TAC Attack

ffBHUflRY 197 3

TH£ SUJinG£RS
Pg 16 ....
 for efficient tactical air power
HISTORY OF THE
SWINGERS ... Pg 16

THG HTTHGK
CURRENT INTEREST
F-4 MINUS TWO 4
FEBRUARY 1973
GEAR-UP LANDINGS
VOL. 13, NO. 2
(or)
Let It All Hang Out 8
THE SWINGERS 16
Tactical Air Command
NUMBERS 26

COMMANDER
DEPARTMENTS
GENERAL WILLIAM W. MOMYER Angle of Attack 3

VICE COMMANDER Weapons Words 6

LT GEN DALES. SWEAT Aircrewmen of Distinction 7

Published by the Chief of Safety SPO Corner 12

COLONEL E. HILLDING T AC Men of the Month 15

Chock Talk 22

TAC Tips 24

Lessons That Live 29

Letters to the Editor 30

Tally 31

editor TACRP 127-1

Moj Tim Brody
Articles, accident briefs, and associated material in this magazine are
non-directive in nature. All suggestions and recommendations are intended
assistant editor to remain within the scope of existing directives. Information used to
Copt Jim Young brief accidents and incidents does not identify the persons, places, or units
involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Names, dates, and places used in
art editor conjunction with accident stories are fictitious. Air Force units are
Stan Hardison encouraged to republish the material contained herein; however, contents
are not for public release. Written permission must be obtained from HQ
TAC before material may be republished by other than Department of
managing editor Defense organizations.
Mariella W. Andrews Contributions of articles, photos, and items of interest from personnel
in the field are encouraged, as are comments and criticism. We reserve the
layout and production right to edit all manuscripts for clarity and readability. Direct
communication is authorized with : The Editor, TAC ATTACK, HQ TAC
SSgt John Tomkowski
(SEPP), Langley AFB, Va. 23365. Autovon 432·2937
Distribution FX, Controlled by SEPP.
Angle of ATTACK
Fl FTY -FIVE
Remember that number, 55. That's the number of
TAC aircrewmen killed as a result of TAC-involved
aircraft accidents in 1972. Let me say it again, 55! We had
to dig into the records of the fifties to find a year to equal
that record. Even ten years ago, we lost fewer crew
members than in 1972. That year, 53 aircrewmen were
killed in 76 accidents. This year, that number plus two
were lost in only 30 accidents.
Now these aren't numbers I'm talking about, these are
people_. _ . T AC people. So you'll pardon me if I get a
little emotional. And here's why. More people were killed
in T AC aircraft accidents last year than were captured by
the enemy in 1972 prior to the December 18 offensive.
And those captured refers to all Air Force, not just TAC.
Think about that! And here's something else. Add seven
to TAC's aircrew fatality figure and you get the total
number of Air Force aircrewmen reported as KIA in 1972
prior to December 18. It hits close to home when you
realize that TAC lost almost as many people to
non-combat aircraft accidents as were lost by the entire
Air Force in a WAR.
Seventeen of our aircrewmen were lost in just two
accidents. Both accidents involved C-130 aircraft, both
accidents resulted from midair collisions, and both
accidents involved aircraft from two different commands
being in the same place at the same time.
While the cause factors extend across both commands
involved, there are some lessons we should have learned
from each accident. For instance: Do you, as an aircrew
member, know the rules of engagement as they apply to
you in such cross-command missions as air-to-air, ADC
intercept missions, and refueling missions? And how
about the many exercises in which you participate? Do
you know the operating parameters? And what about
host-tenant agreements and FAA-Air Force agreements
governing the airspace around your base? Do you know
the rules as they apply to you? Are there deficiencies in
the rules? If so, have you reported them?
At the close of 1971, TAC recorded the best year ever
in terms of accident prevention. But, with regard to
fatalities, 1972 was one of the worst. Now, we must all
apply the lessons of last year to make 1973 the best in
TAC's history. Aircrew lives depend on it.

'
~(
E. HILLDING, olon
Chief of Safety
F-4 MINUS TWO

by Capt Jim Young The "what ifs" for this emergency fall into three
categories: a dead wing and manual rudder, a single engine
The flight manual calls it "Utility System Failure, With with manual rudder, and a single engine with dead wing
Single PC and/or Engine Failure." People in the know call and manual rudder. Let's look at each one in turn.
it "Hairy." You call it anything you like, but you'd better "What if" you have a dead wing and manual rudder
THINK about it now. (loss of utility and one PC system)? The dead wing is
Since August of 1970, five Air Force F-4s have been going to give you some noticeable changes in aircraft
lost in situations involving this type of emergency. The response to lateral controls. What it boils down to is the
accident aircraft in every case was lost on or near the final fact the aileron is more effective than the spoiler. For this
approach phase of flight. Over the same period of time, reason, you shouldn't try to turn into the dead wing. It
almost no incidents of this type have occurred. If you would be more difficult to level the wings than to bank.
discern from this that once you're down to a single PC By always turning away from the dead wing, the reverse is
system, you're backed into a corner or stuck with a true. In this particular set of circumstances, with both
critical situation - you're probably right. This is one of engines running, the manual rudder won't be of as great a
those classic situations that absolutely requires, in my consequence as in the next two instances. Obviously, you
opinion, that you hangar fly it thoroughly prior to should avoid situations where any use of rudder is
actually encountering it, if you expect to handle it required, if at all possible. You're not going to have
successfully. rudder feel trim available either, because of the utility

4 FEBRUARY 1973
 failure. The only rudder you're going to get is from a It might be useful at this point to look at the results of
STRONG leg. some flight tests conducted by McDonnell Douglas in
The next "what if" is a manual rudder, single engine. conjunction with an accident investigation. The following is
(Loss of utility and loss of engine.) Here the lateral an extract from their report.
controls, both wings, are operational. The big hooker here "At the request of the accident board, three profiles
is the yaw induced by single engine operation. When the were flown at St Louis by three different MCAI R pilots.
airspeed gets down to normal approach speeds, the Each pilot tried to duplicate the accident situation but
handling qualities are significantly degraded. In a.ddition, without external stores. They were all in general
depending upon which engine has failed and where your agreement that with the weight [40,000 pounds],
angle of attack probe is located, the angle of attack configuration [2 external fuel tanks and an SUU-20 on
indicator will read erroneously high or low. Therefore, of the right inboard station] , and conditions affecting the
necessity, airspeed must be used in lieu of AOA. We'll talk accident aircraft, the maneuvers attempted by the pilot [a
a I ittle more about the effects of manual rudder use in the left turn onto final at 180 knots with gear and half flaps]
third situation. requires close attention and rapid throttle response during
The third "what if" is a combination of all of the turns to prevent deterioration to an out of control
above (loss of one engine, loss of one PC system, and loss situation. It was found that afterburner power was
of utility). You have a dead wing, manual rudder, and are required shortly after entering the turn in order to
single engine. This is about as bad as you can get and still maintain a level turn at 180 knots, 15 degrees left bank,
keep flying. The asymmetric thrust will yaw the airplane 40,000 pounds gross weight, right engine in idle, and loss
into the dead wing, tending to roll it in that direction. of rudder boost.
Your good wing has a reduced capability to counter this Analysis of the effect of asymmetric failure indicates
roll tendency, and the manual rudder is of limited value. that the rudder will trail with the relative wind over the
It is worth noting here that the Dash One says that lateral aircraft. At 200 knots, with the left engine at military
control response is reduced below 300 knots and power, right engine in idle, gear down, the rudder-trail
continues to be degraded down to final approach speed. angle would be approximately 4.8 degrees right rudder.
That tells you something right there. Later on, down the This, combined with the effect of asymmetric thrust,
page in the flight manual, it says that a MINIMUM of 230 would cause an estimated side-slip angle of 12 degrees
knots should be maintained for a maneuvering airspeed. (aircraft nose right). Aileron deflection required to
Note the word Ml Nl MUM! Most F-4 jocks queried on this prevent roll (with no rudder input) would be 32 degrees.
point were rather emphatic in saying that they'd be faster With 300 pounds of force exerted by the pilot on the left
than 230 if the bird would do it. Losing airspeed later rudder pedal, the rudder would reach approximately 2.8
during the approach to at least get down to a max degrees left rudder deflection and the side-slip angle
approach end engagement speed isn't considered by most would be reduced to 3.8 degrees aircraft nose right. With
F-4 types to be an insurmountable problem. If there's one this condition, only 10 degrees aileron deflection would
thing the F-4 does well, it's slowing down while still be required to prevent the right roll.
airborne. The above data suggest that with an asymmetrical
It's going to take some pretty keen judgment in the engine power setting, if a roll rate due to side-slip is
final approach phase to hack it. If your problem occurs allowed to develop and corrective pilot rudder effort is
with time to spare, and if other circumstances permit, you not immediate and maximum, recovery from the roll
may want to perform a controllability check. Remember would probably require full aileron travel and would be
the minimum altitude of 5000 feet AGL. If at this point marginal. At lower airspeeds, recovery from these
in your emergency you are still juggling checklist pages, conditions becomes even more cirtical."
remember that for any of the above situations, you do A single engine/PC failure coupled with utility failure,
not, repeat, do not, want to blow the flaps down. A no as the above evidence indicates, can be hairy! The
flap approach is recommended. Also, there do~sn't appear degradation in the flight controls combined with the
to be much reason in your controllability check to get any asymmetrical thrust is going to test not only your flying
slower than your programmed barrier engagement speed, skills but your preparation. If you haven't thought this
assuming a barrier is qvailable. The reduction of your gross emergency through via Emergency Situation Training, as
weight to minimum practicable will help out for barrier outlined in this magazine, January 1973 issue, or haven't
engagement speeds as well as improving handling qualities. "hangar flown" it with your buddies, you're really going
Another key point is to get rid of any asymmetric lo·ad. to be backed into a corner. The F-4 minus two can be
The last thing you need in this type of situation is handled, but you'd better handle it now, before it
anything asymmetric. happens for real! ___::;-

