Rule 108

Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid

grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship (l)
civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceeding is

brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings.

Sec. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

G.R. No. 211435

RAMON CORPUS TAN, Petitioner

vs.
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and THE REYES, J. JR.,
and LAZARO-JAVIER, JJ NATIONAL STATISTICS Promulgated: OFFICE OF QUEZON CITY
(now PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY), Respondents

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision dated September
1 2

27, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
3

No. 98952, which affirmed the Orders dated December 27, 2011 and May 18, 2012 of the Regional
4 5

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 (RTC) in Spec. Proc. No. 11-126383, a special proceeding for
correction of entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by herein
petitioner.

The Facts

On September 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry before the RTC. Realizing
6

that he failed to implead the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila (LCR Manila) and the
National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority PSA), petitioner filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Petition and an Amended Petition for Correction of Entry on September
7 8

30, 2011, this time impleading the aforesaid offices as respondents.

In his Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that he was born on November 13, 1965 at St. Paul
Hospital in the City of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the civil registry of Manila; that he
had been using his real name "Ramon Corpuz Tan" during his lifetime; that when he later secured a
copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he discovered that his name was entered as "Ramon Corpus
Tan Ko" instead of his true and correct name which is "Ramon Corpuz Tan"; that the aforesaid
material errors and mistakes in the entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence
and error of the hospital personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that "Ko," which was the first
name of his father, was inadvertently included in his last name; and that the mistake was not
immediately rectified because he only discovered the same, after having his own children.

In support of his claim and prayer, petitioner appended the following documents to his petition:, (a)
Diploma from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (b) Certification from the Philippine Chung Hua
School stating that petitioner completed his kindergarten course therein; (c) Secondary Report Card
from the Philippine Chung Hua School; (d) COMELEC Voter's Identification Card; (e) COMELEC
Voter's Affidavit; (f) BIR Tax Identification Number and Identification Card (g) Community Tax
Certificate issued by Quezon City; and (h) Certificate of Marriage to Maria Teresa Gatuz.

After finding the petition sufficient in form, the RTC set the case for hearing on November 23, 2011.
On November 23, 2011, petitioner and his counsel appeared for the hearing of the case for purposes
of the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. On the same day, petitioner testified through his
judicial affidavit.

The petitioner was also cross-examined by the prosecutor who was deputized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).

On November 24, 2011, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Formal Offer of Exhibits. Among the
pieces of evidence offered in evidence in support of petitioner's material allegations are: (1)
Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit; (2) Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's name as "Ramon
9

Corpus Tan Ko"; (3) BIR Identification Card indicating petitioner's name as "Tan Ramon
10

Corpuz"; (4) Firearm License Card indicating petitioner's name as "Tan, Ramon Corpuz"; (5)
11 12

PhilHealth Identification Card indicating petitioner's name as "Tan, Ramon Corpuz"; (6) Certificate
13

of Marriage; and (7) Certificates of Live Birth of petitioner's children. The Republic of the
14 15

Philippines (Republic) did not interpose any objection to the offer.

On December 2, 2011, the RTC issued an Order admitting the pieces of evidence offered.
16

Ruling of the RTC

In its assailed Order dated December 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the subject petition for correction
of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that the petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of an
adversarial proceeding noting that the correction sought for, is a substantial correction and is
governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which is not summary, but an adversarial proceeding.

The trial court explained that Section 3, Rule 108, requires all interested persons who may be
affected by the petition to be made parties thereto. The trial court noted that aside from the fact that
in Entry No. 3, petitioner's last name was indicated as "Tan Ko," the name of petitioner's father was
also indicated as "Tan Ko" in Entry No. 7. Moreover, in Entry No. 17, petitioner's mother, Trinidad
Corpuz, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" over her printed name as informant. Thus, noting that petitioner
claimed that his father was already dead, the trial court declared that petitioner's mother should have
been made a party to the case. Since his mother was not impleaded as a party, petitioner failed to
comply with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding. The dispositive portion of the RTC Order
states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 17

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in its May 18,
2012 Order.

Not satisfied, the petitioner elevated an appeal to the CA. 18

Ruling of the CA

In its Decision dated September 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the December 27, 2011 and May 18,
2012 Orders of the RTC. The appellate court concurred with the trial court that the error sought to be
corrected is a substantial one which requires an adversarial proceeding. It observed that the
surname "Tan Ko" consistently appeared in petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth, specifically in the
entries of his name, as well as in the names of both his parents. Thus, it opined that the alleged
mistake was not only a misspelled surname but involves a deletion of a word which entails a change
in the surname. It then stressed that the correction of petitioner's surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan"
would be an adjudication that indeed his father's first name is "Ko" and his surname is "Tan." In
effect, the correction prayed for would entail not only a substantial change in his name, but would
also affect the identity of his father. Hence, an adversarial proceeding is required.

The appellate court ruled that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner is insufficient to
cause the change of his surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan." It stated that while the documentary
evidence presented by the petitioner may show that he had been using the surname "Tan," they do
not prove that "Tan" is his correct surname.

The appellate court submitted that petitioner should have impleaded or at least presented his mother
to testify considering that she was the informant in his Certificate of Live Birth, and is, therefore, the
best person to testify on the details surrounding his birth. However, petitioner did not implead or
present his mother as a witness. Clearly, he failed to substantiate his claim that the "Ko" in his
surname was erroneously entered. The appellate court further noted that in petitioner's Certificate of
Live Birth, it was stated that his mother gave birth to three children prior to petitioner's birth.
However, not one of his siblings or even just their birth certificates were presented to bolster the
claim that indeed their surname is "Tan" and not "Tan Ko." The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and the December 27, 2011 Order and the May 18, 2012 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, stationed in Manila in Spec. Proc. No. 11-126383 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its February 24, 2014
Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER FAILED TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE.

Petitioner insists that the error sought to be corrected is merely a clerical error which does not
require a material or substantial alteration so as to necessitate an adversarial proceeding. He argues
that changing his surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan" would not materially affect his relationship with his
mother or his deceased father. The correction of his name would not involve an alteration on his
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity, filiation, or legitimacy of marriage.

Petitioner also claims that her mother could not be considered as a real party-in-interest in his
petition for correction of entry by the mere fact that she appears to be the informant in the subject
Certificate of Live Birth. After all, whatever happens to his petition, whether it be granted or denied,
his mother would not be affected as her surname would still remain as "Corpuz." He further states
that he was not even sure about the authenticity of the purported signature of his mother as
appearing in his Certificate of Live Birth. Thus, petitioner asserts, it is clear that the error in the entry
of his name was committed by other persons who prepared his Certificate of Live Birth, particularly,
the personnel at St. Paul Hospital, Manila where he was born.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that he properly impleaded the LCR Manila, and no other, considering
that no other person would be affected by his petition. He also stresses that the OSG, through the
deputized prosecutor, participated in the case. Thus, petitioner submits that the requirement of
adversarial proceeding, if any was required, has been substantially complied with. In sum, the
petitioner prays for the Court to issue an order directing the correction of his name to "RAMON
CORPUS TAN."

In its Manifestation dated July 18, 2014, the Republic, through the OSG, adopted as its Comment
20

the Appellee's Brief it filed before the CA. In its Appellee's Brief/Comment, the Republic submits
21

that the petitioner has substantially complied with the procedural requirements of an adversary
proceeding. Nevertheless, it contends that petitioner failed to prove his cause of action by clear and
substantial evidence. That petitioner has shown reasonable cause and compelling reason for the
correction of his name, is immaterial to his case. The Republic points out that reasonable cause and
compelling reason are relevant only to a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and not to a petition for correction of entry under Rule 108. Thus, the dismissal of the subject
petition for correction of entry is correct.

The Court's Ruling

The petition utterly lacks merit.

The correction sought by petitioner

involves a substantial change, not a
mere clerical error.

At the onset, the Court notes that the change sought by petitioner in his Petition for Correction of
Entry before the RTC is inconsistent with the correction he prays for in the present petition. In his
Petition for Correction of Entry before the trial court, petitioner prayed that his name be corrected
from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon CORPUZ Tan." This is consistent with his government-
issued identification cards and other supporting documents he submitted.

In the present petition, however, he prays that his name be rectified from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to
"Ramon CORPUS Tan." The Court considers this variance as a result of a typographical error due
perhaps to the ineptness of petitioner's counsel. Thus, for purposes of this petition, the Court
considers the correction to "Ramon CORPUZ Tan" as petitioner's proper prayer considering that it is
the one consistent with his supporting documents.

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the proceeding for the cancellation or correction of
any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register. 22

In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia, the Court declared that a petition for correction of entry
23

under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court covers not only clerical errors, but also substantial changes.
The difference lies only on the procedure which would govern the correction sought. "If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted
is adversary."24
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by
a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other
hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. Substantial and
25

controversial alterations include those which may affect the citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage.
26

Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live Birth or any of the parents
indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial matters which would require an
adversarial proceeding.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Benemerito (Benemerito), the respondent Petronio L. Benemerito

27

filed a petition for the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of his son who was born
on June 1, 1990. He claimed that his name was incorrectly entered in the Certificate of Live Birth as
"Peter Laurente Benemerito." He also sought to change the date of his marriage to his wife as
entered in the birth certificate from September 1, 1989 to January 25, 1998. The Republic argued
that the changes sought by respondent are substantial, and not innocuous. As such, an adversarial
proceeding to fully ventilate respondent's allegations is required.

The Court agreed with the Republic and declared that the corrections sought by the respondent
could hardly qualify as just clerical errors. The Court explained that in order to effect the desired
changes, it would be essential to establish that "Peter Laurente Benemerito" and the respondent
Petronio L. Benemerito refer to the same person. Further, the intended alteration on the date of the
marriage from September 1, 1989 to January 25, 1998 would, in effect, change the status of the
child from legitimate to illegitimate considering that his parents were not yet legally married at the
time he was born on June 1, 1990.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Lugsanay Uy, the respondent sought the "correction" of her name
28

in her Certificate of Live Birth from "Anita Sy" to "Norma S. Lugsanay." She claimed that she was
born on February 8, 1952, and the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. She argued
that as an illegitimate child, her surname should follow that of her mother's. She further alleged that
she is known to her family and friends as "Norma Lugsanay" and that her school records and other
legal documents bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

The Court noted that the entries sought to be corrected are substantial alterations, and not mere
clerical errors, as they touched upon respondent's filiation and citizenship. The Court reasoned that
changing respondent's surname from "Sy" to "Lugsanay" would change her status from legitimate to
illegitimate.

