The first venture of the new regime was the creation of a new capital.

Like its predecessors,

Baghdad rapidly transcended the intentions of its founders, and grew from a military and
administrative center into a major city. The very decision to build the administrative center,
called the City of Peace (madinat al-salam), generated two large settlements in the vicinity.
One was the extensive camp of the Abbasid army in the districts to the north of the palace
complex, called al-Harbiya, and the other, to the south, was al-Karkh, inhabited by thousands
of construction workers brought from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. Here were markets to
provision the workers and their families, workshops to produce their clothes, utensils, and
tools, and factories to supply the building materials for the construction project. The original
Baghdad, then, was a three-part complex - the troop settlement in al- Harbiya, the working
populations in al-Karkh, and the administrative city itself, Madinat al-Salam. No sooner was
Madinat al-Salam completed than the decisions of the Caliphs to build additional palace
residences and administrative complexes in the immediate vicinity stimulated the growth of
additional quarters. Across the Tigris the new palace district of al-Rusafa also promoted
urban development.
Never had there been a Middle Eastern city so large. Baghdad was not a single city, but a
metropolitan center, made up of a conglomeration of districts on both sides of the Tigris
River. In the ninth century it measured about 25 square miles, and had a population of
between 300,000 and 500,000. It was ten times the size of Sasanian Ctesiphon, and it was
larger than all of the settled places - cities, towns, villages, and hamlets combined - in the
Diyala region. It was larger than Constantinople, which is estimated to have had a population
of 200,000, or any other Middle Eastern city until Istanbul in the sixteenth century. In its
time, Baghdad was the largest city in the world outside China.
Its vast size is an index of its importance in the formation of the Abbasid empire, society, and
culture. A capital city, Baghdad became a great commercial city for international trade and
immensely productive textile, leather, paper, and other industries. Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, as well as secret pagans, Persians, Iraqis, Arabs, Syrians, and Central Asians made
up its cosmopolitan population. Soldiers and officials, the workers who built the new city, the
people who lived in the surrounding villages, merchants from Khurasan and the East who
engaged in the India traffic through the Persian Gulf, also settled in Baghdad. Basrans
seeking intellectual contacts and business fortunes, notables and landowners from Aliwaz,
cloth workers from Khuzistan, prisoners of war from Anatolia, scholars from Alexandria,
Harran, and Jundishapur, and Nestorian Christians from villages all over Iraq made Baghdad
their home. Baghdad, then, was the product of the upheavals, population movements,
economic changes, and conversions of the preceding century; the home of a new Middle
Eastern society, heterogeneous and cosmopolitan, embracing numerous Arab and non-Arab
elements, now integrated into a single society under the auspices of the Arab empire and the
Islamic religion. It provided the wealth and manpower to govern a vast empire; it crystallized
the culture that became Islamic civilization.
Abbasid administration: the central government: The creation of Baghdad was part of the
'Abbasid strategy to cope with the problems that had destroyed the Umayyad dynasty, by
building effective governing institutions, and mobilizing adequate political support from
Arab Muslims, converts, and from the non-Muslim communities that paid the empire’s taxes.
The new dynasty had to secure the loyalty and obedience of its subjects for a rebel regime
and justify itself in Muslim terms.
To deal with these problems the new dynasty returned to the principles of 'Umar II. The
'Abbasids swept away Arab caste supremacy and accepted the universal equality of Muslims.
They did away with the anachronism of the Arab “nation in arms,” and frankly embraced all
Muslims as their supporters. Arab caste supremacy had lost its political meaning, and only a
coalition regime, uniting Arab and non- Arab elements, could govern a Middle Eastern
empire. The propagation of Arabic as a lingua franca, the spread of Islam and the conversion
of at least some proportion of the population, the tremendous expansion of commercial
activities, and the economic and demographic upheavals that set people free from their old
lives and launched them on new careers in new cities such as Baghdad made possible an
empire-wide recruitment of personnel and of political support for the new regime. Under the
'Abbasids the empire no longer belonged to the Arabs, though they had conquered its
territories, but to all those peoples who would share in Islam and in the emerging networks of
political and cultural loyalties that defined a new cosmopolitan Middle Eastern society.