TAC ATTACK 5
E ~ .. ,.. Ill
,. ~n

lj . ~ u
weapons words
II I

IIi Iiiii OROS

seem to invent ways to secure ordnance to the aircraft so
I THINK I THOUGHT I THUNK it will fall off when not expected . With all this effort
toward the wrong direction, it seems to us who read all
types of mishap reports, that people are working harder to
devise even more ingenuous ways to get it done wrong. So
by Lt Col William R. Barrett you aren't convinced? Well, try thinking about these 1972
Chief, Missile Safety Branch happenings. First, we might wonder about what the
HqTAC sergeant was thinking while inserting inertia tubes with
cartridges into BDU-33 bomb signal cavities. He did
Just a few years back (two, I think), I was flying C-46s alertly notice that an already install ed inertia tube was not
in North Africa - for the benefit of those not around properly seated; it was protruding about one-half inch
when the Air Force wore brown shoes, this machine was a above the signal cavity. But he did not THINK as he
pretty fair twin engine transport. I was at base operations thumped the protruding inertia tube with the second and
in Cairo - see I told you it was a long time ago - when third fingers of his right hand -sans fingers!
this incident happened. Waiting on maintenance to get my The crew was set for the fifth pass on the bomb range
bird ready, I saw a full load of passengers board another and over the I P, the pilot announced "Hack" for a time
C-46 which had aborted earlier. Almost as soon as the check. The backseater, without much THOUGHT on the
engines were started, they were shut down and moments matter, "hacked" his watch along with actuat ion of the
later the passengers and crew disembarked. I suspect switch for stores release- sans one sto re!
because several flights were late, maintenance felt A life support specialist could not find the canopy
pressured and a replacement aircraft appeared in record open switch, but did find and opened a smal l panel
time. The flight crew did their part by going through their (jettison). He THUNK that pulling the lever behind the
best get-home quick checklists as the passengers were small panel would open the canopy - sans canopy
again enp laning. Suddenly the door opened and passengers initiators!
began to deplane, and most curiously tracked toward the We could look at many more unbelievable happenings,
front of the plane to look at the right engine - sans but you get the idea - we still have the human problem.
propeller. Don't get the idea that maintenance and We can only think a little. THINK, THOUGHT, and
preflights were all that bad, the C-46s had an excellent THUNK on your part will help a lot. ~
operationa l and safety record during
this period. It was the same mishap
cause factor that permeates our
accident statistics today- the human
factor. In this case, too many people
TAC
THRU DEC
WEAPONS MISHAPS ANG
THRU DEC
trying to do their thing too fast I DEC 72 1972 1971 EXPLOSIVE DEC 72 1972 1971
With the pro I iferation of jets,
fewer passengers run to the nearest 6 131 121 TOTAL 1 27 24
TR counter because the pi lot loaded 3 38 51 Personnel 1 15 11
them on an aircraft w ith out a pro-
peller. But, it hasn't so lved our human 3 59 41 Materiel 0 12 7
problem. Personnel error, wh ich is
0 16 34 Other 0 0 0
people doing their thing ca rel essly,
caused, in 1972, over 34 percent of our
exp losives mishaps. Flight crews con-
3 14 2 MISSILE
tinue to push wrong buttons which
cause mishaps, whil e ground crews
0 I I 4 I 23 I NUCLEU

6 FEBRUARY 1973
 TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

AIRCREWMEN
of
DISTINCTION
Captain John W. Grove, First Lieutenant Cohen G.
Cope, and Staff Sergeant Edgar H. Davidson, 703rd CAPT GROVE
Tactical Air Support Squadron, 68th Tactical Air Support
Group, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, have been
selected as Tactical Air Command Aircrewmen of
Distinction for the month of December 1972.
On 8 November 1972, Captain Grove and Lieutenant
Cope, both qualified aircraft commanders, and Staff
Sergeant Davidson prepared their CH-3E for a routine
training mission with Lieutenant Cope scheduled as pilot.
During ground taxi, Lieutenant Cope noticed that a little
extra control pressure was required to turn left; however,
this was attributed to strong crosswinds. He then applied
power to initiate a five foot hover before takeoff. As the
helicopter broke ground, it immediately began turning to
the right at a rate of approximately 180 degrees per lLT COPE SSGT DAVIDSON
second. Lieutenant Cope applied full left pedal (the
rudder pedals in the helicopter are anti-torque devices
which control the angle of attack on the tail rotor), but
this had no effect on the turn rate. Because of his higher
level of experience in the aircraft, Captain Grove assumed
control of the helicopter and continued to apply full left
pedal, but still to no avail. To avoid ground contact,
Captain Grove and Lieutenant Cope increased power
which caused the turn rate to increase. An emergency was
promptly declared as the crew realized they had lost tail
rotor (anti -torque) control. The auxiliary servo system
was the suspected cause of the difficulty and was
immediately turned off; however, this only resulted in a
further increase in turn rate. The auxiliary servo system
was restored as the helicopter, now at 100 feet AGL,
became almost uncontrollable with severe nose up and
nose down attitudes. Captain Grove called for the crew to
tighten seat belts and lock shoulder harnesses. He then electrical switches were turned off, and the crew departed
quickly coordinated emergency landing procedures. the aircraft safely.
Lieutenant Cope was directed to shut down the engines The outstanding airmanship, crew coordination, and
when the aircraft approached the ground and to apply the judgment displayed by this crew in response to a serious
rotor brake on impact. At approximately ten feet above emergency prevented the loss of their CH-3E helicopter
the runway, the engines were pulled back to ground idle, and possible injury to all involved. The actions of Captain
the rotation of the helicopter stopped, and the aircraft Grove, Lieutenant Cope, and Sergeant Davidson qualify
settled to a landing a little harder than normal. The rotor them as Tactical Air Command Aircrewmen of
brake was applied, the engines were shut down, all Distinction. _:.:;;....

TAC ATTACK 7
 gear-up landings or....

OR···
let it all hang out
by Maj Tim Brady

Di d you ever fl y with a pilot who, at some time in hi s Come t o think of it, have you ever known or heard of
past, had landed gea r-up because of his own error? anyone who made that same mistake twice? The stati stics
Watching him shoot an approach is a lesson in aren't avail able but you can bet that it hasn 't happened
attentiveness as far as the landing gear is concern ed. On too many times. The grinding noise the machine makes
f inal, be it an instrument approach or a VFR type, you somehow ingrains a lasting lesson in the lander. In that
can see his eyes dart t o the gear handl e and indica tors statement there is a solution to the problem but,
with amaz in g regul arity. He may even bounce a fi st off unfort unatel y, such a lesson is a mite too expensive to be
t he gea r handle with about every tenth heartbeat. Th e included in the UPT syllabus.
path hi s eyes trace during hi s instrument crosschec k The numbers of pilot caused gear-up mishaps Air Force
becomes so mewhat mi sshapen to in clude th e landing gea r wide has remained relat ively constant since 1969, as you'll
indicat ors. Barrin g mec hani cal probl ems, th e chances are not e in the t abulation below.
t hat he will never aga in land with 'em up and loc ked.

