decision which favored

24
Id . at 93- 98.
25
Id. at 98 .
26
!d. at 95- 97.
27
id. at 99- 104.
28
Id . at 104.
29
id . at 77- 92.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 255989

petitioner for want of proof that th~ir possession of the subject property
was by mere tolerance of petitioner. 30

The Ruling of the CA

In the challenged Decision 31 dated September 24, 2020, the CA

granted the petition. The fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 7 January 2019 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
San Jose City is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the Complaint filed by respondent Rodrigo Galande in
Civil Case No . (17) 4051 for LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION. 32
(Emphasis omitted, italics in the original)

The CA ruled that petitioner failed to prove the first and second
requisites to establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. 33 It found
that respondents' possession of the one-half portion of the subject property
was made not by tolerance of the petitioner but by color of title; 34 that their
possession was in the concept of an owner on the basis of the Notice of
Adverse Claim annotated by their predecessor-in-interest, Gertrudes, on
the title of the subject property in 1966 which has remained outstanding; 35
and that respondents, therefore, cannot be ejected through an action for
unlawful detainer. 36

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 37 on November 4,

2020, but the CA denied38 it for lack of merit.

Hence, the Petition. 39

Petitioner raises the following grounds40 for the Court's resolution:

30
Id. at 87- 88.
31
Id. at 33- 68.
32
ld. at 67.
3
' Id. at 46.
34
Id. at 46- 50.
35
ld . at 50-61.
36
Id . at 61 - 67.
37
Id. at 280- 28 5.
38
Id . at 70- 76 .
39
Id . at 12- 31.
40
Id . at 19.
Decision 6 G.R. No . 255989

I
i

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT DID NOT
SATISFY THE JURISDiCTlONAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE.

II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT A NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM ANNOTATED
ON THE TITLE OF A PROPERTY REMAINS EFFECTIVE UNTIL
ORDERED CANCELLED BY A COURT.

The Issue

The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether the CA

committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for unlawful
detainer.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the petition.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that, as a general rule, the Court

is not a trier of facts 41 and will not recalibrate the evidence on record. 42
This rule, however, allows exceptions when the findings of fact of the trial
comi, as in this case, are contradicted by the findings of the CA,
warranting a second look for the proper dispensation of justice. 43

The CA ruled that an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy in this particular case considering that petitioner failed to prove
the first and second jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain
a summary action for unlawful detainer-particularly, prior physical
possession and tolerance. 44 lt ruled that the transfer of possession of the
portion of the subject prope1iy to respondents was not by virtue of
petitioner's tolerance based on their promise to return possession on

41
Heirs o._f Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs o/P,tronila Syquia k fendoza , 810 Ph ii. 172, 177- 173 (2017).
See also Racadio v. Spouses Vinluan , G.R. No. 207998 (Notice), June 16, 2021.
42
S~v v. Spouses Antonio, G.R. No. 230 I 2{J, .l11ly 5, 2021.
43
Barcelo v. Riparip, G.R. No. 250159. Apri! 26, 2021 , citing Sps. Fahrc:nbaci: 1·. f'cmgiiin,m, 815
Phil. 696, 705 (20 17).
44
Rollo, pp. 43-4 7.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 255989

demand; rather, the transfer was " by agreement" in that petitioner

recognized the annotation on the title showing the adverse claim of
Gertrudes over the one-half portion 0f the subject property. 45 In view
thereof, the CA rejected petitioner's allegation that respondents'
possession was by mere tolerance with a promise to return possession on
demand. On the contrary, it pointed out that the notice of adverse claim
annotated on the title of the subject property was admittedly the basis of
petitioner for the transfer of possession of the portion of the subject
property to respondents. 46

The Court differs from the CA' s ruling and agrees with the findings
of the MTCC and the RTC that petitioner has proven by preponderant
evidence that respondents' possession was by mere tolerance.

