G.R. No.

206761, June 23, 2021

PAUL AMBROSE, Petitioner, v. LOUELLA SUQUE-AMBROSE, Respondent.
GAERLAN, J.:

DOCTRINE: NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE; WHEN APPLIED?

FACTS: Petitioner Paul Ambrose (petitioner), a citizen of the United

States, married respondent Louella Suque-Ambrose (respondent)
on March 13, 2005 in Manila, Philippines.4

On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition5 for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage against respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as amended.6

The petition was amended on May 15, 2007. Thereafter, the

respondent filed her Answer with Counterclaim. After pre-trial, trial
ensued. Only the petitioner presented evidence as the respondent
failed to appear and participate during the hearing on the merits.7

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner
lacks the legal capacity to sue. According to the RTC, under the
nationality principle provided for under Article 15 of the Civil Code,
the petitioner, an American Citizen, is not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status and legal capacity.10

On April 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal but the

same was denied due course by the RTC, on account of the
petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration as required
by Section 20(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.

This prompted the petitioner to file the instant petition for review
on certiorari,
Petitioner argues that Article 15 of the Civil Code does not apply, as
"the legal capacity to get married and its consequences, including
the nullification of void marriage is governed by the law of the place
where the marriage was entered into and not by the nationality
principle."19 - (The Court agrees.)

ISSUE: WON Greg Ambrose, has no legal personality to file

the petition for being a foreigner (US Citizen) pursuant to Art.
15 of the Civil Code;

Petitioner has legal capacity to sue. Lex loci celebrationis is a latin

term, literally translated as the law of the place of the ceremony. It
means that the validity of a contract is governed by the place where
it is made, executed, or to be performed.20 It is adhered to by
Philippine law, as enunciated under the first paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, viz.:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,

in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Otherwise stated, a marriage formally valid in the place it is

celebrated is valid in the Philippines.

Lex loci celebrationis is a conflict of law principle that comes into

play when there are substantive issues relating to a contract that is
celebrated elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its
parties.21 Philippine courts apply the same, not only with respect to
marriage but to other contracts, in order to determine the law that
is to be applied in resolving disputes that arise as a result thereof.

Applied to this controversy, the marriage between the parties

having been celebrated in the Philippines, is governed by Philippine
laws. The same laws holds true with its incidents and consequences.
Thus, all matters relating to the validity of the contract of marriage,
such as the presence or absence of requisites, forms, or solemnities
are to be judged in relation to the law in which it has been
celebrated or performed.

Along this line, it is useful to state that when the marriage is

celebrated elsewhere, its validity does not depend fully on foreign
law. While accepted in the jurisdiction in which it is celebrated, it
may be held invalid in the Philippines when it falls under the
instances mentioned in par. 1, Article 26 of the Family Code such as
incestuous or bigamous marriages. As well, irrespective of the place
of solemnization of marriage, Philippine laws bind the contracting
Filipino citizen with respect to "family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity"; any controversy arising therefrom
would then have to be determined in accordance with the same
law.22

Herein, it is indubitable that the action relates to the validity of the

marriage celebrated in the Philippines. The petitioner's action assails
the psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the
essential marital obligations. Ultimately, therefore, the result of the
action would have an effect on the personal status of the
respondent. With this, there is no reason to foreclose the
petitioner's right to institute the instant petition for nullity of
marriage.

Legal capacity to sue or the capacity to institute legal action is

governed by Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under
which, "[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action." The absence of legal capacity
to sue indicates the general disability of a plaintiff to sue as when a
plaintiff is not in the exercise of his or her civil rights, does not have
the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have
the character or representation; which may be on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality, or
other similar grounds for disqualification.23

Lack of capacity to sue is distinguished from lack of legal personality

to sue while the former refers to the general disqualification of a
plaintiff to institute an action, the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party in interest. As defined under Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." A real party
in interest is one who possesses a substantial interest in the case as
a result of breach of a legal right.24

Both "lack of legal capacity to sue" and "lack of legal personality" to

sue are affirmative defenses.25 In the first, the ground is "that the
plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue,"26 while in the second, the
ground is based on the fact "that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action."27

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the petitioner has both the
legal capacity and personality to sue. His legal personality proceeds
from the fact that it is his marriage to the respondent, which, in
turn, relates to his civil status, that stands to be affected by the
petition for nullity that he instituted. He has legal personality in the
action as he has personal and material interest in the result of the
action.28

With respect to his legal capacity to sue, the statement as to who

may institute an action a petition for nullity of marriage does not
distinguish between citizens of the Philippines and foreigners.
Section 2 of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity

of void marriages.
 1. Who may file. - A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.

The provision is clear in that either of the contracting parties may

file a petition to declare the marriage void. It is a basic rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. No distinction should be made in the
application of the law where none has been indicated. Courts can
only interpret the law; it cannot read into the law what is not
written therein.29

In view of the foregoing, therefore, the RTC should not have

dismissed the case on the absence of the petitioner's legal capacity
to sue. By doing so, it failed to resolve factual issues necessary to
resolve whether or not the marriage between the parties should be
nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity. Considering that
a petition for review on certiorari is limited to questions of law and
the Court is not a trier of facts, the remand of this case to the RTC
for the proper resolution of this case on the merits is most
appropriate.