BY YEAR BY AIRCRAFT

1965 11 C-130 2 CH-3

1966 12 U-3 6 T-29 1
1967 10 B-57 5 F-84 7
1968 14 C-133 2 A-1 6
1969 8 C/KC-97 1 T-33 5
1970 7 C-123 4 T/A-37 4
1971 7 B-66 F-102 3
1972 8 C-131 F-100 3
C-7 3 F-105 2
TOTAL (since 1965) 77
XC-142 1 U-2
0-2 9 F-4 2
C-47 1 T-38 2
OV-10 3 OU-22

BY SITUATION

Single Seat or
Flown by Single Pilot 42 Multi-Crewed 35
 the headset have been installed to warn the pilot that the
gear was not down when it should have been but it's
gear-up landings obvious these devices aren't doing the job for which they
were designed. At least they didn't do it in 77 cases in the
past eight years.
But of course we can't lay the blame on the warning
The improvement in the average number of gear-up devices. They're only supposed to work if an error has
mishaps per year since 1969 compared with previous four been committed. You make a mistake and the
years is notable, but eight per year is still a frustrating horn/ I ight/buzzer tells you about it but only IF you
eight too many. This gear-up landing frustration was observe the light or hear the horn or buzzer. There's the
succinctly expressed by a commander in his indorsement kicker. You must first perceive the warning device. It
to an accident report. seems that in many cases, once the pilot has made up his
" ... It is apparent that accident boards in the past mind that the gear is down and has channeled his
have failed to prevent our accident (this was the 133rd attention to landing the aircaft, all the gear warning horns,
gear-up landing in the past ten years) and I feel we're lights, and buzzers in the world aren't going to sway him
no closer to a solution today than we were ten years from his appointed duty.
ago. Within a week of our unfortunate accident, a twin In addition to the warning devices, we've developed
engine corporation aircraft with a highly qualified pilot handy things called checklists that tell us to put down the
landed gear-up at (commercial airfield). A regional gear. But sometimes distractions enter the picture and
commercial carrier based in (commercial airfield) also force our attention away from the job at hand. For
experienced a similar gear-up landing within the recent instance, if, as you're reading this article, a bomb goes off
past. A new approach to this problem must be found. in the next stall, you're going to be distracted
We know that in the past, blaming the pilot simply momentarily . When you get yourself all pulled together
does not prevent the reoccurrence of gear-up landings. again, chances are you aren't going to remember the exact
The Air Force must exercise leadership in the area and point you quit reading when the explosion occurred. And
test the new resources available to resolve this unless you force yourself back into the article and maybe
problem. Unless this is done, we may reasonably re-read a couple of lines, you just might wind up skipping
expect that more and possibly costlier aircraft are a few. If we make an analogous shift and transpose the
going to land gear-up." john to the seat of an aircraft, the article to a checklist,
Less than two months after this commander made the and the bomb to an unexpected radio call, the formula for
statement, another Air Force aircraft landed gear-up. distraction is complete. And if, after distracted, we don't
In the past, horns, lights, buzzers, and aural tones in re-read a couple of lines, the gear may still be in the well
when the landing slide is complete. It takes a conscious
mental effort to overcome distractions and unless we
force ourselves back into the real situation, that check I ist
is as worthless as last year's change to 60-16.
Then there's the old habit pattern substitution
syndrome. Let's say that you've developed the habit
pattern: reduce power in the pitch, roll out on downwind,
get the gear, the flaps, and turn. A very definite and
habitual number of steps. But throw a distraction in about
the time you would be reaching for the gear handle, such
as a beeper coming through too loud and clear. You
reach down and flip the UHF selector switch off
"both" ... then lower the flaps and turn. You have
substituted the UHF selector switch for the gear handle.
While you've made the correct number of moves with
your hands, and accomplished the correct number of
steps, the gear is still tucked. Unless you retrace the
steps, you may land gear-up.
Some hold that the more people in the cockpit, the
less the chance of making a gear-up landing. If that were
so, we would never hear statements like, "How could five

10 FEBRUARY 1973
people in the cockpit miss the fact that the gear handle and land at 100 knots ... well. And for those aircraft
was UP before (and after) touchdown?" And, if you'll which use the approach speed range for other things such
direct your attention to the tabulation, you'll note that as airdrops, etc .... well.
multi-crewed aircraft have been landed gear-up almost as Incorporating a gear warning device into the angle of
many times as single-seat aircraft or aircraft flown by a attack indicator or Heads Up Display (HUD) in some
single pilot. So adding more people is not the answer. aircraft. On the surface it sounds good, but it's still a
What, then, is the answer? warning device.
To find it, the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center
has initiated a Required Operational Capability (ROC), THE Ml RAGE SYSTEM
stating as its objective: A device is needed that will Adopt the device presently installed on the French
effectively insure that aircraft are correctly configured for Mirage Ill E aircraft used by the Austral ian Air Force. It
landing. This ROC was sent to all the major air commands consists of an audio frequency oscillator wired in series
for ideas and inputs and, at the present time, the complete with the landing gear microswitches, the command radio
package is being put together incorporating the inputs transmitter, and a button on the instrument panel or
from the MAJCOMS to forward to the air staff. other convenient location. If the gear is down and the
In the ROC, several devices were discussed as button is pressed, the circuit is completed and a
possibilities: distinctive tone is transmitted over the aircraft radio. In
operation, the tower operator withholds landing clearance
until he hears this tone in response to,"Check Gear Down."
AUTOMATIC LANDING GEAR In using the button and tone oscillator, the pilot may
Wire the gear-down circuit to the approach or landing develop the habit of pressing the button in response to the
position of the wing flaps so that if the gear is not already tower radio transmission, "Check Gear Down," but the
down, it will be lowered automatically when the flap oscillator responds to fact: no gear, no tone.
switch is put to the approach or landing position. This appears to be a good solution because of its
This device obviously, would not be appropriate for simplicity and applicability to all aircraft. Pilots are
all aircraft; however, it might work on aircraft that have a already conditioned to not land without landing clearance
flap position that is used only for landings. Another and the addition of this device would merely change a
drawback to this device is that it removes the pilot from verbal response to a button response.
the decision loop and in doing so, transfers responsibility You can see some of the disadvantages of this system.
from the pilot. For instance, what if the tower is saturated and misses the
tone transmission. Add to that a pilot who has developed
RADIO ALTIMETER WARNING DEVICE a habit pattern of pressing the button rather than giving
Incorporate a gear warning device into the radio the response of "Gear Check," plus the gear in the up and
altimeter which would provide a cockpit warning to the locked position and zingo ... gear-up landing.
crew if the plane descended through a pre-selected height Perhaps we can capitalize on the anticipated habit
above the ground with the gear up. pattern the pilot will develop using a device of this kind
This device carries with it the inherent disadvantage of by merely not exposing the button until the gear handle is
all the warning devices of the past. Existing warning down. If, in his concentration, the pilot automatically
devices have not prevented gear-up landings. The ability of reaches for the button to respond to "Check Gear Down,"
the pilot to set up a psychological barrier between what he wouldn't find it. In all likelihood, his concentration
he is doing and what the warning device is warning has would be broken and he would momentarily shift his
accounted for many gear-up landings. Adding another attention to the landing gear. Might work!
would not seem to solve the problem. These are just a few of the potential solutions to the
gear-up problem; presumably, many more are being
OTHER WARNING DEVICES researched. And it may very well turn out that there is no
Select an item that the pilot must look at and cannot single foolproof solution.
ignore during a landing approach and incorporate a gear We, at TAC ATTACK, will endeavor to keep you
warning device with it. Such as: informed as the developments unfold in this search for the
Masking the approach speed range of the airspeed best answer to the gear-up landing problem .
indicator with a flag if the gear is up. In shutting down this article, let's end it with an
This might work for those airplanes which use the obvious statement.
approach speed range only during the landing phase. But THE LANDING GEAR IS STILL YOUR
for those that take off at 100 knots, cruise at 100 knots, RESPONSI Bl LITY.

TACATTACK 11
 spo corner

F-+ EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

02 - 100% - THEN WHAT? Probably the easiest Bold which started with a battery fire, proves the point. At one
Face emergency procedure we have to memorize is time in the sequence of events the rear cockpit was so
"Elimination of smoke and fumes." Unfortunately, filled with smoke that the WSO disappeared from view.
maybe it needs to be stressed that while this procedure is Neither crewmember was able to identify the source of
simple, we can't stop right there. The smoke/fumes the smoke as electrical. Because of this fact and other
usually have a source. Barring engine related fires for circumstances, the pilot never accomplished the electrical
which we usually get a fire or overheat light and which fire emergency procedures. The crew eventually had to
don't usually result in smoke in the cockpit, our primary blow the canopy and finally depart the aircraft. History
source of smoke has been from the aircraft electrical reveals that smoke in the cockpit usually has a source.
system. Ordinarily an aviator can recognize the More important, the source is usually within the aircraft
characteristic odor of burning insulation or wiring, and electrical system. One hundred percent oxygen only
will probably immediately dive for the generator switches prevents asphyxiation while you move on to the proper
procedure to eliminate or isolate the source.

/-
and his checklist. There are other units within the
electrical system, however, which may not produce the
traditional "electrical smell" when they are burning. One
prime example is the battery. A recent major accident Maj Burt Miller

~
-;;~./
~
-- .