It bears to note that the permission given by petitioner for

respondents to till the portion of the land cannot be considered an
agreement, much more an acknowledgment that respondents were the
owners thereof. Neither can petitioner's permission be construed as a
waiver of his rights of ownership over the subject property by virtue of its
purchase from Salamancas. 47 Moreover, respondents cannot rely on the
notice of adverse claim to bolster their claim of ownership and c01Telative
right to possess the one-half portion of the subject property.

Petitioner was able to sufficiently

prove the element of tolerance.

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the
following:

(1) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property , either

by contract or by plaintiffs tolerance;

(2) the plaintiff notified defend ant that his right of possession is
tenninated;

(3) the defendant remained in _possession and deprived plaintiff of

its enjoyment; and

45
Id . at 49.
6
" id. at 62 .
47
See id . at 96-9 7.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 255989

(4) the plaintiff filed the c:,:,rnpl;-i.i11t within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vac3tc the propeiiy. 48

The Court has held that an unlawful detainer complaint based on

tolerance must show that (a) tolerance is present right at the inception of
the possession; and ( b) there are ove1i acts indicative of such tolerance, as
bare allegation of tolerance alone wili not suffice. 49

On this score, the Court finds that petitioner was able to sufficiently
establish that respondents ' occupancy of the subject lot was by mere
tolerance. In addition, the Court agree~ with the finding of the MTCC, as
affirmed by the RTC, that petitioner was the prior possessor, and had been
in continuous possession, of the subject property as a tenant thereof until
May 2015, when he allowed respondents to till the one-half portion on the
condition that they will vacate upon demand. Thus:

In the present case, plaintiff was able to present evidence that,

initially , possession of the property by the defendants was by tolerance
of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff was in actual and continuous possession of the

subject parcel of land, being the tenant of the Salamancas. In May
2015, plaintiff allowed the defendants to till half of the subject
property and plant tomatoes on the condition that they will vacate
the same upon demand. Since then, plaintiff tolerated the
defendants' possession of the subject property.

Moreover, there is no dispute that demand was made for the

defendants to voluntarily vacate the premises but [they] refused to leave
and remained in possession of the property. Thus, plaintiff was
deprived of the enjoyment of the subject property. This is evidenced by
the LETTER both dated 23 May 2017 giving defendants fifteen ( 15)
days from receipt to vacate the premises. Consequently, upon notice,
defendants' possession became i Uegal. so (Emphasis suppl ied)

As correctly ruled by the trial courts, respondents' possession of the

one-half portion of the subject property from the time petitioner allowed
them to till it in May 2015 had been merely by tolerance; thus, they were
bound to surrender their possession thereof upon demand. While initially

48 GSJS v. Espenilla, G.R. No. 203267 (Notice), October 6, 2021 , c iting lntramuros Administration
v. 0.ffshor<=' Construction Dev 't. Co., 81.7 Phil. 303 ,324 (2018) .
49 Marquez v. Andres-Vergara, G .R. No. 2298 18 (Notice), February 3, 2020, citing Spous es Cruz v.
Spouses Cri:z, 6 16 Phil. 519, 525 - 526 (200ti) d!ld !bot v. Heirs of Francisco Tayco , 757 Phil. 441 ,
4 52 (2 015 ).
50
Id. at 102. Underscoring omitted.
Decision G.R. No . 255989

lawful, their right of possession ended when they refused to vacate the
property upon petitioner's demand. 51 \\Tith respondents' refusal to comply
with the demand to vacate, petitioner had the right to institute the
complaint for unlawful detainer ag,8.inst them.

The allegations, as well as the facts borne out by the records of the
case, evince that petitioner had been in possession of the subject prope1iy
for 40 years as a tenant of the Salamancas. 52 Respondents have not refuted
this fact in their Answer. 53 Neither have they disputed the fact that they
sta1ied tilling a portion of the subject lot only in May 2015 upon
permission given to them by petitioner. Moreover, respondents failed to
establish that petitioner allowed them to till the subject property in
recognition of their deceased predecessor' s right who had an adverse
claim annotated on the title of the subject property. 54 Notably, the
subsequent denial by Spouses Salamanca- the registered owners of the
subject property- that they had given pennission for respondents to till
the one-half portion of subject property, as well as their refusal to
recognize the adverse claim, ilegated all of respondents' claims over the
subject property. 55 Thus, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the
premises.