In this case, the alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a readily apparent mistake.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the correction sought would definitely have an effect on his filiation
with the persons named in his Certificate of Live Birth.

As aptly observed by the appellate court, the name "Tan Ko" has been consistently used not only in
the entries for petitioner's name, but also for that of his parents. In entry No. 7, the name of
petitioner's father was entered as "Tan Ko," while his mother's name was entered as "Trinidad
Corpus Tan Ko" in entry No. 12. Furthermore, his mother, as the informant for petitioner's birth
certificate, signed as "T.C. Tan Ko" in entry No. 17.
Verily, the "correction" of petitioner's name from "Ramon Corpus Tan Ko" to "Ramon Corpuz Tan"
would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the names of his parents as entered in his
Certificate of Live Birth.

As correctly explained by the appellate court, altering petitioner's surname from "Tan Ko" to "Tan"
would, in effect, be an adjudication that the first name of his father is indeed "Ko" and his surname
"Tan." Clearly, the correction would affect the identity of petitioner's father. Moreover, there would be
a need to correct his mother's name from "Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko" to "Trinidad Corpuz Tan." This
would require deleting the word "Ko" from "Tan Ko" and changing the letter "s" to "z" in "Corpus."
Following Benemerito, to effect the correction, it would be essential to establish that "Trinidad
Corpus Tan Ko" and "Trinidad Corpuz Tan" refer to the same person. A summary proceeding would
certainly be insufficient to effect such substantial corrections.

Petitioner failed to comply with the

procedural requirements of an
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108.

Petitioner claims that even if the correction sought involves a substantial change, he has
substantially complied with the requirement of appropriate adversarial proceeding when he
impleaded LCR Manila and after he caused the publication of the notice setting his petition for
hearing in accordance with Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Republic, through the
OSG, submits that indeed the petitioner has substantially complied with the procedural requirement
of an adversary proceeding. Both the petitioner and the Republic mention the cases of Barco v.
Court of Appeals (Barco) and Republic of the Philippines v. Kho (Kho) as authorities in support of
29 30

their submission that the failure to implead indispensable parties could be cured by compliance with
the publication requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108.

Reliance on Barco and Kho is misplaced. These cases are inapplicable to the present petition.

Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register, shall be made parties to the proceeding.

In Barco, therein private respondent Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entry
in order to change the person named as the father in the birth certificate of her daughter. The local
civil registrar that recorded the subject birth certificate was impleaded along with Francisco Maravilla
(Francisco), the person originally named as the father, and Armando Gustilo (Armando), the person
said to be the real father. Notably, Francisco and Armando interposed no objection to the correction.
Eventually, the trial court granted the petition for correction of entry.

A petition was later filed before the CA seeking the annulment of the RTC Order. Milagros Barco
(Milagros) filed a petition-in-intervention before the CA arguing that she and her daughter have legal
interest in the annulment of the RTC Order. She explained that her daughter is also the child and
heir of Armando, the alleged real father in Nadina's petition for correction of entry. As such, she and
her daughter should have been impleaded therein, failing which, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction. The CA, however, dismissed the petition and petition-in-intervention.

The Court concurred with the CA's conclusion that the failure to implead an indispensable party,
such as Milagros, in the petition for correction of entry was cured by the compliance with the
publication requirement under Section 4 of Rule 108. The Court reasoned that it could not be
established whether Nadina knew of the existence of Milagros' daughter at the time the former filed
the petition for correction. The Court explained that doubt may always be cast as to whether a
petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. The Court stated, thus:

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was
affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of
Armando would affect her ward's share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether
Nadina knew of Mary Joy's existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt
may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose
interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed
to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that
Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to
comply with Section 3 as quoted above.

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out
that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by
publication[.] x x x
31

xxxx

On the other hand, in Kho, the private respondents who were siblings filed a petition for correction of
the entries in their respective birth certificates. They prayed, among others, that the word "married"
opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" be deleted because their parents were not legally
married. Private respondent Carlito Kho, one of the siblings, also sought the correction of the entries
in the birth certificates of his children, specifically, the correction of the date of marriage between him
and his wife from "April 27, 1989" to "January 21, 2000," the latter date being the date appearing in
their marriage certificate; and the correction of the name of his wife's first name from "Maribel" to
"Marivel."

The Republic opposed the corrections and contended that since the changes prayed for were
substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which
indispensable parties, such as Marivel and the private respondents' parents, should have been
notified or impleaded.

The Court, however, dismissed the Republic's contentions ruling that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with, the appropriate adversary proceeding is satisfied.
The Court stressed that it is highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to
correct the entries in her children's birth certificates considering that the notices, orders, and decision
of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and their children. With
respect to the private respondents' parents, the Court noted that their father died in 1959. On the
other hand, their mother was presented as a witness and testified as to the material allegations of
the petition for correction of entries.

From the foregoing, it is clear that there are circumstances which impelled the Court to excuse the
failure to implead indispensable parties in proceedings for cancellation or correction of entry.
In Barco, it is the supposed lack of knowledge or awareness of the petitioner of the existence of
other persons who would be affected by the corrections she sought. In Kho, it is the affected
persons' inferred notice and actual awareness of the proceedings for the correction of entries.

The circumstances in Barco and Kho are unavailing in this case. It could not be said that petitioner
1âшphi1

was unaware of the existence of other persons who may be affected by the corrections sought. It is
his own mother who would be affected by the proceeding for correction of entry which he filed. As
already discussed, his mother's name in the subject birth certificate would necessarily be changed if
the correction prayed for is granted. Further, petitioner's mother has neither been shown nor alleged
to have been living in the same residence with petitioner, unlike in Kho. Thus, there was no showing
or, at the very least, reason to believe that her mother was even aware of the subject proceeding for
correction of entry.

Contrary to the submissions by the parties, it is Lugsanay Uy which finds application to the present
32

petition. In said case, the private respondent sought the "correction" of her name in her Certificate of
Live Birth from "Anita Sy" to "Norma S. Lugsanay," impleading the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog
City as respondent. The Court ruled that respondent should have impleaded her parents and siblings
as the persons who have interest, and are affected by the changes or corrections she wanted to
make. Simply put, impleading and notifying only the local civil registrar is not enough, to wit:

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices
to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were
made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was
likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties; or when a party is inadvertently left out. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
33

Petitioner failed to prove his cause

of action.

Even on the assumption that petitioner complied with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding
under Rule 108, the corrections prayed for could not be granted.

It is well to stress that as a public document, a registered birth certificate, duly recorded in the local
civil registry, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. While it may be true that as a
34

mere prima facie evidence, the facts contained in a birth certificate are not conclusive and may still
be rebutted, still, a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of the truth
contained in such public document. 35

The petitioner utterly failed to overcome the presumption of truth contained in his birth certificate.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner,
consisting of government-issued identification cards and other public documents, only prove that he
had been using the surname "Tan," but not the fact that his father's surname was indeed "Tan."
Aside from being insufficient for the purpose of rebutting the truth of the entries in his birth certificate,
these identification cards and documents are also immaterial to his cause of action. As argued by
the Republic, the evidence presented by petitioner and his plea on the ground of reasonable cause
and compelling reason, are relevant only to a petition for change of name under Rule 103, and not
under a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108.The Court agrees with the
observations of the appellate court that petitioner's mother would be the best witness to testify on the
alleged errors in her son's birth certificate. In a similar vein, the birth certificates of petitioner's older
siblings showing the surname "Tan" instead of "Tan Ko" would greatly bolster his claim. However, for
reasons known only to petitioner, he refused to present his mother or the birth certificates of his
siblings. Thus, there would be no basis to sustain his claim that his surname should be "Tan" instead
of "Tan Ko." Accordingly, the present petition must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated September 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated February 24, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98952, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 250520. May 05, 2021 ]

FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL, AND ALL INTERESTED PERSONS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 28, 2019 Decision[2] (Assailed Decision) and the November 20, 2019
Resolution[3] (Assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA), First Division, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 111884. The CA affirmed the April 30, 2018 Decision[4] and July 20, 2018 Order[5] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 225, Quezon City, in Spec. Proc. No. R QZN-17-04454,
[6]
which denied petitioner's Rule 103 petition for change of name from "Francis Luigi G.
Santos" to "Francis Luigi G. Revilla."