~--~-~ !----~

12 FEBRUARY 1973
F-f ANOTHER SUBJECT DEAD PilOT FACTOR
After takeoff for a routine local proficiency mission, QUESTION:
the pilot raised the gear handle and an What do these accidents have in common?
intermediate/unsafe right gear indication was observed.
The jock kept the airspeed below 250 knots, checked the An F-100 failed to complete a joinup at night and
landing gear control circuit breaker IN, and recycled the crashed two minutes later. The pilot did not eject. Cause
gear lever to the DOWN and UP positions "several" times. -undetermined, most probable- pilot factor.
The gear would only indicate safe when the handle was in An F-4 flight leader struck the ground during descent
the DOWN position. The pilot elected to abort the in marginal weather. The pilot did not eject. Cause- pilot
mission and reduced fuel load. While dumping fuel and factor.
maneuvering for the landing approach, the gear handle An F-4 hit the ground on base-to-final tum for skip
was again recycled through the UP and DOWN positions bomb. The pilot did not eject. Cause- pilot factor.
"several" times. On final, the gear was once again placed A C-123 rolled inverted and crashed on short final. No
in the DOWN position, a DOWN AND LOCKED survivors. Cause- supervisory factor (instructor pilot).
indication was observed, and the aircraft was safely
landed. Investigation revealed the right main gear inner ANSWER:
door actuator piston rod was broken. No way that gear 1. All crewmembers were killed.
was going to indicate UP AND LOCKED! 2. Crewmember factor was the cause or most probable
Although the Dash One does not specifically stipulate cause.
or limit the number of times a gear should be cycled to
the UP position, I thought most jocks followed that old When an aircraft accident occurs in which there were
philosophy, "If it's down, don't mess around." It would no crewmember survivors and the cause is assessed as pilot
still appear to be excellent advice. factor, we label it as "dead pilot factor." It's not a
particularly ingratiating term, but it gets the point across.
Maj Burt .Miller Is it unusual to find "dead pilot factor" as the final

TACATTACK 13
 accidents with survivors. But the problem may go deeper
than just the statistical causes required to feed Air Force

SPO computers. Since TAC and the Air Force take corrective
action on each and every accident, a significant percentage

CORNE R of this corrective action may be misdirected, doing more

harm than good, without eliminating the cause of the
accident. And, if a costly materiel modification is
implemented without true need, then dollars are wasted
that might be better used elsewhere. Finally, if the cause
is not correctly pinpointed, other valuable aircrews and
aircraft may be lost.
Without doubt, the last point is the most important.
Historically, we are having fewer and fewer acCidents in
Tactical Air Command. But the cost per accident is going
up and up, just as the cost of aircraft continues to rise. If
cause factor on accident reports? we accept the theory that our investigations are
To find the answer, TAC Safety looked at 262 incomplete, then it is going to cost a lot while we wait for
accidents which occurred from 1968 to 1971, involving trends to develop or for subsequent accident boards to
TAC and T AC-gai ned Reserve forces. Crewmember error stumble on real cause factors.
was listed as the primary or most probable cause in 72 Let's recognize that part of the cause may be pilots
percent of the accidents in which there were no crew with an overpowering drive to save a lost aircraft. Whether
survivors. In the cases where at least one crewmember or not that is the case, we need to continue to emphasize
survived the accident, crewmember factor (supervisory, education to cover the possibility. We need to bring it to
instructor pilot, pilot) dropped to 45 percent. the forefront of discussion and keep it on the
Quite a startling difference, but what does this really surface ... keep tal king about it from every con-
mean? Well, it could mean two things. First, it would be ceivable direction.
easy to say that pilots are their own worst enemy in And it becomes obvious that we need to improve
attempting to salvage a bad situation (pilot induced). Or the quality of our investigations.
secondly, we could say that accident boards are To this end, the TAC Office of Safety has recently
ill-equipped to handle investigations without organized a special investigative branch within the Flight
living-breathing flight recorders to tell the story. Safety Division to explore all methods of improving field
That pilots would stick with an aircraft to their death investigations of aircraft accidents. With these efforts and
is hard for the living to accept. However, we have with continued education in this area, we hope the
observed that pilots , as members of accident boards, tend percentage of "dead pilot factor" vs "live pilot factor"
to be critical and frequently jump to the conclusion that accidents will eventually approach each other at zero.
the accident pilot made a mistake simply because the
opportunity was there for him to do so. (Occupational lt Col lou Kenison
guilty conscience?)
Or for another example, time after time pilots will
blame themselves for a hard landing, then explain what
they did wrong to the squadron commander and/or the
DO, only to find out the airspeed indicator was erratic or
the flight controls were binding.
This "occupational guilty conscience" may be a small
Tnis space intentionally left blank
part of the answer, but we believe the larger part lies in awaiting your in put to
the reduced capability of accident boards to accurately
" EMERGENCY SITUATION TRAINING " .
pinpoint the cause when there are no crew survivors.
Check the Jon . issue of
Statistically, there is evidence to support this theory since
18 or 25 TAC undetermined accidents in the 1968 to TAC ATTACK for further poop .

1971 time frame involve accidents with no survivors.

An investigative problem does exist, as evidenced by
the difference between the 72 percent pilot factor for no
survivor accidents and the 45 percent pilot factor for

14 FEBRUARY 1973
 TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Maintenance Man Safe~ Award

Master Sergeant Carey L. Stegall, 834 Avionics
Maintenance Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Florida, has been
selected to receive the T AC Maintenance Man Safety
Award for December 1972. Sergeant Stegall will receive a
letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical
Air Command and a Certificate.
MSGT STEGALL

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Crew Chief Safe~ Award

Staff Sergeant Robert F. Ramirez, 316 Organizational
Maintenance Squadron, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia,
has been selected to receive the T AC Crew Chief Safety
Awarddor December 1972. Sergeant Ramirez will receive
a letter of appreciation from the Commander of Tactical
Air Command and a Certificate.

SSGT RAMIREZ

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

Ground Safe!J Man of the Month

Sergeant Victor A. Mortenson, Jr., 2nd Aerial Port
Squadron, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, has been
selected to receive the T AC Ground Safety Man of the
Month Award for December 1972. Sergeant Mortenson
will receive a letter of appreciation from the Commander
of Tactical Air Command and a Certificate.
SGT MORTENSON
TACATTACK
the swingers by William G. Holder and Robert H. George '--
'\
\ \
\ \
\ \
\'~'~""
\ ...,
\
\
''
\ \ (
\ \ \
\
\ \ ...
\..-\.., t
\ \
\

Aircraft designers have long watched the flight of birds the straight wing was ideal for low landing speed, and the
and the way they move their wings in flight. "If only an highly swept wing was ideal for supersonic flight. From
aircraft cou d be built to do this!" was the thought in the this simple statement of the problem comes the solution
designers' minds. -variable sweep.
For many years, even before the Wright brothers' epic One ·Of the scientists who was particularly impressed
flight, inventors have been working on moving wings for by the Busemann theory was Dr. Albert Betz of the
airplanes, wings that increased and decreased their length Aerodynamics Research Institute of Gottingen,Germany.
and width, wings that oscillated longitudinally , wings that He set ab'out ,to do further research on the idea.
flapped like birds' wings. Some of these contraptions were The work of .Dr. Betz was noted by engineers at
actually built, and some of them even flew- sort of.
The PRACTICAL idea of movable wings was
introduced at a scientific convention in Rome in 1935.
Dr. Adolf Busemann, a young German designer, read a
paper on aircraft wings and high-speed flight. Dr.
Busemann's paper started aero engineers thinking about
the advantages of movable wings. They found that one of
the greatest advantages of sweptwings was the reduction
of aerodynamic drag at high speeds. Research has since
established that an airplane having zero sweep (wings at
right angles to the centerline of the airplane) will produce
the same drag at 540 miles per hour as an airplane having
wings swept at 60 degrees flying at over a thousand miles
per hour.
But some engineers realized that the movable wing
concept had inherent disadvantages. When sweep angle
increased, drag decreased but stalling speed increased. So The world's first swingwing aircraft, the Messerschmitt P-1101 , never

16 FEBRUARY 1973
 Messerschmitt, who felt that the concept might have an fuselage, followed by the fuel tanks, undercarriage
application to several high-speed aircraft that the retraction space, and a tai I cone. The 1101's wing span
company was considering. Messerschmitt conducted was some 27 feet, the wing area 170 square feet. The top
extensive wind-tunnel testing to insure the validity of the speed was over 600 miles per hour at altitude.
theory. Thus, the end of the war prevented the Germans from
completing their first swingwing aircraft. There was one
THE MESSERSCHMITT P-1101 other aircraft using the movable wing concept, The
P-1114. This novel design incorporated a provision for
In 1942 Messerschmitt began preliminary work on a moving the entire wing assembly fore and aft along the
design dubbed theP'Ti01) For over two years it was fuselage to compensate for center of lift movement as
nothing more than a t u'CJy program, but in ·September flight speed increased.
1944 it was decided to produce one prototype aircraft. Why the swingwing concept did not receive more
The German plans called for a single-place, mid-wing, attention cannot be definitely determined, but one main
single-engme aircraft with a 40-degree wing sweep. reason for the lack of interest was that engines were not
Attractiveness of other aircraft designs caused the P-11 01 powerful enough to propel the aircraft to the speeds at
program to be considerably cut back, but it was decided which variable sweep would make important
that the prototype would be completed to serve as a contributions to performance. Also, the advanced German
flying test-bed for wing sweep and for new turbojet designers seemed to be more intrigued with the delta-wing
engines. design.
By this time, however, it was clear to the Germans that
the war was almost over. In early 1945 a company of
THE BELL X-5
American infantry overran the P-11 01 development
facility. The Messerschmitt technical personnel had left One hot morning in June 1951, a potbellied little
everything in perfect order, allowing the Americans to white airplane streaked along the desert runway at
continue the swingwing research. Edwards Air Force Base, California. Then the skilled
Although the basic engineering drawings and hands of Bell's chief test pilot guided the tiny plane into
calculations for the P-1101 were never recovered, the the air, and America's first swingwing aircraft had taken
aircraft was moved intact to Wright-Patterson Air Force to the sky. It bore a marked resemblance to the P-11 01.
Base, Ohio, where it was publicly displayed in 1945. Many Early in 1948 the Bell Aircraft Company, aided by the
observers considered the P-11 01 a freak of engineering loan of the P-1101, began design studies on an aircraft
design and of little practical value. This, of course, would that could change its wing sweep in flight. For a time it
in future years prove to be very erroneous. looked as though the Air Force might buy 24 of them,
The P-1101 was truly an advanced aircraft for the time but an unfavorable evaluation of the Air Materiel
of its development. Its two-piece wing had steel spars, Command reduced the program to a two-aircraft research
with wooden ribs, and a 40-degree sweep. The pressure endeavor. Designated the X-5, these planes were expected
cabin was located well forward in the upper part of the to demonstrate the best sweep angle for interceptor

;' !& ' 1

lew. The Bell X-5, first U. S. variable-wing aircraft. Note the sirniliarity to the Messerschmitt P-11 01.