Illuminating the concept of an unlawful detainer action as provided

under Section 1, 56 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Court in GSJS v.
Espenilla 57 held:

Particularly, an action for unlawful detainer exists when a

person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or bui Iding against
or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,

51
ld . at 96- 97 , 102- 103.
52
ld.at93 , 99 .
53
See Answer, id. at 167- 168.
54 See Answer, id . al 167 . See also Position Paper for the Defendan ts, id. at 220.
55
ld . at 178, 244.
56 Section I, Rule 70 of the Ru les of Court provides:
SECTION I. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provi s ion~ o f the next
succeeding section, a person depri ved of the po~session of an y land or buildin g by fo rc;e,
intimidation , threat, strategy, or stealth, ma lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the posses.; ion of any land or building is un iawfu lly withhe ld after the ex piration or termination of
the right to ho ld possession , by virtue o f any con tract, express or im plied, or the lega l
representatives or assign s of any such kssor, vendor. vendee, or other person , may, at an y tim e
within on e ( I ) year after such unlawful deDri vat1 on or withholding of possessi,)n, bring an acti on
in the proper Municipal Tt ia! Court ag,:in:;t rh e per~on or pecsons un lawfull y withholdin g or
depriving of possession , or any persoP. 'X perso ns chii;r ing uncter them , fo r the rest:tuti on of ~u :::h
possess ion , together with damages and c;0~ts.
57
Supra note 48 .
Decision lO G.R. No. 255989

express or implied. Where poss.::ssion by a party was originally legal ,

as it was pem1itted by the other par!y on account of an express or
implied contract between thc,11. tlw po::.-:ses~ion can become illegal when
the other party demands that th~ p0ssessor vacate the subject property
and the possessor refuses to heed rh·~ demand. This is because after a
demand to vacate, the right to possess is terminated. Alternatively ,
possession of a property belongir:g to another may be tolerated or
permitted, even without a p;·ior ccntract between that parties, as long
as there is an implied promise that the occupant will vacute upon
demand. Refitsal to vacate de.spite demand will give rise to an action
for summary ejectment. 58 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In an unlawful detainer case grounded on tolerance, while the

possession is initially lawful, "such possession becomes illegal from the
moment a demand to vacate is made by the owner and the possessor [by
tolerance] refuses to comply with such demand." 59 It must be stressed that
"a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them." 60 This
is because such right of possession is terminated after a demand to vacate
is made. 61 It is an essential requirement therefore that the plaintiffs
supposed act of tolerance must be present right from the start of the
possession that is later sought to be recovered. 62

In an ejectment suit, the on~y issue is

possession de facto-that zs, the
determination of who has the better
right ofpossession over the property.

"It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectrnent cases is physical

or material possession of the subject property, independent of any claim
of ownership by the parties." 63 In such cases, "possession" refers to "prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or that

58 Id.
59 Racadio v. Spouses Vinluan. supra note 41 , J1me l 6, 2021 , citing Ballesleros v_ A hion, 517 Phil.
253 , 266 (2006).
60 Ybiosa v. Alegria, G.R. No. 23 l 940 (Notice), june '.27. 2021 , citing Calubay an v. Pascual, 128 Phil.
160, 163 (1%7). See also Quevada v. Co11rl cfAµp eals , 533 Phil. 527, 539 (2006) and f-.feirs ,Jj
Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus , 5 l l Phil. ! 4, 27 (2005).
61
GS/S v. Espenifla , supra note 48 .
62 Barcelo v. Riparip, supra note 43.
"3 Salazar v. Sos. lustre, G.R. No. 217~84 (~i r:,tice), Jun e 23, 2021 , citin g Holy Trinil_v Really DE"v 't
Corp v. Sp.;. A bacan, 709 Phil. 653. fi6i (7 013). S.:c alc,o Ti?ia v. Sta. Cfa ,·u Es1a1e, i'nc., G.R. No.
239979. February 17, 2020 .
 11
Decision -' I G.R. No. 255989