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos (petitioner) filed a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court seeking to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his
Certificate of Live Birth.[7] He alleged that sometime in 1991, his parents, Lovely Maria T.
Guzman (Lovely Guzman) and Jose Marie Bautista, Jr. also known as Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr.
(Bong Revilla), met and engaged in an intimate relationship. [9] He was later born in Quezon
City on January 9, 1992 as "Francis Luigi Guzman."[10]

Lovely Guzman and Bong Revilla were never married as the latter was already married to Lani
Mercado.[11] Thus, petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and
his father was marked as unknown.[12] However, on April 24, 1996, Bong Revilla executed an
Affidavit of Acknowledgment recognizing petitioner as his son. [13]

In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos (Patrick Santos), who, in turn,
legally adopted petitioner. Thus, petitioner's name was changed from "Francis Luigi Guzman"
to "Francis Luigi G. Santos."[14]
Although petitioner lived with his mother, he grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter's
wife and children and was treated by the family as a legitimate son. [15] He also claimed that
he used the name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered show business.[16] Thus, he filed the instant
petition in order to "avoid confusion," "to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to associate
himself to [Bong Revilla] and to the Revillas,"[17] and to ensure that his records show his true
identity as Bong Revilla's son.[18]

On June 19, 2017, the RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance and directed that the Order be (1) published in a newspaper of general circulation
for three consecutive weeks, (2) sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Philippine
Statistics Office,[19] and (3) posted in three public places where petitioner resides. [20]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed its opposition and sought the dismissal
of the petition claiming that there was no compelling reason to justify the change sought. [21]

The Ruling of the RTC

In its April 30, 2018 Decision,[22] the RTC denied the petition and held that a change of name
was not a matter of right and could be granted only for compelling reasons. [23] In the instant
case, the RTC held that petitioner failed to show that there was any valid or justifiable ground
for change of name. In fact, the RTC held that allowing petitioner to use the surname "Revilla"
rather than "Santos" would create further confusion, given that he had already been legally
adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001.[24] As an adopted child, the RTC held that petitioner was
bound to use the surname "Santos" as adoption legally severs the legal tie between the
adoptee and his or her biological parents.[25]

The RTC further noted that there was no reason to grant the change sought, given that
petitioner has never legally used the name "Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in
1996, he has used the name "Santos" for all documentary purposes since his adoption, [26] and
he only began using the surname "Revilla" when he entered show business. There could thus
be no confusion as to his real identity as the name "Luigi Revilla" was a mere screen name,
which may be different from his legal name.[27]

The Ruling of the CA

In the Assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that allowing a
change of name would create more confusion as to petitioner's status and filiation given that
he had already been legally adopted by Patrick Santos. It was of no moment therefore that he
is the biological son of Bong Revilla as the Family Code and Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8552 [28] or
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 provide that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopting parents.[29]

The CA further stated that the corrections sought involved substantial amendments to
petitioner's birth certificate, as allowing a change in surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would
constitute a change in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." As such, the CA held that
petitioner should have availed himself of the adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 for
cancellation and/or correction of entries rather than the summary proceeding under Rule 103
for change of name.[30] Further, as petitioner failed to implead both his biological father and
his adoptive father, the CA held that the proceedings were void under Section 3, Rule 108 for
failure to implead indispensable parties.[31]
Petitioner thus filed the instant Petition claiming, among others, that (1) the CA erred in ruling
that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies and that the proceedings were void for failure to
implead indispensable parties,[32] and (2) that a change of name from "Santos" to "Revilla"
may be allowed under the law by way of exception to the mandatory provisions on the use of
surnames.[33]

In its Comment,[34] the OSG alleged that the CA did not err (1) in denying the appeal for
petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court[35] and (2) in ruling that petitioner has not shown any proper or reasonable cause which
may justify the change of his surname.[36]

Issues

Whether the CA erred (1) in holding that Rule 108 rather than Rule 103 applies and (2) in
denying the petition to change petitioner's surname from "Santos" to "Revilla".

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has partial merit. Contrary to the position of the CA, petitioner correctly availed
of a Rule 103 proceeding to effect the desired change. However, the Court agrees with the CA,
as well as the RTC, that petitioner failed to prove that there was any compelling reason to
justify the change sought.

Petitioner
correctly availed
of a Rule 103
petition for change
of name

Republic v. Hernandez[37] (Hernandez) discussed the nature of Rule 103 petitions for change of
name in this wise:

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the
reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the
province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring the name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall
state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is
sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and
published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for
the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that
the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall
furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

xxxx

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination of

words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an
individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given
or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by
law.

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The
official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of
the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of
the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purpose of identification.

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an
application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the
requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein
renders the proceedings a nullity.

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully
the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are
shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name
or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show
proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant
a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change
is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

Rule 103 petitions for change of name based on the foregoing jurisprudential grounds is a
separate and distinct remedy from that provided under Rule 108, which involves cancellations
and corrections of entries in the civil registry.[39] The Court explained the difference between
Rule 103 and Rule 108 in Republic v. Mercadera,[40] as follows:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with
others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions
for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a
person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him."
Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the
change by virtue of a court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the
order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the
petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole
world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection.
"It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."

Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family
relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or
civil status. However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he
would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties
might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name,
"what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x."

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in
the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under
Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party
are beyond the ambit of the rule. x x x

xxxx

Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as
even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure,
issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil
status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."
"Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but
only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In
short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper
enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not
violate the Constitution.

xxxx

It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and
application of [Rule] 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected
by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are
often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this
Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with
respect to alterations in a person's registered name can effectively clear the seeming
perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition
itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused
with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted only on
grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a
proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule
108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of
clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained
above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries
like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein."[41] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Notably, the foregoing rules were modified by the enactment of R.A. 9048, [42] which amended
Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code and vested primary jurisdiction over the correction of
certain clerical or typographical errors and changes of first name with the civil registrar. [43] In
2012, R.A. 10172[44] expanded the coverage of the summary administrative procedure provided
under R.A. 9048 to include clerical corrections in the day and/or month in the date of birth, or
in the sex of the person, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry.[45] Presently therefore, when an entry falls within the coverage of
R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A. 10172, a person may only avail of the appropriate judicial
remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is
first filed and later denied.[46] Failure to comply with the administrative procedure generally
renders the petition dismissible for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure
to comply with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.[47]

The Court, in Bartolome v. Republic,[48] summarized the rules as follows:

1. A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct clerical or typographical
errors in the civil register, 3) to change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of
birth, and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear that there was a
clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition with the local civil
registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or
changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048
in relation to R.A. 10172. A person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under
Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the aforementioned entries after the petition in the administrative
proceedings is filed and later denied.

2. A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both his or her first
name and surname may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the
jurisprudential grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present.

3. A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in the civil registry

may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed
in Lee v. Court of Appeals and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan, R.A. 9048 "removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register."[49] (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy
under Rule 103 in order to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." Contrary to the
findings of the CA, Rule 108 is inapplicable as petitioner does not allege or identify any
erroneous entry that requires substantial rectification or cancellation.

It is a threshold principle that the nature of a proceeding is determined by the allegations in

the petition and the ultimate reliefs sought. In the instant case, it is apparent that petitioner
does not seek to correct any clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate or to effect any
changes in his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos.[50] As such, neither Rule 108 nor
R.A. 9048 as amended applies. Rather, the petition is unequivocal that petitioner merely
desires to change and replace his surname "Santos" with the surname "Revilla" in accordance
with Hernandez in order to "avoid confusion,"[51] "to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to
associate himself to [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, and to show that he accepts and
embraces his true identity."[52] He alleges that while he grew up close to his biological father
and his family and was purportedly publicly known as "Bong Revilla's son," [53] "there is nothing
in his name that would associate him and identify him as one of the Revillas." [54] These
allegations show that petitioner ultimately seeks to "alter the 'designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known'" [55] and not to effect
any clerical or substantial corrections. Thus, he properly availed himself of the procedure
prescribed under Rule 103.

In this regard, the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner should have availed himself of
the adversarial proceeding under Rule l 08 instead of the "summary proceeding" under Rule
103[56] as allowing petitioner to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would
constitute a change in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." [57]

First. While a change in status may legally result in a change of name, such as in marriages,
annulments, legitimations, or adoptions, et al., the reverse is not equally true. In Yu v.
Republic,[58] the Court already held that a change of surname under Rule 103 does not
necessarily result in a change of petitioner's status, i.e., from legitimate to illegitimate, viz.:

x x x [A] change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a
change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor
does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status[,] or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is
that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which
he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). x x x

To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection
by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would
thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be
erroneously impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial
application to determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of
name. As held by this Court in several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were
aliens, the change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow x x x. [59]

Indeed, petitioner cannot change his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos to an
"illegitimate" child of Bong Revilla by the mere expedient of changing his name as an adoption
may only be rescinded in accordance with law.[60] In any event, petitioner was unequivocal
that he does not seek to change his status or to rescind his adoption:

x x x [H]e is an adoptee of Patrick Santos and an illegitimate son of Bong Revilla. He seeks to
alter his last name from "Santos" to "Revilla", the designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives and is best known to avoid confusion. Changing Luigi's
last name from "Santos" to "Revilla" will not affect his civil status, as the decision in the
matter of his adoption is included and registered in the official record file of OLC-QC. He does
not seek to change his status from legitimate to illegitimate. Patrick Santos remains to be the
named father in his birth certificate, being his adoptive father. [61] (Underscoring in the original
omitted; underscoring supplied)

Second. Contrary to the statement of the CA, both Rule 108 and Rule 103 involve substantial
matters and require adversarial proceedings. As explained, "[a] change of one's name under
Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that
the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings."[62] It is
an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the
State, through the OSG, and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. [63]

In relation thereto, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the instant proceedings
were void under Section 3,[64] Rule 108 as petitioner failed to implead both his adoptive father
and his biological father as indispensable parties. Notably, while Rule 108 expressly requires
that the petitioner implead all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected, no such requirement appears in Rule 103. The relevant sections provide:

RULE 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

xxxx

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

RULE 103
CHANGE OF NAME

xxxx

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court,
by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing
thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once
a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in
the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not he within
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that
such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
(Underscoring supplied)

Notably, unlike Rule 108, Rule 103 only requires that the order reciting the purpose of the
petition and the date and place of the hearing be published and that any interested person be
allowed to appear and oppose the petition.[65] By virtue of the publication, "all interested
parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment
therein."[66]

In sum, the Court holds that petitioner correctly availed himself of a Rule 103 petition. Further,
the failure to implead petitioner's biological father and adoptive father did not render the
proceedings void as said requirement does not apply to Rule 103.

However, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that petitioner failed to prove that there is
any compelling reason to justify a change of surname from "Santos" to "Revilla".