TAC ATTACK 17
 was noted in the tests. At low speeds, almost all the
the swingers available elevator action was required to level out the X-5
for landing. It had to be accelerated just before
touchdown to keep from flying right into the ground.
aircraft. It was made clear, however, that the X-5 was on ly Even though the X-5 had several deficiencies, a good
a research tool, not intended for production, ever. deal of high-level interest was shown in it as a tactical
Not exactly the sleekest jet aircraft ever built, the X-5 fighter. Its advantages over bigger and heavier fighters of
looked something like a flying tadpole. The two-position the day (e.g., the F-86 and F-89) were its much greater
adjustable wings were variable in sweep between 20 and maneuverability and the fact that it could be carried in
60 degrees. The X-5 had a takeoff weight of about 9500 the C-119. But its complicated sweep mechanism and its
pounds, the adjustable wing assembly weighing 1350 limited fu el capacity and firepower led to its demise as a
pounds. The engines of the plane were placed below the production fighter.
wing in the lower fuselage, to accommodate a variety of On 13 October 1953 one of the X-5s crashed when it
plants and to have the engine out of the way of the sweep failed to recover from a spin at 60 degrees sweep. The
mechanism. other now rests safely at the Air Force Institute of
The mechanism for operating the sweep variation was Technology, on loan from the Air Force Museum.
truly an engineering masterpiece. Th e wings were
mounted on hinges just outboard of each side of the THE GRUMMAN X F10F
fuselage. Inside each wing, near the leading edge, was
attached one end of a ball-bearing screw jack . Shafts were Even though the X-5 had been eliminated from
then passed through the interior of the wings and into the consideration, it did not end th e immediate history of the
fuselage, where they were driven by a gearbox. When the swingw ing . Shortly thereafter, another strange airplane
motors of the mechanism were operated, the screws rolled out at the Flight Test Center. This was a
rotated the wings on their pivots, changing the angle of great-grandson of the famous F4F Wildcat, and it featured
the sweep. But the wings did more than just sweep when two-position, inflight-variable swept wings.
they were operated. In order to compensate for changes in The Grumman X F10F Jaguar was powered by a
pressure and center of gravity, it was necessary to slide the Westinghouse J40 engine which generated 11,600
wings along rails mounted in the fuselage. At 20 degrees pounds of thrust. Its variable-sweep wings were mounted
sweep, the entire wing assembly slid forward on the rails high on the fuselage. The wings were held straight for
until, at 60 degrees sweep, they were about 27 inches landings but cou ld be swept back to 40 degrees for
forward of their starting positions. The sweeping and high-speed flight. The Jaguar featured a delta-shaped
positioning actions took place simultaneously. horizontal tail mounted atop the vertical fin. This
On the fifth test flight of the X -5, the sweep replaced the conventional swept surface originally used.
mechanism was operated for the first time . By the ninth The first of two X F1 OF prototypes flew in May 1953.
flight, the sweep had been operated through its total For a time, it was thought that 30 of these might be
limits. About that time, a strange characteristic of the X-5 orde red, but the X F1 OF proved to be a disappointment.

The Navy's XFlOF, a swingwing built by Grumman.

18 FEBRUARY 1973
 The F-111, TAC's swingwing aircraft.

THE CONVAIR F-111 pin, while the wing sweep is controlled by a hydraulic
actuator. Working much like an automobile jack, large
The Air Force's newest fighter-bomber, the F-111, and screws extend to determine the position of the wings. A
its strategic counterpart, the F B-111, were the next of the pistol grip in the cockpit is the pilot's control device. In
swingwing aircraft . Several versions of this multimission the event damage occurs to the primary hydraulic system,
aircraft have been built, including the bomber version a utility system will automatically cut out flow to
FB-111 which has longer wings than the fighter version . nonessential subsystems in order to furnish power for the
The F-111 began I ife in 1959 when the Air Force defined wing sweep and flight controls.
an operational requirement for an advanced fighter (the The F-111's variable-sweep wing is going to play an
TFX), which would later become the F-111. important part in some aerodynamic testing . Shortly, an
Much of the technology involved with the F-111 F-111 will be fitted with the so-called "supercritical"
design evolved from the X-5 and XF10F. However, with wing, which is specially designed to reduce high-speed
the F-111 sweep design, a slightly different approach was drag. Equipping the F-111 with this wing is expected to
employed. In this aircraft the wing would sweep on its greatly increase maneuverability and increase transonic
own pivot, well outboard of the fuselage. With this performance without affecting the aircraft's handling
technique, the aerodynamic center remained relatively characteristics. The results of this testing should be very
stationary throughout the wing's full sweep. important to the F-111 and high-performance aircraft of
Fully extended to 16 degrees sweep, the wing creates the future .
maximum lift, allowing short takeoffs and landings. As
the speed increases and drag grows, the span and surface THE B-1 STRATEGIC BOMBER (NORTH AMERICAN
area are decreased by sweeping the wings to a maximum ROCKWELL)
of 72.5 degrees. The wingtips come quite close to
touching the leading edges of the tail. In the "folded For over a decade the Air Force has been looking for
position," the F-111 can move along at Mach 2.5 at an aircraft to replace the B-52s and the B-58 fleet.
altitude and supersonic on the deck. The wings can be The so-called AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic
placed in any intermediate position to perform any Aircraft) was the paper project for an advanced bomber
specific mission requirement. (B-1 ). The AMSA also was to employ a swingwing . In
Each wing pivots around an 8.5-inch-diameter steel November 1969 the Air Force released its request for

TAC ATTACK 19
the swingers
mid-fuselage tanks as the wings swing. An on-board
computer will normally handle this intricate transfer, but
it can be controlled manually from the cockpit . The
sweep rates are geared to particular flight conditions and
are slow enough to allow the fuel transfer to maintain the
center of gravity.
The B-1 's wings can be swept or extended normally
with only two of the four hydraulic systems. The wings
can be swept from 15 degrees for takeoff and landing, to
sharply swept back at 67 degrees for high-speed flight.
While engineers consider it highly unlikely that the wings
might jam, the B-1 CAN be landed with wings fully swept
- but, needless to say, it would be a much "hotter"
landing.
The B-1 's first test flight is presently scheduled for the
spring of 1974, with operational status in the late
seventies. The B-1 , engineers say, will last the rest of the
twentieth century. It is, therefore, very possible that the
entire Strategic Air Command fleet will be swingwing in
the eighties, with the FB-111 and the B-1.

THE GRUMMAN F-14 TOMCAT

The proposed B-1 (artist drawing).
When the Navy canceled procurement of the F-111 B,
proposals for the B-1 to interested bidders of the they found themselves in need of another aircraft to
aerospace industry. The airframe contract was won by replace the F-4 Phantom. Once again the Navy went for
North American Rockwell, and General Electric won the another swingwing design in the F-14 Tomcat. The plane
engine contract. is being built by Grumman, long a manufacturer of Navy
Recently, North American displayed a full-scale aircraft.
mockup of the B-1 . The "Big White Bird" is, indeed, a The F-14 's variable-sweep wing is the result of a
beautiful piece of airplane. The construction of the tremendous amount of research work. One of the most
mockup was a big step toward possible future production advanced F-14 developments is "glove vanes," which
of the B-1. extend automatically from the leading edge near the
The B-1 will be able to fly at treetop level at almost fuselage at Mach 1, offsetting the shift in the F-14's
700 miles per hour and more than 1400 milesperhourat aerodynamic center. This leaves the horizontal stabilizer
altitude. With its swingwings, it will be able to land on free for maneuvering, minimizing trim drag penalties and
very short runways- quite amazing for an aircraft in increasing combat agility. Also flap activation is
the 350,000 to 400,000-pound weight class. The B-1 's coordinated with the automatic wing sweep for maximum
swingwing mechanism is considered by engineers to be the performance. The F-14's maximum sweep is 68 degrees
most complicated system in the aircraft. As many as 35 (from a minimum of 20 degrees), when the wing and tail
different swingwing designs were examined before North surfaces are, for all practical purposes, one.
American Rockwell decided on the present truss-type The F-14's sophisticated Mach-sweep programmer
wing-pivot design. provides for fully automatic wing sweep as a function of
So as to compensate for shifts in pressure and center of speed and altitude. Therefore, the pilot can obtain the
gravity, the B-1 uses a complex fuel system that transfers maximum performance under any flight condition. As is
fuel within the fuselage to maintain aircraft stability. To true with the B-1, the F-14 pilot can manually control the
maintain proper balance, fuel will be used from the wing sweep, but even then the programmer will maintain
mid-fuselage tanks first, from the wing tanks second, and limited control on the pilot's action.
from the forward and aft fuselage tanks last. Fuel can be With its swingwing and powerfu I engines, the F-14 may
pumped from the forward and aft fuselage tanks to the make a formidable addition to the Navy's striking power.