The new regime organized new armies and fresh administrative cadres. The 'Abbasids
abolished the military privileges of the Arabs qua Arabs, and built up new forces which
though partly Arab were recruited and organized so that they would be loyal to the dynasty
alone, and not to tribal or caste interests. The Umayyads had already begun to replace
provincial Arab forces with Syrian troops, non-Arab converts to Islam, mawali, and even
local non-Arab, non-Muslim forces, as in Khurasan and Transoxania, and tried to concentrate
military and political power in the hands of picked Syrian regiments loyal to the Caliphs. Yet
they were never able to declare in principle or to complete in practice the transition from the
Arab “nation in arms” to professional armies. Throughout the Umayyad period Arab forces
were still needed for international conquests. Conversely, while the 'Abbasicls continued to
use Arab troops in Yemen, India, Armenia, and on the Byzantine frontiers, the end of the
conquests meant that Arabs in Iraq, Khurasan, Syria, and Egypt could be retired from military
service. The 'Abbasids no longer needed vast reserves of manpower. Rather, they required
only limited frontier forces, and a central army to make occasional expeditions against the
Byzantines, and to suppress internal opposition. For this purpose they used the army with
which they had captured the state - the Khurasanian Arabs and their clients and descendants,
a professional force loyal to the Caliphs who paid them.
The openness of the 'Abbasid regime was particularly evident in administration. Many of the
scribes in the expanding 'Abbasid bureaucracy were Persians from Khurasan. Nestorian
Christians were powerfully represented, probably because they made up a large proportion of
the population of Iraq. Jews were active in tax and banking activities. Shi'i families were also
prominent, and Arabs did not altogether lose their important place. The 'Abbasid dynasty was
Arab; the 'Abbasid armies were composed of Arabs, and the judicial and legal life of
Baghdad and other important cities was in Arab hands. The prominence of Arabs, however,
was no longer a prescriptive right, but was dependent upon loyalty to the dynasty.
A revolutionary social policy was accompanied by the perpetuation of Umayyad
administrative and governmental precedents. Just as the Umayyads had inherited Roman and
Sasanian bureaucratic practices and even the remnants of the old organizations, the 'Abbasids
inherited the traditions and the personnel of Umayyad administration. Clientele ties to the
Caliphs themselves were the essence of government organization. At first the ministries were
just the clerical staffs of the leading officials, and the Caliphs were consulted about
everything. In time, however, the ad hoc, household character of the Caliphate was
substantially (though by no means entirely) superseded by a more rationalized form of
administration. The business of the government became more routinized and three types of
services or bureaus (diwans) developed. The first was the chancery, the diwan al-rasaHl, the
records and correspondence office. The second was the bureaus for tax collection, such as the
diwan al-kharaj. Third, there were bureaus to pay the expenses of the Caliphs’ armies, court,
and pensioners; the army bureau, diwan al-jaysh, was the most important of these. As time
went on, the conduct of business grew more elaborate and more specialized. Each function -
revenue, chancery, disbursement - was subdivided into a host of offices, and each office was
subdivided into divisions to cany on auxiliary activities.
Alongside the bureaucratic staffs, the Caliphs also appointed qadis, or judges. They were
usually selected from among the leading scholars of Muslim law, and their duty was to apply
this law to the civil affairs of the Muslim population. Other judicial officials dealt with state-
related issues; customary law continued to be used in small communities.
With this elaboration of functions and offices, the Caliphs found themselves less and less able
to supervise the business of the state. To keep the organization responsive to the will of the
ruler they instituted internal bureaucratic checks. Financial affairs were watched by the diwan
al-azimma, the controller’s office, which was originally attached to each diwan but later
evolved into an independent bureau of the budget. Correspondence had to go through the
hands of the drafting agency, the diwan al-tawqV, for countersignature, ancl the khatam, the
keeper of the seal. In a special administrative court, the mazalim, the Caliphs, advised by
leading judges, adjudicated fiscal and administrative problems. The barid, the official
messenger ancl information service, spied on the rest of the government.
Finally, the office of the wazir was developed to coordinate, supervise, and check on the
operations of the bureaucracy. Wazir was the title originally applied to the secretaries or
administrators who were close assistants of the Caliphs and whose powers varied according
to the wishes of their patrons.
The elaborate central government was the nerve center of the empire, and from Baghdad the
Caliphs maintained communications with the provinces. But despite the propensities of the
central administration, the provinces were not all governed in a bureaucratic manner. The
degree of control ran from highly centralized administration to loosely held suzerainty. The
empire was tolerant and inclusive rather than monolithic.
Provincial government: The directly controlled provinces were Iraq, Mesopotamia, Egypt,
Syria, western Iran, and Khuzistan - the provinces physically closest to the capital. Khurasan
was sometimes, but not always, included in this group. These provinces were organized to
maximize the obedience of officials to the will of the central government and to assure the
remittance of tax revenues from the provinces to the center. Governors’ appointments were
limited to a very short term so that their careers would be entirely at the mercy of the Caliphs.