There is no
compelling reason
to grant the
change of surname
It has long been settled that "the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
matter of right x x x."[67] In In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang[68] (Wang), the Court held:

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere
matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.

xxxx

A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant at this point. We quote,
thus:

"x x x For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method
of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since,
the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain,
a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the
individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody
can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and
may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis
causa. (5) It is imprescriptible."[69] (Underscoring supplied)

To emphasize, the surname identifies the family to which a person belongs. While the first
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.[70]

This rule, however, is not absolute. Precisely, Article 376 of the Civil Code as implemented by
Rule 103 is a remedy allowed by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil
Code on the use of surnames.[71] To justify a change of name however, a person "must show
not only some proper or compelling reason x x x but also that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name."[72] The following have been considered as valid grounds for
change of name: "(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest."[73]

Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, there can be no question that petitioner,
as the legally adopted child of Patrick Santos, properly bears the surname "Santos". Notably,
the Civil Code provides:

TITLE XIII
Use of Surnames (n)

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

ARTICLE 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. (Underscoring
supplied)

Consistent therewith, Article 189 of the Family Code states that "the adopted shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted
to use the surname of the adopter."[74] The Family Code provisions on Adoption were
superseded by R.A. 8552,[75] which now provides:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse .of
the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family. (Underscoring supplied)

R.A. 8552 likewise states that upon adoption, "[a]n amended certificate of birth shall be issued
by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee
is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname." [76] As held therefore
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[77] it may be inferred from the very wording of the law "that
the use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a
right."[78] Upon issuance of the decree of adoption, the change of the adoptee's surname shall
follow that of the adopter as a natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption,
even if not specifically prayed for.[79]

Although properly surnamed "Santos", petitioner prays that he be allowed to change his
surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" to "avoid confusion, x x x to show [his] sincere and
genuine desire to associate himself to [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, x x x to show
that he accepts and embraces his true identity,"[80] and "to show his true and genuine love to
his biological father."[81] Unfortunately, none of these reasons justify, in law, the desired
change.

First. The Court agrees with the RTC that the use of the surname "Revilla" would create
further confusion rather than avoid it, given that: (1) petitioner has never legally used the
name "Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was legally adopted by
Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name "Santos" for all documentary purposes since
his adoption; (4) although he is publicly known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by
his peers as "Luigi Santos"; (5) even after a change of surname, Patrick Santos shall continue
to be the father named in his birth certificate; and (5) he only began using the surname
"Revilla" when he entered show business.[82] The following factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court:

"In the case at bar, the only reason advanced for the dropping of his surname Santos to Revilla
is to show his lineage and identity as Revilla. However, the compelling reason how such
change of name is necessary to show his lineage as a Revilla is not clearly established. As
petitioner himself and his witnesses testified, he has been a (sic) known as the son of Bong
Revilla all his life and yet never used the surname despite being acknowledged by his
biological father in 1996. As testified on by his mother, it was never a secret that he was (sic)
the son of Bong Revilla, everybody knew he was (sic) a Revilla. All of his mother's family,
friends, co-parent in school know him as Luigi Santos, son of Bong Revilla. He has been using
Santos since his adoption until college, then he started doing teleserye in GMA that was when
he started using Revilla. The other witness, Bryan Revilla, even testified that petitioner has
always been using Santos for documentary purposes up to the present and it was only when
he entered show business that petitioner started using Revilla. He also testified that petitioner
is loved by both his parents, Bong Revilla and Lani Mercado and that they always treat
petitioner as their brother. Hence, it is clear that the perceived confusion came about when
petitioner entered show business and started using the surname Revilla as his screen name.
From then on, he would introduce himself as Luigi Revilla. And as testified on by petitioner,
not being able to use the surname Revilla makes him incomplete, he however admitted that
even if he use[s] the surname Santos, there would be no confusion.

xxxx

"There is no question that petitioner may file the instant petition, but change of name is a
privilege and not a right. And as such, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. In the case at hand, although petitioner did
not deny his legitimacy, he failed to show proper and reasonable cause to justify the change
sought or any compelling reason which may justify the change. A petitioner's convenience can
never be a ground for a change of name x x x. Convenience cannot be considered as one of, or
a recognized ground for change of name."[83]

Indeed, these factual circumstances starkly differ from meritorious petitions for change of
name where it was alleged and proved that petitioners publicly used their requested names in
legal documents and/or school records since childhood and that a change would indeed avoid
confusion, among other reasons.[84]

Second. While petitioner may factually identify and associate with his biological father and his
family, he remains to be the legitimate son of Patrick Santos by virtue of the adoption. The
latter and not the former is thus his true legal identity. It bears reiterating that adoption:
x x x (1) sever[s] all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem[s] the adoptee as a legitimate
child of the adopter; and (3) give[s] adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and
other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.[85] (Underscoring supplied)

As adoption severs all legal ties between the adoptee and his or her biological parents, there
is no basis to allow petitioner to change his name to "Revilla" simply because he is,
biologically, the son of Bong Revilla and wants to associate himself with the Revilla family.

Finally, it bears emphasis that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. It is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In Wang, the Court denied a petition to drop a
minor's middle name, even though the middle name would purportedly cause the minor undue
embarrassment and become an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the
Singaporean community.[86] The Court noted that the only reason advanced by petitioner
therein for the dropping of his middle name was convenience and found this justification to be
amorphous and unmeritorious.[87] Similarly, in Yu Chi Han v. Republic[88] (Yu Chi Han),
petitioner sought to change his name from "Yu Chi Han" to "Alejandro Go Yu," because he
wanted to avoid confusion and to embrace the Catholic faith after he was baptized in
accordance with Catholic rites. The Court denied the petition and held that the confusion was
mainly due to petitioner's unauthorized use of a name other than his true name, which could
be easily remedied by simply asking his friends and business associates to call him by his true
name.[89]

In the instant case, the Court finds that the reasons proffered do not fall under any of the
jurisprudential grounds for change of name. They cannot even be considered as "akin to" any
of the aforementioned grounds. The mere fact that petitioner began using a different
name, i.e., "Luigi Revilla", when he joined show business does not constitute a proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name.[90] As in Yu Chi Han, any confusion
created by the use of said name is mainly due to the unauthorized use of a name other than
petitioner's true legal name. As in Wang, convenience is not a recognized ground for change
of name, which may be allowed only for compelling reasons that must be alleged and proved.
[91]

The Court is aware that it has previously allowed an adopted child named "Maximo Wong" to
revert to "Maximo Alcala, Jr.," his name prior to his adoption, even though the adoption was
never rescinded. In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong[92] (Wong), the Court held:

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind
that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object
of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child.
More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as
legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking
into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title
to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this
new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name
which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the
proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an
application for adoption. On this part, there is unanimous agreement.

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the
adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child,
and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as
if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to
such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. More specifically under the
present state of our law, the Family Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the matter, relevantly provides in this wise
with regard to the issue involved in this case:

"Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters ;"
(Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name would run
counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and the ruling in Manuel vs.
Republic that "one should not be allowed to use a surname which otherwise he is not
permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example to other persons who might
also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses.

While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the same to
be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private respondent would
then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using. True, the law prescribes the
surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit
the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the
requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there will
never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to change his name,
in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in
the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court would then be rendered
inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law.

A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of exception to
the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The law fixes the
surnames that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon
judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in
specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to
signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain
judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, we do
not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an
adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to
Rule 103.[93] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
While the Court agrees that any person, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted, may
petition the court for change of name for compelling reasons, [94] the factual circumstances
in Wong wholly differ from the case at bar.

In Wong, petitioner alleged and proved that he was severely prejudiced by the use of the
surname "Wong," which embarrassed and isolated him from friends and relatives in view of a
suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community. He alleged and proved that the continued use of said surname hampered his
business and social life,[95] viz.:

"The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as contemplated by the provisions of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and
to provide his best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or denying the
petition for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not
all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965;
Nacionales vs. Republic, L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843). In the
present case, We believe that the court a quo had exercised its discretion judiciously when it
granted the petition.

"From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We
discern that said appellee was prompted to file the petition for change of name because of
the embarrassment and ridicule his family name 'Wong' brings in his dealings with his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another
cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a
proper and reasonable cause for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965,
Que Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a
person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or of other persons (Calderon vs.
Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice
or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of
petitioner's name.[96] (Underscoring supplied)

No similar compelling reason was alleged nor proved in this case. A sincere desire to
associate oneself to a certain person or family, without more, does not justify a change of
surname. In view of the foregoing, the Petition must be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The petition for change of name in
Spec. Proc. No. R-QZN-17-04454 is DISMISSED.

[ G.R. No. 215370. November 09, 2021 ]

 RICHELLE BUSQUE ORDOÑA, PETITIONER, VS. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG
CITY AND ALLAN D. FULGUERAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
Decision2 dated April 10, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated October 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99381. The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated April 25, 2012 and the
Order5 dated July 26, 2012 of Branch 166, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City in SP Proc. No.
12335 which denied the verified Petition6 for Correction of Entries (Rule 108 petition) in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Alrich Paul Ordoña Fulgueras (Alrich Paul).

The Antecedents

Richelle Busque Ordoña (petitioner) was married to a certain Ariel O. Libut (Ariel) on October 10,
2000 in Las Piñas City. In December 2005, petitioner went to Qatar for work until 2008 when she
discovered that Ariel had an illicit relationship. This prompted her to return to the Philippines and
separate from him. Despite their eventual separation, petitioner has not yet filed a petition for
annulment of her marriage to Ariel.7

Thereafter, in April 2008, petitioner applied for another work in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
(UAE) where she met Allan D. Fulgueras (Allan), her former colleague in Qatar. She and Allan
engaged in an intimate relationship which resulted in petitioner's pregnancy with Allan as the
purported father. Thus, petitioner went back to the Philippines sometime in September 2009. On
January 26, 2010, petitioner gave birth to a son in a hospital in Pasig City. In the Certificate of Live
Birth,8 the child was given the name "Alrich Paul Ordoña Fulgueras” with "Allan Demen Fulgueras"
as the purported father.9

Thus, on September 7, 2011, petitioner filed before the RTC the Rule 108 petition seeking the
following corrections: (1) change of last name of Alrich Paul in Item No. 1 from "Fulgueras" to
"Ordoña," petitioner's maiden name; and (2) deletion of entries in the paternal information as
provided in Item Nos. 13 to 17. She alleged that it was not Allan who signed the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity10 attached to the Certificate of Live Birth (Affidavit of
Acknowledgment) considering that Allan was not in the Philippines when she gave birth to Alrich
Paul.11

In its Order12 dated September 14, 2011, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in
substance, the RTC (1) set the hearings on December 12, 2011, and February 6, 2012, and
enjoined all persons interested to be present and show adverse cause, if any, to the granting of the
petition; (2) directed the publication of the Order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation; and (3) directed the Court Sheriff to furnish a copy of the Order to
the Solicitor General (OSG), the National Statistics Office, the City Prosecutor's Office, the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, petitioner, and Allan.13

Thus, the Order dated September 14, 2011 was published in the Manila Times newspapers on
November 5, 12, and 19, 2011.14
Further, the Sheriff served a copy of the Order dated September 14, 2011 and a copy of the petition
to the Office of the City Civil Registrar, the City Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General, the
National Statistics Office, and Allan.15

On February 6, 2012, Allan, the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, and the OSG were the oppositors
to the petition. They were called in open court, but none of them appeared. Further, no opposition to
the petition was filed in the RTC.16

Consequently, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence.