20 FEBRUARY 1973
THE Ml RAGE G8 and the PANAVIA 200 Lockheed and Boeing's swingwing. Boeing won and went
about the job of building the largest swingwing ever.
Our report on swingwing aircraft would not be complete But that was not to be. The decision was made in 1969 to
without mentioning the swingwing aircraft of Europe. abandon the swingwing and go with a fixed, double-delta
The presently flying French Mirage G8 is the shape. Now the whole SST program has been scrapped.
culmination of Mirage's experience in swingwing ai~craft, One of the main reasons for the switch from the
having built the G1 and G4 prior to the present G8 swingwing design was the tremendous weight penalty
configuration. At full sweep the wings and tail have only a incurred by the swingwing mechanism. It was quoted that
slight slit of space between them. It is powered by two the weight penalty for the variable geometry was over
engines and has a top speed of Mach 2.5. 40,000 pounds, about 6 percent of the gross weight.
Indications are that the G8 might well be the first
variable-geometry aircraft to be ordered by the French Air SWINGWING IN SPACE- THE LOCKHEED FDL-5
Force. It could be a replacement for the Mirage Ill in the
late seventies. In the late 1960s, Lockheed and the Air Force Flight
During the same period the British-German-Italian Dynamics Laboratory conducted tests on a swingwing
Panavia 200, the new multi mission aircraft, is designed to spacecraft. The spacecraft was designed to be a model for
enter service with the Royal Air Force, the German a reusable launch vehicle.
Luftwaffe, the German Navy, and the Italian Air Force. The triangular-shaped spacecraft has a small vertical
The variable-sweep wing is the key feature that gives tail with a movable rudder. The small delta wings swing
the 200 such a wide diversification of capabilities. Swept into the airstream from the sides of the vehicle, about
forward, it provides high lift capability,giving STOL halfway down its length. The wings would be used after
performance from semi-prepared fields and a very long the spacecraft had re-entered the atmosphere and slowed
loiter time. Swept fully back, it gives a low-drag, down for a conventional aircraft-type landing. The future
high-speed capability with very good response at low may see some application of this concept in returning
levels. space vehicles.
Powered by two Rolls-Royce RF-199 engines of Those early experimenters who strapped contraptions
advanced technology design, the 200 is capable of Mach on their backs and to their arms and jumped from
2+ at altitude. Wing sweep range is from 20 to 70 degrees. precipices and bridges, frantically flapping their arms,
knew the birds had something. While this review has
BOEING'S INITIAL SST shown that the swingwing has a firm hold on its domain
of aeronautics, it is not as sophisticated as our bird
The first design of Boeing's supersonic transport (SST) imitators - it doesn't flap; it merely swings. But it does
might have been the biggest swinger of them all. fly! _..:;:-
When the sides were being formed for the battle to
decide who would build the SST, it came down to two
Reprinted, with perm1ss1on of the Editor, from AIR
different SST concepts - the delta-wing design of UNIVERSITY REVIEW, November-December 1972, pages 53·62.

The French Mirage G 8,

a swingwing mach 2.5 fighter.

-

TAC ATTACK 21
 ... iltciiutt4 rutd ~
chock talk

of two seven right." This was acknowledged by the tractor

ClE~R~NCE RE~II~CK driver. Later the tractor driver ca ll ed, stating," .... we're
at the route two, ready to cross two seven." The tower
The Flight Safety Foundation frequently issues then cleared the 707 for takeoff and responded to the
bulletins to pilots regarding the necessity of repeating tractor, " ... you're not at route two - route two is at
ATC clearances to avoid misunderstanding. The following the two seven right runway pad ... " which was
classic case of a tow-tractor driver misunderstanding an acknowledged by the tractor.
ATC clearance illustrates the importance of a clear A short time later the tractor driver called the tower
understanding of all communications and especially those and said, " ... you know you cleared me across that
from the tower regarding towing an aircraft in an active taxiway and the jet just about got us." The tower replied,
movement area. " ... negative, I d id not clear you to cross, I told you you
A copilot was making the takeoff at night in a B-707 were not at route two and to proceed to the two seven
and was nearing rotation speed when the captain saw, to right runup pad." About that time the pilot of the 707
his horror, a wide-bodied jet dead ahead being illuminated came on and said, " ... you saw that, didn't you?" The
by the 707's landing lights. The wide-body was crossing tractor driver said," . .. I thought I was on route two; I'm
the runway under tow ahead of the 707. very sorry about that."
The 707 captain took control, rotated and banked the The probable cause of this incident was a tractor
aircraft as much as he dared. Fortunately, he lifted the driver's unfamiliarity with the numbered taxi-tow routes,
left wing and pods of the 707 over the wide-body's tail. and misunderstanding that the route information given by
He did not see any lights on the wide-body and had ground control was a clearance to cross an active runway.
not been warned of its presence by the tower.
COULD A SIMILAR SITUATION OCCUR AT YOUR
Later analyses showed that the normal height of the
707 above the runway at the point where the incident BASE?
Flight Safety Foundation
occurred was calculated to be 25 feet -which is some 30
feet below the tail of the wide-body. The fact that a
collision did not occur is attributed to superb airmanship
by the captain of the 707. HISTORY
Air traffic control transcripts revealed the tractor
driver had called the tower and stated, "We have a "One fatality and seven injuries." This was the
wide-body parked at the gate and we want to push back shocking statement reporting the aftermath of a C-130B
and take it over to the maintenance area." The tower tire and wheel explosion. It is sad indeed because the
replied," ... approved, use route one." waste of human resources could have been prevented, if
Because an aircraft in the meantime had become ready the wheel had been given due respect.
for departure, the tower called the tractor driver and The maintenance support Hercules had been offloaded
instructed him to" ... plan to use route two and hold short and was being taxied to the parking area. During one of

22 FEBRUARY 1973
 deflation prior to remova l of wheel assemb li es from
ai rcraft.
What's you r shop's accident history? Will it repeat?

MEETING ADJOURNED
The following safety meeting account, duly sign ed by
the 12 members of the saf ety committee present, was
submitted to a supervisor:
The subject of this month's meeting was "accidents."
We read the Five-Minute Safety Talk entitled, "Accidents
Are Caused." The impact of thi s subject was profound,
with a maintenance slant
and at the conclu sion of the reading a heated discussion
arose.
During a lull, a member of the group raised his hand to
ask a question, and acc identally knocked a coat off the
several turns, the crew felt the aircraft lurch in an unusual rack, wh ich fell over the head of a seco nd member. While
manner. They attributed this to a malfunct ion in the nose removing the garment, the temporarily blinded member
gear system. struck the wind ow with his elbow, scattering glass all over
The engineer and a scanner got out and inspected the the floor.
nose gear. Finding nothing unusual, they signaled the pilot In picking up the glass, two others got cuts on their
to ta xi slowly forward while they checked the rest of the hands. The group leader grabbed the push broom to sweep
gear. After about four feet of travel, the engineer ca ll ed a up t he mess, but in the crowded room, either the handle
halt and signaled for engine shutdown. He had found of the broom or another member moving out of the way
some metal shavings and A PIECE OF BROKEN WHEEL dislodged a fire extinguisher from the wall, which fell and
RIM by the left main rear wheel. Although this discovery discharged, sp ray ing the rest of the group with chemicals.
should have indicated a wheel failure, the 78 1 wri t e-up The member who originally raised his hand to ask the
was to the effect that the left REAR BRAKE HAD question said he forgot what he was going to say and,
DISINTEGRATED. instead, comp lai ned of the cold air coming in through the
The maintenance crew assigned to the repa ir job ran broken window. Since there is no cure for the common
into trouble from the beginning. After the gear was jacked co ld, it was decided to adjourn the meeting, and the
and the axle nut removed, the wheel did not slid e off as membe rs went back to work.
was expected. In fact, it wouldn't budge at all. Pressure
was applied by several individual s, and the t ire was Navy Safety Review
forcibly tapped from the inboard side. One ai rm an was
standing outboard of the wh eel, prepa red to catch the
outer bearing when the wheel came loose. Instead, he MANUFACTUREI lOCAllY
caught the full force of the blast as an exp losion prope ll ed
the wheel off the ax le and across the ramp. The casua lti es: Short ly afte r takeoff in the C-130, the oi l quantity on
one dead and seven injured. number 4 engine began to decrease. The crew turned the
CAUSE: The tire was not deflated before an attempt Herky around and headed for home plate, then shut the
was made to remove it. eng ine down on landing roll when the oil pressure began
This ground accident synopsis was taken from the to f lu ctuat e.
February 1963 issue of AEROSPACE ACCIDENT AND When maintenance dug into the oil system, they
MAINTENANCE RE:VIEW. Why? To show that history discovered an oil pressure line which was supposed to be
repeats itself .... and it does so because we let it. 21 inches long only measured 20 inches. The line
Late in 1972, two airmen were injured when a tire reached from point A to point B without any prob lem,
which they were disassembling came apart with explosive but without that extra inch there was no "give" to the
force; it had not been deflated despite warnings posted in I ine. It pulled loose from the fitting.
and around the shop, readily avai lab le tech data, and four Maintenance also found out that the line had been
separate maintenance operating instructi ons requ iring tire manufactured loca ll y . Luckily, there was no fire.