They were rapidly rotated to prevent them from developing local support they might use
against the central government. In addition, the powers of provincial government were often
divided among several officials. The governor was usually the military commander, and a
different man was appointed by the central treasury to be in charge of taxation and financial
affairs; yet another official headed the judiciary. These officials checked each other’s powers,
and all officials were subject to the supervision of the barid. The ideal of frequent rotation of
governors, separation of civil and military powers, and inspection by the barid was hard to
implement. Governorships were often awarded in payment of political debts to warlords,
generals, and members of the royal family who had acquiesced in the accession of a Caliph or
in his succession plans, and Caliphs had to give these appointees wide latitude in the
administration of their provinces. In such cases, frequent rotation and the separation of civil
and military functions might be waived. Outside the directly administered provinces were
affiliated regions that were scarcely, if at all, controlled by the central government.
Geographically these were the provinces of the Caspian highlands -Jilan, Tabaristan, Daylam,
and Jurjan; the Inner Asian provinces - Transoxania, Farghana, Ushrusana, and Kabul; and
most of North Africa. In some peripheral provinces, the Caliphs appointed a supervising
military governor and assigned a garrison to see to the collection of taxes and the payment of
tribute. For example, until the middle of the ninth century, Armenia and Tabaristan had Arab
governors who overawed the local rulers and collected tribute. These governors had no direct
administrative contact with the subject people; the actual collection of taxes was in local
hands.
In other cases, the Caliphate merely confirmed local dynasties as “governors of the Caliphs.”
Khurasan, which until 820 was directly ruled by Caliphal appointees, came under the control
of the Tahirid family (820-73). Officially the Tahirids were selected by the Caliphs, but the
Caliphs always confirmed the family heirs to the office. The Tahirids paid very substantial
tributes, but no one from the central government intervened to assure the payments or to
inspect their administration. Transoxania under the Samanids was governed in the same way.
The Samanids had been a local ruling family since Sasanian times, but in the wake of the
incorporation of Transoxania into the Islamic empire, they converted to Islam. In the
Caliphate of al- Ma'niun (813-33), the ruling members of the family were named hereditary
governors of Samarqand, Farghana, and Herat, without further supervision.
Local Govt:
Local government was similarly varied. Iraq was divided into a hierarchy of districts, called
kura, tassuj, and rustaq. The rustaq was the bottom unit in the hierarchy and consisted of a
market and administrative town surrounded by a number of villages. The same hierarchy and
even the same names were used in parts of Khurasan and western Iran. In Egypt the structure
of administration was similar. Local government was organized for taxation. Surveys were
taken in the villages to determine the amount of land under cultivation, the crops grown, and
their expected yield, and the information was passed up to the central administration. The
taxes for whole regions would be estimated, the sums divided up for- each district, and the
demand notices sent out describing the responsibilities of each subdivision.
Each sub-unit received its bill and divided it among the smaller units. At the next stage, taxes
were collected, local expenses deducted, and the balance passed upwards until the surplus
eventually reached Baghdad. This hierarchical administration did not encompass all
cultivated lands. The crown lands, which included the estates of older Middle Eastern
empires, church properties, reclaimed wastelands, and lands purchased or confiscated by the
Caliphate, were not part of the usual provincial tax administration. Such lands were very
extensive in Iraq and western Iran.
Other lands, called iqta(, were also cut off from regular provincial administration. One type
of iqta', iqta' tamlik, was frequently, though not always, ceded out of wastelands, for the sake
of stimulating agricultural investment. The concessionaire was expected to reclaim the land
and assure its cultivation in return for a three- year grace period and a long-term reduction of
taxes. Ultimately such lands became private property, since a concession holder could pass it
on to his heirs. A second type of iqta(, called iqta' istighlal, resembled a tax-farm. In this case,
lands already in cultivation and part of the general revenue administration were assigned to
individuals who agreed to pay the treasury a fixed sum of money in return for the right to tax
the peasantry. The assignee’s payment was assessed at the 'usbr or 10 percent rate, but he was
permitted to exact from the peasants full taxes at the kharaj (land tax) rates, which usually
amounted to a third or a half of the value of the crop. The benefit given the assignee was the
difference between what the peasants paid him and what he paid the government.
There were several reasons for making these kinds of grants. Such lands were conceded as a
way of paying off political debts to the 'Abbasid family, important courtiers, officials, and
military officers who had claims on the state for rewards, pensions, or bribes for their support
and cooperation. Such grants also simplified administration by obviating the need for
collecting revenues in the provinces, bringing the specie to Baghdad, and redistributing the
income through yet other bureaus. Instead of keeping surveys and records for large areas, all
that was necessary was the description of the assignment and the amount due. Nevertheless,
before the middle of the ninth century, iqta's were assigned with relative restraint, for they
represented an important concession of state revenues and state powers. Never in this period
were they assigned in lieu of payment of military salaries.