Petitioner's testimony included the above-stated matters, i.e., from her separation with her husband,
Ariel, in 2008, to her subsequent relationship with Allan in Abu Dhabi, UAE, to giving birth to Alrich
Paul on January 26, 2010, and the recording of Alrich Paul's birth before the civil registry. Petitioner
emphasized that Allan could not have signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity because Allan was not in the Philippines at that time. Petitioner further testified that it was
she who supplied the information pertaining to the child's father in the Certificate of Live Birth.17

To bolster her allegations that Allan did not sign the Affidavit of Acknowledgment, petitioner
presented Engineer Michael Mantes (Michael), her and Allan's co-employee. Michael testified as
follows: (1) he personally knew Allan because during the term of his (Michael's) employment contract
from January 2006 to March 2008, he worked with Allan who was a land surveyor in the same
department in a company in Qatar; (2) he personally saw Allan affix his signature on the "as built
data" documents that Allan submitted to him and also during their meetings for attendance; (3) he
met Allan on January 26, 2010 in UAE; and (4) the signature which contained "A" and "Fulgueras"
that appears in the Affidavit of Acknowledgment is different from the real signature of Allan which is
illegible and does not contain any initial.18

The RTC Ruling

On April 25, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision19 denying the petition for lack of merit.

The RTC ruled that there is no dispute that Alrich Paul is an illegitimate child considering that he was
conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Per his Certificate of Live Birth, his mother is petitioner
married to Ariel, but his alleged father is Allan.20

The RTC declared that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255,21 illegitimate children shall use the surname and be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with the Family
Code; however, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.22

The RTC noted that the Certificate of Live Birth of Alrich Paul shows that his alleged father, Allan,
expressly recognized him as his illegitimate child when he affixed his signature in the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity.23

The RTC further noted that petitioner presented Michael to prove that it was physically impossible for
Allan to sign the Certificate of Live Birth because he was abroad. Thus, petitioner wanted to delete
the entries in Item Nos. 13 to 17 in Alrich Paul's Certificate of Live Birth to do away with an
embarrassing situation when he comes of age and attends school where he can be the object of
ridicule and discriminatory remarks from his peers.24
Still, the RTC explained that it must protect the child by giving the best interest in his favor. It
declared that if the entries in Item Nos. 13 to 17 were deleted, Alrich Paul would be considered to
have no father at all; that it would be more embarrassing for Alrich Paul if he, in effect, will have no
father; that the intended correction was only for the convenience of petitioner, who is legally married
to Ariel, but gave birth to Alrich Paul whose alleged father is Allan; and that the legitime of Alrich
Paul might be affected if Item Nos. 13 to 17 were to be deleted.25

The RTC also denied petitioner's prayer for the deletion of the surname of Alrich Paul in his
Certificate of Live Birth. It explained that the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity at
the dorsal portion of the Certificate of Live Birth was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public;
that as such, it had become a public instrument which enjoys the presumption of validity; and that
following Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, Alrich Paul may use the surname
of his alleged father.26

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration27 of the Decision dated April 25, 2012. The OSG then
filed its Comment (Re: Motion for Reconsideration dated May 10, 2012)28 dated July 6, 2012 on the
motion. Thereafter, the RTC denied the motion in its Order29 dated July 26, 2012.

The CA Ruling

The CA denied the petition in its Decision30 dated April 10, 2014.

The CA explained that under Article 164 of the Family Code, "children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate." It then noted that when Alrich Paul was born, petitioner was
still married to Ariel.31

While the CA was aware of petitioner's admission that Allan, and not her husband, Ariel, was the
father of the child Alrich Paul, it pointed out that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates that "the
child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress." Thus, contrary to what the RTC declared, it ruled that
Alrich Paul cannot be deemed the illegitimate child of petitioner and Allan based solely on
petitioner's admission; that the law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy; and that the status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised.32

The CA further explained that the law sets who may dispute the legitimate status of the child, and
that specifically, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs.33

The CA noted that the RTC held that the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Alrich Paul had been
sufficiently defeated because of the physical impossibility of sexual intercourse between petitioner
and Ariel.34 However, it ruled that the RTC relied on the testimony of petitioner regarding the
physical impossibility of sexual intercourse between the latter and Ariel, misapplying the ruling
in Concepcion v. Court of Appeals35 and disregarding the law altogether. It added that the RTC's act
of giving credence to petitioner's testimony was tantamount to allowing petitioner to make a
declaration against the legitimacy of her son, Alrich Paul, which is prohibited under Article 167 of the
Family Code.36

The CA added that it was not for the RTC to rule on the matter: should Ariel or his heirs file an action
impugning the status of Alrich Paul as a legitimate child of Ariel, it should be threshed out in a
different proceeding. It explained that the well settled rule is that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.37
Thus, the CA declared that the presumption that Alrich Paul is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between petitioner and Ariel stands.38

The CA further noted the RTC's reliance on the presumption of validity of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity at the dorsal portion of Alrich Paul's Certificate of Live Birth
which was subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. However, the CA ruled that a record of
birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. As prima facie evidence, the
statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by mere preponderant evidence. It explained that it
is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties. Thus, between the Certificate of Live Birth which is prima facie evidence of Alrich
Paul's illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the CA held that the latter shall prevail. Further, it explained that
not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in
consonance with the purpose of the law.39

Thus, in upholding the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Alrich Paul, the CA ruled that he shall
have the right to bear the surnames of Ariel and petitioner, subject to the action which may be filed
by Ariel or his heirs to impugn his legitimate status within the period allowed by law.40

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. However,

the assailed Decision and Order are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In view of
the discussion above, the Civil Registrar of Pasig City is DIRECTED to enter the
surname "Libut" as the surname of Alrich Paul in his Certificate of Live Birth.
Accordingly, the name of the father should be changed from "Allan D. Fulgueras" to
"Ariel O. Libut". From the foregoing, the Affidavit of Acknowledgment appearing at
the back of Alrich Paul's Certificate of Live Birth shall now be disregarded.

SO ORDERED.41

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 but the CA denied it in its Resolution43 dated
October 14, 2014.

Hence, the instant petition.44

The OSG filed its Comment45 to the petition. Thereafter, petitioner filed her Reply to the OSG's
Comment.46 On the other hand, no comment was filed by Allan.

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the petition.

In resolving the petition, the Court is guided by the Court's pronouncements on the parameters in
seeking relief under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108 governs the proceedings for the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa aptly pointed out the Court's pronouncement in Miller
v. Miller47 (Miller). In that case, the Court, speaking through Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen and relying on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occ.,48 categorically ruled that the legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked
in a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth, the action filed in that case.49 The
Court ruled:

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her

birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her
mother's surname, Espenida, instead or Miller, claiming that she was not an
acknowledged illegitimate child of John.

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of
correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling.
Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only
her identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack[.]"
Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the
Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.50

Article 16451 of the Family Code provides that "children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parties are legitimate." Here, petitioner admitted to being in a valid and subsisting marriage with
Ariel when she conceived and gave birth to Alrich Paul. Thus, Alrich Paul is presumed to be a
legitimate child of petitioner and Ariel. However, looking at the Rule 108 petition in this case,
petitioner, mother of Alrich Paul, in effect declared against her child's legitimacy when she alleged
that Alrich Paul was the child of Allan.

Following the pronouncement in Miller, petitioner's collateral attack of Alrich Paul's filiation cannot be
allowed in a Rule 108 proceeding. Thus, on this ground alone, the RTC should have dismissed the
Rule 108 petition.

Further, assuming arguendo that the Rule 108 petition filed in the case is considered as the direct
action to impugn Alrich Paul's presumed legitimacy, the Rule 108 petition must still fail.

It must be emphasized that the direct action to impugn the legitimacy of a child must be brought by
the proper parties and within the period limited by law.52

Here, as correctly opined by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, petitioner is barred from
impugning Alrich Paul's presumed legitimacy considering the prohibition under Article 167 of the
Family Code.53 Article 167 provides that "[t]he child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."

To elucidate, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code is not conclusive. It
may be disputed based on the grounds and manner provided under Articles 166, 170, and 171 of the
same law.

In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals,54 the Court ruled that the presumption of legitimacy is "quasi-
conclusive" and may be rebutted or overthrown. The Court ruled:

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage,

particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the
 basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved,
unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of

physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as
to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they
reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the
period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception,
unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison
regulations.55

Still, the rule is that the mother is barred from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of her
child, and only the father,56 or in exceptional instances, his heirs,57 can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife based on any of the grounds enumerated under
Article 166 of the Family Code.

The pertinent rules provide:

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual

intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or

(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

xxxx

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within
one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
 husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth
as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two
years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the
period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of
the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Significantly, in Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao58 (Liyao, Jr.), William Liyao, Jr. (William), represented by
his mother Corazon G. Garcia (Corazon), filed an action for compulsory recognition as "the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao."59 William alleged that he was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of William Liyao. Such was the case considering
that he was recognized and acknowledged as such child by William Liyao during his lifetime.60

However, the pertinent facts in Liyao, Jr. are as follows: (1) Corazon gave birth to William on June 9,
1975; (2) Corazon was legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than 10
years at the time of the institution of the action or in 1976; and (3) Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's demise on December 2, 1975.61

The trial court rendered a decision declaring William as the illegitimate child of the deceased William
Liyao. However, the CA reversed the RTC.62

On appeal, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the CA. The Court ruled that the
petition initiated by Corazon as guardian ad litem of the then minor William as the illegitimate son of
the late William Liyao could not prosper. The Court, applying Article 25663 of the Civil Code, the
counterpart provision of Article 167 of the Family Code, ruled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The Court explained that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
marriage and the child cannot choose his own filiation.64

In effect, the presumption of legitimacy of William subsisted absent any impugnation by the proper
party.