arising from ownership"; thus, title is not the issue on hand. 64 For this
purpose, it would be "sufficient for a claimant to prove prior physical
possession even from the owner ot the property to recover his [or her]
possession." 65 As a rule, courts :::i;::co,.- d respect to persons who are in prior
possession of a property, as they enjoy a disputable presumption of
ownership. 66 Thus, as long as a person has prior possession in time, he or
she "has the security that entitles him [or her] to remain on the property
until a person with a better right Ja,.vfully ejects him [or her],'' regardless
of the character of the prior possession. 67

Elucidating on the summary nature of ejectment proceedings which

are limited to the resolution of possession de fa cto, the Court in David v.
Butay68 discoursed :

Thus, in Pajuyo v. Court of App eals, the Com1 ruled that a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself~thus:

The only question that the courts must resolve

in ejectment proceedings is who - is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de Jure. It
does not even matter if a party' s title to the property is
questionable, or wh en hoth parties intruded into public
land and their applications to own the land have yet to
be approved by the proper government agency.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the pai1y in peaceable quiet possessi on shall
not be thrown out by a strong hand , violence or terror.
Neither is the unlawfui withholding of property
allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior p ossession

can recover such p ossession even against the owner
himself Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his fa vor prior possessirm in
time, he has the secw iiy thut eatitles him to remain on
the property until u per.,c,11 with a better rzght lm1iful!y
ej ec/'s him. To repeac, the only issue that the court has to

64 Palaj os 11. Abad, G .R. No. 205832, March 7, 20:22. c it in g: Madayag 11. lv.(aduyag. G. R. No . 2 17576,
.l anuarv 20, 2020 .
65 Sps. !\.!e/iston v. A l ty. Okit, G .R. No. 279 7'.:,3 (No tice), July 28, 202 1, citi ng Sps. Ocampo v. Heirs
ofBernardino U. Dionisio, 744 Phil. 7 16, 72 7 - 728 ('2 0 14).
66 Vew San Juse Builders, Inc. 11. GSIS . G .R. Nos. 2G068~,. 2007 l 0, 20 l 51t6 & 21 l 5 12, July 28, 202 1.
67 Sps. Melislon 11. Atty. Okit , supra, c iting Spo11sr-;s An1ri:::o 11. Doblada, 625 Phi l. 423 , 429(20 10).
68 G.R. No. 22 0996, A pril 26, 2022.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 255989

settle in an ejectrnent suit is the right to physical

possession. 69 (Citati ons timitteJ , emphasis in the
original)

Here, petitioner has proveJ1 hi~ physical possession of the subject

property prior to deprivation thereof by respondents . On the other hand,
respondents, while admitting such prior physical possession by petitioner,
assert that their subsequent possession was not by petitioner's tolerance
but by color of title or ownership as heirs of Gertrudes .70

While the sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is

merely physical or material possession of the property involved, when the
defendant therein raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession - that is, to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. 7 1 It must be emphasized, however, that
the adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the property .72

Here, respondents, as heirs of Gertrudes, assert ownership over the

one-half portion of the subject proper ty based on the adverse claim of
Gertrudes. However, their claim of ownership, as the corollary basis for
their alleged right of possession, cannot prevail as against that of
petitioner.

. Apposite to petitioner' s claim that he has been in possession of th e

subject property for 40 years as tenant and subsequently as owner of the
subject lot by its purchase 73 from Spouses Salamanca, respondents could
only rely on Gertrudes' adverse claim as annotated on TCT No. 21865 74
covering the subject property. It bears to note that the annotation on the
title was entered in 1966 and was merely carried over to the Memorandum
of Encumbrances for TCT Nu . 21865 , which was issued on June 3, 1998
in the name of Spouses Salamanca as registered owners.

