G.R. No.

154616 July 12, 2004

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul the Resolution 1 dated May 11, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64583, which denied petitioner Governor
Antonio Calingin’s petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or the issuance of an order of status quo ante, as well as its Resolution 2 dated July
1, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and borne by the
records, are as follows:
The Office of the President issued a Resolution 3 dated March 22, 2001 in OP Case No.
00-1-9220 (DILG ADM. Case No. P-16-99) entitled Vice Governor Danilo P. Lagbas, et
al. versus Governor Antonio P. Calingin (Misamis Oriental) suspending Gov. Calingin
for 90 days. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr.,
issued a Memorandum4 implementing the said Resolution of the Office of the President.
On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion for
Reconsideration.5
The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which granted an exemption to the election ban in the movement of any
public officer in its Resolution No. 39926 promulgated on April 24, 2001. This was in
pursuance to COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 which provides in part that
Section 1. Prohibited Acts – (a) During the election period from January 2, 2001 until
July 13, 2001, no public official shall make or cause any transfer/detail whatsoever of
any officer or employee in the civil service, including public school teachers, or suspend
elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official, except upon prior written
approval of the Commission.
On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals
to prevent the DILG from executing the assailed suspension order. However, on May
11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by resolution issued on
July 1, 2002, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari where petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred
in
… FINDING THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE SUSPENSION ORDER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE ELECTION
PERIOD IS WITH AUTHORITY FROM THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
… FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS FINAL
AND EXECUTORY AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 67, CHAPTER 4, OF REPUBLIC ACT
7160, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.7
In dispute is the validity of the DILG Memorandum implementing the suspension order
issued by the Office of the President. We are asked to resolve in this connection two
issues: (1) Was the decision of the Office of the President already final and executory?
and (2) Was the exemption from the election ban in the movement of any public officer
granted by COMELEC valid?
Petitioner contends that decisions of the Office of the President on cases where it has
original jurisdiction become final and executory only after the lapse of 15 days from the
receipt thereof and that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the
running of the said period8 in accordance with Section 15, 9 Chapter 3, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner further contends that Section 67,10 Chapter 4 of the Local Government Code
(Rep. Act 7160), which provides that decisions of the Office of the President shall be
final and executory, applies only to decisions of the Office of the President on
administrative cases appealed from the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod of highly-urbanized cities and independent component cities, and
sangguniang bayan of municipalities within the Metro Manila Area. It does not cover
decisions on cases where the Office of the President has original jurisdiction such as
those involving a Provincial Governor.11
In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that it is a principle of statutory construction that
where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially
intended for the said case must prevail. The case on hand involves a disciplinary action
against an elective local official. Thus, the Local Government Code is the applicable law
and must prevail over the Administrative Code which is of general application. 13 Further,
the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted much later than the Administrative
Code of 1987. In statutory construction, all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with the later law are repealed or modified accordingly.14
Besides, even though appeal to the Court of Appeals is granted under Sec. 1, 15 Rule 43
of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 12,16 Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Sec. 6817 of the Local Government Code provides for the immediate
execution pending appeal. Under the same case of Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 18 we
enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government
Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under
which the decisions were rendered mandated them to be so.
In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion
for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision.
Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution.
As to the validity of the exemption granted by COMELEC in its Resolution No. 3992,
petitioner claims that the exemption was invalid for being based on a mere draft
resolution. According to him, a draft resolution does not operate as a final resolution of a
case until the proper resolution is duly signed and promulgated. Petitioner maintains
that a draft cannot produce any legal effect.
A perusal of the records, however, reveals that the Resolution in O.P. Case No. 00-1-
9220 was approved and signed on March 22, 2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de
Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the approval was before the promulgation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24, 2001. The record also shows that the
request to implement the said suspension order was filed on March 22, 2001 by the
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President pursuant to the
requirements stated in the Resolution.
Moreover, COMELEC Resolution No. 352919 – which may be applied by analogy and in
relation to Sec. 220 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 – merely requires the request to
be in writing indicating the office and place from which the officer is removed, and the
reason for said movement, and submitted together with the formal complaint executed
under oath and containing the specific charges and the answer to said complaint. The
request for the exemption was accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of
Controversion, Reply and Draft Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the
COMELEC to substantiate the request were submitted. There being a proper basis for
its grant of exemption, COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Court of Appeals’ resolutions dated May 11, 2002 and July 1, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
64583 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
Also referred to as DILG Sec. Jose D. Lina, Jr.
1
Rollo, pp. 26-34.
2
Id. at 36-37.
3
Id. at 55-58.
4
Id. at 38-39, 51-52.
5
Id. at 60-64.
6
Id. at 67-75.
7
Id. at 9.
8
Id. at 17-18.
9
SEC. 15. Finality of Order. – The decision of the agency shall become final and
executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely
affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper,
has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend
the running of the said period.
10
SEC. 67. Administrative Appeals. – Decisions in administrative cases may, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
11
Records, p. 16.
12
G.R. No. 142261, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 738, 754.
13
Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, 30 September 1992, 214 SCRA 378,
391-392; See also Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277,
284.
14
Ruben Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Third Edition, p. 321.
15
SEC. 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, …Office of the
President, . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
16
SEC. 12. Effect of appeal. – The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order
or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
upon such terms as it may deem just.
17
SEC. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. – An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins
such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his
salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
18
Supra, note 12 at 752.
19
Premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve the addendum to Sec. 2 of Resolution No. 3401, promulgated on 15 December
2000 to read as follows:
SEC. 2.…
Any request for authority to suspend an elective city and barangay officer shall be
submitted in writing to the commission, together with the formal complaint containing the
specific charges, executed under oath and the answer to said complaint.
...
20
SEC. 2. Requests for authority of the Commission. How to file: (1) …The requests
shall indicate the office and place to which the officer or employee is proposed to be
transferred/detailed or otherwise moved and the reason for said transfer/detail.

Case Digest

Facts: Governor Antonio Calingin was suspended for 90 days by the Office of the
President in a case filed by Vice Governor Danilo Lagbas. Undersecretary Eduardo
Soliman of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued a
memorandum implementing the suspension order. Calingin filed a motion for
reconsideration and also filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals to
prevent the DILG from executing the suspension order. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, and Calingin appealed the decision.
Issues:
1. Was the decision of the Office of the President already final and executory?
2. Was the exemption from the election ban granted by COMELEC valid?
Ruling: The decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. While a
motion for reconsideration may be filed, it does not suspend the running of the period
for the decision to become final. The Court of Appeals does not have authority to stay
the execution of the decision. Therefore, the DILG Secretary has the authority to
execute the suspension order.
The exemption from the election ban granted by COMELEC is valid. The request for
exemption was properly submitted with the necessary documents, such as the affidavit
of complaint and the draft resolution. The exemption was approved before the
promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992, and thus, it is valid.
Doctrine: Decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are
immediately executory even pending appeal. No motion for reconsideration is allowed,
but parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The decisions are
considered final and executory after 15 days from the receipt of the decision, unless an
administrative appeal or judicial review has been perfected within that period. The Court
of Appeals does not have the authority to stay the execution of the decision.