TAC ATTACK 23
 tac tips

• • • interest items,

HOT CHECKliST
Ever wonder why the C-130 instructor pilot berates his here shows the minor damage one F-4 received to the
students for placing check I ists, clipboards, etc., on the underside of the airplane, the aux air door, and door 83R,
instrument panel glare shield? while jettisoning a centerline at 2000 feet, 350 KIAS, and
Other than the fact that the checklist can slide off the 1 G level flight. Looks like the Dash One writers know
panel during takeoff and inflict grievous injuries what they're talking about. They're right!
(depending on where it lands, and it always lands
someplace uncomfortable), here's a better reason for not
putting anything on the glare shield.
During the final phase of a formation landing, the
copilot placed his checklist on the glare shield above the
instrument panel. At round out the copilot noticed smoke
coming from the area of the checklist and windshield. He
picked up the checklist and it immediately burst into
flames. Quickly, he dropped it to the floor and stomped
out the fire with his number tens. Smoke, fumes, and no
doubt a bit of confusion followed but the crew was able
to complete the formation landing (as well as the smoke
and fumes elimination checklist) without further incident.
What happened? When the copilot tossed the checklist
on the glare shield, the wire binder on the checklist made
its way under the rubber boot that shields the windshield
NESA electrical terminal. Contact! Current flowed
through the wire, heated it up, and set the checklist
binder on fire.
There's nothing in the mill to make checklist binders
out of Nomex, but we can pass the word that the glare
shield is not a good place to store anything.

THEY'RE RIGHT I
If you fly an F-4E, and are pretty knowledgeable
concerning tank jettison limitations, then you know that a
centerline tank can be jettisoned between 175 KIAS and
390 KIAS. If you're the type that chases down and reads
notes in the Dash One, then you know that between 350
KIAS and 390 KIAS below 15,000 feet, the tanks may
contact the airplane and cause minor damage. The photo

24 FEBRUARY 1973
 mishaps with morals, for the TAC a1rcrewman
#

WHAT IS IT?
C-141? security clearance criteria (need to know, etc) and are
AMST (Advanced Medium Range STOL)? interested, you might pay a visit to your local intel shop
Nope! Try IL-76 , Soviet-built airlifter. for more information. Take a look at the structure within
These photos represent the sum total of what started the Soviet air arm, the missions, the airplanes, the
out as an article on Soviet tactical airlift. Unfortunately, rotations, and some of the airdrop techniques and
most other information on this subject, while voluminous, procedures they use.
is classified. However, assuming you meet the necessary You'll be surprised at what you find.
 numbers

Some people around TAG have yet to accept the what the aircrewman needs to know to accomplish the job
tramtng philosophy or the products of lSD safely and efficiently and discards the stuff that is "nice
(INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT), or to know" but not essential to the job.
SAT (Systems Approach to Training) as it was once The airlines were the first to employ this shift in
called. T A C began using Instructional Systems training philosophy and this article written by an airline
Development in 1969 to train C-130 aircrew members and captain provides an insight as to why it was needed.
is now training A-7 pilots under the concept. The words have a familiar ring and apply not only to
Basically, lSD is a training system which emphasizes the airlines but also to the aircrewmen of TAG.

26 FEBRUARY 1973
by Capt W. R. Broocke A few genuinely meaningful numbers are branded in
National Airlines my mind, though, and I will probably st ill be muttering
them when I am in my whee l chair recalling past glories,
I have a proficiency check in the offing, and instead of because I need, use, or fear them. Some of them are in the
writing this article I should be on my books memorizing book, some of them are not and shou ld be, but their recall
the numbers which are dear to the hearts of the is instant because of their immediacy.
mechanically oriented folks who will ask me about them, I know what numbers to look for in a hot start, and I
but what I have to say has been bubbling inside me for a know what N 1 wi ll read at 38 percent N 2 when we have
long time, so I may as well let it all hang out. a failed N tachometer.
2
The fact is that so many of the numbers are In order to decelerate from the barber pole to 250
meaningless or useless to me that after thirty years of knots in level flight, power off and clean takes eight miles,
receiving military and civilian flight checks, it is simpler three miles with full speed brakes, and descending at 1000
for me to memorize them than it is to justify them. ft. per min., power off and full speed brakes, I'll unwind
When I get in the box in a few days, I will know that 1500 feet on the altimeter wh il e making this speed
the CSD low pressure light comes on, with no gauge to reduction.
herald these sad tidings, at 90-160 pounds. We apparently have two different species of humans
I wil l know that the annunciator panel will show a who live around DCA (Washington National) and LG A
differential current flow. (LaGuardia), for at DCA their ears don't become sensitive
I will be able to glibly state that the exciter ceil ing is until we reach 2 DME NW, 3 DME S, or 1500 ft., at which
60 KW without the faintest idea of what an exc iter ce iling point we must throttle back to 1.5 EPR and hang on until
is. we get to 10 DME out, even though we might be at
I wi ll know that there are 35 vortex generators on each 10,000 ft. by then, depending on the radar vectors.
side of the vertical fin, despite the fact that we on ly check Around LGA the ears are wired just the oppos ite, for
to see if any are missing on our preflight. when we take off there we must throttle back to 1.6 EPR
When asked, I will respond promptly that the air cycle at 800 ft. and continue climbing to 1200 ft., at which
machine turns 56,000 to 57,000 rpm with a design point the people sudden ly become deaf it wou ld seem, for
maximum of 62 ,000 rpm, although there is nary a then we can go back to full bore while continuing the
tachometer to read these numbers from. remainder of the ant i-noise acrobat ics.
When the duct temperature hits 88 degrees Cent igrade, I hope it is apparent by now that I am not blindly
I will say that an overheat light will come on, and the opposed to the use of numbers, for even Shakespeare had
mixing valve will go to full cold, although the duct to know what date the rent came due and how many
temperature gauge is in Fahrenheit and has no yell ow or quarts of oats it took to feed his horse if he had one, but I
red markings. am very much against having to remember those which
Need I go on? I think I would be merely belaboring the contr ibute nothing toward safety or efficiency.
obvious if I were to cont inu e with examp les of how we I can detect a trend away from the worship of
have tried to mechanize something that is nearer to being numbers, nuts, and bolts, thank heavens, and it is long
an art. overdue, but I have wondered how we ever got in this fix
I will have at my fingertips the temperatures that turn in the first place . I think it was probably brought about
on the various fire and overheat Iights, the pressures that by a process of psychological or aptitudinal inbreeding.
turn on the low pressure lights, the numbers for the tire For example, suppose at some time in the dim and distant
pressures, strut extensions, and many others. past it was assumed that on ly redheads wou ld make good
And when I wa lk out the door a free man, I wi ll carpenters. Under this assumption, red headed apprentices
promptly forget them, for I won't need them until my wou ld be sought and encouraged , redheaded carpenters
next check. would be favored for supervisory positions and ultimately

TAC ATTACK 27
 far-out stuff they had previously learned to keep from
U BE R going out of their gourds.
As I said before, I can see a hopeful trend. Our Chief
numbers
Pilot, Captain L. J. Royall, once told our ground school
class, "When a red overheat light comes on, it don't make
a damn if it lights up at 240, 260, or 280; something is
too hot- do something!"
And do something we have done and will do. When the
would end up in positions of power. CSD low pressure light comes on, I will not reflect about
Then suppose some nut crops up with the silly idea what number would appear on the gauge if we had one; I
that blackhaired people can be just as good carpenters as will simply disconnect the generator. Similarly, I will not
redhaired ones. The custom of redheaded carpenters by concern myself about whether the total capacity of the
this time has its self-perpetuating force, for everyone, hydraulic system is 36 gallons or 360 gallons. My concern
carpenters and noncarpenters alike, even though they will be with the top 4.4 gallons, the part that shows up on
might even be a little in sympathy with the nut, have only the quantity gauge, and what to do if this starts dropping.
to look at the carpenter force and see nothing but a sea of I have often toyed with the idea of writing a book with
redheads. They could only conclude, based on undeniable two parts. The first part would be on what is needed to
physical evidence, that to be a good carpenter you must know in order to successfully fly an airplane, and the
be a redhead, and the kook who suggested otherwise second part would be on what is necessary to pass a
would be carried off by his elbows. check. The trouble is I don't feel competent to write the
And so it is with pilots: those bicycle mechanics from second part.
Dayton are our immediate forebears and are due our
homage, but they left a legacy that to be a pilot it is first
necessary to be a mechanic. It is going to take some doing
and a lot of diluting to bring about the more realistic idea
that it is more important to convert into action a lofty
calling to the artistry of flying an aircraft, the dream of
Leonardo da Vinci, and only secondarily important to
know what goes on in its innards.
It is discouraging, then, to hear a check pilot address a
class of trainees and say that the flying and emergency
procedures were being well executed but that they didn't
know the equipment well enough. Admittedly this was
some time ago, but he was a classic illustration of the
mechanic turned pi lot, and the implication was that it
would be OK if the flying slipped a little provided they
knew how far it was from the ground to the top of the
rudder.
At this stage I would be a sap to start knocking check
pilots, and I couldn't even if I wanted to, for I think I What to do? We have to know the numbers, even
know why a pilot would want to become one in the first though some of them are meaningless, for they are the
place. They are, on the whole, superior pilots who do not passwords to our careers. We can, though, try to keep
find the routine of taking off at point A, flying to point them in proper perspective, and eventually, perhaps by
B, and landing there enough of a challenge to make the the weight of our numbers, the poets may yet supplant
job interesting as a steady diet, so they digest huge the pi umbers.
volumes .of esoteric information and reach the attention I haven't the nerve of one successful line pilot friend
of management. This, with their previously demonstrated whose views are similar to mine. An FAA inspector once
superior flying ability, shortly gets them anointed as asked him, "What's behind those holes in the engine
check pilots, then they are caught up in the system. They housing?"
are allowed the use of an airplane or simulator for only a "Owls, maybe?" replied my friend. ~
few hours, but they have to do something with a pilot up
for a proficiency check for the better part of two days.
They knock off the necessary questions in an hour or so
and then have to piece out the time with some of the Reprinted courtesy of AIR LINE PILOT, November 1969 issue.