69 !d.
70
See Respondents· Comment to the Pc-tirion fo r ~. cv 1ew 011 Certiorari, id. at 2<}0<~9 1 .
7! See Sps. Dela Cruz v. Sps. Capen, T29 i"hil . 62+. 637 ('.L01 4).
72 Heirs a/Spouses Marianu v. City of Nag(:. 8:! : F't1ii. 531 , 550 (20 18).
n Rollo, pp. l 98-203.
7
': id. at 150- 153.
 Decision '.,
J _, G.R. No. 255989

A notice of adverse c'.aic1 by its nature, does not prove

respondents' ownership over the si_;hject property. The annotation of a
notice of adverse claim on the fri'ie of tnc disputed property is nothing but
a notice of a claim adverse tc. the t1::gisti:;red owner, the validity of which
is yet to be established in court in a separa!e proceeding. 75 In fact, it is the
ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register a notice of adverse
claim which it finds sufficieI't i!l form and substance. As to whether the
adverse claim is valid and has basis is a different matter.

Under Section 70 76 of Presid~ntiai Decree No . 1529, 77 the reason

why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of
the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his or
her claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of
determining at last the existence of any encumbrance on the title arising
from such adverse claim. 78

If respondents believe that they are the owners of the alleged one-
half portion that they have been allowed to farm, they are not precluded
from filing the necessary action to recover ownership of the subject
property and assume possession of the portion that is rightfully theirs. As

75
Acap v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. JX I, :)q2 ( 1995).
76
Section 70 of PD 1529 provides:
SECTION 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any par!: or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subseq ue:it to the date of the original registration , may. if no other
provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in wriLing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of
the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a descriptio n
of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to. and shall state the adverse clai mant's residence, and
a place at which all notices may be served upon him . This statement shall be entitled to registration
'l.S an adverse claim on the certificate of title . The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration . After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be canceled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Prov ided,
however, that after cance llation, no seco:-,d adverse claim based on the smne ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforc"3aid, any party in interest may file a petition in lhc Cou1t of
First Instance where the land is situat;:d for the cance liat ion of the adverse claim , and the court shall
grant a speedy hearing upon the que,tio:1 of ~h e validity of such adverse claim , and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitalile. :r the adverse claim is adjudged to be inva lid, the
regi stration thereof shall be ordered canceled it. :n ,my case, the COLl!t. after notice and hearing,
shall find that the adverse claim th1Js rcg. istcrec! was frivolous, it r,rny fi ne th e cl a imant in ;rn i.il?l•Junt
not less than one thou sand pesos nor '.1iore than fi ve thousand pesos, in its di scretion. Befo;·e th e
lap~e of thirty days, the claimant may wii11•ir::: w hi s adverse claim by tiling with th e Register of
Deeds a sworn petiti on to that effect.
77
Entitled "' Amending and Codifying the Laws Rel<1 ti v:c to Registrnti on of Pro perty und fo r Other
Purposes,'' '.lpproved on June 1 l , 1978.
6
' Equatorial Reaity Devefop,.,1 ent, Inc. ;, :>~• :;;_ Frng:.1::0 . 470 Phii. 47, 6 l (20()4).
Decision 14 G.R. No. 255989

already adverted to, the adjudication in this case is conclusive only with
respect to the issue of possession de facto over the subject property and
not the ownership thereof.

The CA, therefore, erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for

unlawful detainer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

September 24, 2020 and the Resolution dated February 17, 2021 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 159540 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 7, 2019 of Branch 38,
Regional Trial Court, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, in Civil Case No. 2018-
799-SJC, affirming the Decision dated September 25 , 2018 of Branch 2,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, in Civil Case
No. (17) 4051, is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION in
that the rentals due to petitioner Rodrigo Galande shall earn legal interest
at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of
this Decision until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

HEN

WE CONCUR:

INS. CAGUIOA
Decision 15 G.R. No. 255989

iAMU~N
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above ecision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigne to the er of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

S. CAGUIOA
te
Chairperson, Thira Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.