Furthermore, whatever the organizational forms of local government, local administration
and tax collection posed delicate political problems. Despite the immense power of the
bureaucratic organization, it was extremely difficult to make that power effective in the
villages. The bureaucracy was admirably suited to the communication of orders and to
clerical and financial tasks, but in the villages, the power of the state was limited by
ignorance.
The state came to the villages with staffs of technical specialists such as surveyors to make
land measurements, weighers and measurers to estimate the size of crops, and bankers and
money changers to convert currencies or to give credits. It came with legal specialists, judges
to adjudicate disputes, witnesses to transactions, registrars of deeds, and the like. Alongside
the technicians, it came with specialists in violence, collectors, soldiers, police, extortionists,
stool pigeons, and thugs. Fear was no small part of the business of tax collection.
Yet, with all this, the potential for passive resistance and the problem of inadequate
information could not be solved without the cooperation of local people. These included
family patriarchs, village headmen (such as the raHs in Iran, or the shaykh al-balad in Egypt),
and village landowners, who controlled a large part of the village land and were much richer
than the average peasant, but not so wealthy as the great estate or iqta' holders. In Iraq and
Iran, the dihqans included native elites and Arabs who had acquired land, village-dwelling
and town-dwelling absentee landlords, grain merchants, and money changers who bought the
peasants’ crops, or lent them money to pay their taxes.
These notables played an important intermediary role in the taxation process. As the most
powerful people connected with the villages, they handled negotiations, made a deal on
behalf of the peasants, and paid the taxes. The arrangement suited eveiyone. The bureaucratic
agents were never absolutely sure how much money they could raise, and wished to avoid the
nuisance of dealing with individuals. The peasants did not have to confront the exorbitant
demands of the tax collectors directly. The notables underestimated the taxes to the state,
overestimated them to the peasants, and pocketed the difference. Abbasid officials
understood perfectly well the importance of these people, whom they called their a(wan
(helpers). They understood that for the ultimate tasks of assessment, division, and collection
of taxes the bureaucracy had to depend on people who were not subordinates, who could not
be given orders, but whose cooperation had to be enlisted nonetheless.
Thus, the Abbasid imperial organization was a complex bureaucracy highly elaborate at the
center and in touch with provincial and local forces throughout the empire. Yet the
arrangements between the central government and the provincial and local levels were not
simply hierarchical. At each level, the business of administration was carried on by
independent people. In some cases these were princes or independent governors who
controlled whole provinces, while in others they were the local village chiefs and landowners
without whom the central and provincial governments were helpless. Since the ties of
government were not strictly hierarchical, a complex system of constraints and opportunities,
obligations and loyalties, bound the central, provincial, and local notables to the regime.
These ties depended first of all upon the fact that the army, the police, and the inspectors of
the barid could compel obedience. Also, self-interest dictated the collaboration of village
chiefs and landowners because participation in the tax-collecting apparatus consolidated their
local position. It increased their political importance, conferred upon them the prestige,
authority, and respect accorded the state, and gave them financial opportunities. Apart from
force and interest, class and clientele loyalties drew together central administrators ancl local
elites. The officials of the central government were drawn from the provincial notable
families. Provincial landowning and notable families sent their sons to careers in the central
government. Merchant families maintained branches in Baghdad, and facilitated financial
contacts between the administrative center and the provinces.
Patronage and clienteles were crucial to this system. Central administrators appointed their
provincial representatives, and patronage - fortified by ethnic, religious, regional, and family
affiliations - no doubt helped to smooth the operations of the 'Abbasid state. For example, a
governor of Khurasan, Tahir (820-22), explained that only he could govern the province
because all the notable families were allied to him by marriage and clientship. Clientele ties
also crossed religious lines. Converts to Islam at the center dealt with provincial cousins who
remained Christians or Zoroastrians. Conversion to the new religion did not necessarily
dismpt family, clientele, and regional ties. Thus, the 'Abbasid policy of recruiting notables
regardless of ethnic background not only soothed the conflicts that racked the Umayyad
dynasty, but was essential if a centralized government was to be built at all. Insofar as
effective administration was based upon sympathetic communication between central
officials ancl local notables, the wider the recruitment, the greater the possibility for effective
rule. The 'Abbasid empire, then, was formed by a coalition of provincial and capital city
elites, who agreed on a common concept of the dynasty and the purposes of political power,
and who were organized through bureaucratic and other political institutions to impose their
rule on Middle Eastern peoples.