Marcelino Buyco v.

Philippine National Bank

G.R. No. L-14406 | 30 June 1961

FACTS

This is a mandamus case filed by Buyco praying that the PNB be compelled to
accept his backpay acknowledgement certificate as payment for his obligation.

On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to PNB in the amount of
P5,102.90 plus interest. The loan of petitioner was due to his deficit on his 1952-53 crop
loan with PNB, The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a
holder of backpay acknowledgment certificate which is under Rep. Act No. 897 in the
amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. Petitioner offered to pay the PNB
using his backpay acknowledgement certificate but PNB answered that their motion for
reconsideration (Florentino case, April 28, 1956) was still under consideration by the
court such that they cannot grant yet his request. Later on, the Court denied PNB’s
motion for reconsideration after which petitioner wrote again to PNB reiterating his
request to pay the obligation with the said certificate. A few days after, PNB answered
that they could not accept petitioner’s certificate because of the amendment of its charter.
Petitioner then requested PNB to reconsider its decision which was referred to the Legal
Department, the said department expressed that they could not accept petitioner’s
certificate because of the amendment in its charter.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo granted the petition and ordered the respondent
bank to give due course of the vested right of the petitioner which was acquired previous
to the enactment of R.A. No. 1576 by accepting his backpay certificate as payment for
the obligation to PNB woth costs of the proceedings against PNB. Hence, this appeal by
PNB.
The findings and conclusions stated below are assigned as errors that the trial court
has commited.
1. That in a letter, PNB has impliedly admitted the right of petitioner to apply or
offer his certificate in payment of his obligation to respondent.
2. That the MR filed by PNB, did not affect the petitioner's vested right already
created and acquired at the time he offered to pay his obligation with his
certificate before the passage of Rep. Act No. 1576.
3. Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his
obligation with his backpay certificate.
4. That the writ of mandamus would lie against the appellant.
ISSUE

Whether or not the amendment in Republic Act No. 1576 can apply retroactively to
the payment of the petitioner using his backpay acknowledgment certificate.

Ruling
In view hereof, mandamus is the proper remedy and the judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed with costs against the respondent-appellant.

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO (First Division)

FACTS:
For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to
the case at bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:
“Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is
located shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly
rental agreed between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said
rental does not exceed 300php a month.
Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara

Held:
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case
at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is
the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969,
while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a
half after the increase in rentals had been effected.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may.
Therefore given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses
that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction therefore is in order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is
clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary measure designed to meet a
temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear
and unequivocal language that “no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the
period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon
between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this act.
Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only
from March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by
the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms,
purport to give retroactive effect.
 We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the
language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly
says.

DBP V. CA (Second Division)

G.R NO. L-28774, February 28, 1980

FACTS:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed
Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2
and 4, which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses Nicandro,
for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of PHHC’s
previous transaction with DBP, the spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the PHHC
to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held that the sale
of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in violation of Section 13 of the DBP
Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?
Held:
Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the
purchase price for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction
in question. The general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can only be
maintained by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof.
However, a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect
to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could positively
result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.