28 FEBRUARY 1973
 J

From a collection of anonymous stories published In

1942 by the Army Air Forces, TAC ATTACK presents:

iossotat No. 5 of 17
Courtesy of Lt Col H. M. Butler, 4500 ABW /SE

Lessons that live

too much weather

i......, .4,,,,:........
... t-t- vais Aver tart.,
C (..iv 17iih ;tafl-.1)er fit
I heAlielitititnrille,giiiuraht of exonuting
never entered my,,faivAjant mioci.
-_
1..,,.,. ,lp less than a-minute l was in a 'do
Eight months':;: iencetrf"-PursJi made weight of, he ice and Icy of' Poi.vei bei
me pretty cock St., tt.Sevcral occasions had flown on
I .ti vg sttiedOittle ship. As I lost altitude some of the ice
instruments in a. and had experienced no particula mated *off and es t brought her under control again I
difficulty; therefore the numerowstories and warnthor: t figured that if .1 remained at that altitude could I

had heard from the old-timers-8.5401 flyiniton instruments continue. A minute later, however, it was worse than ever.
in this type of craft had TM effect on rne. In fact, I rather At an altitude of less than two thousand feet I went into
welcomed an opportunity to go through a little "weather" another spiral and then abruptly into a spin.
now 3rid then. Well, learned my lesson, and the hard
I Trying to get that ice-coated ship out of a spin on
way. instruments was the hardest job I ever had in my life. The
Late one winter afternoon, flying back to the home altimeter read sea level as she finally came t.,rpir control.
base from an outlyin(1 station, ran into the "weather" I
I A glance out of my now ice,-ftt canopy 4.4)oweJ that I

had been looking for. The ceiling, from a doubtful one was just off the ground.
thousand feet, went right down to the ground. For a few seconds I wildly dqdgixi trees, barns,
That didn't bother me: I just started climbing, holding farmhouses and sheds, trying to fifx1 a field and make a
my course and keeping my radio tuned to the next landing. It was then slot; g hard, but I finally got my
station. No sooner did actually get into the stuff,
I ship into ii, farmer's field with no damage,
however, than the ship started icing up. The wings, I just sat there, every nerve a-quiver, thanking the Lord
cowling and part of the canopy became coated. My engine for allowing a fool like me to live. _..-
TAC ATTACK 29
letters to the editor ..... .

HELP WANTED REUNION

WANTED - A new Editor for TAC ATTACK. The First Annual AC-130A/E Reunion will be
Qualifications: Grade of Major, with recent pilot held in the summer of 1974, in Las Vegas,
experience in any TAC aircraft. Must be SEA Nevada. All former Spectres, Sandys, and Jolly
ineligible and possess some writing ability. Greens are encouraged and invited to attend.
Reporting date: late June 1973. Interested Request names and current addresses be
individuals may contact Lt Col Neal or Maj forwarded ASAP to 16th Special Operations
Brady, TAC/SEP, Langley AFB, Va (Autovon Squadron, Reunion Committee, APO San
432-2937) for additional information. Take it Francisco 96304. Expect a flyer confirming
from someone who knows ... it's a good specific dates and hotel, along with a request for
job... Ed. reservations.

DISTRIBUTION
CORRECTION Aeronautical Systems Division's Prototype
The January 197 3 issue erroneously showed Program Office (ASD/YP) is now the Air Force
the Maintenance Man of the Month Award OPR for two major new projects, the Lightweight
winner, Master Sergeant Driver, as being assigned Fighters (YF-16, General Dynamics ; YF-17,
to the 834th Avionics Maintenance Squadron, Northrop) and the Advanced Medium STOL
Eglin AFB, Florida. We know better. The 834th Transports (Boeing and McDonnell Douglas).
Avionics Maintenance Squadron is part of the 1 Since these are prototypes of aircraft that may
Special Operations Wing which, of course, 1s eventually enter the TAC inventory, it is
located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. necessary to have as much crosstalk as possible
between organizations. One method is through
such things as TACRP 127-1, TAC ATTACK. We
are not now on the distribution list of this fine
magazine but would like to begin receiving it as
REUNION soon as possible.

The 8th Tactical Fighter Wing will hold its Lt Col William E. Thurman
annual reunion 2-4 March 1973, Sheraton Park Asst Director, Prototype Program Office
Hotel, Washington, D. C. For further information HQ, Aeronautical Systems Division
contact Lt Col Carly L. Bradway, OJCS/J-3 Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
(EUMEAF Division), Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
20301, telephone OXS-7903/57909, or Lt Col
R. L. Markey, 1111 19th Street (AF/SAGF), You're on for two copies. We'd welcome an article (or
Arlington, Virginia 22209, telephone OX4-8571. two) on any or all of the aircraft you mentioned. Ed.

30 1:< U.S . GO V ERNMENT PRINTIN G OFFI C E : 197 3· 5 14. 007/7 FEBRUARY 1973
 TAC TALLY MAJOR ACCIDENT
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
THRU DECEMBER
UNITS
THRU DECEMBER

RATE COMPARISON 1972 1971 1972 1971

ACDTS RATE ACDTS RATE ACDTS RATE ACDTS RATE

TAC ANG AFRes 9AF 6 3.2 10 3.9 12AF 14 3.6 7 i,9

197211971 1972J1971 1972Jl971
1 TFW 3 8.9 2 5.2 27TFW 1 4.8 1 4.2

JAN 0 1.6 0 16.7 0 0 4TFW 0 0 0 0 35 TFW 1 3.6 1 2.5

23TFW 0 0 0 0 49 TFW 4 8.7 0 0

FEB 0.8 1.6 0 11.6 0 0
58 TFTW 3 5.1 4 8.2
31 TFW 1 4.3 3 12.8
MAR 1.6 3.1 6.3 7.0 0 0
67 TRW 0 0 0 0
33TFW 0 0 0 0
APR 2.8 2.7 8.1 4.9 0 0 71 TASG 0 0 0 0
68 TASG 0 0 0 0 313 TAW 0 0 0 0
MAY 4.0 2.5 6.3 5.7 0 0
316 TAW 314 TAW 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 2.9

JUN 4.8 2.6 5.1 6.9 0 0 317 TAW 0 0 0 0 355 TFW 1 3.3 0 0

366TFW 1 5.9 0 0
354 TFW 1 4.1 2 7.6
JUL 4.2 2.9 6.2 7.1 0 0
474 Tf'W 2 7.0 0 0
363 TRW 1 2.9 1 3.4
AUG 4.6 2.7 6.4 7.8 1.9 2.7 463TAW 0 0 0 0
4403 TFW 0 0 2 13.8 23 TFW 1 9.8 0 0
SEP 4.6 3.2 6.2 7.4 1.7 2.4

OCT 6.0 2.1

TAC SPECIAL UNITS
4.2 3.2 6.9 3.0
1SOW 1 2.1 4 6.4 4410 SOTG 2 8.2 1 3.6
NOV 4.0 3.3 5.9 6.9 2.7 2.0 2ADG 0 0 0 0 4485 TS 0 0 0 0
57 FWW 3 14.9 1 5.1 4500 ABW 0 0 0 0
DEC 4.0 3.2 6 .6 6.4 2.5 1.8 ADS 2 - 1 - OTHER 4 - 1 -

'
TAC ANG
DEC 72
1972
THRU DEC
SUMMARY DEC 72
THRU DEC

1971 1972 1971

3 51 33 TOTAL ACCIDENTS 3 22 23
2 32 25 MAJOR 3 18 17
15 55 25 AIRCREW FATALITIES 0 3 7
3 32 21 AIRCRAFT DESTROYED 2 15 16

1 32 24 TOTAL EJECTIONS 4 13 12
0 22 21 SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 4 13 9
0% 68.8% 88.0% PERCENT SUCCESSFUL 100% 100% 75%

TAC ATTACK 31
© Stan Hardison 1973