Here, petitioner's declaration in the birth certificate and in the Rule 108 petition that Alrich Paul is
illegitimate cannot be countenanced as it runs counter to Article 167 of the Family Code. The
presumption that Alrich Paul is legitimate stands in the absence of a direct action timely filed by the
proper party.
Further, even assuming arguendo that petitioner may effectively declare against or impugn Alrich
Paul's legitimacy and that she may do so in a Rule 108 petition, her petition before the trial court
must still fail for failure to satisfy the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. This is considering that what petitioner seeks are substantial corrections, i.e., corrections in
the entries pertaining to Alrich Paul's father as well as Alrich Paul's surname; hence, an adversarial
proceeding is required.65

In Barco v. Court of Appeals,66 the Court ruled that "[s]ince the promulgation of the [Republic v.
Valencia] ruling in 1986 the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."67

Further, in Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar,68 the Court ruled that "the procedure laid down in Rule 108
is not a summary proceeding per se"69 and "as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register."70

Section 3, Rule 108 requires that "all persons who stand to be affected by a substantial correction of
an entry in the civil registrar must be impleaded as indispensable parties" and "failure to implead the
indispensable parties renders all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment ineffectual."71

Section 4, Rule 108 also provides for the requirement of publication and notice.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 108 state:

SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

In the case, Ariel, the presumed father of Alrich Paul was not impleaded as a party. Being the
presumed father of Alrich Paul, Ariel has an interest that would be affected if the trial court were to
grant the reliefs sought by petitioner. His hereditary rights would be adversely affected if the Court
were to declare that Alrich Paul is not his legitimate child but Allan's illegitimate child.

Admittedly, there are instances where failure to implead and to notify the affected or interested
parties are cured by the publication of the notice of hearing.72 These special circumstances are
"when earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; there was no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when the party was
inadvertently left out."73

However, petitioner failed to establish the presence of any of the above exceptions. There is likewise
no indication in the records that Ariel, although not impleaded, was made aware of the petition and
the status of the proceedings.
Given the foregoing, the Court must ultimately dismiss the Rule 108 petition filed by petitioner and
need not discuss the sufficiency of her evidence to justify the corrections sought in Alrich Paul's birth
certificate.

As a result, there is now an absurd and unremedied situation that Alrich Paul remains to be
illegitimate in the birth certificate and will use the surname of Allan while possessing, at the same
time, a legitimate status, one that is conferred on him by law.

Giving clarity to Alrich Paul's situation is attended by a scarcity of remedies.

First, the mother who was in a valid and subsisting marriage at the time of conception or giving birth
to her child is prohibited under Article 167 of the Family Code from impugning the legitimacy of her
child. The proscription remains even if the mother is an estranged wife.

Second, the child who was conceived or born during a valid and existing marriage has no right to
impugn his own legitimacy under the Family Code. He cannot choose his own filiation.74

Third, it is only the father, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, who may impugn the child's
legitimacy on grounds provided under Article 166 of the Family Code within the periods provided
under Article 170 in relation to Article 171 of the Family Code. Upon the expiration of the periods, the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and can no longer be questioned.75

Noted civilist Arturo M. Tolentino discussed:

The prescriptive period begins to run either from the knowledge of the plaintiffs
of the birth of the child, or from the date of the registration of such birth, whichever is
earlier.

The period of prescription is one year if the husband or anyone of the heirs
resides in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

The period is two years if the husband or all of the heirs do not reside in the city
or municipality of birth or registration but somewhere else in the Philippines; and
three years if they reside abroad.

These periods apply whether the plaintiff is the husband or any of the heirs. If
they acquire knowledge of the birth at different dates before it is recorded, the period
of prescription shall be counted from the date on which the plaintiff had knowledge
of such birth.

If he husband should die before the expiration of the period within which he
could bring the action, without having filed the same, an heir could bring the action.
Within what time? We believe the period applicable to him personally would apply,
not the period applicable to the husband. The plaintiff heir would not be merely
representing the predeceased husband, but would be acting in his own right.

If the husband dies after filing the action and it is pending, the action being
personal, the case may be dismissed. The heirs can file another action in their own
right, subject to the prescriptive periods applicable to them.76
The hands of the Court are tied as it may only entertain the impugnation of a child's presumed
legitimacy in a direct action filed by the proper party and within the prescribed period under the law.

In light of these, the Court finds the present case as an opportune moment to highlight the absence
of a remedy in favor of a mother in establishing the true filiation of her child. Ultimately, the Court's
observations are directed to the Legislature inasmuch as the Court is careful not to tread on the
realm of judicial legislation.

One of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child is that found in Article 166(1)(b) of the
Family Code, i.e., "that it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of x x x" "x x x the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible."

Here, petitioner maintained that Ariel, her husband, could not have been Alrich Paul's father
considering that upon learning of the latter's illicit relationship, she separated from him and went to
Abu Dhabi, UAE to work sometime in April 2008, stayed there, and engaged in an intimate
relationship with Allan. Thereafter, she became pregnant, went back to the Philippines sometime in
September 2009, and gave birth to Alrich Paul on January 26, 2010.

However, there is no remedy under the law available to petitioner to dispute the presumption of
legitimacy accorded to Alrich Paul—not in a Rule 108 petition which must be dismissed primarily for
being a collateral attack and not in any other action by reason of her being the mother of Alrich Paul.

It must be emphasized that the scenario under Article 166(1)(b) is a factual matter personally known
not only to the husband, but also the wife. And yet, Article 167 of the Family Code prohibits the
mother from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of her child. Further, the right to impugn
belongs only to the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs. Certainly, there is, in the
words of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, "[an] apparent disparity between the mother's
and the father's legal standing in assailing the legitimacy and/or filiation of a child."77 This runs
counter to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) to which the Philippines is a state party. The Philippines ratified the CEDAW on
August 5, 1981.78 Thus, it is now a part of the Philippine legal system.

As a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines is bound by the obligations imposed therein:

Article 2.

States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women, and to this end, undertake:

xxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or

abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women.

Article 16
 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in
particular, shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:

xxx

(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its
dissolution;

(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their

marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of
the children shall be paramount;

xxx

The CEDAW mandates States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women particularly in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations. Thus, consistent with the CEDAW, the States
Parties must take all the appropriate measures to ensure that all rights available to husbands and/or
fathers must, in matters involving their children, be available to wives and/or mothers. Further, in
eliminating discrimination as to the rights and obligations of parents, the States Parties must
consider the paramount interest of the child.

Thus, consistent with the Philippines' obligations under the CEDAW, Section 14, Article II of the
1987 Constitution embodied the State's commitment to ensure gender equality, thus:

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.79

Here, petitioner's declaration against the legitimacy of Alrich Paul is in conformity with the provisions
of the CEDAW but is regrettably prohibited under our national law.

To be sure, matters of legitimacy and filiation involve not only rights in the child's favor, but also
obligations or burdens to which he or his estate may be subjected to. The obligations, or burdens
which translate to rights in favor of what the law considers as his or her family members include
support of family members80 and those arising from succession.81 No doubt, the child or his estate
need not be unduly and erroneously burdened by obligations in favor of persons who turn out to be
not related to him by blood. Thus, it would be to the best interest of the child if even the mother who
has personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding her pregnancy will be allowed to prove
that her husband could not have fathered her child.

However, with the current state of the laws, an illegitimate child's true filiation may never be
recognized by law because the husband, who is already living separately from the wife, may have no
interest in filing the appropriate action even if he knows that his wife gave birth to a child with
another man.

Nevertheless, while there is a lacuna in the law, this is an opportune moment to signal to the
Legislature the incongruity between our domestic law and our international obligation to eliminate the
discrimination against women particularly in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.
Ultimately, the Legislature should be given the opportunity to perform its primordial role of
lawmaking.82
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 10, 2014 and
the Resolution dated October 14, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
99381 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered DISMISSING the verified petition for correction of entries in the Certificate of
Live Birth of Alrich Paul Ordoña Fulgueras.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 209527. February 14, 2018 ]

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L.
TIPAY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2013 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
that denied the appeal of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental. The trial court, in turn,
granted respondent Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay's (Virgel) petition for the correction of certain
entries in his birth certificate.[4]
Factual Antecedents
In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his
birth certificate. Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth certificate,
respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental and
the National Statistics Office[5] (NSO). Both copies reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his
first name as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the local civil
registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born
on May 12, 1976.[6] Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction
of his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name,
from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."[7]
The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to trial.
Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave
birth to a son on February 25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The Certificate of Baptism,
including other documentary evidence such as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is
phenotypically male, were also presented to the trial court.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered its Decision [9] dated
July 27, 2010 granting Virgel's petition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued: 1. Directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental to cause the appropriate change in the
Certificate of Live Birth of VIRGIE L. TIPAY upon payment of the required legal fees,
particularly:

First Name : From: VIRGIE

To: VIRGEL

Sex : From: Female

To: MALE

Date of Birth of : From: no entry

Child To: FEBRUARY 25,
1976
SO ORDERED.[10]
From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the
trial court.[11] The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the
change of Virgel's name from Virgie should have been made through a proceeding under Rule
103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This argument was premised on the assumption
that the summary procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical or
innocuous errors, which excludes one's name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with
the RTC was not filed pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.[12]
Virgel refuted these arguments, alleging that changes of name are within the purview of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. He further disagreed with the position of the Republic and asserted
that substantial errors may be corrected provided that the proceedings before the trial court
were adversarial. He also argued that the proceedings before the RTC were in rem, which
substantially complies with the requirements of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[13]
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the Republic's appeal in its Decision[14] dated October 9, 2013, the dispositive
of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The July 27, 2010 Decision of the [RTC], 11th Judicial
Region, Branch No. 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, in Special Proceedings Case No. 243-09 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In its assailed decision, the CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of the
entry on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is nonetheless within the
jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The CA also held that the
petition filed with the trial court fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 108
because notices were sent to the concerned local civil registrar and the OSG. Since Virgel
was able to establish that he is indeed male, a fact which remains undisputed, the CA upheld
the trial court's decision.[16]
As to the change of Virgel's name from "Virgie" to "Virgel," the CA did not find any reason to
depart from the decision of the RTC because it was more expeditious to change the entry in
the same proceeding. The CA found that the correction of Virgel's name was necessary to
avoid confusion, especially since his correct gender is male. In the same vein, the CA ruled
that even if the petition with the RTC was considered a Rule 103 proceeding, the requirements
under Rule 108 are substantially the same as that under Rule 103. Thus, the CA already
deemed these requirements complied with.[17] Finally, regarding the month and date of Virgel's
birth, the CA found the documentary evidence credible enough to establish that he was indeed
born on February 25, 1976.[18]
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, the Republic appealed to this Court insisting that the
entries sought to be corrected are substantial changes outside the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The Republic also reiterated its earlier arguments, adding that the CA should not have
equated the procedural requirements under Rule 103 with that of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.[19]
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition. However, this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to
establish that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the

procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry.
It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were
beyond the purview of the rule.[20]
Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of substantial
errors. The Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial alterations in the civil
registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as long as the
issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting
the application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.
[21]
The Court's ruling in Republic v. Valencia,[22] explained the adversarial procedure to be
followed in correcting substantial errors in this wise:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which
is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and
a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated
February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding."
xxxx

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are-(l) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of
the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that
when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition
is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. [23] (Emphasis
Ours)
Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is limited to changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors.
[24]
The cited cases in the petition were already superseded by much later jurisprudence.
[25]
Most importantly, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 [26] in 2001, the local
civil registrars, or the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct
clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of a judicial order.[27] This law provided an administrative recourse for
the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving the substantial
corrections in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. [28]
The RTC was correct in taking cognizance of
the petition for correction of entries in Virgel’s
birth certificate.
R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in. the
performance of clerical work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to the
understanding.[29] It was further amended in 2011, when R.A. No. 10172[30] was passed to
expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changes in the
day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a person when it is
patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the entry. [31]
Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with the RTC in 2009, R.A.
No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in
Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate adversarial
proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. [32] The changes in the
entries pertaining to the gender and date of birth are indisputably substantial corrections,
outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that may be corrected
administratively.
The records of this case show that Virgel complied with the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He impleaded the local civil registrar of Governor Generoso,
Davao Oriental, the Solicitor General, and the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental as
parties to his petition for correction of entries.[33] The RTC then issued an order, which set the
case for hearing on July 10, 2009. In compliance with Rule 108, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, the order was published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Davao Oriental. Additionally, the local civil registrar and the OSG
were notified of the petition through registered mail.[34]
The OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Mati,
Davao City for purposes of the proceedings before the RTC. Accordingly, the prosecutor
assigned to the case was present during the hearing but opted not to cross-examine Virgel or
his mother after their respective testimonies. There was also no opposition filed against the
petition of Virgel before the RTC.[35]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties who have a claim or whose interests may be
affected were notified and granted an opportunity to oppose the petition. Two sets of notices
were sent to potential oppositors—through registered mail for the persons named in the
petition, and through publication, for all other persons who are not named but may be
considered interested or affected parties.[36] A hearing was scheduled for the presentation of
Virgel's testimonial and documentary evidence, during which time, the deputized prosecutor of
the OSG was present, and allowed to participate in the proceedings. While none of the parties
questioned the veracity of Virgel's allegations, much less present any controverting evidence
before the trial court,[37] the RTC proceedings were clearly adversarial in nature. It dutifully
complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court were
adversarial, but merely insists on the erroneous premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited
to the correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry. [38] Having
established that the proper recourse for the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on
this matter. The Court has long settled in Republic v. Olaybar[39] that as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections and changes in
the civil registry, such as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be
effected, viz.:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with,
and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding
is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties
of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition,
if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.[40] (Emphases Ours)
Since the Republic was unable to substantiate its arguments, or even cite a specific rule of
procedure that Virgel failed to follow, the Court has no reason to depart from the factual
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence refuting
Virgel's assertion that he is indeed phenotypically male, the correction of the entry on Virgel's
sex in his birth certificate, from "FEMALE" to "MALE," was correctly granted.
With respect to the change of his name to "Virgel" the Court does not agree with the CA that
the requirements under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court may be substituted with that of Rule
108. These remedies are distinct and separate from one another, and compliance with one
rule cannot serve as a fulfillment of the requisites prescribed by the other. [41] Nonetheless, the
Court has settled in Republic v. Mercadera[42] that changes in one's name are not necessarily
confined to a petition filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court include "changes of name" in the enumeration of entries in the civil register
that may be cancelled or corrected. Thus, the name "Virgie" may be corrected to "Virgel" as a
necessary consequence of the substantial correction on Virgel's gender, and to allow the
record to conform to the truth.
With respect to the date of Virgel's birth, the Court again disagrees with the CA that the
alleged date (i.e., February 25, 1976) is undisputed. The NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate
indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976, a date obviously different from that alleged in the
petition for correction.[43] As a public document, the date of birth appearing in the NSO copy is
presumed valid and prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. Virgel bore the burden of
proving its supposed falsity.[44]
Virgel failed to discharge this burden. The police clearance presented to the trial court
corroborates the entry in the NSO copy, indicating Virgel's date of birth as May 12, 1976.
[45]
The Court is also unconvinced by the other documentary evidence supposedly showing
that Virgel was born on February 25, 1976 because the information indicated in the
identification card from the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Member Data Record from the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, were all supplied by Virgel. [46] These are self-serving
information, which do not suffice to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the date
of birth reflected in the NSO copy of Virgel's birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated October 9, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02286 is AFFIRMED,
only insofar as the corrections of the following entries in the birth certificate are concerned:
(a) first name, from "Virgie" to "Virgel;" and (b) gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE."
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207074

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Names are labels for one's identity. They facilitate social interaction, including the allocation of rights
and determination of liabilities. It is for this reason that the State has an interest in one's name.

The name through which one is known is generally, however, not chosen by the individual who
bears it. Rather, it is chosen by one's parents. In this sense, the choice of one's name is not a
product of the exercise of autonomy of the individual to whom it refers.

In view of the State's interest in names as markers of one's identity, the law requires that these
labels be registered. Understandably, in some cases, the names so registered or other aspects of
one's identity that pertain to one's name are not reflected with accuracy in the Certificate of Live
Birth filed with the civil registrar.

Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of two (2) motives. The first, as an
exercise of one's autonomy, is to change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The
other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person; it is simply to correct the data
as it was recorded in the Civil Registry.

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the April 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of
1 2

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358, which denied the Republic of the Philippines' appeal from the 3

Regional Trial Court December 7, 2010 Order granting herein respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's
4

(Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.

To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of
Ilagan City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155 for the correction of her name from "Michael" to
5

"Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
6 7

In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"·' her mother's middle name,
"Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in
her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded. 8
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official transcript of
records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate. 9

The Regional Trial Court, having found Gallo's petition sufficient in form and substance, set a
hearing on August 2, 2010. It also ordered the publication of the Notice of Hearing once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Isabela. 10

The Office of the Solicitor General authorized the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear on its
behalf. Trial then ensued.
11

During trial, Gallo testified on her allegations. She showed that her college diploma, voter's
certification, and transcript indicated that her name was "Michelle Soriano Gallo." The doctor who
examined her also certified that she was female. On cross-examination, Gallo explained that she
12

never undertook any gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to evade any
civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport.
13

The Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 20 I 0 Order, granted the petition. It lent credence to
14

the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and
innocuous." It concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's Certificate of Live Birth and
15

applied Rule I 08 of the Rules of Court, citing Republic v. Cagandahan. Thus:

16 17

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, an order is hereby issued directing the Civil Registrar
General, NSO through the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ilagan, Isabela to correct the entries in the
Birth Certificate of the petitioner as well as in the National Statistics Office Authenticated copy
particularly her first name "MICHAEL" to "MICHELLE", gender from "MALE" to "FEMALE'', middle
name of petitioner to be entered as "SORIANO", middle names of petitioner's parents to be properly
supplied as "ANGANGAN" for the mother and "BALINGAO" for the father, as well as date of
marriage of petitioner's parents to be recorded as "MAY 23, 1981 ", after payment of legal fees if
there be any.

SO ORDERED. 18

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did not comply with the
19

jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order
did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also
20

defective for not stating the cause of the change of name. 21

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of the Solicitor
General's appeal. It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule 108 as the
22

corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous. It further clarified that Rule 108 is limited
23

to the implementation of Article 412 of the Civil Code and that the proceedings which stem from it
24

can "either be summary, if the correction sought is clerical, or adversary . . . if [it] affects . . . civil
status, citizenship or nationality ... which are deemed substantial corrections." 25

The Court of Appeals discussed that Rule 103, on the other hand, "governs the proceeding for
changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register." 26

Jurisprudence has recognized the following grounds as sufficient to warrant a change of name, to
wit: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; ( c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.27

The Court of Appeals also stated that Republic Act No. 10172, "the present law on the matter,
classifies a change in the first name or nickname, or sex of a person as clerical error that may be
corrected without a judicial order." It applied this ruling on the inclusion of Gallo's middle name, her
28

parents' middle names, and the latter's date of marriage, as they do not involve substantial
corrections. 29

As the petition merely involved the correction of clerical errors, the Court of Appeals held that a
summary proceeding would have sufficed. With this determination, the Regional Trial Court's more
rigid and stringent adversarial proceeding was more than enough to satisfy the procedural
requirements under Rule 108. 30

However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes otherwise. For it, Gallo
wants to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises procedural errors made by the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals in finding for Gallo. 31

Citing Republic v. Mercadera, petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
32

innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108. Thus,
33

the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. As "Michael" could not have been the
34

result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it
contemplates a substantial change. 35

Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. It also argues that
36

the use of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. 37

Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly now governs the change of first
38

name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter. 39

To support its claim, it cited Silverio v. Republic, which held that "[t]he intent and effect of the law is
40

to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 ... and 108 ... of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied."41

Respondent Gallo, in her Comment, counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned
42

corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. In any case, she argues that the corrections are clerical; hence, the
43

applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding
properly satisfied. Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of
44

non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to
dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these issues before this Court. 45

Petitioner filed its Reply. The case was then submitted for resolution after the parties filed their
46

respective Memoranda. 47
The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the
change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error;

Second, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive change under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors; and

Finally, whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
1âwphi1

This Court finds for the respondent. Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry.
1âwphi1

In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a mere correction of
error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition, which should only raise
questions of law.

Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, its functions do not
include weighing and analyzing evidence adduced from the lower courts all over again.

In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co. : 48

The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be
raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal
by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already
been considered in the lower courts.

Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question
of fact:

Jurisprudence dictates that there is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of
fact" when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for
determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues
raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of
fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed
requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual. (Emphasis supplied)
49

In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of evidence as determining
whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change requires looking
into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.

On changes of first name, Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048, is helpful
in identifying the nature of the determination sought.
Republic Act No. 10172 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which
50

is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding." Thus:

Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

....

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the
date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status
of the petitioner.
51

Likewise, Republic Act No. 9048 states:

52

Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

....

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner.
53

By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after
reference to and evaluation of existing documents presented.

Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was
ever used.

This Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of
Appeals, that this case involves the correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this
Court is bound by the lower courts' findings.

II.A

In any case, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while Republic Act No.
9048 applies to all other corrections sought.

Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons," which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
54

there. 55
Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage,
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments
of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of name. 56

As stated, the governing law on changes of first name is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which
amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or
corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.

Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name. On 57

the other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the
civil register may be changed or corrected. 58

Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial
changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized
by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.

This requirement for judicial authorization was justified to prevent fraud and allow other parties, who
may be affected by the change of name, to oppose the matter, as decisions in these proceedings
bind the whole world. 59

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special
proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his
legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a
person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known." When granted, a person's identity and interactions
are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name
aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.

The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all,
publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it."

Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or
in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status.
However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by
parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby
acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced ... mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant ... " (Citations omitted)
60

Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must
file a petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a
hearing date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 61
After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial
Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civi1 register.62

On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous
mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial
63

errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule and those affecting the
64

civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person. The proceedings under this rule may either be
65

summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial

errors.66

As explained in Republic v. Mercadera: 67

Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above[-]stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even
substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established,
provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the
purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious
to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction
of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted .... " "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a
substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized
by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the
proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not
violate the Constitution." (Emphasis in the original)
68

Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the
69

petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar. 70

Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108,
thus:

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with
Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use
of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes
"changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical
errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status,
and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded
therein." (Citations omitted)
71

However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively
72

removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them
under the jurisdiction of the civil registrar.
73

In Silverio v. Republic: 74

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) . . .

....

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. (Citations omitted)
75

In Republic v. Cagandahan: 76

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
77

In Republic v. Sali: 78

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name
has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known
by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has
the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a
petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
79

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical
or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames. 80

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 81

Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name
through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has
been filed and later denied.

In 2012, Republic Act No. 9048 was amended by Republic Act No. 10172. 82

In addition to the change of the first name, the day and month of birth, and the sex of a person may
now be changed without judicial proceedings. Republic Act No. 10172 clarifies that these changes
may now be administratively corrected where it is patently clear that there is a clerical or
typographical mistake in the entry. It may be changed by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with
the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected
or changed is kept. 83

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the
date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
84

However, Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012-more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May
13, 2010. Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
85

II.B

As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is necessary to determine the nature
of the correction sought by Gallo.

Petitioner maintains that Rule 103 applies as the changes were substantive while respondent
contends that it is Rule 108 which governs as the changes pertain only to corrections of clerical
errors.

Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's

Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

A clerical or typographical error pertains to a

[M]istake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous ... which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records[.] 86

However, corrections which involve a change in nationality, age, or status are not considered clerical
or typographical. 87

Jurisprudence is replete with cases determining what constitutes a clerical or typographical error in
names with the civil register.

In Republic v. Mercadera, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) sought to correct her name from
88

"Marilyn" to "Merlyn." She alleged that "she had been known as MERLYN ever since" and she
89

prayed that the trial court correct her recorded given name "Marilyn" "to conform to the one she grew
up to." The Office of the Solicitor General argued that this change was substantial which must
90

comply with the procedure under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. However, this Court ruled that
91

Rule 103 did not apply because the petition merely sought to correct a misspelled given name:

In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn'' is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly
misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that
blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the
same.

The [Court of Appeals] did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could
remember. 92

Mercadera also cited similar cases in which this Court determined what constitutes harmless errors
that need not go through the proceedings under Rule 103:

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the
same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely
involves the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the
righting of a clerical error." In LabayoRowe v. Republic, it was held that the change of petitioner's
name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration
wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto
and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d,"
so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court,
with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that,
"changing the name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon' to 'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause
any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and
tone (tono, tunog, himig). (Citations omitted)
93

Likewise, in Republic v. Sali, Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali) sought to correct her Certificate of Live
94

Birth, alleging that her first name was erroneously entered as "Dorothy" instead of "Lorena," and her
date of birth as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." She alleged that she had been using the
name "Lorena" and the birth date "April 24, 1968" ever since. She also averred that she had always
been known as "Lorena" in her community. She claimed that the petition was just to correct the error
and not to evade any criminal or civil liability, or to affect any succession of another person. 95
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Republic, argued against Sali's
claim, alleging that the petition was for a change of name under Rule 103 and not for the correction
of a simple clerical error. It averred that there must be a valid ground for the name change, and the
applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it for
hearing. It also contended that assuming Rule 108 was the proper remedy, Sali failed to exhaust her
remedies when she did not file an affidavit under Republic Act No. 9048. 96

In Sali, this Court held that Rule 103 did not apply because the petition was not for a change of
name, but a petition for correction of errors in the recording of Sali's name and birth date. Sali had
been using the name "Lorena" since birth, and she merely sought to have her records conform to the
name she had been using as her true name. She had no intention of changing her name altogether.
Thus, her prayer for the correction of her misspelled name is not contemplated by Rule 103. 97

In the case at bar, petitioner, raising the same arguments as that in Sali, claims that the change
sought by Gallo is substantial, covered by Rule 103 because the two (2) names are allegedly entirely
different from each other. It argues that "Michael" could not have been the result of a misspelling of
"Michelle."
98

On the other hand, Gallo argues that the corrections are clerical which fall under Rule 108, with the
requirements of an adversarial proceeding properly complied. 99

Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition was not to change the name by
which she is commonly known, this Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is
not filing the petition to change her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of
her name.

Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute. 100

Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely correcting the misspelling of
her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael," especially since the first four (4)
letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The differences only pertain to an additional
letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be
vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people.
In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have
determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely seeking to
correct her records to conform to her true given name.

However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.

As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13, 2010. The current law,
101

Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012. 102

The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No. 9048. 103

To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001 and removed the correction of
clerical or typographical errors from the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for
judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register, or changes
of first name or nickname. Thus:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. 104

Therefore, it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the Regional
Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the
Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case. In Republic v. Sali, 105

Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for
correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were
committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be
set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using
the name "Lorena." Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What
she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the
same to conform to the name she grew up with.

Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect . . .

....

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name
has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known
by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has
the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a
petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court . . .

....

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the
RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been
administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name. 106

Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the middle names of her parents as
Angangan for her mother and Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as May
23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.

Under Section 2(3) of Republic Act No. 9048:

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner. 107

These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it
involves any change in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex.

Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" fall within the coverage of
108

clerical mistakes not deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if there is no
proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used, the correction may be
made.

Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them administratively before filing
a petition under Rule 108.

However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule 108 as this was
a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No.
9048. 109

This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan: 110

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error.

It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. (Citation omitted)
111

It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15, 2012 that errors in entries as
to biological sex may be administratively corrected, provided that they involve a typographical or
clerical error. 112

However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of biological sex may still be
considered a substantive matter.

In Cagandahan, this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of name and biological sex in his
113

or her Certificate of Live Birth after a gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule
108. In that case, it was held that the change did not involve a mere correction of an error in
114

recording but a petition for a change of records because the sex change was initiated by the
petitioner. 115

IV

Considering that Gallo did not first file an administrative case in the civil register before proceeding
to the courts, petitioner contends that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9048. 116

On the other hand, respondent argues that petitioner has waived its right to invoke these doctrines
because it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court and only raised these
issues before this Court. 117

This Court rules in favor of Gallo.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer
concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction.
Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer
to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court. 118

However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:
119 120

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect
of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and
the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. (Citation omitted)
121

Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has
jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper
jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 122

In Republic v. Lacap: 123

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. (Citation omitted)
124

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take
cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it
cannot be waived.

However, for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, this Court has ruled that failure
to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an
opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of
laches.125

In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: 126

True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the opinion that the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation . . .

....
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppels in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction ... In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice cannot be tolerated- obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court ... And in Littleton vs. Burgess, ... the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
127

Thus, where a party participated in the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised
only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal, the party invoking it may be estopped from doing
so.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; ( d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; ( e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g)
when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; G) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong
public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto proceedings . . (Emphasis supplied, citations
128

omitted)

Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2) doctrines was only
raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions before the Regional Trial Court, it is
estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds for dismissal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96358 is AFFIRMED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo is GRANTED. This Court directs that the Certificate
of Live Birth of Michelle Soriano Gallo be corrected as follows:

1) Correct her first name from "Michael" to "Michelle";

2) Correct her biological sex from "Male" to "Female";

3) Enter her middle name as "Soriano";

4) Enter the middle name of her mother as "Angangan";

5) Enter the middle name of her father as "Balingao"; and

6) Enter the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981."

SO ORDERED.

RULE 109

Appeals in Special Proceedings

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. — An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
 (a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of
a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of this rules.